[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 50 (Monday, April 29, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3490-S3496]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE ACT--MOTION TO PROCEED--Continued
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I want to speak about fast-track trade
authority, which is now known by the euphemism ``trade promotion
authority.''
Before I do that, I want to talk for a moment about what is happening
with respect to trade with Cuba. Since we are on the subject of trade,
there is something happening with Cuba about which I believe I must
alert the Senate.
As you know, a wide majority in both the U.S. Senate and the House
has agreed that we should not use food as a weapon and that the 40-year
embargo with Cuba--at least with respect to food and medicine--should
be loosened. So by a vote of the House and of the Senate, we are now
able to sell food to Cuba.
Yet under current law, the Cubans are not allowed to purchase food
from the United States on credit. They cannot borrow from a private
lender. They must pay cash. Following the hurricane in Cuba, Cuba is
buying American grain and agricultural products to the tune of $70
million, but they have to pay cash and run the transaction through a
French bank in order to buy commodities from American farmers. This is
just bizarre.
The head of a group called Alimport, which is the organization in
Cuba that purchases food for the Cuban Government, was invited to this
country by farm leaders. His name is Pedro Alvarez. He was intending to
come here--including to my State of North Dakota--and asked for a visa
to do that. He was intending to purchase additional food from our
country--and to pay cash. A visa was granted, but then the State
Department abruptly reversed course and decided to revoke the visa. The
State Department said: No, we don't want somebody from Cuba coming in
to buy food or commodities from American farmers. When we called the
State Department to ask them why they decided to revoke the visa to
have the head of Cuban imports come into this country, they said: It is
not our policy to encourage the sale of food to Cuba.
Now, I find it just byzantine that our State Department would say:
No, we don't want the head of the Cuban agency that purchases
agricultural commodities to come to our country to purchase those
commodities and, therefore, we will revoke his visa.
When will those who take that position wake up and understand that
using food as a weapon is merely shooting ourselves in the foot?
I have now written a letter to Pedro Alvarez in Alimport and said: I
am inviting you to this country; a U.S. Senator is inviting you to this
country. I would like you to come to America; I would like you to come
to North Dakota; come to North Dakota and buy wheat from our wheat
farmers and buy dried beans from those who plant dried beans.
I wrote a letter to the State Department saying: You have a
responsibility to give these people visas to come here.
I do not know what on Earth the State Department is thinking. I have
talked to someone at the State Department who indicated that the matter
is being reviewed. I said: Can you tell me who decided to revoke the
visas? Who decided that farmers in America should be the victims of
this foreign policy nonsense? Who was it? Who made the phone calls? I
want to know who said that this is political, this isn't trade policy,
and the politics persuade us we ought to revoke visas from someone from
Cuba who wants to come to this county and buy wheat, dried beans,
apples, and other commodities from the United States.
I just do not understand why we have people in this country who still
think that way. We ought never use food and medicine as a weapon. We
have done it for 40 years with respect to Cuba. We can sell food to
China. That is a Communist country. We can sell food to Vietnam. That
is a Communist country. But for 40 years we have said no, you cannot
sell food to Cuba.
We loosened that restriction. Cubans can now buy our food, and now we
have the spectacle of the State Department deciding to revoke visas
they already approved for people from Cuba who want to come to this
country and buy from American farmers. That is unfair to our farmers.
It is another embargo.
Cuba bought $1 billion worth of food last year. The Europeans are
selling food to them, and the Canadians are selling food to them. We
have sold them some now, but judging by the behavior of the State
Department, it appears they do not want us to sell food to Cuba,
despite the fact the Congress has already made the judgment that such
sales should be lawful.
I intend tomorrow to press this case once again at the State
Department, and I hope they will change their mind and make a rational
decision, one that is in concert with what the Congress has already
decided, both the House and the Senate.
Let me turn to the trade issue of fast track for a few moments. I see
some colleagues in the Chamber who wish to speak. I will not speak as
long as I had intended. They will want the opportunity to have a
portion of this time as well.
Let me quickly put up a chart showing an excerpt from ``Inside U.S.
Trade,'' a publication on international trade. It quotes U.S. Trade
Representative Zoellick speaking to a business group in Chicago. Mr.
Zoellick described lawmakers and lobbyists who oppose a trade promotion
authority bill sponsored by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman
Bill Thomas as ``xenophobes and isolationists.''
The Trade Ambassador says those who oppose fast track are xenophobes
and isolationists. This really fits the way this thoughtless debate
always plays out on trade. Instead of it being a thoughtful debate
about what America's real trade policy ought to be to benefit this
country, it turns quickly into a thoughtless debate by those who say
there are only two sides: Those who support free trade, globalization,
expanded trade, and have a world view that will allow them to see well
over the horizon and understand the world much better than others, and
those who are just xenophobic, isolationist stooges. That is how this
debate is characterized: Those who think and those who do not.
