[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 66 (Tuesday, May 21, 2002)]
[House]
[Pages H2820-H2834]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  DEFENDING PRESIDENT BUSH REGARDING KNOWLEDGE OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, 
THREAT, AND DETAILING UPCOMING TRAVEL TO RUSSIA, UZBEKISTAN, CHINA, AND 
                              NORTH KOREA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Issa). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) 
is recognized provisionally for half the time remaining until midnight.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I take the time this 
evening, and thank the Speaker and the staff for bearing with me, to 
basically perform two functions.
  First of all, I will respond to those critics of President Bush who 
have taken unfair shots at him over the 9-11 situation, and will 
factually refute what people like the minority leader, the gentleman 
from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), have said publicly about this President 
somehow not heeding evidence that was provided to him.
  I am going to present the true facts of what we could have and should 
have done prior to September 11 that I think would have allowed us to 
both understand what was about to occur and to have done something 
about it.
  The second action I am going to discuss this evening is an upcoming 
trip that I will be leading to Russia, Uzbekistan, Beijing, China, as 
well as Pyongyang, North Korea, the first delegation going into that 
country, and Seoul, South Korea, at the end of this week.
  Mr. Speaker, let me start out by saying, first of all, in response to 
many of the media pundits who have spent the last week or 10 days 
criticizing President Bush and have publicly said that he had 
indications that should have alerted him to the upcoming attack on the 
World Trade Center, nothing could be farther from the truth. The facts 
are all in. The data the President got were basically individual 
elements provided by individual agencies about potential acts that 
might be against our country, nowhere near the immensity of what we 
actually saw on September 11.
  They were bits of information, like the CIA saying there might be an 
attempt to hijack an airplane, but no linkage of that act to an attack 
on the Trade Center; or the fact that other agencies were looking at 
pilots that were obtaining licenses and had no intention of landing an 
airplane. Each of these bits of information, while being provided to 
the upper levels of our government, in and of themselves would not lead 
anyone to believe that an imminent attack was about to occur on the 
Trade Center.
  But Mr. Speaker, as I said on September 11 on CNN live at 12 noon 
from the roof of a church across from the Capitol, on that day the 
government did fail the American people. Now, the President did not 
fail the American people, but the government failed the American 
people.
  I am going to document for our colleagues today, and for the American 
public and the media, steps that we took in the years prior to 
September 11 when our agencies and the government did not respond. This 
started back in the Clinton administration and continued during the 
Bush administration.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, during the late 1990s, I chaired the Committee 
on Research for our national security, which meant that my job was to 
oversee about $38 billion a year that we spend on cutting-edge 
technology for the military.
  One of those projects that I helped get additional funding for was 
the Information Dominant Center that the Army was standing up down at 
Fort Belvoir, technically known as the LIWAC. This Land Information 
Warfare Assessment Center was designed to monitor on a 24-hour-a-day 
basis 7 days a week all of our military classified systems, those 
systems used to run the Army. Each of our services was in the process 
of standing up an entity like the one that the Army stood up at Fort 
Belvoir.
  Back in 1997, as I was supporting increased funding for this 
capability, I was amazed in two trips that I took to Fort Belvoir that 
the Army was not just able to maintain security over their information 
systems, but they were able to use new software tools and high-speed 
computers to do what is commonly called ``profiling,'' to take vast 
amounts of information about the classified and unclassified 
information and process it and analyze it so that a picture could be 
drawn and a threat could be developed, proliferation could be 
monitored.

                              {time}  2310

  Now, this was back in 1997. In fact, I had a chance to use these 
capabilities and I think this story, more than any other, underscores 
the inabilities of our agencies on September 11 to really understand 
the threat that was emerging.

[[Page H2821]]

  As you might recall, back in 1997 we had gotten into a war in Kosovo 
to remove Milosevic from power. All of Congress was not supportive of 
that conflict. In fact, I opposed the initial involvement with 
President Clinton by our troops, not because I have supported Milosevic 
but because I felt that we did not force Russia or allow Russia to play 
a more vibrant role in helping us to get Milosevic out of power.
  Two weeks after the bombing campaign started, I started to receive 
telephone calls and started to receive e-mails from my Russian 
colleagues in the State Duma. People who are senior leaders who called 
me and e-mailed me and said we have a real problem. Your policy of 
bombing Milosevic and innocent Serbs is causing the Russian people to 
lose confidence in what America's real intent is, and you are driving 
Russia further away from our country. And I said what do you want me to 
do? They said we need you to convince your president that Russia can 
help play a role in ending the war and getting Milosevic out of office. 
And the Russians told me that they wanted me to go to Belgrade in the 
middle of the conflict, that they would arrange a meeting with 
Milosevic.
  Well, I told them that that was very much undoable because we were in 
the middle of a war. We were bombing Serbia at the time. But I asked 
them to put that request in writing and they did. Within the next few 
days I got a letter on official Duma stationery where the Russians 
outlined their desire to take me and a delegation of Members of 
Congress to Belgrade, Yugoslavia. They outlined who would come from the 
Russian side and they committed that they would have a meeting with 
Milosevic personally with a date and time certain. They also agreed to 
visit a refugee camp of our choosing so we could show them the damage 
that Milosevic had caused innocent people, and they also agreed to 
release the three American POWs that were being held hostage.
  When the letter came, it also included the name of an individual I 
did not know. His name was Dragomir Kric. The Russians had told me that 
this individual was very close to Milosevic personally, that the 
Russians trusted him, and that he was the guy that would get Milosevic 
to agree to the terms to end the hostilities against the Serbian, 
Yugoslavian people.
  The Russian request I then took to the State Department with my 
colleague, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) on the other side. 
We had a 1 hour and 30 minute meeting in the Office of Deputy Secretary 
of State Strobe Talbott. We outlined for him what the Russians had 
requested for us and that we were willing to lead a delegation into 
Belgrade in spite of the war going on. Strobe Talbott listened and he 
said, I do not think it is a good idea. He said we cannot guarantee 
your safety and we do not think Milosevic will do what the Russians say 
he will do, and we think he will just use you. So my advice is not to 
go, but as citizens in America you can do what you want.
  I said that we would not violate the request of our State Department 
and would not go. But the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer) suggested 
that perhaps we should meet the Russians in a neutral city and he 
suggested Vienna. Strobe Talbott said that was fine. So I came back to 
Capitol Hill and I sent a letter to all 435 members of the House 
outlining for them what the Russians had asked, what the administration 
response was, and invited every Member of this body to attend a meeting 
if they were interested in going with us to Vienna. From the meeting 
that we held 1- Members of Congress, 5 Democrats and 5 Republicans, 
volunteered to go with me to Vienna to meet with our Russian 
counterparts and Mr. Kric.
  Now, before we left on that trip I wanted to know something about 
Kric so I called the CIA director, George Tennant. I said I do not know 
who this guy is. The Russians are convinced that he can give us 
information that will allow us to get Milosevic to agree to our terms. 
Can you tell me something about him as the director of the CIA?
  He called me back the next day and gave me 2 or 3 sentences about 
Dragomir Kric and said that they thought he was tied in with the 
corruption in Russia but did not know much else about him.
  Without telling anyone, Mr. Speaker, I went back to my friends at the 
Army Information Dominence Center, and I said can you run me a profile 
of a Dragomir Kric and tell me something about him. They ran a profile 
and they came back to me with 8 pages of information about this man, 
the profile of someone who was very close to Milosevic personally.
  With that information, we left on a military plane on a Thursday 
afternoon after votes and flew all night to Vienna, arrived on Friday 
morning, and began our discussions in the hotel in Vienna with the 11 
members of Congress, a State Department representative, the 5 Russians 
and Dragomir Kric.

  We worked all through Friday into the night and into Saturday. And by 
Saturday midday something historic had happened. The Russians had 
agreed to the terms that we wanted to end the conflict. The Russians 
had agreed to things they had never agreed to. During the time when we 
were meeting, Kric was calling back to Belgrade talking to Milosevic on 
the phone personally. He would come back in the room and he would tell 
us what Milosevic was happy with and what he was not, but we were not 
there to negotiate with Milosevic. We were there to get the Russians to 
agree with us on an end to the conflict.
  By 2 o'clock on Saturday afternoon we reached agreement. It was word 
for word read by the Russian and American side and we all signed off on 
an end to the war. It was an historic time for us because we thought we 
could stop the bombing and stop killing innocent people and get 
Milosevic out of power.
  Kric immediately left the room and made a phone call. He came back in 
the room and said I just talked to Milosevic personally, and he has 
assured me that if we go down as a group right now to Belgrade, and I 
will hire the bus, and we all go down together, Milosevic will meet 
with us, he will agree to this framework which ends his reign. He will 
agree to accept international peacekeeping force to disarm the Serbs, 
and he will agree to allowing a U.N. or NATO force to bring stability 
to this country. And he will also release the 3 POWs that have not been 
heard from since they were captured by Milosevic.
  Well, that was pretty historic, Mr. Speaker. So my colleagues on the 
other side called the White House from Vienna. They get on the White 
House operation center phone line and talked to John Podesta, the chief 
of staff for the President. And they said we have something that you 
have to get to President Clinton immediately. We have negotiated what 
we think is the end of the Kosovo war with the Russians, with a 
representative of Milosevic agreeing to the terms.
  Another representative with us of the State Department called the 
State Department operations center and he told them what had 
transpired. So he notified both the White House and the State 
Department. The State Department said let me talk to Congressman 
Weldon. So I got on the phone. On the other end of the line was Steven 
Sestanovich who was at that time in charge of the Russia desk at the 
State Department.
  I outlined for him what had occurred. He said, Curt, this is amazing 
but it is above my pay grade. I cannot tell you what to do. Hold on and 
I will have someone else call you back. Thirty minutes later, Mr. 
Speaker, I got a call from Tom Pickering. Tom Pickering was at that 
time number three in the State Department and had been the ambassador 
for us to Russia. I had known him in that capacity. He said, Curt, what 
is going on? And I explained to him that we had met with the Russians 
and Kric. We had reached agreement, and that Milosovic through Kric was 
saying that he was prepared to end the war if we went down to Belgrade. 
So I said to Tom Pickering, what do you think we should do?
  He said, Curt, first of all, we do not trust Milosevic. We do not 
think that he will live up to what he is telling you through this guy 
Kric; and, furthermore, Curt, I do not even know who Kric is. I never 
heard of this guy and how could you believe that somehow he speaks for 
Milosevic?
  I said, Tom, I did not know Kric either before I came here, but I 
know the Russians. They are my friends, and they have convinced me that 
he is the

[[Page H2822]]

person that can get Milosevic to do what we want. He said, I do not 
think it is a good idea. In fact, let me tell you, the Reverend Jesse 
Jackson has been in Belgrade for a week. We have been in constant 
communication with him. In fact, he is coming home today. His 
delegation has been unsuccessful. They were trying to get the three 
POWs released, he said, but their mission has failed.

                              {time}  2320

  What makes you think that you can do something that the Reverend 
Jesse Jackson could do? I do not know, Tom. All I am telling you is 
what the Russians are saying based upon Kric's taught discussions with 
Milosevic. He said I do not think you should go, and I said okay, then 
we will not, because we are a Nation of laws and not of people.
  I came back to the room where the Members of Congress were seated 
with our Russian counterparts. I told them the story, and they 
immediately became incensed at me. Kric called me a coward for not 
taking a delegation to Belgrade. He said, You just lost a chance to end 
the war and bring home your POWs.
  I had Members of Congress from both parties telling me they were 
going to go on their own, and I said, Oh no, you are not; we came in a 
military plane that I acquired; you are going back to America with me.
  So the 11 Members of Congress and the Russians and our State 
Department official sat down and discussed how we would implement our 
plan instead of going to see Milosevic in Belgrade. Kric went out of 
the room and came back in after making a phone call, and said, You just 
blew it; Milosevic had said you had a chance to end the war, to get him 
to publicly accept this agreement and he would release the POWs.
  We continued to meet. Two hours later, our Navy escort came into the 
room, and he said to the 11 Members of Congress that CNN has just 
announced that Milosevic is releasing the POWs to Jesse Jackson's 
delegation. Kric told us that Milosevic did not want to keep them 
because he was fearful they would be harmed and we would blame him for 
their injuries. Even though he did not want to release them to Jesse 
Jackson, he did.
  To continue the story and make my point, Mr. Speaker, we all came 
back home to America. We briefed our colleagues. We briefed the 
administration. We presented the framework that we negotiated, and 8 
days later, or 2 weeks later, that became the basis of the G-8 
agreement to end the war. So our work was fruitful, but something 
interesting happened that applies to September 11.
  I got a call from the FBI in my office asking my staff to allow two 
agents to come over for me to brief them, for me to brief them, on a 
fellow named Dragomir Kric. I said, Fine, set it up for Monday 
afternoon in my office in the Rayburn Building. I went back to 
Pennsylvania, and on the Friday before that Monday, my office paged me 
with a 911 page. I called them and they said, You must call CIA 
congressional affairs immediately. I did.
  The CIA said, Congressman, we are going to fly two agents to 
Philadelphia right now. They will meet you at the airport, they will 
come to your home, they will come to a hotel, wherever you want to meet 
them, but they have to talk to you immediately. I said, What is the 
urgency? They said, We have been tasked by the State Department to 
brief them on Dragomir Kric and we want you to tell us what you know 
about him. I said, Well, the FBI already asked for that information, 
why can't we do it together on Monday afternoon?
  So that Monday afternoon I had four agents in my office: two CIA 
agents, one CI person and two FBI agents. For two hours they grilled me 
with four pages of questions about Kric.
  I answered all their questions. I told them that there were four Kric 
brothers, that they were the owners of the largest banking system in 
the former Yugoslavia; that they employed some 60,000 people; that 
their bank had tried to finance the sale of an SA-10 from Russia to 
Milosevic; that their bank had been involved in a $4 billion German 
bond scam; that one of the brothers had financed Milosevic's election; 
that the house Milosevic lived in was really their house; that, in 
fact, Krics' wives were best of friends with Milosevic's wife; and that 
they were the closest people to this leader.
  I told them all the information. When I got done, Mr. Speaker, I 
said, Now, do you want to know where I got my data from? They said, 
Yeah, you got it from the Russians. I said, No. They said, Well, then 
you got it from Kric. I said, No. I said, Before I went over there I 
had the Army's information dominant center run a profile for me of 
Dragomir Kric.
  The FBI and the CIA in 1997 said to me, what is the Army's 
information dominant center? The FBI and the CIA had no knowledge that 
our military was developing a capability that would be able to do 
massive data mining of information to allow us to do a profile of a 
person or an event that was about to happen.
  We took that model, based on that lesson which infuriated me as a 
Member of Congress to be asked to brief the CIA and the FBI, and 
working with people in the intelligence agencies, I developed a plan. 
This plan was to create a national collaborative center.
  Back in 1997, Mr. Speaker, the national collaborative center where 
there were articles written, published in the media, technical media 
here was called the NOAH, N-O-A-H. It stands for National Operations 
and Analysis Hub. The function of the NOAH would be to have all 32 
Federal agencies that have classified systems have a node of each of 
those systems in one central location managed by one of their 
employees, and when tasked by the national command authority, the 
President or the National Security Council, their data would be entered 
into a massive computer using new software tools like STARLITE and 
SPIRES and six others that are used by the private sector to do data 
mining.

