[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 45 (Monday, April 22, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2995-S2997]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       INTERVIEW WITH DENNIS ROSS

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, in reviewing my press clips this 
morning, I saw an interview between Brit Hume on ``FOX News Sunday'' 
and Dennis Ross, President Clinton's Middle East envoy. Many of us have 
followed closely the negotiations at Camp David, and also at Taba, but 
never before have we really heard Dennis Ross comment on these 
negotiations.
  For the first time this past Sunday, we did. I was really quite 
surprised by these comments. I thought they were of such significance 
that I ask unanimous consent to have the entire interview printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Transcript: Dennis Ross, Former U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East

       Following is a transcripted excerpt from FOX News Sunday, 
     April 21, 2002.
       Brit Hume (host). Former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross has 
     worked to achieve Middle East peace throughout President 
     Clinton's final days in office. In the months following 
     Clinton's failed peace summit at Camp David, U.S. negotiators 
     continued behind-the-scenes peace talks with the Palestinians 
     and Israelis up until January 2001, and that followed 
     Clinton's presentation of ideas at the end of December 2000.
       Dennis Ross joins us now with more details on all that, and 
     Fred Barnes joins the questioning.
       So, Dennis, talk to us a little bit, if you can--I might 
     note that we're proud to able to say that you're a Fox News 
     contributing analyst.
       Dennis Ross (Fmr. U.S. special envoy to the Middle East). 
     Thank you.
       Hume. Talk to us about the sequence of events. The Camp 
     David talks, there was an offer. That was rejected. Talks 
     continued. You come now to December, and the president has a 
     new set of ideas. What unfolded?
       Ross. Let me give you the sequence, because I think it puts 
     all this in perspective.
       Number one, at Camp David we did not put a comprehensive 
     set of ideas on the table. We put ideas on the table that 
     would have affected the borders and would have affected 
     Jerusalem.
       Arafat could not accept any of that. In fact, during the 15 
     days there, he never himself raised a single idea. His 
     negotiators did, to be fair to them, but he didn't. The only 
     new idea he raised at Camp David was that the temple didn't 
     exist in Jerusalem, it existed in Nablus.

[[Page S2996]]

