[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 66 (Tuesday, May 21, 2002)]
[House]
[Pages H2820-H2834]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DEFENDING PRESIDENT BUSH REGARDING KNOWLEDGE OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001,
THREAT, AND DETAILING UPCOMING TRAVEL TO RUSSIA, UZBEKISTAN, CHINA, AND
NORTH KOREA
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Issa). Under the Speaker's announced
policy of January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon)
is recognized provisionally for half the time remaining until midnight.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I take the time this
evening, and thank the Speaker and the staff for bearing with me, to
basically perform two functions.
First of all, I will respond to those critics of President Bush who
have taken unfair shots at him over the 9-11 situation, and will
factually refute what people like the minority leader, the gentleman
from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), have said publicly about this President
somehow not heeding evidence that was provided to him.
I am going to present the true facts of what we could have and should
have done prior to September 11 that I think would have allowed us to
both understand what was about to occur and to have done something
about it.
The second action I am going to discuss this evening is an upcoming
trip that I will be leading to Russia, Uzbekistan, Beijing, China, as
well as Pyongyang, North Korea, the first delegation going into that
country, and Seoul, South Korea, at the end of this week.
Mr. Speaker, let me start out by saying, first of all, in response to
many of the media pundits who have spent the last week or 10 days
criticizing President Bush and have publicly said that he had
indications that should have alerted him to the upcoming attack on the
World Trade Center, nothing could be farther from the truth. The facts
are all in. The data the President got were basically individual
elements provided by individual agencies about potential acts that
might be against our country, nowhere near the immensity of what we
actually saw on September 11.
They were bits of information, like the CIA saying there might be an
attempt to hijack an airplane, but no linkage of that act to an attack
on the Trade Center; or the fact that other agencies were looking at
pilots that were obtaining licenses and had no intention of landing an
airplane. Each of these bits of information, while being provided to
the upper levels of our government, in and of themselves would not lead
anyone to believe that an imminent attack was about to occur on the
Trade Center.
But Mr. Speaker, as I said on September 11 on CNN live at 12 noon
from the roof of a church across from the Capitol, on that day the
government did fail the American people. Now, the President did not
fail the American people, but the government failed the American
people.
I am going to document for our colleagues today, and for the American
public and the media, steps that we took in the years prior to
September 11 when our agencies and the government did not respond. This
started back in the Clinton administration and continued during the
Bush administration.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, during the late 1990s, I chaired the Committee
on Research for our national security, which meant that my job was to
oversee about $38 billion a year that we spend on cutting-edge
technology for the military.
One of those projects that I helped get additional funding for was
the Information Dominant Center that the Army was standing up down at
Fort Belvoir, technically known as the LIWAC. This Land Information
Warfare Assessment Center was designed to monitor on a 24-hour-a-day
basis 7 days a week all of our military classified systems, those
systems used to run the Army. Each of our services was in the process
of standing up an entity like the one that the Army stood up at Fort
Belvoir.
Back in 1997, as I was supporting increased funding for this
capability, I was amazed in two trips that I took to Fort Belvoir that
the Army was not just able to maintain security over their information
systems, but they were able to use new software tools and high-speed
computers to do what is commonly called ``profiling,'' to take vast
amounts of information about the classified and unclassified
information and process it and analyze it so that a picture could be
drawn and a threat could be developed, proliferation could be
monitored.
{time} 2310
Now, this was back in 1997. In fact, I had a chance to use these
capabilities and I think this story, more than any other, underscores
the inabilities of our agencies on September 11 to really understand
the threat that was emerging.
[[Page H2821]]
As you might recall, back in 1997 we had gotten into a war in Kosovo
to remove Milosevic from power. All of Congress was not supportive of
that conflict. In fact, I opposed the initial involvement with
President Clinton by our troops, not because I have supported Milosevic
but because I felt that we did not force Russia or allow Russia to play
a more vibrant role in helping us to get Milosevic out of power.
Two weeks after the bombing campaign started, I started to receive
telephone calls and started to receive e-mails from my Russian
colleagues in the State Duma. People who are senior leaders who called
me and e-mailed me and said we have a real problem. Your policy of
bombing Milosevic and innocent Serbs is causing the Russian people to
lose confidence in what America's real intent is, and you are driving
Russia further away from our country. And I said what do you want me to
do? They said we need you to convince your president that Russia can
help play a role in ending the war and getting Milosevic out of office.
And the Russians told me that they wanted me to go to Belgrade in the
middle of the conflict, that they would arrange a meeting with
Milosevic.
Well, I told them that that was very much undoable because we were in
the middle of a war. We were bombing Serbia at the time. But I asked
them to put that request in writing and they did. Within the next few
days I got a letter on official Duma stationery where the Russians
outlined their desire to take me and a delegation of Members of
Congress to Belgrade, Yugoslavia. They outlined who would come from the
Russian side and they committed that they would have a meeting with
Milosevic personally with a date and time certain. They also agreed to
visit a refugee camp of our choosing so we could show them the damage
that Milosevic had caused innocent people, and they also agreed to
release the three American POWs that were being held hostage.
When the letter came, it also included the name of an individual I
did not know. His name was Dragomir Kric. The Russians had told me that
this individual was very close to Milosevic personally, that the
Russians trusted him, and that he was the guy that would get Milosevic
to agree to the terms to end the hostilities against the Serbian,
Yugoslavian people.
The Russian request I then took to the State Department with my
colleague, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) on the other side.
We had a 1 hour and 30 minute meeting in the Office of Deputy Secretary
of State Strobe Talbott. We outlined for him what the Russians had
requested for us and that we were willing to lead a delegation into
Belgrade in spite of the war going on. Strobe Talbott listened and he
said, I do not think it is a good idea. He said we cannot guarantee
your safety and we do not think Milosevic will do what the Russians say
he will do, and we think he will just use you. So my advice is not to
go, but as citizens in America you can do what you want.
I said that we would not violate the request of our State Department
and would not go. But the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) suggested
that perhaps we should meet the Russians in a neutral city and he
suggested Vienna. Strobe Talbott said that was fine. So I came back to
Capitol Hill and I sent a letter to all 435 members of the House
outlining for them what the Russians had asked, what the administration
response was, and invited every Member of this body to attend a meeting
if they were interested in going with us to Vienna. From the meeting
that we held 1- Members of Congress, 5 Democrats and 5 Republicans,
volunteered to go with me to Vienna to meet with our Russian
counterparts and Mr. Kric.
Now, before we left on that trip I wanted to know something about
Kric so I called the CIA director, George Tennant. I said I do not know
who this guy is. The Russians are convinced that he can give us
information that will allow us to get Milosevic to agree to our terms.
Can you tell me something about him as the director of the CIA?
He called me back the next day and gave me 2 or 3 sentences about
Dragomir Kric and said that they thought he was tied in with the
corruption in Russia but did not know much else about him.
Without telling anyone, Mr. Speaker, I went back to my friends at the
Army Information Dominence Center, and I said can you run me a profile
of a Dragomir Kric and tell me something about him. They ran a profile
and they came back to me with 8 pages of information about this man,
the profile of someone who was very close to Milosevic personally.
With that information, we left on a military plane on a Thursday
afternoon after votes and flew all night to Vienna, arrived on Friday
morning, and began our discussions in the hotel in Vienna with the 11
members of Congress, a State Department representative, the 5 Russians
and Dragomir Kric.
We worked all through Friday into the night and into Saturday. And by
Saturday midday something historic had happened. The Russians had
agreed to the terms that we wanted to end the conflict. The Russians
had agreed to things they had never agreed to. During the time when we
were meeting, Kric was calling back to Belgrade talking to Milosevic on
the phone personally. He would come back in the room and he would tell
us what Milosevic was happy with and what he was not, but we were not
there to negotiate with Milosevic. We were there to get the Russians to
agree with us on an end to the conflict.
By 2 o'clock on Saturday afternoon we reached agreement. It was word
for word read by the Russian and American side and we all signed off on
an end to the war. It was an historic time for us because we thought we
could stop the bombing and stop killing innocent people and get
Milosevic out of power.
Kric immediately left the room and made a phone call. He came back in
the room and said I just talked to Milosevic personally, and he has
assured me that if we go down as a group right now to Belgrade, and I
will hire the bus, and we all go down together, Milosevic will meet
with us, he will agree to this framework which ends his reign. He will
agree to accept international peacekeeping force to disarm the Serbs,
and he will agree to allowing a U.N. or NATO force to bring stability
to this country. And he will also release the 3 POWs that have not been
heard from since they were captured by Milosevic.
Well, that was pretty historic, Mr. Speaker. So my colleagues on the
other side called the White House from Vienna. They get on the White
House operation center phone line and talked to John Podesta, the chief
of staff for the President. And they said we have something that you
have to get to President Clinton immediately. We have negotiated what
we think is the end of the Kosovo war with the Russians, with a
representative of Milosevic agreeing to the terms.
Another representative with us of the State Department called the
State Department operations center and he told them what had
transpired. So he notified both the White House and the State
Department. The State Department said let me talk to Congressman
Weldon. So I got on the phone. On the other end of the line was Steven
Sestanovich who was at that time in charge of the Russia desk at the
State Department.
I outlined for him what had occurred. He said, Curt, this is amazing
but it is above my pay grade. I cannot tell you what to do. Hold on and
I will have someone else call you back. Thirty minutes later, Mr.
Speaker, I got a call from Tom Pickering. Tom Pickering was at that
time number three in the State Department and had been the ambassador
for us to Russia. I had known him in that capacity. He said, Curt, what
is going on? And I explained to him that we had met with the Russians
and Kric. We had reached agreement, and that Milosovic through Kric was
saying that he was prepared to end the war if we went down to Belgrade.
So I said to Tom Pickering, what do you think we should do?
He said, Curt, first of all, we do not trust Milosevic. We do not
think that he will live up to what he is telling you through this guy
Kric; and, furthermore, Curt, I do not even know who Kric is. I never
heard of this guy and how could you believe that somehow he speaks for
Milosevic?
I said, Tom, I did not know Kric either before I came here, but I
know the Russians. They are my friends, and they have convinced me that
he is the
[[Page H2822]]
person that can get Milosevic to do what we want. He said, I do not
think it is a good idea. In fact, let me tell you, the Reverend Jesse
Jackson has been in Belgrade for a week. We have been in constant
communication with him. In fact, he is coming home today. His
delegation has been unsuccessful. They were trying to get the three
POWs released, he said, but their mission has failed.
{time} 2320
What makes you think that you can do something that the Reverend
Jesse Jackson could do? I do not know, Tom. All I am telling you is
what the Russians are saying based upon Kric's taught discussions with
Milosevic. He said I do not think you should go, and I said okay, then
we will not, because we are a Nation of laws and not of people.
I came back to the room where the Members of Congress were seated
with our Russian counterparts. I told them the story, and they
immediately became incensed at me. Kric called me a coward for not
taking a delegation to Belgrade. He said, You just lost a chance to end
the war and bring home your POWs.
I had Members of Congress from both parties telling me they were
going to go on their own, and I said, Oh no, you are not; we came in a
military plane that I acquired; you are going back to America with me.
So the 11 Members of Congress and the Russians and our State
Department official sat down and discussed how we would implement our
plan instead of going to see Milosevic in Belgrade. Kric went out of
the room and came back in after making a phone call, and said, You just
blew it; Milosevic had said you had a chance to end the war, to get him
to publicly accept this agreement and he would release the POWs.
We continued to meet. Two hours later, our Navy escort came into the
room, and he said to the 11 Members of Congress that CNN has just
announced that Milosevic is releasing the POWs to Jesse Jackson's
delegation. Kric told us that Milosevic did not want to keep them
because he was fearful they would be harmed and we would blame him for
their injuries. Even though he did not want to release them to Jesse
Jackson, he did.
To continue the story and make my point, Mr. Speaker, we all came
back home to America. We briefed our colleagues. We briefed the
administration. We presented the framework that we negotiated, and 8
days later, or 2 weeks later, that became the basis of the G-8
agreement to end the war. So our work was fruitful, but something
interesting happened that applies to September 11.
I got a call from the FBI in my office asking my staff to allow two
agents to come over for me to brief them, for me to brief them, on a
fellow named Dragomir Kric. I said, Fine, set it up for Monday
afternoon in my office in the Rayburn Building. I went back to
Pennsylvania, and on the Friday before that Monday, my office paged me
with a 911 page. I called them and they said, You must call CIA
congressional affairs immediately. I did.
The CIA said, Congressman, we are going to fly two agents to
Philadelphia right now. They will meet you at the airport, they will
come to your home, they will come to a hotel, wherever you want to meet
them, but they have to talk to you immediately. I said, What is the
urgency? They said, We have been tasked by the State Department to
brief them on Dragomir Kric and we want you to tell us what you know
about him. I said, Well, the FBI already asked for that information,
why can't we do it together on Monday afternoon?
So that Monday afternoon I had four agents in my office: two CIA
agents, one CI person and two FBI agents. For two hours they grilled me
with four pages of questions about Kric.
