[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 31 (Monday, March 18, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2009-S2014]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  STATEMENT ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS--MARCH 18, 2002

      By Mr. HUTCHINSON (for himself and Mr. Lott):
  S. 2025. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to increase 
the rate of special pension for recipients of the Medal of Honor and to 
make that special pension effective from the date of the act for which 
the recipient is awarded the Medal of Honor and to amend title 18, 
United States Code, to increase the criminal penalties associated with 
misuse of fraud relating to the Medal of Honor; to the Committee on 
Veterans' Affairs.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Living 
American Hero Appreciation Act. This legislation honors those Americans 
that have exhibited the highest levels of courage. It ensures that the 
recipients of the Medal of Honor receive the recognition and support 
that they earned through their acts of bravery. As the war on terrorism 
progresses, I believe that it is important that we remember those that 
have already fought for our Nation, and placed themselves in peril in 
order to defend our freedom.
  As the senior Senator from Arkansas, I'm very proud that my State has 
produced over 20 Medal of Honor recipients. Three of these courageous 
individuals still live in Arkansas. Clarence Craft of Fayetteville and 
Nathan Gordon of Morrilton received their medals as a result of heroism 
in World War II. Nick Bacon of Little Rock was cited for his courage in 
Vietnam. Nick has continued his service to our Nation as the Director 
of the Arkansas Department of Veterans Affairs.
  This legislation will ensure that our Nation's Medal of Honor 
recipients receive the recognition that they've earned. It will raise 
their special pension to $1,000 a month. More significantly, though, it 
will ensure that recipients receive pension payment for the period 
between the act of heroism for which the individual was given the 
medal, and the actually issuance of the medal. These courageous 
individuals should not be penalized for administrative delays in 
issuing the decoration. Finally, this bill includes increased criminal 
penalties for the unauthorized purchase, possession of a Medal of 
Honor, and for false impersonation of a Medal of Honor recipient.
  I want to thank Congressman Curt Weldon for his hard work in getting 
this bill passed by the House of Representatives. It is my privilege to 
introduce the Senate version of this bill, and I look forward to 
working with my colleagues for its swift passage.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2025

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Living American Hero 
     Appreciation Act''.

     SEC. 2. INCREASE IN RATE OF SPECIAL PENSION FOR MEDAL OF 
                   HONOR RECIPIENTS AND RETROACTIVITY OF PAYMENTS 
                   TO DATE OF ACTION.

       (a) Increase in Special Pension.--Section 1562(a) of title 
     38, United States Code, is amended by striking ``a special 
     pension at the rate of'' and all that follows through the 
     period at the end and inserting ``a special pension, 
     beginning as of the first day of the first month that begins 
     after the date of the act for which that person was awarded 
     the Medal of Honor. The special pension shall be at the rate 
     of $1000, as increased from time to time under section 
     5312(a) of this title.''.
       (b) Cost of Living Adjustment.--Section 5312(a) of such 
     title is amended by inserting after ``children,'' the 
     following: ``the rate of special pension paid under section 
     1562 of this title,''.
       (c) Lump Sum Payment for Existing Medal of Honor 
     Recipients.--The Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall, within 
     60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, make a 
     lump sum payment to each person who is, immediately before 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, in receipt of the 
     pension payable under section 1562 of title 38, United States 
     Code (as amended by subsection (a)). Such payment shall be in 
     the amount equal to the total amount of special pension that 
     the person would have received had the person received 
     special pension during the period beginning as of the first 
     day of the first month that began after the date of the act 
     for which that person was awarded the Medal of Honor and 
     ending with the last day of the month preceding the month 
     that such person's special pension in fact commenced. For 
     each month of such period, the amount of special pension 
     shall be determined using the rate of special pension that 
     was in effect for that month.

     SEC. 3. CRIMINAL PENALTY FOR UNAUTHORIZED PURCHASE OR 
                   POSSESSION OF MEDAL OF HONOR OR FOR FALSE 
                   PERSONATION AS A RECIPIENT OF MEDAL OF HONOR.

       (a) Unauthorized Purchase or Possession.--Section 704 of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a) by striking ``In general.--Whoever'' 
     and inserting ``In General.--Except as provided in subsection 
     (b), whoever''; and
       (2) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:
       ``(b) Medal of Honor.--
       ``(1) In general.--Whoever knowingly wears, possesses, 
     manufactures, purchases, or sells a Medal of Honor, or the 
     ribbon, button, or rosette of a Medal of Honor, or any 
     colorable imitation thereof, except when authorized under 
     regulations made pursuant to law, shall be fined under this 
     title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
       ``(2) Definitions.--As used in this subsection:
       ``(A) The term `Medal of Honor' means--
       ``(i) a medal of honor awarded under section 3741, 6241, or 
     8741 of title 10 or under section 491 of title 14;
       ``(ii) a duplicate medal of honor issued under section 
     3754, 6256, or 8753 of title 10 or under section 504 of title 
     14; or
       ``(iii) a replacement of a medal of honor provided under 
     section 3747, 6253, or 8751 of title 10 or under section 501 
     of title 14.
       ``(B) The term `sells' includes trades, barters, or 
     exchanges for anything of value.''.
       (b) False Personation.--(1) Chapter 43 of such title is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new section:

     ``Sec. 918. Medal of honor recipient

       ``(a) Whoever falsely or fraudulently holds himself out as 
     having been, or represents or pretends himself to have been, 
     awarded a medal of honor shall be fined under this title or 
     imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
       ``(b) As used in this section, the term `medal of honor' 
     means a medal awarded under section 3741, 6241, or 8741 of 
     title 10 or under section 491 of title 14.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``918. Medal of honor recipient.''.

