[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 58 (Thursday, May 9, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4147-S4151]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. BIDEN (for himself, Mr. Helms, Mr. Kennedy, and Mr. 
        Frist):
  S. 2487. A bill to provide for global pathogen surveillance and 
response; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, Senator Helms and I are proud to introduce 
today the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002. Senator Helms is 
recovering from his heart surgery and is unable to be here today, but 
let me note our joint efforts in recognizing the importance of disease 
surveillance and preparing this bill for introduction. In recent years, 
we have joined forces on a number of sensible foreign policy 
initiatives and I am proud that we are doing so once again. I am also 
especially pleased that Senators Kennedy and Frist, the chairman and 
ranking member of the Public Health Subcommittee of the Senate Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, have also agreed to be 
original cosponsors of this bill.
  This bill authorizes $150 million over the next 2 years to provide 
assistance to developing nations to improve global disease surveillance 
to help prevent and contain both biological weapons attacks and 
naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks around the world. As 
the ranking member and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
respectively, Senator Helms and I recognize all too well that 
biological weapons are a global threat with no respect for borders. A 
terrorist group could launch a biological weapons attack in Mexico in 
the expectation that the epidemic would quickly spread to the United 
States. A rogue state might experiment with new disease strains in 
another country, intending later to release them here. A biological 
weapons threat need not begin in the United States to reach our shores.
  For that reason, our response to the biological weapons threat cannot 
be limited to the United States alone. Global disease surveillance, a 
systematic approach to tracking disease outbreaks as they occur and 
evolve around the world, is essential to any real international 
response.
  This country is making enormous advances on the domestic front in 
bioterrorism defense. $3 billion has been appropriated for this purpose 
in FY 2002, including $1.1 billion to improve State and local public 
health infrastructure. Delaware's share will include $6.7 million from 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to improve the public 
health infrastructure and $548,000 to improve hospital readiness in my 
State.
  The House and Senate are currently in conference to reconcile 
competing versions of a comprehensive bioterrorism bill drafted last 
fall following the anthrax attacks via the U.S. postal system. Those 
attacks, which killed five individuals and infected more than twenty 
people, highlighted our domestic vulnerabilities to a biological 
weapons attack. We need to further strengthen our Nation's public 
health system, improve Federal public health laboratories, and fund the 
necessary research and procurement for vaccines and treatments to 
respond better to future bioterrorist attacks. As an original co-
sponsor of the Senate bill, I know the final package taking shape in 
conference will achieve those goals and I look forward to its enactment 
into law.
  Nevertheless, any effective response to the challenge of biological 
weapons must also have an international component. Limiting our 
response to U.S. territory would be shortsighted and doomed to failure. 
A dangerous pathogen released on another continent can quickly spread 
to the United States in a matter of days, if not hours. This is the 
dark side of globalization. International trade, travel, and migration 
patterns offer unlimited opportunities for pathogens to spread across 
national borders and to move from one continent to another. Moreover, 
an overseas epidemic could give us our first warning of a new disease 
strain that was developed by a country or by terrorists for use as a 
biological weapon, or that could be used by others for that purpose.
  We should make no mistake: in today's world, all infectious disease 
epidemics, wherever they occur and whether they are deliberately 
engineered or are naturally occurring, are a potential threat to all 
nations, including the United States.
  How does disease surveillance fit into all of this? A biological 
weapons attack succeeds partly through the element of surprise. As Dr. 
Alan P. Zelicoff of the Sandia National Laboratory testified before the 
Foreign Relations Committee in March, early warning of a biological 
weapons attact can prevent illness and death in all but a small 
fraction of those infected. A cluster of flu-like symptoms in a city or 
region may be dismissed by individual physicians as just the flu when 
in fact it may be anthrax, plague, or another biological weapon. Armed 
with the knowledge, however, that a biological weapons attack has in 
fact occurred, doctors and nurses can examine their patients in a 
different light and, in many cases, effectively treat infected 
individuals.
  Disease surveillance, a comprehensive reporting system to quickly 
identify and communicate abnormal patterns of symptoms and illnesses, 
can quickly alert doctors across a region that a suspicious disease 
outbreak has occurred. Epidemiological specialists can then investigate 
and combat the outbreak. And if it's a new disease or strain, we can 
begin to develop treatments that much earlier.
  A good surveillance system requires trained epidemiological 
personnel, adequate laboratory tools for quick diagnosis, and 
communications equipment to circulate information. Even in the United 
States today, many States and localities rely on old-fashioned pencil 
and paper methods of tracking disease patterns. Thankfully, we are 
addressing those domestic deficiencies through the bioterrorism bill in 
conference.
  For example, in Delaware, we are developing the first, comprehensive, 
state-wide electronic reporting system for infectious diseases. This 
system will be used as a prototype for other states, and will enable 
much earlier detection of infectious disease outbreaks, both natural 
and bioterrorist. I and my congressional colleagues in the delegation 
have been working for over two years to get this project up and 
running, and we were successful in obtaining $2.6 million in funding 
for this

