[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 52 (Wednesday, May 1, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3595-S3597]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                               FAST-TRACK

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I rise to offer some comments on the 
proposed trade legislation before us, and in particular on the so-
called Trade Promotion Authority provisions in that package, also known 
as fast-track.
  As a number of my colleagues have noted, the issue of whether or not 
to enact fast-track procedures is not a question of whether one favors 
or opposes free or fair trade, but rather what role Congress plays in 
trade agreements.
  The fast-track proposal we are considering, and its predecessors, are 
quite recent inventions.
  Prior to the Tokyo round of the GATT, there was no fast-track 
mechanism.
  In fact, of the hundreds and hundreds of trade agreements our Nation 
has negotiated and entered into, only five have used the fast-track 
procedures.
  This by itself should dispose of the argument that fast-track is 
necessary for us to negotiate trade agreements at all.
  Really, what we are saying here is that fast-track has been the 
exception, not the rule, with regard to trade negotiations.
  The previous Administration negotiated and implemented over 200 trade 
agreements without fast-track.
  What were some of those agreements?
  Madam President, I don't think I really need to tell you, but they 
included:
  The Market Access Agreement with Argentina for Textiles and Clothing, 
the Market Access Agreement with Australia for Textiles and Clothing, 
the Agreement on Bilateral Trade Relations with Belarus, the Market 
Access Agreement with Brazil for Textiles and Clothing, an Agreement 
concerning Intellectual Property Rights with Bulgaria, an Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Cambodia on 
Trade Relations and Intellectual Property Rights Protection, the 
Agreement on Salmon and Herring with Canada, the Agreement on Ultra-
high Temperature Milk with Canada, the Agreement on Trade in Softwood 
Lumber with Canada, the Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights 
Protection with Ecuador, a Memorandum of Understanding on Trade in 
Bananas with Costa Rica, several agreements with the European Union, an 
Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights Protection with India, 
several dozen agreements with Japan, several dozen agreements with 
Korea, and many, many more agreements with dozens of other countries.
  Just last year, this body passed legislation implementing the U.S.--
Jordan Free Trade Agreement, also negotiated and implemented without 
fast-track procedures.
  We passed not only bilateral agreements, but multilateral agreements 
such as:
  the Information Technology Agreement, which involved over 40 
countries, the Financial Services Agreement, and, the Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement.
  President Clinton did not need fast track to negotiate those 
agreements, and President Bush does not need it to negotiate additional 
agreements.
  While the ability to negotiate and enter into international 
agreements are inherently part of the President's constitutional 
powers, the Constitution grants exclusive authority to Congress ``to 
regulate Commerce with foreign nations.''
  Congress has sole constitutional authority over setting tariff levels 
and making or changing Federal law.
  Those who support fast-track constantly make the argument that if you 
want free trade, you have to enact fast-track.
  They equate fast-track with free trade. The reason is obvious. The 
arguments for free trade are powerful. Indeed, I agree with those 
arguments.
  We as a nation are better off in a world with freer trade than we are 
without it.
  But the underlying premise, that we need fast-track to achieve free 
and fair trade, is absolutely false.
  I have referred to the hundreds of trade agreements negotiated 
without fast-track procedures.
  That is evidence enough.
  But let me also argue that not only is fast-track not necessary for 
free trade, it may actually undermine it.
  One of the greatest defects of the NAFTA and GATT agreements was the

[[Page S3596]]