I answered all their questions. I told them that there were four Kric
brothers, that they were the owners of the largest banking system in
the former Yugoslavia; that they employed some 60,000 people; that
their bank had tried to finance the sale of an SA-10 from Russia to
Milosevic; that their bank had been involved in a $4 billion German
bond scam; that one of the brothers had financed Milosevic's election;
that the house Milosevic lived in was really their house; that, in
fact, Krics' wives were best of friends with Milosevic's wife; and that
they were the closest people to this leader.
I told them all the information. When I got done, Mr. Speaker, I
said, Now, do you want to know where I got my data from? They said,
Yeah, you got it from the Russians. I said, No. They said, Well, then
you got it from Kric. I said, No. I said, Before I went over there I
had the Army's information dominant center run a profile for me of
Dragomir Kric.
The FBI and the CIA in 1997 said to me, what is the Army's
information dominant center? The FBI and the CIA had no knowledge that
our military was developing a capability that would be able to do
massive data mining of information to allow us to do a profile of a
person or an event that was about to happen.
We took that model, based on that lesson which infuriated me as a
Member of Congress to be asked to brief the CIA and the FBI, and
working with people in the intelligence agencies, I developed a plan.
This plan was to create a national collaborative center.
Back in 1997, Mr. Speaker, the national collaborative center where
there were articles written, published in the media, technical media
here was called the NOAH, N-O-A-H. It stands for National Operations
and Analysis Hub. The function of the NOAH would be to have all 32
Federal agencies that have classified systems have a node of each of
those systems in one central location managed by one of their
employees, and when tasked by the national command authority, the
President or the National Security Council, their data would be entered
into a massive computer using new software tools like STARLITE and
SPIRES and six others that are used by the private sector to do data
mining.
In addition to classified information systems, they would also run
through massive amounts of unclassified data, newspaper stories,
magazine story, TV broadcasts, radio broadcasts. A person cannot do
that manually, but they can do it through high-speed computers, as the
Army did for me in developing the profile of Kric.
We took this plan and we said to the intelligence community, this is
what we need to have to be prepared for threats in the 21st century,
because the threats we are going to see over the next several decades
will not come only from one nation state, they will come from terrorist
organizations. We need to be able to pool all this data together and be
able to profile it, analyze it and then come back with a true picture
of what may be about to occur.
Mr. Speaker, this was in 1997. I briefed John Hamre. Dr. John Hamre
was then the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I said, John, you have got to
go down to Fort Belvoir and see this facility; it is amazing. He went
down twice. He called me back and he said, Curt, it is amazing what
they are doing there. This profiling worked, and they could do it
because unofficially some other secret lines were running through Fort
Belvoir that the Army could unofficially access. So it really was an
official process.
He said, But you know, Curt, I cannot get to where you want to go
because the CIA and the FBI will not cooperate and neither will the
other agencies. He said, So I have a suggestion for you. Why do you not
host a meeting in your office? I will come and you invite my
counterparts at the FBI and the CIA.
So, Mr. Speaker, in my office, in 1998, I had the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the Deputy Director of the CIA and the Deputy Director of the
FBI, four of us met for 1 hour. We briefed them on the NOAH. We talked
about the need for a national collaborative center, national data
fusion center; and the response was, We do not need to do that right
now, we are doing our own systems in our own agencies; so thank you for
your recommendations, and we are trying to share but not the way you
want because that is too bold. That is too aggressive. This was 1998,
Mr. Speaker.
Not satisfied with that, we held hearings. We did briefings for our
colleagues; and in two consecutive defense bills, I put language in the
bill that basically said the Defense Department and our intelligence
agencies had to create a national collaborative center. So it became a
part of the law; but Mr. Speaker, the agencies refused. They
[[Page H2823]]
said we do not need to do that, we do our job very well.
Each of them does their job very well, but the problem is the threats
in the 21st century will be seen from a number of different sources. It
may be information coming from the Customs Department or from the
Defense Intelligence Agency or from the NSA or from the CIA or the FBI
or Commerce, State and Justice, all of which have classified systems;
or it may come from some public statements in articles in other
countries. We can only have the capability to understand all of that if
we have a national fusion center.
{time} 2230
We did not have that capability before September 11. That is why I
stood up on September 11, at 12 p.m. in the afternoon and said, ``Today
our government failed the American people.'' Because, Mr. Speaker, we
knew what we should have done. We knew what we could have done. And we
did not do it.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, I firmly believe that if we would have
implemented the NOAH, which John Hamre offered to pay for with DOD
dollars, back when we first recommended it, I am convinced we could
have stopped or known about and prevented September 11 from ever
happening.
Let me give an example. CIA information on terrorism, combined with
what the FBI knew about training pilots and open-source information on
remarks by al Qaeda, would have helped the intelligence community and
enforcement agencies focus better on the threat. For example, in August
of 2000, an al Qaeda member had been interviewed by an Italian
newspaper and reported that al Qaeda was training kamikaze pilots. The
intelligence community and enforcement agencies, however, do not read
open-source information. Yes, they read all the classified stuff, but
this interview in 2000 was in an open-source newspaper account in
Italy.
If we would have had a fusion center, all of that data would have
been processed, and in very real quick time, through massive high-speed
computers, and we would have seen the linkages between what was
occurring. But with each agency doing its own thing, it is impossible
to see the linkages. And that is why when President Bush before
September 11 got a bit of information from the CIA and a bit from the
FBI, and something else, and nothing from open sources, there is no way
he could have foretold what was about to occur.
If we would have had the NOAH in place, an idea that was developed
with the intelligence community, an idea that was briefed to the FBI,
briefed to the CIA and briefed to the Defense Department, I think we
could have done something to prevent al Qaeda.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, there is another interesting development that
occurred. After the Army showed the capability of the LIWAC model at
Ft. Belvoir, other services began to take interest. Special forces
command down in Florida contacted the Army and said, hey, we hear you
are doing some neat things. We want to build a mini version of what you
are doing down at our headquarters.
I did not find out about this until October of 2001, after the attack
on the trade center. A year before, special forces command developed
their own mini version of a data processing or collaborative center
with very limited capabilities. But what they did, Mr. Speaker, they
did a profile of al Qaeda 1 year before 9-11.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Issa). The gentleman from Pennsylvania
(Mr. Weldon) is recognized to continue until midnight.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, here is the chart, the
unclassified chart of what special forces command had 1 year before 9-
11. Interesting. The entire al Qaeda network is identified in a graphic
chart with all the linkages to all the terrorist groups around the
world.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, I was told by the folks who developed the
capability for special forces command that this chart and the briefing
that was supposed to be given to General Shelton, Chairman of our Joint
Chiefs, had a recommendation to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's
network. Mr. Speaker, this was 1 year before 9-11. This was not during
President Bush's administration. This occurred in the fall of the
remaining term of President Bill Clinton.
The key question I have been trying to get at is why was this 3-hour
briefing, which I also got, I got General Holland to bring his briefers
up from Florida with special forces, I went in the Pentagon, went in
the tank, and they gave me the briefing, as much as they could give me,
because part of it is being used for our operational plan, why was that
3-hour briefing with the recommendations to take out 5 cells of bin
Laden's network condensed down to a 1-hour brief when it was given to
General Hugh Shelton in January of 2001? And why were the
recommendations to take out 5 cells not followed up on? That is the
question we should get answered, Mr. Speaker.
Because 1 year before 9-11, the capability that special forces built
actually identified to us the network of al Qaeda. And they went beyond
that and gave us recommendations where we could take out cells to
eliminate their capability. So for those pundits out there sitting in
their armchairs criticizing President Bush, they have it all wrong.
Facts are a tough thing to refute, and the fact is that back in 1997,
we told the administration at that time what to do. In 1998, we briefed
the agencies. In 1999, we put language in a defense bill. In 2000, we
put language in a defense bill. In 2000, special forces command built
another mini version of that capability. And in 2000 they briefed
General Shelton telling him to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's network.
All of that activity could have prevented or helped to prevent 9-11
from ever occurring. I challenge my colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to review
the facts. I challenge the media to report the truth.
We still do not have a national collaborative center. That capability
still does not exist. We are getting there, but it has been a long
road. I briefed our Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, with the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton), chairman of the Committee on
Government Reform, about 4 months ago. He agreed with us, but he has
not yet been able to achieve this new interagency collaborative center,
and that is an indictment of our government that the American people
deserve to be outraged over.
We need this kind of capability in the 21st century, because these
bits of pieces of information have to be pieced together, both
classified and unclassified, so that our analysts can get the clear
picture of what may be about to occur against our people and our
friends.
So, Mr. Speaker, I seek to clarify the charges against the President
and to answer them, and I encourage my colleagues to learn more about
the need for a national collaborative center, a national data fusion
center or, as I call it, a national operations and analysis hub.
Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the Record the documentation from as
far back as 1998, 1999, and 2000 with our recommendations to implement
this kind of capability:
of an Office of Transformation within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to advise the Secretary on--
(1) development of force transformation strategies to
ensure that the military of the future is prepared to
dissuade potential military competitors and, if that fails,
to fight and win decisively across the spectrum of future
conflict;
(2) ensuring a continuous and broadly focused
transformation process;
(3) service and joint acquisition and experimentation
efforts, funding for experimentation efforts, promising
operational concepts and technologies and other
transformation activities, as appropriate; and
(4) development of service and joint operational concepts,
transformation implementation strategies, and risk management
strategies.
(c) Sense of Congress of Funding.--It is the sense of
Congress that the Secretary of Defense should consider
providing funding adequate for sponsoring selective
prototyping efforts, wargames, and studies and analyses and
for appropriate staffing, as recommended by the director of
an Office of Transformation as described in subsection (b).
SEC. 903. REVISED JOINT REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL
COLLABORATIVE INFORMATION ANALYSIS CAPABILITY.
(A) Revised Report.--At the same time as the submission of
the budget for fiscal year 2003 under section 1105 of title
31, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional defense committees and the congressional
intelligence committees a revised report assessing
alternatives for the establishment of a national
[[Page H2824]]
collaborative information analysis capability.
(b) Matters Included.--The revised report shall cover the
same matters required to be included in the DOD/CIA report,
except that the alternative architectures assessed in the
revised report shall be limited to architectures that include
the participation of All Federal agencies involved in the
collection of intelligence. The revised report shall also
include a draft of legislation sufficient to carry out the
preferred architecture identified in the revised report.
(c) Officials To Be Consulted.--The revised report shall be
prepared after consultation with all appropriate Federal
officials, including the following:
(1) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(2) The Secretary of Commerce.
(3) The Secretary of State.
(4) The Attorney General.
____
Defense Information and Electronics Report
weldon: dod needs massive intelligence network for shared threat info
Senior Pentagon officials are mulling over an idea proposed
by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) that would link classified and
unclassified documents in a massive intelligence
clearinghouse that could be accessed by 33 federal agencies--
a concept similar in some ways to one floated by DOD
intelligence officials but with significantly fewer players
involved.
``Our problem with intelligence is that we're stove-
pipped,'' said Weldon, chairman of the House Armed Services
military research and development subcommittee, during a Nov.
8 interview. ``Each agency has its own way of collecting data
and analyzing it, but they don't share that information with
other agencies. The need is to have a better system of
analyzing and fusing data sets across agencies and services--
certainly within the Pentagon and the military, but my
opinion is that we have to go further than that.''
Weldon first proposed the concept of a ``National
Operations Analysis Hub'' to Deputy Defense Secretary John
Hamre last June, although the congressman said he kept his
initiative quiet until a stronger plan could be developed.
The Pentagon-funded network of agencies would be operated
by DOD. According to Weldon, it would pull together large
amounts of information to produce intelligence profiles of
people, regions and national security threats, such as
information warfare and cyber-terrorism.
``The NOAH concept of a national collaborative environment
supporting policy and decision-makers mirrors the ideas you
have expressed to me in recent discussions, and it is a
tangible way to confront the growing asymmetrical threats to
our nation,'' Weldon wrote in his July 30 letter to Hamre.
The NOAH concept, however, was not wholeheartedly embraced
by Hamre, who met with Weldon last summer and told the
congressman his suggested use of the Army's Land Information
Warfare Activity at Ft. Belvoir, VA, as a model for NOAH,
would never stick.
Because LIWA is already short of resources, the Army is
apprehensive about taking on any new tasks, Hamre told
Weldon.
Weldon, in a July 21 letter to Hamre, also urged the
Pentagon to support additional future funding for LIWA,
citing critical budget shortfalls that he said have kept the
agency from fulfilling a barrage of requests for intelligence
files from Army commanders (Defense Information and
Electronics Report, July 30, p1).
``There's massive amounts of data out there, and you have
to be able to analyze it and create ways to focus on that
data so its relevant to whatever you're interested in,'' he
said this week about his support for LIWA. ``Well, the Army
has already done that.''
While Weldon continues to push for NOAH to be patterned
after LIWA, he sees it operating on a much larger scale.
