[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 45 (Monday, April 22, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2995-S2997]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INTERVIEW WITH DENNIS ROSS
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, in reviewing my press clips this
morning, I saw an interview between Brit Hume on ``FOX News Sunday''
and Dennis Ross, President Clinton's Middle East envoy. Many of us have
followed closely the negotiations at Camp David, and also at Taba, but
never before have we really heard Dennis Ross comment on these
negotiations.
For the first time this past Sunday, we did. I was really quite
surprised by these comments. I thought they were of such significance
that I ask unanimous consent to have the entire interview printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Transcript: Dennis Ross, Former U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East
Following is a transcripted excerpt from FOX News Sunday,
April 21, 2002.
Brit Hume (host). Former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross has
worked to achieve Middle East peace throughout President
Clinton's final days in office. In the months following
Clinton's failed peace summit at Camp David, U.S. negotiators
continued behind-the-scenes peace talks with the Palestinians
and Israelis up until January 2001, and that followed
Clinton's presentation of ideas at the end of December 2000.
Dennis Ross joins us now with more details on all that, and
Fred Barnes joins the questioning.
So, Dennis, talk to us a little bit, if you can--I might
note that we're proud to able to say that you're a Fox News
contributing analyst.
Dennis Ross (Fmr. U.S. special envoy to the Middle East).
Thank you.
Hume. Talk to us about the sequence of events. The Camp
David talks, there was an offer. That was rejected. Talks
continued. You come now to December, and the president has a
new set of ideas. What unfolded?
Ross. Let me give you the sequence, because I think it puts
all this in perspective.
Number one, at Camp David we did not put a comprehensive
set of ideas on the table. We put ideas on the table that
would have affected the borders and would have affected
Jerusalem.
Arafat could not accept any of that. In fact, during the 15
days there, he never himself raised a single idea. His
negotiators did, to be fair to them, but he didn't. The only
new idea he raised at Camp David was that the temple didn't
exist in Jerusalem, it existed in Nablus.
[[Page S2996]]
Hume. This is the temple where Ariel Sharon paid a visit,
which was used as a kind of pre-text for the beginning of the
new intifada, correct?
Ross. This is the core of the Jewish faith.
Hume. Right.
Ross. So he was denying the core of the Jewish faith there.
After the summit, he immediately came back to us and he said,
``We need to have another summit,'' to which we said, ``We
just shot our wad. We got a no from you. You're prepared
actually to do a deal before we go back to something like
that.''
He agreed to set up a private channel between his people
and the Israelis, which I joined at the end of August. And
there were serious discussions that went on, and we were
poised to present out ideas the end of September, which is
when the intifada erupted. He knew we were poised to present
the ideas. His own people were telling him they looked good.
And we asked him to intervene to ensure there wouldn't be
violence after the Sharon visit, the day after. He said he
would. He didn't lift a finger.
Now, eventually we were able to get back to a point where
private channels between the two sides led each of them to
again ask us to present the ideas. This was in early
December. We brought the negotiators here.
Hume. Now, this was a request to the Clinton
administration----
Ross. Yes.
Hume [continuing]. To formulate a plan. Both sides wanted
this?
Ross. Absolutely.
Hume. All right.
Ross. Both sides asked us to present these ideas.
Hume. All right. And they were?
Ross. The ideas were presented on December 23 by the
president, and they basically said the following: On borders,
there would be about a 5 percent annexation in the West Bank
for the Israelis and a 2 percent swap. So there would be a
net 97 percent of the territory that would go to the
Palestinians.
On Jerusalem, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem
would become the capitol of the Palestinian state.
On the issue of refuges, there would be a right of return
for the refugees to their own state, not to Israel, but there
would also be a fund of $30 billion internationally that
would be put together for either compensation or to cover
repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation costs.
And when it came to security, there would be a
international presence, in place of the Israelis, in the
Jordan Valley.
