[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 46 (Tuesday, April 23, 2002)]
[House]
[Pages H1519-H1522]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
OIL DISTORTS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the
gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur) is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, the recent events in Venezuela have given
the American people yet another example of the way that oil distorts
U.S. foreign policy. Most Americans do not realize it, but Venezuela is
a crucial supplier of oil to the United States. According to the CIA,
petroleum dominates the Venezuelan economy, accounting for
approximately one-third of its economy and 80 percent of its export
earnings. In fact, Venezuela ranks third on the list of countries that
provide with us petroleum, approximately 1.5 million barrels every day,
or more than half of its total production.
Stanley Weiss, founder and chairman of Business Executives for
National Security, a nonpartisan organization of business leaders,
wrote recently in the Los Angeles Times that the United States imports
twice as much oil from Canada and Venezuela as it does from the Persian
Gulf. And Venezuela is particularly important as a source of
reformulated gasoline, which is required in many American cities that
are struggling to meet USEPA emission standards for clean air.
Every time an American citizen pulls up to a Citgo gas pump, they are
pumping dollars into the Venezuelan national oil company known as
Pedevesa. And it was labor unrest at the Pedevesa facilities throughout
Venezuela that helped to spur the 1-day coup against Venezuelan
President Hugh Chavez.
So important is Venezuelan oil to the world's market that the price
of oil dropped precipitously after Chavez was deposed and rebounded
just as quickly when he was restored to power by the people of
Venezuela.
The Bush administration, which is dominated by oil in much the same
manner as the Venezuelan economy, could barely contain its glee when
President Chavez was overthrown in a coup d'etat. Meanwhile, every
other government in this hemisphere reacted negatively to the overthrow
of a democratically elected government. By putting the interests of the
oil economy first and democratic rule second, the Bush administration
not only found itself out of step with every other government in Latin
America but foolishly forfeited the high moral ground.
Now the administration has a lot of sorting out to do. It has to
explain to Congress about what really happened in Venezuela. Did the
Bush administration actively encourage antidemocratic forces to
overthrow a leader with whom we happen to disagree? Did the Bush
administration give a wink and a nod to the coup plotters? Under what
authority was the Bush administration acting when U.S. military
advisers found themselves on the side of the insurgents? When was that
action authorized by the Congress of the United States? When did
President Bush learn about the attempted coup and direction was given
to U.S. diplomats, military officials, and advisers in the region? What
did they receive from the White House, the State Department or the
Defense Department? What relationship does the President, Vice
President, or any of his advisers have with any oil interests in
Venezuela? On whose order did the Bush administration officials choose
not to speak out against the overthrow of a democratically elected
president from a nation that is America's third largest oil supplier?
The United States simply must occupy the moral high ground. We are
engaged in a worldwide battle against terrorism and antidemocratic
forces. We are trying to show the rest of the world what it means to
stand up for democratic values. Not to support a legitimately elected
government, no matter how much we may disagree with its president, has
damaged the perception of the United States as a standard bearer for
legitimate elections and democratic governments.
The Organization of American States took a position diametrically
opposed to this country's position. I hope the Committee on
International Relations demands a full explanation by the Bush
administration so there is no repeat of this sorry performance.
President Chavez should understand that Americans believe in democracy
and view Venezuela as a friend, not just as an oil well. And the
American people can take from this latest sordid experience another
lesson in the many ways in which dependence on foreign oil distorts our
politics and our policy.
Mr. Speaker, I submit herewith for the Record two articles, one from
the Toledo Blade that talks about the administration's flip-flop in our
policy towards Venezuela, and also a time line and related article from
the New York Times on ``2 days that Shook Venezuela: The Fall, and
Return, of President Hugo Chavez.
[From the New York Times, Apr. 20, 2002]
2 Days That Shook Venezuela: The Fall, and Return, of Hugo Chavez
The killings at the anti-Chavez demonstration rocked the
country, reviving memories of the violent events in 1989,
known as the Caracazo, in which hundreds were killed by
government forces. Venezuelans across the political spectrum
swore that such violence would never take place again.