  In addition to classified information systems, they would also run 
through massive amounts of unclassified data, newspaper stories, 
magazine story, TV broadcasts, radio broadcasts. A person cannot do 
that manually, but they can do it through high-speed computers, as the 
Army did for me in developing the profile of Kric.
  We took this plan and we said to the intelligence community, this is 
what we need to have to be prepared for threats in the 21st century, 
because the threats we are going to see over the next several decades 
will not come only from one nation state, they will come from terrorist 
organizations. We need to be able to pool all this data together and be 
able to profile it, analyze it and then come back with a true picture 
of what may be about to occur.
  Mr. Speaker, this was in 1997. I briefed John Hamre. Dr. John Hamre 
was then the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I said, John, you have got to 
go down to Fort Belvoir and see this facility; it is amazing. He went 
down twice. He called me back and he said, Curt, it is amazing what 
they are doing there. This profiling worked, and they could do it 
because unofficially some other secret lines were running through Fort 
Belvoir that the Army could unofficially access. So it really was an 
official process.
  He said, But you know, Curt, I cannot get to where you want to go 
because the CIA and the FBI will not cooperate and neither will the 
other agencies. He said, So I have a suggestion for you. Why do you not 
host a meeting in your office? I will come and you invite my 
counterparts at the FBI and the CIA.
  So, Mr. Speaker, in my office, in 1998, I had the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, the Deputy Director of the CIA and the Deputy Director of the 
FBI, four of us met for 1 hour. We briefed them on the NOAH. We talked 
about the need for a national collaborative center, national data 
fusion center; and the response was, We do not need to do that right 
now, we are doing our own systems in our own agencies; so thank you for 
your recommendations, and we are trying to share but not the way you 
want because that is too bold. That is too aggressive. This was 1998, 
Mr. Speaker.
  Not satisfied with that, we held hearings. We did briefings for our 
colleagues; and in two consecutive defense bills, I put language in the 
bill that basically said the Defense Department and our intelligence 
agencies had to create a national collaborative center. So it became a 
part of the law; but Mr. Speaker, the agencies refused. They

[[Page H2823]]

said we do not need to do that, we do our job very well.
  Each of them does their job very well, but the problem is the threats 
in the 21st century will be seen from a number of different sources. It 
may be information coming from the Customs Department or from the 
Defense Intelligence Agency or from the NSA or from the CIA or the FBI 
or Commerce, State and Justice, all of which have classified systems; 
or it may come from some public statements in articles in other 
countries. We can only have the capability to understand all of that if 
we have a national fusion center.

                              {time}  2230

  We did not have that capability before September 11. That is why I 
stood up on September 11, at 12 p.m. in the afternoon and said, ``Today 
our government failed the American people.'' Because, Mr. Speaker, we 
knew what we should have done. We knew what we could have done. And we 
did not do it.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, I firmly believe that if we would have 
implemented the NOAH, which John Hamre offered to pay for with DOD 
dollars, back when we first recommended it, I am convinced we could 
have stopped or known about and prevented September 11 from ever 
happening.
  Let me give an example. CIA information on terrorism, combined with 
what the FBI knew about training pilots and open-source information on 
remarks by al Qaeda, would have helped the intelligence community and 
enforcement agencies focus better on the threat. For example, in August 
of 2000, an al Qaeda member had been interviewed by an Italian 
newspaper and reported that al Qaeda was training kamikaze pilots. The 
intelligence community and enforcement agencies, however, do not read 
open-source information. Yes, they read all the classified stuff, but 
this interview in 2000 was in an open-source newspaper account in 
Italy.
  If we would have had a fusion center, all of that data would have 
been processed, and in very real quick time, through massive high-speed 
computers, and we would have seen the linkages between what was 
occurring. But with each agency doing its own thing, it is impossible 
to see the linkages. And that is why when President Bush before 
September 11 got a bit of information from the CIA and a bit from the 
FBI, and something else, and nothing from open sources, there is no way 
he could have foretold what was about to occur.
  If we would have had the NOAH in place, an idea that was developed 
with the intelligence community, an idea that was briefed to the FBI, 
briefed to the CIA and briefed to the Defense Department, I think we 
could have done something to prevent al Qaeda.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, there is another interesting development that 
occurred. After the Army showed the capability of the LIWAC model at 
Ft. Belvoir, other services began to take interest. Special forces 
command down in Florida contacted the Army and said, hey, we hear you 
are doing some neat things. We want to build a mini version of what you 
are doing down at our headquarters.
  I did not find out about this until October of 2001, after the attack 
on the trade center. A year before, special forces command developed 
their own mini version of a data processing or collaborative center 
with very limited capabilities. But what they did, Mr. Speaker, they 
did a profile of al Qaeda 1 year before 9-11.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Issa). The gentleman from Pennsylvania 
(Mr. Weldon) is recognized to continue until midnight.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, here is the chart, the 
unclassified chart of what special forces command had 1 year before 9-
11. Interesting. The entire al Qaeda network is identified in a graphic 
chart with all the linkages to all the terrorist groups around the 
world.
  In fact, Mr. Speaker, I was told by the folks who developed the 
capability for special forces command that this chart and the briefing 
that was supposed to be given to General Shelton, Chairman of our Joint 
Chiefs, had a recommendation to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's 
network. Mr. Speaker, this was 1 year before 9-11. This was not during 
President Bush's administration. This occurred in the fall of the 
remaining term of President Bill Clinton.
  The key question I have been trying to get at is why was this 3-hour 
briefing, which I also got, I got General Holland to bring his briefers 
up from Florida with special forces, I went in the Pentagon, went in 
the tank, and they gave me the briefing, as much as they could give me, 
because part of it is being used for our operational plan, why was that 
3-hour briefing with the recommendations to take out 5 cells of bin 
Laden's network condensed down to a 1-hour brief when it was given to 
General Hugh Shelton in January of 2001? And why were the 
recommendations to take out 5 cells not followed up on? That is the 
question we should get answered, Mr. Speaker.
  Because 1 year before 9-11, the capability that special forces built 
actually identified to us the network of al Qaeda. And they went beyond 
that and gave us recommendations where we could take out cells to 
eliminate their capability. So for those pundits out there sitting in 
their armchairs criticizing President Bush, they have it all wrong.
  Facts are a tough thing to refute, and the fact is that back in 1997, 
we told the administration at that time what to do. In 1998, we briefed 
the agencies. In 1999, we put language in a defense bill. In 2000, we 
put language in a defense bill. In 2000, special forces command built 
another mini version of that capability. And in 2000 they briefed 
General Shelton telling him to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's network. 
All of that activity could have prevented or helped to prevent 9-11 
from ever occurring. I challenge my colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to review 
the facts. I challenge the media to report the truth.
  We still do not have a national collaborative center. That capability 
still does not exist. We are getting there, but it has been a long 
road. I briefed our Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, with the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton), chairman of the Committee on 
Government Reform, about 4 months ago. He agreed with us, but he has 
not yet been able to achieve this new interagency collaborative center, 
and that is an indictment of our government that the American people 
deserve to be outraged over.
  We need this kind of capability in the 21st century, because these 
bits of pieces of information have to be pieced together, both 
classified and unclassified, so that our analysts can get the clear 
picture of what may be about to occur against our people and our 
friends.
  So, Mr. Speaker, I seek to clarify the charges against the President 
and to answer them, and I encourage my colleagues to learn more about 
the need for a national collaborative center, a national data fusion 
center or, as I call it, a national operations and analysis hub.
  Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the Record the documentation from as 
far back as 1998, 1999, and 2000 with our recommendations to implement 
this kind of capability:

     of an Office of Transformation within the Office of the 
     Secretary of Defense to advise the Secretary on--
       (1) development of force transformation strategies to 
     ensure that the military of the future is prepared to 
     dissuade potential military competitors and, if that fails, 
     to fight and win decisively across the spectrum of future 
     conflict;
       (2) ensuring a continuous and broadly focused 
     transformation process;
       (3) service and joint acquisition and experimentation 
     efforts, funding for experimentation efforts, promising 
     operational concepts and technologies and other 
     transformation activities, as appropriate; and
       (4) development of service and joint operational concepts, 
     transformation implementation strategies, and risk management 
     strategies.
       (c) Sense of Congress of Funding.--It is the sense of 
     Congress that the Secretary of Defense should consider 
     providing funding adequate for sponsoring selective 
     prototyping efforts, wargames, and studies and analyses and 
     for appropriate staffing, as recommended by the director of 
     an Office of Transformation as described in subsection (b).

     SEC. 903. REVISED JOINT REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL 
                   COLLABORATIVE INFORMATION ANALYSIS CAPABILITY.

       (A) Revised Report.--At the same time as the submission of 
     the budget for fiscal year 2003 under section 1105 of title 
     31, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense and the 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the 
     congressional defense committees and the congressional 
     intelligence committees a revised report assessing 
     alternatives for the establishment of a national

[[Page H2824]]

     collaborative information analysis capability.
       (b) Matters Included.--The revised report shall cover the 
     same matters required to be included in the DOD/CIA report, 
     except that the alternative architectures assessed in the 
     revised report shall be limited to architectures that include 
     the participation of All Federal agencies involved in the 
     collection of intelligence. The revised report shall also 
     include a draft of legislation sufficient to carry out the 
     preferred architecture identified in the revised report.
       (c) Officials To Be Consulted.--The revised report shall be 
     prepared after consultation with all appropriate Federal 
     officials, including the following:
       (1) The Secretary of the Treasury.
       (2) The Secretary of Commerce.
       (3) The Secretary of State.
       (4) The Attorney General.
                                  ____


               Defense Information and Electronics Report


 weldon: dod needs massive intelligence network for shared threat info

       Senior Pentagon officials are mulling over an idea proposed 
     by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) that would link classified and 
     unclassified documents in a massive intelligence 
     clearinghouse that could be accessed by 33 federal agencies--
     a concept similar in some ways to one floated by DOD 
     intelligence officials but with significantly fewer players 
     involved.
       ``Our problem with intelligence is that we're stove-
     pipped,'' said Weldon, chairman of the House Armed Services 
     military research and development subcommittee, during a Nov. 
     8 interview. ``Each agency has its own way of collecting data 
     and analyzing it, but they don't share that information with 
     other agencies. The need is to have a better system of 
     analyzing and fusing data sets across agencies and services--
     certainly within the Pentagon and the military, but my 
     opinion is that we have to go further than that.''
       Weldon first proposed the concept of a ``National 
     Operations Analysis Hub'' to Deputy Defense Secretary John 
     Hamre last June, although the congressman said he kept his 
     initiative quiet until a stronger plan could be developed.
       The Pentagon-funded network of agencies would be operated 
     by DOD. According to Weldon, it would pull together large 
     amounts of information to produce intelligence profiles of 
     people, regions and national security threats, such as 
     information warfare and cyber-terrorism.
       ``The NOAH concept of a national collaborative environment 
     supporting policy and decision-makers mirrors the ideas you 
     have expressed to me in recent discussions, and it is a 
     tangible way to confront the growing asymmetrical threats to 
     our nation,'' Weldon wrote in his July 30 letter to Hamre.
       The NOAH concept, however, was not wholeheartedly embraced 
     by Hamre, who met with Weldon last summer and told the 
     congressman his suggested use of the Army's Land Information 
     Warfare Activity at Ft. Belvoir, VA, as a model for NOAH, 
     would never stick.
       Because LIWA is already short of resources, the Army is 
     apprehensive about taking on any new tasks, Hamre told 
     Weldon.
       Weldon, in a July 21 letter to Hamre, also urged the 
     Pentagon to support additional future funding for LIWA, 
     citing critical budget shortfalls that he said have kept the 
     agency from fulfilling a barrage of requests for intelligence 
     files from Army commanders (Defense Information and 
     Electronics Report, July 30, p1).
       ``There's massive amounts of data out there, and you have 
     to be able to analyze it and create ways to focus on that 
     data so its relevant to whatever you're interested in,'' he 
     said this week about his support for LIWA. ``Well, the Army 
     has already done that.''
       While Weldon continues to push for NOAH to be patterned 
     after LIWA, he sees it operating on a much larger scale. 
     Impressed by its ability to pull together huge amounts of 
     both unclassified and classified data, Weldon noted LIWA's 
     Information Dominance Center can create in-depth profiles 
     that could be useful to the CIA, FBI and the White House. Yet 
     most federal agencies don't even know LIWA exists, he added.
       ``Right now the military is limited to [its] own sources of 
     information,'' Weldon said. ``And in the 21st century, a 
     terrorist group is more than likely going to be involved with 
     terrorist nations. So the boundaries are crossed all the 
     time. We don't have any way to share that and get beyond the 
     stove-pipping.''
       Meanwhile, officials within the Defense Department's 
     intelligence community have been considering another way to 
     amass intelligence information through a concept called the 
     Joint Counter-intelligence Assessment Group. A DOD 
     spokeswoman said proponents of the idea, for now, are 
     unwilling to disclose details about it. She was also unable 
     to say whether a formal proposal to Hamre had been made yet.
       In Weldon's July 30 letter to Hamre, however, Weldon 
     alludes to an ongoing, ``initiative to link 
     counterintelligence groups throughout the community.''
       ``I have heard of an attempts to connect the Office of Drug 
     Control Policy (ONDCP) and [Office of the Secretary of 
     Defense] assets with federal, state and local law enforcement 
     agencies,'' Weldon wrote.
       However, Weldon said in the interview he believes JCAG is 
     simply more ``stove-pipping.''
       `I also have seen what the Army has done at LIWA, which has 
     created a foundation for creating a higher-level architecture 
     collaborating all of these efforts,'' his July letter states.
       NOAH would link together almost every federal agency with 
     intelligence capabilities, including the National Security 
     Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Energy 
     Department, the CIA and the FBI. Both Congress and the White 
     House would be offered a ``node'' for briefing capabilities, 
     meaning intelligence agencies could detail situations on 
     terrorist attacks or wartime scenarios.
       ``It's mainly for policymakers, the White House 
     decisionmakers, the State Department, military, and military 
     leaders,'' he said.
       Although information-sharing among the intelligence 
     community has yet to be formalized through NOAH or JCAG or a 
     similar system, military officials have said they need some 
     kind of linked access capability.
       Intelligence systems need to be included within the Global 
     Information Grid--the military's vision of a future global 
     network that could be accessed from anywhere in the world, 
     said Brig. Gen. Marilyn Quagliotti, vice director of the 
     Joint Staff's command, control, communications and computers 
     directorate, during a Nov. 5 speech on information assurance 
     at a conference in Arlington, VA.
       ``We need a more integrated strategy, including help from 
     [the Joint Staff's intelligence directorate] with 
     intelligence reports or warnings of an attack,'' she said.
       Quagliotti said the toughest challenge for achieving 
     ``information superiority'' is the need to unite networks and 
     network managers under one command structure with stronger 
     situational awareness capabilities.
       ``Part of [the challenge] is the overwhelming amount of 
     information, the ability to access that Information, and the 
     ability to reach back and get that information, which means 
     that networks become more crucial to the warfight,'' she 
     said.
                                  ____


