[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 51 (Tuesday, April 30, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3522-S3527]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                      U.S. POLICY TOWARD COLOMBIA

  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I want to turn to another important 
topic--the situation in Colombia. Two weeks ago, Colombia's President, 
Andres Pastrana, was in Washington for what may have been his last 
official visit before the elections in May to choose his successor. He 
cannot run again under Colombia's Constitution. While I am sorry to see 
him leave, I am proud that he is departing through a democratic 
transfer of power, confirming, once again, his commitment to democracy 
in Colombia. I respect President Pastrana. I admire his attempts to 
bring peace to Colombia and his successes in improving relations 
between our two nations.
  I do, however, have concerns about the administration's request for 
more assistance to Colombia. The reason we are given as to why we are 
spending such large sums of money in Colombia seems to change 
frequently--from fighting an insurgency to combating terrorism to 
protecting democracy to reducing the flow of drugs. Before we spend 
even more money down there, I hope the administration will articulate a 
clear plan, look carefully at the billions we have spent with little to 
show for it, and understand Colombia's need to take more responsibility 
for their own problem.
  Colombia should not be blamed for America's drug problem. Even if no 
cocaine or heroin came here from Colombia, illegal drugs would still 
come into this country. As long as Americans spend billions on illegal 
drugs, somebody else is going to supply it.
  In many ways Colombia fits into larger issues about our foreign 
assistance programs. I think it is time for us to re-examine the way 
foreign aid is being used. During the cold war, we would give foreign 
aid to countries simply because they claimed to be anti-Soviet Union. 
It didn't make any difference how it was used. After the Cold War, we 
starting giving money, while paying little attention to human rights 
violations by foreign militaries or security forces, to nations that 
would say that they would help fight drug trafficking. Today, I am 
worried that we are starting down a road where we give all sorts of 
assistance to governments that claim to be antiterrorist, irrespective 
of their commitment to democracy, human rights, or economic reform.
  I have said over and over again that we should increase foreign 
assistance to many areas of the world. We have moral and strategic 
reasons for doing that. But we ought to at least stand for something 
when we provide this assistance. We can deliver a strong message that, 
while we don't expect an absolute replication of our form of 
government, we do expect you to respect human rights and other basic 
American values if you use our tax dollars.
  There is no reason that countries cannot respect these values and use 
foreign aid effectively--these things go hand and hand. We have had 
some wonderful successes where we have done both. We have had some 
colossal disasters where we have not.
  Madam President, I have known Colombia's President Pastrana for 
several years, and consider him a friend. He has worked diligently for 
peace, often at great personal risk, and while he ultimately was unable 
to obtain the peace agreement with the guerrillas that he so deeply 
wanted, his administration will be remembered for other achievements. 
Today, thanks to his efforts and those of Colombia's fine Ambassador, 
Luis Moreno, Colombia's relations with the United States, which had 
suffered under previous Colombian administrations, are strong and based 
on mutual respect.
  I want to thank President Pastrana for his friendship, for the 
dignity that he restored to the presidency, for his

[[Page S3526]]