[[Page S4148]]

project over the past 2 years. I and my colleagues have requested $1.4 
million for additional funding in FY 2003, and we are extremely 
optimistic that this funding will be forthcoming.

  It is vitally important that we extend these initiatives into the 
international arena. However, as many developing countries are way 
behind us in terms of public health resources, laboratories, personnel, 
and communications, these countries will need help just to get to the 
starting point we have already reached in this country.
  An effective disease surveillance system is beneficial even in the 
absence of biological weapons attacks. Bubonic plague is bubonic 
plague, whether it is deliberately engineered or naturally occurring. 
Just as disease surveillance can help contain a biological weapons 
attack, it can also help contain a naturally occurring outbreak of 
infectious disease. According to the World Health Organization, 30 new 
infectious diseases have emerged over the past thirty years; between 
1996 and 2001 alone, more than 800 infectious disease outbreaks 
occurred around the world, on every continent. With better 
surveillance, we can do a better job of mitigating the consequences of 
these disease outbreaks.
  In 2000, the World Health Organization established the first truly 
global disease surveillance system, the Global Alert and Response 
Network, to monitor and track infectious disease outbreaks in every 
region of the world. The WHO has done an impressive job so far with 
this initiative, working on a shoestring budget. But this global 
network is only as good as its components, individual nations. 
Unfortunately, developing nations, those nations most likely to 
experience rapid disease outbreaks, simply do not possess the trained 
personnel, the laboratory equipment, or the public health 
infrastructure to track evolving disease patterns and detect emerging 
pathogens.
  According to a report by the National Intelligence Council, 
developing nations in Africa and Asia have established only rudimentary 
systems, if any at all, for disease surveillance, response, and 
prevention. The World Health Organization reports that more than sixty 
percent of laboratory equipment in developing countries is either 
outdated or non-functioning.
  This lack of preparedness can lead to tragic results. In August 1994 
in Surat, a city in western India, a surge of complaints on flea 
infestation and a growing rat population was followed by a cluster of 
reports on patients exhibiting the symptoms of pneumonic plague. 
However, authorities were unable to connect the dots until the plague 
had spread to seven states across India, ultimately killing 56 people 
and costing the Indian economy $600 million. Had the Indian authorities 
employed better surveillance tools, they may well have contained the 
epidemic, limited the loss of life, and surely avoided the panic that 
led to economically disastrous embargoes on trade and travel. An 
outbreak of pneumonic plague in India this February was detected more 
quickly and contained with only a few deaths, and no costly panic.
  Developing nations are the weak links in any comprehensive global 
disease surveillance network. Unless we take action to shore up their 
capabilities to detect and contain disease outbreaks, we leave the 
entire world vulnerable to a deliberate biological weapons attack or a 
virulent natural epidemic.
  It is for these reasons that Senator Helms and I have worked together 
in recent months to craft the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002. 
This bill will authorize $150 million in FY 2003 and FY 2004 to 
strengthen the disease surveillance capabilities of developing nations. 
First, the bill seeks to ensure in developing nations a greater number 
of personnel trained in basic epidemiological techniques. It offers 
enhanced in-country training for medical and laboratory personnel and 
the opportunity for select personnel to come to the United States to 
receive training in our Centers for Disease Control laboratories and 
Master of Public Health programs in American universities. Second, the 
bill provides assistance to developing nations to acquire basic 
laboratory equipment, including items as mundane as microscopes, to 
facilitate the quick diagnosis of pathogens. Third, the bill enables 
developing nations to obtain communications equipment to quickly 
transmit data on disease patterns and pathogen diagnoses, both inside a 
nation and to regional organizations and the WHO. Again, we're not 
talking about fancy high-tech equipment, but basics like fax machines 
and Internet-equipped computers. Finally, the bill gives preference to 
countries that agree to let experts from the United States or 
international organizations investigate any suspicious disease 
outbreaks.

