[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 67 (Wednesday, May 22, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4688-S4695]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE EXPANSION ACT--Continued
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada is recognized.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, what is the matter now before the Senate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 3433.
Mr. REID. Is that the Reed of Rhode Island amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
Amendments Nos. 3456, 3457, 3431, and 3432 Withdrawn
Mr. REID. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators Durbin and Boxer, I
ask unanimous consent that the following amendments be withdrawn:
Amendments Nos. 3456, 3457, 3431, and 3432.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. GRAMM. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, I am sorry,
we were having a conference in the cloakroom and I didn't hear.
Mr. REID. Four amendments are being withdrawn.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, not only do I not object, I concur.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
amendment no. 3443
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I make a point of order against the Reed of
Rhode Island amendment, No. 3443, that it is not properly drafted.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The point of order is well taken, and the
amendment falls.
Amendment No. 3447
Mr. REID. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the next matter
in order is the Byrd amendment No. 3447; is that right?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The amendment is now
pending.
Amendment No. 3527 To Amendment No. 3447
Mr. REID. Mr. President I call up amendment No. 3527, a second-degree
amendment to the Byrd amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the second-degree
amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Nevada [Mr. Reid], for Mr. Hollings,
proposes an amendment numbered 3527 to Amendment No. 3447.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To provide for the certification of textile and apparel
workers who lose their jobs or who have lost their jobs since the start
of 1999 as eligible individuals for purposes of trade adjustment
assistance and health insurance benefits)
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. . TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE AND HEALTH BENEFITS FOR
TEXTILE AND APPAREL WORKERS.
(a) In General.--An individual employed in the textile or
apparel industry before the date of enactment of this Act
who, after December 31, 1998--
(1) lost, or loses, his or her job (other than by
termination for cause); and
(2) has not been re-employed in that industry, is deemed to
be eligible for adjustment assistance under subchapter A of
chapter 2 of title II of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.
2271 et seq.).
(b) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on the day
after the date of enactment of this Act.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, what is the pending question?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 3527 to amendment No. 3447.
Mr. BYRD. Is amendment No. 3447 my amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. BYRD. The pending amendment is the second-degree amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I will speak on the first-degree amendment.
Mr. President, there can be little doubt that the various agencies of
the executive branch are increasingly in the driver's seat on the
important matter of trade. Meanwhile, the Congress and the American
people are merely being brought along for the ride.
There are many reasons for this growing inequity, not the least of
which is the willingness--at times, in fact, the eagerness--of this
body to give us its rights and responsibilities under the Constitution.
The Constitution mandates to the legislative branch--the people's
branch--authority over foreign trade matters. It cannot, however, force
the institution to exercise this authority and assert itself in trade
matters. That requires the will of the Members. The lessons we have
learned from our most recent experiences with trade agreements should
be incentive enough for us to insist on our rights with regard to trade
matters. We, after all, represent communities that have lost businesses
to other countries and families who have lost their jobs to foreign
firms.
Yet here we are, once again, considering a measure that further ties
the hands of the members of this institution in the area of trade.
Perhaps even worse, we are continuing a trend of blinding ourselves to
the details of the trade agreements on which we must ultimately vote.
It is almost as if we don't want to know,
At the very least, we should do more to lift the veil on trade
negotiations so that we have some idea as to what it is this Nation is
signing up to when the agreements go into effect. But to do so we need
to establish the means for Members to participate more broadly, and in
more detail, in important trade negotiations, as well as to carry out
the important oversight functions that our complex trade laws require.
The fast track bill now before the Senate opens that door. The bill
establishes the Congressional Oversight Group to serve as an official
adviser to
[[Page S4689]]
the U.S. Trade Representative on matters that include the formulation
of specific trade objectives and negotiating strategies, the
development of new trade agreements, and the enforcement of existing
trade agreements.
The establishment of the Congressional Oversight Group is intended to
help the legislative branch play a more substantial role in trade
negotiations, but as laid out in this legislation it does not go quite
far enough.
As established by the bill, the Congressional Oversight Group will be
comprised of five Senators, each of whom must serve on the Finance
Committee, five Members of the House of Representatives, each of whom
must serve on the Ways and Means Committee, and, on an ad hoc basis,
the chairman and ranking members of the various committees of the House
and Senate that would have jurisdiction over provisions in the trade
agreement that is under negotiation. This select group, of perhaps as
few as 10 Members of Congress, would then be given the authority, under
law, to advise the U.S. Trade Representative on important matters of
international commerce. Choosing members of the Finance and Ways and
Means Committees was a logical move on the part of the authors of this
provision. These are committees with, perhaps, the greatest degree of
expertise in trade matters. But our trade negotiators, and the American
people, should have the greater benefit of the breadth of expertise
that can be offered by a more diverse representation of the Congress.