                        [From Signal, Apr. 2000]

    Fusion Center Concept Takes Root As Congressional Interest Waxes

       Creation of a national operations and analysis hub is 
     finding grudging acceptance among senior officials in the 
     U.S. national security community. This fresh intelligence 
     mechanism would link federal agencies to provide instant 
     collaborative threat profiling and analytical assessments for 
     use against asymmetrical threats. National policy makers, 
     military commanders and law enforcement agencies would be 
     beneficiaries of the hub's information.
       Prodded by a resolute seven-term Pennsylvania congressman 
     and reminded by recent terrorist and cyberthreat activities, 
     the U.S. Defense Department is rethinking its earlier 
     aversion to the idea, and resistance is beginning to crumble. 
     Funding to establish the national operations and analysis hub 
     (NOAH), which would link 28 federal agencies, is anticipated 
     as a congressional add-on in the Defense Department's new 
     budget. An initial $10 million in funding is likely in fiscal 
     year 2001 from identified research and development accounts.
       Spearheading the formation of NOAH is Rep. Curt Weldon (R-
     PA), chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives National 
     Security Committee's military research and development 
     subcommittee. He emphasizes that challenges facing U.S. 
     leaders are beginning to overlap, blurring distinction and 
     jurisdiction. ``The increasing danger is both domestic and 
     international.''
       Conceptually, NOAH would become a national-level operations 
     and control center with a mission to integrate various 
     imagery, data and analytical viewpoints. The intelligence 
     products would support U.S. actions. ``I see NOAH as going 
     beyond the capability of the National Military Command Center 
     and the National Joint Military Intelligence Command. NOAH 
     would provide recommended courses of action that allow the 
     U.S. to effectively meet emerging challenges in near real 
     time,'' the congressman illustrates.
       ``This central national-level hub would be composed of a 
     system of agency-specified mini centers, or `pods,' of 
     participating agencies and services associated with growing 
     national security concerns,'' Weldon reports. ``NOAH would 
     link the policy maker with action recommendations derived 
     from fused information provided by the individual pod.'' 
     Automation and connectivity would allow the pods to talk to 
     each other in a computer-based environment to share data and 
     perspectives on a given situation.
       The congressman believes that NOAH should reside within the 
     Defense Department and is modeling the hub's concept on a 
     U.S. Army organization he closely follows. He says the idea 
     for NOAH comes from officials in several federal agencies. 
     However, it is also based on his own experiences with the 
     U.S. Army's Intelligence and Security Command's (INSCOM's) 
     Land Warfare Information Activity (LIWA) and Information 
     Dominance Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
       Patterned after LIWA, (SIGNAL, March, page 31), NOAH would 
     display collaborative threat profiling and analysis. With the 
     aid of a variety of electronic tools, the hub would support 
     national actions, Weldon discloses.
       The congressman is conscious of other initiatives such as 
     linking counterintelligence groups throughout the community. 
     He also

[[Page H2825]]

     is aware of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) 
     counterterrorism center, the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation's (FBI's) National Infrastructure Protection 
     Center and a new human intelligence (HUMNIT) special 
     operations center. ``We don't need another analytical center. 
     Instead, we need a national-level fusion center that can take 
     already analyzed data and offer courses of action for 
     decision making,'' he insists.
       Weldon's wide experience in dealing with officials from the 
     FBI, CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) convince him 
     that policy makers are continuing to work in a vacuum. 
     ``Briefings and testimonies are the primary vehicles for 
     transmitting information to leaders. The volume of 
     information germane to national security issues is expanding 
     so rapidly that policy makers are overwhelmed with data,'' he 
     claims.
       Robust situational awareness of asymmetric threats to 
     national security is a key in assisting leaders, Weldon 
     observes. ``Policy makers need an overarching information and 
     intelligence architecture that will quickly assimilate, 
     analyze and display assessments and recommend courses of 
     action for many simultaneous national emergencies,'' he 
     declares. The concept of NOAH also calls for virtual 
     communications among policy makers.
       Weldon's plan is for White House, Congress, Pentagon and 
     agency-level leaders each to have a center where they 
     receive, send, share and collaborate on assessments before 
     they act. He calls NOAH the policy maker's tool. In the 
     collaborative environment, the hub would provide a 
     multiissue, multiagency hybrid picture to the White House 
     situation room and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
       NOAH's concept also includes support for HUMINT and 
     peacekeeping missions along with battle damage assessment. 
     The same system could later help brace congressional 
     committees and hearings. The new capability would allow 
     application of foreign threat analyses to policy, while 
     providing a hybrid situational awareness picture of the 
     threat, Weldon relates. Industrial efforts of interest to the 
     policy maker could be incorporated, and academia also could 
     be directly linked.
       In meetings with high-level FBI, CIA and defense officials, 
     Weldon stressed the need to ``acquire, fuse and analyze 
     disparate data from many agencies in order to support the 
     policy maker's actions against threats from terrorism, 
     [ballistic missile] proliferation, illegal technology 
     diversions, espionage, narcotics [trafficking], information 
     warfare and cyberterrorism.'' He is convinced that current 
     collection and analysis capabilities in various intelligence 
     agencies are stovepiped. ``To some extent, this involves turf 
     protection, but it clearly hinders policy making.''
       Weldon, who was a Russian studies major, offers some of his 
     own recent experiences as examples of why there is a strong 
     need for NOAH. He maintains close contact with a number of 
     Russians and understands their programs and technologies. The 
     congressman is quick to recall vignettes about Russian 
     officials and trips to facilities in the region.
       During the recent U.S. combat action involvement in Kosovo, 
     Weldon was contacted by senior Russian officials. Clamoring 
     for Russia to be involved in the peace process they claimed 
     that otherwise upcoming elections could go to the communists. 
     The Russians proposed a Belgrade meeting with Weldon, 
     congressional colleagues, key Serbian officials and possibly 
     Yugoslave President Slobodan Milosevic.
       After the first meeting with key officials from the 
     departments of State and Defense and the CIA, Weldon and 
     other members of Congress went to Vienna, Austria. The State 
     Department objected to a meeting in Belgrade, suggesting 
     instead a neutral site. Before the departure, the Russians 
     informed Weldon that Dragomir Karic, a member of a powerful 
     and wealthy Kosovo family, would attend the meeting. Karic's 
     brother was a member of the Milosevic regime.
       At the end of the Vienna meeting, the Russians and Karic 
     told Weldon that if he would accompany them to Belgrade, 
     Milosevic was prepared to meet with them and publicly embrace 
     a peace agreement concept reached during the Vienna meeting. 
     The agreement would have directly involved Russia in the 
     peace process. A diplomatic official with the U.S. delegation 
     telephoned Washington, D.C., and the State Department 
     objected to the Belgrade trip. The congressman and his 
     colleagues returned home.
       As soon as he arrived in Washington, D.C., the FBI 
     telephoned to request a meeting with Weldon to gather details 
     on Karic. It was clear, Weldon reports, they had very little 
     information on him or his family. The following day, the CIA 
     telephoned the congressman and asked for a meeting ``about 
     Karic.'' Instead, the congressman proposed a joint meeting 
     with CIA and FBI agents in his office. Two officials from 
     each agency attended with a list of questions.
       Weldon learned from the agents that they were seeking 
     information on Karic to brief the State Department. When he 
     explained that the information came from the Army and LIWA, 
     the CIA and FBI agents had no knowledge of that organization, 
     he confirms. Before his departure for Vienna, the congressman 
     received a six-page LIWA profile of Karic and his family's 
     links to Milosevic.
       ``This is an example of why an organization like NOAH is so 
     critically necessary,'' Weldon contends. ``LIWA's Information 
     Dominance Center provides the best capability we have today 
     in the federal government to assess massive amounts of data 
     and develop profiles. LIWA uses it contacts with other 
     agencies to obtain database information from those systems,'' 
     he explains. ``Some is unclassified and some classified.''
       Weldon cites an ``extraordinary capability by a former CIA 
     and Defense Intelligence Agency official, who is a LIWA 
     profiler, as one of the keys in LIWA's success. She does the 
     profiling and knows where to look and which systems to pull 
     information from in a data mining and extrapolation 
     process,'' he proclaims. ``She makes the system work,''
       Weldon intends to use LIWA's profiling capability as a 
     model for building NOAH. ``My goal is to go beyond service 
     intelligence agencies and integrate all intelligence 
     collection. This must be beyond military intelligence, which 
     is too narrow in scope, to provide a governmentwide 
     capability. Each agency with a pod linked to NOAH would 
     provide two staff members assigned at the hub, which would 
     operate continuously. Data brought together in ``this cluster 
     would be used for fusion and profiling, Which any agency 
     could then request,'' he maintains.
       NOAH would not belong to the Army, which would continue 
     with its own intelligence capabilities as would the other 
     services. There would only be one fusion center, which would 
     handle input from all federal agencies and from open sources. 
     Weldon explains. ``NOAH would handle threats like information 
     operations and examine stability in various regions of the 
     world. We need this ability to respond immediately.'' The 
     congressman adds that he recently was briefed by LIWA on very 
     sensitive, very limited and scary profile information, which 
     he describes as ``potentially explosive.'' In turn, Weldon 
     arranged briefings for the chairman of the House National 
     Security Committee, the Speaker of the House and other key 
     congressional leaders.
       ``But this kind of profiling capability is very limited 
     now. The goal is to have it on a regular basis. The profiling 
     could be used for sensitive technology transfer issues and 
     information about security breaches,'' the congressman 
     allows. LIWA has what he terms the fusion and profiling 
     state-of-the-art capability in the military, ``even beyond 
     the military.'' Weldon is pressing the case for NOAH among 
     the leaders in both houses of Congress, ``It is essential 
     that we create a govenmentwide capability under very strict 
     controls.''
       Weldon adds that establishing NOAH is not a funding issue; 
     it is a jurisdictional issue. ``Some agencies don't want to 
     tear down their stovepipes. Yet, information on a drug lord, 
     as an example, could be vitally important to help combat 
     terrorism.'' He makes a point that too often, federal 
     agencies overlap each other in their efforts to collect 
     intelligence against these threats, or they fail to pool 
     their resources and share vital information. ``This 
     redundancy of effort and confusion of jurisdiction only 
     inhibits our nation's capabilities,'' he offers.
       NOAH would provide high-bandwidth, virtual connectivity to 
     experts to agency pod sites. Protocols for interagency data 
     sharing would be established and refined in links to all pod 
     sites. The ability to retrieve, collate, analyze and display 
     data would be exercised to provide possible courses of 
     action. A backup site would be established for redundancy, 
     and training would begin on collaborative tools as soon as it 
     is activated.
       This hub system would become part of the national policy 
     creation and execution system. The tools available at LIWA 
     would be shared so that every agency would have the same 
     tools. Weldon explains that all agencies would post data on 
     the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) highway in a 
     replicated format sensitive to classification. NOAH's global 
     network would use the NRO system as a backbone.
       NOAH optimizes groups of expertise within each 
     organization--experts who are always on hand regardless of 
     the issue. This approach ties strategic analysis and tactical 
     assessment to a course of action.``Before the U.S. can take 
     action against emerging threats, we must first understand 
     their relationship to one another, their patterns, the people 
     and countries involved and the level of danger posed to our 
     nation,'' Weldon says, ``That is where NOAH begins.''
                                  ____


                    Steps To Achieve NOAH Capability

       Establish baseline capability by building initial Hub 
     Center and congressional virtual hearing room. Equip White 
     House Situation Room to Collaborate with these sites.
       Staff the Hub Center with two reps from each of the 28 key 
     participating agencies.
       Link up NOAH internal and external collaborative 
     environment.
       Hook in Back up Site for redundancy and begin training on 
     collaborative tools.
       Build the 28 Key Agency Pod Sites along model of the 
     Information Dominance Center at Fort Belvoir, VA.
       Link all Pod Sites to NOAH hub center.
       Establish Protocols for Inter-agency data sharing.
       Exercise live ability to retrieve, collate, analyze, 
     display disparate data and provide policy makers course of 
     action analysis at the NOAH Hub Center.
       Refine procedures and Protocols.
                                  ____


       Agencies Represented in the National Collaborative Center

     Central Intelligence Agency
     Defense Intelligence Agency
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency
     National Security Agency

[[Page H2826]]

     National Reconnaissance Office
     Defense Threat Reduction Agency
     Joint Chiefs of Staff
     Army/LIWA
     Air Force
     Navy
     Marine Corps
     Joint Counter-Intelligence Assessment Group
     ONDCP
     FBI
     Drug Enforcement Agency
     U.S. Customs
     National Criminal Investigative Service
     National Infrastructure Protection Center
     Defense Information Systems Agency
     State Department
     Five CINCs
     Department of Energy
     Department of Commerce
     Department of the Treasury
     Justice Department
     Office of the Secretary of Defense
     National Military Command Center
     National Joint Military Intelligence Command

       Elements to be connected to the national collaborative 
     center would include the White House Situation Room, a 
     Congressional Virtual Hearing Room and a possible redundant, 
     or back-up site.