Impressed by its ability to pull together huge amounts of
both unclassified and classified data, Weldon noted LIWA's
Information Dominance Center can create in-depth profiles
that could be useful to the CIA, FBI and the White House. Yet
most federal agencies don't even know LIWA exists, he added.
``Right now the military is limited to [its] own sources of
information,'' Weldon said. ``And in the 21st century, a
terrorist group is more than likely going to be involved with
terrorist nations. So the boundaries are crossed all the
time. We don't have any way to share that and get beyond the
stove-pipping.''
Meanwhile, officials within the Defense Department's
intelligence community have been considering another way to
amass intelligence information through a concept called the
Joint Counter-intelligence Assessment Group. A DOD
spokeswoman said proponents of the idea, for now, are
unwilling to disclose details about it. She was also unable
to say whether a formal proposal to Hamre had been made yet.
In Weldon's July 30 letter to Hamre, however, Weldon
alludes to an ongoing, ``initiative to link
counterintelligence groups throughout the community.''
``I have heard of an attempts to connect the Office of Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) and [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] assets with federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies,'' Weldon wrote.
However, Weldon said in the interview he believes JCAG is
simply more ``stove-pipping.''
`I also have seen what the Army has done at LIWA, which has
created a foundation for creating a higher-level architecture
collaborating all of these efforts,'' his July letter states.
NOAH would link together almost every federal agency with
intelligence capabilities, including the National Security
Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Energy
Department, the CIA and the FBI. Both Congress and the White
House would be offered a ``node'' for briefing capabilities,
meaning intelligence agencies could detail situations on
terrorist attacks or wartime scenarios.
``It's mainly for policymakers, the White House
decisionmakers, the State Department, military, and military
leaders,'' he said.
Although information-sharing among the intelligence
community has yet to be formalized through NOAH or JCAG or a
similar system, military officials have said they need some
kind of linked access capability.
Intelligence systems need to be included within the Global
Information Grid--the military's vision of a future global
network that could be accessed from anywhere in the world,
said Brig. Gen. Marilyn Quagliotti, vice director of the
Joint Staff's command, control, communications and computers
directorate, during a Nov. 5 speech on information assurance
at a conference in Arlington, VA.
``We need a more integrated strategy, including help from
[the Joint Staff's intelligence directorate] with
intelligence reports or warnings of an attack,'' she said.
Quagliotti said the toughest challenge for achieving
``information superiority'' is the need to unite networks and
network managers under one command structure with stronger
situational awareness capabilities.
``Part of [the challenge] is the overwhelming amount of
information, the ability to access that Information, and the
ability to reach back and get that information, which means
that networks become more crucial to the warfight,'' she
said.
____
[From Signal, Apr. 2000]
Fusion Center Concept Takes Root As Congressional Interest Waxes
Creation of a national operations and analysis hub is
finding grudging acceptance among senior officials in the
U.S. national security community. This fresh intelligence
mechanism would link federal agencies to provide instant
collaborative threat profiling and analytical assessments for
use against asymmetrical threats. National policy makers,
military commanders and law enforcement agencies would be
beneficiaries of the hub's information.
Prodded by a resolute seven-term Pennsylvania congressman
and reminded by recent terrorist and cyberthreat activities,
the U.S. Defense Department is rethinking its earlier
aversion to the idea, and resistance is beginning to crumble.
Funding to establish the national operations and analysis hub
(NOAH), which would link 28 federal agencies, is anticipated
as a congressional add-on in the Defense Department's new
budget. An initial $10 million in funding is likely in fiscal
year 2001 from identified research and development accounts.
Spearheading the formation of NOAH is Rep. Curt Weldon (R-
PA), chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives National
Security Committee's military research and development
subcommittee. He emphasizes that challenges facing U.S.
leaders are beginning to overlap, blurring distinction and
jurisdiction. ``The increasing danger is both domestic and
international.''
Conceptually, NOAH would become a national-level operations
and control center with a mission to integrate various
imagery, data and analytical viewpoints. The intelligence
products would support U.S. actions. ``I see NOAH as going
beyond the capability of the National Military Command Center
and the National Joint Military Intelligence Command. NOAH
would provide recommended courses of action that allow the
U.S. to effectively meet emerging challenges in near real
time,'' the congressman illustrates.
``This central national-level hub would be composed of a
system of agency-specified mini centers, or `pods,' of
participating agencies and services associated with growing
national security concerns,'' Weldon reports. ``NOAH would
link the policy maker with action recommendations derived
from fused information provided by the individual pod.''
Automation and connectivity would allow the pods to talk to
each other in a computer-based environment to share data and
perspectives on a given situation.
The congressman believes that NOAH should reside within the
Defense Department and is modeling the hub's concept on a
U.S. Army organization he closely follows. He says the idea
for NOAH comes from officials in several federal agencies.
However, it is also based on his own experiences with the
U.S. Army's Intelligence and Security Command's (INSCOM's)
Land Warfare Information Activity (LIWA) and Information
Dominance Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
Patterned after LIWA, (SIGNAL, March, page 31), NOAH would
display collaborative threat profiling and analysis. With the
aid of a variety of electronic tools, the hub would support
national actions, Weldon discloses.
The congressman is conscious of other initiatives such as
linking counterintelligence groups throughout the community.
He also
[[Page H2825]]
is aware of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's)
counterterrorism center, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI's) National Infrastructure Protection
Center and a new human intelligence (HUMNIT) special
operations center. ``We don't need another analytical center.
Instead, we need a national-level fusion center that can take
already analyzed data and offer courses of action for
decision making,'' he insists.
Weldon's wide experience in dealing with officials from the
FBI, CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) convince him
that policy makers are continuing to work in a vacuum.
``Briefings and testimonies are the primary vehicles for
transmitting information to leaders. The volume of
information germane to national security issues is expanding
so rapidly that policy makers are overwhelmed with data,'' he
claims.
Robust situational awareness of asymmetric threats to
national security is a key in assisting leaders, Weldon
observes. ``Policy makers need an overarching information and
intelligence architecture that will quickly assimilate,
analyze and display assessments and recommend courses of
action for many simultaneous national emergencies,'' he
declares. The concept of NOAH also calls for virtual
communications among policy makers.
Weldon's plan is for White House, Congress, Pentagon and
agency-level leaders each to have a center where they
receive, send, share and collaborate on assessments before
they act. He calls NOAH the policy maker's tool. In the
collaborative environment, the hub would provide a
multiissue, multiagency hybrid picture to the White House
situation room and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
NOAH's concept also includes support for HUMINT and
peacekeeping missions along with battle damage assessment.
The same system could later help brace congressional
committees and hearings. The new capability would allow
application of foreign threat analyses to policy, while
providing a hybrid situational awareness picture of the
threat, Weldon relates. Industrial efforts of interest to the
policy maker could be incorporated, and academia also could
be directly linked.
In meetings with high-level FBI, CIA and defense officials,
Weldon stressed the need to ``acquire, fuse and analyze
disparate data from many agencies in order to support the
policy maker's actions against threats from terrorism,
[ballistic missile] proliferation, illegal technology
diversions, espionage, narcotics [trafficking], information
warfare and cyberterrorism.'' He is convinced that current
collection and analysis capabilities in various intelligence
agencies are stovepiped. ``To some extent, this involves turf
protection, but it clearly hinders policy making.''
Weldon, who was a Russian studies major, offers some of his
own recent experiences as examples of why there is a strong
need for NOAH. He maintains close contact with a number of
Russians and understands their programs and technologies. The
congressman is quick to recall vignettes about Russian
officials and trips to facilities in the region.
During the recent U.S. combat action involvement in Kosovo,
Weldon was contacted by senior Russian officials. Clamoring
for Russia to be involved in the peace process they claimed
that otherwise upcoming elections could go to the communists.
The Russians proposed a Belgrade meeting with Weldon,
congressional colleagues, key Serbian officials and possibly
Yugoslave President Slobodan Milosevic.
After the first meeting with key officials from the
departments of State and Defense and the CIA, Weldon and
other members of Congress went to Vienna, Austria. The State
Department objected to a meeting in Belgrade, suggesting
instead a neutral site. Before the departure, the Russians
informed Weldon that Dragomir Karic, a member of a powerful
and wealthy Kosovo family, would attend the meeting. Karic's
brother was a member of the Milosevic regime.
At the end of the Vienna meeting, the Russians and Karic
told Weldon that if he would accompany them to Belgrade,
Milosevic was prepared to meet with them and publicly embrace
a peace agreement concept reached during the Vienna meeting.
The agreement would have directly involved Russia in the
peace process. A diplomatic official with the U.S. delegation
telephoned Washington, D.C., and the State Department
objected to the Belgrade trip. The congressman and his
colleagues returned home.
As soon as he arrived in Washington, D.C., the FBI
telephoned to request a meeting with Weldon to gather details
on Karic. It was clear, Weldon reports, they had very little
information on him or his family. The following day, the CIA
telephoned the congressman and asked for a meeting ``about
Karic.'' Instead, the congressman proposed a joint meeting
with CIA and FBI agents in his office. Two officials from
each agency attended with a list of questions.
Weldon learned from the agents that they were seeking
information on Karic to brief the State Department. When he
explained that the information came from the Army and LIWA,
the CIA and FBI agents had no knowledge of that organization,
he confirms. Before his departure for Vienna, the congressman
received a six-page LIWA profile of Karic and his family's
links to Milosevic.
``This is an example of why an organization like NOAH is so
critically necessary,'' Weldon contends. ``LIWA's Information
Dominance Center provides the best capability we have today
in the federal government to assess massive amounts of data
and develop profiles. LIWA uses it contacts with other
agencies to obtain database information from those systems,''
he explains. ``Some is unclassified and some classified.''
Weldon cites an ``extraordinary capability by a former CIA
and Defense Intelligence Agency official, who is a LIWA
profiler, as one of the keys in LIWA's success. She does the
profiling and knows where to look and which systems to pull
information from in a data mining and extrapolation
process,'' he proclaims. ``She makes the system work,''
Weldon intends to use LIWA's profiling capability as a
model for building NOAH. ``My goal is to go beyond service
intelligence agencies and integrate all intelligence
collection. This must be beyond military intelligence, which
is too narrow in scope, to provide a governmentwide
capability. Each agency with a pod linked to NOAH would
provide two staff members assigned at the hub, which would
operate continuously. Data brought together in ``this cluster
would be used for fusion and profiling, Which any agency
could then request,'' he maintains.
NOAH would not belong to the Army, which would continue
with its own intelligence capabilities as would the other
services. There would only be one fusion center, which would
handle input from all federal agencies and from open sources.
Weldon explains. ``NOAH would handle threats like information
operations and examine stability in various regions of the
world. We need this ability to respond immediately.'' The
congressman adds that he recently was briefed by LIWA on very
sensitive, very limited and scary profile information, which
he describes as ``potentially explosive.'' In turn, Weldon
arranged briefings for the chairman of the House National
Security Committee, the Speaker of the House and other key
congressional leaders.
``But this kind of profiling capability is very limited
now. The goal is to have it on a regular basis. The profiling
could be used for sensitive technology transfer issues and
information about security breaches,'' the congressman
allows. LIWA has what he terms the fusion and profiling
state-of-the-art capability in the military, ``even beyond
the military.'' Weldon is pressing the case for NOAH among
the leaders in both houses of Congress, ``It is essential
that we create a govenmentwide capability under very strict
controls.''
Weldon adds that establishing NOAH is not a funding issue;
it is a jurisdictional issue. ``Some agencies don't want to
tear down their stovepipes. Yet, information on a drug lord,
as an example, could be vitally important to help combat
terrorism.'' He makes a point that too often, federal
agencies overlap each other in their efforts to collect
intelligence against these threats, or they fail to pool
their resources and share vital information. ``This
redundancy of effort and confusion of jurisdiction only
inhibits our nation's capabilities,'' he offers.
NOAH would provide high-bandwidth, virtual connectivity to
experts to agency pod sites. Protocols for interagency data
sharing would be established and refined in links to all pod
sites. The ability to retrieve, collate, analyze and display
data would be exercised to provide possible courses of
action. A backup site would be established for redundancy,
and training would begin on collaborative tools as soon as it
is activated.
This hub system would become part of the national policy
creation and execution system. The tools available at LIWA
would be shared so that every agency would have the same
tools. Weldon explains that all agencies would post data on
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) highway in a
replicated format sensitive to classification. NOAH's global
network would use the NRO system as a backbone.
NOAH optimizes groups of expertise within each
organization--experts who are always on hand regardless of
the issue. This approach ties strategic analysis and tactical
assessment to a course of action.``Before the U.S. can take
action against emerging threats, we must first understand
their relationship to one another, their patterns, the people
and countries involved and the level of danger posed to our
nation,'' Weldon says, ``That is where NOAH begins.''
____
Steps To Achieve NOAH Capability
Establish baseline capability by building initial Hub
Center and congressional virtual hearing room. Equip White
House Situation Room to Collaborate with these sites.
