[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 67 (Wednesday, May 22, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4711-S4716]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. DOMENICI (for himself, Mr. Biden, Mr. Lugar, Ms. Landrieu, 
        Mr. Hagel, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Murkowski, and Ms. Mikulski):
  S. 2545. A bill to extend and improve United States programs on the 
proliferation of nuclear materials, and for other purposes; to the 
Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise to introduce a new bill, the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 2002. Senators Biden, Lugar, Landrieu, 
Hagel, Murkowski and Bingaman--the junior Senator from my State--join 
me in cosponsoring this important piece of legislation.
  The end of the Soviet Union in 1991 started a chain of events, which 
in the long term can lead to vastly improved global stability. Concerns 
about global confrontations were greatly reduced after that event.
  But with that event, the Soviet system of guards, guns, and a highly 
regimented society that had effectively controlled their weapons of 
mass destruction, along with the materials and expertise to create 
them, was significantly weakened. Even today, with Russia's economy 
well on the road to recovery, there's still plenty of room for concerns 
about the security of these Russian assets.
  The tragic events of September 11 brought the United States into the 
world of international terrorism, a world from which we had been very 
sheltered. Even with the successes of the subsequent war on terrorism, 
there's still ample reason for concern that the forces of Al Qaeda and 
other international terrorists are seeking other avenues to disrupt 
peaceful societies around the world.
  In some sense, the events of September 11 set a new gruesome standard 
against which terrorists may measure their future successes. There 
should be no question that these groups would use weapons of mass 
destruction if they could acquire them and deliver them here or to 
countless other international locations.
  One of our strongest allies in the current war on terrorism has been 
the Russian Federation. Assistance from the Russians and other states 
of the former Soviet Union has been vital in many aspects of the 
conflict in Afghanistan.
  President Putin and President Bush have forged a strong working 
relationship, and the current summit meeting is another measure of 
interest in increased cooperation. As this new bill seeks to strengthen 
our nonproliferation programs, it provides many options for actions to 
be conducted through joint partnerships between the Russian Federation 
and the United States that build on this increased cooperative spirit.
  The Nunn-Lugar program of 1991 and the Nunn-Lugar Domenici 
legislation of 1996 provided vital support for cooperative programs to 
reduce the risks that weapons of mass destruction might become 
available to terrorists. They established a framework for cooperative 
progress that has served our nation and the world very well. But 
despite their successes, there remain many actions that should be taken 
to further reduce these threats.
  The report by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler is one of the most 
comprehensive calls for increased attention to these risks. That 
report, which was written well before September 11, and many others 
have suggested additional actions that could and should be taken beyond 
the two original bills.
  One of the most important realizations from September 11 concerns the 
global reach of the forces of terrorism. It's now clear that our 
nuclear nonproliferation programs should extend far beyond the states 
of the former Soviet Union.
  This new bill expands and strengthens many of the programs 
established earlier, to further reduce threats to global peace. It 
expands the scope of several programs to world-wide coverage. It 
focuses on threats of a nuclear or radiological type, which fall within 
the expertise of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the 
Department of Energy.
  It expands programs to include the safety and security of nuclear 
facilities and radioactive materials around the world, wherever 
countries are willing to enter into cooperative arrangements for threat 
reduction. It recognizes that devices that disperse radioactive 
materials, so-called ``dirty bombs,'' can represent a real threat to 
modern societies.
  Dirty bombs could be used as weapons of mass terror, property 
contamination, and economic disaster. We need better detection systems 
for the presence of dirty bombs that are appropriate to the wide range 
of delivery systems for such a weapon, from trucks to boats to 
containers. And we need to be far better prepared to deal with the 
consequences of such an attack.
  The new legislation includes provisions to accelerate and expand 
existing programs for disposition of fissile materials. These 
materials, of course, represent not only a concern with dirty bombs, 
but also the even larger threat of use in crude nuclear weapons.
  It includes a program that should help accelerate the conversion of 
highly enriched uranium into forms unusable for weapons. It addresses 
one of the major concerns associated with this material, that both the 
United States in the Atoms for Peace program as well as the Soviet 
Union, provided highly enriched uranium to many countries as fuel for 
research reactors. That fuel represents a proliferation risk today.
  It authorizes new programs for global management of nuclear 
materials, in cooperation with other nations and with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. It recognizes that modern societies use 
radioactive materials as essential tools in many ways, and offers 
assistance in providing new controls on the most dangerous of these 
materials.
  It suggests that many of the program elements involve international 
cooperation with the Russian Federation and with other nations. In 
fact, it recognizes that the global nature of the current threats 
requires such cooperation, and provides authorizations for the 
Secretary of Energy and Secretary of State to offer significant help to 
other nations. In many cases, we cannot accomplish these programs 
without such cooperation.
  This new bill includes provisions extending the first responder 
training programs, originally created under Nunn-Lugar-Domenici. These 
programs have already made real contributions. In fact, the training 
provided under this program in New York City helped mitigate the 
catastrophe there on September 11. That program was authorized for only 
5 years in the original legislation. This bill extends that 
authorization for another 10 years for first responder preparation in 
various communities and cities of America.
  The new bill requires annual reports demonstrating that all our 
nonproliferation programs are well coordinated and integrated. 
Countless reports have called for improved coordination of all federal 
nonproliferation programs. The original call for this coordination in 
the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation was completely ignored by the 
Clinton administration.
  The report requires an annual statement of the extent of coordination 
between federally funded and private activities. That is very 
important, because of the important work being done by private 
organizations, like the Nuclear Threat Initiative, that are providing 
critical assistance toward similar nonproliferation goals.
  With this new bill, our programs to counter threats of nuclear and 
radiological terrorism will be significantly strengthened and risks to 
the United States and our international partners can be greatly 
reduced.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2545

