[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 56 (Tuesday, May 7, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3961-S3963]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mrs. CARNAHAN:
  S. 2470. A bill to encourage and facilitate the security of nuclear 
materials and facilities worldwide, to the Committee on Armed Services.
  Mrs. CARNAHAN. Madam President, the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union more than a decade ago resulted in economic and political chaos.
  The Soviet Union possessed more than 10,000 nuclear weapons, and 
dozens of nuclear weapons production facilities sprawled across 11 time 
zones. As a result of the economic collapse, funding fell short for 
security at nuclear weapons storage and production facilities. This 
left dangerous amounts of deadly weapons and materials vulnerable to 
theft.
  Since 1991, there have been countless documented cases of individuals 
stealing plutonium and uranium from the former Soviet Union. So far, we 
believe no ``nuclear smuggler'' has taken enough material to make a 
nuclear device. The real problem is the uncertainty of the unknown.
  Since the end of the Cold War, we have done a great deal to curb the 
threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. The United States has 
taken the lead in the international community to help Russia secure its 
nuclear weapons and material. The Department of Defense's Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program and the sister programs at the Department of 
Energy are truly ``defense by other means.'' The Defense Department's 
program is more commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar program, in 
recognition of its creators, my colleague from Indiana, Dick Lugar, and 
former Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia. Because of these two men, we face 
less of a threat from the Soviet Union's nuclear legacy than we would 
have otherwise.
  The Department of Defense has focused on destroying nuclear weapons 
and improving security over weapons in transit and storage. The 
Department of Energy has focused its own threat reduction efforts on 
locking up uranium and plutonium that could be used in a nuclear weapon 
and helping develop peaceful, commercial job opportunities for weapons 
scientists. The investments made in these programs to secure Soviet 
nuclear weapons and materials have truly been in our national interest.
  However, as far-reaching as these programs have been, they were not 
designed to address some of the terrorist threats we now face. In 
particular, there are three gaps in our nuclear threat reduction 
policies that need to be dealt with.
  First, these programs do not apply to countries outside of the former 
Soviet Union. Second, these programs do not address the threat of 
radiological materials. Third, these programs do not deal with 
preventing terrorist sabotage of nuclear power plants.
  Expanding our threat reduction programs globally is an important 
priority. So far, most of our efforts have focused on the dangerous 
situation in the former Soviet Union. This makes sense, since most of 
the under-secured nuclear weapons useable material is located in that 
part of the world.
  However, we need to pay more attention to the smaller amounts of 
weapons material in other parts of the world that are not under tight 
enough lock and key. This means building up security at every type of 
nuclear facility worldwide, including nuclear power plants, processing 
facilities, storage sites and other related buildings.
  We also need to start focusing on radiological materials.
  And by radiological materials, I am referring to highly radioactive 
substances other than weapons-useable uranium or plutonium. A ``dirty 
bomb'' combines radioactive material that could be found at nuclear 
power plants, medical facilities or other industrial sites with 
explosives. This weapon would not be as immediately destructive as a 
nuclear bomb. But it would cause significant physical, environmental, 
economic, and psychological damage to our citizens, and to our national 
security.
  Indeed, intelligence reports indicate that Osama bin Ladin has been 
actively pursuing the materials to develop a ``dirty bomb.'' In fact, 
he called the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction a ``religious 
duty.'' In addition, there have been reports of meetings between 
Pakistani nuclear weapons scientists and al-Qaeda operatives and 
between Iraqi officials and al-Qaeda representatives. We will never 
know what went on at these meetings. But we must take every step 
possible to thwart their evil plans.
  Finally, we will contribute to our national security by improving 
nuclear power plant security outside the United States. The Department 
of Energy has been working for years to improve the safety of Soviet-
designed nuclear power plants in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. This is to prevent the possible repeat of the Chernobyl 
disaster.
  However, to date, protecting these plants from terrorist sabotage has 
never been addressed. Before the tragedies of September 11, we never 
thought such an attack was realistic. Now that our reality has changed, 
we are providing greater security to protect our