According to witnesses, shots were fired from several
buildings as well as from a bridge one block from the
presidential palace, which overlooks the route of the march.
One of the buildings that witnesses identified as a source of
gunfire contains the offices of Freddy Bernal, the mayor of
the borough that includes downtown Caracas and one of the
leaders of the Bolivarian Circles.
Eddie Ramiez, an executive with the state oil company, was
in a part of the march that came close to the presidential
palace. ``Shots were fired from a building,'' he said. ``I
think there were people there waiting for us, and some crazy
person started to shoot.''
None of the snipers who fired from rooftops (as opposed to
the bridge) have been identified, with pro-Chavez forces
arguing that
[[Page H1520]]
much of the gunfire was directed at Miraflores Palace and
that some anti-Chavez demonstrators were also armed.
Since Mr. Chavez's return to power last Sunday, his
followers have sought to place the blame for the killings on
the Metropolitan Police, which reports to one of his main
political adversaries, Alfredo Pena, the mayor of Caracas.
However, after an independent investigation, the country's
two main human rights groups concluded that the shootings
took place ``to minimize the action of the opposition with
the acquiescence of organisms of the state,'' and police and
military officers.
Gen. Nestor Gonzalez, an ally of Mr. Chavez who broke with
the president early last week, said that the military high
command already had information at midday that there would be
an attack on the anti-Chavez march. He said this week that
the top commanders learned of the plans from ``a general who
had personally infiltrated in the Bolivarian Circles.''
As the confrontation in the streets raged, Mr. Chavez
ordered all television stations to join a national network
and began delivering a speech warning Venezuelans ``not to
fall into provocation.'' But independent stations split the
screen so as to continue broadcasting the violence near the
palace. Their transmissions signals were cut, and public
opinion began turning against Mr. Chavez.
Feeling vulnerable, Mr. Chavez ordered tanks and troops to
move to the palace from army headquarters at Fort Tiuna, in
Caracas. But military commanders, fearing a repetition of the
1989 bloodshed, told the president that they would not obey
him. ``The result would have been a massacre,'' General
Gonzalez said. Military dissidents who had plotted against
Mr. Chavez had sought out business leaders thought to be
sympathetic. they included Pedro Carmona Estanga, the
president of Fedecamaras, the main national business
confederation.
Entreaties were also made to the American Embassy here but
it appears they did not meet with encouragement.
``They were always impeccable at the embassy, from the
ambassador on down,'' said a businessman who was a witness to
several ``what if'' conversations. ``I can't tell you the
number of times they made it clear that they would not
countenance a coup. There was no winking going on, either.
They would always say, ``We do not want a rupture.''
Other anti-Chavez groups also traveled to the United States
to meet with Mr. Cisneros, the media magnate who has business
interests there, and with American officials. The Bush
Administration's two top officials for Latin American policy,
Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich and John Maisto, the
national security adviser for Latin America, are both former
ambassadors to Venezuela and have maintained close ties with
business, political and news media leaders here.
So early on Thursday night top military officers, including
the army commander, Gen. Efrain Vazquez Velasco, were
confident when they delivered an ultimatum to Mr. Chavez: you
must quit. Cornered, Mr. Chavez said he was unwilling to
resign but would agree to ``abandon his functions,'' a
slightly different procedure under Venezuelan law that would
require the approval of the National Assembly, in which Mr.
Chavez has a majority.
The key figure in the hours of negotiations that followed
was the armed forces commander, Gen. Lucas Rincon Romero,
whose true loyalties still are not clear. Early on Friday, he
announced that Mr. Chavez had ``resigned,'' which led 90
minutes later to Mr. Carmona being named as head of a
military-supported transitional government.