       Hume. This is the temple where Ariel Sharon paid a visit, 
     which was used as a kind of pre-text for the beginning of the 
     new intifada, correct?
       Ross. This is the core of the Jewish faith.
       Hume. Right.
       Ross. So he was denying the core of the Jewish faith there. 
     After the summit, he immediately came back to us and he said, 
     ``We need to have another summit,'' to which we said, ``We 
     just shot our wad. We got a no from you. You're prepared 
     actually to do a deal before we go back to something like 
     that.''
       He agreed to set up a private channel between his people 
     and the Israelis, which I joined at the end of August. And 
     there were serious discussions that went on, and we were 
     poised to present out ideas the end of September, which is 
     when the intifada erupted. He knew we were poised to present 
     the ideas. His own people were telling him they looked good. 
     And we asked him to intervene to ensure there wouldn't be 
     violence after the Sharon visit, the day after. He said he 
     would. He didn't lift a finger.
       Now, eventually we were able to get back to a point where 
     private channels between the two sides led each of them to 
     again ask us to present the ideas. This was in early 
     December. We brought the negotiators here.
       Hume. Now, this was a request to the Clinton 
     administration----
       Ross. Yes.
       Hume [continuing]. To formulate a plan. Both sides wanted 
     this?
       Ross. Absolutely.
       Hume. All right.
       Ross. Both sides asked us to present these ideas.
       Hume. All right. And they were?
       Ross. The ideas were presented on December 23 by the 
     president, and they basically said the following: On borders, 
     there would be about a 5 percent annexation in the West Bank 
     for the Israelis and a 2 percent swap. So there would be a 
     net 97 percent of the territory that would go to the 
     Palestinians.
       On Jerusalem, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem 
     would become the capitol of the Palestinian state.
       On the issue of refuges, there would be a right of return 
     for the refugees to their own state, not to Israel, but there 
     would also be a fund of $30 billion internationally that 
     would be put together for either compensation or to cover 
     repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation costs.
       And when it came to security, there would be a 
     international presence, in place of the Israelis, in the 
     Jordan Valley.
       These were ideas that were comprehensive, unprecedented, 
     stretched very far, represented a culmination of an effort in 
     our best judgment as to what each side could accept after 
     thousands of hours of debate, discussion with each side.
       Barnes. Now, Palestinian officials say to this day that 
     Arafat said yes.
       Ross. Arafat came to the White House on January 2. Met with 
     the president, and I was there in the Oval Office. He said 
     yes, and then he added reservations that basically meant he 
     rejected every single one of the things he was supposed to 
     give.
       Hume. What was he supposed to give?
       Ross. He was supposed to give, on Jerusalem, the idea that 
     there would be for the Israelis sovereignty over the Western 
     Wall, which would cover the areas that are of religious 
     significance to Israel. He rejected that.
       Hume. He rejected their being able to have that?
       Ross. He rejected that.
       He rejected the idea on the refugees. He said we need a 
     whole new formula, as if what we had presented was non-
     existent.
       He rejected the basic ideas on security. He wouldn't even 
     countenance the idea that the Israelis would be able to 
     operate in Palestinian airspace.
       You know when you fly into Israel today you go to Ben 
     Gurion. You fly in over the West Bank because you can't--
     there's no space through otherwise. He rejected that.
       So every single one of the ideas that was asked of him he 
     rejected.
       Hume. Now, let's take a look at the map. Now, this is 
     what--how the Israelis had created a map based on the 
     president's ideas. And----
       Ross. Right.
       Hume. [continuing]. What can we--that situation shows that 
     the territory at least is contiguous. What about Gaza on that 
     map?
       Ross. The Israelis would have gotten completely out of 
     Gaza. And what you see also in this line, they show an area 
     of temporary Israelis control along the border.
       Hume. Right.
       Ross. Now, that was an Israeli desire. That was not what we 
     presented. But we presented something that did point out that 
     it would take six years before the Israelis would be totally 
     out of the Jordan Valley.
       So that map there that you see, which shows a very narrow 
     green space along the border, would become part of the 
     orange. So the Palestinians would have in the West Bank an 
     area that was contiguous. Those who say there were cantons, 
     completely untrue. It was contiguous.
       Hume. Cantons being ghettos, in effect----
       Ross. Right.
       Hume [continuing]. That would be cut off from other parts 
     of the Palestinian state.
       Ross. Completely untrue.
       And to connect Gaza with the West Bank, there would have 
     been an elevated highway, an elevated railroad, to ensure 
     that there would be not just safe passage for the 
     Palestinians, but free passage.
       Barnes. I have two other questions. One, the Palestinians 
     point out that this was never put on paper, this offer. Why 
     not?
       Ross. We presented this to them so that they could record 
     it. When the president presented it, he went over it at 
     dictation speed. He then left the cabinet room. I stayed 
     behind. I sat with them to be sure, and checked to be sure 
     that every single word.
       The reason we did it this way was to be sure they had it 
     and they could record it. But we told the Palestinians and 
     Israelis, if you cannot accept these ideas, this is the 
     culmination of the effort, we withdraw them. We did not want 
     to formalize it. We wanted them to understand we meant what 
     we said. You don't accept it, it's not for negotiation, this 
     is the end of it, we withdraw it.
       So that's why they have it themselves recorded. And to this 
     day, the Palestinians have not presented to their own people 
     what was available.
       Barnes. In other words, Arafat might use it as a basis for 
     further negotiations so he'd get more?
       Ross. Well, exactly.
       Hume. Which is what, in fact, he tried to do, according to 
     your account.
       Ross. We treated it as not only a culmination. We wanted to 
     be sure it couldn't be a floor for negotiations.
       Hume. Right.
       Ross. It couldn't be a ceiling. It was the roof.
       Hume. This was a final offer?
       Ross. Exactly. Exactly right.
       Hume. This was the solution.
       Barnes. Was Arafat alone in rejecting it? I mean, what 
     about his negotiators?
       Ross. It's very clear to me that his negotiators understood 
     this was the best they were ever going to get. They wanted 
     him to accept it. He was not prepared to accept it.
       Hume. Now, it is often said that this whole sequence of 
     talks here sort of fell apart or ended or broke down or 
     whatever because of the intervention of the Israeli 
     elections. What about that?
       Ross. The real issue you have to understand was not the 
     Israeli elections. It was the end of the Clinton 
     administration. The reason we would come with what was a 
     culminating offer was because we were out of time.
       They asked us to present the ideas, both sides. We were 
     governed by the fact that the Clinton administration was 
     going to end, and both sides said we understand this is the 
     point of decision.
       Hume. What, in your view, was the reason that Arafat, in 
     effect, said no?
       Ross. Because fundamentally I do not believe he can end the 
     conflict. We had one critical clause in this agreement, and 
     that clause was, this is the end of the conflict.
       Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a 
     cause. Everything he has done as leader of the Palestinians 
     is to always leave his options open, never close a door. He 
     was being asked here, you've got to close the door. For him 
     to end the conflict is to end himself.
       Hume. Might it not also have been true, though, Dennis, 
     that, because the intifada had already begun--so you had the 
     Camp David offer rejected, the violence begins anew, a new 
     offer from the Clinton administration comes along, the 
     Israelis agree to it, Barak agrees to it----
       Ross. Yes.
       Hume [continuing]. Might he not have concluded that the 
     violence was working?
       Ross. It is possible he concluded that. It is possible he 
     thought he could do and get more with the violence. There's 
     no doubt in my mind that he thought the violence would create 
     pressure on the Israelis and on us and maybe the rest of the 
     world.
       And I think there's one other factor. You have to 
     understand that Barak was able to reposition Israel 
     internationally. Israel was seen as having demonstrated 
     unmistakably it wanted peace, and the reason it wasn't 
     available, achievable was because Arafat wouldn't accept it.
       Arafat needed to re-establish the Palestinians as a victim, 
     and unfortunately they are a victim, and we see it now in a 
     terrible way.
       Hume. Dennis Ross, thank you so much.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, on Camp David, let me quote Dennis 
Ross, President Clinton's Middle East envoy and a person who literally 
carried out thousands of hours of negotiation. He said:

       Let me give you the sequence [of events], because I think 
     it puts all this in perspective. Number one, at Camp David we 
     did not put a comprehensive set of ideas on the table. We put 
     ideas on the table that would have affected borders and would 
     have affected Jerusalem.
       Arafat could not accept any of that. In fact, during the 15 
     days there he never himself raised a single idea. His 
     negotiators did, to be fair to them, but he didn't. The only 
     new ideas he raised at Camp David was that the temple didn't 
     exist in Jerusalem, it existed in Nablus . . . So he was 
     denying the core of the Jewish faith there.

  On the eruption of the Intifada:

       After the summit, he immediately came back to us and he 
     said, ``We need to have another summit,'' to which we said, 
     ``We just shot our wad. We got a no from you. You're prepared 
     actually to do a deal before we go back to something like 
     that.''
       He agreed to set up a private channel between his people 
     and the Israelis, which I joined at the end of August. And 
     there were serious discussions that went on, and we

[[Page S2997]]

     were poised to present our ideas the end of September, which 
     is when the intifada erupted.
       He knew we were poised to present the ideas. His own people 
     were telling him they looked good. And we asked him to 
     intervene to ensure there wouldn't be violence after the 
     Sharon visit, the day after. He said he would. He didn't lift 
     a finger.

  On a final plan in December:

       Now, eventually we were able to get back to a point where 
     private channels between the two sides led each of them to 
     again ask us to present the ideas. This was in early 
     December. We brought the negotiators here.
       The ideas were presented on December 23 by the President, 
     and they basically said the following:
       On borders, there would be about a 5 percent annexation in 
     the West Bank for the Israelis and a 2 percent swap. So there 
     would be a net 97 percent of the territory that would go to 
     the Palestinians.
       On Jerusalem, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem 
     would become the capitol of the Palestinian state.
       On the issue of refugees, there would be a right of return 
     for the refugees to their own state, not to Israel, but there 
     would also be a fund of $30 billion internationally that 
     would be put together for either compensation or to cover 
     repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation costs.
       And when it came to security, there would be an 
     international presence, in place of the Israelis, in the 
     Jordan Valley.
       These were ideas that were comprehensive, unprecedented, 
     stretched very far, represented a culmination of an effort in 
     our best judgment as to what each side could accept after 
     thousands of hours of debate, discussion with each side.
       Arafat came to the White House on January 2.

  Mr. President, it was January 2, just before President Clinton left 
office.