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Nonproliferation Act 
     of 2002''.

[[Page S4712]]

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Whereas the focus on the security of radioactive 
     materials before the events of September 11, 2001, was on 
     fissile materials, it is now widely recognized that the 
     United States must expand its concerns to the safety and 
     security of nuclear facilities, and the radioactive materials 
     in use or stored at such facilities, that may be attractive 
     to terrorists for use in radiological dispersal devices as 
     well as in crude nuclear weapons. Such materials include all 
     radioactive materials in the nuclear fuel cycle (such as 
     nuclear waste and spent fuel) as well as industrial and 
     medical radiation sources. Steps must be taken not only to 
     prevent the acquisition of such materials by terrorists, but 
     also to rapidly mitigate the consequences of the use of such 
     devices and weapons on public health and safety, facilities, 
     and the economy.
       (2) The technical activities of United States efforts to 
     combat radiological terrorism should be centered in the 
     National Nuclear Security Administration because it has the 
     nuclear expertise and specialized facilities and activities 
     needed to develop new and improved protection and consequence 
     mitigation systems and technologies. New technologies and 
     systems should be developed by the Administration in 
     partnership with other agencies and first responders that 
     also have the operational responsibility to deal with the 
     threat of radiological terrorism.
       (3) Fissile materials are a special class of materials that 
     present a range of threats, from utilization in improvised 
     nuclear devices to incorporation in radiological dispersal 
     devices. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 
     of 1996 (title XIV of Public Law 104-201; 50 U.S.C. 2301 et 
     seq.) focused on cooperative programs with the former Soviet 
     Union to control such materials. It is critical that these 
     efforts continue and that efforts commence to develop a 
     sustainable system by which improvements in such efforts are 
     retained far into the future. Development of such a 
     sustainable system must occur in partnership with the Russian 
     Federation and the other states of the former Soviet Union.
       (4) The Russian Federation and the other states of the 
     former Soviet Union are not the only locations of fissile 
     materials around the world. Cooperative programs to control 
     potential threats from any of such materials should be 
     expanded to other international partners. Programs, 
     coordinated with the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
     other international partners, should be initiated to optimize 
     control of such materials.
       (5) The Agreement Between the Government of the United 
     States of America and the Government of the Russian 
     Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched 
     Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington 
     on February 18, 1993 (the so-called ``HEU deal''), represents 
     an effective approach to reducing the stocks of the Russian 
     Federation of highly enriched uranium (HEU). However, such 
     stocks are much larger than contemplated in the Agreement, 
     and many other nations also possess quantities of highly 
     enriched uranium. Global stability would be enhanced by 
     modification of all available highly enriched uranium into 
     forms not suitable for weapons. Efforts toward such 
     modification of highly enriched uranium should include 
     expansion of programs to deal with research reactors fueled 
     by highly enriched uranium, which were provided by the United 
     States under the Atoms for Peace program and the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 and similarly encouraged by the former 
     Soviet Union.
       (6) Expansion of commercial nuclear power around the world 
     will lead to increasing global stocks of reactor grade 
     plutonium and fission products in spent fuel. If improperly 
     controlled, such materials can contribute to proliferation 
     and represent health and environmental risks. The 
     international safeguards on such materials established 
     through the International Atomic Energy Agency must be 
     strengthened to deal with such concerns. The National Nuclear 
     Security Administration is the appropriate Federal agent for 
     dealing with technical matters relating to the safeguard and 
     management of nuclear materials. The United States, in 
     cooperation with the Russian Federation and the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency, should lead the international community 
     in developing proliferation-resistant nuclear energy 
     technologies and strengthened international safeguards that 
     facilitate global management of all nuclear materials.
       (7) Safety and security at nuclear facilities are 
     inextricably linked. Damage to such facilities by sabotage or 
     accident, or the theft or diversion of nuclear materials at 
     such facilities, will have substantial adverse consequences 
     worldwide. It is in the United States national interest to 
     assist countries that cannot afford proper safety and 
     security for their nuclear plants, facilities, and materials 
     in providing proper safety and security for such plants, 
     facilities, and materials, and in developing the sustainable 
     safety and security cultures that are required for the safe 
     and secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The 
     National Nuclear Security Administration is the appropriate 
     Federal agent for dealing with the technical aspects of 
     providing for international nuclear safety that must be 
     coordinated with safeguards of nuclear materials.
       (8) The United States has provided sealed sources of 
     nuclear materials to many countries through the Atoms for 
     Peace program and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. These 
     sources remain property of the United States. A recent report 
     of the Inspector General of the Department of Energy, 
     entitled ``Accounting for Sealed Sources of Nuclear Material 
     Provided to Foreign Countries'', noted that a total of 2-3 
     kilograms of plutonium were in sources provided to 33 nations 
     and that the Department can not account fully for these 
     sources. Many of these sources are small enough to present 
     little risk, but a careful review of sources and recipients 
     could identify concerns requiring special attention. In 
     addition, the former Soviet Union supplied sealed sources of 
     nuclear materials for research and industrial purposes, 
     including some to other countries. These sources contain a 
     variety of radioactive materials and are often uncontrolled, 
     missing, or stolen. The problem of dangerous radiation 
     sources is international, and a solution to the problem will 
     require substantial cooperation between the United States, 
     the Russian Federation, and other countries of the former 
     Soviet Union, as well as international organizations such as 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency. The International 
     Nuclear Safety and Cooperation program and the Materials 
     Protection, Control, and Accounting program of the National 
     Nuclear Security Administration address such matters. However 
     those programs need to be strengthened.
       (9) Authorization for domestic testing of preparedness for 
     emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, and 
     biological weapons provided by section 1415 of the Defense 
     Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 
     2315) has expired. These tests have been invaluable in 
     preparing first responders for a range of potential threats 
     and should be continued.
       (10) Coordination of all Federal nonproliferation programs 
     should be improved to maximize efficiency and effectiveness 
     of programs in multiple agencies. Congress needs a 
     comprehensive annual report detailing the nonproliferation 
     policies, strategies, and budgets of the Federal Government. 
     Cooperation among Federal and private non-proliferation 
     programs is critical to maximize the benefits of such 
     programs.
       (11) The United States response to terrorism must be as 
     rapid as possible. In carrying out their antiterrorism 
     activities, the departments and agencies of the Federal 
     Government, and State and local governments, need rapid 
     access to the specialized expertise and facilities at the 
     national laboratories and sites of the Department of Energy. 
     Multiple agency sponsorship of these important national 
     assets would help achieve this objective.