These were ideas that were comprehensive, unprecedented,
stretched very far, represented a culmination of an effort in
our best judgment as to what each side could accept after
thousands of hours of debate, discussion with each side.
Barnes. Now, Palestinian officials say to this day that
Arafat said yes.
Ross. Arafat came to the White House on January 2. Met with
the president, and I was there in the Oval Office. He said
yes, and then he added reservations that basically meant he
rejected every single one of the things he was supposed to
give.
Hume. What was he supposed to give?
Ross. He was supposed to give, on Jerusalem, the idea that
there would be for the Israelis sovereignty over the Western
Wall, which would cover the areas that are of religious
significance to Israel. He rejected that.
Hume. He rejected their being able to have that?
Ross. He rejected that.
He rejected the idea on the refugees. He said we need a
whole new formula, as if what we had presented was non-
existent.
He rejected the basic ideas on security. He wouldn't even
countenance the idea that the Israelis would be able to
operate in Palestinian airspace.
You know when you fly into Israel today you go to Ben
Gurion. You fly in over the West Bank because you can't--
there's no space through otherwise. He rejected that.
So every single one of the ideas that was asked of him he
rejected.
Hume. Now, let's take a look at the map. Now, this is
what--how the Israelis had created a map based on the
president's ideas. And----
Ross. Right.
Hume. [continuing]. What can we--that situation shows that
the territory at least is contiguous. What about Gaza on that
map?
Ross. The Israelis would have gotten completely out of
Gaza. And what you see also in this line, they show an area
of temporary Israelis control along the border.
Hume. Right.
Ross. Now, that was an Israeli desire. That was not what we
presented. But we presented something that did point out that
it would take six years before the Israelis would be totally
out of the Jordan Valley.
So that map there that you see, which shows a very narrow
green space along the border, would become part of the
orange. So the Palestinians would have in the West Bank an
area that was contiguous. Those who say there were cantons,
completely untrue. It was contiguous.
Hume. Cantons being ghettos, in effect----
Ross. Right.
Hume [continuing]. That would be cut off from other parts
of the Palestinian state.
Ross. Completely untrue.
And to connect Gaza with the West Bank, there would have
been an elevated highway, an elevated railroad, to ensure
that there would be not just safe passage for the
Palestinians, but free passage.
Barnes. I have two other questions. One, the Palestinians
point out that this was never put on paper, this offer. Why
not?
Ross. We presented this to them so that they could record
it. When the president presented it, he went over it at
dictation speed. He then left the cabinet room. I stayed
behind. I sat with them to be sure, and checked to be sure
that every single word.
The reason we did it this way was to be sure they had it
and they could record it. But we told the Palestinians and
Israelis, if you cannot accept these ideas, this is the
culmination of the effort, we withdraw them. We did not want
to formalize it. We wanted them to understand we meant what
we said. You don't accept it, it's not for negotiation, this
is the end of it, we withdraw it.
So that's why they have it themselves recorded. And to this
day, the Palestinians have not presented to their own people
what was available.
Barnes. In other words, Arafat might use it as a basis for
further negotiations so he'd get more?
Ross. Well, exactly.
Hume. Which is what, in fact, he tried to do, according to
your account.
Ross. We treated it as not only a culmination. We wanted to
be sure it couldn't be a floor for negotiations.
Hume. Right.
Ross. It couldn't be a ceiling. It was the roof.
Hume. This was a final offer?
Ross. Exactly. Exactly right.
Hume. This was the solution.
Barnes. Was Arafat alone in rejecting it? I mean, what
about his negotiators?
Ross. It's very clear to me that his negotiators understood
this was the best they were ever going to get. They wanted
him to accept it. He was not prepared to accept it.
Hume. Now, it is often said that this whole sequence of
talks here sort of fell apart or ended or broke down or
whatever because of the intervention of the Israeli
elections. What about that?
Ross. The real issue you have to understand was not the
Israeli elections. It was the end of the Clinton
administration. The reason we would come with what was a
culminating offer was because we were out of time.