Staff the Hub Center with two reps from each of the 28 key
participating agencies.
Link up NOAH internal and external collaborative
environment.
Hook in Back up Site for redundancy and begin training on
collaborative tools.
Build the 28 Key Agency Pod Sites along model of the
Information Dominance Center at Fort Belvoir, VA.
Link all Pod Sites to NOAH hub center.
Establish Protocols for Inter-agency data sharing.
Exercise live ability to retrieve, collate, analyze,
display disparate data and provide policy makers course of
action analysis at the NOAH Hub Center.
Refine procedures and Protocols.
____
Agencies Represented in the National Collaborative Center
Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
National Imagery and Mapping Agency
National Security Agency
[[Page H2826]]
National Reconnaissance Office
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Army/LIWA
Air Force
Navy
Marine Corps
Joint Counter-Intelligence Assessment Group
ONDCP
FBI
Drug Enforcement Agency
U.S. Customs
National Criminal Investigative Service
National Infrastructure Protection Center
Defense Information Systems Agency
State Department
Five CINCs
Department of Energy
Department of Commerce
Department of the Treasury
Justice Department
Office of the Secretary of Defense
National Military Command Center
National Joint Military Intelligence Command
Elements to be connected to the national collaborative
center would include the White House Situation Room, a
Congressional Virtual Hearing Room and a possible redundant,
or back-up site.
Mr. Speaker, the second topic I want to touch upon briefly is the
President's summit, which will take place in Russia this week. When the
President travels to Moscow and St. Petersburg this week, he will have
something that no other president has had before in our relationship
with Russia. This President will take with him a document that was
prepared by a bipartisan group of our colleagues in the House and the
Senate, supported by all the major U.S.-Russia thinktanks to broaden
our relationship with Russia.
A year ago, I started working on trying to forge a new direction for
our relationship with Russia. I contacted all the thinktanks from
Harvard and Columbia to Monterrey, to the U.S.-Russia Business Council,
the Tolstoy Foundation, Georgia Tech, and all those schools doing work
with Russia and all those nonprofits and NGOs. I said, first of all,
tell me what you are doing with Russia. Because, surprisingly, Mr.
Speaker, not one Federal agency had a complete list of all the
initiatives between the U.S. people and the Russian people, U.S.
agencies and Russian agencies, U.S. NGOs and Russian NGOs.
That document became a 9-page appendix in the back of the report we
prepared for President Bush, for the first time listing all the
activities that we are engaged in with Russia on. How can we have a
relationship when we do not even know what we are doing with that
country and its people?
{time} 2340
I also asked those groups to make recommendations for me of what new
things we could be doing with Russia to expand our relationship beyond
the issues where we disagree. Because you see, Mr. Speaker, in the past
our Presidents would meet and they would argue over issues that we
disagree on, how many missiles we had, how many nuclear weapons, the
ABM treaty, and we argue when neither side trusts the other.
My point is before we can get to those difficult issues, we have a
new President in Russia, a new President in America, a new Congress,
why do we not expand our relationship based on the new direction Putin
is taking Russia and truly become friends with the Russian people?
The resultant recommendations that we produced are contained in this
document. Members can get it on my Web site, both in Russian and in
English. It is also being transmitted over in Russia to the Duma, and I
presented it to Putin himself in October of last year. This document,
Mr. Speaker, says, and I hope that the upcoming summit will build on
this and I am confident it will, that our relationship with Russia
should be expanded to 11 areas, not just defense. They include
agriculture, culture and education, economic development, energy and
natural resources, the environment, health care, judicial and legal,
local government, science and technology, space and aeronautics and
defense and security. There are 108 recommendations. Some do not
require any new programs, simply changes legislatively, like
ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention basically elevating
Russia out of Jackson-Vanik, supporting Russia's accession to the WTO,
restructuring of the London and Paris Club debt.
Other recommendations require action on the part of the
administration and the Congress. Many of these recommendations do not
involve public money. They involve simply the support of existing
private relationships, school to school, company to company, NGO to
NGO. In fact, in the area of culture, that entire document was written
by the Tolstoy Foundation. They receive no public money. All of their
work is done with foundation and donations. In the economic area, we
dealt with the U.S.-Russia Business Council. They gave us their
recommendations. In health care I went to the Academy of Physicians.
They are doing work in Russia in training doctors and nurses. They
wrote that recommendation. The resultant document, 45 pages long, gave
this President something no other President had, a detailed blueprint
to expand the relationship between Russia and the U.S. to a new level.
In giving this to the President, Mr. Speaker, I did not want it to
come from me. So I went to our colleagues in the House and the Senate.
I had 2 days prior to the October summit to get signatures. Every
Member I went to agreed to sign on as a supporter of this document and
its recommendations. In the Senate, I went to Carl Levin, Joe Biden,
and Dick Lugar. They signed the front page with me. In the House I went
to the far left, my good friend Dennis Kucinich who chairs the
Progressive Caucus who immediately signed on. He has been with me to
Russia three times. I went to my good friend Bernie Sanders who has
traveled to Russia with me, who is our only socialist in the Congress.
I went to the chairman of the Hispanic Caucus, Silvestre Reyes, who
signed the document responding and representing all the Hispanic
Members and moderate Democrats like Howard Berman, Norm Dicks, Jack
Murtha, all signed on in support of this new relationship.
On the conservative side I went to our colleagues and friends Roscoe
Bartlett and Joe Pitts, John Doolittle, they all signed on, as well as
the leadership, Dick Armey, Chris Cox, J.C. Watts, and Henry Hyde.
In the end, Mr. Speaker, when this document was given by me to
President Bush, Condoleezza Rice, and to President Putin before he left
for Crawford, Texas, by me, it had the signatures of one-third of the
Congress. So as President Bush travels to St. Petersburg and Moscow
this week, he now has the unified support of this Congress to broaden
our relationship with Russia like we have never done before. It is up
to our President and the Russian President to stake out new territory.
The arms control agreement they have reached is historic. I commend
President Bush overwhelmingly for what he has done to reduce the
nuclear weapons from 6,000 to 2,000 on both sides. That in itself is a
historic item, as is the new relationship with Russia and NATO. But,
Mr. Speaker, that is not enough. The stars are all aligned this week.
We have a new President in Russia who has done some dramatic things,
things that would never have been thought of over the past 10, 15 years
in Russia. He shut down Russia's largest listening station against us
in Cuba without our asking. He ordered the pullback of trainloads of
Russian military supplies in Moldova on the European border without our
request. He offered us his airport that used to be a Soviet
military base in Uzbekistan where our troops are currently housed.
He was the first elected official on September 11 to call President
Bush to say Russia will give you whatever you need to fight terrorism.
It was not Tony Blair. It was Putin. And he has given us full access to
Russia's intelligence.
So we have a president in Russia who is taking some dramatic steps.
He is being criticized for that back home. In fact, just a month and a
half ago, 41 retired generals and admirals and two former defense
ministers in Russia took out a full page ad in a Russian publication
called Nezavizimaya Gazeta, one of the largest publications in Moscow.
That full page ad criticized Putin for moving too close to America, for
getting too friendly with the West.
You see, Mr. Speaker, there are hard-liners in Russia that want to
take us back to the Cold War, that do not like America and Russia
coming together; but it is not just in Russia, Mr. Speaker. There are
hard-liners in our country that do not like the direction we are going
in, either. President Bush and
[[Page H2827]]
President Putin have got to pull away from the Cold War mentality,
those hard-liners in both countries, and have a historic opportunity to
move our two nations into a new relationship, a relationship of trust,
of understanding, and of mutual engagement, in the areas of health
care, education, environment, energy, to show the Russian people that
we truly want them to be a successful nation, that we want to be
partners with them; and I am convinced now more than ever that we need
Russia.
We need to reduce our dependency on Middle Eastern crude oil which is
the reason why we have the major problem in the Middle East today, in
Israel. If we reduce our dependency on Middle Eastern crude, the
Russians have vast amounts of crude and gas that we can help them
develop. We must work with them together.
So, Mr. Speaker, I wish the President well. I will lead a 19-Member
delegation into Moscow the day that President Bush comes back home. We
will follow up his meetings with Putin with members of the Duma and the
Federation Council. We will follow up on the recommendations of the
document and on Monday morning we will listen to President Putin give
us a summary of his feeling about the summit. I am optimistic, Mr.
Speaker, because I think these two Presidents are going to
fundamentally change the face of the world security relationship.
Russia and America, two archenemies for 70 years, I think in the 21st
century will become two partners that will work to stabilize the world.
Russia can assist us in dealing with Iran and Iraq because of their
ties to those countries. In fact, Russia can assist us in a number of
areas, in energy, in technology. It is in our interest and in theirs to
work together.
Just 2 weeks ago on the floor of this Chamber, we took another
historic vote. I offered an amendment to the defense bill that was
supported by 362 Members of Congress from both parties to challenge the
Russians to provide full transparency on their nuclear weapons, their
nuclear testing, their nuclear program. That same day in my office, I
was meeting with the Russian minister of atomic energy. He is a friend
of mine. I have known him for the past 5 years when he worked at
Kurchatov Institute for my friend Yevgeny Velakof. The minister of
atomic energy was in my office when we voted on an historic measure
that I offered to provide full transparency in our nuclear relationship
with Russia. My hope is that this too will become a point of discussion
between Presidents Bush and Putin, because if we truly want further
arms reductions, if we truly want to have a more secure world, it has
got to start by building a trust that we have not had for the past 10
years.
And if I were a Russian, I would not have trusted us either during
the 1990s. After all, we turned our back when Yeltsin's friends were
stealing billions of dollars of IMF money. We pretended we did not see
it, because we did not want to embarrass Boris Yeltsin. And when we saw
evidence of technology being transferred out of Russia, by disgruntled
generals and admirals, we pretended that we did not see that because we
did not want to embarrass Yeltsin. So the Congress misread that and
blamed the Russian Government and said we do not want to work with this
country. So during the 1990s, we lost the trust and confidence of the
Russian people. The best evidence of that to me was comparing what I
saw in 1992 when Boris Yeltsin stood on a tank outside the Moscow White
House waving the Russian flag with 20,000 or 30,000 Russians
surrounding him, declaring the Soviet Union was dead, Communism had
ended, Russia was a new country.
{time} 2350
During that same speech, Yeltsin said America and Russia will be
partners together, and the Russian people cheered. That was in 1992
when Yeltsin gave that speech.
Compare that to 1999. Yeltsin has health problems, drinking problems.
Russia is filled with corruption, which we ignored. 1999, Yeltsin is
being railroaded out of office, his popularity is down to 2 percent.
The only people supporting Yeltsin was the United States leadership.
That is why in the fall of 1999, two months before Yeltsin left office,
20,000 new Russians gathered outside our embassy in Moscow and burned
the American flag, fired weapons at our embassy, and threw paint at the
walls of our embassy compound. In seven short years we had gone from
Russia's partner to the Russian people saying ``we don't trust you,
America.''
This week, President Bush and President Putin have a chance to change
all that, and unlike any other time, they have got the Congress behind
them, the Duma behind them, the Federation Council behind them. Members
of Congress will be in Moscow right following the summit telling the
Russian people that this truly is a new time, a new beginning.
I ask and I urge all of my colleagues to thank the President for his
leadership and to continue to support those efforts, especially passage
of the Jackson-Vanik legislation, that will truly allow Russia to
become a close partner and ally of our Nation.
Mr. Speaker, following our trip to Russia, we are going to do a few
other historic things I want to highlight for our colleagues. We will
leave Russia on Monday, after meeting with Putin in the morning and the
Members of the Duma and the Federation Council, and we will fly in our
military plane to Uzbekistan. In Taskent we will meet with the
President of the country and leaders of their parliament.
Uzbekistan is a shining example of a former Soviet State that has now
become one of our strongest allies, opening up its territory for our
troops. We will visit with their parliament and we will challenge them
to start a new relationship between their parliament and our Congress
like we have done with the Russian Duma, the Ukrainian Rada, the
Moldavian Parliament.
While in Uzbekistan, after meeting with their leaders, we will go to
our military base, we will meet with our troops, we will give them
home-baked cookies from the kids and families of America, we will give
them 6,000 hand-made greeting cards from elementary school children, we
will give them Hershey candy bars and TastyKakes from Pennsylvania, and
talk to them about what life is like back here in the States.
We may also visit one of our base camps in Afghanistan to show our
support there for our troops as well.
Then we will leave Uzbekistan and we will travel to Beijing, China.
In Beijing we will meet with the incoming leader, Mr. Hu, who was just
recently in the U.S. I will speak at the National Defense University of
the People's Liberation Army, the third time I have spoken there. I
will give a speech on a major university campus in Beijing and interact
with the up and coming leaders of that country.
We will also meet with the chairman and leadership of the People's
Congress to talk about areas of mutual concern and interest between the
U.S. and China.