  Mr. Speaker, the second topic I want to touch upon briefly is the 
President's summit, which will take place in Russia this week. When the 
President travels to Moscow and St. Petersburg this week, he will have 
something that no other president has had before in our relationship 
with Russia. This President will take with him a document that was 
prepared by a bipartisan group of our colleagues in the House and the 
Senate, supported by all the major U.S.-Russia thinktanks to broaden 
our relationship with Russia.
  A year ago, I started working on trying to forge a new direction for 
our relationship with Russia. I contacted all the thinktanks from 
Harvard and Columbia to Monterrey, to the U.S.-Russia Business Council, 
the Tolstoy Foundation, Georgia Tech, and all those schools doing work 
with Russia and all those nonprofits and NGOs. I said, first of all, 
tell me what you are doing with Russia. Because, surprisingly, Mr. 
Speaker, not one Federal agency had a complete list of all the 
initiatives between the U.S. people and the Russian people, U.S. 
agencies and Russian agencies, U.S. NGOs and Russian NGOs.
  That document became a 9-page appendix in the back of the report we 
prepared for President Bush, for the first time listing all the 
activities that we are engaged in with Russia on. How can we have a 
relationship when we do not even know what we are doing with that 
country and its people?

                              {time}  2340

  I also asked those groups to make recommendations for me of what new 
things we could be doing with Russia to expand our relationship beyond 
the issues where we disagree. Because you see, Mr. Speaker, in the past 
our Presidents would meet and they would argue over issues that we 
disagree on, how many missiles we had, how many nuclear weapons, the 
ABM treaty, and we argue when neither side trusts the other.
  My point is before we can get to those difficult issues, we have a 
new President in Russia, a new President in America, a new Congress, 
why do we not expand our relationship based on the new direction Putin 
is taking Russia and truly become friends with the Russian people?
  The resultant recommendations that we produced are contained in this 
document. Members can get it on my Web site, both in Russian and in 
English. It is also being transmitted over in Russia to the Duma, and I 
presented it to Putin himself in October of last year. This document, 
Mr. Speaker, says, and I hope that the upcoming summit will build on 
this and I am confident it will, that our relationship with Russia 
should be expanded to 11 areas, not just defense. They include 
agriculture, culture and education, economic development, energy and 
natural resources, the environment, health care, judicial and legal, 
local government, science and technology, space and aeronautics and 
defense and security. There are 108 recommendations. Some do not 
require any new programs, simply changes legislatively, like 
ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention basically elevating 
Russia out of Jackson-Vanik, supporting Russia's accession to the WTO, 
restructuring of the London and Paris Club debt.
  Other recommendations require action on the part of the 
administration and the Congress. Many of these recommendations do not 
involve public money. They involve simply the support of existing 
private relationships, school to school, company to company, NGO to 
NGO. In fact, in the area of culture, that entire document was written 
by the Tolstoy Foundation. They receive no public money. All of their 
work is done with foundation and donations. In the economic area, we 
dealt with the U.S.-Russia Business Council. They gave us their 
recommendations. In health care I went to the Academy of Physicians. 
They are doing work in Russia in training doctors and nurses. They 
wrote that recommendation. The resultant document, 45 pages long, gave 
this President something no other President had, a detailed blueprint 
to expand the relationship between Russia and the U.S. to a new level.
  In giving this to the President, Mr. Speaker, I did not want it to 
come from me. So I went to our colleagues in the House and the Senate. 
I had 2 days prior to the October summit to get signatures. Every 
Member I went to agreed to sign on as a supporter of this document and 
its recommendations. In the Senate, I went to Carl Levin, Joe Biden, 
and Dick Lugar. They signed the front page with me. In the House I went 
to the far left, my good friend Dennis Kucinich who chairs the 
Progressive Caucus who immediately signed on. He has been with me to 
Russia three times. I went to my good friend Bernie Sanders who has 
traveled to Russia with me, who is our only socialist in the Congress. 
I went to the chairman of the Hispanic Caucus, Silvestre Reyes, who 
signed the document responding and representing all the Hispanic 
Members and moderate Democrats like Howard Berman, Norm Dicks, Jack 
Murtha, all signed on in support of this new relationship.
  On the conservative side I went to our colleagues and friends Roscoe 
Bartlett and Joe Pitts, John Doolittle, they all signed on, as well as 
the leadership, Dick Armey, Chris Cox, J.C. Watts, and Henry Hyde.
  In the end, Mr. Speaker, when this document was given by me to 
President Bush, Condoleezza Rice, and to President Putin before he left 
for Crawford, Texas, by me, it had the signatures of one-third of the 
Congress. So as President Bush travels to St. Petersburg and Moscow 
this week, he now has the unified support of this Congress to broaden 
our relationship with Russia like we have never done before. It is up 
to our President and the Russian President to stake out new territory.
  The arms control agreement they have reached is historic. I commend 
President Bush overwhelmingly for what he has done to reduce the 
nuclear weapons from 6,000 to 2,000 on both sides. That in itself is a 
historic item, as is the new relationship with Russia and NATO. But, 
Mr. Speaker, that is not enough. The stars are all aligned this week. 
We have a new President in Russia who has done some dramatic things, 
things that would never have been thought of over the past 10, 15 years 
in Russia. He shut down Russia's largest listening station against us 
in Cuba without our asking. He ordered the pullback of trainloads of 
Russian military supplies in Moldova on the European border without our 
request. He offered us his airport that used to be a Soviet 
military base in Uzbekistan where our troops are currently housed.

  He was the first elected official on September 11 to call President 
Bush to say Russia will give you whatever you need to fight terrorism. 
It was not Tony Blair. It was Putin. And he has given us full access to 
Russia's intelligence.
  So we have a president in Russia who is taking some dramatic steps. 
He is being criticized for that back home. In fact, just a month and a 
half ago, 41 retired generals and admirals and two former defense 
ministers in Russia took out a full page ad in a Russian publication 
called Nezavizimaya Gazeta, one of the largest publications in Moscow. 
That full page ad criticized Putin for moving too close to America, for 
getting too friendly with the West.
  You see, Mr. Speaker, there are hard-liners in Russia that want to 
take us back to the Cold War, that do not like America and Russia 
coming together; but it is not just in Russia, Mr. Speaker. There are 
hard-liners in our country that do not like the direction we are going 
in, either. President Bush and

[[Page H2827]]

President Putin have got to pull away from the Cold War mentality, 
those hard-liners in both countries, and have a historic opportunity to 
move our two nations into a new relationship, a relationship of trust, 
of understanding, and of mutual engagement, in the areas of health 
care, education, environment, energy, to show the Russian people that 
we truly want them to be a successful nation, that we want to be 
partners with them; and I am convinced now more than ever that we need 
Russia.
  We need to reduce our dependency on Middle Eastern crude oil which is 
the reason why we have the major problem in the Middle East today, in 
Israel. If we reduce our dependency on Middle Eastern crude, the 
Russians have vast amounts of crude and gas that we can help them 
develop. We must work with them together.
  So, Mr. Speaker, I wish the President well. I will lead a 19-Member 
delegation into Moscow the day that President Bush comes back home. We 
will follow up his meetings with Putin with members of the Duma and the 
Federation Council. We will follow up on the recommendations of the 
document and on Monday morning we will listen to President Putin give 
us a summary of his feeling about the summit. I am optimistic, Mr. 
Speaker, because I think these two Presidents are going to 
fundamentally change the face of the world security relationship. 
Russia and America, two archenemies for 70 years, I think in the 21st 
century will become two partners that will work to stabilize the world. 
Russia can assist us in dealing with Iran and Iraq because of their 
ties to those countries. In fact, Russia can assist us in a number of 
areas, in energy, in technology. It is in our interest and in theirs to 
work together.
  Just 2 weeks ago on the floor of this Chamber, we took another 
historic vote. I offered an amendment to the defense bill that was 
supported by 362 Members of Congress from both parties to challenge the 
Russians to provide full transparency on their nuclear weapons, their 
nuclear testing, their nuclear program. That same day in my office, I 
was meeting with the Russian minister of atomic energy. He is a friend 
of mine. I have known him for the past 5 years when he worked at 
Kurchatov Institute for my friend Yevgeny Velakof. The minister of 
atomic energy was in my office when we voted on an historic measure 
that I offered to provide full transparency in our nuclear relationship 
with Russia. My hope is that this too will become a point of discussion 
between Presidents Bush and Putin, because if we truly want further 
arms reductions, if we truly want to have a more secure world, it has 
got to start by building a trust that we have not had for the past 10 
years.
  And if I were a Russian, I would not have trusted us either during 
the 1990s. After all, we turned our back when Yeltsin's friends were 
stealing billions of dollars of IMF money. We pretended we did not see 
it, because we did not want to embarrass Boris Yeltsin. And when we saw 
evidence of technology being transferred out of Russia, by disgruntled 
generals and admirals, we pretended that we did not see that because we 
did not want to embarrass Yeltsin. So the Congress misread that and 
blamed the Russian Government and said we do not want to work with this 
country. So during the 1990s, we lost the trust and confidence of the 
Russian people. The best evidence of that to me was comparing what I 
saw in 1992 when Boris Yeltsin stood on a tank outside the Moscow White 
House waving the Russian flag with 20,000 or 30,000 Russians 
surrounding him, declaring the Soviet Union was dead, Communism had 
ended, Russia was a new country.

                              {time}  2350

  During that same speech, Yeltsin said America and Russia will be 
partners together, and the Russian people cheered. That was in 1992 
when Yeltsin gave that speech.
  Compare that to 1999. Yeltsin has health problems, drinking problems. 
Russia is filled with corruption, which we ignored. 1999, Yeltsin is 
being railroaded out of office, his popularity is down to 2 percent. 
The only people supporting Yeltsin was the United States leadership. 
That is why in the fall of 1999, two months before Yeltsin left office, 
20,000 new Russians gathered outside our embassy in Moscow and burned 
the American flag, fired weapons at our embassy, and threw paint at the 
walls of our embassy compound. In seven short years we had gone from 
Russia's partner to the Russian people saying ``we don't trust you, 
America.''
  This week, President Bush and President Putin have a chance to change 
all that, and unlike any other time, they have got the Congress behind 
them, the Duma behind them, the Federation Council behind them. Members 
of Congress will be in Moscow right following the summit telling the 
Russian people that this truly is a new time, a new beginning.
  I ask and I urge all of my colleagues to thank the President for his 
leadership and to continue to support those efforts, especially passage 
of the Jackson-Vanik legislation, that will truly allow Russia to 
become a close partner and ally of our Nation.
  Mr. Speaker, following our trip to Russia, we are going to do a few 
other historic things I want to highlight for our colleagues. We will 
leave Russia on Monday, after meeting with Putin in the morning and the 
Members of the Duma and the Federation Council, and we will fly in our 
military plane to Uzbekistan. In Taskent we will meet with the 
President of the country and leaders of their parliament.
  Uzbekistan is a shining example of a former Soviet State that has now 
become one of our strongest allies, opening up its territory for our 
troops. We will visit with their parliament and we will challenge them 
to start a new relationship between their parliament and our Congress 
like we have done with the Russian Duma, the Ukrainian Rada, the 
Moldavian Parliament.
  While in Uzbekistan, after meeting with their leaders, we will go to 
our military base, we will meet with our troops, we will give them 
home-baked cookies from the kids and families of America, we will give 
them 6,000 hand-made greeting cards from elementary school children, we 
will give them Hershey candy bars and TastyKakes from Pennsylvania, and 
talk to them about what life is like back here in the States.
  We may also visit one of our base camps in Afghanistan to show our 
support there for our troops as well.
  Then we will leave Uzbekistan and we will travel to Beijing, China. 
In Beijing we will meet with the incoming leader, Mr. Hu, who was just 
recently in the U.S. I will speak at the National Defense University of 
the People's Liberation Army, the third time I have spoken there. I 
will give a speech on a major university campus in Beijing and interact 
with the up and coming leaders of that country.
  We will also meet with the chairman and leadership of the People's 
Congress to talk about areas of mutual concern and interest between the 
U.S. and China.
  We will leave Beijing on Thursday and fly into Pyongyang, North 
Korea, the first time ever that a U.S. Congressional delegation in a 
bipartisan, open way has visited North Korea. What a historic 
opportunity for us to open the door for dialog with the leaders of 
North Korea.
  We will not be there to endorse them, we will not be there to support 
their government, because it is a communist dictatorship. We will be 
there to tell them as human beings we have to talk, we have to meet, we 
have to speak and exchange our views. And we want to tell them that we 
care about their people, we care about the education of their kids, the 
ability for them to feed their people and the ability of them to 
provide a stable quality of life for North Korean citizens. We will not 
reach any landmark agreements. We will do something that needs to be 
done, we will open the door to North Korea.

