[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 67 (Wednesday, May 22, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4688-S4695]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE EXPANSION ACT--Continued

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, what is the matter now before the Senate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 3433.
  Mr. REID. Is that the Reed of Rhode Island amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.


          Amendments Nos. 3456, 3457, 3431, and 3432 Withdrawn

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators Durbin and Boxer, I 
ask unanimous consent that the following amendments be withdrawn: 
Amendments Nos. 3456, 3457, 3431, and 3432.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. GRAMM. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, I am sorry, 
we were having a conference in the cloakroom and I didn't hear.
  Mr. REID. Four amendments are being withdrawn.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, not only do I not object, I concur.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           amendment no. 3443

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I make a point of order against the Reed of 
Rhode Island amendment, No. 3443, that it is not properly drafted.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The point of order is well taken, and the 
amendment falls.


                           Amendment No. 3447

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the next matter 
in order is the Byrd amendment No. 3447; is that right?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The amendment is now 
pending.


                Amendment No. 3527 To Amendment No. 3447

  Mr. REID. Mr. President I call up amendment No. 3527, a second-degree 
amendment to the Byrd amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the second-degree 
amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Nevada [Mr. Reid], for Mr. Hollings, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 3527 to Amendment No. 3447.

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

   (Purpose: To provide for the certification of textile and apparel 
workers who lose their jobs or who have lost their jobs since the start 
   of 1999 as eligible individuals for purposes of trade adjustment 
               assistance and health insurance benefits)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC.  . TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH BENEFITS FOR 
                   TEXTILE AND APPAREL WORKERS.

       (a) In General.--An individual employed in the textile or 
     apparel industry before the date of enactment of this Act 
     who, after December 31, 1998--
       (1) lost, or loses, his or her job (other than by 
     termination for cause); and
       (2) has not been re-employed in that industry, is deemed to 
     be eligible for adjustment assistance under subchapter A of 
     chapter 2 of title II of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 
     2271 et seq.).
       (b) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on the day 
     after the date of enactment of this Act.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, what is the pending question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 3527 to amendment No. 3447.
  Mr. BYRD. Is amendment No. 3447 my amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. BYRD. The pending amendment is the second-degree amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I will speak on the first-degree amendment.
  Mr. President, there can be little doubt that the various agencies of 
the executive branch are increasingly in the driver's seat on the 
important matter of trade. Meanwhile, the Congress and the American 
people are merely being brought along for the ride.
  There are many reasons for this growing inequity, not the least of 
which is the willingness--at times, in fact, the eagerness--of this 
body to give us its rights and responsibilities under the Constitution. 
The Constitution mandates to the legislative branch--the people's 
branch--authority over foreign trade matters. It cannot, however, force 
the institution to exercise this authority and assert itself in trade 
matters. That requires the will of the Members. The lessons we have 
learned from our most recent experiences with trade agreements should 
be incentive enough for us to insist on our rights with regard to trade 
matters. We, after all, represent communities that have lost businesses 
to other countries and families who have lost their jobs to foreign 
firms.
  Yet here we are, once again, considering a measure that further ties 
the hands of the members of this institution in the area of trade. 
Perhaps even worse, we are continuing a trend of blinding ourselves to 
the details of the trade agreements on which we must ultimately vote. 
It is almost as if we don't want to know,
  At the very least, we should do more to lift the veil on trade 
negotiations so that we have some idea as to what it is this Nation is 
signing up to when the agreements go into effect. But to do so we need 
to establish the means for Members to participate more broadly, and in 
more detail, in important trade negotiations, as well as to carry out 
the important oversight functions that our complex trade laws require.
  The fast track bill now before the Senate opens that door. The bill 
establishes the Congressional Oversight Group to serve as an official 
adviser to

[[Page S4689]]

the U.S. Trade Representative on matters that include the formulation 
of specific trade objectives and negotiating strategies, the 
development of new trade agreements, and the enforcement of existing 
trade agreements.
  The establishment of the Congressional Oversight Group is intended to 
help the legislative branch play a more substantial role in trade 
negotiations, but as laid out in this legislation it does not go quite 
far enough.
  As established by the bill, the Congressional Oversight Group will be 
comprised of five Senators, each of whom must serve on the Finance 
Committee, five Members of the House of Representatives, each of whom 
must serve on the Ways and Means Committee, and, on an ad hoc basis, 
the chairman and ranking members of the various committees of the House 
and Senate that would have jurisdiction over provisions in the trade 
agreement that is under negotiation. This select group, of perhaps as 
few as 10 Members of Congress, would then be given the authority, under 
law, to advise the U.S. Trade Representative on important matters of 
international commerce. Choosing members of the Finance and Ways and 
Means Committees was a logical move on the part of the authors of this 
provision. These are committees with, perhaps, the greatest degree of 
expertise in trade matters. But our trade negotiators, and the American 
people, should have the greater benefit of the breadth of expertise 
that can be offered by a more diverse representation of the Congress.
  Mr. President, in some respects, the Senate has already gone over 
this territory. We have the National Security Working Group to assist 
the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee with 
reviewing important arms control agreements. The National Security 
Working Group is not a replacement for those communities, but it is a 
useful back channel between the legislative and executive branches 
during the early stages of arms control negotiations, just as the 
Congressional Oversight Group is intended to do for trade negotiations. 
But the National Security Working Group has functioned well because its 
membership is not limited to those Senators who serve on the committees 
of jurisdiction. The National Security Working Group has 20 members, 
eight of whom serve on neither the Armed Services Committee or the 
Foreign Relations Committee. Indeed, one of the group's greatest 
strengths is that it draws its membership from the whole Senate, rather 
than just one committee.