There is an old saying: You ought not ever buy anything from somebody
who is out of breath. There is a kind of breathless quality to this
debate about fast track: It just has to be fast track; if it is not
fast track, we cannot pursue international trade agreements.
That, of course, is total nonsense. We did not give Bill Clinton fast
track
[[Page S3491]]
when he was President. I did not support giving him fast-track trade
authority when he was President, and I do not support giving George W.
Bush fast-track authority either.
Yet in the Clinton Presidency they did negotiate trade agreements.
How did they do that? They do not need fast track to negotiate trade
agreements. Fast track is simply a mechanism by which the Congress
says: Wait a minute, before you negotiate in secret the next trade
agreement, let us handcuff our arms behind our back; please let us do
that; then you negotiate in secret; and when you come back, we wear
handcuffs so we will not be able to offer even one amendment to this
trade agreement you have negotiated in secret. That is what fast track
is.
There are a good many Members of Congress who sign up. I do not know,
there is some kind of masochistic urge in trade, I guess, to say: Let's
do this, let's tie our hands, and then allow someone else to negotiate
in secret.
Here is what the Constitution says about the Congress. Article I,
section 8, says:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations. . . .
It does not say the President. It does not say the U.S. Trade
Ambassador. It does not say some unnamed trade negotiators. The
Constitution says:
The Congress shall have Power--
The word is ``power.''
The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations. . . .
In recent decades--three decades, in fact--we have had Presidents
negotiate just five trade agreements under fast track: GATT, United
States-Israel, United States-Canada, NAFTA, and the WTO.
I want to show a chart showing the effects of one of these
agreements. We gave fast-track trade authority to negotiate a trade
agreement with Canada and Mexico. Prior to that, we had a small trade
surplus with Mexico. Of course, after this agreement was done, it
turned into a huge deficit. Prior to that, we had a modest deficit with
Canada. After a trade agreement was negotiated with Canada, the deficit
exploded. We turned a trade relation with Mexico that was a positive
relationship into a negative relationship, and with Canada we had an
explosion of the deficit.
I thought it would be interesting to take a look at a chart that
showed what happened to our trade deficits through all of these trade
agreements. Every time we have another agreement, the trade deficit
goes up, up, and way up.
One might ask: What is the difference? The difference is this line
means jobs in this country, good jobs, manufacturing jobs, and this
line suggests an erosion of the manufacturing sector in this country.
Under fast-track trade authority, which Congress has given to some
Presidents, the major export has been jobs. The Economic Policy
Institute suggests somewhere over 3 million jobs have been lost
comparing prior to NAFTA and WTO and after NAFTA and WTO.
Some say: This is just a global economy, and let's just move goods
everywhere, and whatever happens happens. They ignore the fact that in
this country, we have had people fight in the streets, we have had
people killed in the streets for the right to form unions. We had
people take to the streets to demand fair and safe workplaces. We had
people marching in the streets in this country dealing with child labor
laws. For 75 and 100 years, we have confronted all of these tough
issues in the United States, and we have created an environment in
which an employee has to have a safe workplace, be paid a decent wage,
a business cannot hire kids, cannot dump pollutants into the stream and
the air, and employees have a right to organize as a labor union.
Economists always remind us of the importance of comparative
advantage in determining what country gets to produce what products.
But should child labor be a comparative advantage in trade? The legal
minimum age for child workers in Peru is 12 years old.
When someone takes the product of a 12-year-old, who works 12 hours a
day and is paid 12 cents an hour, and ships it to Pittsburgh or Los
Angeles or Denver or Fargo, and puts it on the store shelf, is that
fair trade? Is that what we want American workers to compete with?
There are 3 million workers in Brazil under the age of 15. Fair
competition? Or how about people making shoes for 24 cents an hour in
Indonesia? Fair competition?
People say, well, America has to become competitive. Competitive with
what? With 12-year-old kids making 12 cents an hour or 24 cents an
hour? Is that the marketplace in which we describe fair trade
competition?
Before we pass fast track, I would like to see a little bit of
progress by our trade officials to solve a few problems they have
created recently. I am not asking for the Moon. I am saying before they
run off and, under fast track, negotiate new trade agreements, how
about doing something that stands up for this country's economic
interests? How about solving a few problems that have been created in
past trade agreements?
I will talk first about Canadian wheat because that is a huge problem
for my state of North Dakota. We had a trade agreement with Canada. We
allowed Canada to sell its wheat through a sanctioned monopoly called
the Canadian Wheat Board, which would be illegal in this country. It
then sends an avalanche of unfairly subsidized Canadian grain into this
country, taking money right out of the pockets of our farmers. It goes
on year after year in a relentless way and no one stops it. Why?
Because the remedies to stop unfair trade have been emasculated in our
trade agreements.
We were promised with the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement that this
would not happen, but it did. It not only happened and an avalanche of
unfairly traded Canadian grain came down injuring our farmers, but when
we got to the bottom of it, we found out that our trade ambassador
entered into a secret side agreement with Canada, and our negotiators
refused to tell the truth about it even in a committee hearing in the
U.S. House of Representatives when asked directly about it.
