[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 57 (Wednesday, May 8, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4069-S4071]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Ms. LANDRIEU (for herself and Mr. Smith of Oregon):
  S. 2478. A bill to promote enhanced non-proliferation cooperation 
between the United States and the Russian Federation; to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, the United States Government and all of 
us personally have conducted a serious reassessment of our priorities 
in the months since the horrific events of September 11, 2001. The work 
of this body has been radically reshaped as we work together to 
effectively combat the menace of international terrorism. We have 
appropriated billions of dollars so our military can wage war in 
Afghanistan and prepare for the possibility of future military 
operations. We have devoted billions of dollars to strengthening our 
homeland defense capabilities, everything from beefing up border and 
port security to manufacturing additional vaccines to prepare for the 
possibility of a biological weapons attack. The time has also come to 
reassess what needs to be done to ensure that nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction and the expertise to employ them do not 
leak out of the former Soviet Union and find their way into the hands 
of terrorist or terrorist states.
  Last year, I sponsored the Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 2001, S. 
1117, which called for expanding and accelerating programs to prevent 
diversion and proliferation of Russian nuclear weapons, and fissile 
materials; reducing the number of nuclear warheads in the United States 
and Russian arsenals; and for reducing the number of nuclear weapons of 
those two nations that are on high alert. The NTRA enjoyed success on a 
number of fronts: U.S.-Russia threat reduction and non-proliferation 
programs were expanded and accelerated; the Senate, working with the 
Administration, paved the way for the deep cuts that Presidents Bush 
and Putin generally agreed to in November 2001; and the possibility of 
taking some weapons off high alert was studied as part of the Nuclear 
Posture Review. Solid steps were taken, but we all know that more needs 
to be done.
  I rise today to introduce legislation that will help to address what 
is probably the most serious threat to U.S. national security: the 
possibility that terrorists or terrorist states will acquire nuclear 
weapons and materials, and other weapons of mass destruction from the 
massive and poorly secured former Soviet nuclear weapons complex.
  The scope of the problem that we face is difficult to fathom, but I 
will attempt to illuminate it by citing a few facts. Today, Russia 
possesses approximately 20,000 nuclear weapons and enough weapons-grade 
material to fabricate over 60,000 more. Not including the United 
States, Russia possesses approximately 95 percent of the world's 
nuclear weapons and weapons-grade material, a testimony to the great 
resources and effort that both sides devoted in waging the cold war. 
These weapons and material are stored in literally hundreds of sites 
across Russia's 11 time zones. Making this problem even more 
disconcerting is the fact that Russia is unable to reliably account for 
its huge stock of warheads and materials, having inherited a sub-
standard accounting system from the totalitarian Soviet state. 
Additionally, there are over 20,000 scientists and technicians in the 
former Soviet Union that are considered proliferation risks.
  As the Members of this Chamber will recall proudly, Senators Sam Nunn 
and Richard Lugar, along with others, took the lead in the early 1990s 
to put together a suite of programs that still work to address the 
threat posed by the possible proliferation of former Soviet nuclear 
weapons and other materials. As the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact fell 
apart, there was a palpable fear that nuclear weapons and materials 
would proliferate widely. In conjunction with the work in the Senate, 
the first Bush administration also took up the challenge by backing the 
Nunn-Lugar programs as well as supporting initiatives to help Soviet 
Premier Gorbachev as he attempted to keep the Soviet Union from radical 
collapse. The events of September 11 serve as another wake-up call. 
There is a growing realization that Russia desperately needs our help. 
But more remains to be done--much, much more.
  Fortunately, the Bush Administration has devoted considerable time 
and effort to working to increase cooperation between the United States 
and Russia on these matters, as exemplified by U.S.-Russian cooperation 
in the war