  The amendment I offer expands the Congressional Oversight Group to 22 
members, selected from the membership of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives who do not serve on the Finance Committee in the Senate 
or the Ways and Means Committee in the House. Just as with the National 
Security Working Group, the leadership of each House of Congress will 
serve on this panel. In addition, the leadership of each House will 
select eight additional members to complete the Congressional Oversight 
Group. It also authorizes expenses for Senate staff, so that the group 
can follow the negotiations of trade agreements on a full-time basis, 
not just as the schedules of the members of the group allow.
  The changes that I propose to the composition of the Congressional 
Oversight Group as established in the fast-track bill do not in any way 
detract from the consultations between the administration and the 
congressional committees of jurisdiction. The Trade Act of 1974 
established a process for consultation between the congressional 
committees of jurisdiction and the executive branch. At the beginning 
of each Congress, the President pro tempore of the Senate is directed 
to appoint, after consultation with the chairman of the Finance 
Committee, five members of that committee to work with the U.S. Trade 
Representative during the negotiation of trade agreements. The Speaker 
of the House is also directed to make appointments for members of the 
House committees of jurisdiction to serve in the same advisory role.
  The U.S. Trade Representative is directed to keep these congressional 
advisors ``currently informed on the trade policy of the United 
States,'' and make these advisors aware of any proposed changes to our 
trade policy. This is the mechanism by which the members of the 
committees of jurisdiction can remain informed of the progress in 
negotiating fast-track agreements.
  My amendment prevents the congressional Oversight Group from being a 
redundant entity, as it currently is configured in the fast-track bill, 
and expands it to include a broader group of members of Congress in 
both Houses who are interested in trade, but do not serve on the 
Finance Committee or the Ways and Means Committee. The amendment does 
not elevate the Congressional Oversight Group above the status of the 
committees of jurisdiction on trade matters. In fact, my amendment 
specifically directs that any meetings that are open to the 
Congressional Oversight Group shall also be open to congressional 
advisers for trade policy.
  Because trade agreements encompass so many issues, including labor 
protections and environmental standards, as well as adjustments to our 
own trade rules, all committees with jurisdiction should be fully 
consulted at all stages of negotiations on a new trade agreement. But 
many Senators who do not serve on the committees of jurisdiction also 
have great interest in our trade laws and they can offer significant 
contributions. These Senators should have the opportunity to receive 
similar consultations. The Congressional Oversight Group, as laid out 
by my amendment, would allow these Senators with an interest in trade 
matters to be fully informed of the progress of negotiations.
  The fast-track procedure for considering trade bills turns the 
legislative process on its head. It forbids Senators from offering 
amendments, even for the purpose of clarifying the intent of the 
agreement in question. The fast-track procedures limit the time that a 
trade agreement could be debated, as if Senators should not be given 
the time to learn what is really in the agreement.
  In that case, the only Senators who would really know what a trade 
agreement does, and why it needs to be done, are those Senators who 
participate during the negotiation of those agreements. Right now, only 
five Senators have been appointed to be congressional trade advisors to 
the U.S. Trade Representative, and every one of those Senators serves 
on the Committee on Finance. It is all well and good to draw upon the 
expertise of the members of the Finance Committee, but what about the 
rest of us?
  At what point will we, who do not serve on the Finance Committee, be 
made aware of the progress of trade negotiations? When will those 
Members of the Senate who are not on the committees of jurisdiction 
have an opportunity to see that the interests of our States are 
protected by a trade agreement? Is it when the agreement is signed, 
sealed, and delivered to Congress for an up-or-down vote? Or are we, as 
the elected representatives of the people, entitled to have our input 
on these trade agreements while there is still an opportunity to do so?
  In an increasingly global marketplace, the ramifications of trade 
negotiations are undoubtedly reaching into the smallest crevices of our 
economy. The types of industries, the numbers of businesses, and every 
American's everyday concerns that are being impacted by foreign trade 
are real and constantly growing. The consultation of a broader number 
of Senators on potential trade agreements will more adequately and 
appropriately address the pervasive influence of foreign trade on 
America today. My amendment to change the composition of the 
Congressional Oversight Group will help end the exclusive nature of 
trade consultations. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. DORGAN. I wonder if the Senator from West Virginia will yield for 
a question.
  Mr. BYRD. I will be glad to yield.
  Mr. DORGAN. First, I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a 
cosponsor to this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Cantwell). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, the Senator from West Virginia has 
offered a very sound proposal to this so-called fast-track legislation. 
I was wondering if the Senator from West Virginia, who has been in this 
Chamber a long while, knows of circumstances where other