  I will be taking a letter with me, Mr. Speaker, from the President of 
Drexel University in Philadelphia, a school with a huge population of 
foreign and Korean students, and the president of Drexel, Constantine 
Papadakis, will invite the President of the largest university in North 
Korea to establish an academic relationship between the two schools.
  We will also be carrying a letter from the Foreign Policy Research 
Institute in Philadelphia offering to host a conference in America on 
U.S.-North Korean relations.
  I will be carrying a third letter signed by students of Drexel to 
students of the largest university in North

[[Page H2828]]

Korea asking to have a student exchange of letters and eventually trips 
back and forth. We will also discuss our relations with the People's 
Congress in North Korea and ways we can work together. Hopefully this 
will be the start of the opening up and the thawing of the relations 
between our country and North Korea.
  Following our trip to Pyongyang, we will travel to Seoul, Korea. In 
Seoul we will brief the South Koreans who are enthusiastically 
supporting our trip about our discussions. We will brief the incoming 
candidates for the presidency of that country in the elections later 
this year. We will brief the parliamentary leaders, and give a press 
conference to the world about the trip and the implications of building 
peace with the Russians, the Uzbekis, the Chinese, the North Koreans, 
and our good friends, the South Koreans.
  Mr. Speaker, what this all says is this Congress plays a vitally 
crucial role in not just helping to prevent incidents like 9/11 with 
recommendations that the administration needs to listen to, but this 
Congress also plays a constructive role in building peaceful relations 
with those countries that would be our enemy. I thank our colleagues 
for their support of this effort.
  Mr. Speaker, I will insert in the Record a summary of our New Time, 
New Beginning document, as well as the accompanying letter signed by 
one-third of the Congress that was hand-delivered to President Bush and 
to President Putin prior to the Crawford Summit, which we hope will be 
the basis of the St. Petersburg summit.
  I thank the staff and you for your indulgence in allowing me to 
present this information today.

                                     House of Representatives,

                                 Washington, DC, November 7, 2001.
     President George W. Bush,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear President Bush: As you prepare for the upcoming summit 
     with President Putin, we commend the positive approach you 
     have established with Russia. Too often, the focus of our 
     bilateral relations has been on defense and security--
     precisely the issues on which our interests often collide. It 
     would be more useful, as we move forward with a Russian 
     policy for the 21st century to take a more holistic 
     approach--one that takes into account Russia's myriad 
     concerns as well as our own.
       Therefore, in consultation with many of the leading experts 
     on Russia, we propose a series of bipartisan initiatives to 
     engage Russia on issues such as the environment, energy, 
     economic development, health care--as well as defense and 
     security. We call this proposal ``A New Time, A New 
     Beginning.'' Some of these are new ideas, but many are not. 
     Many of these initiatives are already underway, and need 
     additional support to make even greater progress.
       Such engagement is in the U.S. interest as well as 
     Russia's. If the United States and Russia cooperate on issues 
     across the board, Russia will be more likely to work closely 
     with America on the national security issues that matter most 
     to us--missile defense, the war against terrorism, and 
     proliferation.
       We encourage you to review the enclosed proposal and hope 
     that some of these initiatives will prove useful to you in 
     the ongoing discussions between Russia and America. We look 
     forward to working with you to forge a new relationship that 
     will benefit both our countries.
       Thank you for your consideration of this request.
           Sincerely,
         Connie Morella, Jim Maloney, Cass Ballenger, Nathan Deal.
         Jerry Weller, Jim Gibbons, Jim Ryun, Judy Biggert, Jerry 
           Costello, Eddie Bernice Johnson, Stephen Horn, Kay 
           Granger, Ed Schrock, Tom Davis, Randy Cunningham, Gary 
           Condit, Randy Forbes, Steven LaTourette, Joe Skeen, Bob 
           Borski, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Chris Smith.
         Adam Putnam, Frank Pallone, Johnny Isakson, Robert 
           Andrews, Bernie Sanders, Nick Lampson, Rod Blagojevich, 
           Jim Saxton, Jim Turner, Mike Ferguson, Van Hilleary, Ed 
           Royce, Bob Filner, Luis Gutierrez, Danny Davis.
         Jane Harman, Rick Boucher, Christopher John, Todd Akin, 
           Dave Weldon, Bart Gordon, Virgil Goode, Jr., Alan 
           Mollohan, Frank Wolf, Hilda Solis, Rush Holt, Carrie 
           Meek, Amo Houghton, Paul Kanjorski, Bob Goodlatte, Doug 
           Bereuter, John Shimkus, J.D. Hayworth.
         James Greenwood, Kevin Brady, Bob Brady, Melissa Hart, 
           Phil English, John Thune, Tom Allen, George Gekas, 
           Robert Andrews, Mike Doyle, Shelly Moore Capito, Rob 
           Simmons, Todd Akin.

                A New Vision for U.S.-Russian Relations


                              introduction

       Those of us who value the U.S.-Russian relationship have 
     been on a roller-coaster ride for the past decade. During the 
     heady days of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ensuing 
     collapse of the Soviet Union, it appeared that our two 
     countries would cooperate as never before. The world cheered 
     when Presidents Bush and Yeltsin hailed a new ``strategic 
     partnership'' between America and Russia.
       There followed, however, a dark period--marked by misguided 
     American policies and rampant Russian corruption. The Russian 
     economy sagged as American aid--money meant for the Russian 
     people--was siphoned off and stashed in Swiss banks and 
     American real estate investment. At the same time, NATO's war 
     in Kosovo strained the already sinking bilateral 
     relationship. What were the results of this increasingly 
     bitter disenchantment? A more aggressive Russian foreign 
     policy, increased proliferation from Moscow to rogue states, 
     and the final coup de grace: Russia and China announcing last 
     year a new ``strategic partnership''--against the interests 
     of America and the West.
       Now is the time, with new leaders in Washington and Moscow, 
     to improve the relationship for the long-term.
       My interest in this relationship began when I was nineteen 
     years old, when a college professor convinced me to switch my 
     major to Russian Studies. Since that time, I have been 
     fascinated with the Soviet Union and Russia--and have 
     traveled there more than twenty-five times.
       I began my travels when I was a member of my local County 
     Council and was invited to travel to Moscow by the American 
     Council of Young Political Leaders. I have continued to visit 
     Russia since my election to Congress, as a member of the 
     House Armed Services Committee, and later as co-chairman of 
     the Duma-Congress Study Group, the official 
     interparliamentary exchange between the U.S. and Russia.
       My interactions with leaders across Russia have taught me 
     that the Russians are a proud people, historically aware, and 
     mindful of Russia's unique global role. Increasingly, they 
     are becoming aware of the limitless possibilities of U.S.-
     Russian cooperation on a host of issues.
       This brief paper, then, is an effort to weave together a 
     comprehensive program of U.S.-Russian cooperation across a 
     wide-range of issues.
       Too often, the focus of our bilateral relations has been on 
     defense and security--precisely the issues on which our 
     interests often collide. It would be more useful, as we move 
     forward with a Russian policy for the 21st century, to take a 
     more holistic approach--one that takes into account Russia's 
     myriad concerns as well as our own.
       Therefore, in consultation with many of the leading experts 
     on Russia, I propose a series of initiatives to engage Russia 
     on issues like the environment, energy, economic development, 
     and health care--as well as defense and security. Some of 
     these are new ideas, but many are not. Many of these 
     initiatives are already underway, and need additional support 
     to make even greater progress.
       Such engagement is in the interest of the U.S. as well as 
     Russia. For if the U.S. and Russia are cooperating on issues 
     across the board, Russia will be more likely to work closely 
     with America on the national security issues that matter most 
     to us--missile defense, the war against terrorism, and 
     proliferation.
       This is not, and will never be, a finished product. The 
     contours of our bilateral relationship change daily with 
     world events. Nor will it likely be turned into a grand 
     legislative proposal, although certainly parts of it may be. 
     I hope that it is a starting point for discussions between 
     Russia and America on ways that we can forge a new 
     relationship that will benefit both our countries.
       For if we make a new American-Russian relationship, one 
     based on common interests that benefit the citizens of both 
     countries, then we will make great progress--not just for 
     America and Russia alone, but for peace and stability across 
     the globe.
       Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA)
                                  ____


                        U.S.-Russia Partnership


                       a new time a new beginning

                       Summary of recommendations

       Agricultural Development: Assist in agricultural 
     production; expand private-sector investment; and enhance 
     capacity to purchase essential agricultural inputs, 
     commodities and equipment.
       Cultural/Education Development: Expand cultural ties 
     outside the major cities; assist regional museums in 
     generating tourism; and provide for more Russian language and 
     cultural studies in U.S. schools.
       Defense and Security: Initiate new bilateral talks similar 
     to the Ross-Mamedov talks on a Global Protection System; move 
     forward with joint talks on a new nonproliferation regime; 
     and encourage progress on the RAMOS program and restructure 
     the Nuclear Cities Initiative.
       Economic Development: Help facilitate Russia's accession to 
     the WTO and its acceptance of all WTO agreements; increase 
     funding for OPIC and EX-IM Bank projects in Russia; and work 
     with Russia to improve intellectual property rights.
       Energy/Natural Resources: Foster cooperative pilot 
     projects, starting with oil and gas exploration in Timan 
     Pechora; convene bilateral task force to discuss the energy 
     ramifications of the war on terrorism; and eliminate 
     bureaucratic obstacles to joint cooperation on energy.
       Environmental Cooperation: Develop a revolving fund to 
     assure development of promising Russian technologies; expand 
     debt for

[[Page H2829]]

     nature swaps; and dramatically expand cooperation on marine 
     science research.
       Health Care: Increase emphasis on chronic disease like 
     cardiovascular disease and diabetes; develop more extensive 
     physician exchange programs; and augment existing cooperation 
     between NIH and appropriate Russian research institutes.
       Judicial/Legal Systems: Support expansion of jury trials 
     into all Russian regions; expand Environmental Public 
     Advocacy Centers into Russia; and encourage a doubling of the 
     number of legal clinics.
       Local Governments: Propose ways to expand the tax base 
     available to local governments; encourage political 
     participation by increasing local partisan affiliations; and 
     encourage the gradual devolution of services to the local 
     level.
       Science and Technology: Increase cooperation in the area of 
     nuclear fuel cycles; expand cooperative fusion research on 
     nonpolluting energy solutions; and involve Russian industry 
     in embryonic U.S. nanotechnology efforts.
       Space and Aeronautics: Utilize commercial joint ventures to 
     enable Russia to meet its Space Station obligations; increase 
     joint projects on space solar power, propulsion technology, 
     and weather satellites; and cooperate on mutually-beneficial 
     planetary defense tracking technologies.


                        Agricultural development

                                Summary

       United States government resources are employed in Russia 
     to enhance Russia's capacity to purchase essential 
     agricultural inputs, commodities, and equipment in order to 
     assist agricultural production and expand private-sector 
     investment to improve Russia's agricultural infrastructure. 
     Neither Russia's government nor the private sector alone are 
     willing or able to meet these needs. There are a number of 
     programs carried out through USDA and USAID to benefit 
     Russian agriculture. USDA and USAID officials have stated 
     that there are no cooperative efforts between Russia and the 
     U.S. in any third countries. Most programs are administered 
     by private voluntary organizations (PVOs) which utilize USDA 
     and USAID resources to carry out development activities 
     within Russia. Additionally, private-sector efforts such as 
     the U.S.-Russia Business Council utilize government resources 
     through these programs in order to expand and enhance the 
     U.S.-Russian commercial relationship.
       Those PVOs involved in Russian that are actually working at 
     ground level believe that greater efforts are required to 
     improve the country's ability to provide for its citizens. 
     Regarding USDA's programs, the Administration's food aid 
     review, especially with regard to the 416(b) surplus disposal 
     program, has thrown into question the amount of resources 
     available for Russia, since many PVO projects are funded 
     through monetized 416(b) donations. This situation may become 
     clearer once U.S. food aid programs are reauthorized and/or 
     altered through a new farm bill and once the Administration 
     releases its food aid proposals as part of its FY03 budget 
     request. As for USAID, PVOs express the concern that the 
     agency's activities in Russia Require a greater focus on 
     agriculture.
       The programs designed as a solution would require U.S. 
     governemnt resources (primarily, through USDA and USAID) 
     because the Russian government and private capital markets 
     cannot or will not provide the resources necessary to improve 
     the Russian agriculture infrastructure. A number of proposals 
     exist, and the number of proposals would increase with a 
     greater commitment to Russian agriculture through USDA and 
     USAID. Such efforts through USDA and USAID would play a key 
     role not only in improving the ability of Russia agriculture 
     to meet the critical needs of its citizens, but in enhancing 
     the Russian private sector and improving the prospects for 
     future earnings of U.S. agribusiness.

                            Recommendations

       Improving credit availability and production practices and 
     attracting investment in Russian agribusiness are the areas 
     of focus for redeveloping Russian agriculture. CNFA's 
     Agribusiness Partnerships Program seeks to build financially 
     and economically viable private sector agricultural systems 
     within Russia and the former Soviet states.
       For example, in 1993, the Russian baby food manufacturing 
     industry was supplying less than half of the country's annual 
     baby food required to assure minimum levels of health and 
     nutrition to Russian infants and children. CNFA entered into 
     a partnership with Heinz to increase domestic manufacturing 
     output. Using USAID-funded technical assistance, CNFA and 
     Heinz worked to develop and introduce more nutritious baby 
     food products and enhance local production to increase the 
     Russian baby food sector's ability to meet its domestic 
     demand.
       The recovery of Russian domestic production capacity may 
     require foreign equity investment in production facilities 
     and businesses along with access to credits for the purchase 
     of production inputs. Without proactive PVO involvement, 
     neither the Russian government nor private capital markets 
     will be willing or able to meet these needs.
       (a) CNFA has a proposal that would establish a fund which 
     will provide long-term investment capital for the development 
     of agricultural production, processing, packaging, and 
     distribution businesses and establish a trade finance 
     facility. This fund would address Russia's inability to 
     purchase critical agriculture inputs and commodities and the 
     lack of investment capital to develop the private sector 
     agricultural infrastructure. The fund would be established 
     through the monetization of USDA food aid commodities within 
     Russia.
       (b) Similarly, another PVO, ACDI-VOCA, has submitted a 
     large project proposal to improve rural credit availability 
     and facilitate investment in medium-sized Russian food 
     processing companies. Thus far, the proposal has not received 
     approval. ACDI-VOCA believes the approval has been stalled at 
     the interagency food aid review process due to what it 
     perceives as OMB's unease at utilizing 416(b) donations for 
     monetizing. Again, this proposal would seek to address two 
     principle problems: inadequate access to credit and 
     inadequate capital investment.


                    cultural/educational development

                                Summary

       Cultural cooperation is known to be one of the best ways to 
     overcome mutual distrust, insularity, and conflict among 
     nations. By working together with artists, writers, 
     musicians, and cultural institutions we can promote artistic 
     freedom, good will, and international exposure, as well as 
     support economic viability in the cultural sector. 
     Additionally, in sharing knowledge, specific techniques, and 
     skills--and in broadening horizons--we are investing 
     positively and constructively toward greater mutual 
     understanding and a more peaceful and stable world for 
     ourselves and coming generations.