They asked us to present the ideas, both sides. We were
governed by the fact that the Clinton administration was
going to end, and both sides said we understand this is the
point of decision.
Hume. What, in your view, was the reason that Arafat, in
effect, said no?
Ross. Because fundamentally I do not believe he can end the
conflict. We had one critical clause in this agreement, and
that clause was, this is the end of the conflict.
Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a
cause. Everything he has done as leader of the Palestinians
is to always leave his options open, never close a door. He
was being asked here, you've got to close the door. For him
to end the conflict is to end himself.
Hume. Might it not also have been true, though, Dennis,
that, because the intifada had already begun--so you had the
Camp David offer rejected, the violence begins anew, a new
offer from the Clinton administration comes along, the
Israelis agree to it, Barak agrees to it----
Ross. Yes.
Hume [continuing]. Might he not have concluded that the
violence was working?
Ross. It is possible he concluded that. It is possible he
thought he could do and get more with the violence. There's
no doubt in my mind that he thought the violence would create
pressure on the Israelis and on us and maybe the rest of the
world.
And I think there's one other factor. You have to
understand that Barak was able to reposition Israel
internationally. Israel was seen as having demonstrated
unmistakably it wanted peace, and the reason it wasn't
available, achievable was because Arafat wouldn't accept it.
Arafat needed to re-establish the Palestinians as a victim,
and unfortunately they are a victim, and we see it now in a
terrible way.
Hume. Dennis Ross, thank you so much.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, on Camp David, let me quote Dennis
Ross, President Clinton's Middle East envoy and a person who literally
carried out thousands of hours of negotiation. He said:
Let me give you the sequence [of events], because I think
it puts all this in perspective. Number one, at Camp David we
did not put a comprehensive set of ideas on the table. We put
ideas on the table that would have affected borders and would
have affected Jerusalem.
Arafat could not accept any of that. In fact, during the 15
days there he never himself raised a single idea. His
negotiators did, to be fair to them, but he didn't. The only
new ideas he raised at Camp David was that the temple didn't
exist in Jerusalem, it existed in Nablus . . . So he was
denying the core of the Jewish faith there.
On the eruption of the Intifada:
After the summit, he immediately came back to us and he
said, ``We need to have another summit,'' to which we said,
``We just shot our wad. We got a no from you. You're prepared
actually to do a deal before we go back to something like
that.''
He agreed to set up a private channel between his people
and the Israelis, which I joined at the end of August. And
there were serious discussions that went on, and we
[[Page S2997]]
were poised to present our ideas the end of September, which
is when the intifada erupted.
He knew we were poised to present the ideas. His own people
were telling him they looked good. And we asked him to
intervene to ensure there wouldn't be violence after the
Sharon visit, the day after. He said he would. He didn't lift
a finger.
On a final plan in December:
Now, eventually we were able to get back to a point where
private channels between the two sides led each of them to
again ask us to present the ideas. This was in early
December. We brought the negotiators here.
The ideas were presented on December 23 by the President,
and they basically said the following:
On borders, there would be about a 5 percent annexation in
the West Bank for the Israelis and a 2 percent swap. So there
would be a net 97 percent of the territory that would go to
the Palestinians.
On Jerusalem, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem
would become the capitol of the Palestinian state.
On the issue of refugees, there would be a right of return
for the refugees to their own state, not to Israel, but there
would also be a fund of $30 billion internationally that
would be put together for either compensation or to cover
repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation costs.
And when it came to security, there would be an
international presence, in place of the Israelis, in the
Jordan Valley.
These were ideas that were comprehensive, unprecedented,
stretched very far, represented a culmination of an effort in
our best judgment as to what each side could accept after
thousands of hours of debate, discussion with each side.
Arafat came to the White House on January 2.
Mr. President, it was January 2, just before President Clinton left
office.