Mr. President, in some respects, the Senate has already gone over
this territory. We have the National Security Working Group to assist
the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee with
reviewing important arms control agreements. The National Security
Working Group is not a replacement for those communities, but it is a
useful back channel between the legislative and executive branches
during the early stages of arms control negotiations, just as the
Congressional Oversight Group is intended to do for trade negotiations.
But the National Security Working Group has functioned well because its
membership is not limited to those Senators who serve on the committees
of jurisdiction. The National Security Working Group has 20 members,
eight of whom serve on neither the Armed Services Committee or the
Foreign Relations Committee. Indeed, one of the group's greatest
strengths is that it draws its membership from the whole Senate, rather
than just one committee.
The amendment I offer expands the Congressional Oversight Group to 22
members, selected from the membership of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who do not serve on the Finance Committee in the Senate
or the Ways and Means Committee in the House. Just as with the National
Security Working Group, the leadership of each House of Congress will
serve on this panel. In addition, the leadership of each House will
select eight additional members to complete the Congressional Oversight
Group. It also authorizes expenses for Senate staff, so that the group
can follow the negotiations of trade agreements on a full-time basis,
not just as the schedules of the members of the group allow.
The changes that I propose to the composition of the Congressional
Oversight Group as established in the fast-track bill do not in any way
detract from the consultations between the administration and the
congressional committees of jurisdiction. The Trade Act of 1974
established a process for consultation between the congressional
committees of jurisdiction and the executive branch. At the beginning
of each Congress, the President pro tempore of the Senate is directed
to appoint, after consultation with the chairman of the Finance
Committee, five members of that committee to work with the U.S. Trade
Representative during the negotiation of trade agreements. The Speaker
of the House is also directed to make appointments for members of the
House committees of jurisdiction to serve in the same advisory role.
The U.S. Trade Representative is directed to keep these congressional
advisors ``currently informed on the trade policy of the United
States,'' and make these advisors aware of any proposed changes to our
trade policy. This is the mechanism by which the members of the
committees of jurisdiction can remain informed of the progress in
negotiating fast-track agreements.
My amendment prevents the congressional Oversight Group from being a
redundant entity, as it currently is configured in the fast-track bill,
and expands it to include a broader group of members of Congress in
both Houses who are interested in trade, but do not serve on the
Finance Committee or the Ways and Means Committee. The amendment does
not elevate the Congressional Oversight Group above the status of the
committees of jurisdiction on trade matters. In fact, my amendment
specifically directs that any meetings that are open to the
Congressional Oversight Group shall also be open to congressional
advisers for trade policy.
Because trade agreements encompass so many issues, including labor
protections and environmental standards, as well as adjustments to our
own trade rules, all committees with jurisdiction should be fully
consulted at all stages of negotiations on a new trade agreement. But
many Senators who do not serve on the committees of jurisdiction also
have great interest in our trade laws and they can offer significant
contributions. These Senators should have the opportunity to receive
similar consultations. The Congressional Oversight Group, as laid out
by my amendment, would allow these Senators with an interest in trade
matters to be fully informed of the progress of negotiations.
The fast-track procedure for considering trade bills turns the
legislative process on its head. It forbids Senators from offering
amendments, even for the purpose of clarifying the intent of the
agreement in question. The fast-track procedures limit the time that a
trade agreement could be debated, as if Senators should not be given
the time to learn what is really in the agreement.
In that case, the only Senators who would really know what a trade
agreement does, and why it needs to be done, are those Senators who
participate during the negotiation of those agreements. Right now, only
five Senators have been appointed to be congressional trade advisors to
the U.S. Trade Representative, and every one of those Senators serves
on the Committee on Finance. It is all well and good to draw upon the
expertise of the members of the Finance Committee, but what about the
rest of us?
At what point will we, who do not serve on the Finance Committee, be
made aware of the progress of trade negotiations? When will those
Members of the Senate who are not on the committees of jurisdiction
have an opportunity to see that the interests of our States are
protected by a trade agreement? Is it when the agreement is signed,
sealed, and delivered to Congress for an up-or-down vote? Or are we, as
the elected representatives of the people, entitled to have our input
on these trade agreements while there is still an opportunity to do so?
In an increasingly global marketplace, the ramifications of trade
negotiations are undoubtedly reaching into the smallest crevices of our
economy. The types of industries, the numbers of businesses, and every
American's everyday concerns that are being impacted by foreign trade
are real and constantly growing. The consultation of a broader number
of Senators on potential trade agreements will more adequately and
appropriately address the pervasive influence of foreign trade on
America today. My amendment to change the composition of the
Congressional Oversight Group will help end the exclusive nature of
trade consultations. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. DORGAN. I wonder if the Senator from West Virginia will yield for
a question.
Mr. BYRD. I will be glad to yield.
Mr. DORGAN. First, I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a
cosponsor to this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Cantwell). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, the Senator from West Virginia has
offered a very sound proposal to this so-called fast-track legislation.
I was wondering if the Senator from West Virginia, who has been in this
Chamber a long while, knows of circumstances where other
[[Page S4690]]
things have been given ``fast track'' treatment in ways that help
ordinary folks.