[[Page S3962]]

power plants here at home. These efforts will serve as good models to 
upgrade the security at nuclear plants in Russia and elsewhere.
  Today I am introducing a bill that would help bolster our national 
security by improving the security of all nuclear and radiological 
material worldwide. My bill addresses each of the three gaps in our 
current efforts that I have just identified.
  First, it calls on the Department of Energy in cooperation with the 
Departments of State and Defense to develop a program that would 
encourage all countries to adhere to the highest security standards for 
their nuclear material wherever it is used or stored;
  Second, it requires the Department of Energy to establish a 
systematic approach for securing radiological materials other than 
uranium and plutonium outside the United States; and
  Third, it directs the Department of Energy, in consultation with the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, to develop plans for preventing terrorist attacks on nuclear 
power plants outside the United States.
  This bill is a cost-effective and short-term way to counter current 
threats to our national security and it promotes world cooperation in 
securing nuclear materials. Already, this bill has gained the 
endorsement of several world leaders in the field of nuclear non-
proliferation, including: Dr William Potter, Director of the Monterey 
Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies; Dr. Graham Allison, 
former Assistant Secretary of Defense; and Rose Gottemoeller, former 
Deputy UnderSecretary at the Department of Energy.
  At this time I ask unanimous consent that letters of support from 
each of these individuals and organizations be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                              Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
                                     Monterey, CA, April 29, 2002.
     Senator Jean Carnahan,
     Hart Senate Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Carnahan: As the director of the Monterey 
     Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies, I have long 
     been involved in research and training activities designed to 
     combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction. I have 
     focused especially on proliferation risks associated with the 
     former Soviet Union and have sought to enhance the safety and 
     security of fissile material and nuclear facilities in that 
     region. As you are well aware, this task has acquired even 
     greater urgency in the aftermath of September 11, as has the 
     need to consolidate and secure the smaller amounts of fissile 
     material that are inadequately safeguarded in other parts of 
     the world.
       Although the highest priority should be given to 
     consolidating, securing, and reducing the global stocks of 
     fissile material--the stuff of nuclear weapons--it also is 
     important for more attention and resources to be devoted to 
     countering nuclear threats posed by the sabotage of nuclear 
     power plants, research reactors, and spent fuel storage 
     sites, and the risks associated with so-called ``dirty 
     bombs'' or radiological dispersal devices, which could be 
     made by matching conventional explosives with radioactive 
     source material. These dangers, while global in nature, are 
     especially acute in Russia due to the amount of nuclear 
     material present, the absence of adequate safeguards, and the 
     vulnerability of many nuclear facilities to sabotage and/or 
     terrorist attack. Although experts at Russian nuclear 
     facilities have highlighted these vulnerabilities for a long 
     time, their remediation has not typically been a high 
     priority for U.S. nonproliferation assistance.
       In light of these serious nuclear dangers, I strongly 
     support your efforts to develop new legislation to counter 
     nuclear terrorism and to improve the security of fissile and 
     radiological material and nuclear facilities both in Russia 
     and worldwide. In this regard, there are many useful lessons 
     to be learned from the decade of U.S.-Russian collaboration 
     in cooperative threat reduction, a topic many of my staff and 
     I have analyzed carefully. Please feel free to contact me if 
     you would like more detailed information on our prior work or 
     if I can be of any assistance to you as you pursue your 
     exceptionally timely and important legislation.
           Sincerely,

                                            William C. Potter,

                                        Director, CNS and CRES and
     Institute Professor.
                                  ____



                                           Harvard University,

                                     Cambridge MA, April 30, 2002.
     Senator Jean Carnahan,
     Hart Senate Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Carnahan: I am writing to support your draft 
     legislation focused on addressing the threat of nuclear 
     terrorism. As a member of the Baker-Cutler panel and a 
     longtime Russia watcher, I have seen with my own eyes 
     security systems for potential bomb material that would make 
     it an easy task for terrorists to steal. As a former Senator, 
     now Ambassador Howard Baker has testified to his colleagues 
     on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ``I don't mean to 
     be unduly philosophical or psychological about it, but it 
     really boggles my mind that there could be 40,000 nuclear 
     weapons, or maybe 80,000 in the former Soviet Union, poorly 
     controlled and poorly stored, and that the world isn't in a 
     near-state of hysteria about the danger.'' And the problem is 
     not limited to Russia: around the world, there are dozens of 
     facilities with enough highly enriched uranium or a bomb--
     some of them civilian research facilities with a single night 
     watchman and a chain link fence providing the only security.
       In the aftermath of September 11, with Osama bin Laden 
     declaring that acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a 
     ``religious duty,'' allowing such conditions to continue 
     would pose an unacceptable threat to the security of the 
     United States and the world. If a nuclear weapon were to fall 
     in the hands of those who organized the September 11 attacks, 
     there would be no threats and no negotiations. Tens of 
     thousands of innocent victims would die in a flash; if the 
     bomb were in lower Manhattan, it would destroy everything up 
     to Grammercy Park.
       That terrible vision must guide our efforts now, and our 
     sense or urgency. We must be asking ourselves: ``on the day 
     after a U.S. city is destroyed in a nuclear blast, what would 
     we wish we had done to prevent it?'' And then we must take 
     those actions now, a quickly as we practically can.
       What is needed is a fast-paced, focused effort to eliminate 
     stockpiles of potential bomb material wherever they are no 
     longer needed, while instilling rapid security upgrades 
     wherever these materials will remain. The goal should be to 
     attain a stringent, global standard for security for all 
     stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials--for if these 
     cannot be stolen, then terrorists cannot get the means for a 
     nuclear attack. At the same time, we must be doing more to 
     guard against potential Chernobyls caused by terrorist 
     attacks on nuclear facilities or terrorist acquisition and 
     use of radiological material for a ``dirty bomb.''
       Thus the objectives outlined in your legislation are 
     precisely what is needed. Should this legislation become law, 
     the security of the United States would be measurably 
     improved, and our children and grandchildren will thank you. 
     I commend you for your leadership in this crucial endeavor. 
     Let me know if I can be of any assistance in pushing it 
     through.
           Sincerely,
                                                Graham T. Allison,
        Douglas Dillon Professor of International Affairs, Former 
     Assistant Secretary of Defense.
                                  ____