  If passed, the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002 will go a 
long way in ensuring that developing nations acquire the basic disease 
surveillance capabilities to link up effectively with the WHO's global 
network. This bill offers an inexpensive and common sense solution to a 
problem of global proportions, the dual threat of biological weapons 
and naturally occurring infectious diseases. The funding authorized is 
only a tiny fraction of what we will spend domestically on bioterrorism 
defenses, but this investment will pay enormous dividends in terms of 
our national security.
  Let me close with an excerpt of testimony from the Foreign Relations 
Committee hearing last September on bioterrorism. Dr. D.A. Henderson, 
the man who spearheaded the successful international campaign to 
eradicate smallpox in the 1970's, recently stepped down from a short-
term position as the director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness 
in the Department of Health and Human Services. In that position, he 
was vested with the responsibility for helping organize the U.S. 
government's response to future bioterrorist attacks. Dr. Henderson, 
who at the time of the hearing was the head of the Johns Hopkins 
University Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, was very clear on 
the value of global disease surveillance:

       In cooperation with the WHO and other countries, we need to 
     strengthen greatly our intelligence gathering capability. A 
     focus on international surveillance and on scientist-to-
     scientist communication will be necessary if we are to have 
     an early warning about the possible development and 
     production of biological weapons by rogue nations or groups.

  Dr. Henderson is exactly right. We cannot leave the rest of the world 
to fend for itself in combating biological weapons and infectious 
diseases if we are to ensure America's security.

  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Global Pathogen 
Surveillance Act of 2002 be printed in the the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2487

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Global Pathogen Surveillance 
     Act of 2002''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSE.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Bioterrorism poses a grave national security threat to 
     the United States. The insidious nature of the threat, the 
     likely delayed recognition in the event of an attack, and the 
     underpreparedness of the domestic public health 
     infrastructure may produce catastrophic consequences 
     following a biological weapons attack upon the United States.
       (2) A contagious pathogen engineered as a biological weapon 
     and developed, tested, produced, or released in another 
     country can quickly spread to the United States. Given the 
     realities of international travel, trade, and migration 
     patterns, a dangerous pathogen released anywhere in the world 
     can spread to United States territory in a matter of days, 
     before any effective quarantine or isolation measures can be 
     implemented.
       (3) To effectively combat bioterrorism and ensure that the 
     United States is fully prepared to prevent, diagnose, and 
     contain a biological weapons attack, measures to strengthen 
     the domestic public health infrastructure and improve 
     domestic surveillance and monitoring, while absolutely 
     essential, are not sufficient.
       (4) The United States should enhance cooperation with the 
     World Health Organization, regional health organizations, and 
     individual countries to help detect and quickly contain 
     infectious disease outbreaks or bioterrorism agents before 
     they can spread.
       (5) The World Health Organization (WHO) has done an 
     impressive job in monitoring infectious disease outbreaks 
     around the world, particularly with the establishment in 
     April 2000 of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response network.
       (6) The capabilities of the World Health Organization are 
     inherently limited in that its