That part is still confusing to me,'' Mr. Carmona said of
General Rincon's actions and statements this week, after he
was placed under house arrest and General Rincon was once
again at Mr. Chavez side, apparently forgiven by the
president. ``There are facts that are still in a gray area.''
By midmorning on Friday, Mr. Chavez, himself a former army
colonel who in 1992 led a failed coup attempt, looked to be
finished. He was being held in military custody at Fort
Tiuna; Cuba was beginning efforts that would have allowed him
to go into exile there, and the Bush administration was
already signaling its support for the new government.
On Friday morning, the day Mr. Carmona claimed power, Mr.
Reich, the assistant secretary, summoned ambassadors from
Latin America and the Caribbean to his office. The
representative from Brazil read a communique that stated that
his country could not condone a rupture of democratic rule in
Venezuela, diplomats said.
They said Mr. Reich responded that the ouster of Mr. Chavez
was not a rupture of democratic rule because he had resigned.
``He stressed the position that Chavez was responsible'' for
his fate, ``and said we had to support the new government,''
said one Latin American envoy.
Almost immediately, though, Mr. Carmona began making the
political blunders that would quickly bring him down. After
working hand in hand for months with Carlos Ortega, the
leader of the Venezuelan Workers' Federation, the country's
main labor union group, he named a cabinet that had no labor
representatives and was tilted heavily toward a discredited
conservative party.
In addition, Mr. Carmona fanned military rivalries by
naming two navy officers to the cabinet, including Adm.
Hector Ramirez Perez as minister of defense instead of
General Vasquez Velasco, and none from the army.
``There were many more people with aspirations than space
to accommodate them, and they all seemed ready to jump ship
when they felt they were being excluded,'' said Janet Kelly,
a political science professor and commentator here.
But the biggest mistake was a decree, announced at Mr.
Carmona's swearing-in on Friday afternoon, that dissolved the
National Assembly, fired the Supreme Court and called for new
presidential elections only after a year. The effect was to
suspend the Constitution, which generated immediate
opposition to the new government, both at home and in the
rest of Latin America.
``In hindsight, it was the most idiotic thing that could
have been done,'' said a person who was at Miraflores for the
ceremony. ``But we had just come out of an ambush and we were
venting our distaste for the people who occupied those
positions, so everyone applauded the dissolution.''
As Mr. Carmona spoke, military officers were jostling for
position behind him, trying to make sure they would appear in
photographs in the papers the next day, spectators recalled.
But some civilian political leaders were already unhappy with
the look of things, and ducked out of the ceremony.
By Saturday morning, it was clear that Mr. Carmona's
transition government was floundering. Ambassador Shapiro had
breakfast with him at 9 a.m., and told him that dissolving
Congress was an error and should be reconsidered.
The government's image was further undetermined by raids on
the home of some key Chavez supporters. Among those singled
out were Tarek William Saab, who as chairman of the
congressional Foreign Relations Committee was regarded as Mr.
Chavez's main link to Iraq, Iran and Libya; and Ramon
Rodriguez Chacin, who as minister of the interior and justice
was in charge of the state spy apparatus.
At the same time, though, Mr. Chavez's supporters in the
poor neighborhoods of western Caracas were taking to the
streets. By early afternoon, thousands were congregating
outside Miraflores, demanding that Mr. Chavez be restored.
At Fort Tiuna, though, some 30 generals and admirals were
still arguing about who should get what post in the Carmona
government. ``This was grave for Carmona,'' said Gen. Rafael
Montero, a former minister of defense sympathetic to the
anti-Chavez forces. ``He didn't have the advice he needed.''
With the high command distracted, the presidential guard,
which was thought to be loyal to Mr. Chavez but had still not
been replaced, was able to retake control of Miraflores. ``We
never abandoned the president,'' said Col. Gonzalo Millan a
member of the palace guard. He added, ``Kings are the only
ones who do things by decree, but no one here is a king.''