     SEC. 3. TESTING OF PREPAREDNESS FOR EMERGENCIES INVOLVING 
                   NUCLEAR, RADIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, OR BIOLOGICAL 
                   WEAPONS.

       (a) Extension of Testing.--Section 1415 of the Defense 
     Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of 
     Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2720; 50 U.S.C. 2315) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``of five successive 
     fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 1997'' and inserting 
     ``of fiscal years 1997 through 2013''; and
       (2) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``of five successive 
     fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 1997'' and inserting 
     ``of fiscal years 1997 through 2013''.
       (b) Construction of Extension with Designation of Attorney 
     General as Lead Official.--The amendment made by subsection 
     (a) may not be construed as modifying the designation of the 
     President entitled ``Designation of the Attorney General as 
     the Lead Official for the Emergency Response Assistance 
     Program Under Sections 1412 and 1415 of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997'', dated April 6, 
     2000, designating the Attorney General to assume programmatic 
     and funding responsibilities for the Emergency Response 
     Assistance Program under sections 1412 and 1415 of the 
     Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996.

     SEC. 4. PROGRAM ON TECHNOLOGY FOR PROTECTION FROM NUCLEAR OR 
                   RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM.

       (a) Program Required.--(1) The Administrator for Nuclear 
     Security shall carry out a program on technology for 
     protection from nuclear or radiological terrorism, including 
     technology for the detection, identification, assessment, 
     control, disposition, consequence management, and consequence 
     mitigation of the dispersal of radiological materials or of 
     nuclear terrorism.
       (2) The Administrator shall carry out the program as part 
     of the nonproliferation and verification research and 
     development programs of the National Nuclear Security 
     Administration.
       (b) Program Elements.--In carrying out the program required 
     by subsection (a), the Administrator shall--
       (1) provide for the development of technologies to respond 
     to threats or incidents involving nuclear or radiological 
     terrorism in the United States;
       (2) demonstrate applications of the technologies developed 
     under paragraph (1), including joint demonstrations with the 
     Office of Homeland Security and other appropriate Federal 
     agencies;
       (3) provide, where feasible, for the development in 
     cooperation with the Russian Federation of technologies to 
     respond to nuclear or radiological terrorism in the former 
     states of the Soviet Union, including the