This is what has happened with Canadian wheat exports in the United
States and U.S. wheat exports to Canada: a pail versus a thimble, but
that pail represents serious damage to U.S. farmers.
There are some other trade problems. I have spoken at great length
about beef in Europe. We have not been able to get most U.S. beef into
Europe for 10 years because they say we use beef hormones. They portray
our cows as having two heads over in Europe.
We took Europe to the WTO, the World Trade Organization. We took our
case to the WTO and we won. The WTO said, yes, Europe is wrong so you
can go ahead and exact some penalties with respect to Europe.
Do you want to know what we did? We were upset that Europe would not
allow our beef in. We went to the WTO. The WTO said, yes, Europe is
guilty. So the United States says, all right, what we are going to do
is we are going to retaliate. We retaliated against European shipments
to the United States of goose liver, truffles, and Roquefort cheese.
Now that is enough to scare the devil out of an opponent; is it not? A
trading partner like Europe, we say they better watch it; we are going
to slap them with goose liver, truffles, and Roquefort cheese? What
kind of remedy is that? When Europe was upset about the recent steel
decision, they said, we are going to respond with tariffs on U.S.
steel, textiles, and citrus products.
How about Korean automobiles? Maybe we could ask our trade ambassador
to fix that. I have gotten several letters from Korea recently because
I have been talking about their automobile industry. Last year there
were 618,000 Korean automobiles shipped into the United States, Daewoos
and Hyundais, into our marketplace. That is fine with me, but do you
know how many U.S. automobiles were shipped into Korea? We were able to
sell 2,800 U.S. cars in Korea. For every 217 Korean cars sold in the
U.S. marketplace, we were able to sell one in the country of Korea.
Why? Because Korea does not want U.S. cars in the marketplace. It is
very simple.
Is there somebody who will stand up and say this is unfair trade?
Because, after all, this represents a loss of good manufacturing jobs
in our country, when there is that kind of trade imbalance.
Is there someone who will fix that problem? The beef problem with
Europe? The grain problem with Canada?
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Or how about wheat flour to Europe? Or eggs? Let me use eggs as an
example. We cannot get American eggs in the European marketplace. Do
you know why? Because American eggs are washed. They will not allow
washed American eggs into the European marketplace. So we do not have a
market for American eggs. Pork chops to China, T-bone steaks to Tokyo--
I will speak tomorrow at much greater length about a range of these
issues.
I ask this question: Mr. President and Mr. Trade Ambassador and
others, you are so anxious to go negotiate a new trade agreement. How
about solving a few of the trade problems that have been created?
Brazil sends sugar to Canada. It is loaded on molasses, liquid
molasses, and sent into the United States. Molasses becomes the carrier
for sugar that could otherwise not enter under U.S. law. They ship it
down into Michigan, offload the sugar, send the molasses back to get
another load of Brazilian sugar to Canada, fundamentally undercutting
our sugar program. In my judgment, it is an abrogation of fair trade.
It has been going on for years. Yet you cannot get anybody to do
anything about it.
In the legislation that is going to come up on trade adjustment
assistance, I believe that the molasses problem is being addressed by
some concerned members of the Senate. But the point is that we have
chronic trade issues and that administrations do not do enough about
these problems.
We have an enforcement division down in the Commerce Department. We
have some enforcement in USTR. I have not seen the statistics lately,
but do you know how many people we have dealing with China and Japan?
We have eight people enforcing trade agreements with Japan, a country
with which we have a $60 billion to $70 billion trade deficit, and they
cannot even tell us what the agreements are that we have with Japan,
let alone tell us whether they are enforcing them.
This country does not do right by its producers, farmers,
manufacturers, and others in the area of international trade. So we are
now requested by this administration to give them fast-track authority
so they can negotiate another agreement somewhere in the world. I say
that we ought not give fast-track authority. I would not support it for
President Clinton. I do not support it for this President.
I think it is time for us to stand up for this country's economic
interest. No, not build a wall, not keep goods out of our country. This
is not about isolationism. This is about standing up for this country's
manufacturing sector and its workers, saying that we will compete any
time, anywhere, as long as the conditions of competition are fair, but
we demand fair trade.
One final point: I started by talking about Cuba. The revocation of
the visas that I described is about politics. It is not about trade
policy. It is about pointy-headed foreign policy.
For the first 25 years after the Second World War, our trade was
almost all foreign policy. We could compete anywhere in the world with
one hand tied behind our back. We were the biggest, the best, and the
strongest. In the second 25 years, things have gotten tougher. Our
competitors are shrewd, tough, international competitors, and it is
time that our foreign policy stop being the dominant force in trade
policy. It is time our country stand up for its own economic interests
and demand fair trade. We ought to do that before we embark on any
notion about fast-track authority for any President. That is in the
best interest of this country, in my judgment.