We will leave Beijing on Thursday and fly into Pyongyang, North
Korea, the first time ever that a U.S. Congressional delegation in a
bipartisan, open way has visited North Korea. What a historic
opportunity for us to open the door for dialog with the leaders of
North Korea.
We will not be there to endorse them, we will not be there to support
their government, because it is a communist dictatorship. We will be
there to tell them as human beings we have to talk, we have to meet, we
have to speak and exchange our views. And we want to tell them that we
care about their people, we care about the education of their kids, the
ability for them to feed their people and the ability of them to
provide a stable quality of life for North Korean citizens. We will not
reach any landmark agreements. We will do something that needs to be
done, we will open the door to North Korea.
I will be taking a letter with me, Mr. Speaker, from the President of
Drexel University in Philadelphia, a school with a huge population of
foreign and Korean students, and the president of Drexel, Constantine
Papadakis, will invite the President of the largest university in North
Korea to establish an academic relationship between the two schools.
We will also be carrying a letter from the Foreign Policy Research
Institute in Philadelphia offering to host a conference in America on
U.S.-North Korean relations.
I will be carrying a third letter signed by students of Drexel to
students of the largest university in North
[[Page H2828]]
Korea asking to have a student exchange of letters and eventually trips
back and forth. We will also discuss our relations with the People's
Congress in North Korea and ways we can work together. Hopefully this
will be the start of the opening up and the thawing of the relations
between our country and North Korea.
Following our trip to Pyongyang, we will travel to Seoul, Korea. In
Seoul we will brief the South Koreans who are enthusiastically
supporting our trip about our discussions. We will brief the incoming
candidates for the presidency of that country in the elections later
this year. We will brief the parliamentary leaders, and give a press
conference to the world about the trip and the implications of building
peace with the Russians, the Uzbekis, the Chinese, the North Koreans,
and our good friends, the South Koreans.
Mr. Speaker, what this all says is this Congress plays a vitally
crucial role in not just helping to prevent incidents like 9/11 with
recommendations that the administration needs to listen to, but this
Congress also plays a constructive role in building peaceful relations
with those countries that would be our enemy. I thank our colleagues
for their support of this effort.
Mr. Speaker, I will insert in the Record a summary of our New Time,
New Beginning document, as well as the accompanying letter signed by
one-third of the Congress that was hand-delivered to President Bush and
to President Putin prior to the Crawford Summit, which we hope will be
the basis of the St. Petersburg summit.
I thank the staff and you for your indulgence in allowing me to
present this information today.
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, November 7, 2001.
President George W. Bush,
Washington, DC.
Dear President Bush: As you prepare for the upcoming summit
with President Putin, we commend the positive approach you
have established with Russia. Too often, the focus of our
bilateral relations has been on defense and security--
precisely the issues on which our interests often collide. It
would be more useful, as we move forward with a Russian
policy for the 21st century to take a more holistic
approach--one that takes into account Russia's myriad
concerns as well as our own.
Therefore, in consultation with many of the leading experts
on Russia, we propose a series of bipartisan initiatives to
engage Russia on issues such as the environment, energy,
economic development, health care--as well as defense and
security. We call this proposal ``A New Time, A New
Beginning.'' Some of these are new ideas, but many are not.
Many of these initiatives are already underway, and need
additional support to make even greater progress.
Such engagement is in the U.S. interest as well as
Russia's. If the United States and Russia cooperate on issues
across the board, Russia will be more likely to work closely
with America on the national security issues that matter most
to us--missile defense, the war against terrorism, and
proliferation.
We encourage you to review the enclosed proposal and hope
that some of these initiatives will prove useful to you in
the ongoing discussions between Russia and America. We look
forward to working with you to forge a new relationship that
will benefit both our countries.
Thank you for your consideration of this request.
Sincerely,
Connie Morella, Jim Maloney, Cass Ballenger, Nathan Deal.
Jerry Weller, Jim Gibbons, Jim Ryun, Judy Biggert, Jerry
Costello, Eddie Bernice Johnson, Stephen Horn, Kay
Granger, Ed Schrock, Tom Davis, Randy Cunningham, Gary
Condit, Randy Forbes, Steven LaTourette, Joe Skeen, Bob
Borski, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Chris Smith.
Adam Putnam, Frank Pallone, Johnny Isakson, Robert
Andrews, Bernie Sanders, Nick Lampson, Rod Blagojevich,
Jim Saxton, Jim Turner, Mike Ferguson, Van Hilleary, Ed
Royce, Bob Filner, Luis Gutierrez, Danny Davis.
Jane Harman, Rick Boucher, Christopher John, Todd Akin,
Dave Weldon, Bart Gordon, Virgil Goode, Jr., Alan
Mollohan, Frank Wolf, Hilda Solis, Rush Holt, Carrie
Meek, Amo Houghton, Paul Kanjorski, Bob Goodlatte, Doug
Bereuter, John Shimkus, J.D. Hayworth.
James Greenwood, Kevin Brady, Bob Brady, Melissa Hart,
Phil English, John Thune, Tom Allen, George Gekas,
Robert Andrews, Mike Doyle, Shelly Moore Capito, Rob
Simmons, Todd Akin.
A New Vision for U.S.-Russian Relations
introduction
Those of us who value the U.S.-Russian relationship have
been on a roller-coaster ride for the past decade. During the
heady days of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ensuing
collapse of the Soviet Union, it appeared that our two
countries would cooperate as never before. The world cheered
when Presidents Bush and Yeltsin hailed a new ``strategic
partnership'' between America and Russia.
There followed, however, a dark period--marked by misguided
American policies and rampant Russian corruption. The Russian
economy sagged as American aid--money meant for the Russian
people--was siphoned off and stashed in Swiss banks and
American real estate investment. At the same time, NATO's war
in Kosovo strained the already sinking bilateral
relationship. What were the results of this increasingly
bitter disenchantment? A more aggressive Russian foreign
policy, increased proliferation from Moscow to rogue states,
and the final coup de grace: Russia and China announcing last
year a new ``strategic partnership''--against the interests
of America and the West.
Now is the time, with new leaders in Washington and Moscow,
to improve the relationship for the long-term.
My interest in this relationship began when I was nineteen
years old, when a college professor convinced me to switch my
major to Russian Studies. Since that time, I have been
fascinated with the Soviet Union and Russia--and have
traveled there more than twenty-five times.
I began my travels when I was a member of my local County
Council and was invited to travel to Moscow by the American
Council of Young Political Leaders. I have continued to visit
Russia since my election to Congress, as a member of the
House Armed Services Committee, and later as co-chairman of
the Duma-Congress Study Group, the official
interparliamentary exchange between the U.S. and Russia.
My interactions with leaders across Russia have taught me
that the Russians are a proud people, historically aware, and
mindful of Russia's unique global role. Increasingly, they
are becoming aware of the limitless possibilities of U.S.-
Russian cooperation on a host of issues.
This brief paper, then, is an effort to weave together a
comprehensive program of U.S.-Russian cooperation across a
wide-range of issues.
Too often, the focus of our bilateral relations has been on
defense and security--precisely the issues on which our
interests often collide. It would be more useful, as we move
forward with a Russian policy for the 21st century, to take a
more holistic approach--one that takes into account Russia's
myriad concerns as well as our own.
Therefore, in consultation with many of the leading experts
on Russia, I propose a series of initiatives to engage Russia
on issues like the environment, energy, economic development,
and health care--as well as defense and security. Some of
these are new ideas, but many are not. Many of these
initiatives are already underway, and need additional support
to make even greater progress.
Such engagement is in the interest of the U.S. as well as
Russia. For if the U.S. and Russia are cooperating on issues
across the board, Russia will be more likely to work closely
with America on the national security issues that matter most
to us--missile defense, the war against terrorism, and
proliferation.
This is not, and will never be, a finished product. The
contours of our bilateral relationship change daily with
world events. Nor will it likely be turned into a grand
legislative proposal, although certainly parts of it may be.
I hope that it is a starting point for discussions between
Russia and America on ways that we can forge a new
relationship that will benefit both our countries.
For if we make a new American-Russian relationship, one
based on common interests that benefit the citizens of both
countries, then we will make great progress--not just for
America and Russia alone, but for peace and stability across
the globe.
Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA)
____
U.S.-Russia Partnership
a new time a new beginning
Summary of recommendations
Agricultural Development: Assist in agricultural
production; expand private-sector investment; and enhance
capacity to purchase essential agricultural inputs,
commodities and equipment.
Cultural/Education Development: Expand cultural ties
outside the major cities; assist regional museums in
generating tourism; and provide for more Russian language and
cultural studies in U.S. schools.
Defense and Security: Initiate new bilateral talks similar
to the Ross-Mamedov talks on a Global Protection System; move
forward with joint talks on a new nonproliferation regime;
and encourage progress on the RAMOS program and restructure
the Nuclear Cities Initiative.
Economic Development: Help facilitate Russia's accession to
the WTO and its acceptance of all WTO agreements; increase
funding for OPIC and EX-IM Bank projects in Russia; and work
with Russia to improve intellectual property rights.
Energy/Natural Resources: Foster cooperative pilot
projects, starting with oil and gas exploration in Timan
Pechora; convene bilateral task force to discuss the energy
ramifications of the war on terrorism; and eliminate
bureaucratic obstacles to joint cooperation on energy.
Environmental Cooperation: Develop a revolving fund to
assure development of promising Russian technologies; expand
debt for
[[Page H2829]]
nature swaps; and dramatically expand cooperation on marine
science research.
Health Care: Increase emphasis on chronic disease like
cardiovascular disease and diabetes; develop more extensive
physician exchange programs; and augment existing cooperation
between NIH and appropriate Russian research institutes.
Judicial/Legal Systems: Support expansion of jury trials
into all Russian regions; expand Environmental Public
Advocacy Centers into Russia; and encourage a doubling of the
number of legal clinics.
Local Governments: Propose ways to expand the tax base
available to local governments; encourage political
participation by increasing local partisan affiliations; and
encourage the gradual devolution of services to the local
level.
Science and Technology: Increase cooperation in the area of
nuclear fuel cycles; expand cooperative fusion research on
nonpolluting energy solutions; and involve Russian industry
in embryonic U.S. nanotechnology efforts.
Space and Aeronautics: Utilize commercial joint ventures to
enable Russia to meet its Space Station obligations; increase
joint projects on space solar power, propulsion technology,
and weather satellites; and cooperate on mutually-beneficial
planetary defense tracking technologies.
Agricultural development
Summary
United States government resources are employed in Russia
to enhance Russia's capacity to purchase essential
agricultural inputs, commodities, and equipment in order to
assist agricultural production and expand private-sector
investment to improve Russia's agricultural infrastructure.
Neither Russia's government nor the private sector alone are
willing or able to meet these needs. There are a number of
programs carried out through USDA and USAID to benefit
Russian agriculture. USDA and USAID officials have stated
that there are no cooperative efforts between Russia and the
U.S. in any third countries. Most programs are administered
by private voluntary organizations (PVOs) which utilize USDA
and USAID resources to carry out development activities
within Russia. Additionally, private-sector efforts such as
the U.S.-Russia Business Council utilize government resources
through these programs in order to expand and enhance the
U.S.-Russian commercial relationship.
Those PVOs involved in Russian that are actually working at
ground level believe that greater efforts are required to
improve the country's ability to provide for its citizens.
Regarding USDA's programs, the Administration's food aid
review, especially with regard to the 416(b) surplus disposal
program, has thrown into question the amount of resources
available for Russia, since many PVO projects are funded
through monetized 416(b) donations. This situation may become
clearer once U.S. food aid programs are reauthorized and/or
altered through a new farm bill and once the Administration
releases its food aid proposals as part of its FY03 budget
request. As for USAID, PVOs express the concern that the
agency's activities in Russia Require a greater focus on
agriculture.
The programs designed as a solution would require U.S.
governemnt resources (primarily, through USDA and USAID)
because the Russian government and private capital markets
cannot or will not provide the resources necessary to improve
the Russian agriculture infrastructure. A number of proposals
exist, and the number of proposals would increase with a
greater commitment to Russian agriculture through USDA and
USAID. Such efforts through USDA and USAID would play a key
role not only in improving the ability of Russia agriculture
to meet the critical needs of its citizens, but in enhancing
the Russian private sector and improving the prospects for
future earnings of U.S. agribusiness.
Recommendations
Improving credit availability and production practices and
attracting investment in Russian agribusiness are the areas
of focus for redeveloping Russian agriculture. CNFA's
Agribusiness Partnerships Program seeks to build financially
and economically viable private sector agricultural systems
within Russia and the former Soviet states.
For example, in 1993, the Russian baby food manufacturing
industry was supplying less than half of the country's annual
baby food required to assure minimum levels of health and
nutrition to Russian infants and children. CNFA entered into
a partnership with Heinz to increase domestic manufacturing
output. Using USAID-funded technical assistance, CNFA and
Heinz worked to develop and introduce more nutritious baby
food products and enhance local production to increase the
Russian baby food sector's ability to meet its domestic
demand.