[[Page S4713]]

     demonstration of technologies so developed; and
       (4) provide, where feasible, assistance to other countries 
     on matters relating to nuclear or radiological terrorism, 
     including--
       (A) the provision of technology and assistance on means of 
     addressing nuclear or radiological incidents;
       (B) the provision of assistance in developing means for the 
     safe disposal of radioactive materials;
       (C) in coordination with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
     the provision of assistance in developing the regulatory 
     framework for licensing and developing programs for the 
     protection and control of radioactive sources; and
       (D) the provision of assistance in evaluating the 
     radiological sources identified as not under current 
     accounting programs in the report of the Inspector General of 
     the Department of Energy entitled ``Accounting for Sealed 
     Sources of Nuclear Material Provided to Foreign Countries'', 
     and in identifying and controlling radiological sources that 
     represent significant risks.
       (c) Requirements for International Elements of Program.--
     (1) In carrying out activities in accordance with paragraphs 
     (3) and (4) of subsection (b), the Administrator shall 
     consult with--
       (A) the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and 
     Secretary of Commerce; and
       (B) the International Atomic Energy Agency.
       (2) The Administrator shall encourage joint leadership 
     between the United States and the Russian Federation of 
     activities on the development of technologies under 
     subsection (b)(4).
       (d) Incorporation of Results in Emergency Response 
     Assistance Program.--To the maximum extent practicable, the 
     technologies and information developed under the program 
     required by subsection (a) shall be incorporated into the 
     program on responses to emergencies involving nuclear and 
     radiological weapons carried out under section 1415 of the 
     Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 
     (title XIV of Public Law 104-201; 50 U.S.C. 2315).
       (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Department of Energy for the 
     National Nuclear Security Administration to carry out 
     activities under this section amounts as follows:
       (1) For fiscal year 2003, $40,000,000.
       (2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2003, such sums 
     as may be necessary in such fiscal year.

     SEC. 5. EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS PROTECTION, 
                   CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING PROGRAM.

       (a) Expansion of Program to Additional Countries 
     Authorized.--The Secretary of Energy may expand the 
     International Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting 
     (MPC&A) program of the Department of Energy to encompass 
     countries outside the Russian Federation and the independent 
     states of the former Soviet Union.
       (b) Notice to Congress of Use of Funds for Additional 
     Countries.--Not later than 30 days after the Secretary 
     obligates funds for the International Materials Protection, 
     Control, and Accounting program, as expanded under subsection 
     (a), for activities in or with respect to a country outside 
     the Russian Federation and the independent states of the 
     former Soviet Union, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a 
     notice of the obligation of such funds for such activities.
       (c) Assistance to Department of State for Nuclear Materials 
     Safeguards Programs.--(1) As part of the International 
     Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program, the 
     Secretary of Energy may provide technical assistance to the 
     Secretary of State in the efforts of the Secretary of State 
     to assist other nuclear weapons states to review and improve 
     their nuclear materials safeguards programs.
       (2) The technical assistance provided under paragraph (1) 
     may include the sharing of technology or methodologies to the 
     states referred to in that paragraph. Any such sharing 
     shall--
       (A) be consistent with the treaty obligations of the United 
     States; and
       (B) take into account the sovereignty of the state 
     concerned and its weapons programs, as well the sensitivity 
     of any information involved regarding United States weapons 
     or weapons systems.
       (3) The Secretary of Energy may include the Russian 
     Federation in activities under paragraph (1) if the Secretary 
     determines that the experience of the Russian Federation 
     under the International Materials Protection, Control, and 
     Accounting program with the Russian Federation would make the 
     participation of the Russian Federation in such activities 
     useful in providing technical assistance under that 
     paragraph.
       (d) Plan for Accelerated Conversion or Return of Weapons-
     Usable Nuclear Materials.--(1) The Secretary shall build on 
     efforts to accelerate the conversion or return to the country 
     of origin of all weapons-usable nuclear materials located in 
     research reactors and other facilities outside the country of 
     origin.
       (2) The plan under paragraph (1) for nuclear materials of 
     origin in the Soviet Union shall be developed in consultation 
     with the Russian Federation.
       (3) As part of the plan under paragraph (1), the Secretary 
     shall assist the research reactors and facilities referred to 
     in that paragraph in upgrading their materials protection, 
     control, and accounting procedures until the weapons-usable 
     nuclear materials in such reactors and facilities are 
     converted or returned in accordance with that paragraph.
       (4) The provision of assistance under paragraph (3) shall 
     be closely coordinated with ongoing efforts of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency for the same purpose.
       (e) Radiological Dispersal Device Protection, Control, and 
     Accounting.--(1) The Secretary shall establish within the 
     International Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting 
     program a program on the protection, control, and accounting 
     of materials usable in radiological dispersal devices.
       (2) The program under paragraph (1) shall include--
       (A) an identification of vulnerabilities regarding 
     radiological materials worldwide;
       (B) the mitigation of vulnerabilities so identified through 
     appropriate security enhancements; and
       (C) an acceleration of efforts to recover and control so-
     called ``orphaned'' radiological sources.
       (3) The program under paragraph (1) shall be known as the 
     Radiological Dispersal Device Protection, Control, and 
     Accounting program.
       (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Department of Energy to carry out 
     activities under this section amounts as follows:
       (1) For fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000.
       (2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2003, such sums 
     as may be necessary in such fiscal year.