                                            Carnegie Endowment for


                                          International Peace,

                                   Washington, DC, April 12, 2002.
     Senator Jean Carnahan,
     Hart Senate Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Carnahan: Please allow me to introduce myself. 
     My name is Rose Gottemoeller, and I am a Senior Associate at 
     the Carnegie Endowment. I have previously served in senior 
     positions both in and out of the U.S. government, most 
     recently (until October 2000) as Deputy Undersecretary of 
     Energy for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Assistant 
     Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation and National 
     Security. From 1994 to 1997, I was Deputy Director of the 
     International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 
     after serving in 1993 and 1994 as the White House National 
     Security Council Director responsible for denuclearization of 
     Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Prior to that time, I was at 
     the RAND Corporation as a senior researcher on issues related 
     to Soviet defense and arms control policy.
       Based on my long experience working on nuclear security 
     issues, I strongly believe that more needs to be done, both 
     in the former Soviet Union and throughout the rest of the 
     world, to ensure a safe and secure future for all Americans. 
     For the better part of the last ten years, the United States 
     has borne the brunt of helping Russia and its neighbors 
     improve security of its civilian and military facilities that 
     house weapons-useable fissile material. As you know, the 
     United States has contributed millions of dollars to secure 
     the Soviet nuclear legacy, but not out of altruism: it is 
     clearly in our national interest to do so.
       While I strongly believe that the support of the U.S. must 
     continue, I now also emphasize that the only way to develop a 
     comprehensive effort to address poorly secured nuclear 
     materials in other parts of the world is for our friends and 
     allies to shoulder some of the burden. The security of 
     nuclear material is in every country's best interest, and 
     every country should be an active participant.
       Thus far, most cooperative efforts to improve the physical 
     protection of nuclear materials have taken place in the 
     former Soviet Union. This is logical, given that most 
     weapons-usable fissile material is located in that region of 
     the world, and much of it has been adequately protected since 
     the break-up of the USSR.
       However, particularly since September 11th, I believe that 
     we all need to pay more attention to the smaller caches of 
     fissile material that exist in other parts of the world. Many 
     of them are not protected to a level commensurate with 
     international standards.

[[Page S3963]]

       It is important to note that while terrorists might have 
     aspirations of developing advanced weapons of mass 
     destruction, it is more likely that a terrorist organization 
     would be able to develop a Radiological Dispersal Device 
     (RDD). This weapon of mass disruption could be created with 
     conventional explosives and some spent fuel or other 
     radiological source material. To the best of my knowledge, 
     there are no nonproliferation efforts for radiological 
     materials. This needs to change. One approach would be to 
     improve the physical protection of such materials, although 
     this task would be so enormous and expensive on a world-wide 
     basis that I believe careful priorities need to be set for 
     such projects. It would also be important to consider 
     emergency response and public information efforts, so that 
     local governments and citizens will have the tools at hand to 
     respond to such an attack.
       The security of nuclear power plants has also come under 
     scrutiny lately. The DOE has been working for years to 
     improve the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear power plants, 
     with significant successes. However, to date, protecting 
     these plants from terrorist sabotage has been less of a 
     priority, and thus has not received attention or funding. 
     This, too, must change.
       The DOE could very easily and usefully take the lessons it 
     has learned from its experience during the last decade of 
     cooperation with Russia and apply them to these new and 
     evolving threats to our national security.
       Therefore, I strongly support your endeavors, and am 
     thankful for your vision in developing new legislation to 
     address these issues. In the absence of a determined program 
     of action, we have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear 
     terrorism against American targets before this decade is out.
       Please feel free to contact me if I can provide you any 
     further information or clarification. Again, thank you for 
     your commitment to this important issue.
           Sincerely yours,
                                             Rose E. Gottemoeller,
     Senior Associate.
                                  ____