[[Page S4690]]

things have been given ``fast track'' treatment in ways that help 
ordinary folks.
  Has the Senator from West Virginia been aware of circumstances where, 
for example, legislation that affects ordinary Americans is given fast-
track authority to be considered here?
  Mr. BYRD. No, no.
  Mr. DORGAN. How about the disputes against unfair foreign trade 
practices that the steel industry raises or that family farmers or 
textile manufacturers raise--do the disputes they deem they need to 
bring because they are victims of unfair trade get fast-tracked or do 
they get slow-tracked?
  Mr. BYRD. No, they get slow-tracked.
  Mr. DORGAN. I wonder if the Senator will agree that, while fast track 
is making new agreements and shoving them through the Congress with no 
amendments, efforts to correct the problems in trade that are faced by 
so many American workers and so many businesses cannot get any action, 
let alone slow-track; they get no movement at all. Is that not the 
case?
  Mr. BYRD. That is the case, precisely.
  Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, it is ever more important that the 
Senator's amendment be approved. To the extent Congress is going to 
provide so-called fast-track authority, we need people looking over the 
shoulders of those who are going to negotiate these trade agreements.
  I was in a room in Montreal when the United States-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement was negotiated. It did not do much good, frankly. I went 
there and heard what the negotiator had to tell us, but it was not part 
of the negotiations. When I got back here, I discovered that which was 
negotiated behind the scenes in a secret agreement did not come out 
until 2 years later, much to the detriment of American farmers.
  Senator Byrd is on the right track saying if fast track is going to 
happen--and I do not support fast track--but if it is going to happen, 
in future negotiations, let's have more people looking over the 
shoulders of those who are negotiating on behalf of our country.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. DAYTON. Madam President, I rise as a cosponsor of Senator Byrd's 
amendment, and I wish to express my support for this amendment, if my 
voice will let me do so.
  I am very proud to be a cosponsor of this amendment. It is a very 
important improvement to this legislation. I particularly believe those 
who found the Dayton-Craig amendment to be anathema should look at this 
very closely, welcome it, and support it, as should all of my 
colleagues.
  It does provide, as the Senator from North Dakota just said 
correctly, an ongoing involvement of the Members of both the House and 
the Senate in these negotiations. If we are going to be asked to 
approve these agreements on an expedited basis when they come to us, 
then I think it is essential we have this opportunity to participate.
  The Byrd amendment provides us with a group, the staff, and resources 
necessary to make qualified judgments. That is an essential role if we 
are going to have a true partnership with the executive branch.
  I note the Constitution of the United States, which the distinguished 
Senator from West Virginia knows so well, ascribes to the legislative 
branch the sole authority for governing trade negotiations and all 
aspects of trade. It does not mention the executive branch. Certainly 
that responsibility has been devolving to a shared relationship, but it 
is certainly not one this branch could responsibly cede nor would it 
want to cede.
  I also point out that given the arrangements with the World Trade 
Organization, which is still expanding its breadth and its reach, once 
rules have been established by that body, it is my understanding they 
can only be changed by unanimous concurrence of all participating 
countries, which means that once this country has given up to the World 
Trade Organization any of the laws or the protections that have been 
established for the benefit of the American people, we cannot 
unilaterally take them back, which makes it even more important that 
the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia be passed to give the 
Congress that oversight and chance to anticipate ahead of time what the 
consequences are going to be of some of these decisions.

  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Senator from Minnesota. I 
appreciate his willingness to cosponsor the amendment, and I value his 
association in the matter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                     Amendments Nos. 3448 And 3449

  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia controls 48 
minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.
  Madam President, I speak on amendments Nos. 3448 and 3449, which I 
offered earlier.
  Madam President, for nearly 50 years I have worked to preserve the 
institutional integrity of the Senate and the House. Throughout this 
long period, I have repeatedly and consistently opposed exactly the 
type of fast-track provisions that are contained in this bill. During 
my decades in the Senate, I have staunchly opposed fast-track because I 
believe it improperly delegates to the Executive Branch unwarranted and 
excessive power over the regulation of foreign commerce. I have to say, 
however, that upon reviewing this bill, I find its provisions are some 
of the most offensive to date. This bill continues the sorry trend of 
giving the President carte blanche to determine what will be contained 
in a series of trade agreements, and--except for the provisions on 
trade remedies exempted by the Dayton-Craig amendment--deprives the 
Senate of any opportunity to amend these agreements in order to either 
improve their provisions or correct any deficiencies they may contain.
  This bill impedes the ability of the Senate to enact a resolution of 
disapproval against a trade agreement that it finds objectionable. 
Although, at first glance, the bill appears to permit a Senator to 
introduce a resolution of disapproval rejecting a trade agreement that 
is brought back to the Senate by the President, the reality is that 
such a resolution most probably would never come to the floor of the 
Senate for a vote.
  This is because the bill states that, once a resolution of 
disapproval is introduced and referred to the Senate Finance Committee, 
it will not be in order for the full Senate to consider the resolution 
if it has not been reported by that committee. In other words, a 
disapproval resolution cannot be forced to the floor through a 
discharge of the Senate Finance Committee. The way this bill is 
currently written, if a resolution of disapproval is not reported out 
of the Senate Finance Committee, it might as well never have been 
introduced. The resolution simply languishes, and languishes, and 
languishes, and languishes.
  This means that, so long as the Senate Finance Committee endorses the 
President's agreement, the views of the rest of the Senate are 
irrelevant. Enacting fast-track in this bill not only provides the 
President with unfettered authority to negotiate trade agreements, it 
also prevents the Senate from exercising its constitutional 
responsibility to reject or modify trade agreements that are not in the 
best interests of the American people.
  The Constitution in Article 1, Section 8, not only provides Congress 
with the power to ``lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and 
excises'' and to ``regulate commerce with foreign nations,'' but it 
also gives the Congress the authority to enact all legislation that 
``shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the 
foregoing powers.'' This authority of the Congress to enact or to 
refuse to enact legislation