Has the Senator from West Virginia been aware of circumstances where,
for example, legislation that affects ordinary Americans is given fast-
track authority to be considered here?
Mr. BYRD. No, no.
Mr. DORGAN. How about the disputes against unfair foreign trade
practices that the steel industry raises or that family farmers or
textile manufacturers raise--do the disputes they deem they need to
bring because they are victims of unfair trade get fast-tracked or do
they get slow-tracked?
Mr. BYRD. No, they get slow-tracked.
Mr. DORGAN. I wonder if the Senator will agree that, while fast track
is making new agreements and shoving them through the Congress with no
amendments, efforts to correct the problems in trade that are faced by
so many American workers and so many businesses cannot get any action,
let alone slow-track; they get no movement at all. Is that not the
case?
Mr. BYRD. That is the case, precisely.
Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, it is ever more important that the
Senator's amendment be approved. To the extent Congress is going to
provide so-called fast-track authority, we need people looking over the
shoulders of those who are going to negotiate these trade agreements.
I was in a room in Montreal when the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement was negotiated. It did not do much good, frankly. I went
there and heard what the negotiator had to tell us, but it was not part
of the negotiations. When I got back here, I discovered that which was
negotiated behind the scenes in a secret agreement did not come out
until 2 years later, much to the detriment of American farmers.
Senator Byrd is on the right track saying if fast track is going to
happen--and I do not support fast track--but if it is going to happen,
in future negotiations, let's have more people looking over the
shoulders of those who are negotiating on behalf of our country.
Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. DAYTON. Madam President, I rise as a cosponsor of Senator Byrd's
amendment, and I wish to express my support for this amendment, if my
voice will let me do so.
I am very proud to be a cosponsor of this amendment. It is a very
important improvement to this legislation. I particularly believe those
who found the Dayton-Craig amendment to be anathema should look at this
very closely, welcome it, and support it, as should all of my
colleagues.
It does provide, as the Senator from North Dakota just said
correctly, an ongoing involvement of the Members of both the House and
the Senate in these negotiations. If we are going to be asked to
approve these agreements on an expedited basis when they come to us,
then I think it is essential we have this opportunity to participate.
The Byrd amendment provides us with a group, the staff, and resources
necessary to make qualified judgments. That is an essential role if we
are going to have a true partnership with the executive branch.
I note the Constitution of the United States, which the distinguished
Senator from West Virginia knows so well, ascribes to the legislative
branch the sole authority for governing trade negotiations and all
aspects of trade. It does not mention the executive branch. Certainly
that responsibility has been devolving to a shared relationship, but it
is certainly not one this branch could responsibly cede nor would it
want to cede.
I also point out that given the arrangements with the World Trade
Organization, which is still expanding its breadth and its reach, once
rules have been established by that body, it is my understanding they
can only be changed by unanimous concurrence of all participating
countries, which means that once this country has given up to the World
Trade Organization any of the laws or the protections that have been
established for the benefit of the American people, we cannot
unilaterally take them back, which makes it even more important that
the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia be passed to give the
Congress that oversight and chance to anticipate ahead of time what the
consequences are going to be of some of these decisions.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Senator from Minnesota. I
appreciate his willingness to cosponsor the amendment, and I value his
association in the matter.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana.
Mr. BAUCUS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendments Nos. 3448 And 3449
Mr. BYRD. Madam President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia controls 48
minutes.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Chair.
Madam President, I speak on amendments Nos. 3448 and 3449, which I
offered earlier.
Madam President, for nearly 50 years I have worked to preserve the
institutional integrity of the Senate and the House. Throughout this
long period, I have repeatedly and consistently opposed exactly the
type of fast-track provisions that are contained in this bill. During
my decades in the Senate, I have staunchly opposed fast-track because I
believe it improperly delegates to the Executive Branch unwarranted and
excessive power over the regulation of foreign commerce. I have to say,
however, that upon reviewing this bill, I find its provisions are some
of the most offensive to date. This bill continues the sorry trend of
giving the President carte blanche to determine what will be contained
in a series of trade agreements, and--except for the provisions on
trade remedies exempted by the Dayton-Craig amendment--deprives the
Senate of any opportunity to amend these agreements in order to either
improve their provisions or correct any deficiencies they may contain.
This bill impedes the ability of the Senate to enact a resolution of
disapproval against a trade agreement that it finds objectionable.
Although, at first glance, the bill appears to permit a Senator to
introduce a resolution of disapproval rejecting a trade agreement that
is brought back to the Senate by the President, the reality is that
such a resolution most probably would never come to the floor of the
Senate for a vote.
This is because the bill states that, once a resolution of
disapproval is introduced and referred to the Senate Finance Committee,
it will not be in order for the full Senate to consider the resolution
if it has not been reported by that committee. In other words, a
disapproval resolution cannot be forced to the floor through a
discharge of the Senate Finance Committee. The way this bill is
currently written, if a resolution of disapproval is not reported out
of the Senate Finance Committee, it might as well never have been
introduced. The resolution simply languishes, and languishes, and
languishes, and languishes.