     SEC. 6. ACCELERATED DISPOSITION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM 
                   AND PLUTONIUM.

       (a) Program Authorized.--(1) The Secretary of Energy may 
     carry out a program to pursue with the Russian Federation, 
     and any other nation that possesses highly enriched uranium, 
     options for blending such uranium so that the concentration 
     of U-235 in such uranium is below 20 percent.
       (2) The options pursued under paragraph (1) shall include 
     expansion of the Material Consolidation and Conversion 
     program of the Department of Energy to include--
       (A) additional facilities for the blending of highly 
     enriched uranium; and
       (B) additional centralized secure storage facilities for 
     highly enriched uranium, as so blended.
       (b) Incentives Regarding Highly Enriched Uranium in 
     Russia.--As part of the options pursued under subsection (a) 
     with the Russian Federation, the Secretary may provide 
     financial and other incentives for the removal of all highly 
     enriched uranium from any particular facility in the Russian 
     Federation if the Secretary determines that such incentives 
     will facilitate the consolidation of highly enriched uranium 
     in the Russian Federation to the best-secured facilities.
       (c) Construction with HEU Disposition Agreement.--Nothing 
     in this section may be construed as terminating, modifying, 
     or otherwise effecting requirements for the disposition of 
     highly enriched uranium under the Agreement Between the 
     Government of the United States of America and the Government 
     of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of 
     Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, 
     signed at Washington on February 18, 1993.
       (d) Priority in Blending Activities.--In pursuing options 
     under this section, the Secretary shall give priority to the 
     blending of highly enriched uranium from weapons, though 
     highly enriched uranium from sources other than weapons may 
     also be blended.
       (e) Transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium to 
     United States.--(1) As part of the program under subsection 
     (a), the Secretary may, upon the request of any nation--
       (A) purchase highly enriched uranium or weapons grade 
     plutonium from the nation at a price determined by the 
     Secretary;
       (B) transport any uranium or plutonium so purchased to the 
     United States; and
       (C) store any uranium or plutonium so transported in the 
     United States.
       (2) The Secretary is not required to blend any highly 
     enriched uranium purchased under paragraph (1)(A) in order to 
     reduce the concentration of U-235 in such uranium to below 20 
     percent. Amounts authorized to be appropriated by subsection 
     (m) may not be used for purposes of blending such uranium.
       (f) Transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium to Russia.--(1) As 
     part of the program under subsection (a), the Secretary may 
     encourage nations with highly enriched uranium to transfer 
     such uranium to the Russian Federation for disposition under 
     this section.
       (2) The Secretary shall pay any nation that transfers 
     highly enriched uranium to the Russian Federation under this 
     subsection an amount determined appropriate by the Secretary.
       (3) The Secretary shall bear the cost of any blending and 
     storage of uranium transferred to the Russian Federation 
     under this subsection, including any costs of blending and 
     storage under a contract under subsection (g).
       (g) Contracts for Blending and Storage of Highly Enriched 
     Uranium in Russia.--As part of the program under subsection 
     (a), the Secretary may enter into one or more contracts with 
     the Russian Federation--
       (1) to blend in the Russian Federation highly enriched 
     uranium of the Russian Federation and highly enriched uranium 
     transferred to the Russian Federation under subsection (f); 
     or

[[Page S4714]]