[[Page S4691]]

applies specifically to the trade agreements that the President seeks 
to negotiate under fast-track.
  It is imperative that every Senator retain his or her right to 
introduce a resolution of disapproval that can be considered in the 
light of day by the full Senate. The rules of the Senate exist not only 
to protect the rights of its Members. In fact, it should be said that 
the rules and procedures exist to protect the rights of the people. 
This body is uniquely structured to provide a voice and power to the 
minority. I repeat, the minority. And I remind my colleagues in this 
Chamber that a minority can be right. The rules of this body, in fact, 
provide each individual member with leverage, and each of us has a 
stake in ensuring that these rules are respected, and that procedural 
changes of this type are only undertaken with great care and 
thoughtfulness.

  To this end, I am introducing two amendments to require that, upon 
introduction, any resolution of disapproval--including an extension 
resolution of disapproval--will be referred not only to the Senate 
Committee on Finance, but also to the Senate Committee on Rules and 
Administration. After all, it is the Rules Committee that is charged 
with making the rules and procedures that govern this institution, and 
its expertise is essential to guarantee that the commitments undertaken 
by our trading partners in the trade agreements we negotiate are 
enforceable under U.S. law.
  Under these amendments, each of these committees will be required to 
report the resolution of disapproval that has been referred to it 
within 10 days of the date of its introduction and, if either of these 
committees fails to report the resolution of disapproval within that 
time, either of these committees shall automatically be discharged from 
further consideration of the resolution. The resolution shall then be 
placed directly on the Senate Calendar. Once the disapproval resolution 
is placed on the Senate Calendar, any Senator may make a motion to 
proceed to consider that resolution, and the motion to consider the 
resolution shall not be debatable.
  The language in this bill and its accompanying report prohibiting a 
resolution of disapproval from being discharged from the Finance 
Committee constitutes a sharp distortion of the Senate's rules that 
would dramatically impede the rights of the 79 Members of the Senate 
who happen not to serve on the Senate Finance Committee. In other 
words, almost four-fifths of the Senate will have no say regarding 
whether what the President has negotiated is right or wrong.
  If enacted as currently written, this bill would effectively cut a 
majority of Senators out of the trade regulation process, preventing 
them from correcting sweeping changes in trade law that could unfairly 
affect the lives of their constituents who rely on the Senate to 
protect their interests. It is not as if Senators, in recent years, 
have had much of a say in trade matters. They have not. And what little 
voice they have had has been suppressed, if not silenced, on too many 
occasions by this gimmick called fast-track, a gimmick now renamed 
``trade promotion authority.'' This legislation goes beyond fast-track 
in its impairment of the Senate's prerogatives.
  I cannot support surrendering the rights and prerogatives, the duties 
and responsibilities of the Senate to any president of any political 
party. We in the Congress have an obligation to strike down trade 
agreements that adversely affect the American people. But it is 
impossible for us to do so if we do not provide ourselves the 
opportunity to adequately review, debate, amend, or reject their 
provisions as we are rightly empowered to do under the Constitution of 
the United States. These amendments ensure that we retain the power to 
modify or reject trade agreements that are not in the best interests of 
the majority of the people of the United States and, in so doing, 
protect the economic well-being of the Nation and of the people we 
represent.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I support giving the President trade 
promotion authority, as the bill now before the Senate would do. It is 
essential that we work with President Bush to ensure that we break down 
barriers and promote the sale of U.S. goods and services and 
agricultural commodities in other countries.
  Export markets are absolutely necessary to assure the profitability 
of American agriculture. America's farmers are producing more but 
exporting less.
  Last year, exports of U.S. farm products amounted to just over $50 
billion. That is a decrease from 5 years ago when we reached a high of 
$60 billion in foreign exports.
  For our country to prosper, we must have access to foreign markets. 
These markets not only help farmers; they help create jobs in 
processing industries, as well as transportation.
  Tariffs in other countries against our farm products are too high. 
They can be reduced through aggressive negotiation by our President. 
The tariff on U.S. agricultural products averages over 60 percent 
compared to under 5 percent on other domestic goods. If the President 
had the authority to negotiate international trade agreements, farm 
receipts would go up and not down as has been our recent experience.
  One out of every three acres planted by farmers across America is 
intended for export. But because we aren't selling all we produce, 
commodity prices are going down, and the agricultural sector is having 
a very hard time making ends meet.
  One of my State's biggest exports is poultry. The Mississippi broiler 
industry, which is one of the largest in the Nation, accounts for 40 
percent of all farm receipts in my State. That industry especially 
benefits from trade agreements that prohibit quotas and reduce tariffs.
  As a result of breaking down trade barriers on poultry, my State's 
exports to the Philippines, for example, have risen over 600 percent. 
This is a clear reminder of the positive result we can obtain through 
free trade agreements.
  Throughout the world, there are about 150 different trade agreements 
among other countries. The United States is only partner to three of 
them. For every market that is opened through country-to-country 
negotiations, an opportunity is lost for America.
  I urge the Senate to approve this trade promotion authority 
legislation.
  I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dayton). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                Amendment No. 3543 To Amendment No. 3401