This means that, so long as the Senate Finance Committee endorses the
President's agreement, the views of the rest of the Senate are
irrelevant. Enacting fast-track in this bill not only provides the
President with unfettered authority to negotiate trade agreements, it
also prevents the Senate from exercising its constitutional
responsibility to reject or modify trade agreements that are not in the
best interests of the American people.
The Constitution in Article 1, Section 8, not only provides Congress
with the power to ``lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excises'' and to ``regulate commerce with foreign nations,'' but it
also gives the Congress the authority to enact all legislation that
``shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers.'' This authority of the Congress to enact or to
refuse to enact legislation
[[Page S4691]]
applies specifically to the trade agreements that the President seeks
to negotiate under fast-track.
It is imperative that every Senator retain his or her right to
introduce a resolution of disapproval that can be considered in the
light of day by the full Senate. The rules of the Senate exist not only
to protect the rights of its Members. In fact, it should be said that
the rules and procedures exist to protect the rights of the people.
This body is uniquely structured to provide a voice and power to the
minority. I repeat, the minority. And I remind my colleagues in this
Chamber that a minority can be right. The rules of this body, in fact,
provide each individual member with leverage, and each of us has a
stake in ensuring that these rules are respected, and that procedural
changes of this type are only undertaken with great care and
thoughtfulness.
To this end, I am introducing two amendments to require that, upon
introduction, any resolution of disapproval--including an extension
resolution of disapproval--will be referred not only to the Senate
Committee on Finance, but also to the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration. After all, it is the Rules Committee that is charged
with making the rules and procedures that govern this institution, and
its expertise is essential to guarantee that the commitments undertaken
by our trading partners in the trade agreements we negotiate are
enforceable under U.S. law.
Under these amendments, each of these committees will be required to
report the resolution of disapproval that has been referred to it
within 10 days of the date of its introduction and, if either of these
committees fails to report the resolution of disapproval within that
time, either of these committees shall automatically be discharged from
further consideration of the resolution. The resolution shall then be
placed directly on the Senate Calendar. Once the disapproval resolution
is placed on the Senate Calendar, any Senator may make a motion to
proceed to consider that resolution, and the motion to consider the
resolution shall not be debatable.
The language in this bill and its accompanying report prohibiting a
resolution of disapproval from being discharged from the Finance
Committee constitutes a sharp distortion of the Senate's rules that
would dramatically impede the rights of the 79 Members of the Senate
who happen not to serve on the Senate Finance Committee. In other
words, almost four-fifths of the Senate will have no say regarding
whether what the President has negotiated is right or wrong.
If enacted as currently written, this bill would effectively cut a
majority of Senators out of the trade regulation process, preventing
them from correcting sweeping changes in trade law that could unfairly
affect the lives of their constituents who rely on the Senate to
protect their interests. It is not as if Senators, in recent years,
have had much of a say in trade matters. They have not. And what little
voice they have had has been suppressed, if not silenced, on too many
occasions by this gimmick called fast-track, a gimmick now renamed
``trade promotion authority.'' This legislation goes beyond fast-track
in its impairment of the Senate's prerogatives.
I cannot support surrendering the rights and prerogatives, the duties
and responsibilities of the Senate to any president of any political
party. We in the Congress have an obligation to strike down trade
agreements that adversely affect the American people. But it is
impossible for us to do so if we do not provide ourselves the
opportunity to adequately review, debate, amend, or reject their
provisions as we are rightly empowered to do under the Constitution of
the United States. These amendments ensure that we retain the power to
modify or reject trade agreements that are not in the best interests of
the majority of the people of the United States and, in so doing,
protect the economic well-being of the Nation and of the people we
represent.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I support giving the President trade
promotion authority, as the bill now before the Senate would do. It is
essential that we work with President Bush to ensure that we break down
barriers and promote the sale of U.S. goods and services and
agricultural commodities in other countries.
Export markets are absolutely necessary to assure the profitability
of American agriculture. America's farmers are producing more but
exporting less.
Last year, exports of U.S. farm products amounted to just over $50
billion. That is a decrease from 5 years ago when we reached a high of
$60 billion in foreign exports.
For our country to prosper, we must have access to foreign markets.
These markets not only help farmers; they help create jobs in
processing industries, as well as transportation.
Tariffs in other countries against our farm products are too high.
They can be reduced through aggressive negotiation by our President.
The tariff on U.S. agricultural products averages over 60 percent
compared to under 5 percent on other domestic goods. If the President
had the authority to negotiate international trade agreements, farm
receipts would go up and not down as has been our recent experience.
One out of every three acres planted by farmers across America is
intended for export. But because we aren't selling all we produce,
commodity prices are going down, and the agricultural sector is having
a very hard time making ends meet.