[[Page S4149]]

     disease surveillance and monitoring is only as good as the 
     data and information the World Health Organization receives 
     from member countries and are further limited by the narrow 
     range of diseases (plague, cholera, and yellow fever) upon 
     which its disease surveillance and monitoring is based, and 
     the consensus process used by the World Health Organization 
     to add new diseases to the list. Developing countries in 
     particular often cannot devote the necessary resources to 
     build and maintain public health infrastructures.
       (7) In particular, developing countries could benefit 
     from--
       (A) better trained public health professionals and 
     epidemiologists to recognize disease patterns;
       (B) appropriate laboratory equipment for diagnosis of 
     pathogens;
       (C) disease reporting that is based on symptoms and signs 
     (known as ``syndrome surveillance'') enabling the earliest 
     possible opportunity to conduct an effective response;
       (D) a narrowing of the existing technology gap in syndrome 
     surveillance capabilities, based on reported symptoms, and 
     real-time information dissemination to public health 
     officials; and
       (E) appropriate communications equipment and information 
     technology to efficiently transmit information and data 
     within national and regional health networks, including 
     inexpensive, Internet-based Geographic Information Systems 
     (GIS) for early recognition and diagnosis of diseases.
       (8) An effective international capability to monitor and 
     quickly diagnose infectious disease outbreaks will offer 
     dividends not only in the event of biological weapons 
     development, testing, production, and attack, but also in the 
     more likely cases of naturally occurring infectious disease 
     outbreaks that could threaten the United States. Furthermore, 
     a robust surveillance system will serve to deter terrorist 
     use of biological weapons, as early detection will help 
     mitigate the intended effects of such malevolent uses.
       (b) Purpose.--The purposes of this Act are as follows:
       (1) To enhance the capability of the international 
     community, through the World Health Organization and 
     individual countries, to detect, identify, and contain 
     infectious disease outbreaks, whether the cause of those 
     outbreaks is intentional human action or natural in origin.
       (2) To enhance the training of public health professionals 
     and epidemiologists from eligible developing countries in 
     advanced Internet-based syndrome surveillance systems, in 
     addition to traditional epidemiology methods, so that they 
     may better detect, diagnose, and contain infectious disease 
     outbreaks, especially those due to pathogens most likely to 
     be used in a biological weapons attack.
       (3) To provide assistance to developing countries to 
     purchase appropriate public health laboratory equipment 
     necessary for infectious disease surveillance and diagnosis.
       (4) To provide assistance to developing countries to 
     purchase appropriate communications equipment and information 
     technology, including appropriate computer equipment and 
     Internet connectivity mechanisms, to facilitate the exchange 
     of Geographic Information Systems-based syndrome surveillance 
     information and to effectively gather, analyze, and transmit 
     public health information for infectious disease surveillance 
     and diagnosis.
       (5) To make available greater numbers of United States 
     Government public health professionals to international 
     health organizations, regional health networks, and United 
     States diplomatic missions where appropriate.
       (6) To establish ``lab-to-lab'' cooperative relationships 
     between United States public health laboratories and 
     established foreign counterparts.
       (7) To expand the training and outreach activities of 
     overseas United States laboratories, including Centers for 
     Disease Control and Prevention and Department of Defense 
     entities, to enhance the public health capabilities of 
     developing countries.
       (8) To provide appropriate technical assistance to existing 
     regional health networks and, where appropriate, seed money 
     for new regional networks.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Eligible developing country.--The term ``eligible 
     developing country'' means any developing country that--
       (A) has agreed to the objective of fully complying with 
     requirements of the World Health Organization on reporting 
     public health information on outbreaks of infectious 
     diseases;
       (B) has not been determined by the Secretary, for purposes 
     of section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2780), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2371), or section 6(j) of the Export Administration 
     Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405), to have repeatedly 
     provided support for acts of international terrorism, unless 
     the Secretary exercises a waiver certifying that it is in the 
     national interest of the United States to provide assistance 
     under the provisions of this Act; and
       (C) is a state party to the Biological Weapons Convention.
       (2) Eligible national.--The term ``eligible national'' 
     means any citizen or national of an eligible developing 
     country who does not have a criminal background, who is not 
     on any immigration or other United States watch list, and who 
     is not affiliated with any foreign terrorist organization.
       (3) International health organization.--The term 
     ``international health organization'' includes the World 
     Health Organization and the Pan American Health Organization.
       (4) Laboratory.--The term ``laboratory'' means a facility 
     for the biological, microbiological, serological, chemical, 
     immuno-hematological, hematological, biophysical, 
     cytological, pathological, or other examination of materials 
     derived from the human body for the purpose of providing 
     information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of 
     any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health 
     of, human beings.
       (5) Secretary.--Unless otherwise provided, the term 
     ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of State.
       (6) Select agent.--The term ``select agent'' has the 
     meaning given such term for purposes of section 72.6 of title 
     42, Code of Federal Regulations.
       (7) Syndrome surveillance.--The term ``syndrome 
     surveillance'' means the recording of symptoms (patient 
     complaints) and signs (derived from physical examination) 
     combined with simple geographic locators to track the 
     emergence of a disease in a population.