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order 
at this point that I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself 
and Senator Voinovich, an amendment to the Baucus substitute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself and Mr. 
     Voinovich, proposes an amendment numbered 3543 to amendment 
     No. 3401.
       On page 228, line 21, insert after ``exports'' the 
     following: ``(including motor vehicles and vehicle parts)''.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I offer an amendment with Senator 
Voinovich, my fellow co-chair of the Senate Auto Caucus and Senator 
Stabenow. Our amendment would include in one of the listed principal 
negotiating objectives of the United States to reduce trade barriers in 
other countries to U.S. motor vehicles and vehicle parts. Increasing 
access for our products to markets which are closed or partially closed 
to us surely should be the objective of all of us.
  Other countries have full access to our market for their autos and 
auto parts. The fast track provision we are considering makes it a 
principal negotiating objective to expand trade and reduce barriers for 
trade in services, foreign investment, intellectual property, 
electronic commerce, and agriculture, and other sectors. Yet the 
biggest portion of our trade deficit is in

[[Page S4692]]

autos. In 2001, our automotive deficit made up over 31 percent of our 
total trade deficit with the world. In 2001, our automotive deficit was 
59 percent of our total trade deficit with Japan and 53 percent of our 
total deficit with Korea.
  No omnibus trade bill should leave the Senate without addressing 
barriers to our products which are the largest contributors to our 
trade deficit. We can start by making opening foreign markets for U.S. 
automotive products one of our principal negotiating objectives.
  America's domestic auto industry is the largest manufacturing 
industry in the United States. The domestic auto industry alone 
contributes almost 4 percent to the total U.S. Gross Domestic Products. 
Our domestic auto manufacturers operate 52 manufacturing and assembly 
facilities in 19 states around the country, and when auto parts 
manufacturers are included, there is an automotive manufacturing 
presence in almost every state. The Big 3 automakers directly employ 
over 500,000 people in automotive-related jobs in the U.S. That number 
grows by an additional 2 million jobs when you count automotive 
suppliers and other related industries.
  The auto industry is also a hi-tech manufacturing industry. It is one 
of the largest users of computers and the advanced technologies. It 
also spends nearly $20 billion annually on research and development, 
more than any other industrial sector in America. The U.S. auto 
industry contributes mightily to our economic well being. Yet we 
continue to neglect it when it comes to insisting on fair market access 
for exports of autos and auto parts.
  The U.S. passenger vehicle market is the most open and competitive in 
the world. But when we go to sell our autos and auto parts in foreign 
markets, we face significant trade restrictions. Some of the most 
egregious practitioners of unfair trade in autos and auto parts are 
Japan and Korea. The sale of American vehicles and auto parts in Japan 
has been blocked by protectionist measures such as government 
regulations dealing with vehicle certification, inspection, and repair. 
In Korea, restrictions include a tax system that discriminates against 
imported vehicles by making them prohibitively expensive, 
discriminatory practices such as labeling foreign vehicles as ``luxury 
goods,'' and the perception that the purchase of a foreign vehicle will 
trigger a tax audit.

