[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 65 (Monday, May 20, 2002)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E866-E867]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. PETER A. DeFAZIO

                               of oregon

                    in the house of representatives

                          Monday, May 20, 2002

  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, over the next few days, I will be taking 
time to comment on legislation recently approved by the House of 
Representatives, H.R. 4546, the fiscal year 2003 National Defense 
Authorization Act.
  I voted against this legislation because it perpetuates the misguided 
spending priorities and lack of accountability that is ingrained at the 
Pentagon.
  In my upcoming series of floor statements, I will be outlining some 
of the reasons I opposed this bill. I will also be describing several 
common sense amendments I drafted to H.R. 4546 that were blocked from 
consideration on the floor by the House Rules Committee.
  Before I get into some of specific reasons why I opposed this bill, I 
wanted to mention a few of the provisions I felt are worthwhile.
  I am pleased H.R. 4546 continues the effort begun a few years ago to 
improve the pay and benefits for our men and women in uniform. This 
legislation includes a 4.1 percent pay raise, with other targeted 
raises of 6.5 percent for mid-grade and senior noncommissioned officers 
and mid-grade officers.
  The bill also reduces out-of-pocket housing costs for military 
personnel by increasing housing allowances to cover 92.5 percent of all 
housing costs. The ultimate goal is to eliminate out-of-pocket expenses 
by 2005.
  The bill extends the practice of authorizing special pay and bonus 
incentives for key personnel. These incentives will also be extended to 
National Guard and Reserve members.
  H.R. 4546 also includes long overdue provisions to assist military 
retirees. For example, for individuals with a disability rating of at 
least 60 percent, the bill would eliminate the requirement that 
retirement pay be reduced by an amount equal to any disability 
compensation received through the Department of Veterans Affairs. 
Congress should now work toward repealing the disability compensation 
offset for all veterans.
  Important enhancements to TRICARE were also included in the bill.
  I was pleased these quality-of-life improvements for active duty and 
retired personnel were proposed. I have consistently worked throughout 
my congressional career to ensure our military men and women are not 
forgotten in military budget debates. After all, having adequately 
compensated, fed, and trained troops is arguably more important to our 
national security than gold-plated weapons systems.
  Unfortunately, these worthy provisions were heavily outweighed by the 
many problems in the rest of the bill.
  The problems with the bill include the gag rule under which it was 
brought to the floor.
  There were more than 80 amendments submitted to the Rules Committee 
for the defense authorization bill. Only 25 were allowed on the House 
floor. Of those 25, around half were noncontroversial amendments that 
were eventually rolled into a manager's amendment.
  What would be the harm in providing 10 minutes of debate on all of 
the amendments submitted to the Rules Committee? That would allow 
approximately six amendments to be debated per hour, which would mean 
it would take 2-3 days to finish the bill, assuming we actually would 
work a full day. Is that really too much to ask--that we should have 2-
3 days to debate Pentagon spending which, after all, accounts for $1 of 
every $2 available to Congress for discretionary spending?
  This House used to debate the defense authorization bill for a week 
or more at a time. Apparently, the Rules Committee believes that 
Congress doesn't have the right to debate Pentagon priorities during a 
time of war. Stifling debate does a disservice to the American people 
and does not constitute national security readiness for our country.
  Under the gag rule on H.R. 4546, Congress was authorizing $833 
million in spending for the Pentagon for every minute of debate. It was 
an expensive debate, but not an extensive debate.
  So what type of issues did the Rules Committee and the House 
Republican leadership believe the American people did not deserve to 
have a debate about?
  I offered five amendments questioning the merits of weapons systems 
like the Crusader artillery system, the Comanche helicopter, and the F-
22 fighter jet. I also offered an important amendment with 
Representative Ron Paul to reinforce Congress' constitutional 
prerogatives relating to war.
  The Rules Committee blocked all of these amendments from even being 
debated on the House floor.
  Since the Rules Committee wouldn't allow a debate during floor 
consideration of the bill, over the next several days, I will take time 
on the House floor to explain my amendments and why the House should 
have adopted them.
  Two of my amendments were offered on behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld to 
help him carry out his stated intention of terminating the 
unjustifiable $11 billion Crusader artillery system.
  Even President Bush has lambasted the program. During the campaign, 
when asked for an example of a wasteful Pentagon program that would be 
sacrificed in the name of military transformation, he said, ``I'll give 
you an example--the Crusader Howitzer program. It looks like it's too 
heavy, it's not lethal enough.''
  Even soldiers on the front line know the Crusader is a turkey. I 
recently met the father of an Army artillery soldier. I asked him what 
his son thought of the Crusader. He said his son considered it ``a 
joke.''
  Despite universal support among independent military analysts as 
varied as the CATO Institute, the Center for Defense Information, and 
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments for terminating the 
Crusader, some powerful Members of Congress have decided that they know 
best and included nearly half a billion dollars for the Crusader in 
H.R. 4546 as well as report language prohibiting the cancellation of 
this ridiculous program.
  My amendments sought to overturn this misguided effort to keep the 
Crusader program.
  One of my amendments would have cut the $475.2 million from the 
Army's research, development, test and evaluation account that was 
provided by the House Armed Services Committee for the Crusader.
  My other Crusader-related amendment would have prohibited the funds 
in H.R. 4546 from being spent on the Crusader program until the 
Secretary of Defense submitted a report to Congress certifying his 
continued support for the program as well as an analysis of a number of 
problematic aspects of the Crusader program.
  Proponents of the Crusader claim it is faster and can fire farther 
than the system it's replacing, the Paladin. The Army even faxed 
talking points to some select members of the House Armed Services 
Committee with the disingenuous, outrageous claim that U.S. soldiers 
would be killed if the Crusader program was cancelled.
  The Crusader is essentially a computer simulation. I think there have 
been a few laboratory tests. But, make no mistake, the Crusader 
essentially doesn't exist. It's still on the drawing board. It's not 
scheduled for deployment until 2008. For the Army to make the claim 
that terminating the continued development of a computer simulated 
artillery system threatens the lives of U.S. soldiers is pathetic and 
misleading, to say the least.
  So, what's wrong with the Crusader? In short, everything.
  Let's start with the mission. Planning for the Crusader began after 
the Gulf War when the Army discovered the Paladin system had trouble 
keeping up with our tanks and fighting vehicles. But, the Crusader's 
mission--blowing holes in massive lines of approaching soldiers--is 
irrelevant to the real world threats we face. The Soviet Union doesn't 
exist. There are not going to be lines of communist troops marching 
across the plains of Europe.
  Further, in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the two largest post-Gulf War 
military engagements, it became clear that aircraft with smart bombs 
and, in Afghanistan, on-the-ground human spotters, can effectively take 
out enemy positions just as effectively as any artillery system. In 
fact, probably more effectively since the Crusader would likely have 
trouble negotiating tough terrain like that found in Afghanistan.
  Besides, the Army is already developing the Future Combat Systems 
(FCS), a portion of which has the same artillery mission and deployment 
date--2008--as the Crusader. So, as the Crusader is being deployed, it 
is immediately made obsolete by its more high-tech successor, the FCS.
  The Crusader also has a number of technical problems.
  A June 1997 GAO report found the cannon cannot fire if the automated 
loading system fails. There is no manual backup system.