       (2) to store the blended material in the Russian 
     Federation.
       (h) Limitation on Release for Sale of Blended Uranium.--
     Uranium blended under this section may not be released for 
     sale until the earlier of--
       (1) January 1, 2014; or
       (2) the date on which the Secretary certifies that such 
     uranium can be absorbed into the global market without undue 
     disruption to the uranium mining industry in the United 
     States.
       (i) Proceeds of Sale of Uranium Blended by Russia.--Upon 
     the sale by the Russian Federation of uranium blended under 
     this section by the Russian Federation, the Secretary may 
     elect to receive from the proceeds of such sale an amount not 
     to exceed 75 percent of the costs incurred by the Department 
     of Energy under subsections (b), (f), and (g).
       (j) Report on Status of Program.--Not later than July 1, 
     2003, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     status of the program carried out under the authority in 
     subsection (a). The report shall include--
       (1) a description of international interest in the program;
       (2) schedules and operational details of the program; and
       (3) recommendations for future funding for the program.
       (k) Disposition of Plutonium in Russia.--(1) The Secretary 
     may assist the Russian Federation in any fiscal year with the 
     plutonium disposition program of the Russian Federation (as 
     established under the agreement referred to in paragraph (2)) 
     if the President certifies to Congress at the beginning of 
     such fiscal year that the United States and the Russian 
     Federation have entered into a binding agreement on the 
     disposition of the weapons grade plutonium of the Russian 
     Federation.
       (2) The agreement referred to in this paragraph is the 
     Agreement Between the Government of the United States of 
     America and the Government of the Russian Federation 
     Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium 
     Designated As No Longer Required For Defense Purposes and 
     Related Cooperation, signed August 29, 2000, and September 1, 
     2000.
       (3) The program under paragraph (1)--
       (A) shall include transparent verifiable steps;
       (B) shall proceed at roughly the rate of the United States 
     program for the disposition of plutonium;
       (C) shall provide for cost-sharing among a variety of 
     countries;
       (D) shall provide for contributions by the Russian 
     Federation;
       (E) shall include steps over the near term to provide high 
     confidence that the schedules for the disposition of 
     plutonium of the Russian Federation will be achieved; and
       (F) may include research on more speculative long-term 
     options for the future disposition of the plutonium of the 
     Russian Federation in addition to the near-term steps under 
     subparagraph (E).
       (l) Highly Enriched Uranium Defined.--In this section, the 
     term ``highly enriched uranium'' means uranium with a 
     concentration of U-235 of 20 percent or more.
       (m) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Department of Energy to carry out 
     activities under this section amounts as follows:
       (1) For fiscal year 2003--
       (A) for activities under subsections (a) through (i), 
     $100,000,000; and
       (B) for activities under subsection (k), $200,000,000.
       (2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2003, such sums 
     as may be necessary in such fiscal year for activities under 
     subsection (a) through (i).

     SEC. 7. STRENGTHENED INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS FOR NUCLEAR 
                   MATERIALS AND SAFETY FOR NUCLEAR OPERATIONS.

       (a) Report on Options for International Program To 
     Strengthen Safeguards and Safety.--(1) Not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Administrator for Nuclear Security shall submit to Congress a 
     report on options for an international program to develop 
     strengthened safeguards for all nuclear materials and safety 
     for nuclear operations.
       (2) Each option for an international program under 
     paragraph (1) may provide that the program is jointly led by 
     the United States, the Russian Federation, and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency.
       (3) The Administrator shall include with the report on 
     options for an international program under paragraph (1) a 
     description and assessment of various management alternatives 
     for the international program. If any option requires Federal 
     funding or legislation to implement, the report shall also 
     include recommendations for such funding or legislation, as 
     the case may be.
       (b) Joint Programs with Russia on Proliferation Resistant 
     Nuclear Technologies.--The Administrator shall pursue with 
     the Russian Federation joint programs between the United 
     States and the Russian Federation on proliferation resistant 
     nuclear technologies.
       (c) Participation of Office of Nuclear Energy Science.--The 
     Administrator shall consult with the Office of Nuclear Energy 
     Science and Technology of the Department of Energy in the 
     development of options under subsection (a) and joint 
     programs under (b).
       (d) Participation of International Technical Experts.--In 
     developing options under subsection (a), the Administrator 
     shall, in consultation with the Russian Federation and the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency, convene and consult with 
     an appropriate group of international technical experts on 
     the development of various options for technologies to 
     provide strengthened safeguards for nuclear materials and 
     safety for nuclear operations, including the implementation 
     of such options.
       (e) Assistance Regarding Hostile Insiders and Aircraft 
     Impacts.--(1) The Secretary of Energy may, utilizing 
     appropriate expertise of the Department of Energy, provide 
     assistance to nuclear facilities abroad on the interdiction 
     of hostile insiders at such facilities in order to prevent 
     incidents arising from the disablement of the vital systems 
     of such facilities.
       (2) The Secretary may carry out a joint program with the 
     Russian Federation and other countries to address and 
     mitigate concerns on the impact of aircraft with nuclear 
     facilities in such countries.
       (f) Assistance to IAEA in Strengthening International 
     Nuclear Safeguards.--The Secretary may expand and accelerate 
     the programs of the Department of Energy to support the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency in strengthening 
     international nuclear safeguards.
       (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is hereby 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Department of Energy to 
     carry out activities under this section amounts as follows:
       (1) For fiscal year 2003--
       (A) for activities under subsections (a) through (e), 
     $20,000,000, of which $5,000,000 shall be available for 
     sabotage protection for nuclear power plants and other 
     nuclear facilities abroad; and
       (B) for activities under subsection (f), $30,000,000.
       (2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2003, such sums 
     as may be necessary in such fiscal year.

     SEC. 8. EXPORT CONTROL PROGRAMS.

       (a) Authority To Pursue Options for Strengthening Export 
     Control Programs.--The Secretary of Energy may pursue in the 
     former Soviet Union and other regions of concern, principally 
     in South Asia, the Middle East, and the Far East, options for 
     accelerating programs that assist countries in such regions 
     in improving their domestic export control programs for 
     materials, technologies, and expertise relevant to the 
     construction or use of a nuclear or radiological dispersal 
     device.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Department of Energy to carry out 
     activities under this section amounts as follows:
       (1) For fiscal year 2003, $5,000,000.
       (2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2003, such sums 
     as may be necessary in such fiscal year.