  Since 1990, the U.S. automotive trade deficit with Japan has averaged 
55 percent of our total trade deficit with Japan. A 5 year market 
opening agreement in autos and auto parts that was largely a failure. 
The U.S. automotive trade deficit with Korea has grown significantly 
since 1995 despite two automotive market opening agreements with Korea.
  Japan and Korea want it both ways. They want to keep a sanctuary 
automotive home market that is protected from competition while they 
export a significant portion of production to the United States.
  We have been trying to open Japan's automotive markets for decades to 
no avail. In the mid-1980's we engaged in 8 years of Market Oriented 
Sector Specific, MOSS, talks with Japan to try to open Japan's auto 
parts market. During that time, our auto parts deficit with Japan rose 
from $3.3 billion in 1985 to nearly $11 billion in 1992 despite modest 
increases in sales by U.S. parts makers to the Japanese. The MOSS talks 
were followed by Framework talks in autos and auto parts which led to a 
1995 U.S.-Japan Automotive Trade Agreement with the goal of increasing 
market access in Japan for U.S. autos and auto parts. That goal has not 
been achieved. Despite that fact, the Administration has allowed the 
Agreement to expire. Meanwhile, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan in 
autos and auto parts has gotten worse. The auto and auto parts trade 
deficit was $32.9 billion in 1995. By the end of 2000 when the 
Agreement was allowed to expire, it was $44.2 billion, more than 60 
percent of the overall U.S. trade deficit with Japan and 10 percent of 
the worldwide U.S. trade deficit.
  The U.S. government, in its annual Trade Barriers Report, 
acknowledges that it is disappointed with the access of North American-
made vehicles and parts to Japan.
  When it comes to automotive trade between the United States and 
Korea, the numbers speak for themselves. South Korea has the most 
closed market for imported cars and trucks in the developed world. 
While foreign vehicles account for only \1/2\ of one percent of its 
total vehicle market, Korea depends on open markets in other countries 
to absorb its auto exports. Korea exports half of all the passenger 
vehicles it produces, with many of those vehicles coming to the U.S. 
Last year, Korea imported only 7,747 vehicles from the United States 
and exported over 600,000 to our country.
  This imbalance exists despite two separate automotive trade 
agreements between the United States and Korea which were supposed to 
open Korea's market: the first in 1995 and the second in 1998. This 
imbalance is unfair to America and its workers and only threatens to 
get worse if we do not act immediately.
  The amendment Senator Voinovich and I have introduced attempts to 
address the gross inequities in market access for U.S. autos and auto 
parts among some of our major trading partners. Our amendment would 
make market access for motor vehicles and vehicle parts a principal 
negotiating objective of the Untied States. The underlying bill 
includes 14 principal negotiating objectives and the Senate voted 
overwhelmingly to add textiles to that list. Since autos and auto parts 
are the largest part of our deficit, it is unacceptable that foreign 
trade barriers that exclude U.S.-made passenger vehicles and auto parts 
from certain markets are allowed to exist. We must act to get rid of 
those barriers.
  Our amendment would make it a principal negotiating objective to 
expand competitive market opportunities for U.S. motor vehicles and 
vehicle parts and to obtain fairer and more open conditions of trade by 
reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers.
  The current trade situation in autos and auto parts is unfair to 
America. We simply want access--to compete--no guarantees, just access. 
Every nation in the world strives to have a successful automotive 
industry and fights for that industry. We should do the same. The 
nearly 2.5 million men and women working in our nation's largest 
manufacturing industry deserve nothing less.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
not, without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
  The amendment (No. 3543) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. If there is no one else who seeks recognition at this 
point----
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I would like to have recognition on another matter, on 
the Byrd amendment.
  Mr. LEVIN. If I may take 2 minutes.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Yes, go ahead.
  I thank my friend, Senator Grassley, for helping us to work out this 
matter. As always, he is a gentleman and is accommodating. Again, we 
are very grateful for the effort he made to make this possible.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 3447

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, is the regular order the Byrd amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order is the Hollings second-
degree amendment to the Byrd amendment.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Would I be in order to speak on the Byrd underlying 
amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I am strongly opposed to this amendment, 
for two reasons.
  First, the amendment would disrupt the bipartisan balance we achieved 
in the Finance Committee on Trade Promotion Authority. Republicans and 
Democrats looked carefully at all the issues, especially the issues 
relating to Congressional notification and consultation, and approved a 
bill that, overall, goes farther in terms of congressional oversight 
and consultation than we have ever gone in fast-rack legislation.
  The second reason I oppose this amendment is that it would 
essentially

[[Page S4693]]

