[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 67 (Wednesday, May 22, 2002)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E877-E878]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   BOB STUMP NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                         HON. PETER A. DeFAZIO

                               of oregon

                    in the house of representatives

                         Thursday, May 16, 2002

       The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of 
     the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4546) to 
     authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for military 
     activities of the Department of Defense, and for military 
     construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for 
     fiscal year 2003, and for other purposes;

  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to continue my remarks about 
H.R. 4546, the fiscal year 2003 Department of Defense authorization 
act. In my previous remarks, I criticized the House Rules Committee for 
blocking all amendments, including five I drafted, that would have 
allowed the House to debate the wisdom of various weapons systems. I 
also detailed the rationale for my amendments to eliminate the Crusader 
artillery system.
  In my remarks today, I want to discuss another weapons system--the 
Army's Comanche helicopter--that is behind schedule, over budget, and 
unable to meet critical performance requirements.
  In at least eight reports since 1986, the GAO has raised concerns 
about the Army's effort to develop its next generation light 
helicopter, now known as the Comanche.
  Further, the Army itself has recognized problems with the Comanche 
program, which has been restructured five times since its inception. 
Previous restructurings have significantly delayed the development 
schedule, extended the production schedule, and reduced planned 
quantities.
  I personally have been raising red flags about the Comanche program 
since the late 1990s. The first GAO report I requested on the Comanche 
was released in August 1999. This report identified a number of cost, 
quality control, and performance concerns about the Comanche program.
  An updated report I requested from the GAO was released in June 2001. 
This report concluded that the concerns raised in the August 1999 
report had only gotten worse.
  It is not just the GAO that has raised concerns. The Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation has also been critical of the Comanche.
  I was pleased to see the House Armed Services Committee imposed a few 
conditions on the Army's Comanche helicopter program in H.R. 4546.
  One of the conditions, a requirement that the Army reassess the cost 
and timeline of the Comanche program, is similar to what I proposed in 
an amendment last year.
  The other condition, an annual report by the DOD Inspector General, 
is a useful step in providing for constant, independent oversight of 
the program.
  However, I am concerned that the Committee did not go quite far 
enough in protecting taxpayers from runaway costs for a program GAO and 
others have consistently identified as failing to meet testing and 
performance goals.
  The amendment I offered would have prohibited the Pentagon from 
awarding contracts for low rate initial production (LRIP) until the 
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of Operational 
Test and Evaluation, certified that the testing program has been 
rigorous enough to determine the program performs as expected in an 
operational environment, in other words, not just in computer 
simulation or laboratory tests. The amendment also required that the 
Comanche achieve key performance standards before contracts for LRIP 
could be awarded.
  According to the June 2001 GAO report, a decision on whether to move 
forward with low rate initial production was expected in June 2005.
  It is my understanding that in the year since the GAO report, the 
Comanche program has fallen even further behind schedule, and a LRIP 
decision now may not occur until 2008.
  Some might argue that my amendment, therefore, was premature. I would 
argue that given the repeated mismanagement of the Comanche program, 
Congress must send the unmistakable message that the program will not 
advance toward production until timing, cost, quality, and performance 
concerns are all addressed to our satisfaction. My amendment would have 
sent that message.
  Defense contractors push hard to get to LRIP decisions because, once 
they are over

[[Page E878]]