       Met with the president, and I was there--

  ``I'' being Dennis Ross--

     in the Oval Office. He said yes, and then he added 
     reservations that basically meant he rejected every single 
     one of the things he was supposed to give.
       He [was] supposed to give, on Jerusalem, the idea that 
     there would be for the Israelis sovereignty over the Western 
     Wall, which would cover the areas that are of religious 
     significance to Israel. He rejected that.
       He rejected the idea on the refugees. He said we need a 
     whole new formula, as if what we had presented was non-
     existent.
       He rejected the basic ideas on security. He wouldn't even 
     countenance the idea that the Israelis would be able to 
     operate in Palestinian airspace.

  This is commercial aviation.

       You know when you fly into Israel today you go to Ben 
     Gurion. You fly in over the West Bank because you can't--
     there's no space through otherwise. He rejected that.
       So every single one of the ideas that was asked of him he 
     rejected.

  Dennis Ross then went on to say:

       It's very clear to me that his negotiators understood this 
     was the best they were ever going to get. They wanted him to 
     accept it. He was not prepared to accept it.

  Then on why Arafat said no. Dennis Ross said:

       Because fundamentally I do not believe he can end the 
     conflict. We had one critical clause in this agreement, and 
     that clause was, this is the end of the conflict.
       Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a 
     cause. Everything he has done as leader of the Palestinians 
     is to always leave his options open, never close a door. He 
     was being asked here, you've got to close the door. For him 
     to end the conflict is to end himself.

  Now, he was asked the question on whether Arafat believed he could 
get more through violence. This is how Dennis Ross responded. And I 
quote:

       It is possible he concluded that. It is possible he thought 
     he could do and get more with the violence. There's no doubt 
     in my mind that he thought the violence would create pressure 
     on the Israelis and on us and maybe the rest of the world.
       And I think there's one other factor. You have to 
     understand that Barak was able to reposition Israel 
     internationally. Israel was seen as having demonstrated 
     unmistakably it wanted peace, and the reason it wasn't 
     available, achievable was because Arafat wouldn't accept it.
       Arafat needed to re-establish the Palestinians as a victim, 
     and unfortunately they are a victim, and we see it now in a 
     terrible way.

  Mr. REID. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I certainly will.
  Mr. REID. I did not see this interview on television over the 
weekend, so I appreciate very much the Senator from California bringing 
it to my attention and the attention of the Senate and the American 
people.
  But it appears to me that what he has said--``he,'' meaning Dennis 
Ross--is that Yasser Arafat could not take yes for an answer. It 
appears that he and his people got everything they asked for, and that 
still was not good enough.
  Is that how the Senator sees that?
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I think that is exactly correct.
  What Dennis Ross said, essentially, was the final negotiations, that 
had been gone over prior to this meeting in the White House, had been 
gone over with the negotiators--that the implication is, that there was 
an assent to it by the negotiators, and then when the meeting was held 
in the White House, Arafat said, yes, but then he presented so many 
reservations that that clearly countermanded the ``yes.''
  So the implication that is drawn from that, I say to the Senator, is 
that you are absolutely right. When push came to shove, Yasser Arafat 
said no.
  Mr. REID. Well, I appreciate very much the Senator from California 
bringing this to our attention. And I have a clear picture that what 
has taken place in the Middle East since August a year ago is the 
direct result of the inability of Yasser Arafat to accept what he had 
asked for in the first place; that is, all the violence, all the 
deaths, all the destruction, I personally place at his footsteps.
  I want the Senator from California to know how I personally feel, 
that this man, to whom I tried to give every benefit of the doubt, has 
none of my doubt any more. I think Yasser Arafat is responsible for the 
problems in the Middle East totally.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I say to Senator Reid, thank you very much. I 
appreciate those comments. I think there are many in the Senate who 
share those comments. What is so significant to me because I know 
Dennis Ross--and Dennis Ross was really an excellent Middle East envoy, 
an excellent negotiator, fully knowledgeable about all of the points of 
convention--and I thought if anybody had a chance of achieving a 
settlement, it really was Dennis Ross and President Clinton. And, 
clearly, that did not happen. I think on this ``FOX News Sunday,'' 
Dennis Ross clearly said why it did not happen.
  So I appreciate those comments.

                          ____________________