In the interior of the country, unit commanders were also
beginning to defy the desk generals and to declare their
support for Mr. Chavez. At 1:30 p.m., Gen. Raul Baduel,
commander of a paratrooper brigade in Maracay in which Mr.
Chavez himself had once served, and four other senior field
officers announced they were rebelling against the new
government and began to organize a plan to ``rescue'' Mr.
Chavez from his captors.
Though he had by now been moved from Caracas to a naval
base on the coast, Mr. Chavez was still refusing to sign a
document of resignation. When a sympathetic corporal named
Juan Bautista Rodriguez, a member of the unit watching over
the deposed president, learned of Mr. Chavez's position, he
offered to smuggle out a message to that effect to encourage
the Chavez forces. ``I put it at the bottom of a trash can to
disguise it,'' Mr. Chavez said this week. ``Later I learned
that the soldier had recovered it. I don't know how he did
it, but he discreetly transmitted a fax to someone who got
the message to Miraflores.''
With the balance clearly shifting in favor of Mr. Chavez,
who had by now been moved to the Caribbean island of La
Orchila, the same military officers who had overthrown him
began to distance themselves from Mr. Carmona. At 4:30 p.m.
General Vazquez Velasco, still irate at not having been named
defense minister, told Mr. Carmona that military support of
his government would be withdrawn unless he revoked the
offending decree dissolving congress.
Mr. Carmona acted about half an hour later, but by then it
was too late. A few blocks away from the palace, the pro-
Chavez National Assembly was already convening to appoint
Diosdado Cabello, Mr. Chavez's vice president, as interim
president, as established by the Constitution.
Around 10 o'clock, Mr. Carmona stepped down and the
uprising was effectively over. Four Air Force helicopters
headed to La Orchila to pick up Mr. Chavez, who arrived in
triumph back at Miraflores around 3:00 a.m. on Sunday.
``I was absolutely sure, completely certain, that we would
be back,'' Mr. Chavez said in a speech to his jubilant
supporters. ``But you know what? The only thing I couldn't
imagine was that we would return so rapidly.''
[[Page H1521]]
____
[From the Toledo Blade, Apr. 21, 2002]
Divisions Over Venezuela
Flip-flop pits dislike for Chavez, issue of democracy
(By Frida Ghitis)
Washington.--The news from Venezuela blew like a cool
breeze on a sweltering summer day for U.S. leaders in
Washington following those developments.
Administration officials, tense and tired from watching the
unraveling of the Middle East; edgy from suddenly facing
domestic criticism that President Bush's policies on
terrorism were losing their moral clarity with his call for
Israel to stop its actions against Palestinians; weary from
threats by Muslim oil producers to suspend oil shipments if
the United States didn't get Israel to stop attacking
Palestinians, suddenly found reason to rejoice. The word from
Venezuela brought a welcome bit of news. The troublesome,
often irritating president of the South American country, had
moved aside. A new president was taking over. At last, some
good news!
Not so fast. What occurred in Venezuela and, more
importantly, the way Washington reacted to it, has become a
major embarrassment for the Bush administration, which found
itself on the defensive, deny charges that, at the very
least, it knew about the coup before it happened. Even if
those charges are proved to be false, Washington's rejoicing
over a bungled coup that kept the Venezuelan out of office
for only 48 hours, left the administration open to charges
that it turned its back on democracy.
Most think of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, as the
principal source of America's oil. But Venezuela, on the
northeastern corner of South America, is one of the world's
major oil producers. The country is the third largest
provider of oil to the United States, exporting about 1.5
million barrels to America every day. Venezuela, a member
of OPEC, long had been one of the organization's least
disciplined members, going over its quota frequently and
thus making it almost impossible for the oil cartel to
control prices. That all changed when the colorful Hugo
Chavez came to power.