strip the Finance Committee of much of its traditional authority and 
jurisdiction over the trade policy oversight function.
  According to this proposed provision, none of the proposed eight 
members of the Congressional Oversight Group may be members of the 
Senate Finance Committee.
  Under this amendment, more than twenty percent of the Senate would be 
shut out from direct oversight of how trade negotiations subject to 
fast-track procedures are being conducted.
  In that regard, this is a very radical amendment.
  It strikes me as extremely unusual, to say the very least, that the 
Finance Committee, which wrote and passed the bipartisan trade 
promotion authority bill in the first place, would be given almost no 
role whatever in the oversight process once trade promotion authority 
becomes law.
  I say almost no role, because some Finance Committee members--those 
few who are congressional advisers for trade policy--would apparently 
have some limited role, in that the cochairmen of the Congressional 
Oversight Group are required to meet with them ``regularly''.
  Mr. President, this is not the way that oversight of trade policy 
should be conducted.
  I don't believe that any member of a Senate Committee--especially the 
Finance Committee--should be automatically excluded from the entity 
that the Senate establishes to review and monitor trade negotiations.
  But that is exactly what this amendment does.
  Do the proponents of this amendment mean that we can't trust Members 
of the Finance Committee to do the job the jurisdiction of their 
committee confers on them?
  It appears that is exactly what this means.
  This is not just bad policy.
  Specifically excluding Senators from serving in any oversight 
capacity would also set a terrible precedent.
  The congressional oversight process that Senator Baucus and I 
designed in the bipartisan trade promotion authority bill is a good 
one, and it should be preserved.
  Mr. President, I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this 
amendment.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, hopefully, tomorrow, after a few 
rollcall votes on a few remaining amendments, we are going to have an 
opportunity to pass this bipartisan trade promotion authority act of 
2002. I would like to address the issue of the bill for a few minutes 
while we are waiting for final action by the Senate on how we proceed 
tomorrow.
  This bill provides the President with the flexibility he needs to 
negotiate strong international trade agreements on behalf of U.S. 
workers and farmers while maintaining Congress's constitutional role 
over U.S. trade policy. It represents a thoughtful approach to 
addressing the complex relationships between international trade, 
workers' rights, and the environment, without undermining the 
fundamental purpose and proven effectiveness of trade promotion 
authority procedures.
  Specifically, this bipartisan act gives the administration the 
authority to negotiate and bring back trade agreements to Congress that 
will eliminate and reduce trade barriers relating to manufacturing, 
services, agriculture, intellectual property, investment, and e-
commerce.
  The legislation supports eliminating subsidies that decrease market 
opportunities for U.S. agriculture or unfairly distort markets to the 
detriment of the United States, with special emphasis on biotechnology, 
ending unjustified barriers not based on sound science, and fair 
treatment for import-sensitive agriculture.
  The legislation preserves U.S. sovereignty while engaging new trade 
agreements that will create solid economic growth, improve efficiency 
and innovation, create better, high-paying jobs for hard-working 
Americans that on average pay 15 percent above the average wage, and 
increases the availability of attractively priced products into the 
U.S. market for the benefit of our consumers.
  The legislation adds a trade negotiating objective on labor and the 
environment--very important provisions for many Members of this body. 
This is done to ensure that a party to a trade agreement does not fail 
to effectively enforce its labor and environmental laws through a 
sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, recognizing a 
government retains certain discretion.
  It strengthens, under the labor and environmental provisions, the 
capacity to promote respect for core labor standards and to protect the 
environment, to reduce or eliminate government practices or policies 
that unduly threaten sustainable development, and it seeks market 
access for U.S. environmental technologies, goods, and services.
  The legislation adds a new negotiating objective on enforcement, 
giving labor and environment disputes covered by the agreement parity 
with other issues in the trade agreement.
  It sets forth other Presidential priorities not covered by trade 
promotion authority, including greater cooperation between the World 
Trade Organization on the one hand, and the International Labor 
Organization on the other hand, and consultative mechanisms among 
parties to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading 
partners to promote respect for core labor standards and the 
environment, technical assistance on labor issues, and reporting on the 
child labor laws of U.S. trading partners.
  The legislation directs the President to take into account legitimate 
health, safety, essential security, and consumer interests. It directs 
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to preserve our ability to 
enforce vigorously U.S. trade remedy laws and avoid agreements which 
lessen the effectiveness of U.S. antidumping or countervailing duty 
laws.
  The legislation contains negotiating objectives on investment to 
increase transparency for the dispute settlement process, calls for 
standards of expropriation and compensation that are consistent with 
U.S. legal principles and practice, and eliminates frivolous claims.
  The bill expands and improves consultations between the 
administration and Congress before, during, and after trade 
negotiations and particularly in the development of implementing 
legislation.
  The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Assistance Act provides trade 
promotion authority until June 1, 2005, with a possibility of a 2-year 
extension. I point this out because there is a misunderstanding that 
Congress is going to give all of its power to the President. We have 
the consultation I talked about. Most importantly, whatever is agreed 
to by the President has to be passed by Congress as a law before any 
agreement can become effective. But we also do not give this power away 
to the President forever. This is the year 2002, almost June 1. So we 
are talking about the next 3 years with the possibility of a 2-year 
extension.
  I happen to believe we ought to have standing trade negotiation 
authority for the President, and we should not have these lapses that 
we have had since 1994, but obviously the extent to which we give it 
for shorter periods of time ought to satisfy more Members of this body 
that we are not giving up our congressional power, which is a specific 
grant in our Constitution that Congress shall regulate interstate and 
foreign commerce.

  The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act also contains 
unprecedented procedures that ensure prompt, meaningful, and extensive 
consultations with the Congress throughout the negotiating process. In 
other words, Members of this body and the other body are going to have 
ample opportunity while the President is doing all this negotiating to 
have reports given to us, feedback and, obviously, if Congress has to 
pass a final product, the President, in negotiating a position for the 
United States, is going to have to take into consideration the views of 
Members of Congress if the President wants to reach an agreement that 
will eventually pass by a majority vote in both the House and Senate.

[[Page S4694]]