One of my State's biggest exports is poultry. The Mississippi broiler
industry, which is one of the largest in the Nation, accounts for 40
percent of all farm receipts in my State. That industry especially
benefits from trade agreements that prohibit quotas and reduce tariffs.
As a result of breaking down trade barriers on poultry, my State's
exports to the Philippines, for example, have risen over 600 percent.
This is a clear reminder of the positive result we can obtain through
free trade agreements.
Throughout the world, there are about 150 different trade agreements
among other countries. The United States is only partner to three of
them. For every market that is opened through country-to-country
negotiations, an opportunity is lost for America.
I urge the Senate to approve this trade promotion authority
legislation.
I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dayton). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Amendment No. 3543 To Amendment No. 3401
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order
at this point that I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of myself
and Senator Voinovich, an amendment to the Baucus substitute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself and Mr.
Voinovich, proposes an amendment numbered 3543 to amendment
No. 3401.
On page 228, line 21, insert after ``exports'' the
following: ``(including motor vehicles and vehicle parts)''.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I offer an amendment with Senator
Voinovich, my fellow co-chair of the Senate Auto Caucus and Senator
Stabenow. Our amendment would include in one of the listed principal
negotiating objectives of the United States to reduce trade barriers in
other countries to U.S. motor vehicles and vehicle parts. Increasing
access for our products to markets which are closed or partially closed
to us surely should be the objective of all of us.
Other countries have full access to our market for their autos and
auto parts. The fast track provision we are considering makes it a
principal negotiating objective to expand trade and reduce barriers for
trade in services, foreign investment, intellectual property,
electronic commerce, and agriculture, and other sectors. Yet the
biggest portion of our trade deficit is in
[[Page S4692]]
autos. In 2001, our automotive deficit made up over 31 percent of our
total trade deficit with the world. In 2001, our automotive deficit was
59 percent of our total trade deficit with Japan and 53 percent of our
total deficit with Korea.
No omnibus trade bill should leave the Senate without addressing
barriers to our products which are the largest contributors to our
trade deficit. We can start by making opening foreign markets for U.S.
automotive products one of our principal negotiating objectives.
America's domestic auto industry is the largest manufacturing
industry in the United States. The domestic auto industry alone
contributes almost 4 percent to the total U.S. Gross Domestic Products.
Our domestic auto manufacturers operate 52 manufacturing and assembly
facilities in 19 states around the country, and when auto parts
manufacturers are included, there is an automotive manufacturing
presence in almost every state. The Big 3 automakers directly employ
over 500,000 people in automotive-related jobs in the U.S. That number
grows by an additional 2 million jobs when you count automotive
suppliers and other related industries.
The auto industry is also a hi-tech manufacturing industry. It is one
of the largest users of computers and the advanced technologies. It
also spends nearly $20 billion annually on research and development,
more than any other industrial sector in America. The U.S. auto
industry contributes mightily to our economic well being. Yet we
continue to neglect it when it comes to insisting on fair market access
for exports of autos and auto parts.
The U.S. passenger vehicle market is the most open and competitive in
the world. But when we go to sell our autos and auto parts in foreign
markets, we face significant trade restrictions. Some of the most
egregious practitioners of unfair trade in autos and auto parts are
Japan and Korea. The sale of American vehicles and auto parts in Japan
has been blocked by protectionist measures such as government
regulations dealing with vehicle certification, inspection, and repair.
In Korea, restrictions include a tax system that discriminates against
imported vehicles by making them prohibitively expensive,
discriminatory practices such as labeling foreign vehicles as ``luxury
goods,'' and the perception that the purchase of a foreign vehicle will
trigger a tax audit.
Since 1990, the U.S. automotive trade deficit with Japan has averaged
55 percent of our total trade deficit with Japan. A 5 year market
opening agreement in autos and auto parts that was largely a failure.
The U.S. automotive trade deficit with Korea has grown significantly
since 1995 despite two automotive market opening agreements with Korea.
Japan and Korea want it both ways. They want to keep a sanctuary
automotive home market that is protected from competition while they
export a significant portion of production to the United States.
We have been trying to open Japan's automotive markets for decades to
no avail. In the mid-1980's we engaged in 8 years of Market Oriented
Sector Specific, MOSS, talks with Japan to try to open Japan's auto
parts market. During that time, our auto parts deficit with Japan rose
from $3.3 billion in 1985 to nearly $11 billion in 1992 despite modest
increases in sales by U.S. parts makers to the Japanese. The MOSS talks
were followed by Framework talks in autos and auto parts which led to a
1995 U.S.-Japan Automotive Trade Agreement with the goal of increasing
market access in Japan for U.S. autos and auto parts. That goal has not
been achieved. Despite that fact, the Administration has allowed the
Agreement to expire. Meanwhile, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan in
autos and auto parts has gotten worse. The auto and auto parts trade
deficit was $32.9 billion in 1995. By the end of 2000 when the
Agreement was allowed to expire, it was $44.2 billion, more than 60
percent of the overall U.S. trade deficit with Japan and 10 percent of
the worldwide U.S. trade deficit.