I see my colleague from Iowa is in the Chamber. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, President Clinton used to brag--and I
think correctly--during the years he was President that some 20 million
jobs were created during his Presidency. Those are statistics that
speak for themselves.
In regard to this debate before the Senate, President Clinton said
about one-third of the jobs were created because of international
trade. Quite obviously, the last Democrat President talked about the
importance of trade. Jobs are created by trade. Those are jobs that pay
very good wages--13 to 18 percent higher than the national average. It
is estimated 1 in 10 Americans, 12 million people, are employed in jobs
related to goods and services.
The important issue of trade promotion authority is before the
Senate. It has worked, as has already been correctly stated. Presidents
since President Ford have periodically have had trade promotion
authority. It has led to trade agreements passed by Congress. They are
now the law of the land.
When it was pointed out--correctly--that Congress has the power to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce, that is very true. But
remember that Congress does not have the ability to negotiate with
other countries--particularly 144 countries in the World Trade
Organization--in a way that could be considered an expeditious way of
reaching an agreement.
We form a sort of contract with the President of the United States.
This is not just for Republicans and Republican Presidents. Republicans
in this body tried to form such a contract with President Clinton in
the last administration, but his own party would not let him have this
authority. Trade promotion authority is a type of contract between the
Congress and the President of the United States in which the President,
in very precise ways, is given the authority by Congress to agree, on
the part of Congress, with goals that will be pursued at the
negotiating table.
This legislation will help achieve those goals. It establishes a
format for Congress to be consulted by the President of the United
States in every step of that process. Congress reviews the agreement
that the President brings it back. We have the last say. If we do not
pass it, it does not become law, and there is no agreement, no matter
how much the President negotiated with 143 other countries to bring
that agreement back to Congress.
We in Congress do not see trade promotion authority as Congress
giving away all its power over international trade to the President of
the United States. Not at all. We cannot do that without amending the
Constitution. We don't intend to amend the Constitution to do that.
However, trade promotion authority is a type of contract with the
President of the United States to negotiate for us because the Congress
of the United States, as the legislative arm of our Government, is not
capable, with 535 men and women, of negotiating with 144 other
countries in the World Trade Organization, or with another 30-some
countries in the Western Hemisphere if you are talking about regional
FTAA trade negotiations, or even on a bilateral basis negotiating with
Chile or with Singapore, which are in process now.
We want our President to be credible at the negotiating table. When
the President has Trade Promotion Authority, other countries,
negotiating with the United States, know the President is a credible
negotiator.
We have been told the United States loses so much when we negotiate.
We don't lose anything when the rest of the world's tariffs are way up
here and ours are much lower; we cannot go much lower. When we bring
foreign tariffs down, even if we bring them just partway down and not
down to our low level, it is a win-win situation for the United States.
I quote Harvard economist Jeff Frankel, estimating that the economic
benefits of a successfully completed new round of WTO trade
negotiations would mean $7,000 per individual or, as we measure in this
country, the unit of the family, about $28,000 for a family of four.
This estimate was even backed up by Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, Alan Greenspan. He said before the Senate Finance Committee when
he testified last year on the importance of trade promotion authority
to the President, that the estimates made by Jeff Frankel, were very
credible estimates.
As just one example of the advantage of a trade agreement to the
United States, look at Caterpillar, located in several countries around
the world, but with its main operation in the United States. The
corporate headquarters is in the United States. I have an example of a
$187,000 Caterpillar, model 140H, a motor grader tractor, made in
America. If shipped to Chile, it is slapped with $13,090 in tariffs and
duties, or 7 percent of the tractor's cost because we do not have a
free trade agreement with Chile.
[[Page S3493]]
That same tractor can be made in Brazil by a Caterpillar plant in
Brazil and shipped to Chile with only a $3,740 tariff because Brazil
has some trade agreements with Chile. Obviously, not a free trade
agreement but some agreements that reduce the tariff from 7 percent on
a tractor made in the United States to 2 percent.
If that same tractor is made in Canada, because Canada has a free
trade agreement with Chile, there are no tariffs whatsoever on that
Caterpillar motor grader tractor made in Canada.
We have to ask ourselves, as Senators for the entire United States,
would you not rather have the Caterpillar tractor made in America and
shipped to Chile than have it made in Canada or have it made in Brazil
and shipped to Chile?
This decision is a no-brainer, Mr. President. We have seen so much
advancement in the rural economy since the process of reducing tariffs
worldwide. Originally called GATT, now called the World Trade
Organization process, WTO for short, that process has been going on
since 1947. We ought to be satisfied with what world trade has done for
America, that it is good for America, it is good for the world, and
that if we are going to be in this business of having America's
leadership continue as it is in the war against terrorism, but more
based upon our military prowess than anything else, but backed up by
economic strength, it seems to me if the President of the United States
can have trade promotion authority and continue to be the leader in
reduction of world tariff trade barriers and nontariff trade barriers,
as the United States has been between 1947 and 1994 when the authority
ran out, we are going to have an additional advantage--an additional
tool for world leadership to use in pursuing peace sooner.
