[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 62 (Wednesday, May 15, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4381-S4382]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              AFGHANISTAN

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, as the loya jirga process moves forward in 
Afghanistan, all of us must realize that U.S. security depends on a 
political solution in that far-away country that truly creates 
functioning stability there. All of us know what the costs of an 
unstable Afghanistan have been--those costs were delivered to us on 
September 11.
  A political solution in Afghanistan, in my opinion, cannot rely 
solely on the Northern Alliance leaders who control many aspects of the 
government today. While we have had numerous military successes in 
Afghanistan, we must be as serious about our commitment to a truly 
multi-ethnic political resolution to the country's current 
ingovernability.
  Last week, Dr. Marin Strmecki, a scholar on Afghanistan for the past 
20 years, a fine intellectual who served on my staff many years ago, 
wrote an excellent analysis in the National Review. I have much respect 
for Dr. Strmecki's analysis and would urge my colleagues to read it. I 
ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the National Review, May 20, 2002]

                     Winning, Truly, in Afghanistan

                         (By Marin J. Strmecki)

       In late March, President Bush placed a call to Prime 
     Minister Silvio Berlusconi of Italy that led to the delay of 
     the departure from Rome of the former king of Afghanistan, 
     Zahir Shah. The king had wanted to return to his war-torn 
     country in the hope of reunifying it--but the U.S. had 
     credible information that there would be an attempt on his 
     life. The most dismaying aspect of this news was that the 
     ringleaders of the plan were members of the Northern 
     Alliance, an Afghan faction closely aligned with the U.S. and 
     propelled into Kabul by the U.S. rout of the Taliban.
       This episode illustrates a growing danger: Despite having 
     won militarily in Afghanistan, the U.S. may still lose 
     politically. A complete victory would mean a pro-Western 
     government in Kabul, one that would mop up the remnants of 
     al-Qaeda and cooperate in the larger regional war. But if the 
     U.S. doesn't change its policies soon, radical Islamists 
     could end up in the driver's seat in Afghanistan.
       The critical error came last fall, when U.S. officials 
     selected their principal Afghan allies. The Bush 
     administration opted against working with ``the Rome group,'' 
     a faction of Western-oriented Afghans (including the former 
     king) who sought to recreate the country's moderate and 
     secular pre-1978 government. Though it had no forces in the 
     field, the Rome group could have rapidly mobilized 
     sympathetic commanders and fighters, particularly in Taliban 
     strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan. The U.S. 
     chose instead to ally itself with the Northern Alliance, a 
     faction supported by Iran and Russia and in control of about 
     10 percent of the country.
       The Northern Alliance was a dubious choice. Two of its 
     principal leaders, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdul Rasul 
     Sayyaf, are major figures in the jihadist movement and were 
     close associates of Osama bin Laden in the 1980s. When 
     Rabbani served as president in the early 1990s, his 
     administration granted visas to the foreign elements of al-
     Qaeda. Also, he and his party, Jamiat-i-Islami, sought to 
     seize dictatorial power, with his secret-police and interior 
     ministries, led by Qasim Fahim and Yunus Qanooni 
     respectively, killing thousands of members of other political 
     groups. Moreover, Rabbani's Tajik-led military forces carried 
     out atrocities against ethnic Pashtuns in many areas, abuses 
     that contributed greatly to the outbreak of the civil war out 
     of which the Taliban emerged.
       Not surprisingly, when Northern Alliance forces rolled into 
     Kabul last fall, its leaders picked up where the Rabbani 
     government had left off. Rabbani himself reoccupied the

[[Page S4382]]