                            Recommendations

       Encourage expansion of cultural ties and initiatives 
     outside the major centers. In recent years too much emphasis 
     has been placed by Western institutions on the major centers 
     of Moscow and St. Petersburg. This policy fails to serve the 
     rest of the country as reasons grapple with a range of 
     challenges, from economic problems to the need to regain 
     their own identity.
       Create viable links with other like-minded institutions to 
     promote cultural cooperation. Example: With the support of 
     the Soros Foundation through their Open Society project 
     entitled ``Transformation of Russian Society,'' the L.N. 
     Tolstoy Museum/Estate at Yasnaya Polyana (LNM/E) established 
     the first association of museum/estates in Russia. In the mid 
     1990s, this project assisted in the development of regional 
     museums as focal centers for the preservation and 
     promulgation of local culture, with programs on literature, 
     music, and the arts.
       Link regional museum centers to promote much-needed tourism 
     and other support for the economically-depressed heartland of 
     Russia outside the major centers of Moscow and St. 
     Petersburg.
       Help to stimulate programs by supporting grassroots 
     initiatives. Example: LNM/E in Tula has been involved for 
     many years now in a project to encourage local artisans and 
     musicians in this economically-depressed region. With 
     assistance from the Soros Foundation, the LNM/E has been able 
     to provide a forum for exhibitions and concerts to help 
     stimulate local talent and find a market for them as well.
       Foster interest in and greater appreciation of Russian 
     language and culture among youth in the U.S. and provide 
     Russian language and cultural immersion programs for 
     secondary school students in preparation for college.
       Increase funding for collaborative academic and research 
     programs between Russian and American scholars, local 
     government leaders, journalists, heads of NGOs, and 
     researchers.
       Allocate more federal funding for cultural initiatives to 
     the private sector. There are many small non-profit 
     organizations in the U.S. which have both cultural 
     sensitivity and proven track records, yet cannot compete for 
     AID funding because of current bureaucratic restrictions.
       Support initiatives to create a U.S. clearinghouse for the 
     identification and consolidation of U.S.-Russian cultural 
     initiatives and exchange programs. There is no central point 
     that can identify and help consolidate programs or facilitate 
     student exchanges. Many programs today--both government and 
     private--are being duplicated.
       The U.S. should follow through with funding promised by 
     former President Bush for the establishment of the American 
     University in Moscow. Support initiatives like the Soros 
     Foundation linking U.S. schools with Russian schools. Expand 
     education exchanges between teachers, administrators, and 
     educators at all levels. Establish a university to university 
     relationship between American and Russian universities. Every 
     school should have a partner.


                          defense and security

                                Summary

       United States defense and security cooperation and 
     assistance involving the Russian Federation should contribute 
     to defining a new bilateral strategic framework that is not 
     rooted in the notion of Mutual Assured Destruction. Instead, 
     the new security framework should be based upon improving 
     U.S. and Russian security by working with Russia to combat 
     terrorism and to halt the spread of missiles and weapons of 
     mass destruction (WMD).
       America and Russia must forge an alliance beneficial to 
     both, or face the near certainty that historical suspicions 
     will reassert themselves and plunge the world into a new Cold 
     War. Such an eventuality would be especially tragic since the 
     United States and Russia have more in common than not. 
     Indeed, given that the gravest and most imminent threats to 
     both nations are terrorism

[[Page H2830]]

     and WMD proliferation, these great common enemies should make 
     the United States and Russia natural allies.
       The Cold War era model of bilateral relations and arms 
     control is predicated on mutual antagonism and nuclear 
     threats: a situation that is unacceptable as the basis for 
     21st Century U.S.-Russian relations. Russia and the United 
     States each have unique security concerns, but have more 
     security concerns that are shared in common. U.S. policy 
     should encourage Russia to recognize the advantages of U.S.-
     Russian cooperation in areas like counter-terrorism, 
     nonproliferation and missile defense--and the dangers of 
     pursuing a confrontational foreign policy. There is some 
     evidence to suggest that Russia may grudgingly compromise on 
     U.S. missile defense goals. However, the main thrust of 
     current Russian foreign policy and military strategy is 
     actively seeking to curtail American influence and enhancing 
     Russia's status by trying to diminish the United States. U.S. 
     policy must recognize the existence of both positive and 
     negative strains in Russian foreign policy, and then 
     encourage the positive strain that is consistent with U.S. 
     national security interests.
       There should be a clear intent in U.S. policy to transition 
     from near-term measures rooted in U.S. nonproliferation goals 
     to a long-term solution. For example, one component of a 
     long-term solution might be transitioning the Russian economy 
     from defense to non-military production so that scientists 
     can participate in sustainable non-weapons work that benefits 
     the Russian economy. Achieving this will require integration 
     of defense and security cooperation, with broader social and 
     economic assistance focused on regional economies--programs 
     administered outside the U.S. security community.
       This is consistent not only with U.S. nonproliferation 
     goals, but Russian interests as well. According to President 
     Putin, Russia must speed up its integration into the Western 
     community. If Putin is serious, Russia should not be involved 
     in activities that undermine the security of the West. While 
     Russia has formed an alliance with China, President Bush and 
     President Putin have since found mutual interests in fighting 
     terrorism as a result of September 11, 2001.
       The key to forging a U.S.-Russian alliance is to do it now, 
     before U.S.-Russian relations deteriorate further. The United 
     States must offer Russia a relationship that clearly benefits 
     Russian as well as U.S. interests, and begin as soon as 
     possible, working jointly toward mutually beneficial goals. 
     As the victor in the Cold War, the greater burden for taking 
     the initiative and building trust between the sides falls 
     upon the United States. In its relations with Russia, the 
     U.S. holds an array of levers--strategic, military-technical, 
     economic, and social--that can be used as positive and 
     negative inducements to move Russia toward cooperation, and 
     ultimately toward alliance, with the United States. Even the 
     most modest proposals and programs already underway should be 
     viewed as means to the larger end of reforging the still 
     adversarial relationship between Washington and Moscow into a 
     new American-Russian alliance that will defeat terrorism, 
     halt WMD proliferation, and establish a more stable global 
     order for the growth of political and economic freedom 
     everywhere.

                            Recommendations

                               Strategic

       Begin a new, high-level dialog similar to the Ross-Mamedov 
     talks of 1992 to discuss U.S. and Russian proposals for a 
     Global Protection System. Transitioning the security dialog 
     with Russia to a ``normal'' one primarily conducted by lower-
     level officials is a laudable goal, but you can't ``get there 
     from here'' without an interim step. That step is to initiate 
     a high-level process that has a broad mandate and will 
     provide ``cover'' for lower levels of the Russian defense and 
     security establishment to talk productively about these 
     issues. The resulting cooperative approach to BMD deployment 
     could encompass U.S. NMD, the Russian proposal for a European 
     missile shield, and new initiatives like a feasibility study 
     of boost-phase intercept involving Russia, Israel, and 
     Turkey.
       Moscow has repeatedly proposed working with Washington 
     against terrorism. Washington should propose a formal 
     alliance with Moscow in a global war against terrorism that 
     will involve military and intelligence cooperation and joint 
     operations. The U.S.-Russian alliance against terrorism will 
     help Russia by gaining U.S. support for Russia's war against 
     terrorism in Central Asia, which will go far toward achieving 
     the U.S. goal of crushing terrorism globally. Unless Central 
     Asia is stabilized, the region threatens to continue to 
     spiral toward chaos and become, like Afghanistan, a breeding 
     ground for terrorism. Moreover, a U.S.-Russian alliance 
     against terrorism would preempt the emergence of an anti-
     Western Sino-Russian alliance, pull Russia closer to the 
     West, and give a second chance to Russian democracy.
       Russia has advocated an expanded international 
     nonproliferation regime that would, among other things, 
     involve countries of proliferation concern to the United 
     States. The Departments of State and Defense should begin 
     detailed discussions with the Russian Foreign and Defense 
     Ministries on this proposal to determine if a new regime 
     could establish more stringent nonproliferation and arms 
     trade criteria. According to these criteria, Russia would 
     limit its sales of arms, military technology, weapons of mass 
     destruction, and dual-use military-civilian technology to 
     China and Iran, cease such sales to rogue states, and 
     severely limit them to countries in conflict, such as India 
     and Pakistan. U.S. support for the effort, which, if 
     successful, would enhance Moscow's diplomatic prestige, 
     should also depend on Russia's willingness to advocate the 
     return of U.N. weapons inspectors to Iraq. Russia has 
     proposed this regime as an alternative to U.S. NMD and the 
     U.S. must make it clear that it does not accept that 
     argument: missile defense and international cooperation on 
     nonproliferation are not mutually exclusive (indeed, they 
     actually reinforce each other).
       Direct the Department of Defense and the Ballistic Missile 
     Defense Organization to develop a strategy to evaluate the 
     feasibility of increasing technical cooperation with Russian 
     military industry on missile defense technologies. The 
     strategy should include a risk assessment (e.g., the spread 
     of knowledge to China) and an assessment of the possible 
     benefits (technical and political) to U.S. programs of 
     projects like co-development of the Russian S-500. For 
     example, Russian scientists might participate in developing 
     high-speed boosters for interceptor rockets and airborne and 
     space-based lasers.
       Demonstrate to Russia that the U.S. is not interested in 
     taking advantage of Russian weakness. Traditional nuclear 
     arms control only makes sense if the U.S. and Russia remain 
     adversaries. The U.S. should immediately begin efforts to 
     demonstrate that American policy seeks to support 
     transparency rather than numerical equivalencies as a measure 
     of our shared interest in ``stability.'' We also seek to take 
     a fuller account of each side's nuclear arsenals and 
     infrastructure--including tactical nuclear weapons and 
     nuclear weapon production facilities--in any future nuclear 
     agreement between the U.S. and Russia. We understand that 
     both the U.S. and Russia increasingly have different force 
     structure requirements as determined by our respective threat 
     perceptions, geography, and technical abilities. The 
     Departments of Defense, State, and Energy should articulate a 
     strategy for communicating our interest in transparency to 
     the Russians and fulfilling our part of such transparency 
     dialog. We cannot force the Russians to accept that our 
     motives are benign and that such a dialog is in Russian 
     interests. However, the offer, coupled with the array of 
     economic and political outreaches inherent in our broader 
     Russian Policy, would be a good faith effort.
       Make clear to Russia that the potential for cooperation in 
     areas like counterterrorism, joint operations with NATO, 
     regional defenses for Europe, etc. are greatly undermined by 
     the way Russia has chosen to wage its war in Chechnya.

                           Military-Technical

       Encourage and continue the Russian-American Observation 
     Satellite (RAMOS) program. The innovative U.S.-Russian space 
     based remote sensor R&D program addresses defense and 
     environmental concerns. Initial concept of co-orbiting U.S. 
     and Russian satellites for simultaneous stereo observations 
     should be continued.
       Restructure CTR Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) funding to 
     other more effective efforts. The NCI's near-term goal of 
     providing non-weapon work for Russian scientists if more 
     flexibly addressed by other programs (e.g., ISTC, IPP) while 
     its longer-term goal of converting the nuclear cities to 
     sustainable non-weapons work cannot be achieved without a 
     broader focus on the economies of the respective regions.

                                Economic

       Support the rescheduling of Russia's $150 billion debt to 
     the Paris Club if Russia demonstrates active cooperation in 
     cutting the flow of advanced military technology to rogue 
     states.
       A sustained effort to increase the percentage of 
     Cooperative Threat Reduction money actually being spent in 
     Russia. The perception is that in too many programs 
     inordinate amounts of money are spent on administration, U.S. 
     contractors, and consultants. Program offices must be made 
     aware that this issue is a congressional priority and 
     reporting requirements should reflect that concern.
       A more rigorous joint program accounting effort to monitor 
     how U.S. funds are spent in Cooperative Threat Reduction and 
     associated programs. This improves U.S. confidence that 
     monies are being spent appropriately and gives Russians 
     experience in the application of modern accounting methods. 
     Waste, fraud and abuse of CTR funding is a serious concern to 
     both governments and a vehicle like this is necessary lest 
     the process devolve into an adversarial one of accusation and 
     denial.
       Insist that Russia stop taxing U.S. assistance provided to 
     scientists through cooperative programs. The Administration 
     should suspend all Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private 
     Investment Corporation Insurance and Credits to U.S. 
     companies that do business with Russian entities that are 
     linked to Iran's military build-up activities. Russian 
     government-controlled companies, such as the natural gas 
     monopoly Gazprom, should not be allowed to raise funds from 
     U.S. investors for energy schemes in Iran, since they could 
     fund Iran's military buildup, which ultimately could be used 
     to threaten U.S. interests in the region.
       Task the interagency WMD working group at the National 
     Security Council with designing a strategy for sanctioning 
     Russia and Iran because of their proliferation activities. 
     The intelligence community should

[[Page H2831]]

     be tasked with a comprehensive assessment of the ongoing 
     technology transfer and weapons programs, and with providing 
     recommendations identifying ``choke points'' that might be 
     vulnerable to sanctions. The current WMD working group at the 
     NSC should be tasked with developing a sanctions strategy 
     that targets Russian and Iranian officials, businesses, and 
     individuals involved in the proliferation of WMD 
     technologies, material, or know-how, as well as their sources 
     of financing.
       Establish a vehicle, preferably through a Congressionally 
     mandated organization like USIP, to target support to U.S. 
     non-governmental initiatives that interface directly with 
     official or semi-official Russia in a productive way. These 
     initiatives need a level of analytical freedom and the 
     ability to shape the agenda of their dialog that is sometimes 
     not possible within more traditional Department or Agency 
     sponsorship (it needs to be easy to ``think outside the box'' 
     established by Administration policy). The Russians would 
     almost certainly be responsive to an effort with this sort of 
     background and it would serve to broaden the bilateral dialog 
     at a time when Russian voices appear to be more reticent. 
     Efforts supported should be conscious of congressional 
     interest in spending money in Russia. For example, Congress 
     could create a vehicle for funding unofficial academic 
     research that would, of necessity, involve significant 
     Russian participation at the official or senior unofficial 
     level. Projects could be chosen for their potential to be 
     ``spun on'' to the official foreign policy or House-Duma 
     dialogs.
       Encourage U.S.-Russian military officer exchange programs 
     and greatly increase the numbers. Encourage joint 
     participation in U.S., Russian, and NATO military exercises. 
     This will help allay Russia's residual fear of the West and 
     promote a climate of trust.
       Ratify the Law of the Sea Convention to establish 
     guidelines for international maritime waters.