perception that those agreements picked ``winners and losers.'' I 
believe strongly that those perceptions are based on reality, that some 
industries were huge winners in those agreements, while other 
industries were effectively written off.
  Wisconsin had more than its share of those industries that were 
written off, and at the top of that list, at the very top was the dairy 
farmer.
  There is no doubt in my mind that other industries were given a 
higher priority than our dairy farmers, and the results of those 
agreements underscore that feeling.
  Under the GATT, the European Union is allowed to export 20 times the 
amount of dairy products under subsidy than the U.S. is allowed to 
export.
  Not only did we formally provide the EU this significant advantage in 
that agreement with respect to dairy, but apparently the EU is not even 
complying with those incredibly generous limitations.
  The industries given lower priority do not end with dairy, and while 
our more populous cities--Milwaukee, Madison, Green Bay--experienced 
serious job loss as a result of the NAFTA agreement--over 1000 jobs 
lost in Racine, and over 2600 jobs lost in Milwaukee--the fallout from 
the ``winners and losers'' approach extended to many smaller 
communities.
  Even if we only use the extremely conservative statistics collected 
by the Department of Labor--statistics which many argue grossly 
understate actual job loss--smaller communities all over Wisconsin have 
been the victim of this ``winners and losers'' approach to trade 
agreements.
  NAFTA's legacy of lost jobs includes places such as:
  Baraboo, with 95 lost jobs; DeForest, with 40 lost jobs; Elkhorn, 
with 50 lost jobs; Hawkins, with 443 lost jobs; Marinette, with 32 lost 
jobs; Mauston, with 48 lost jobs; Merrill, with 84 lost jobs; Montello, 
with 25 lost jobs; Oconto Falls, with 437 lost jobs; Peshtigo, with 221 
lost jobs; Platteville, with 576 lost jobs; Reedsburg, with 25 lost 
jobs; Spencer, with 23 lost jobs; and, Waupaca, with 132 lost jobs.
  To trade negotiators whose focus was on advancing the prospects of 
those industries they pre-determined to be ``winners,'' the losses 
experienced elsewhere apparently were unfortunate but acceptable.
  But for the communities I mentioned, those losses were real--real 
workers with real families to support.
  The fast-track procedures under which GATT and NAFTA were negotiated 
and implemented invite this kind of polarization at the negotiating 
table.
  And it is this kind of economic disparity produced by these trade 
agreements--the picking of winners and losers--that undermines broad 
public support for pursuing free trade agreements.
  Free trade ought to benefit all sectors of the economy.
  Without fast-track procedures, our negotiators will know their work 
product will undergo rigorous Congressional scrutiny.
  And they will know that it will be much more difficult to enact a 
trade agreement that disproportionately benefits some while 
disadvantaging others.
  It is this kind of trade agreement--one that benefits the entire 
economy--that will enhance the cause of free trade.
  Fast-track also encourages another disturbing trend in trade 
agreements, namely advancing the short-term interests of multinational 
corporations over those of the average worker and consumer.
  The increasing globalization of the economy confronts us every day.
  Few can doubt the enormous power that multinational corporations 
wield in trade agreements, from the negotiating table itself to the 
closed-door bargaining that will go on before the implementing 
legislation is sent to Congress.
  Fast-track procedures make it all the easier for those interests to 
advance an agreement that may include provisions that conflict with the 
interests of our Nation.
  With opposition to the entire agreement the only alternative left to 
Congress, and with the considerable weight of the multinational 
corporate interests behind any proposal, it is likely that Congress 
will swallow even a deeply flawed agreement.
  What does that do for the public support necessary for free trade?
  It severely undermines it, Mr. President, and puts future trade 
agreements that can enhance our economy at risk.
  Let me turn to another provision in the current fast-track proposal.
  It may surprise some to know that even provisions that have nothing 
to do with the underlying trade agreement cannot be amended or even 
stricken from the bill. Some may find this hard to believe, but in fact 
we have seen such provisions included in fast-track protected trade 
legislation.
  Many of us will recall the GATT implementing measure which included 
some controversial provisions intended to offset the costs of the trade 
agreement.
  Among those provisions was a change in the actuarial standards of the 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation and a provision many viewed as a 
sweetheart deal for certain media giants that gave preferential 
treatment with respect to FCC licenses.
  Neither of those provisions had anything to do with the underlying 
trade agreement. Both certainly deserved more scrutiny than they 
received under the constraints of fast-track procedures.
  Whatever justification there may be for providing special procedures 
for trade agreements, procedures which supporters argue are necessary 
to attract our trading partners to the table, there is no such 
justification for shielding unrelated provisions from thorough 
Congressional scrutiny and review.
  Let me stress those funding provisions were not part of the trade 
agreement itself. Our trading partners do not get a say in how we 
offset the cost of a trade agreement, and one might ask, if our trading 
partners have no say in the offset provisions, why are those provisions 
included under fast-track procedures?
  The fast-track proposal before us today has that same flaw. Under its 
procedures, the most unjustified funding mechanism attached to trade 
implementing legislation under fast-track will remain unscathed.
  To correct that problem, I plan to offer an amendment that allows any 
tax increase included in a fast-track protected bill to be fully 
debated and amended. There is no reason Congress cannot fully debate, 
modify, or strike any tax increase.
  But beyond the problem of fast-track protected tax increases, there 
may be no limit at all on extraneous matters in fast-track bills. I am 
not confident that as it is currently drafted the fast-track authority 
provided in this bill protects Congress from this potential abuse.
  If that is true, if extraneous matters are not prohibited from fast-
track protected trade bills, then there is nothing to prevent a 
President from including language to ban all abortions.
  If extraneous matters are not prohibited, then there is nothing to 
prevent a President from including language requiring all guns to be 
registered.
  In short, if extraneous matters are not prohibited, then there is 
nothing to prevent a President from including provisions, completely 
unrelated to trade, that would otherwise not pass this body.
  I plan to offer an amendment to protect against such an abuse. It 
would provide that a point of order could be raised against extraneous 
matters included in a fast-track protected trade bill, and would 
require that they be dropped.
  Let me reiterate that many of us who support free and fair trade find 
nothing inconsistent with that support and insisting that Congress be a 
full partner in approving agreements.
  Indeed, as the senior Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, has 
noted, support for fast-track procedures reveals a lack of confidence 
in the ability of our negotiators to craft a sound agreement, or a lack 
of confidence in the ability of Congress to weigh regional and sectoral 
interests against the national interest, or may simply be a desire by 
the Executive Branch to avoid the hard work necessary to convince 
Congress to support the agreements that it negotiates.
  I can think of no better insurance policy for a sound trade agreement 
than the prospect of a thorough Congressional review, complete with the 
ability to amend that agreement.

[[Page S3597]]

  Not only would the threat of possible congressional modification spur 
our negotiators to produce the best product possible, that potential 
for congressional intervention could serve as an effective club in the 
hands of our negotiators when they are bargaining with our trading 
partners.
  With hundreds of trade agreements negotiated and implemented without 
fast-track, the refrain we hear again and again, that we need to enact 
fast-track in order to negotiate trade agreements, is off key.
  We do not need fast-track to negotiate trade agreements.
  As I have argued today, in several important ways, fast-track invites 
bad trade agreements.
  It produces agreements that pick winners and losers instead of 
advancing all sectors of the economy together.
  It produces agreements designed to respond to the short-term 
interests of multinational corporations instead of fostering long-term 
sustainable economic growth.
  It protects the completely unrelated funding provisions in trade 
implementing legislation, and as such invites enormous abuse.
  And it may provide a mechanism to enact controversial legislation, 
unrelated to trade, that would otherwise fail to pass.
  I think fast-track is bad for free trade. We don't need it, and we 
shouldn't enact it. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this 
legislation, and in doing so, voting for--voting for--free and fair 
trade.

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