     presidential palace and appointed ministers and governors, 
     all from his Islamist party. More troubling, the Northern 
     Alliance opened the doors to Russian and Iranian advisers and 
     intelligence operatives, who arrived in Kabul on a steady 
     stream of air transports. Fahim, now the defense minister, 
     garrisoned his forces in the capital and staffed the military 
     high command exclusively with his political cronies and 
     former Communist officers selected by his Russian allies.
       Though international pressure forced the creation of a 
     coalition government in late December, all of the powerful 
     ministries--defense, interior, and foreign affairs--remained 
     in the hands of the Northern Alliance. Qanooni, again the 
     interior minister, and Fahim proceeded to use their power to 
     harass political opponents, with several senior officials 
     reportedly taking part in the assassination in January of a 
     cabinet minister associated with the Rome group.
       The Northern Alliance's winner-take-all approach threatens 
     U.S. interests. First of all, the interim government has not 
     been much help to U.S. forces against al-Qaeda in the south 
     and east, where Pashtuns remember all too well the atrocities 
     of the Rabbani government and seek to hold the new government 
     at arm's length. Second, its Iranian allies have established 
     two Hezbollah-style clandestine networks, Sepah-e-Mohammed 
     and Sepah-e-Sahaba, to wage a campaign of Lebanon-style 
     attacks designed to bog down the U.S. or even force it to 
     withdraw. Third, Northern Alliance leaders have sought to 
     delay or subvert the scheduled June meeting of the national 
     assembly, or loya jirga, which is the key event in the 
     planned transition to a more representative government. 
     Fourth, if the dominance of the Northern Alliance persists, 
     the Pashtuns (40-45 percent of the population) could rise up 
     in a renewed civil war, and offer Pakistan's intelligence 
     service an opportunity to reestablish its pernicious practice 
     of supporting Taliban-style movements in Afghanistan.
       The Bush administration must act carefully--but quickly. 
     First, the U.S. must assert itself as the dominant foreign 
     power in Afghanistan until the transition is completed (when 
     elections take place in about two years). Bush has made 
     excellent statements indicating that the U.S. will remain 
     engaged over the long haul. In practical terms, this means 
     that the U.S.--even as it moves on to other theaters--must 
     retain sufficient strike power in the region to cow the 
     Afghan factions. The U.S. also must check the roles of Russia 
     and Iran. Although Bush encouraged Russia's President Putin 
     to bolster the Northern Alliance as it fought to topple the 
     Taliban, he must now explain to Putin that stability can only 
     come from pluralism in an open political process--and that 
     Moscow needs to rein in its client. The U.S. must also insist 
     that the Afghan authorities cut off incoming flights from 
     Iran.
       Second, the U.S. must signal a shift away from its 
     excessive reliance on the Northern Alliance. It should 
     emphasize the need to pluralize Afghan politics and to 
     distribute important cabinet seats more broadly: The stacking 
     of ministries with Northern Alliance Appointees--often 
     incompetent and in many cases illiterate--must not be allowed 
     to stand. The coalition should further insist that--with the 
     deployment of the International security assistance Force 
     (ISAF) in Kabul--Northern Alliance troops begin to be 
     redeployed back to their native provinces. At the same time, 
     the U.S. and its allies must try to level the playing field 
     for the loya jirga. Russia and Iran have provided vast 
     amounts of money to the Northern Alliance to buy political 
     support; the U.S. should assist pro-Western parties, just as 
     it did in Europe after World War II.
       Third, the U.S. should insist that the loya jirga end the 
     current imbalance of power favoring the Northern Alliance. We 
     should also demand that every new minister be professionally 
     qualified for his position and that no minister have a 
     history of massive human-rights abuses. These criteria would 
     preclude reappointment of Qanooni and Fahim, who were deeply 
     involved in massacres in the early and mid 1990s. This step 
     is essential to opening a new chapter in Afghanistan's 
     troubled recent history.
       Fourth, the U.S. should take the lead--but with the 
     smallest possible footprint--in solving the security problem 
     in Afghanistan. The ISAF should not be drawn into policing 
     Afghanistan. If its mission expands geographically, a larger 
     deployment--even one with as many as 20,000 additional 
     troops--would be spread so thinly as to be militarily 
     meaningless. The primary U.S. goal should be, rather, the 
     creation of professional, nonpolitical, and ethnically 
     balanced police and military services. This would require 
     playing an intrusive role in rebuilding Afghan security 
     services, similar to the one the U.S. played in El Salvador 
     in the 1980s. Qualified Afghan personnel are available, at 
     home and abroad, and many were not involved in factional 
     politics during the 1990s. Even before the defeat of the 
     Taliban, members of the Rome group had organized an 
     association of former officers of the Afghan armed forces 
     and police in anticipation of the need to rebuild the 
     government; the U.S. should use these professionals to 
     form core groups in each agency or service who would then 
     recruit and train their subordinates and line officers.
       Because of its poverty, Afghanistan should have a military 
     limited to approximately 50,000 troops, though these forces 
     must have sufficient mobility to deploy rapidly anywhere in 
     the country. This limits the scope of the task of rebuilding 
     the armed forces, and the process could readily be completed 
     in two to three years. Only by creating such a professional 
     military force can the U.S. have a local ally sufficiently 
     able to hunt down remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda elements and 
     preclude their return after the U.S. moves on to other 
     theaters.
       Fifth, the U.S. must be willing to fund the operations of 
     the Afghan government--and particularly its police and 
     military services--until its capacity to raise revenues has 
     been reestablished. Providing sufficient pay for troops is 
     crucial, because it enables the government to draw the best 
     personnel away from factional armies, such as those of the 
     Northern Alliance, and from regional warlords.
       Together, these actions can, over time, secure a political 
     outcome commensurate with the victory won by American arms 
     last fall. But the adjustment in policy is badly needed. If 
     we stay on the present course, the most likely outcome is a 
     Northern Alliance-dominated government--a result that will 
     leave Islamists like Rabbani in power, extend Iranian and 
     Russian influence, and set the stage for renewed civil war 
     when Pakistan eventually reengages in Afghanistan's politics. 
     If the United States wisely recalibrates, it can establish a 
     moderate and pro-Western state in Afghanistan, an outcome 
     that will have a powerful and unmistakable demonstration 
     effect for those who seek positive political change in the 
     members of the Axis of Evil.

                          ____________________