The other side of the coin is that if you are going to have an
expanding world population--which we all know is underway and is going
to be underway for decades to come--you cannot have stagnant world
economic growth. More people with less material goods are only going to
lead to social instability, political instability, and the opposite of
world peace.
An expanding world economic pie can only come through the reduction
of trade barriers, and that only comes through this process of global
trade liberalization that in the WTO. That is the only way we are going
to have an expanding world population with more people having more
material goods, more prosperity, and more social stability and
political stability as well, and the peace that will come with it.
Even though during these weeks of debate on trade promotion authority
we are going to be talking about its economic benefits, and some other
people will be talking about the economic harm they see coming from
trade promotion authority, from my perspective it is not just an
economic issue. It is also an issue of expanding the world economic pie
for social stability, political stability, and eventually world peace.
Mr. President, I support cloture on the motion to proceed on one of
the four trade bills that will be before the Senate in the next several
weeks. The one before us is the Andean Trade Act. This vote is far more
than a vote on cloture on the motion to proceed on the Andean bill. In
the next few days, starting with and moving beyond this vote, we may
finally take up other trade bills: trade promotion authority, trade
adjustment assistance, the Generalized System of Preferences, or GSP,
and trade adjustment assistance.
This vote is in reality a referendum on the future leadership of U.S.
trade policy. After months of delay, it is finally a long overdue
acknowledgment of the Senate's important constitutional and political
responsibility for U.S. trade policy. As such, today is the start of
the most important legislative period on the Senate floor for America's
trade policy since trade negotiating authority for the President lapsed
in April 1994.
It was in 1994 when a critical ingredient of American global
leadership in trade policy was lost, trade promotion authority. As a
result, in the last 8 years the United States has been severely
handicapped in its ability to conduct major trade negotiations. Yes, we
recently concluded a free trade agreement with Jordan and we have
started Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations. That is the
Western Hemisphere regional free trade zone. We also have bilateral
free trade negotiation going on with Singapore and with Chile right
now.
We have been involved with three agreements in the last 6 years. The
rest of the world has adopted 130 or more preferential trade
agreements; 127 of which we were not a party to. That damages America's
trade interests.
The European Union has 27 preferential or special customs agreements
with other countries and is negotiating 15 more. Our international
competitors, then, are clearly not waiting for the United States of
America while they negotiate and while we get our act together. We have
been, for about 6 years now, maybe 8 years, trying to get our act
together.
The lack of trade promotion authority is already affecting our
effectiveness at the negotiating table in the Western Hemisphere
negotiations called the Free Trade Area of the Americas. I recently
commissioned a General Accounting Office study on the status of the
Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations. They found the Western
Hemisphere participants believed that the absence of the President's
trade promotion authority has thwarted the negotiations to the extent
that some countries are not willing to make the necessary concessions
to move negotiations forward.
This lack of progress of the Free Trade Area of the Americas has
enormous economic consequences for the United States. We currently sell
less than 8 percent of our exported goods south of Mexico's southern
border--meaning Central and South America.
In terms of competitiveness in exports, we are underperforming in our
own hemisphere. A successful conclusion to the Free Trade Area of the
Americas talks will help us catch up, but the President needs trade
promotion authority to make that happen.
The United States is currently pursuing new World Trade Organization
negotiations with 143 other nations in Geneva. These negotiations are,
right now, underway. Our negotiators are meeting with their
counterparts in Geneva almost as we speak to try to hammer out
procedures for addressing the major issues in these important
negotiations, issues such as market access for America's farmers and
ranchers for all of our agricultural products. They are all on the
table, but without trade promotion authority, our negotiators have one
hand tied behind their backs. That is something that before this debate
is over I hope I can convince the Senator from North Dakota of--who
spoke previous to me--that it is very important not to negotiate from a
position of disadvantage.
Right now, without trade promotion authority, do not have credibility
at the negotiating table. We need credibility to set the agenda and to
influence the scope and timing of these talks.
Without trade promotion authority, our foreign competitors will have
the upper hand. They will determine the scope and the timing of the
World Trade Organization negotiations to their advantage--obviously not
to the advantage of the United States.
Last Friday the Agriculture Coalition for Trade Promotion Authority,
which represents more than 80 food and agricultural groups, sent a
letter to congressional leaders. It was signed by 29 university
agricultural economists. I will read from a portion of that letter:
. . . There is an important political dimension in all
trade negotiations, and without trade promotion authority,
the ability of the United States negotiators to press for
agreements on our terms and our agenda will be fatally
weakened. . . . Trade Promotion Authority is an indispensable
tool that U.S. trade officials need now to keep U.S.
agriculture on the path of prosperity and long-term economic
growth.