                          economic development

                                Summary

       Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has 
     experienced widespread economic dislocation and a drop of 
     about 50 percent in GDP. However, after more than a decade of 
     virtually uninterrupted decline, the Russian economy 
     demonstrated many promising signs of recovery.
       The year 2000 was one of the most successful years for 
     Russia in over three decades. The growth of GDP was 7.7 
     percent, fixed assets grew more than 18 percent, unemployment 
     fell by more than 9 percent, real income of the population 
     increased, and pensions increased by 38 percent in real 
     terms.

                            Recommendations

       Work to facilitate Russia's accession and its 
     implementation of WTO agreements. The U.S. government can 
     help Russia to realize its enormous economic potential and 
     enable the country to become a more significant participant 
     in the global economy. Specifically, these efforts will 
     support the growth of the Russian private sector by 
     permitting Russia to negotiate the elimination of trade 
     barriers faced by its exporters and to challenge the WTO-
     consistency of measures taken by other member countries.
       Increase the budgetary allocations for EX-IM, OPIC, and 
     TDA. To help solidify the policy transition from aid to 
     trade, these program funds must be maintained and increased. 
     Where feasible, U.S. institutional financial risk on 
     appropriate large-scale projects should be shared with 
     multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the EBRD.
       Provde targeted financing opportunities for small- and 
     medium-sized U.S. companies. The practices of various U.S. 
     government-sponsored funds should be reviewed to ensure that 
     they promote access to capital for the development of small- 
     and medium-size enterprises.
       The continuing development of the Tax Code will greatly 
     benefit Russia if it creates a tax system that encourages, 
     rather than discourages, investment.
       Investors in Russia continue to express concern over 
     weakness in protecting the property rights investors are 
     afforded under Russian law. Amendments to the current legal 
     framework should address gaps and ambiguities associated with 
     some of these risks.
       Support Russian efforts to strengthen Intellectual Property 
     Rights protection and enforcement. Anti-counterfeit 
     legislation should be strengthened and penalties enforced, 
     while training law enforcement and judicial officials in this 
     area.
       Currency control laws have failed to stop capital flight 
     and instead have damaged the reputation of the Russian 
     business community. The current framework, which acts as a 
     disincentive to Western investment, should be replaced by 
     control and monitoring arrangements that will encourage 
     investment and allow Russian capital freedom of movement in 
     the global economy, while protecting the Russian tax base and 
     treasury.
       Russia should be graduated from Jackson-Vanik. This would 
     remove a longstanding irritant in our relationship with 
     Russia and help foster a sense of ``normal'' trade relations 
     between our countries.
       Authorize and appropriate funds to achieve the goal of 
     awarding 10,000 Masters of Business Administration degrees in 
     Russia.
       Revitalize the enterprise fund concept in Russia as a means 
     of U.S. support to Russian entrepreneurs. Additional funding 
     from the U.S.-Russia Investment Fund or other vehicles would 
     be necessary.


                        energy/natural resources

                                Summary

       Russia, as the world's second largest oil producer and a 
     major supplier of gas to Western Europe, represents an 
     important stabilizing force for global energy security. U.S. 
     polity makers have long understood that in the post-Cold War 
     era, bilateral energy cooperation can provide mutual benefits 
     that go well beyond enhanced energy security. Cooperation in 
     the energy sphere contributes to economic development in 
     Russia, commercial opportunities for U.S. and Russian firms, 
     and a highly positive foundation for the bilateral political 
     relationship.
       As our two countries proceed to re-engage across a broad 
     range of important policy and cultural arenas, energy can 
     claim its critical position as the centerpiece in the 
     relationship, strengthening global energy security and 
     promoting mutual economic growth.

                            Recommdendations

       Development of U.S.-Russian cooperation in energy should 
     become a priority for international policy because of its 
     capacity to address this risk of uncertain supplies and 
     unnecessary dependence. The U.S. and Russia should initiate 
     the development of a sustained institutional structure to 
     move forward on critical areas hindering mutual development 
     of Russian energy resources.
       A high level Presidential task force with representation 
     from both the Putin and Bush administrations should be 
     immediately established as part of the partner offer in 
     addressing the economic and energy components of the anti-
     terrorism campaign.
       The institutional structure for moving forward on critical 
     energy policy and projects should be established to eliminate 
     bureaucratic tendencies that are delaying the implementation 
     of a favorable investment climate in Russia and positive 
     economic responses from the United States. On the U.S. side, 
     this will require the direct involvement of the Secretaries 
     of Energy and Commerce, as well as the Vice President. 
     Members of Congress should be involved and regularly 
     consulted.
       The bilateral group should proceed with specific remedies 
     to move projects forward. Official U.S. financial 
     organizations, such as OPIC and U.S. Ex-Im Bank should play a 
     prominent and ongoing role in the bilateral discussions.
       An expanded program of energy cooperation will provide a 
     critical reinforcement of the positive aspects of the 
     bilateral relationship. One such project, for example, is the 
     development of the oil and gas resources of the Timan Pechora 
     region which offers enormous challenges in project 
     development and investment, but also enormous rewards in new 
     petroleum supplies for the world market.
       Work of the Duma-Congress interparliamentary group should 
     be intensified for purposes of using this efficient mechanism 
     of bilateral consultation to encourage approval in Russia, at 
     the parliamentary level and to promote investment and 
     taxation laws that provide a positive environment for 
     investment, such as full and appropriate finalization of PSA 
     legislation.
       This bilateral energy initiative should engage both 
     official and non-governmental groups committed to moving 
     forward on energy cooperation. The Moscow International 
     Petroleum Club, a nongovernmental and consultative 
     organization, is prepared to lend all assistance to ``jump 
     start'' the process and provide ongoing support as a well-
     known and well-respect NGO in the energy area.


                       environmental cooperation

                                Summary

       With Russia's economy ailing, substantial environmental 
     improvements will necessarily be connected with 
     socioeconomic, institutional, and cultural changes. This 
     represents a challenge as well as an opportunity. While 
     environmental protection cannot reasonably be regarded as a 
     priority, it can as a consequence be a driver of societal 
     changes on the whole.
       It has been demonstrated that Russia's population suffers 
     from environmental pollution to a degree that makes it not 
     just a quality-of-life issue. The environmental pollution 
     threatens Russia's economic well-being and public health, 
     especially for poor families.
       Western governments and international financial 
     institutions should support projects to improve Russia's 
     environmental infrastructure. Based on a market approach, 
     Western donors should provide expertise and oversight to 
     avoid excesses, lawlessness, and abuse. The Russian 
     government should provide the appropriate incentives. Nothing 
     would better mobilize the forces of capitalism for positive 
     change while at the same time bring Russian and Western 
     interests under one umbrella.

                            Recommendations

       Russians have a strong bias in favor of engineered 
     solutions (hardware) to problems, while advanced economies 
     are taking a software approach (planning and organization). 
     The hardware bias has been adopted in international 
     assistance projects. This trend must be reversed.
       Russia's scientific institutes and scientists have 
     developed state-of-the-art technology to prevent and clean up 
     environmental problems. For lack of funding these 
     technologies have not been deployed in Russia and have not 
     been commercialized in international markets. A revolving 
     fund should be created

[[Page H2832]]

     to deploy the technologies and solve the problems.
       If trade benefits were extended to certified sustainably-
     produced products in Europe and North America, this alone 
     could open markets wide enough for investors to take the risk 
     of improving the degraded and polluting infrastructure. Trade 
     rules benefiting sustainable production would also give an 
     incentive to the Russian government, which bets heavily on 
     export earnings from natural resource extraction, to enforce 
     its laws.
       By enlarging the concept of debt-for-nature swaps to 
     environmental protection more generally, Russia's government 
     would get real incentives and financial tools to tighten and 
     enforce its rules. Oversight over environmental protection 
     would thus move from the resource extraction agencies to less 
     directly interested ones. Existing legislative proposals such 
     as the Russian Economic Restoration and Justice Act of 1999 
     and the Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 2001 could, if 
     modified, serve as cornerstones for financial cooperative 
     assistance.
       Financial tools such as a mortgage or a bond system must be 
     developed for a market economy to flourish and be sustained. 
     Issuing bonds to finance local environmental projects could 
     be acceptable to Russians, especially where the environmental 
     problems are clear and their impact severe.
       Increase participation with groups such as Global 
     Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE) 
     and the Advisory Committee on the Protection of the Seas 
     (ACOPS). Both organizations work with Russia to help conserve 
     the world's most valuable ecosystems. A shared annual 
     legislative agenda for Members of Congress and their 
     colleagues in the Duma can bring attention to the threats to 
     ecosystems such as ill-conceived development projects and 
     poor environmental policy.
       Increase cooperation in marine science research to better 
     address the problems of the ocean where maintenance of stable 
     fisheries is becoming a source of conflict. Such cooperation 
     can increase our knowledge of the oceans, boast our ability 
     to manage the oceans' rich resources, and enhance our 
     understanding of ocean effects on climate and carbon 
     sequestration.
       Expand cooperation between the U.S. and Russian navies to 
     help assist with preserving the environment.
       Promost the DOE and the Ministry of Atomic Energy for the 
     Russian Federation (MinAtom) to cooperate on the Nuclear 
     Cities Initiative (NCI). NCI seeks to increase U.S. national 
     and global security through economic diversification and 
     weapons complex down-sizing in Russia's Nuclear Cities.
       Encompass all forms of energy in a comprehensive energy 
     plan that includes attention to global warming and 
     environmental impacts.
       Establish a mechanism for the exchange of information and 
     to assist in the implementation of initiatives that result 
     from these recommendations.


                              health care

                                Summary

       Since the collapse of the USSR, public health and the state 
     of the medical care system in Russia have been deeply 
     troubled. Mortality trends, which began to worsen in the late 
     1960s, accelerated downward in the past decade, leading to a 
     decline in longevity unknown outside parts of the developing 
     world. Russia sustained a net loss of 750,000 persons last 
     year. Of the two factors behind this trend--decreased 
     fertility and premature mortality--mortality is the more 
     important. The major contributor to premature mortality is an 
     excessive incidence of fatal cardiovascular disease--heart 
     attacks and strokes, due, in turn, to a high prevalence of 
     unrecognized and unmanaged hypertension, an easily treatable 
     disease but one that requires an innovative and sustained 
     program of prevention and education. This record, 
     unprecedented in time of peace for a developed country, 
     reveals conditions that threaten to cause serious social and 
     economic consequences for the nation. President Putin has 
     acknowledged it as a key security issue for Russia.
       For Russia as well as the West, the health issue is both a 
     challenge and an opportunity. The history of U.S. and Western 
     health assistance for Russia reveals a record of thin 
     support, episodic contributions and, at times, 
     counterproductive efforts. There has been a lack of 
     appropriate leadership, absence of a coherent strategy, and a 
     resignation generated by a feeling that the job was simply 
     too overwhelming. Yet there are opportunities for 
     constructive engagement for both professional contributions 
     and community-based efforts in partnership with Russian 
     colleagues in a well-conceived plan that builds on the 
     strengths of the existing Russian resources.

                            Recommendations

       An effective health assistance program for the Russian 
     Federation should concentrate on important health issues and 
     serious, life-threatening diseases--those which make the most 
     prominent contribution to premature mortality and where 
     effective intervention and prevention are possible. This 
     implies a much increased emphasis on chronic diseases--
     especially cardiovascular disorders and diabetes. An 
     effective program should combine clinical medicine, public 
     health, and public education.
       Develop, implement, and evaluate cooperative physician 
     exchange programs for the sharing of knowledge and skills 
     that improve the Russian medical profession's ability to meet 
     the challenges of the burden of disease.
       Develop and implement cooperative programs aimed at 
     efficient use of medical care resources for treatment and 
     prevention of disease.
       Serve as a clearinghouse for privately and publicly 
     sponsored programs designed to improve the health of Russians 
     and improve the quality and effectiveness of preventive and 
     therapeutic efforts there.
       Develop close working relationships with private American 
     and European philanthropic institutions interested in both 
     security and health issues in the former Soviet republics.
       Establish close working relationships with key commercial 
     entities whose interests involve issues of health and 
     medicine in the Russian Federation.
       Assist professional education--continuing medical education 
     for Russian physicians--by organizing exchanges in both 
     directions, based in regional academic medical centers in 
     several regions of the Russian Federation.
       Support Russian versions of the American Medical 
     Association, Center for Disease Control, etc.
       Collaborate among compelementary organizations on behalf of 
     disease management and prevention by combining clinical 
     medicine, public health, and public education. Key examples 
     include cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and tuberculosis.
       Assist in the selective provision of therapeutic drugs and 
     medical equipment.
       Increase cooperative biomedical research between the 
     National Institutes of Health and research institutes in 
     Russia.
       A joint announcement by Presidents Bush and Putin for close 
     bilateral cooperation on the eradication of AIDS, cancer, 
     etc. would build support for these types of programs.