     SEC. 4. PRIORITY FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES.

       Priority in the provision of United States assistance for 
     eligible developing countries under all the provisions of 
     this Act shall be given to those countries that permit 
     personnel from the World Health Organization and the Centers 
     for Disease Control and Prevention to investigate outbreaks 
     of infectious diseases on their territories.

     SEC. 5. RESTRICTION.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, no foreign 
     nationals participating in programs authorized under this Act 
     shall have access, during the course of such participation, 
     to select agents that may be used as, or in, a biological 
     weapon, except in a supervised and controlled setting.

     SEC. 6. FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established a fellowship 
     program (in this section referred to as the ``program'') 
     under which the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary 
     of Health and Human Services, and, subject to the 
     availability of appropriations, award fellowships to eligible 
     nationals of developing countries to pursue public health 
     education or training, as follows:
       (1) Master of public health degree.--Graduate courses of 
     study leading to a master of public health degree with a 
     concentration in epidemiology from an institution of higher 
     education in the United States with a Center for Public 
     Health Preparedness, as determined by the Centers for Disease 
     Control and Prevention.
       (2) Advanced public health epidemiology training.--Advanced 
     public health training in epidemiology for public health 
     professionals from eligible developing countries to be 
     carried out at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
     (or equivalent State facility), or other Federal facility 
     (excluding the Department of Defense or United States 
     National Laboratories), for a period of not less than 6 
     months or more than 12 months.
       (b) Specialization in Bioterrorism.--In addition to the 
     education or training specified in subsection (a), each 
     recipient of a fellowship under this section (in this section 
     referred to as a ``fellow'') may take courses of study at the 
     Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or at an 
     equivalent facility on diagnosis and containment of likely 
     bioterrorism agents.
       (c) Fellowship Agreement.--
       (1) In general.--In awarding a fellowship under the 
     program, the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Health and Human Services, shall require the recipient to 
     enter into an agreement under which, in exchange for such 
     assistance, the recipient--
       (A) will maintain satisfactory academic progress (as 
     determined in accordance with regulations issued by the 
     Secretary and confirmed in regularly scheduled updates to the 
     Secretary from the institution providing the education or 
     training on the progress of the recipient's education or 
     training);
       (B) will, upon completion of such education or training, 
     return to the recipient's country of nationality or last 
     habitual residence (so long as it is an eligible developing 
     country) and complete at least four years of employment in a 
     public health position in the government or a 
     nongovernmental, not-for-profit entity in that country or, 
     with the approval of the Secretary and the government 
     concerned, in an international health organization; and
       (C) agrees that, if the recipient is unable to meet the 
     requirements described in subparagraph (A) or (B), the 
     recipient will reimburse the United States for the value of 
     the assistance provided to the recipient under the 
     fellowship, together with interest at a rate determined in 
     accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary but not 
     higher than the rate generally applied in connection with 
     other Federal loans.
       (2) Waivers.--The Secretary may waive the application of 
     paragraph (1)(B) and (1)(C) if the Secretary determines that 
     it is in the national interest of the United States to do so.
       (d) Implementation.--The Secretary, in consultation with 
     the Secretary of Health and Human Services, is authorized to 
     enter into an agreement with any eligible developing country 
     under which the developing country agrees--

[[Page S4150]]

       (1) to establish a procedure for the nomination of eligible 
     nationals for fellowships under this section;
       (2) to guarantee that a fellow will be offered a 
     professional public health position within the developing 
     country upon completion of his studies; and
       (3) to certify to the Secretary when a fellow has concluded 
     the minimum period of employment in a public health position 
     required by the fellowship agreement, with an explanation of 
     how the requirement was met.
       (e) Participation of United States Citizens.--On a case-by-
     case basis, the Secretary may provide for the participation 
     of United States citizens under the provisions of this 
     section if the Secretary determines that it is in the 
     national interest of the United States to do so. Upon 
     completion of such education or training, a United States 
     recipient shall complete at least five years of employment in 
     a public health position in an eligible developing country or 
     the World Health Organization.