The recovery of Russian domestic production capacity may
require foreign equity investment in production facilities
and businesses along with access to credits for the purchase
of production inputs. Without proactive PVO involvement,
neither the Russian government nor private capital markets
will be willing or able to meet these needs.
(a) CNFA has a proposal that would establish a fund which
will provide long-term investment capital for the development
of agricultural production, processing, packaging, and
distribution businesses and establish a trade finance
facility. This fund would address Russia's inability to
purchase critical agriculture inputs and commodities and the
lack of investment capital to develop the private sector
agricultural infrastructure. The fund would be established
through the monetization of USDA food aid commodities within
Russia.
(b) Similarly, another PVO, ACDI-VOCA, has submitted a
large project proposal to improve rural credit availability
and facilitate investment in medium-sized Russian food
processing companies. Thus far, the proposal has not received
approval. ACDI-VOCA believes the approval has been stalled at
the interagency food aid review process due to what it
perceives as OMB's unease at utilizing 416(b) donations for
monetizing. Again, this proposal would seek to address two
principle problems: inadequate access to credit and
inadequate capital investment.
cultural/educational development
Summary
Cultural cooperation is known to be one of the best ways to
overcome mutual distrust, insularity, and conflict among
nations. By working together with artists, writers,
musicians, and cultural institutions we can promote artistic
freedom, good will, and international exposure, as well as
support economic viability in the cultural sector.
Additionally, in sharing knowledge, specific techniques, and
skills--and in broadening horizons--we are investing
positively and constructively toward greater mutual
understanding and a more peaceful and stable world for
ourselves and coming generations.
Recommendations
Encourage expansion of cultural ties and initiatives
outside the major centers. In recent years too much emphasis
has been placed by Western institutions on the major centers
of Moscow and St. Petersburg. This policy fails to serve the
rest of the country as reasons grapple with a range of
challenges, from economic problems to the need to regain
their own identity.
Create viable links with other like-minded institutions to
promote cultural cooperation. Example: With the support of
the Soros Foundation through their Open Society project
entitled ``Transformation of Russian Society,'' the L.N.
Tolstoy Museum/Estate at Yasnaya Polyana (LNM/E) established
the first association of museum/estates in Russia. In the mid
1990s, this project assisted in the development of regional
museums as focal centers for the preservation and
promulgation of local culture, with programs on literature,
music, and the arts.
Link regional museum centers to promote much-needed tourism
and other support for the economically-depressed heartland of
Russia outside the major centers of Moscow and St.
Petersburg.
Help to stimulate programs by supporting grassroots
initiatives. Example: LNM/E in Tula has been involved for
many years now in a project to encourage local artisans and
musicians in this economically-depressed region. With
assistance from the Soros Foundation, the LNM/E has been able
to provide a forum for exhibitions and concerts to help
stimulate local talent and find a market for them as well.
Foster interest in and greater appreciation of Russian
language and culture among youth in the U.S. and provide
Russian language and cultural immersion programs for
secondary school students in preparation for college.
Increase funding for collaborative academic and research
programs between Russian and American scholars, local
government leaders, journalists, heads of NGOs, and
researchers.
Allocate more federal funding for cultural initiatives to
the private sector. There are many small non-profit
organizations in the U.S. which have both cultural
sensitivity and proven track records, yet cannot compete for
AID funding because of current bureaucratic restrictions.
Support initiatives to create a U.S. clearinghouse for the
identification and consolidation of U.S.-Russian cultural
initiatives and exchange programs. There is no central point
that can identify and help consolidate programs or facilitate
student exchanges. Many programs today--both government and
private--are being duplicated.
The U.S. should follow through with funding promised by
former President Bush for the establishment of the American
University in Moscow. Support initiatives like the Soros
Foundation linking U.S. schools with Russian schools. Expand
education exchanges between teachers, administrators, and
educators at all levels. Establish a university to university
relationship between American and Russian universities. Every
school should have a partner.
defense and security
Summary
United States defense and security cooperation and
assistance involving the Russian Federation should contribute
to defining a new bilateral strategic framework that is not
rooted in the notion of Mutual Assured Destruction. Instead,
the new security framework should be based upon improving
U.S. and Russian security by working with Russia to combat
terrorism and to halt the spread of missiles and weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).
America and Russia must forge an alliance beneficial to
both, or face the near certainty that historical suspicions
will reassert themselves and plunge the world into a new Cold
War. Such an eventuality would be especially tragic since the
United States and Russia have more in common than not.
Indeed, given that the gravest and most imminent threats to
both nations are terrorism
[[Page H2830]]
and WMD proliferation, these great common enemies should make
the United States and Russia natural allies.
The Cold War era model of bilateral relations and arms
control is predicated on mutual antagonism and nuclear
threats: a situation that is unacceptable as the basis for
21st Century U.S.-Russian relations. Russia and the United
States each have unique security concerns, but have more
security concerns that are shared in common. U.S. policy
should encourage Russia to recognize the advantages of U.S.-
Russian cooperation in areas like counter-terrorism,
nonproliferation and missile defense--and the dangers of
pursuing a confrontational foreign policy. There is some
evidence to suggest that Russia may grudgingly compromise on
U.S. missile defense goals. However, the main thrust of
current Russian foreign policy and military strategy is
actively seeking to curtail American influence and enhancing
Russia's status by trying to diminish the United States. U.S.
policy must recognize the existence of both positive and
negative strains in Russian foreign policy, and then
encourage the positive strain that is consistent with U.S.
national security interests.
There should be a clear intent in U.S. policy to transition
from near-term measures rooted in U.S. nonproliferation goals
to a long-term solution. For example, one component of a
long-term solution might be transitioning the Russian economy
from defense to non-military production so that scientists
can participate in sustainable non-weapons work that benefits
the Russian economy. Achieving this will require integration
of defense and security cooperation, with broader social and
economic assistance focused on regional economies--programs
administered outside the U.S. security community.
This is consistent not only with U.S. nonproliferation
goals, but Russian interests as well. According to President
Putin, Russia must speed up its integration into the Western
community. If Putin is serious, Russia should not be involved
in activities that undermine the security of the West. While
Russia has formed an alliance with China, President Bush and
President Putin have since found mutual interests in fighting
terrorism as a result of September 11, 2001.
The key to forging a U.S.-Russian alliance is to do it now,
before U.S.-Russian relations deteriorate further. The United
States must offer Russia a relationship that clearly benefits
Russian as well as U.S. interests, and begin as soon as
possible, working jointly toward mutually beneficial goals.
As the victor in the Cold War, the greater burden for taking
the initiative and building trust between the sides falls
upon the United States. In its relations with Russia, the
U.S. holds an array of levers--strategic, military-technical,
economic, and social--that can be used as positive and
negative inducements to move Russia toward cooperation, and
ultimately toward alliance, with the United States. Even the
most modest proposals and programs already underway should be
viewed as means to the larger end of reforging the still
adversarial relationship between Washington and Moscow into a
new American-Russian alliance that will defeat terrorism,
halt WMD proliferation, and establish a more stable global
order for the growth of political and economic freedom
everywhere.
Recommendations
Strategic
Begin a new, high-level dialog similar to the Ross-Mamedov
talks of 1992 to discuss U.S. and Russian proposals for a
Global Protection System. Transitioning the security dialog
with Russia to a ``normal'' one primarily conducted by lower-
level officials is a laudable goal, but you can't ``get there
from here'' without an interim step. That step is to initiate
a high-level process that has a broad mandate and will
provide ``cover'' for lower levels of the Russian defense and
security establishment to talk productively about these
issues. The resulting cooperative approach to BMD deployment
could encompass U.S. NMD, the Russian proposal for a European
missile shield, and new initiatives like a feasibility study
of boost-phase intercept involving Russia, Israel, and
Turkey.
Moscow has repeatedly proposed working with Washington
against terrorism. Washington should propose a formal
alliance with Moscow in a global war against terrorism that
will involve military and intelligence cooperation and joint
operations. The U.S.-Russian alliance against terrorism will
help Russia by gaining U.S. support for Russia's war against
terrorism in Central Asia, which will go far toward achieving
the U.S. goal of crushing terrorism globally. Unless Central
Asia is stabilized, the region threatens to continue to
spiral toward chaos and become, like Afghanistan, a breeding
ground for terrorism. Moreover, a U.S.-Russian alliance
against terrorism would preempt the emergence of an anti-
Western Sino-Russian alliance, pull Russia closer to the
West, and give a second chance to Russian democracy.
Russia has advocated an expanded international
nonproliferation regime that would, among other things,
involve countries of proliferation concern to the United
States. The Departments of State and Defense should begin
detailed discussions with the Russian Foreign and Defense
Ministries on this proposal to determine if a new regime
could establish more stringent nonproliferation and arms
trade criteria. According to these criteria, Russia would
limit its sales of arms, military technology, weapons of mass
destruction, and dual-use military-civilian technology to
China and Iran, cease such sales to rogue states, and
severely limit them to countries in conflict, such as India
and Pakistan. U.S. support for the effort, which, if
successful, would enhance Moscow's diplomatic prestige,
should also depend on Russia's willingness to advocate the
return of U.N. weapons inspectors to Iraq. Russia has
proposed this regime as an alternative to U.S. NMD and the
U.S. must make it clear that it does not accept that
argument: missile defense and international cooperation on
nonproliferation are not mutually exclusive (indeed, they
actually reinforce each other).
Direct the Department of Defense and the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization to develop a strategy to evaluate the
feasibility of increasing technical cooperation with Russian
military industry on missile defense technologies. The
strategy should include a risk assessment (e.g., the spread
of knowledge to China) and an assessment of the possible
benefits (technical and political) to U.S. programs of
projects like co-development of the Russian S-500. For
example, Russian scientists might participate in developing
high-speed boosters for interceptor rockets and airborne and
space-based lasers.
Demonstrate to Russia that the U.S. is not interested in
taking advantage of Russian weakness. Traditional nuclear
arms control only makes sense if the U.S. and Russia remain
adversaries. The U.S. should immediately begin efforts to
demonstrate that American policy seeks to support
transparency rather than numerical equivalencies as a measure
of our shared interest in ``stability.'' We also seek to take
a fuller account of each side's nuclear arsenals and
infrastructure--including tactical nuclear weapons and
nuclear weapon production facilities--in any future nuclear
agreement between the U.S. and Russia. We understand that
both the U.S. and Russia increasingly have different force
structure requirements as determined by our respective threat
perceptions, geography, and technical abilities. The
Departments of Defense, State, and Energy should articulate a
strategy for communicating our interest in transparency to
the Russians and fulfilling our part of such transparency
dialog. We cannot force the Russians to accept that our
motives are benign and that such a dialog is in Russian
interests. However, the offer, coupled with the array of
economic and political outreaches inherent in our broader
Russian Policy, would be a good faith effort.
Make clear to Russia that the potential for cooperation in
areas like counterterrorism, joint operations with NATO,
regional defenses for Europe, etc. are greatly undermined by
the way Russia has chosen to wage its war in Chechnya.
Military-Technical
Encourage and continue the Russian-American Observation
Satellite (RAMOS) program. The innovative U.S.-Russian space
based remote sensor R&D program addresses defense and
environmental concerns. Initial concept of co-orbiting U.S.
and Russian satellites for simultaneous stereo observations
should be continued.
Restructure CTR Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) funding to
other more effective efforts. The NCI's near-term goal of
providing non-weapon work for Russian scientists if more
flexibly addressed by other programs (e.g., ISTC, IPP) while
its longer-term goal of converting the nuclear cities to
sustainable non-weapons work cannot be achieved without a
broader focus on the economies of the respective regions.
Economic
Support the rescheduling of Russia's $150 billion debt to
the Paris Club if Russia demonstrates active cooperation in
cutting the flow of advanced military technology to rogue
states.
A sustained effort to increase the percentage of
Cooperative Threat Reduction money actually being spent in
Russia. The perception is that in too many programs
inordinate amounts of money are spent on administration, U.S.
contractors, and consultants. Program offices must be made
aware that this issue is a congressional priority and
reporting requirements should reflect that concern.
A more rigorous joint program accounting effort to monitor
how U.S. funds are spent in Cooperative Threat Reduction and
associated programs. This improves U.S. confidence that
monies are being spent appropriately and gives Russians
experience in the application of modern accounting methods.
Waste, fraud and abuse of CTR funding is a serious concern to
both governments and a vehicle like this is necessary lest
the process devolve into an adversarial one of accusation and
denial.
Insist that Russia stop taxing U.S. assistance provided to
scientists through cooperative programs. The Administration
should suspend all Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private
Investment Corporation Insurance and Credits to U.S.
companies that do business with Russian entities that are
linked to Iran's military build-up activities. Russian
government-controlled companies, such as the natural gas
monopoly Gazprom, should not be allowed to raise funds from
U.S. investors for energy schemes in Iran, since they could
fund Iran's military buildup, which ultimately could be used
to threaten U.S. interests in the region.