[[Page S4070]]

against terrorism, the Bush-Putin summit in November 2001, and the May 
2002 U.S.-Russia summit in Russia. The administration wisely realizes 
that only through greater cooperation with Russia can we deal 
effectively with this problem.
  As I mentioned, Russian nuclear weapons and materials are stored in 
hundreds of sites. While helping to improve the security of these sites 
is a daunting task, we should ponder how much more difficult preventing 
an attack would become if even a miniscule portion of these warheads or 
materials were to proliferate. As members of this body know, the 
warning signs are growing. It is well known that groups such as al 
Qaeda and states such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea wish to develop or 
acquire WMD. Even more disconcerting are reports that members of al 
Qaeda have attempted to break into Russian nuclear weapon facilities. 
We would do well to meditate on these reports and ask ourselves if the 
United States is doing enough to prevent the myriad groups and states 
that wish to acquire WMD from Russia from being able to do so.
  Mindful of this serious challenge to U.S. and global security I am 
introducing the Nuclear and Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002, 
NTTRA. The NTTRA would promote policies that will greatly reduce the 
likelihood of nuclear terrorism.
  First, the NTTRA states that it is the policy of the United States to 
work cooperatively with the Russian Federation in order to prevent the 
diversion of weapons of mass destruction and material, including 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well scientific and 
technical expertise necessary to design and build weapons of mass 
destruction. As a review by the Bush administration found last year, 
``most U.S. programs to assist Russia in threat reduction and 
nonproliferation work well, are focused on priority tasks, and are well 
managed,'' The NTTRA proposals complement the increases that the Bush 
administration has proposed for these programs.
  The NTTRA also calls for the President to deliver to Congress, no 
later than six months after the enactment of the NTTRA, a series of 
recommendations on how to enhance the implementation of U.S.-Russia 
non-proliferation and threat reduction programs, including suggestions 
on how to improve and streamline the contracting and procurement 
practices of these programs and a listing of impediments to the 
efficient and effective implementation of these programs.

  Second, recognizing the shortcomings in the Russian system for 
accounting for nuclear warheads and weapons-grade material, the NTTRA 
states that it is the policy of the United States to establish 
cooperatively with Russia comprehensive inventories and data exchanges 
of Russian and U.S. weapons-grade material and assembled warheads with 
particular attention to tactical, or ``non-strategic,'' warheads--one 
of the most likely weapons a terrorist organization or state would 
attempt to acquire--and with particular attention focused on weapons 
which have been removed from deployment.
  Only through such an accounting system will we be able to reliably 
say that Russian warheads and materials are sufficiently secure.
  Third, the NTTRA calls upon the President to deliver to Congress a 
plan laying out progress toward irreversibility involving the 
elimination of launchers and transparency measures involving warheads. 
As the Bush administration works to lock in the gains that the United 
States and Russia have generally agreed to, this plan will help keep 
the Senate fully apprised.
  Fourth, the NTTRA calls for the establishment of a joint U.S.-Russia 
Commission on the Transition from Mutually Assured Destruction to 
Mutually Assured Security. The U.S. side of the Commission would be 
composed of private citizens who are experts in the field of U.S.-
Russia strategic stability. The NTTRA also calls upon the President to 
make every effort to encourage the Russian Government to establish a 
complementary Commission that would jointly meet and discuss how to 
preserve strategic stability during this time of rapid and positive 
change in the U.S.-Russia relationship.
  Working with Russia to address the many serious issues which still 
exist over 10 years after the end of the cold war should be one of the 
top U.S. priorities in the overall battle against global terrorism. 
Allow me to be frank and to say that this work will not be easy and 
there will certainly be testing times as the United States and Russia 
work to fully put the cold war to rest and to reach a level of foreign 
and defense policy cooperation which was unfathomable only a few years 
ago. But we are faced with few other options. We must shore up our 
first line of defense against the possibility of terrorism turning 
nuclear.
  I call upon the members of this body to collectively redouble our 
efforts to prevent the unthinkable from happening by supporting the 
Nuclear and Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2478

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear and Terrorism Threat 
     Reduction Act of 2002''.

     SEC. 2. ENHANCING THREAT REDUCTION.