     SEC. 7. IN-COUNTRY TRAINING IN LABORATORY TECHNIQUES AND 
                   SYNDROME SURVEILLANCE.

       (a) In General.--In conjunction with the Centers for 
     Disease Control and Prevention and the Department of Defense, 
     the Secretary shall, subject to the availability of 
     appropriations, support short training courses in-country 
     (not in the United States) to laboratory technicians and 
     other public health personnel (who are eligible persons) from 
     developing countries in laboratory techniques relating to the 
     identification, diagnosis, and tracking of pathogens 
     responsible for possible infectious disease outbreaks. 
     Training under this section may be conducted in overseas 
     facilities of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
     or in Overseas Medical Research Units of the Department of 
     Defense, as appropriate. The Secretary shall coordinate such 
     training courses, where appropriate, with the existing 
     programs and activities of the World Health Organization.
       (b) Training in Syndrome Surveillance.--In conjunction with 
     the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the 
     Department of Defense, the Secretary shall, subject to the 
     availability of appropriations, establish and support short 
     training courses in-country (not in the United States) for 
     health care providers and other public health personnel from 
     eligible developing countries in techniques of syndrome 
     surveillance reporting and rapid analysis of syndrome 
     information using Geographic Information System (GIS) tools. 
     Training under this subsection may be conducted via the 
     Internet or in appropriate facilities as determined by the 
     Secretary. The Secretary shall coordinate such training 
     courses, where appropriate, with the existing programs and 
     activities of the World Health Organization.

     SEC. 8. ASSISTANCE FOR THE PURCHASE AND MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC 
                   HEALTH LABORATORY EQUIPMENT.

       (a) Authorization.--The President is authorized, on such 
     terms and conditions as the President may determine, to 
     furnish assistance to eligible developing countries to 
     purchase and maintain public health laboratory equipment 
     described in subsection (b).
       (b) Equipment Covered.--Equipment described in this 
     subsection is equipment that is--
       (1) appropriate, where possible, for use in the intended 
     geographic area;
       (2) necessary to collect, analyze, and identify 
     expeditiously a broad array of pathogens, including mutant 
     strains, which may cause disease outbreaks or may be used as 
     a biological weapon;
       (3) compatible with general standards set forth by the 
     World Health Organization and, as appropriate, the Centers 
     for Disease Control and Prevention, to ensure 
     interoperability with regional and international public 
     health networks; and
       (4) not defense articles, defense services, or training as 
     defined under the Arms Export Control Act.
       (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to exempt the exporting of goods and technology 
     from compliance with applicable provisions of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (or successor statutes).
       (d) Limitation.--Amounts appropriated to carry out this 
     section shall not be made available for the purchase from a 
     foreign country of equipment that, if made in the United 
     States, would be subject to the Arms Export Control Act or 
     likely be barred or subject to special conditions under the 
     Export Administration Act of 1979 (or successor statutes).
       (e) Procurement Preference.--In the use of grant funds 
     authorized under subsection (a), preference should be given 
     to the purchase of equipment of United States manufacture. 
     The use of amounts appropriated to carry out this section 
     shall be subject to section 604 of the Foreign Assistance Act 
     of 1961.
       (f) Host Country's Commitments.--The assistance provided 
     under this section shall be contingent upon the host 
     country's commitment to provide the resources, 
     infrastructure, and other assets required to house, maintain, 
     support, secure, and maximize use of this equipment and 
     appropriate technical personnel.

     SEC. 9. ASSISTANCE FOR IMPROVED COMMUNICATION OF PUBLIC 
                   HEALTH INFORMATION.