The U.S. government, in its annual Trade Barriers Report,
acknowledges that it is disappointed with the access of North American-
made vehicles and parts to Japan.
When it comes to automotive trade between the United States and
Korea, the numbers speak for themselves. South Korea has the most
closed market for imported cars and trucks in the developed world.
While foreign vehicles account for only \1/2\ of one percent of its
total vehicle market, Korea depends on open markets in other countries
to absorb its auto exports. Korea exports half of all the passenger
vehicles it produces, with many of those vehicles coming to the U.S.
Last year, Korea imported only 7,747 vehicles from the United States
and exported over 600,000 to our country.
This imbalance exists despite two separate automotive trade
agreements between the United States and Korea which were supposed to
open Korea's market: the first in 1995 and the second in 1998. This
imbalance is unfair to America and its workers and only threatens to
get worse if we do not act immediately.
The amendment Senator Voinovich and I have introduced attempts to
address the gross inequities in market access for U.S. autos and auto
parts among some of our major trading partners. Our amendment would
make market access for motor vehicles and vehicle parts a principal
negotiating objective of the Untied States. The underlying bill
includes 14 principal negotiating objectives and the Senate voted
overwhelmingly to add textiles to that list. Since autos and auto parts
are the largest part of our deficit, it is unacceptable that foreign
trade barriers that exclude U.S.-made passenger vehicles and auto parts
from certain markets are allowed to exist. We must act to get rid of
those barriers.
Our amendment would make it a principal negotiating objective to
expand competitive market opportunities for U.S. motor vehicles and
vehicle parts and to obtain fairer and more open conditions of trade by
reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers.
The current trade situation in autos and auto parts is unfair to
America. We simply want access--to compete--no guarantees, just access.
Every nation in the world strives to have a successful automotive
industry and fights for that industry. We should do the same. The
nearly 2.5 million men and women working in our nation's largest
manufacturing industry deserve nothing less.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If
not, without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 3543) was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. GRASSLEY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LEVIN. If there is no one else who seeks recognition at this
point----
Mr. GRASSLEY. I would like to have recognition on another matter, on
the Byrd amendment.
Mr. LEVIN. If I may take 2 minutes.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Yes, go ahead.
I thank my friend, Senator Grassley, for helping us to work out this
matter. As always, he is a gentleman and is accommodating. Again, we
are very grateful for the effort he made to make this possible.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.
Amendment No. 3447
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, is the regular order the Byrd amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order is the Hollings second-
degree amendment to the Byrd amendment.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Would I be in order to speak on the Byrd underlying
amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I am strongly opposed to this amendment,
for two reasons.
First, the amendment would disrupt the bipartisan balance we achieved
in the Finance Committee on Trade Promotion Authority. Republicans and
Democrats looked carefully at all the issues, especially the issues
relating to Congressional notification and consultation, and approved a
bill that, overall, goes farther in terms of congressional oversight
and consultation than we have ever gone in fast-rack legislation.
The second reason I oppose this amendment is that it would
essentially
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strip the Finance Committee of much of its traditional authority and
jurisdiction over the trade policy oversight function.
According to this proposed provision, none of the proposed eight
members of the Congressional Oversight Group may be members of the
Senate Finance Committee.
Under this amendment, more than twenty percent of the Senate would be
shut out from direct oversight of how trade negotiations subject to
fast-track procedures are being conducted.
In that regard, this is a very radical amendment.
It strikes me as extremely unusual, to say the very least, that the
Finance Committee, which wrote and passed the bipartisan trade
promotion authority bill in the first place, would be given almost no
role whatever in the oversight process once trade promotion authority
becomes law.
I say almost no role, because some Finance Committee members--those
few who are congressional advisers for trade policy--would apparently
have some limited role, in that the cochairmen of the Congressional
Oversight Group are required to meet with them ``regularly''.
Mr. President, this is not the way that oversight of trade policy
should be conducted.
I don't believe that any member of a Senate Committee--especially the
Finance Committee--should be automatically excluded from the entity
that the Senate establishes to review and monitor trade negotiations.
But that is exactly what this amendment does.
Do the proponents of this amendment mean that we can't trust Members
of the Finance Committee to do the job the jurisdiction of their
committee confers on them?
It appears that is exactly what this means.
This is not just bad policy.
Specifically excluding Senators from serving in any oversight
capacity would also set a terrible precedent.
The congressional oversight process that Senator Baucus and I
designed in the bipartisan trade promotion authority bill is a good
one, and it should be preserved.
Mr. President, I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this
amendment.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, hopefully, tomorrow, after a few
rollcall votes on a few remaining amendments, we are going to have an
opportunity to pass this bipartisan trade promotion authority act of
2002. I would like to address the issue of the bill for a few minutes
while we are waiting for final action by the Senate on how we proceed
tomorrow.