The individuals who signed that letter are some of the most
distinguished agricultural economists in our country. I am sure some of
my colleagues would recognize their names. I hope we hear their message
very clearly. I am suggesting it is wrong not to act on their advice.
I ask unanimous consent that entire letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
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TPA Coalition Commends Letter to Congressional Leaders From Prominent
Agricultural Economists
The Agricultural Coalition for Trade Promotion Authority
today commended the 29 university agricultural economists who
signed a letter in support of TPA that was sent Friday to
Congressional leaders. The letter, which will go to every
House and Senate member today, points out that without trade,
the U.S. farm economy would be in a desperate situation and
that without TPA, ``the ability of U.S. negotiators to press
for agreements on our terms and our agenda will be fatally
weakened.''
Following is the text of the letter. The Agriculture
Coalition for TPA includes more than 80 food and agriculture
groups dedicated to the passage of legislation granting the
president Trade Promotion Authority. It is co-chaired by the
National Pork Producers Council and Farmland Industries.
April 26, 2002.
Hon. Thomas A. Daschle,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Trent Lott,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Richard A. Gephardt,
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Daschle, Senator Lott, Representative
Gephardt, and Mr. Speaker: We, the undersigned agricultural
economists from the nation's agricultural colleges,
universities and research institutions, strongly support
trade negotiations to advance U.S. agriculture's interests in
the global market.
Despite the frustrations some in the farm community voice
today about recent trade agreements, U.S. agriculture would
be substantially worse off had it not been for those
arrangements. The fall in exports resulting from the Asian
financial crisis and the unusual string of years of strong
global crop production would have been worse without the
access opportunities in Mexico and many other markets that
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round provided.
Clearly, there remain important tariff and subsidy
inequities that impede U.S. exports. Global food and
agriculture tariffs average 62 percent, while U.S. food and
agriculture tariffs average only 12 percent. But the only
practical way to deal with these problems is through the
multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade negotiations the
Administration has undertaken, and for which it must have
Trade promotion authority (TPA). While the regional and
bilateral trade initiatives currently under negotiation are
important, the most promising trade initiative for U.S. food
and agriculture producers is the ongoing multilateral World
Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations.
To put the importance of trade and the need for
negotiations in perspective, it is worth pointing out that
the value of U.S. agricultural exports--now around $54
billion--frequently tracks or exceeds the level of net farm
income each year. Without exports, farm and ranch income
would plummet.
The domestic U.S. market is, of course, the principal
destination for most of our farm output. However, the U.S.
population is only about 4 percent of the world's total.
Increased access to the other 96 percent, which can only be
accomplished through trade negotiations, would offer U.S.
producers another--and potentially enormous--outlet for our
high quality production.
As economists, we tend to view issues in terms of numbers:
the data that show that a substantial portion of our
production is exported, the strong recent growth in exports
of job-creating high value and processed agricultural
products, and the contribution exports make to the overall
farm economy. However, we also recognize that there is an
important political dimension in all trade negotiations, and
that without TPA the ability of U.S. negotiators to press for
agreements on our terms and our agenda will be fatally
weakened. Indeed, there is a deadline of March 2003 in the
ongoing WTO agriculture negotiations for establishing the
framework of the final agreement--which is referred to by our
trade negotiators as establishing the ``modalities.'' If the
U.S. is to provide effective leadership in establishing these
modalities, our negotiating partners must know that U.S.
leadership is based on and supported by authority from
Congress. In short, TPA is an indispensable tool that U.S.
trade officials need now to keep U.S. agriculture on the path
of prosperity and long-term economic growth.
Sincerely,
Dermot Hayes, Ph.D., Professor of Economics, Iowa State
University; Colin A. Carter, Ph.D., Professor,
Agricultural Marketing, International Trade, UC Davis
College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences; Mechel
S. Paggi, Ph.D., Director, Center for Agricultural
Business, California State University, Fresno; Daniel A.
Summer, Director, Agricultural Issues Center, University
of California, Davis; Frank H. Buck, Jr., Professor,
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
University of California, Davis; Michael Reed, Ph.D.,
Director, Graduate Studies, University of Kentucky; John
C. Beghin, Ph.D, Professor of Economics, Iowa State
University; Cary W. Herndon, Jr., Professor, Department of
Agricultural Economics, Mississippi State University;
Julian M. Alston, Professor & Agricultural Economist,
University of California; Gary Storey, Agricultural
Economics, University of Saskatchewan; Gail L. Cramer,
Professor and Head Department of Agricultural Economics
and Agribusiness, Louisiana State University; Timothy G.
Taylor, Professor and Director, Center for Agibusiness,
University of Florida; George C. Davis, Associate
Professor, Texas A&M University; P. Lynn Kennedy, Ph.D.,
Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness,
Louisiana State University; Timothy E. Josling, Professor
of Food Research, Stanford University; Gary W. Williams,
Ph.D., Professor of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M
University; Barry Goodwin, Professor, Agricultural,
Environmental & Development Economics, Ohio State
University; Chris Barrett, Associate Professor, Applied
Economics & Management, Cornell University; Thomas W.