       (a) Assistance for Purchase of Communication Equipment and 
     Information Technology.--The President is authorized to 
     provide, on such terms and conditions as the President may 
     determine, assistance to eligible developing countries for 
     the purchase and maintenance of communications equipment and 
     information technology described in subsection (b), and 
     supporting equipment, necessary to effectively collect, 
     analyze, and transmit public health information.
       (b) Covered Equipment.--Equipment described in this 
     subsection is equipment that--
       (1) is suitable for use under the particular conditions of 
     the area of intended use;
       (2) meets appropriate World Health Organization standards 
     to ensure interoperability with like equipment of other 
     countries and international organizations; and
       (3) is not defense articles, defense services, or training 
     as defined under the Arms Export Control Act.
       (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to exempt the exporting of goods and technology 
     from compliance with applicable provisions of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (or successor statutes).
       (d) Limitation.--Amounts appropriated to carry out this 
     section shall not be made available for the purchase from a 
     foreign country of equipment that, if made in the United 
     States, would be subject to the Arms Export Control Act or 
     likely be barred or subject to special conditions under the 
     Export Administration Act of 1979 (or successor statutes).
       (e) Procurement Preference.--In the use of grant funds 
     under subsection (a), preference should be given to the 
     purchase of communications (and information technology) 
     equipment of United States manufacture. The use of amounts 
     appropriated to carry out this section shall be subject to 
     section 604 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
       (f) Assistance for Standardization of Reporting.--The 
     President is authorized to provide, on such terms and 
     conditions as the President may determine, technical 
     assistance and grant assistance to international health 
     organizations (including regional international health 
     organizations) to facilitate standardization in the reporting 
     of public health information between and among developing 
     countries and international health organizations.
       (g) Host Country's Commitments.--The assistance provided 
     under this section shall be contingent upon the host 
     country's commitment to provide the resources, 
     infrastructure, and other assets required to house, support, 
     maintain, secure, and maximize use of this equipment and 
     appropriate technical personnel.

     SEC. 10. ASSIGNMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL TO UNITED 
                   STATES MISSIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
                   ORGANIZATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Upon the request of a United States chief 
     of diplomatic mission or an international health 
     organization, and with the concurrence of the Secretary of 
     State, the head of a Federal agency may assign to the 
     respective United States mission or organization any officer 
     or employee of the agency occupying a public health position 
     within the agency for the purpose of enhancing disease and 
     pathogen surveillance efforts in developing countries.
       (b) Reimbursement.--The costs incurred by a Federal agency 
     by reason of the detail of personnel under subsection (a) may 
     be reimbursed to that agency out of the applicable 
     appropriations account of the Department of State if the 
     Secretary determines that the relevant agency may otherwise 
     be unable to assign such personnel on a non-reimbursable 
     basis.

     SEC. 11. LABORATORY-TO-LABORATORY EXCHANGE PROGRAM.

       (a) Authority.--The head of a Federal agency, with the 
     concurrence of the Secretary, is authorized to provide by 
     grant, contract, or otherwise for educational exchanges by 
     financing educational activities--
       (1) of United States public health personnel in approved 
     public health and research laboratories in eligible 
     developing countries; and
       (2) of public health personnel of eligible developing 
     countries in United States public health and research 
     laboratories.
       (b) Approved Public Health Laboratories Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``approved public health and research 
     laboratories'' means non-United States Government affiliated 
     public health laboratories that the Secretary determines are 
     well-established and have a demonstrated record of 
     excellence.

     SEC. 12. EXPANSION OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
                   LABORATORIES ABROAD.

       (a) In General.--Subject to the availability of 
     appropriations, the Centers for Disease Control and 
     Prevention and the Department of Defense shall each--
       (1) increase the number of personnel assigned to 
     laboratories of the Centers or the Department, as 
     appropriate, located in eligible developing countries that 
     conduct research and other activities with respect to 
     infectious diseases; and
       (2) expand the operations of those laboratories, especially 
     with respect to the implementation of on-site training of 
     foreign nationals and activities affecting neighboring 
     countries.
       (b) Cooperation and Coordination between Laboratories.--
     Subsection (a) shall be carried out in such a manner as to 
     foster cooperation and avoid duplication between and among 
     laboratories.

[[Page S4151]]

       (c) Relation to Core Missions and Security.--The expansion 
     of the operations of overseas laboratories of the Centers or 
     the Department under this section shall not--
       (1) detract from the established core missions of the 
     laboratories; or
       (2) compromise the security of those laboratories, as well 
     as their research, equipment, expertise, and materials.