This bill provides the President with the flexibility he needs to
negotiate strong international trade agreements on behalf of U.S.
workers and farmers while maintaining Congress's constitutional role
over U.S. trade policy. It represents a thoughtful approach to
addressing the complex relationships between international trade,
workers' rights, and the environment, without undermining the
fundamental purpose and proven effectiveness of trade promotion
authority procedures.
Specifically, this bipartisan act gives the administration the
authority to negotiate and bring back trade agreements to Congress that
will eliminate and reduce trade barriers relating to manufacturing,
services, agriculture, intellectual property, investment, and e-
commerce.
The legislation supports eliminating subsidies that decrease market
opportunities for U.S. agriculture or unfairly distort markets to the
detriment of the United States, with special emphasis on biotechnology,
ending unjustified barriers not based on sound science, and fair
treatment for import-sensitive agriculture.
The legislation preserves U.S. sovereignty while engaging new trade
agreements that will create solid economic growth, improve efficiency
and innovation, create better, high-paying jobs for hard-working
Americans that on average pay 15 percent above the average wage, and
increases the availability of attractively priced products into the
U.S. market for the benefit of our consumers.
The legislation adds a trade negotiating objective on labor and the
environment--very important provisions for many Members of this body.
This is done to ensure that a party to a trade agreement does not fail
to effectively enforce its labor and environmental laws through a
sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, recognizing a
government retains certain discretion.
It strengthens, under the labor and environmental provisions, the
capacity to promote respect for core labor standards and to protect the
environment, to reduce or eliminate government practices or policies
that unduly threaten sustainable development, and it seeks market
access for U.S. environmental technologies, goods, and services.
The legislation adds a new negotiating objective on enforcement,
giving labor and environment disputes covered by the agreement parity
with other issues in the trade agreement.
It sets forth other Presidential priorities not covered by trade
promotion authority, including greater cooperation between the World
Trade Organization on the one hand, and the International Labor
Organization on the other hand, and consultative mechanisms among
parties to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading
partners to promote respect for core labor standards and the
environment, technical assistance on labor issues, and reporting on the
child labor laws of U.S. trading partners.
The legislation directs the President to take into account legitimate
health, safety, essential security, and consumer interests. It directs
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to preserve our ability to
enforce vigorously U.S. trade remedy laws and avoid agreements which
lessen the effectiveness of U.S. antidumping or countervailing duty
laws.
The legislation contains negotiating objectives on investment to
increase transparency for the dispute settlement process, calls for
standards of expropriation and compensation that are consistent with
U.S. legal principles and practice, and eliminates frivolous claims.
The bill expands and improves consultations between the
administration and Congress before, during, and after trade
negotiations and particularly in the development of implementing
legislation.
The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Assistance Act provides trade
promotion authority until June 1, 2005, with a possibility of a 2-year
extension. I point this out because there is a misunderstanding that
Congress is going to give all of its power to the President. We have
the consultation I talked about. Most importantly, whatever is agreed
to by the President has to be passed by Congress as a law before any
agreement can become effective. But we also do not give this power away
to the President forever. This is the year 2002, almost June 1. So we
are talking about the next 3 years with the possibility of a 2-year
extension.
I happen to believe we ought to have standing trade negotiation
authority for the President, and we should not have these lapses that
we have had since 1994, but obviously the extent to which we give it
for shorter periods of time ought to satisfy more Members of this body
that we are not giving up our congressional power, which is a specific
grant in our Constitution that Congress shall regulate interstate and
foreign commerce.
The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act also contains
unprecedented procedures that ensure prompt, meaningful, and extensive
consultations with the Congress throughout the negotiating process. In
other words, Members of this body and the other body are going to have
ample opportunity while the President is doing all this negotiating to
have reports given to us, feedback and, obviously, if Congress has to
pass a final product, the President, in negotiating a position for the
United States, is going to have to take into consideration the views of
Members of Congress if the President wants to reach an agreement that
will eventually pass by a majority vote in both the House and Senate.
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In regard to this negotiation process and consultation therein, the
bill establishes a congressional oversight group which is a broad-
based, bipartisan, and permanent institution to be accredited as though
official advisers to the U.S. delegation to consult with the U.S. Trade
Representative and provide advice regarding formulation of specific
objectives, negotiation strategies and positions, and development of
the final trade agreement.
This congressional oversight group would maximize bipartisanship and
input from Members from a broad range of committees comprising the
chairman and ranking member of the Ways and Means Committee, three
additional committee members, and also the chairman and ranking member,
and their designees, of each committee with a jurisdiction over any law
affected by trade agreements being negotiated.
The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Assistance Act also requires
development of a written plan by the U.S. Trade Representative for
consulting with Congress throughout the negotiations. That plan must
include provisions for regular and detailed briefings of the
congressional oversight group throughout the negotiations, access to
documents relating to negotiations by members of the congressional
oversight group, and their designated staffs. There would be very close
cooperation between the congressional oversight group and the U.S.