Task the interagency WMD working group at the National
Security Council with designing a strategy for sanctioning
Russia and Iran because of their proliferation activities.
The intelligence community should
[[Page H2831]]
be tasked with a comprehensive assessment of the ongoing
technology transfer and weapons programs, and with providing
recommendations identifying ``choke points'' that might be
vulnerable to sanctions. The current WMD working group at the
NSC should be tasked with developing a sanctions strategy
that targets Russian and Iranian officials, businesses, and
individuals involved in the proliferation of WMD
technologies, material, or know-how, as well as their sources
of financing.
Establish a vehicle, preferably through a Congressionally
mandated organization like USIP, to target support to U.S.
non-governmental initiatives that interface directly with
official or semi-official Russia in a productive way. These
initiatives need a level of analytical freedom and the
ability to shape the agenda of their dialog that is sometimes
not possible within more traditional Department or Agency
sponsorship (it needs to be easy to ``think outside the box''
established by Administration policy). The Russians would
almost certainly be responsive to an effort with this sort of
background and it would serve to broaden the bilateral dialog
at a time when Russian voices appear to be more reticent.
Efforts supported should be conscious of congressional
interest in spending money in Russia. For example, Congress
could create a vehicle for funding unofficial academic
research that would, of necessity, involve significant
Russian participation at the official or senior unofficial
level. Projects could be chosen for their potential to be
``spun on'' to the official foreign policy or House-Duma
dialogs.
Encourage U.S.-Russian military officer exchange programs
and greatly increase the numbers. Encourage joint
participation in U.S., Russian, and NATO military exercises.
This will help allay Russia's residual fear of the West and
promote a climate of trust.
Ratify the Law of the Sea Convention to establish
guidelines for international maritime waters.
economic development
Summary
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has
experienced widespread economic dislocation and a drop of
about 50 percent in GDP. However, after more than a decade of
virtually uninterrupted decline, the Russian economy
demonstrated many promising signs of recovery.
The year 2000 was one of the most successful years for
Russia in over three decades. The growth of GDP was 7.7
percent, fixed assets grew more than 18 percent, unemployment
fell by more than 9 percent, real income of the population
increased, and pensions increased by 38 percent in real
terms.
Recommendations
Work to facilitate Russia's accession and its
implementation of WTO agreements. The U.S. government can
help Russia to realize its enormous economic potential and
enable the country to become a more significant participant
in the global economy. Specifically, these efforts will
support the growth of the Russian private sector by
permitting Russia to negotiate the elimination of trade
barriers faced by its exporters and to challenge the WTO-
consistency of measures taken by other member countries.
Increase the budgetary allocations for EX-IM, OPIC, and
TDA. To help solidify the policy transition from aid to
trade, these program funds must be maintained and increased.
Where feasible, U.S. institutional financial risk on
appropriate large-scale projects should be shared with
multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the EBRD.
Provde targeted financing opportunities for small- and
medium-sized U.S. companies. The practices of various U.S.
government-sponsored funds should be reviewed to ensure that
they promote access to capital for the development of small-
and medium-size enterprises.
The continuing development of the Tax Code will greatly
benefit Russia if it creates a tax system that encourages,
rather than discourages, investment.
Investors in Russia continue to express concern over
weakness in protecting the property rights investors are
afforded under Russian law. Amendments to the current legal
framework should address gaps and ambiguities associated with
some of these risks.
Support Russian efforts to strengthen Intellectual Property
Rights protection and enforcement. Anti-counterfeit
legislation should be strengthened and penalties enforced,
while training law enforcement and judicial officials in this
area.
Currency control laws have failed to stop capital flight
and instead have damaged the reputation of the Russian
business community. The current framework, which acts as a
disincentive to Western investment, should be replaced by
control and monitoring arrangements that will encourage
investment and allow Russian capital freedom of movement in
the global economy, while protecting the Russian tax base and
treasury.
Russia should be graduated from Jackson-Vanik. This would
remove a longstanding irritant in our relationship with
Russia and help foster a sense of ``normal'' trade relations
between our countries.
Authorize and appropriate funds to achieve the goal of
awarding 10,000 Masters of Business Administration degrees in
Russia.
Revitalize the enterprise fund concept in Russia as a means
of U.S. support to Russian entrepreneurs. Additional funding
from the U.S.-Russia Investment Fund or other vehicles would
be necessary.
energy/natural resources
Summary
Russia, as the world's second largest oil producer and a
major supplier of gas to Western Europe, represents an
important stabilizing force for global energy security. U.S.
polity makers have long understood that in the post-Cold War
era, bilateral energy cooperation can provide mutual benefits
that go well beyond enhanced energy security. Cooperation in
the energy sphere contributes to economic development in
Russia, commercial opportunities for U.S. and Russian firms,
and a highly positive foundation for the bilateral political
relationship.
As our two countries proceed to re-engage across a broad
range of important policy and cultural arenas, energy can
claim its critical position as the centerpiece in the
relationship, strengthening global energy security and
promoting mutual economic growth.
Recommdendations
Development of U.S.-Russian cooperation in energy should
become a priority for international policy because of its
capacity to address this risk of uncertain supplies and
unnecessary dependence. The U.S. and Russia should initiate
the development of a sustained institutional structure to
move forward on critical areas hindering mutual development
of Russian energy resources.
A high level Presidential task force with representation
from both the Putin and Bush administrations should be
immediately established as part of the partner offer in
addressing the economic and energy components of the anti-
terrorism campaign.
The institutional structure for moving forward on critical
energy policy and projects should be established to eliminate
bureaucratic tendencies that are delaying the implementation
of a favorable investment climate in Russia and positive
economic responses from the United States. On the U.S. side,
this will require the direct involvement of the Secretaries
of Energy and Commerce, as well as the Vice President.
Members of Congress should be involved and regularly
consulted.
The bilateral group should proceed with specific remedies
to move projects forward. Official U.S. financial
organizations, such as OPIC and U.S. Ex-Im Bank should play a
prominent and ongoing role in the bilateral discussions.
An expanded program of energy cooperation will provide a
critical reinforcement of the positive aspects of the
bilateral relationship. One such project, for example, is the
development of the oil and gas resources of the Timan Pechora
region which offers enormous challenges in project
development and investment, but also enormous rewards in new
petroleum supplies for the world market.
Work of the Duma-Congress interparliamentary group should
be intensified for purposes of using this efficient mechanism
of bilateral consultation to encourage approval in Russia, at
the parliamentary level and to promote investment and
taxation laws that provide a positive environment for
investment, such as full and appropriate finalization of PSA
legislation.
This bilateral energy initiative should engage both
official and non-governmental groups committed to moving
forward on energy cooperation. The Moscow International
Petroleum Club, a nongovernmental and consultative
organization, is prepared to lend all assistance to ``jump
start'' the process and provide ongoing support as a well-
known and well-respect NGO in the energy area.
environmental cooperation
Summary
With Russia's economy ailing, substantial environmental
improvements will necessarily be connected with
socioeconomic, institutional, and cultural changes. This
represents a challenge as well as an opportunity. While
environmental protection cannot reasonably be regarded as a
priority, it can as a consequence be a driver of societal
changes on the whole.
It has been demonstrated that Russia's population suffers
from environmental pollution to a degree that makes it not
just a quality-of-life issue. The environmental pollution
threatens Russia's economic well-being and public health,
especially for poor families.
Western governments and international financial
institutions should support projects to improve Russia's
environmental infrastructure. Based on a market approach,
Western donors should provide expertise and oversight to
avoid excesses, lawlessness, and abuse. The Russian
government should provide the appropriate incentives. Nothing
would better mobilize the forces of capitalism for positive
change while at the same time bring Russian and Western
interests under one umbrella.
Recommendations
Russians have a strong bias in favor of engineered
solutions (hardware) to problems, while advanced economies
are taking a software approach (planning and organization).
The hardware bias has been adopted in international
assistance projects. This trend must be reversed.
Russia's scientific institutes and scientists have
developed state-of-the-art technology to prevent and clean up
environmental problems. For lack of funding these
technologies have not been deployed in Russia and have not
been commercialized in international markets. A revolving
fund should be created
[[Page H2832]]
to deploy the technologies and solve the problems.
If trade benefits were extended to certified sustainably-
produced products in Europe and North America, this alone
could open markets wide enough for investors to take the risk
of improving the degraded and polluting infrastructure. Trade
rules benefiting sustainable production would also give an
incentive to the Russian government, which bets heavily on
export earnings from natural resource extraction, to enforce
its laws.
By enlarging the concept of debt-for-nature swaps to
environmental protection more generally, Russia's government
would get real incentives and financial tools to tighten and
enforce its rules. Oversight over environmental protection
would thus move from the resource extraction agencies to less
directly interested ones. Existing legislative proposals such
as the Russian Economic Restoration and Justice Act of 1999
and the Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 2001 could, if
modified, serve as cornerstones for financial cooperative
assistance.
Financial tools such as a mortgage or a bond system must be
developed for a market economy to flourish and be sustained.
Issuing bonds to finance local environmental projects could
be acceptable to Russians, especially where the environmental
problems are clear and their impact severe.
Increase participation with groups such as Global
Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE)
and the Advisory Committee on the Protection of the Seas
(ACOPS). Both organizations work with Russia to help conserve
the world's most valuable ecosystems. A shared annual
legislative agenda for Members of Congress and their
colleagues in the Duma can bring attention to the threats to
ecosystems such as ill-conceived development projects and
poor environmental policy.
Increase cooperation in marine science research to better
address the problems of the ocean where maintenance of stable
fisheries is becoming a source of conflict. Such cooperation
can increase our knowledge of the oceans, boast our ability
to manage the oceans' rich resources, and enhance our
understanding of ocean effects on climate and carbon
sequestration.
Expand cooperation between the U.S. and Russian navies to
help assist with preserving the environment.
Promost the DOE and the Ministry of Atomic Energy for the
Russian Federation (MinAtom) to cooperate on the Nuclear
Cities Initiative (NCI). NCI seeks to increase U.S. national
and global security through economic diversification and
weapons complex down-sizing in Russia's Nuclear Cities.
Encompass all forms of energy in a comprehensive energy
plan that includes attention to global warming and
environmental impacts.
Establish a mechanism for the exchange of information and
to assist in the implementation of initiatives that result
from these recommendations.
health care
Summary
Since the collapse of the USSR, public health and the state
of the medical care system in Russia have been deeply
troubled. Mortality trends, which began to worsen in the late
1960s, accelerated downward in the past decade, leading to a
decline in longevity unknown outside parts of the developing
world. Russia sustained a net loss of 750,000 persons last
year. Of the two factors behind this trend--decreased
fertility and premature mortality--mortality is the more
important. The major contributor to premature mortality is an
excessive incidence of fatal cardiovascular disease--heart
attacks and strokes, due, in turn, to a high prevalence of
unrecognized and unmanaged hypertension, an easily treatable
disease but one that requires an innovative and sustained
program of prevention and education. This record,
unprecedented in time of peace for a developed country,
reveals conditions that threaten to cause serious social and
economic consequences for the nation. President Putin has
acknowledged it as a key security issue for Russia.
For Russia as well as the West, the health issue is both a
challenge and an opportunity. The history of U.S. and Western
health assistance for Russia reveals a record of thin
support, episodic contributions and, at times,
counterproductive efforts. There has been a lack of
appropriate leadership, absence of a coherent strategy, and a
resignation generated by a feeling that the job was simply
too overwhelming. Yet there are opportunities for
constructive engagement for both professional contributions
and community-based efforts in partnership with Russian
colleagues in a well-conceived plan that builds on the
strengths of the existing Russian resources.
Recommendations
An effective health assistance program for the Russian
Federation should concentrate on important health issues and
serious, life-threatening diseases--those which make the most
prominent contribution to premature mortality and where
effective intervention and prevention are possible. This
implies a much increased emphasis on chronic diseases--
especially cardiovascular disorders and diabetes. An
effective program should combine clinical medicine, public
health, and public education.
Develop, implement, and evaluate cooperative physician
exchange programs for the sharing of knowledge and skills
that improve the Russian medical profession's ability to meet
the challenges of the burden of disease.
Develop and implement cooperative programs aimed at
efficient use of medical care resources for treatment and
prevention of disease.
Serve as a clearinghouse for privately and publicly
sponsored programs designed to improve the health of Russians
and improve the quality and effectiveness of preventive and
therapeutic efforts there.
Develop close working relationships with private American
and European philanthropic institutions interested in both
security and health issues in the former Soviet republics.
Establish close working relationships with key commercial
entities whose interests involve issues of health and
medicine in the Russian Federation.
Assist professional education--continuing medical education
for Russian physicians--by organizing exchanges in both
directions, based in regional academic medical centers in
several regions of the Russian Federation.
Support Russian versions of the American Medical
Association, Center for Disease Control, etc.
Collaborate among compelementary organizations on behalf of
disease management and prevention by combining clinical
medicine, public health, and public education. Key examples
include cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and tuberculosis.