[[Page E867]]

  The automation of the Crusader has been one of its key selling points 
because it would allow troops to remain under the protection of armor. 
But, as GAO has noted, if the automated system fails, the crew will be 
forced to resupply the vehicle by a ``time consuming hand process, 
making them more vulnerable to counterfire.''
  Another key selling feature--the Crusader's theoretical rapid rate of 
fire--would drop dramatically if the cooling system fails.
  A lot has also been written about the weight of the Crusader. While 
the weight has been reduced from 60 tons to about 40 tons, as GAO 
reported in February 2002, ``the deployability advantage gained does 
not appear significant.'' GAO also warns that development is not done 
and the weight could again increase.
  Not exactly the faster, more mobile force the Pentagon says it wants.
  At its current weight and size, the only possible way to load two 
Crusaders onto a single C-17 is back to back. But, that only leaves 
mere inches of room, not enough space to properly restrain them with 
heavy chains.
  There is also some concern on how the Army has reduced the weight. 
The Army reduced the size and payload of the system. The Army also 
plans to remove the heavy armor and road wheel protection and turn them 
into kits that can be applied when needed in combat situations. Weight 
reduction by removing armor is probably not much comfort to the 
soldiers.
  There have also been development problems.
  For example, the cost of the Crusader program has increased by $1.5 
billion.
  Testing to date has been restricted to modeling and simulation, 
hardly sufficient to determine if the Crusader can operate in real-
world operational environments.
  As GAO noted in its February, 2002 report, many critical Crusader 
technologies are not sufficiently mature to start product development. 
GAO wrote, ``If, after starting product development, the Crusader 
technologies do not mature on schedule and instead cause delays, the 
Army may spend more and take longer to develop, produce and field the 
Crusader system. Crusader performance goals may be at risk.''
  GAO also wrote, ``Confining delays in maturing technology to a time 
prior to the start of product development . . . is critical to saving 
time and money . . . a delay during product development costs several 
times more than a similar delay that occurs before product 
development.''
  Despite all of these problems, and Secretary Rumsfeld's stated 
intention to kill the program, Congress fully funded the Crusader 
program in H.R. 4546.
  The conference committee that will be created to resolve differences 
between the House and Senate versions of the DOD authorization bill 
should kill the Crusader program. If they don't, and if money is 
included in the upcoming DOD appropriations bill for the Crusader, I 
will do my best to eliminate its funding.
  The Crusader is not necessary for our national security. Rather, it 
is a corporate welfare boondoggle for a well-connected defense firm.

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