                                          Russian American Nuclear


                                    Security Advisory Council,

                                      Washington, DC, May 1, 2002.
     Hon. Jean Carnahan,
     Hart Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Carnahan: On behalf of the Russian-American 
     Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), I want to thank 
     you for sponsoring legislation in support of expanded and 
     improved international efforts to control nuclear and 
     radiological materials. Few objectives are more central to 
     ensuring international security than keeping these and other 
     weapon of mass destruction materials out of hostile hands.
       Since its inception, RANSAC and its members have been very 
     active in promoting efforts to improve nuclear controls in 
     Russia and the former Soviet Union. But we also believe that 
     it is essential to engage the rest of the international 
     community in this effort.
       Since last September there has been some forward progress 
     in programs working to reduce the global nuclear materials 
     threat, but the pace of these efforts remains drastically out 
     of synch with the magnitude of the risks. And, the 
     international community must devote more time, attention, and 
     resources--both in the former Soviet Union and the rest of 
     the world--to diminish these obvious nuclear dangers. I 
     applaud and support the goals of your legislation as a 
     practical step toward accelerating and expanding these 
     efforts.
       Thank you for your leadership on this critical issue.
           Sincerely,
                                                Kenneth N. Luongo,
     Executive Director.
                                  ____


                   Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign


     statement from the nuclear threat reduction campaign, on the 
        introduction of the global nuclear security act of 2002

       Since 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency has 
     documented almost 400 cases of trafficking in nuclear and 
     other radioactive materials. Of those, 18 involved small 
     volumes of weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched 
     uranium, and most of those cases originated in the former 
     Soviet Union. Recent revelations from American intelligence 
     officials indicate that Osama Bin Laden and his al Qaeda 
     network have been trying to acquire radiological material to 
     build a co-called ``dirty'' bomb for use against American 
     targets.
       At present, there are no cooperative programs to secure 
     radiological materials in Russia or elsewhere. The Nuclear 
     Threat Reduction Campaign (NTRC) applauds Senator Jean 
     Carnahan (D-MO) for taking important measures to address this 
     serious threat by introducing the Global Nuclear Security 
     Act, 2002. In the wake of the tragic events of September 
     11th, Senator Carnahan's bill will begin the difficult, but 
     necessary, process of securing radiological materials from 
     potential terrorist theft, tighten international nuclear 
     safety standards, and develop plans for mitigating the threat 
     of terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants outside of the 
     United States.
       This bill supports the President's pledge that, ``Our 
     highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons 
     of mass destruction.'' The Global Nuclear Security Act, 2002 
     is an immediate and cost-effective mechanism to counter 
     current threats to our national security.
       (The NTRC has put forth a five-part agenda encouraging 
     Congress and the Bush Administration to: work toward a 
     comprehensive inventory of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade 
     materials; pass the Debt-Reduction-for-Non-Proliferation Act; 
     sign a legally-binding agreement to reduce stockpiles of 
     strategic weapons held by the United States and Russia; 
     strengthen joint U.S.-Russia threat reduction and non-
     proliferation programs; and expand existing programs to 
     mitigate the threat of bioterrorism. The NTRC is a project of 
     the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and The Justice 
     Project.)

  Mrs. CARNAHAN. In January of this year, I traveled, with eight of my 
colleagues, to meet with the leaders of Pakistan, Turkey, Afghanistan, 
and several countries of the former Soviet Union.
  We were impressed with their level of commitment to the war against 
terrorism, and to making the world safe from weapons of mass 
destruction. We are all in this struggle against terrorism together. 
The only way to lock up all nuclear and radiological material is for 
friends and allies to work together and share the burden. We will spend 
several billions of dollars this year to improve our homeland security, 
and rightly so. But we also must recognize that we are only as safe as 
the weakest link in the chain-link fence guarding some nuclear material 
in far away country.
  I fully support President Bush's call to action, when he said late 
last year, with Russian President Putin by his side, that ``Our highest 
priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction.''
  I hope my colleagues will join me as well in supporting this effort.

                          ____________________