that hump, they know it is nearly impossible to kill the program. That 
is why Congress needed to signal now that we have no intention of 
allowing the LRIP decision from being made until we are fully satisfied 
the Comanche will work as advertised and will be built within 
reasonable cost and time constraints.
  I'd like to run down a few of the specific problems with the 
Comanche.
  In August 1999, the GAO warned the Comanche faced significant risks 
of cost overruns, scheduling delays, and degraded performance primarily 
because the Army decided to (1) begin engineering and manufacturing 
development before key technologies had matured, (2) compress the 
flight-testing schedule, which increases concurrency between 
development and operational testing, and (3) begin initial production 
before completing operational testing.
  In its most recent report, issued in June 2001, the GAO noted the 
problems identified in the August 1999 report have gotten worse. The 
GAO cites a range of concerns including understated acquisition program 
cost estimates; ambitious flight test schedules with substantial 
concurrency in test events; delays in another DOD program, the Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF), which had been counted on to develop a critical 
component of the aircraft; inadequate facilities to fully test and 
integrate system hardware and software; and considerable growth in 
aircraft weight.
  The program's total development and production cost estimate has 
increased by almost $4.8 billion--from $43.3 billion to $48.1 billion. 
This includes a $75 million increase in development costs and a nearly 
$4.8 billion increase in production costs. As the GAO notes, these 
costs are likely to further escalate.
  DOD's most recent cost estimate for the Comanche was done in April 
2000. At that time, DOD's Cost Analysis Improvement Group estimated the 
Comanche would need an additional $180 million for its engineering and 
manufacturing development phase. However, this money was not included 
in the April 2000 baseline.
  Further, in January 2001, DOD added about $504 million in funding to 
the Comanche program over the next few years. About $84 million was 
earmarked for RDT&E, the remaining $420 million was for production. 
These additional funds have not yet been reflected in the program's 
official cost estimates.
  The Comanche program office also maintains a list of unfunded 
requirements that total $68 million. According to the GAO, ``The 
program office acknowledges that, unless additional funds are obtained, 
some yet-to-be-determined program performance requirements could be 
impacted.''
  The Comanche is also missing testing and production targets.
  The GAO is particularly critical of the Comanche development and 
testing schedule, in which many crucial events come close together or 
concurrently in the late stages. The GAO specifically writes, ``We have 
reported that when development work and low-rate initial production 
(LRIP) are done concurrently, significant schedule delays that cause 
cost increases and other problems are not uncommon in early production. 
Also, production processes are often not able to consistently yield 
output of high quality when full-rate production begins.''
  Before entering the LRIP stage, previous GAO work has shown 
successful commercial firms already know that (1) technologies match 
customer requirements; that is, they can fit onto a product and 
function as expected, (2) the product's design meets performance 
requirements, and (3) the product can be produced within cost, 
schedule, and quality targets. According to GAO, ``It is unlikely the 
Army will have this level of knowledge about Comanche'' by the June 
2005 LRIP decision date.
  Specifically, the GAO notes ``several critical subsystems--to be 
included in the mission equipment package--may not be available until 
development flight-testing is well underway. These subsystems are very 
complex state-of-the-art systems that have not been demonstrated on a 
helicopter platform like Comanche.'' The GAO goes on to warn ``the 
Army's schedule for developing and testing software for the Comanche 
may not be completed prior to the full-rate production decision.''
  Failure to correct deficiencies prior to LRIP could lead to costly 
retrofits and repairs to aircraft already produced. As GAO wrote ``To 
produce that many aircraft during low-rate initial production, the Army 
will have to ramp up its production capabilities rapidly and at a time 
when the aircraft design is still evolving as new subsystems are 
introduced and test results are evaluated.''
  The Comanche is also failing to meet performance requirements.
  GAO says the Comanche is at risk of not achieving its rate of 
vertical climb requirement. The Comanche's ability to climb at a rate 
of 500 feet per minute is a key performance requirement as identified 
by the DOD itself. The Comanche's weight was a concern in the GAO's 
August 1999 report. The problem had only gotten worse by the time of 
the June 2001 report. The Comanche's empty weight had increased by 653 
pounds--from 8,822 to 9,475--which threatens the vertical climb 
requirement.
  GAO also says the Comanche is unlikely to complete the development 
and integration of its mission equipment package, which is needed to 
support a range of important functions including early warning, target 
acquisition, piloting, navigation, and communications.
  GAO also warns the program is not successfully completing development 
of the system for detecting equipment problems. A critical component of 
the Comanche is its on-board fault detection system that can rapidly 
and accurately provide information about equipment problems. Without 
this system, the cost of maintaining the aircraft would increase. 
According to the Army, this system needs to be 75 to 95 percent 
accurate--75 percent for mechanical and electrical equipment and 95 
percent for avionics and electronics equipment. However, the Comanche 
program office has concluded this requirement will be difficult to 
achieve within the current cost, weight, and packaging constraints and 
does not expect to achieve a mature fault detection and fault isolation 
capability until two years after initial fielding.
  Finally, the GAO warns the Comanche is failing to achieve the 
``beyond-line-of-sight'' communications capability needed to perform 
its mission. Satellite communications are essential to this 
reconnaissance capability. The Army was planning to rely on satellite 
communication technology that was being developed and miniaturized as 
part of the Joint Strike Fighter program. However, the JSF has been 
delayed. The Comanche program office now believes it must develop its 
own satellite communication technology. GAO warns the development 
schedule ``remains high-risk for the timely inclusion of this 
capability on the initially fielded Comanche helicopters.''
  Finally, the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
raised significant concerns about the Comanche in a 2000 report. Among 
the criticisms, the report said:
  ``It is highly unlikely that the Service can deliver the expected 
system performance within the current budget and schedule. Lacking an 
operational assessment of an integrated system, it is difficult to 
predict with any degree of confidence whether the individual subsystems 
can be successfully integrated, whether the subsystems will function 
properly in an operational environment, or whether, in concert, they 
will provide the anticipated benefits in operational performance.''
  ``DOT&E's assessment of the Comanche's weight projections found 
several questionable areas, including overly optimistic expected weight 
reductions and questionable estimates of future weight growth.''
  ``Overall, the Comanche has a risky test and evaluation strategy for 
integrating the MEP (mission equipment package) on the aircraft ... The 
resulting schedule compression allows little reserve in the timetable, 
thereby increasing the impact of unforeseen events/delays.''
  As the aforementioned warnings I've outlined from the GAO and the 
Pentagon's own Director of Operational Test and Evaluation make clear, 
Congress should not continue to pour money into the Comanche without 
regard to results.
  Unfortunately, H.R. 4546 continues to sink billions of taxpayer 
dollars into weapons system of dubious utility and questionable 
performance.

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