[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 52 (Wednesday, May 1, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Page S3621]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            NEW SOLUTIONS TO CHINESE PROLIFERATION PRACTICES

  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, an official of the People's Republic of 
China, who many say will be the next leader of China when the scheduled 
leadership succession occurs next fall, is making his first visit to 
the United States this week. Mr. H.E. Hu Jintao, the current Vice 
President of China, will be getting his first up-front taste of 
official Washington. This is an opportunity to make it clear how we 
feel about certain Chinese policies, most particularly in the area of 
Chinese proliferation practices. Let's hope he takes back with him the 
right impressions.
  President Bush made a summit visit to China, and met with President 
Jiang Zemin this past February. I liked the tone that he set in the 
meeting with Chinese leaders. He was serious and businesslike, and 
eschewed what had been a practice of overly positive glad-handing which 
runs the risk of communicating the wrong message.
  President Bush's approach, it would appear, did seem to be somewhat 
productive with the Chinese leadership. For example, during a speech at 
Tsinghua University in Beijing, the President made a strong case for 
American values and religious freedom. The speech was broadcast live 
and unedited throughout China, an unprecedented event for an American 
President. So that is a small step forward, and I commend the President 
on his speech, which I hope received wide attention in China.
  Less successful were the President's attempts to bring the Chinese 
around on the matter of proliferation of technologies associated with 
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. This has been a 
bone of contention between the U.S. and China for many years, despite 
repeated assurances by the Chinese that they would cease providing 
these technologies to states such as Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan, North 
Korea, Libya and others.
  For example, in November of 2000, the U.S. and China signed an 
agreement stipulating that China would stop its proliferation 
practices. The Chinese have not yet implemented that agreement. We 
should insist on implementation. The same goes for the multilateral 
Missile Technology Control Regime, the MTCR, a voluntary agreement 
among 28 nations to restrict the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. China, although not among the 28 member nations, has 
promised to adhere to the MTCR. Let's see some delivery on that. 
Although President Bush has made new proposals in this area to the 
Chinese leaders, to date, his efforts have been rebuffed.
  The Chinese have also stated that they are ready to issue export 
control regulations that will make it clearly illegal for Chinese 
companies to proliferate specific items. Where is the list? We might 
wish to consider making certain transfers of technology or other items 
the Chinese want from us contingent on an acceptable export control 
list plus the implementation and enforcement of export control 
regulations. This is an area where we need to close some loopholes and 
demonstrate to the Chinese that the United States is serious about 
stopping this dangerous practice. The Chinese are very attentive to 
actions, and not overly impressed by rhetoric.
  The Chinese seem to have the psychology backwards. In order for them 
to comply with commitments they have already made, they have said that 
the U.S. should provide more incentives to deliver on their promises. 
They would like, in particular, for the U.S. to free up and approve 
licenses for satellite launches in China. I see it the opposite way: in 
the face of noncompliance and lack of progress on the November 2000 
pledges regarding missile technology exports, we should, first, refuse 
to grant any licenses for satellite launches in China; and, second, 
withhold or prohibit the export of additional high technology and 
science that the Chinese badly want.
  What is the current situation? First, the so-called sanctions regime 
which penalizes such behavior does not work. When a Chinese company is 
found to have provided missile technologies to, let us say, Iran or 
Iraq, U.S. law today provides that the company be prohibited from doing 
business in the U.S. The prohibition may look good on paper, but it 
appears to provide no real deterrent to Chinese companies that deal on 
the international market.
  Second, the Chinese government makes a pretense of not knowing that 
so-called private companies in China are engaging in this behavior. 
This boggles the mind. Of course the government knows, or can quickly 
find out. We need to help the Chinese government focus on this matter, 
and so I propose that we consider changing our sanctions laws in this 
area to penalize the Chinese government itself for this behavior, 
regardless of whether the culprit is the government or a private 
company. Restrictions could be immediately slapped on exports of 
various technologies and scientific advances from the U.S. that are of 
high importance to the Chinese, such as space launch and other 
technologies that they covet from us. Only by immediate and painful 
steps will the Chinese government be motivated to end this practice, 
and drop the pretense of being ignorant of these transactions.

  The Chinese government is capable of practicing a very effective form 
of brutal dictatorship in areas, such as religious freedom, and freedom 
of the press and assembly, any time it chooses to do so. It has been 
very effective, for example in crushing the Falun Gong religious 
movement in a very short period of time throughout China. Surely 
Chinese leaders can exert equal pressure to stop the proliferation of 
missile technology and end a practice that is anathema to civilized 
nations and the international community.
  I would remind my colleagues that the Chinese themselves do not 
hesitate to use trade sanctions to correct what they see as unfair 
actions by other nations. Recently, when the Japanese slapped high 
tariffs on Chinese mushrooms and other agricultural products, the 
Chinese immediately retaliated by stopping the importation into China 
of Japanese automobiles. The Japanese got the message in very short 
order and dropped the agricultural tariffs. So the Chinese know how to 
fashion punishments to fit the crime. That is all I am suggesting here. 
We should consider a credible sanctions regime, on items that the 
Chinese really care about, that could stop in its tracks the very 
dangerous practice of the proliferation of advanced missiles systems 
and weapons to states which should not be getting them.
  A related consideration is that the Chinese, who are relying more and 
more on imported oil, seem to be attempting to secure long-term energy 
contracts with the regimes which are the recipients of their advanced 
weapons technologies. To the extent that there is a quid pro quo here, 
and clearly that appears to be the case, we might consider helping the 
Chinese secure contracts for energy supplies from sources other than 
rogue states, on the condition that proliferation end. This form of 
carrot could well be used as an incentive to change behavior.
  In sum, I am suggesting a mixed basket of disincentives and 
incentives, penalties and rewards, to encourage the Chinese to get out 
of the proliferation business.
  Secretary of State Powell has called Chinese noncompliance on 
nonproliferation an ``irritation'' in the U.S.-Chinese relationship. I 
would characterize it as an open wound.
  The Chinese are dragging their feet on implementing agreements and 
assurances with the U.S. on proliferation, and hiding behind various 
transparent excuses. It is time for Congress and the Administration to 
consider specific changes in the laws dealing with sanctions on 
proliferation practices.

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