Assist in the selective provision of therapeutic drugs and
medical equipment.
Increase cooperative biomedical research between the
National Institutes of Health and research institutes in
Russia.
A joint announcement by Presidents Bush and Putin for close
bilateral cooperation on the eradication of AIDS, cancer,
etc. would build support for these types of programs.
judicial/legal systems
Summary
Russia's judiciary is the least developed of the three
branches. Reform has begun but some of the old structure and
personnel are still in place. Trial by jury is being
introduced and President Putin declared that it would become
the norm nationwide by 2003. A major overhaul of the Soviet-
era criminal code is nearing approval in the Duma.
Recommendations
Jury trials were a feature of the pre-revolutionary Russian
legal system. Few initiatives have had such a concrete impact
in promoting the rule of law in Russia and in promoting human
rights. Putin will almost certainly succeed in his new effort
to expand jury trials to other regions of the Russian
Federation. The U.S. technical assistance community can and
should play a critical role in promoting Putin's practical
and high-minded initiative.
The Central and East European Law Initiative's (CEELI)
much-heralded Environmental Public Advocacy Center (EPAC) in
Ukraine, Moldova, and Uzbekistan has successfully litigated
high-impact environmental cases on behalf of citizens in the
courts and has promoted citizen participation in advocacy and
environmental decision-making. Russia would benefit from a
proliferation of NGOs able to advocate on behalf of the
public through proper, legal channels (as opposed to settling
disputes through extra-judicial means). Average citizens
should be involved in settling environmental disputes with
businesses and the government in a manner that is familiar to
Americans but wholly unfamiliar to most Russians.
Russia adopted a new system last year to expand judicial
power to a group of magistrates, commonly referred to as
Justices of the Peace. Work with these magistrates will prove
to be critical because they will be the court of first
instance for most common citizen complaints. These courts
also will be the first in Russia to implement an abbreviated
trial, pursuant to the current draft code of criminal
procedure, which includes for the first time a system of plea
bargaining. Likewise, the justices will have greater
discretion under the draft code to determine the conditions
of pre-trial release (bail).
The expansion of legal clinics in the last five years has
proven to be successful in reforming the Russian legal
education system. Encouraging the doubling of these clinics
in the next 3-5 years will have a salutary effect on the
legal education system in Russia, as well as facilitate
access to justice for Russia's poor.
Russian law students and law professors continue to use
outdated textbooks from Soviet times. The dearth of textbooks
on newer subjects (particularly on commercial law) has
hampered curriculum reform and the ability of professors to
prepare their students to practice in a market economy.
Through small grant programs targeting individual professors
or groups of professors, this need could be addressed
relatively inexpensively.
The Law on Advocates has passed its first reading in
parliament and appears destined to be passed in final form in
the near term. The new law will represent the legislative
backbone for the restructuring of the legal profession in
Russia. New, higher qualification standards, ethics
standards, etc. will be mandated by the new law. A great deal
of assistance and training will be needed in order to
properly implement the law.
Continue to promote the passage of a modern criminal
procedure code in Russia. The Code itself mandates of
expansion of jury trials throughout the entire Federation by
[[Page H2833]]
2003 and sets other timetables for the transfer of the
responsibility from prosecutors to judges for issuing arrest
warrants, search warrants, wiretap orders, and setting
conditions for pretrial release.
Encourage American law schools to provide tuition for at
least one Russian student and establish a U.S. government
program to cover all other costs. Additionally, Russian
students should be able to apply for J, I (section 212E)
visas.
Fully support and expand institutional relationships
between the Russian and American local governments. State-to-
state, city-to-city, and mayor-to-mayor initiatives should be
further encouraged.
Support and expand training programs for local officials in
Russia.
local governments
Summary
A successful transition to democracy in Russia cannot take
place only at the national level. The democratization of
national political institutions without corresponding changes
taking place locally would be a prescription for political
instability. Furthermore, there are a number or reasons why
the attempt to build democracy at the sub-national level in
Russia is conducive to a successful transition to democracy
nationally.
In stable federal systems, legitimate and effectively
functioning local governments can act as a balance to central
power; their absence creates greater opportunity for abuse of
power by the center.
Popular participation at the local level gives people a
knowledge of the mechanics of democracy. Among the lessons to
be learned through participation in local politics are
tolerance for the opinions of others, majority rule,
representation, and accountability.
Popular participation in local government also leads to
stronger feelings of political efficacy--the sense that
people have some control over the decisions that directly
effect their lives. As such, democratically run local
governments can instill greater support for democratic
institutions nationally and so contribute to the development
of a democratic political culture.
Finally, national policies must be implemented locally;
local governments that are responsive and are perceived as
legitimate are likely to be more effective in doing so. Local
knowledge and proximate interest may improve the
effectiveness of local service delivery.
The Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted in 1993
envisages two levels of government below the national level,
both operating in accordance with democratic principles. The
upper level consists of 89 federal subdivisions, considered
part of the Russian state system. Below them are institutions
of Local Self Government, generally municipalities. Chapter
Eight of the Constitution is devoted to these institutions
and accords them an essential role in promoting public
participation in all local decision making. However, despite
the high ideals expressed in the Constitution, democracy at
the sub-national level in Russia has been slow to develop.
Efforts to promote these ideals are crucial to building
democracy in Russia.
Recommendations
Together with Russian specialists, assess the degree to
which efforts to develop institutions of local self
government in Russia have succeeded and identify areas of
weakness which could benefit from American cooperation.
Propose ways to improve the tax base of local government in
Russia and explore ways in which revenues might best be
shared between levels of government.
Consider ways to encourage political participation locally,
including efforts at building stronger political parties and
organizations that represent elements of civil society.
Focus on strengthening local legal institutions, including
the courts, the judiciary, and legal services for those who
can least afford them, while encouraging legal education.
science and technology
Summary
Under the existing 10-year Umbrella Agreement on S&T
Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United
States signed in 1993, a large number of projects have been
underway involving more than 15 federal agencies. Areas of
research have included space, the environment, agricultural
science, energy, public health and medicine, infectious
diseases, earth sciences, nuclear and molecular physics,
information technology, and a wide range of basic science
disciplines. Cooperative endeavors between U.S. and Russian
scientists have resulted in numerous scientific and political
breakthroughs.
Participating U.S. government agencies include: ARS, CDC,
DOD, DOE, DOS, DOT, EPA, HHS, NASA, NIH, NIST, NOAA, NRC,
NSF/CRDF, ONR, USDA, and USGS. In addition, private funds,
such as the Soros and Turner Foundations, have made or are
about to make sizable investments in the Russian science
community.
Under the various programs administered by these agencies,
thousands of Russian scientists and engineers have been
involved in commercial and scientific relationships. Numerous
areas of cooperation can be expanded and new areas can be
explored. The U.S. needs to determine which areas of
cooperation require focused attention. The goals of these
programs should be self-sustained.
Recommendations
DoD/DoE should cooperate with MinAtom in the area of
nuclear fuel cycles, including development of proliferation
resistant fuel cycles for possible application in advanced
nuclear countries and appropriate repositories for final
disposition of spent fuel.
Stimulate arms control thinking by training the next
generation of Russian nuclear weapons and public policy
specialists in programs for natural and social sciences.
Encourage private firms and NGOs to utilize current
technology to respond to and mitigate natural and
environmental disasters.
Encourage industry by way of taxes and other incentives to
develop and use Russian technology and to support the
institutes that create the technology.
Continue and expand cooperative fusion research that began
over 25 years ago because it is expected that fusion energy
could become the long-term non-polluting solution to the
world's energy needs.
Involve Russia in nanotechnology projects because materials
research is an area of traditional Russian R&D strength.
Cooperate with Russia in the area of food safety and food
security--in the production as well as processing and storage
stages. This could provide significant benefits not only to
the U.S. and Russia, but to developing countries as well.
Increase cooperation in marine science research to better
address the problems of the ocean, where maintenance of
stable fisheries is becoming a source of conflict. Such
cooperation can increase our knowledge of the oceans, boost
our ability to manage the oceans' rich resources, and enhance
our understanding of oceanic effects on climate and carbon
sequestration.
Further develop commercial relations in the high-tech area
of information technology using the strong mathematical and
software development skills of Russian computer scientists.
The existing NCI and IPP programs could serve as facilitators
for this further development.
Restructure our scientific aid programs so that there are
economic drivers for investments in science that complement
the political issues and scientific advancements for the
project. The existing NCI and IPP programs could serve as
economic drivers.
Establish a mechanism for the exchange of information and
to assist in the implementation of initiatives that result
from these recommendations.
space and aeronautics
Summary
At the dawn of the post-Cold War era, U.S. industry feared
that Russia's vast rocket resources would disrupt the
international satellite launch services market following the
end of Soviet Communism. By formulating a framework for
cooperative space activities, the U.S. and Russian
governments opened the door for the creation of strategic
partnerships between their respective aerospace companies.
Today, the once secretive Russian Proton Rocket, now marketed
alongside other western launch vehicles, is the result of
joint ventures between U.S. and Russian space launch service
providers. Such ventures, however, will not be limited to
only marketing space transportation services as we enter the
21st century.
The push for greater commercialization of government space
assets and operations is characteristic of new challenges for
the 21st Century, as well as greater improvements in space-
related technologies for the benefit of near-Earth space
development and space exploration. Some members of Congress
view a newly formulated partnership with Russia as a
potential solution to the cost-related problems we now face
with the International Space Station (ISS) and other future
undertakings such as the colonization of Mars. Undoubtedly,
the ISS, space exploration, and improvements in aerospace
technology appear to be the major elements that will come to
characterize U.S.-Russian cooperation in space and
aeronautics activities in the mid-term.
Recommendations
International Space Station--Currently, Russia provides
Progress re-supply cargo ships to support ISS refueling and
logistics and Soyuz capsules for crew return. Russia is also
expected to provide modules for docking and stowage, critical
power, and research modules. Although Russia has invested
large sums of money in the program, it is unclear whether it
can continue as a viable partner in this effort due to
schedule delays, funding shortages, and national security
concerns. Additionally, the U.S. estimate of a growing
projected Station cost overrun only compounds the problem.
Joint commercialization ventures, however, may provide Russia
with opportunities for meeting its ISS obligations. SpaceHab,
Inc. has approached Russia regarding a cooperative
arrangement to develop its Enterprise module, which would
have the capability to meet Russia's docking and stowage
obligations as well as provide a near-term solution for new
habitation. Similarly, Boeing is interested in developing the
Russian FGB-2 as an alternative means for providing
habitation capability. Both proposals require substantial
U.S. payments, which are not currently budgeted.
Space-Related Technologies and Missions--In the case of
rocket engine development, Pratt & Whitney, Inc. currently
imports Russia's RD-180 engines to power the new U.S.
commercial Atlas III and Atlas V launchers. Pratt & Whitney
is developing a
[[Page H2834]]
U.S.-based capability for manufacturing RD-180 engines for
use on military launches of these systems. Additionally,
American and Russian scientists were working to define a new
space-based stereo viewing research project called the
Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS). The goal of
RAMOS was to build confidence between the United States and
the Russian Federation by cooperating on a defense research
and development program. This program has currently received
an increase in funding. Potential joint U.S.-Russian
cooperation programs are focused on a wide range of
technologies and space operational needs.
(a) Space Solar Power: Russia and U.S. could further this
joint technology risk reduction program. (b) Cooperative
Aeronautics Research Program: This joint research program in
advanced aeronautics and propulsion technologies could
benefit both nations. (c) Advanced Space Propulsion
technology: We should build on previous U.S.-Russian
cooperative activities on Russian electric propulsion
technology for deep space missions. (d) Joint Weather
Satellites: The U.S. and Russia could jointly develop polar
and geostationary weather satellites and solar monitoring
satillites. (e) Planetary Defense: Joint U.S.-Russian
cooperative program to detect, monitor, and track potential
Earth-crossing asteroids and develop capabilities to rapidly
respond. There is an unmet need to develop a comprehensive
catalogue of Earth-threatening objects and the means to
rapidly respond to the threat they pose. (f) Arospace and
Aeronautics Research: Achievement of the goal of low-cost
access will depend upon significant improvements in launch
vehicle technology development. It must be understood that
U.S.-Russian partnership on space initiatives will require
U.S.-Russian partnership in the areas of aeronautics as well.
The state of art in aircraft engine technology for both
countries would benefit from an exchange in manufacturing
techniques and materials science.
Further Space Exploration--The focus of joint programs
involving humans exploring the solar system and beyond must
involve launch vehicle technology development. Concentration
in this area would allow cooperative programs to move forward
in exploring and determining whether there is life in the
oceans beneath the ice on Europa, for example. Although NASA
abandoned its Pluto mission earlier this year due to a lack
of funds, a joint mission to Pluto and the Kuiper asteroid
belts may make it feasible.
Support and expand private sector relationship. The
Lockheed Krunachev Space Launch is an example of this
partnership.
____________________