Mr. Chavez, a former paratrooper who had once led a failed
military coup of his own, was elected president
democratically with promises of bringing radical change to a
country that, although awash in petroleum, suffers from
horrific poverty. Just months before he took power in
Caracas, a barrel of oil was selling for about $10, less than
half today's price. President Chavez immediately set to
transform his country, and to revitalize the oil cartel.
Enjoying enormous popular support, Mr. Chavez tore down and
then rebuilt government institutions. He had a new
constitution written after his chosen delegates were approved
as the drafters of the document. He gained control of the
judiciary and the legislature, and he stacked just about
every part of government with his supporters, many of them
military men. In the process, Mr. Chavez managed to insult
the church, calling priests ``devils in vestments.'' He
routinely attacked the rich, calling them oligarchs who
should move to Miami. Most observers agreed, Mr. Chavez was
concentrating powers into his own hands, severely crippling
democratic institutions in his country. But he did it all
within the law.
Then Mr. Chavez set out to work on the world oil markets.
He paid visits to Muammar Kaddafi of Libya, to Saddam Hussein
in Baghdad, while continuing to develop a deeply personal
friendship with Fidel Castro of Cuba, constantly irritating
Washington. Mr. Chavez helped OPEC set production quotas and
stick to them. He was instrumental in producing a tightening
of oil supplies that brought oil prices to new levels.
It's not surprising then, that when Venezuela announced a
few days ago that Hugo Chavez was no longer its president,
oil prices took a sudden drop--about 6 percent (They went
back up after he was reinstated). The timing, for the
United States and many others, could not have been better.
Oil prices had gone up 25 percent this year alone, as the
American economy picks up steam, and as tensions in the
Middle East continue to mount. Only recently, Saddam
announced that he was stopping shipments of oil as a
gesture of support for the Palestinians, and Iranian
President Mohammed Khatami (the ``moderate'' Iranian)
reiterated his country's call for Muslim countries to stop
selling oil for 30 days, also in support of the
Palestinians.
What superb timing by the masses in Caracas! On April 11, a
large protest by Venezuelan workers, angry over Mr. Chavez's
installation of a new board of directors of the traditionally
independent national oil company, spun out of control.
Tensions had been building for months. The country is sharply
divided, with Mr. Chavez's populist rhetoric intensifying
class differences. Major military figures had come forth
calling for his resignation, and what was once a sky-high
approval rating had dipped to about 30 percent. When the
protests were met with gunfire from Chavez supporters, the
military stepped in and took over. They installed Pedro
Carmona Estanga, a business leader who didn't last long.
The head of the country's largest business association was
declared president, with an announcement that Mr. Chavez had
resigned. But Chavez supporters refused to believe their man
had folded. A top executive at the oil company said the
country would start pumping more oil, probably exceeding its
OPEC quota.
It is unlikely that a single Latin American president felt
that Mr. Chavez really would be missed. And yet, the
Organization of American States condemned the Venezuelan
coup. Almost all democratically elected leaders in the
Americas made it clear that, like him or not, Mr. Chavez
legally, democratically had been elected president.
Removing him constituted an affront against the principle
of democracy, a principle worth preserving, even when one
disagrees with the outcome of the process. The president
of Mexico declared that he would not recognize the new
government. Statements throughout the hemisphere condemned
what appeared to be a coup. The United States, however,
did not speak out against the overthrow of a
democratically elected president. American officials
stated that Mr. Chavez himself was responsible for the
events that lead to his ouster.
The United States did itself enormous damage. Latin America
and, for that matter, much of the Third World, where the
image of America as a nation that supported despotic regimes
that suited its goals during the Cold War has been changing
very slowly. When the United States sent troops to Haiti to
``restore democracy'' many in the hemisphere believed perhaps
America was truly standing up for the democracy it claimed to
hold so dear. That image now has been set back.
Worse yet, many in Latin America believe that the Bush
administration, with a sharp focus on controlling oil
markets, played an important part in the failed coup.