dedication to his people. Although we did not always agree about U.S. 
policy toward Colombia, President Pastrana always treated me with 
respect and warmth. I am grateful to him, and wish him the best in the 
future. While I regret that I was unable to travel to his country 
during his term of office, I am determined to do so and look forward to 
visiting him there when I do.
  The issue of U.S. policy toward Colombia is the subject of 
considerable concern in Washington, both because of President 
Pastrana's recent visit, and because of President Bush's supplemental 
appropriations request, which proposes to shift the focus of our 
assistance program in Colombia from counter-narcotics to counter-
terrorism.
  I am of mixed minds about this proposal, and want to take a moment to 
discuss some of my concerns.
  Before we rush to bring the war against international terrorism to 
Colombia's jungle as the Administration and some in Congress now urge, 
we would do well to understand that country's feudal history. We should 
also review what has been done with the nearly $2 billion we have 
appropriated for Colombia in the past two years.
  ``Plan Colombia,'' devised by the Clinton Administration and the 
Colombian Government to counter the flourishing trade in cocaine from 
Colombia to the United States, called for $7.5 billion. Colombia was to 
contribute $4 billion, and, were told at the time, the U.S. share was 
$1.6 billion. Donations by other countries, mostly the Europeans, have 
not materialized. The Colombian Government's support has also fallen 
far short. For fiscal year 2003, the Bush Administration seeks another 
$439 million in counter-drug aid, plus $98 million in military aid, for 
a total of $537 million.
  So far, U.S. tax dollars have paid for a fleet of aircraft to spray 
chemical herbicide over large areas of the country planted in coca, 
combat helicopters to protect the planes from ground fire, and training 
and equipment for counter-drug battalions. More funds were provided for 
economic programs to give coca farmers alternative sources of income 
and to reform Colombia's dysfunctional justice system.
  Because of the Colombian military's poor human rights record, 
Congress conditioned aid on the prosecution of military officers 
implicated in serious abuses, and on the severing of the military's 
links with illegal paramilitary groups. These groups, like the 
guerrillas, have been designated by the Administration as terrorist 
organizations.
  By any objective measure, Plan Colombia's results have been, at best, 
disappointing.
  First, the State Department predicted a 30 percent reduction in coca 
cultivation by the end of 2002. Although 84,250 hectares were sprayed 
last year, coca cultivation in Colombia actually rose, by at least 
21,100 hectares. There has not been any reduction in the flow of 
illegal drugs into the U.S., and virtually no one in the Administration 
thinks there will be.
  Second, while aerial spraying may at some point reduce the coca crop, 
there is vast territory ripe for future cultivation and a huge U.S. 
demand for drugs. Serious questions have been raised about the health 
and environmental impact of the spraying which need to be 
satisfactorily answered if this program is to continue. Manual 
eradication, as was done in Bolivia and Peru, should be reconsidered, 
and we should target the large growers, drug labs and traffickers. 
Moreover, any of these eradication efforts will ultimately fail without 
economic alternatives for those displaced by coca eradication.
  Third, U.S.-funded economic programs have produced little in the way 
of viable alternatives. It is dangerous and difficult to implement 
these programs in conflict zones where coca is grown. The Colombian 
Government has not invested enough of its own money in these areas, and 
however much it has invested has produced few tangible results. Nor has 
it done enough to reform its sagging economy. This needs to be a 
partnership, and our support for alternative income programs should 
focus where the needs are greatest and programs can be sustained.
  Fourth, senior military officers implicated in the murders of 
civilians, or who abet paramilitary violence and drug trafficking, have 
not been jailed despite the conditions on U.S. aid. Many remain on 
active duty and some have been promoted. Human rights investigators and 
prosecutors have been threatened, killed or forced to flee the country. 
While some soldiers have been suspended, none have been prosecuted and 
some have joined paramilitaries.
  Under our law, the Secretary of State must certify that certain human 
rights conditions have been met prior to the release of military aid. 
Earlier this year, a number of high-ranking Administration officials 
traveled to Colombia, and informed Colombian military officers that 
more progress was needed. Unfortunately, as far as I am aware, no such 
progress has taken place and therefore, to his credit, the Secretary 
has not made the certification. However, I am told the certification 
could come at any time, and if that is true I hope that it is based on 
facts and reflects a good faith application of the law.
  Fifth, top paramilitary leaders, implicated in hundreds of murders, 
travel around the country and give press interviews despite numerous 
warrants for their arrest. One has to ask why these arrest warrants, 
many of which have been pending for years, have not been executed? 
Local military commanders share airfields, intelligence and logistics, 
and in some instances even coordinate attacks. While some members of 
paramilitaries have been captured, their influence has grown throughout 
the country and they are responsible for a large share of targeted 
assassinations and gruesome attacks against unarmed civilians. Like the 
guerrillas, the paramilitaries are deeply involved in drug trafficking. 
Continued U.S. aid to the Colombian military must be tied to 
accountability for abuses and to aggressively fighting the 
paramilitaries, particularly the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
(``AUC'').
  Sixth, President Pastrana's brave efforts to negotiate peace, 
cynically spurned by the guerrillas, have collapsed. The violence has 
intensified and the guerrillas, especially the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (``FARC''), have sharply escalated kidnappings, 
assassinations and other terrorist acts. They are unlikely to be able 
to defeat the Colombian military, but they can lay siege to cities by 
cutting off water and power supplies. Colombia's generals are now 
asking the U.S. for aid to fight the war.
  Americans need to understand that Colombia is really two 
``countries,'' which is at the heart of its problems. The thinly 
populated, impoverished eastern half, which the government has ignored 
for generations, is mired in the 19th Century, while the sophisticated, 
urban west is edging toward the 21st. There are deeply rooted social, 
economic and political reasons why Latin America's oldest conflict is 
no closer to resolution, and why drug money, corruption and lawlessness 
permeate Colombian society. These problems, which ultimately only 
Colombians can solve, will not be fixed by attacking the symptoms, and 
an all out war against the twin terrorist threats--guerrillas and 
paramilitaries--would cost far more, take far longer, and wreak more 
havoc than anyone in Washington has acknowledged so far.
  Until now we have confined our aid to fighting drugs. In the first 
sign of a shift, the Administration asked Congress for an additional 
$98 million to protect 100 miles of an oil pipeline that has been a 
frequent target of guerrilla attacks that have cost Colombia $500 
million a year in oil revenues. The White House is now seeking broad, 
new counter-terrorism authority in the fiscal year 2002 supplemental, 
opening the door to a deeper, open-ended U.S. involvement in Colombia.
  If we go down that road what would be the likely result? Colombia is 
not Afghanistan, and no one supports sending U.S. troops. But while no 
two countries are the same, we gave over $5 billion to the military of 
El Salvador, a country with \1/50\th the land area of Colombia, and 
they could not defeat the guerrillas there. Are we, and the Colombian 
people who currently spend a meager 3 percent of GDP on the army, 
prepared for a wider war, the huge cost, many more displaced people, 
and the inevitable increase in civilian casualties? Is the only 
alternative to continue a limited, ineffective counter-drug strategy, 
and the growth in public support for the AUC which may ultimately pose 
a greater threat to the