                         judicial/legal systems

                                Summary

       Russia's judiciary is the least developed of the three 
     branches. Reform has begun but some of the old structure and 
     personnel are still in place. Trial by jury is being 
     introduced and President Putin declared that it would become 
     the norm nationwide by 2003. A major overhaul of the Soviet-
     era criminal code is nearing approval in the Duma.

                            Recommendations

       Jury trials were a feature of the pre-revolutionary Russian 
     legal system. Few initiatives have had such a concrete impact 
     in promoting the rule of law in Russia and in promoting human 
     rights. Putin will almost certainly succeed in his new effort 
     to expand jury trials to other regions of the Russian 
     Federation. The U.S. technical assistance community can and 
     should play a critical role in promoting Putin's practical 
     and high-minded initiative.
       The Central and East European Law Initiative's (CEELI) 
     much-heralded Environmental Public Advocacy Center (EPAC) in 
     Ukraine, Moldova, and Uzbekistan has successfully litigated 
     high-impact environmental cases on behalf of citizens in the 
     courts and has promoted citizen participation in advocacy and 
     environmental decision-making. Russia would benefit from a 
     proliferation of NGOs able to advocate on behalf of the 
     public through proper, legal channels (as opposed to settling 
     disputes through extra-judicial means). Average citizens 
     should be involved in settling environmental disputes with 
     businesses and the government in a manner that is familiar to 
     Americans but wholly unfamiliar to most Russians.
       Russia adopted a new system last year to expand judicial 
     power to a group of magistrates, commonly referred to as 
     Justices of the Peace. Work with these magistrates will prove 
     to be critical because they will be the court of first 
     instance for most common citizen complaints. These courts 
     also will be the first in Russia to implement an abbreviated 
     trial, pursuant to the current draft code of criminal 
     procedure, which includes for the first time a system of plea 
     bargaining. Likewise, the justices will have greater 
     discretion under the draft code to determine the conditions 
     of pre-trial release (bail).
       The expansion of legal clinics in the last five years has 
     proven to be successful in reforming the Russian legal 
     education system. Encouraging the doubling of these clinics 
     in the next 3-5 years will have a salutary effect on the 
     legal education system in Russia, as well as facilitate 
     access to justice for Russia's poor.
       Russian law students and law professors continue to use 
     outdated textbooks from Soviet times. The dearth of textbooks 
     on newer subjects (particularly on commercial law) has 
     hampered curriculum reform and the ability of professors to 
     prepare their students to practice in a market economy. 
     Through small grant programs targeting individual professors 
     or groups of professors, this need could be addressed 
     relatively inexpensively.
       The Law on Advocates has passed its first reading in 
     parliament and appears destined to be passed in final form in 
     the near term. The new law will represent the legislative 
     backbone for the restructuring of the legal profession in 
     Russia. New, higher qualification standards, ethics 
     standards, etc. will be mandated by the new law. A great deal 
     of assistance and training will be needed in order to 
     properly implement the law.
       Continue to promote the passage of a modern criminal 
     procedure code in Russia. The Code itself mandates of 
     expansion of jury trials throughout the entire Federation by

[[Page H2833]]

     2003 and sets other timetables for the transfer of the 
     responsibility from prosecutors to judges for issuing arrest 
     warrants, search warrants, wiretap orders, and setting 
     conditions for pretrial release.
       Encourage American law schools to provide tuition for at 
     least one Russian student and establish a U.S. government 
     program to cover all other costs. Additionally, Russian 
     students should be able to apply for J, I (section 212E) 
     visas.
       Fully support and expand institutional relationships 
     between the Russian and American local governments. State-to-
     state, city-to-city, and mayor-to-mayor initiatives should be 
     further encouraged.
       Support and expand training programs for local officials in 
     Russia.


                           local governments

                                Summary

       A successful transition to democracy in Russia cannot take 
     place only at the national level. The democratization of 
     national political institutions without corresponding changes 
     taking place locally would be a prescription for political 
     instability. Furthermore, there are a number or reasons why 
     the attempt to build democracy at the sub-national level in 
     Russia is conducive to a successful transition to democracy 
     nationally.
       In stable federal systems, legitimate and effectively 
     functioning local governments can act as a balance to central 
     power; their absence creates greater opportunity for abuse of 
     power by the center.
       Popular participation at the local level gives people a 
     knowledge of the mechanics of democracy. Among the lessons to 
     be learned through participation in local politics are 
     tolerance for the opinions of others, majority rule, 
     representation, and accountability.
       Popular participation in local government also leads to 
     stronger feelings of political efficacy--the sense that 
     people have some control over the decisions that directly 
     effect their lives. As such, democratically run local 
     governments can instill greater support for democratic 
     institutions nationally and so contribute to the development 
     of a democratic political culture.
       Finally, national policies must be implemented locally; 
     local governments that are responsive and are perceived as 
     legitimate are likely to be more effective in doing so. Local 
     knowledge and proximate interest may improve the 
     effectiveness of local service delivery.
       The Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted in 1993 
     envisages two levels of government below the national level, 
     both operating in accordance with democratic principles. The 
     upper level consists of 89 federal subdivisions, considered 
     part of the Russian state system. Below them are institutions 
     of Local Self Government, generally municipalities. Chapter 
     Eight of the Constitution is devoted to these institutions 
     and accords them an essential role in promoting public 
     participation in all local decision making. However, despite 
     the high ideals expressed in the Constitution, democracy at 
     the sub-national level in Russia has been slow to develop. 
     Efforts to promote these ideals are crucial to building 
     democracy in Russia.

                            Recommendations

       Together with Russian specialists, assess the degree to 
     which efforts to develop institutions of local self 
     government in Russia have succeeded and identify areas of 
     weakness which could benefit from American cooperation.
       Propose ways to improve the tax base of local government in 
     Russia and explore ways in which revenues might best be 
     shared between levels of government.
       Consider ways to encourage political participation locally, 
     including efforts at building stronger political parties and 
     organizations that represent elements of civil society.
       Focus on strengthening local legal institutions, including 
     the courts, the judiciary, and legal services for those who 
     can least afford them, while encouraging legal education.


                         science and technology

                                Summary

       Under the existing 10-year Umbrella Agreement on S&T 
     Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United 
     States signed in 1993, a large number of projects have been 
     underway involving more than 15 federal agencies. Areas of 
     research have included space, the environment, agricultural 
     science, energy, public health and medicine, infectious 
     diseases, earth sciences, nuclear and molecular physics, 
     information technology, and a wide range of basic science 
     disciplines. Cooperative endeavors between U.S. and Russian 
     scientists have resulted in numerous scientific and political 
     breakthroughs.
       Participating U.S. government agencies include: ARS, CDC, 
     DOD, DOE, DOS, DOT, EPA, HHS, NASA, NIH, NIST, NOAA, NRC, 
     NSF/CRDF, ONR, USDA, and USGS. In addition, private funds, 
     such as the Soros and Turner Foundations, have made or are 
     about to make sizable investments in the Russian science 
     community.
       Under the various programs administered by these agencies, 
     thousands of Russian scientists and engineers have been 
     involved in commercial and scientific relationships. Numerous 
     areas of cooperation can be expanded and new areas can be 
     explored. The U.S. needs to determine which areas of 
     cooperation require focused attention. The goals of these 
     programs should be self-sustained.

                            Recommendations

       DoD/DoE should cooperate with MinAtom in the area of 
     nuclear fuel cycles, including development of proliferation 
     resistant fuel cycles for possible application in advanced 
     nuclear countries and appropriate repositories for final 
     disposition of spent fuel.
       Stimulate arms control thinking by training the next 
     generation of Russian nuclear weapons and public policy 
     specialists in programs for natural and social sciences.
       Encourage private firms and NGOs to utilize current 
     technology to respond to and mitigate natural and 
     environmental disasters.
       Encourage industry by way of taxes and other incentives to 
     develop and use Russian technology and to support the 
     institutes that create the technology.
       Continue and expand cooperative fusion research that began 
     over 25 years ago because it is expected that fusion energy 
     could become the long-term non-polluting solution to the 
     world's energy needs.
       Involve Russia in nanotechnology projects because materials 
     research is an area of traditional Russian R&D strength.
       Cooperate with Russia in the area of food safety and food 
     security--in the production as well as processing and storage 
     stages. This could provide significant benefits not only to 
     the U.S. and Russia, but to developing countries as well.
       Increase cooperation in marine science research to better 
     address the problems of the ocean, where maintenance of 
     stable fisheries is becoming a source of conflict. Such 
     cooperation can increase our knowledge of the oceans, boost 
     our ability to manage the oceans' rich resources, and enhance 
     our understanding of oceanic effects on climate and carbon 
     sequestration.
       Further develop commercial relations in the high-tech area 
     of information technology using the strong mathematical and 
     software development skills of Russian computer scientists. 
     The existing NCI and IPP programs could serve as facilitators 
     for this further development.
       Restructure our scientific aid programs so that there are 
     economic drivers for investments in science that complement 
     the political issues and scientific advancements for the 
     project. The existing NCI and IPP programs could serve as 
     economic drivers.
       Establish a mechanism for the exchange of information and 
     to assist in the implementation of initiatives that result 
     from these recommendations.


                         space and aeronautics

                                Summary

       At the dawn of the post-Cold War era, U.S. industry feared 
     that Russia's vast rocket resources would disrupt the 
     international satellite launch services market following the 
     end of Soviet Communism. By formulating a framework for 
     cooperative space activities, the U.S. and Russian 
     governments opened the door for the creation of strategic 
     partnerships between their respective aerospace companies. 
     Today, the once secretive Russian Proton Rocket, now marketed 
     alongside other western launch vehicles, is the result of 
     joint ventures between U.S. and Russian space launch service 
     providers. Such ventures, however, will not be limited to 
     only marketing space transportation services as we enter the 
     21st century.
       The push for greater commercialization of government space 
     assets and operations is characteristic of new challenges for 
     the 21st Century, as well as greater improvements in space-
     related technologies for the benefit of near-Earth space 
     development and space exploration. Some members of Congress 
     view a newly formulated partnership with Russia as a 
     potential solution to the cost-related problems we now face 
     with the International Space Station (ISS) and other future 
     undertakings such as the colonization of Mars. Undoubtedly, 
     the ISS, space exploration, and improvements in aerospace 
     technology appear to be the major elements that will come to 
     characterize U.S.-Russian cooperation in space and 
     aeronautics activities in the mid-term.

                            Recommendations

       International Space Station--Currently, Russia provides 
     Progress re-supply cargo ships to support ISS refueling and 
     logistics and Soyuz capsules for crew return. Russia is also 
     expected to provide modules for docking and stowage, critical 
     power, and research modules. Although Russia has invested 
     large sums of money in the program, it is unclear whether it 
     can continue as a viable partner in this effort due to 
     schedule delays, funding shortages, and national security 
     concerns. Additionally, the U.S. estimate of a growing 
     projected Station cost overrun only compounds the problem. 
     Joint commercialization ventures, however, may provide Russia 
     with opportunities for meeting its ISS obligations. SpaceHab, 
     Inc. has approached Russia regarding a cooperative 
     arrangement to develop its Enterprise module, which would 
     have the capability to meet Russia's docking and stowage 
     obligations as well as provide a near-term solution for new 
     habitation. Similarly, Boeing is interested in developing the 
     Russian FGB-2 as an alternative means for providing 
     habitation capability. Both proposals require substantial 
     U.S. payments, which are not currently budgeted.
       Space-Related Technologies and Missions--In the case of 
     rocket engine development, Pratt & Whitney, Inc. currently 
     imports Russia's RD-180 engines to power the new U.S. 
     commercial Atlas III and Atlas V launchers. Pratt & Whitney 
     is developing a

[[Page H2834]]

     U.S.-based capability for manufacturing RD-180 engines for 
     use on military launches of these systems. Additionally, 
     American and Russian scientists were working to define a new 
     space-based stereo viewing research project called the 
     Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS). The goal of 
     RAMOS was to build confidence between the United States and 
     the Russian Federation by cooperating on a defense research 
     and development program. This program has currently received 
     an increase in funding. Potential joint U.S.-Russian 
     cooperation programs are focused on a wide range of 
     technologies and space operational needs.
       (a) Space Solar Power: Russia and U.S. could further this 
     joint technology risk reduction program. (b) Cooperative 
     Aeronautics Research Program: This joint research program in 
     advanced aeronautics and propulsion technologies could 
     benefit both nations. (c) Advanced Space Propulsion 
     technology: We should build on previous U.S.-Russian 
     cooperative activities on Russian electric propulsion 
     technology for deep space missions. (d) Joint Weather 
     Satellites: The U.S. and Russia could jointly develop polar 
     and geostationary weather satellites and solar monitoring 
     satillites. (e) Planetary Defense: Joint U.S.-Russian 
     cooperative program to detect, monitor, and track potential 
     Earth-crossing asteroids and develop capabilities to rapidly 
     respond. There is an unmet need to develop a comprehensive 
     catalogue of Earth-threatening objects and the means to 
     rapidly respond to the threat they pose. (f) Arospace and 
     Aeronautics Research: Achievement of the goal of low-cost 
     access will depend upon significant improvements in launch 
     vehicle technology development. It must be understood that 
     U.S.-Russian partnership on space initiatives will require 
     U.S.-Russian partnership in the areas of aeronautics as well. 
     The state of art in aircraft engine technology for both 
     countries would benefit from an exchange in manufacturing 
     techniques and materials science.
       Further Space Exploration--The focus of joint programs 
     involving humans exploring the solar system and beyond must 
     involve launch vehicle technology development. Concentration 
     in this area would allow cooperative programs to move forward 
     in exploring and determining whether there is life in the 
     oceans beneath the ice on Europa, for example. Although NASA 
     abandoned its Pluto mission earlier this year due to a lack 
     of funds, a joint mission to Pluto and the Kuiper asteroid 
     belts may make it feasible.
       Support and expand private sector relationship. The 
     Lockheed Krunachev Space Launch is an example of this 
     partnership.

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