Washington is denying it ever lent even tacit support to
plotters although it admits that Chavez adversaries did seek
support, and that the man who took office for a short time
after deposing Mr. Chavez was, in fact, in contact with Otto
J. Reich at the State Department. Mr. Reich is in charge of
Inter-American affairs at the State Department.
The government says the United States did nothing to
encourage the assault on democracy. And yet, it is guilty, at
the very least, of badly mishandling the crisis in Caracas.
The mistakes of mid-April may take years to repair.
____
[From the Toledo Blade, Apr. 21, 2002]
Latin Policy Chief Gives Little to Foes
Washington.--Reacting to criticism of the reaction to the
resignation and revival of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez,
the Bush administration's chief policy-maker for Latin
America, Otto J. Reich, came back swinging. ``We have
reviewed our actions since last Thursday [April 11],'' he
said. ``I find very little that I would do differently.''
Such is the confidence of Mr. Reich, a former ambassador to
Venezuela whose conservative credentials and combative
demeanor have made him popular among Republicans and stirred
the suspicions of Democrats.
After a few short months, Mr. Reich is facing his second
crisis in Latin America (the first was the collapse of the
Argentina economy, and he has taken a hands-off approach to
it). He is thoughtful and meticulous, with experience in the
region as a development agency official, diplomat, and
businessman.
He also is a fierce partisan who cedes little ground to his
opponents, particularly those who fail to share his concern
over the threats posed by President Fidel Castro of Cuba and,
more recently, by Mr. Chavez, who has built close ties with
Castro.
In January, after Senate Democrats denied Mr. Reich a
hearing on the Latin policy post and refused to confirm him,
President Bush granted him a recess appointment, which allows
him to serve until the end of the congressional session--and
beyond, if reappointed.
Secretary of State Colin Powell fully backs Mr. Reich, said
the secretary's spokesman, Philip Reeker, calling him a ``key
player''.
Some of the animus toward Mr. Reich stems from his
involvement in what became known as the Iran-control scandal
in the Reagan administration. As director of the State
Department's Office of Public Diplomacy, Mr. Reich tried to
influence public opinion in support of the Nicaraguan
contras, the General Accounting Office found, by resorting to
``prohibited covert propaganda'' like preparing newspaper
opinion articles for pro-contra authors.
Mr. Reich has denied wrong-doing and never was charged.
Recently, in his first major policy speech as assistant
secretary, he made light of the controversy, greeting the
``former colleagues'' and ``unindicted co-conspirators'' in
the crowd. Then he complained, ``That was supposed to get a
better laugh than that.''
Otto Juan Reich was born in 1945 in Cuba, which he fled as
a teenager. He thrived in his adoptive country, earning a
bachelor's degree at the University of North Carolina and a
master's in Latin American studies at Georgetown University.
His uncompromising views on Cuba have made him a pillar of
support for the American trade embargo of four decades.
His appointment was championed by Cuban exiles, who
supported Mr. Bush's presidential campaign, and viewed as a
setback to advocates of more open contracts with Havana. He
has criticized corruption in Latin America and has advocated
free trade.
When the crisis flared up in Venezuela, Mr. Reich, who had
made no secret of his disdain for Mr. Chavez, was ready to
respond. He had been the Venezuela envoy in the late `80s.
After that, as a lobbyist he numbered among his clients Mobil
Oil, which has interest in Venezuela.
[[Page H1522]]
``My entire life I've done things that have prepared me for
this job,`` Mr. Reich said last week.
Mr. Reich said the administration had had no involvement or
knowledge--indeed had been operating under an ``information
blackout'' in the first hours of the revolt on April 11.
He defended his decision on the next day to establish
contact with Pedro Carmona Estanga, the business leader who
sought to replace Mr. Chavez. He said the administration
would have been criticized even more harshly had it failed to
warn Mr. Carmona of its desire to see democratic processes
respected.
``I think it would be irresponsible not to do it,'' Mr.
Reich said.
____________________