Trade Representative at all critical periods of the negotiations,
including at negotiation sites, after the agreement is concluded,
consultations regarding ongoing compliance and enforcement of
commitments under the agreement, and finally, transmittal of a report
by the Secretary of Commerce to Congress on U.S. strategy for
correcting World Trade Organization dispute settlement reports that add
to obligations or diminish rights of the United States.
It also provides that the President provide Congress with a written
notice of intent to enter negotiations 90 days before initiating
negotiations, or as soon as feasible after enactment of trade promotion
authority; for negotiations already underway, including the intended
date for entering negotiations, specific U.S. objectives and statement
of whether seeking new agreements or changes in the existing agreement;
and that the President and the U.S. Trade Representative consult with
Congress before initiating or continuing negotiations on agricultural
products, fish and shellfish trade, textiles and apparel products.
Before and after negotiations begin, the President and U.S. Trade
Representative must consult with Congress regarding the negotiations,
and particularly the U.S. Trade Representative must consult with all
committees with jurisdiction over laws that would affect an agreement.
Before and after negotiations begin, if a majority of the members of
the Congressional Oversight Committee request a meeting, the President
himself must meet with the group regarding the negotiations.
I have used the word ``consult'' many times. It is all reflected in
the legislation that Congress is very carefully guarding its
constitutional power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, and
we are having a contract with the President of the United States, but
that contract is not a blank check to the President of the United
States. He keeps in constant touch with us as the words ``consulting''
and ``consultation'' and ``consult'' imply, legally binding that he do
that.
So I hope it is very clear we are not willy-nilly delegating some
power to the President. Not at all. We are going to be a part of this
process.
Now, people might ask why, if Congress is going to be a part of the
process, are we having this contract with the President to negotiate
for us? It is because of the impossibility, and it ought to be very
obvious, 535 Members of Congress not having the ability to be in Geneva
or someplace else negotiating with 142 other countries on the issue of
some trade agreement. So we ask the President to do it.
I hope the emphasis upon consulting and Congress demanding that the
President sit down at certain points during this process indicates
that, in fact, we are very selfishly guarding congressional
responsibility.
There is another part of notice and consultation that is required
before actually entering into final trade agreements by the President,
before it is actually signed in other words, because immediately after
initiating an agreement the U.S. Trade Representative must consult
closely with appropriate congressional committees, including the
congressional trade advisers, the congressional oversight group, and
the House and Senate Committees on Agriculture.
The President is required, at least 90 days before entering an
agreement, to formally notify Congress of his intent to enter into an
agreement and publish notice of such intent in the Federal Register. At
this time, the President must also notify the appropriate congressional
committees of certain amendments proposed to be included in the
implementing bill and then provide the International Trade Commission
with details of the agreement so the ITC can prepare and submit an
assessment of the likely impact of the agreement on the U.S. economy
and specific industry sectors.
Before entering into an agreement, the President must consult with
the appropriate congressional committees and the congressional
oversight group regarding three matters: The nature of the agreement;
the extent to which the agreement meets congressional objectives as
outlined in the bill before Congress right now; and the implementation
of that agreement.
Both Houses of Congress have the ability, in the final analysis, as
we all know and as has been the practice for the last 25 years, to
disapprove an agreement by passing separate disapproval resolutions if
the administration fails or refuses to notify or consult with Congress
in accordance with the bill that is before Congress right now that
hopefully we will vote on tomorrow.
Another example of notice and consultation after a trade agreement is
entered into: After the President signs it, as soon as practical after
entering into an agreement, the President must submit a copy of the
agreement to Congress along with statements or reasons that he had for
entering into that agreement. The President is required, at least 60
days after entering an agreement, to submit to Congress a description
of the changes to existing laws that would be needed to comply with the
agreement.
The President is also required to submit to Congress the final text
of the agreement and provide an explanation of how the bill
implementing the agreement would change existing law, how the agreement
makes progress at achieving the Trade Promotion Authority Act's
objective, and also he must submit an implementation plan.
When that is all done, we then have to have notice and consultation
on an ongoing basis. The President must report to the appropriate
congressional committees on the mechanisms created among parties in the
agreement to promote respect for core labor standards and to develop
and implement sound environmental and health standards.
The President must also report on the required reviews of the impact
of future trade agreements on the environment and U.S. employment.
Congress may withdraw a trade promotion authority for failure to
consult. Disapproval resolutions can be introduced by any Senator and
may cover multiple agreements. Grounds for disapproval include failure
to make progress in achieving the objectives that the bill has laid
out.
Obviously, as I have stated before, none of this happens unless
Congress gives approval by majority vote in both the House and the
Senate to approve or disapprove these agreements negotiated under this
bill that hopefully will pass tomorrow.
I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the time until 10:30 a.m., May
23d, tomorrow, count against the time provided under the cloture.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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