     SEC. 9. IMPROVEMENTS TO NUCLEAR MATERIALS PROTECTION, 
                   CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING PROGRAM OF THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       (a) Revised Focus for Program.--(1) The Secretary of Energy 
     shall work cooperatively with the Russian Federation to 
     update and improve the Joint Action Plan for the Materials 
     Protection, Control, and Accounting programs of the 
     Department and the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic 
     Energy.
       (2) The updated plan shall shift the focus of the upgrades 
     of the nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting 
     program of the Russian Federation in order to assist the 
     Russian Federation in achieving, as soon as practicable but 
     not later than January 1, 2012, a sustainable safeguards 
     system for the nuclear materials of the Russian Federation 
     that is supported solely by the Russian Federation.
       (b) Pace of Program.--The Secretary shall work with the 
     Russian Federation, including applicable institutes in 
     Russia, to pursue acceleration of the nuclear materials 
     protection, control, and accounting programs at nuclear 
     defense facilities in the Russian Federation.
       (c) Transparency of Program.--(1) The Secretary shall work 
     with the Russian Federation to identify various alternatives 
     to provide the United States adequate transparency in the 
     nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting program 
     of the Russian Federation to assure that such program is 
     meeting applicable goals for nuclear materials protection, 
     control, and accounting.
       (2) The alternatives identified under paragraph (1) may not 
     include full intrusive access to sensitive facilities in the 
     Russian Federation.
       (d) Sense of Congress.--In furtherance of the activities 
     required under this section, it is the sense of Congress the 
     Secretary should--
       (1) improve the partnership with the Russian Ministry of 
     Atomic Energy in order to enhance the pace and effectiveness 
     of nuclear materials safeguards at facilities in the Russian 
     Federation, including serial production enterprises; and
       (2) clearly identify the assistance required by the Russian 
     Federation, the contributions anticipated from the Russian 
     Federation, and the transparency milestones that can be used 
     to assess progress in meeting the requirements of this 
     section.

     SEC. 10. COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS OF ALL 
                   UNITED STATES NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES.

       Section 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2002 (Public

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     Law 107-107; 115 Stat. 1247) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Annual Report on Implementation of Plan.--(1) Not 
     later than January 31, 2003, and each year thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     implementation of the plan required by subsection (a) during 
     the preceding year.
       ``(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall include--
       ``(A) a discussion of any progress made during the year 
     covered by such report in the matters of the plan required by 
     subsection (a);
       ``(B) a discussion of any consultations with foreign 
     nations, and in particular the Russian Federation, during 
     such year on joint programs to implement the plan;
       ``(C) a discussion of any cooperation and coordination 
     during such year in the implementation of the plan between 
     the United States and private entities that share objectives 
     similar to the objectives of the plan; and
       ``(D) any recommendations that the President considers 
     appropriate regarding modifications to law or regulations, or 
     to the administration or organization of any Federal 
     department or agency, in order to improve the effectiveness 
     of any programs carried out during such year in the 
     implementation of the plan.''.