[[Page S3527]]

country than the FARC? Can the military be made to see their oft-times 
allies, the AUC, as terrorists to be fought as aggressively as the 
FARC? Should we send an envoy of the caliber of Richard Holbrooke to 
push for a cease fire, and actively support a much more inclusive 
negotiating strategy than was pursued previously? What about attacking 
the security problems that have given rise to the AUC, by strengthening 
Colombia's National Police, who have a cleaner human rights record and 
who may be more effective in responding to kidnappings and other 
terrorist acts?
  We want to help Colombia, particularly as the FARC has evolved from a 
rebel movement with a political ideology to a drug-financed terrorist 
syndicate. But we and the Colombians need to be clear about our goals 
and what it would take to achieve them. We should not commit ourselves 
to a costly policy that is fogged with ambiguity, and we should not 
subvert our other objectives of promoting the rule of law, protecting 
human rights, and supporting equitable economic development. Goal-
setting should also be coordinated, after the elections in May, with 
Colombia's new president, who may favor an entirely different approach.
  Finally, just as Colombians need to take far more responsibility for 
their own problems, Colombia cannot solve America's drug problem. Too 
often, we unfairly blame Colombia, and the other Andean nations, for 
the epidemic of drug addiction in our own country. Our meager attempts 
to reduce demand for drugs have failed, and unless we devote far more 
effort to what we know works--education and treatment--the drugs will 
keep coming and Americans will keep dying.

  Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.