Hertel, Professor of Agricultural Economics, Purdue
University; David Harvey, Ph.D., Professor of Agricultural
Economics, University of Newcastle upon Tyne; Scott R.
Pearson, Professor, Food Research Institute, Stanford
University; David Abler, Ph.D., Professor and Graduate
Officer, Agricultural, Environmental and Regional
Economics, Penn State University; Eric Monke, Ph.D.,
Professor, Agriculture/Resource Economics, University of
Arizona; David Blanford, Ph.D., Professor and Head,
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology,
Pennsylvania State University; Maury E. Bredahl, Director,
Center for International Trade Studies, Univerisity of
Missouri-Columbia; James E. Ross, Ph.D., Courtesy
Professor, International Trade and Development Center,
Univerisity of Florida; Vernon Oley Roningen, Ph.D.,
Consulting Services and Economic Analysis, VORSIM; Jimmye
Hillman, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, International
Agricultural Policy University of Arizona; and Luther G.
Tweenten, Faculty Emeritus, Agricultural, Environmental &
Development Economics, Ohio State University.
Mr. GRASSLEY. On the subject of another trade bill coming before us,
I want people to know I strongly support what we have had since 1963,
called trade adjustment assistance. It is coming up for
reauthorization. It has been an integral part of our trade policy for
about 40 years.
We need to update trade adjustment assistance and make it more
effective for people whom it is designed to serve.
Finally, I would like to say a few words about the Andean trade bill.
That is the bill which the cloture motion we are debating is on.
The Andean trade bill will enable the United States to constructively
engage with our Latin American neighbors at a time when many of them
face enormous economic and political challenges. There is political
instability and the social instability in some of those countries
because they face severe economic challenges. There are more people
with less growth and fewer material goods for the people. What the
Andean pact comes down to is that we need--and the Andean nations
need--a trade policy that will positively affect trade between our
countries.
Where I come from--the little town of New Hartford, IA--when your
neighbor down the road has an emergency, or needs a hand, in that
Midwestern spirit we reach out to help. The United States pretty much
has adopted the same policy as part of our responsibility of world
leadership since World War II. It happens all over America. Neighbors
help and support each other.
When our Andean neighbors--Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador--
found themselves under siege by narco-terrorists, we reached out to
help these hemispheric neighbors. Through the Andean Trade Preference
Act, we designed a plan that is based on trade--not aid--following the
advice of President Kennedy 40 years ago that focuses upon people's
self-help. That is what trade is all about. Aid is all about doing
something for somebody instead of helping themselves. But trade is
about helping people to help themselves so they eventually develop to a
point--such as Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand have in the last 40
years--where they don't need our help.
The Andean pact uses trade to promote economic development through a
diversified export base as an alternative to the allure of the drug
trade. I also support the Andean trade bill because it recognizes that
trade and prosperity go hand in hand. Trade is not just for rich
countries such as the United States, it is also for countries that
aspire to be rich.
[[Page S3495]]
What country looking at the United States wouldn't like to have the
prosperity the United States has developed in the last hundred years
and become the richest nation in the world? Countries want better and
more secure lives for their people. Countries want better health care,
better education, and a better future for their children.
Through the Andean Trade Preference Act and complementary trading
initiatives, such as the free trade areas of the Americas, we can help
achieve a new era of hemispheric economic cooperation that will not
only benefit those countries to the south of us but it will benefit us
as well. The Andean nations know that trade--not aid--is the best way
to overcome the fragmentation of Latin American economies and build
self-sustaining growth that nourishes democratic institutions.
The United States must get off the sidelines. We need to get back
into the middle of the negotiating circle and back into our customary
role as leader of the world economy in trade, as we have been generally
since at least 1947. But we haven't been there in the last few years.
The rest of the world is not going to stand around and wait for us.
They are negotiating over 100 agreements, and we have negotiated 3.
The longer we wait, without credibility at the negotiating table, the
more harm will be done to our political and economic interests. By not
leading the world, we are not going to help the world economy grow as
large as that world economy can grow.
It is very important to get this debate started. To get this debate
started, we have to have a yes vote on cloture on this bill so we can
overcome a few Members of the Senate who believe the United States
ought to be more parochial and a little more isolated. That is not a
place where America has been since 1947.
I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for
the Andean Trade Preference Expansion Act and the cloture vote on the
motion to proceed.
However, I believe the Senate should move forward on this important
piece of legislation separately from consideration of Trade Promotion
Authority.
I believe it is essential for the people of Ecuador, Colombia, Peru,
and Bolivia and the people of the United States that the Senate
expeditiously debate and act on the Andean Trade Preference Expansion
Act on its own.
The original Andean Trade Preference Act was designed to discourage
illicit drug production and help participating countries develop a
broader export base.