Met with the president, and I was there--
``I'' being Dennis Ross--
in the Oval Office. He said yes, and then he added
reservations that basically meant he rejected every single
one of the things he was supposed to give.
He [was] supposed to give, on Jerusalem, the idea that
there would be for the Israelis sovereignty over the Western
Wall, which would cover the areas that are of religious
significance to Israel. He rejected that.
He rejected the idea on the refugees. He said we need a
whole new formula, as if what we had presented was non-
existent.
He rejected the basic ideas on security. He wouldn't even
countenance the idea that the Israelis would be able to
operate in Palestinian airspace.
This is commercial aviation.
You know when you fly into Israel today you go to Ben
Gurion. You fly in over the West Bank because you can't--
there's no space through otherwise. He rejected that.
So every single one of the ideas that was asked of him he
rejected.
Dennis Ross then went on to say:
It's very clear to me that his negotiators understood this
was the best they were ever going to get. They wanted him to
accept it. He was not prepared to accept it.
Then on why Arafat said no. Dennis Ross said:
Because fundamentally I do not believe he can end the
conflict. We had one critical clause in this agreement, and
that clause was, this is the end of the conflict.
Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a
cause. Everything he has done as leader of the Palestinians
is to always leave his options open, never close a door. He
was being asked here, you've got to close the door. For him
to end the conflict is to end himself.
Now, he was asked the question on whether Arafat believed he could
get more through violence. This is how Dennis Ross responded. And I
quote:
It is possible he concluded that. It is possible he thought
he could do and get more with the violence. There's no doubt
in my mind that he thought the violence would create pressure
on the Israelis and on us and maybe the rest of the world.
And I think there's one other factor. You have to
understand that Barak was able to reposition Israel
internationally. Israel was seen as having demonstrated
unmistakably it wanted peace, and the reason it wasn't
available, achievable was because Arafat wouldn't accept it.
Arafat needed to re-establish the Palestinians as a victim,
and unfortunately they are a victim, and we see it now in a
terrible way.
Mr. REID. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I certainly will.
Mr. REID. I did not see this interview on television over the
weekend, so I appreciate very much the Senator from California bringing
it to my attention and the attention of the Senate and the American
people.
But it appears to me that what he has said--``he,'' meaning Dennis
Ross--is that Yasser Arafat could not take yes for an answer. It
appears that he and his people got everything they asked for, and that
still was not good enough.
Is that how the Senator sees that?
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I think that is exactly correct.
What Dennis Ross said, essentially, was the final negotiations, that
had been gone over prior to this meeting in the White House, had been
gone over with the negotiators--that the implication is, that there was
an assent to it by the negotiators, and then when the meeting was held
in the White House, Arafat said, yes, but then he presented so many
reservations that that clearly countermanded the ``yes.''
So the implication that is drawn from that, I say to the Senator, is
that you are absolutely right. When push came to shove, Yasser Arafat
said no.
Mr. REID. Well, I appreciate very much the Senator from California
bringing this to our attention. And I have a clear picture that what
has taken place in the Middle East since August a year ago is the
direct result of the inability of Yasser Arafat to accept what he had
asked for in the first place; that is, all the violence, all the
deaths, all the destruction, I personally place at his footsteps.
I want the Senator from California to know how I personally feel,
that this man, to whom I tried to give every benefit of the doubt, has
none of my doubt any more. I think Yasser Arafat is responsible for the
problems in the Middle East totally.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I say to Senator Reid, thank you very much. I
appreciate those comments. I think there are many in the Senate who
share those comments. What is so significant to me because I know
Dennis Ross--and Dennis Ross was really an excellent Middle East envoy,
an excellent negotiator, fully knowledgeable about all of the points of
convention--and I thought if anybody had a chance of achieving a
settlement, it really was Dennis Ross and President Clinton. And,
clearly, that did not happen. I think on this ``FOX News Sunday,''
Dennis Ross clearly said why it did not happen.
So I appreciate those comments.
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