     SEC. 13. ASSISTANCE FOR REGIONAL HEALTH NETWORKS AND 
                   EXPANSION OF FOREIGN EPIDEMIOLOGY TRAINING 
                   PROGRAMS.

       (a) Authority.--The President is authorized, on such terms 
     and conditions as the President may determine, to provide 
     assistance for the purposes of--
       (1) enhancing the surveillance and reporting capabilities 
     for the World Health Organization and existing regional 
     health networks; and
       (2) developing new regional health networks.
       (b) Expansion of Foreign Epidemiology Training Programs.--
     The Secretary of Health and Human Services is authorized to 
     establish new country or regional Foreign Epidemiology 
     Training Programs in eligible developing countries.

     SEC. 14. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to subsection (c), there are 
     authorized to be appropriated $70,000,000 for the fiscal year 
     2003 and $80,000,000 for fiscal year 2004, to carry out this 
     Act.
       (2) Allocation of funds.--Of the amounts made available 
     under paragraph (1)--
       (A) $50,000,000 for the fiscal year 2003 and $50,000,000 
     for the fiscal year 2004 are authorized to be available to 
     carry out sections 6, 7, 8, and 9;
       (B) not more than $2,000,000 shall be available for each of 
     the fiscal years 2003 and 2004 for the specific training 
     programs authorized in section 6, of which not more than 
     $500,000 shall be available to carry out subsection (a)(1) of 
     such section and not more than $1,500,000 shall be available 
     to carry out subsection (a)(2) of such section;
       (C) $5,000,000 for the fiscal year 2003 and $5,000,000 for 
     the fiscal year 2004 are authorized to be available to carry 
     out section 10;
       (D) $2,000,000 for the fiscal year 2003 and $2,000,000 for 
     the fiscal year 2004 are authorized to be available to carry 
     out section 11;
       (E) $8,000,000 for the fiscal year 2003 and $18,000,000 for 
     the fiscal year 2004 are authorized to be available to carry 
     out section 12; and
       (F) $5,000,000 for the fiscal year 2003 and $5,000,000 for 
     the fiscal year 2004 are authorized to be available to carry 
     out section 13.
       (b) Availability of Funds.--The amount appropriated 
     pursuant to subsection (a) is authorized to remain available 
     until expended.
       (c) Reporting Requirement.--
       (1) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report, 
     in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services and the Secretary of Defense, containing--
       (A) a description of the implementation of programs under 
     this Act; and
       (B) an estimate of the level of funding required to carry 
     out those programs at a sufficient level.
       (2) Limitation on Obligation of Funds.--Not more than 10 
     percent of the amount appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) 
     may be obligated before the date on which a report is 
     submitted, or required to be submitted, whichever first 
     occurs, under paragraph (1).

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise to join with my colleagues Senators 
Biden, Helms, and Kennedy in introducing the Global Pathogen 
Surveillance Act of 2002. This bipartisan legislation will help ensure 
that we are better prepared globally to deal with biological threats 
and attacks.
  The Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002 authorizes enhanced 
bilateral and multilateral activities to improve the capacity of the 
United States and our partners in the international community to detect 
and contain infectious diseases and biological weapons. The Global 
Pathogen Surveillance Act will enhance the training, upgrade equipment 
and communications systems, and provide additional American expertise 
and assistance in international surveillance.
  To better prepare our nation to meet the growing threat of 
bioterrorism, we must put in place and maintain a comprehensive 
framework including prevention, preparedness and consequence 
management. To accomplish this goal, we not only need to strengthen our 
local public health infrastructure domestically, but to work with our 
friends and neighbors in the global community to prevent, detect, and 
appropriately contain and respond to bioterrorist activities outside 
our borders. This is truly a global responsibility. Infectious 
diseases, such as smallpox, do not respect borders. If we can prevent 
their spread in other countries around the world, we can better protect 
our citizens here at home.
  I applaud Senators Helms and Biden for their leadership in this area. 
I look forward to working with them, and all of my colleagues to ensure 
that we provide appropriate authorities and funding to improve our 
international efforts to detect and contain infectious diseases and 
offensive biological threats.
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