The results over the past decade have been very encouraging. The
Andean Trade Preference Act has generated $3.2 billion in new output
and $1.7 billion in new exports to the United States. Export
diversification has resulted in the creation of 140,000 jobs in the
region.
The excellent cooperation of participating countries with the United
States in the fight against narcotics production and trafficking has
resulted in significant gains. For example, coca cultivation in Bolivia
has fallen by 68 percent and in Peru by 74 percent.
Unfortunately, we have not seen similar progress in Colombia, but
this is due more to political instability and the continuing struggle
against narco-terrorism. I am hopeful that these difficult issues can
be resolved and that Colombia will enjoy the full benefits of this
bill.
Just as important, the Andean Trade Preference Act has given hope to
the people of the region for a better tomorrow and has shown them that
the journey from poverty to economic prosperity need not begin with the
cultivation of illicit narcotics.
Nevertheless, despite these success stories, the Andean Trade
Preference Act expired on December 4, 2001 and the 90-day suspension of
import duties on eligible products issued by President Bush is set to
expire on May 16.
The House passed its own version of the Andean Trade Preference
Expansion Act on November 16, 2001. That bill has now come to the
Senate floor and will be amended to include Trade Promotion Authority
legislation. I am concerned that this will slow passage of the
underlying bill.
If the United States continues to delay passage of the Andean Trade
Preference Expansion Act, the participating countries will be put in a
vulnerable position and could face devastating consequences. They will
deal with increased narcotics production and trafficking, and the gains
of the past ten years will be lost.
In addition, in a recent meeting, the ambassadors of Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru indicated to me that inaction on this bill would
result in the loss of tens of thousands of jobs. The hopes of hard
working families will be shattered.
Finally, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia all face presidential
elections this year, and the lack of closer trade ties with the United
States could impede continued growth of democracy in the region.
The resulting weakness of the central governments will only serve to
reenforce the strength of drug lords and their armies and destabilize
the region even further.
We should also be concerned about our own economy and export growth.
Between 1991 and 1999, U.S. exports to the Andean region increased by
65 percent. The United States is the largest source of imports for each
of the participating countries.
The gains from an expanded Andean Trade Act, strengthened democracies
and stronger, more vibrant economies, will encourage even more U.S.
investment and exports to the region, creating more jobs at home and
fostering greater economic growth.
My home State of California, the fifth largest economic engine in the
world and a leader in global commerce, will greatly benefit from
increased prosperity and political stability in the Andean region.
If we do not act, U.S. credibility and leadership in the region will
suffer and future efforts to expand trade in Central and South America
will be met with skepticism and resistance.
Cloture Motion
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, pursuant to rule
XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion,
which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Cloture Motion
We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the
provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
hereby move to bring to a close debate on the motion to
proceed to Calendar No. 295, H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade
Preference Act:
Max Baucus, Zell Miller, Harry Reid, Tom Carper, Joseph
Lieberman, Bob Graham, John Breaux, Blanche L. Lincoln,
Ron Wyden, Dianne Feinstein, Ben Nelson, Trent Lott,
Charles Grassley, Orrin G. Hatch, Jon Kyl, Rick
Santorum, Pat Roberts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum
call has been waived.
The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on the
motion to proceed to H.R. 3009, an act to extend the Andean Trade
Preference Act, to grant additional trade benefits under that act, and
for other purposes, shall be brought to a close?
The yeas and nays are required under the rule. The clerk will call
the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mrs. Carnahan),
the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Corzine), the Senator from Connecticut
(Mr. Dodd), the Senator from New York (Mr. Schumer), and the Senator
from New Jersey (Mr. Torricelli) are necessarily absent.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr.
Helms), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. Craig), the Senator from New Mexico
(Mr. Domenici), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Hutchinson), and the
Senator from Alaska (Mr. Murkowski), are necessarily absent.
I further announce that if present and voting the Senator from North
Carolina (Mr. Helms) would vote ``no.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Reed). Are there any other Senators in the
Chamber desiring to vote?
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 69, nays 21, as follows:
[[Page S3496]]
[Rollcall Vote No. 97 Leg.]
YEAS--69
Akaka
Allard
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Campbell
Cantwell
Carper
Chafee
Cleland
Clinton
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Crapo
Daschle
DeWine
Durbin
Edwards
Ensign
Enzi
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Graham
Gramm
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Johnson
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Leahy
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Miller
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Nickles
Reid
Roberts
Santorum
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Voinovich
Wyden
NAYS--21
Allen
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Dayton
Dorgan
Feingold
Hollings
Inouye
Kennedy
Levin
Mikulski
Reed
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Sessions
Shelby
Snowe
Thurmond
Warner
Wellstone
NOT VOTING--10
Carnahan
Corzine
Craig
Dodd
Domenici
Helms
Hutchinson
Murkowski
Schumer
Torricelli
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 69, the nays are
21. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn having voted in
the affirmative, the motion is agreed to.
The Senator from Massachusetts.
____________________