       (a) Statement of Policy.--
       (1) It is the policy of the United States to work 
     cooperatively with the Russian Federation in order to prevent 
     the diversion of weapons of mass destruction and materials 
     relating thereto, including nuclear, biological, and chemical 
     weapons, as well as the scientific and technical expertise 
     necessary to design and build weapons of mass destruction.
       (2) With respect to enhancing threat reduction, there 
     should be three primary objectives, as stated in the 
     President's review of 30 different United States-Russia 
     cooperative programs, as follows:
       (A) To ensure that existing United States cooperative non-
     proliferation programs with the Russian Federation are 
     focused on priority threat reduction and non-proliferation 
     goals, and are conducted as efficiently and effectively as 
     possible.
       (B) To examine what new initiatives might be undertaken to 
     further United States threat reduction and non-proliferation 
     goals.
       (C) To consider organizational and procedural changes 
     designed to ensure a consistent and coordinated United States 
     Government approach to cooperative programs with the Russian 
     Federation on the reduction of weapons of mass destruction 
     and prevention of their proliferation.
       (3) The goal of United States programs to assist the 
     Russian Federation should be to have them work well, be 
     focused on priority tasks, and be well managed.
       (4) In order to further cooperative efforts, the following 
     key programs should be expanded:
       (A) The Department of Energy Material Protection, Control 
     and Accounting (MPC&A) program to assist the Russian 
     Federation secure and consolidate weapons-grade nuclear 
     material.
       (B) The Department of Energy Warhead and Fissile Material 
     Transparency Program.
       (C) The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC).
       (D) The Redirection of Biotechnical Scientists program.
       (E) The Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction 
     project to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility 
     at Shchuch'ye, Russia, to enable its earliest completion at 
     no increased expense.
       (5) Other programs should be adjusted, refocused, or 
     reexamined, including--
       (A) approaches to the current plutonium disposition program 
     in the Russian Federation, in order to make the program less 
     costly and more effective;
       (B) the project to end production by the Russian Federation 
     of weapons-grade plutonium, in order to transfer the project 
     from the Department of Defense to the Department of Energy;
       (C) consolidation of the Department of Energy's Nuclear 
     Cities Initiative (NCI) with the Initiative for Proliferation 
     Prevention (IPP), with a focus on projects to assist the 
     Russian Federation in reduction of its nuclear warheads 
     complex; and
       (D) acceleration of the Department of Energy's Second Line 
     of Defense program to assist the Russian Federation install 
     nuclear detection equipment at border posts.
       (b) Increased Funding of Certain Key Programs.--In order to 
     guarantee that the United States-Russia non-proliferation and 
     threat reduction efforts operate as efficiently as possible, 
     certain key programs should receive additional funding above 
     current levels, including--
       (1) the United States-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium 
     Purchase Agreement;
       (2) the Second Line of Defense program;
       (3) the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention;
       (4) the Fissile Materials Disposition program;
       (5) the Redirection of Biotechnical Scientists program;

[[Page S4071]]

       (6) the Department of Energy Material Protection, Control, 
     and Accounting (MPC&A) program;
       (7) the International Science and Technology Center; and
       (8) the Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency program.
       (c) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress 
     a report containing recommendations on how to enhance the 
     implementation of United States-Russia non-proliferation and 
     threat reduction programs, which shall include--
       (1) recommendations on how to improve and streamline the 
     contracting and procurement practices of those programs; and
       (2) a listing of impediments to the efficient and effective 
     implementation of those programs.

     SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORIES AND DATA EXCHANGES BETWEEN 
                   THE UNITED STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON 
                   WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that inventories of weapons-
     grade material and warheads should be tracked in order, among 
     other things--
       (1) to make it more likely that the Russian Federation can 
     fully account for its entire inventory of weapons-grade 
     material and assembled weapons; and
       (2) to make it more likely that the sources of any material 
     or weapons possessed or used by any foreign state or 
     terrorist organization can be identified.
       (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
     States to establish jointly with the Russian Federation 
     comprehensive inventories and data exchanges of Russian and 
     United States weapons-grade material and assembled warheads, 
     with particular attention to tactical, or ``nonstrategic'' 
     warheads, one of the most likely weapons a terrorist 
     organization or terrorist state would attempt to acquire, and 
     with particular attention focused on weapons that have been 
     removed from deployment.
       (c) Assistance in Developing Comprehensive Inventories.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United States 
     Government shall work with the Russian Federation to develop 
     comprehensive inventories of Russian weapons-grade plutonium 
     and highly enriched uranium programs and assembled warheads, 
     with special attention to be focused on tactical warheads and 
     warheads that have been removed from deployment.
       (d) Data Exchanges.--As part of this process, to the 
     maximum extent practicable, without jeopardizing United 
     States national security interests, the United States is 
     authorized to enter into ongoing data exchanges with the 
     Russian Federation on categories of material and weapons 
     described in subsection (c).
       (e) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until a 
     comprehensive inventory is created and the information 
     collected from the inventory exchanged between the 
     governments of the United States and the Russian Federation, 
     the President shall submit to Congress a report, in both an 
     unclassified and classified form as necessary, describing the 
     progress that has been made toward that objective.