     SEC. 11. UTILIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL 
                   LABORATORIES AND SITES IN SUPPORT OF 
                   ANTITERRORISM ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Agencies as Joint Sponsors of Laboratories for Work on 
     Antiterrorism.--Each department or agency of the Federal 
     Government, or of a State or local government, that carries 
     out work on antiterrorism activities at a Department of 
     Energy national laboratory shall be a joint sponsor, under a 
     multiple agency sponsorship arrangement with the Department, 
     of such laboratory in the performance of such work.
       (b) Agencies as Joint Sponsors of Sites for Work on 
     Antiterrorism.--Each department or agency of the Federal 
     Government, or of a State or local government, that carries 
     out work on antiterrorism activities at a Department site 
     shall be a joint sponsor of such site in the performance of 
     such work as if such site were a federally funded research 
     and development center and such work were performed under a 
     multiple agency sponsorship arrangement with the Department.
       (c) Primary Sponsorship.--The Department of Energy shall be 
     the primary sponsor under a multiple agency sponsorship 
     arrangement required under subsection (a) or (b).
       (d) Work.--(1) The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall 
     act as the lead agent in coordinating the submittal to a 
     Department national laboratory or site of requests for work 
     on antiterrorism matters by departments and agencies that are 
     joint sponsors of such national laboratory or center, as the 
     case may be, under this section.
       (2) A request for work may not be submitted to a national 
     laboratory or site under this section unless approved in 
     advance by the Administrator.
       (3) Any work performed by a national laboratory or site 
     under this section shall comply with the policy on the use of 
     federally funded research and development centers under 
     section 35.017(a)(4) of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
       (4) The Administrator shall ensure that the work of a 
     national laboratory or site requested under this section is 
     performed expeditiously and to the satisfaction of the head 
     of the department or agency submitting the request.
       (e) Funding.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a joint sponsor 
     of a national laboratory or site under this section shall 
     provide funds for work of such center or site, as the case 
     may be, under this section under the same terms and 
     conditions as apply to the primary sponsor of such center 
     under section 303(b)(1)(C) of the Federal Property and 
     Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 253(b)(1)(C)) 
     or of such site to the extent such section applies to such 
     site as a federally funded research and development center by 
     reason of subsection (b).
       (2) The total amount of funds provided a national 
     laboratory or site in a fiscal year under this subsection by 
     joint sponsors other than the Department of Energy shall not 
     exceed an amount equal to 25 percent of the total funds 
     provided such center or site, as the case may be, in such 
     fiscal year from all sources.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the world is a dangerous place, and the 
United States is not immune to those dangers. In just the last few 
days, we have heard warnings that suicide bombers will mount attacks in 
the United States and that terrorist groups will inevitably obtain 
weapons of mass destruction from rogue states.
  My own greatest concern is that rogue states or terrorist groups may 
obtain nuclear weapons, or the means to produce them, from the former 
Soviet Union, where less-than-adequate security and under-employed 
weapons scientists coexist with the world's largest stockpile of excess 
fissile material. We know that both rogues and terrorists are 
attempting to exploit the instability in that region in order to gain 
weapons of mass destruction.
  Some Russians have been caught stealing radioactive, or even fissile, 
material. And witnesses at two Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
warned that even modestly capable terrorists could convert stolen 
highly enriched uranium into enormously destructive improvised nuclear 
devices.
  But I do not share the view that proliferation of nuclear weapons is 
inevitable. The United States has had real successes in nuclear 
nonproliferation and there is every reason to think that we can build 
on that record.
  Thanks to the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the 
countries of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine gave up their nuclear 
weapons.
  Thanks to the Materials Protection, Control and Accounting program, 
many Russian facilities have improved their security for fissile 
materiel.
  Thanks to our fissile material disposition programs, the United 
States and Russia will each demilitarize 34 metric tons of excess 
plutonium, and Russia will downblended 500 metric tons of high-enriched 
uranium into low-enriched fuel for nuclear power reactors.
  Thanks to several U.S. programs, thousands of under-employed weapons 
scientists in the former Soviet Union have obtained at least part-time 
employment in new, socially useful endeavors.
  These programs point the way to how we can speed up the day when 
rogue states and terrorists will find the doors closed to them when 
they seek dangerous materials or technology from the former Soviet 
Union. The administration told many months to review these programs 
last year, but that review led it to the absolutely correct conclusions 
that the programs are vital to our national security and that nearly 
all of them should be expanded. The problem now is that we are still 
not doing nearly enough. The President's budget request for fiscal year 
2003 would maintain our nonproliferation assistance programs, but not 
significantly increase them.
  The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 2002 takes important steps to 
expand these programs, and I am proud to co-sponsor this legislation. 
Senator Domenici to be both commended and supported for drafting this 
bill. I am also delighted to be joined by Senators Lugar and Hagel from 
the Foreign Relations Committee, Senators Landrieu and Bingaman from 
the Armed Services Committee, and Senator Murkowski, who has paid 
particular attention to Russian nuclear problems.
  The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 2002 will lead to greater levels 
of effort--and, I believe, greater levels of achievement--in several 
areas. For example, it authorizes $40 million for a new research, 
development, and demonstration program to help respond to nuclear or 
radiological terrorism. Some of these funds would also help other 
nations to better regulate the protection and control of radiological 
sources, to prevent any diversion to terrorists. Some of the funds will 
go to new technologies to detect radioactive and fissile materials 
being smuggled into the United States. And some will support work with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency to improve international 
safeguards for nuclear materials and operations.
  It authorizes up to $300 million to accelerate and expand current 
programs to blend down highly enriched uranium (HEU) into reactorgrade 
material which cannot explode and to dispose of plutonium in Russia. 
This provision also allows for HEU purchases from other countries.
  It authorizes $20 million for work with the international community 
to develop options for a global program for international safeguards, 
nuclear safety and proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies. This 
includes efforts to improve sabotage protection for nuclear power 
plants and other nuclear facilities overseas.
  These are sensible proposals, and very sensibly priced when one 
considers the magnitude of the threat that they address. Former Senator 
Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler called on us 
last year to devote at least $3,000,000,000 dollars a year to this 
effort. Even with last year's congressionally-mandated budget increases 
and even with this fine bill, we will achieve less than two-thirds of 
that objective.
  But these are important steps, ones that have been vetted with 
experts inside and outside our government. They

[[Page S4716]]

deserve the support of all of us, and they will help build a safer 
world for our children and grandchildren.
                                 ______