  In regard to this negotiation process and consultation therein, the 
bill establishes a congressional oversight group which is a broad-
based, bipartisan, and permanent institution to be accredited as though 
official advisers to the U.S. delegation to consult with the U.S. Trade 
Representative and provide advice regarding formulation of specific 
objectives, negotiation strategies and positions, and development of 
the final trade agreement.
  This congressional oversight group would maximize bipartisanship and 
input from Members from a broad range of committees comprising the 
chairman and ranking member of the Ways and Means Committee, three 
additional committee members, and also the chairman and ranking member, 
and their designees, of each committee with a jurisdiction over any law 
affected by trade agreements being negotiated.
  The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Assistance Act also requires 
development of a written plan by the U.S. Trade Representative for 
consulting with Congress throughout the negotiations. That plan must 
include provisions for regular and detailed briefings of the 
congressional oversight group throughout the negotiations, access to 
documents relating to negotiations by members of the congressional 
oversight group, and their designated staffs. There would be very close 
cooperation between the congressional oversight group and the U.S. 
Trade Representative at all critical periods of the negotiations, 
including at negotiation sites, after the agreement is concluded, 
consultations regarding ongoing compliance and enforcement of 
commitments under the agreement, and finally, transmittal of a report 
by the Secretary of Commerce to Congress on U.S. strategy for 
correcting World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports that add 
to obligations or diminish rights of the United States.
  It also provides that the President provide Congress with a written 
notice of intent to enter negotiations 90 days before initiating 
negotiations, or as soon as feasible after enactment of trade promotion 
authority; for negotiations already underway, including the intended 
date for entering negotiations, specific U.S. objectives and statement 
of whether seeking new agreements or changes in the existing agreement; 
and that the President and the U.S. Trade Representative consult with 
Congress before initiating or continuing negotiations on agricultural 
products, fish and shellfish trade, textiles and apparel products.
  Before and after negotiations begin, the President and U.S. Trade 
Representative must consult with Congress regarding the negotiations, 
and particularly the U.S. Trade Representative must consult with all 
committees with jurisdiction over laws that would affect an agreement.
  Before and after negotiations begin, if a majority of the members of 
the Congressional Oversight Committee request a meeting, the President 
himself must meet with the group regarding the negotiations.
  I have used the word ``consult'' many times. It is all reflected in 
the legislation that Congress is very carefully guarding its 
constitutional power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, and 
we are having a contract with the President of the United States, but 
that contract is not a blank check to the President of the United 
States. He keeps in constant touch with us as the words ``consulting'' 
and ``consultation'' and ``consult'' imply, legally binding that he do 
that.
  So I hope it is very clear we are not willy-nilly delegating some 
power to the President. Not at all. We are going to be a part of this 
process.
  Now, people might ask why, if Congress is going to be a part of the 
process, are we having this contract with the President to negotiate 
for us? It is because of the impossibility, and it ought to be very 
obvious, 535 Members of Congress not having the ability to be in Geneva 
or someplace else negotiating with 142 other countries on the issue of 
some trade agreement. So we ask the President to do it.
  I hope the emphasis upon consulting and Congress demanding that the 
President sit down at certain points during this process indicates 
that, in fact, we are very selfishly guarding congressional 
responsibility.
  There is another part of notice and consultation that is required 
before actually entering into final trade agreements by the President, 
before it is actually signed in other words, because immediately after 
initiating an agreement the U.S. Trade Representative must consult 
closely with appropriate congressional committees, including the 
congressional trade advisers, the congressional oversight group, and 
the House and Senate Committees on Agriculture.
  The President is required, at least 90 days before entering an 
agreement, to formally notify Congress of his intent to enter into an 
agreement and publish notice of such intent in the Federal Register. At 
this time, the President must also notify the appropriate congressional 
committees of certain amendments proposed to be included in the 
implementing bill and then provide the International Trade Commission 
with details of the agreement so the ITC can prepare and submit an 
assessment of the likely impact of the agreement on the U.S. economy 
and specific industry sectors.
  Before entering into an agreement, the President must consult with 
the appropriate congressional committees and the congressional 
oversight group regarding three matters: The nature of the agreement; 
the extent to which the agreement meets congressional objectives as 
outlined in the bill before Congress right now; and the implementation 
of that agreement.
  Both Houses of Congress have the ability, in the final analysis, as 
we all know and as has been the practice for the last 25 years, to 
disapprove an agreement by passing separate disapproval resolutions if 
the administration fails or refuses to notify or consult with Congress 
in accordance with the bill that is before Congress right now that 
hopefully we will vote on tomorrow.
  Another example of notice and consultation after a trade agreement is 
entered into: After the President signs it, as soon as practical after 
entering into an agreement, the President must submit a copy of the 
agreement to Congress along with statements or reasons that he had for 
entering into that agreement. The President is required, at least 60 
days after entering an agreement, to submit to Congress a description 
of the changes to existing laws that would be needed to comply with the 
agreement.

  The President is also required to submit to Congress the final text 
of the agreement and provide an explanation of how the bill 
implementing the agreement would change existing law, how the agreement 
makes progress at achieving the Trade Promotion Authority Act's 
objective, and also he must submit an implementation plan.
  When that is all done, we then have to have notice and consultation 
on an ongoing basis. The President must report to the appropriate 
congressional committees on the mechanisms created among parties in the 
agreement to promote respect for core labor standards and to develop 
and implement sound environmental and health standards.
  The President must also report on the required reviews of the impact 
of future trade agreements on the environment and U.S. employment. 
Congress may withdraw a trade promotion authority for failure to 
consult. Disapproval resolutions can be introduced by any Senator and 
may cover multiple agreements. Grounds for disapproval include failure 
to make progress in achieving the objectives that the bill has laid 
out.
  Obviously, as I have stated before, none of this happens unless 
Congress gives approval by majority vote in both the House and the 
Senate to approve or disapprove these agreements negotiated under this 
bill that hopefully will pass tomorrow.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the time until 10:30 a.m., May 
23d, tomorrow, count against the time provided under the cloture.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page S4695]]



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