     SEC. 4. COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE TRANSITION FROM MUTUALLY 
                   ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD) TO MUTUALLY ASSURED 
                   SECURITY (MAS).

       (a) Statement of Policy.--With the end of the Cold War more 
     than a decade ago, with the United States and the Russian 
     Federation fighting together against global terrorism, and 
     with the Presidents of the United States and the Russian 
     Federation agreeing to establish ``a new strategic framework 
     to ensure the mutual security of the United States and 
     Russia, and the world community'', the United States and the 
     Russian Federation should increase significantly their 
     efforts to put dangerous and unnecessary elements of the Cold 
     War to rest.
       (b) Establishment.--In order to assist with the policy 
     expressed in subsection (a), the President is authorized to 
     conclude an agreement with the Russian Federation for the 
     establishment of a Joint United States-Russia Commission to 
     Assess the Transition from Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) 
     to Mutual Assured Security (MAS) (in this section referred to 
     as the ``Commission'').
       (c) Composition.--The United States delegation of the 
     Commission shall consist of 13 members appointed by the 
     President, as follows:
       (1) Three members, after consultation with the Speaker of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (2) Three members, after consultation with the Majority 
     Leader of the Senate.
       (3) Two members, after consultation with the Minority 
     Leader of the House of Representatives.
       (4) Two members, after consultation with the Minority 
     Leader of the Senate.
       (5) Two members as the President may determine.
       (d) Qualifications.--The United States members of the 
     Commission shall be appointed from among private United 
     States citizens with knowledge and expertise in United 
     States-Russia strategic stability issues.
       (e) Chair.--The chair of the Commission should be chosen by 
     consensus from among the members of the Commission.
       (f) Russian Commission.--The President should make every 
     effort to encourage the Government of the Russian Federation 
     to appoint a Russian Federation delegation of the Commission 
     that would jointly meet and discuss the issues described in 
     subsection (g).
       (g) Duties of the Commission.--The duties of the Commission 
     should include consideration of how--
       (1) to ensure that the reduction of strategic nuclear 
     weapons announced by the United States and the Russian 
     Federation in November 2001 take effect in a rapid, safe, 
     verifiable and irreversible manner;
       (2) to preserve and enhance START I monitoring and 
     verification mechanisms;
       (3) to develop additional monitoring and verification 
     mechanisms;
       (4) to preserve the benefits of the unratified START II 
     agreement, especially those measures that affect strategic 
     stability;
       (5) to ensure the safety of warheads removed from 
     deployment;
       (6) to safely and verifiably dismantle warheads in excess 
     of the ceiling established by the President Bush at the 
     November 2001 United States-Russia summit;
       (7) to begin a new high-level dialogue to discuss United 
     States and Russian Federation proposals for a global and 
     theater level missile defense systems;
       (8) to extend presidential decision-making time as it 
     relates to nuclear weapons operations;
       (9) to improve Russian-American cooperative efforts to 
     enhance strategic early warning, including but not limited to 
     the Joint Data Exchange Center and the Russian-American 
     Observation Satellite; and
       (10) to increase cooperation between the United States and 
     the Russian Federation on the programs and activities 
     described in sections 2 and 3.
       (e) Cooperation.--In carrying out its duties, the 
     Commission should receive the full and timely cooperation of 
     United States Government officials, including providing the 
     Commission with analyses, briefings, and other information 
     necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities.
       (f) Report.--The Commission shall, not later than six 
     months after the date of its first meeting, submit to 
     Congress an interim report on its findings and, not later 
     than six months after submission of the interim report, 
     submit to Congress a final report containing its conclusions.
                                 ______