[[Page S2010]]

                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. LUGAR:
  S. 2036. A bill to authorize the use of Cooperative Threat Reduction 
funds for projects and activities to address proliferation threats 
outside the states of the former Soviet Union, and for other purposes; 
to the Committee on Armed Services.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Nunn-Lugar/
CTR Expansion Act. My bill would authorize the Secretary of Defense to 
use up to $50 million of unobligated Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat 
Reduction funds for non-proliferation projects and emergencies outside 
the states of the former Soviet Union.
  In 1991, I introduced the Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction 
legislation with former Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia. The program was 
designed to assist the states of the former Soviet Union in dismantling 
weapons of mass destruction and establishing verifiable safeguards 
against the proliferation of those weapons. For more than 20 years the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has been our country's principal 
response to the proliferation threat that resulted from the 
disintegration of the custodial system guarding the Soviet nuclear, 
chemical, and biological legacy.
  The Nunn-Lugar program has destroyed a vast array of former Soviet 
weaponry, including 443 ballistic missiles, 427 ballistic missile 
launchers, 92 bombers, 483 long-range nuclear air-launched cruise 
missiles, 368 submarine ballistic missile launchers, 286 submarine 
launched ballistic missiles, 21 strategic missile submarines, 194 
nuclear test tunnels, and 5,809 nuclear warheads that were mounted on 
strategic systems aimed at us. All this has been accomplished at a cost 
of less than one-third of 1 percent of the Department of Defense's 
annual budget. In addition, Nunn-Lugar facilitated the removal of all 
nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus.
  Nunn-Lugar also has launched aggressive efforts to safeguard and 
eliminate the former Soviet chemical and biological weapons arsenals. 
The Nunn-Lugar Program has been used to upgrade the security 
surrounding these dangerous substances and to provide civilian 
employment to tens of thousands of Russian weapons scientists. We are 
now beginning efforts to construct facilities that will destroy the 
Russian arsenal of chemical warheads.
  The continuing experience of Nunn-Lugar has created a tremendous non-
proliferation asset for the United States. We have an impressive cadre 
of talented scientists, technicians, negotiators, and managers working 
for the Defense Department and for associated defense contractors. 
These individuals understand how to implement non-proliferation 
programs and how to respond to proliferation emergencies. The bill I am 
introducing today would permit and facilitate the use of Nunn-Lugar 
expertise and resources when non-proliferation threats around the world 
are identified.
  The Nunn-Lugar/CTR Expansion Act would be a vita component of our 
national security strategy in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The 
problem we face today is not just terrorism. It is the nexus between 
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. There is little doubt that 
Osama bin Laden and al-Quaeda would have used weapons of mass 
destruction if they had possessed them. It is equally clear that they 
have made an effort to obtain them.

  The al-Quaeda terrorist attacks on the United States were planned to 
kill thousands of people indiscriminately. The goal was massive 
destruction of institutions, wealth, national morale, and innocent 
people. We can safely assume that those objectives have not changed. As 
horrible as the tragedy of September 11th was, the death, destruction, 
and disruption to American society was minimal compared to what could 
have been inflicted by a weapon of mass destruction.
  Victory in this war must be defined not only in terms of finding and 
killing Osama bin Laden or destroying terrorist cells in this or that 
country. We must also undertake the ambitious goal of comprehensively 
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  Let me propose a fairly simple and clear definition of victory. 
Imagine two lists. The first list is of those nation-states that house 
terrorist cells, voluntarily or involuntarily. Those states can be 
highlighted on a map illustrating who and where they are. Our stated 
goal will be to shrink that list nation by nation. Through intelligence 
sharing, termination of illicit financial channels, support of local 
police work, diplomacy, and public information, a coalition of nations 
led by the United States should seek to root out each cell in a 
comprehensive manner for years to come and maintain a public record of 
success that the world can observe and measure. If we are diligent and 
determined, we can terminate or cripple most of these cells.
  But there should also be a second list. It would contain all of the 
states that possess materials, programs, or weapons of mass 
destruction. We should demand that each of these nation-states account 
for all of the materials, programs, and weapons in a manner that is 
internationally verifiable. We should demand that all such weapons and 
materials be made secure from theft or threat of proliferation, using 
the funds of that country and supplemented by international funds if 
required. We should work with each nation to formulate programs of 
continuing accountability and destruction.
  Victory, then, can be succinctly stated: we must keep the world's 
most dangerous technologies out of the hands of the world's most 
dangerous people. This requires diligent work that shrinks both lists. 
Both lists should be clear and finite. The war against terrorism will 
not be over until all nations on the lists have complied with these 
standards.
  Despite the tremendous progress realized by the Nunn-Lugar program in 
the former Soviet Union, the United States continues to lack even 
minimal international confidence about many foreign weapons programs. 
In most cases, there is little or no information regarding the number 
of weapons or amounts of materials a country may have produced, the 
storage procedures they employ to safeguard their weapons, or plans 
regarding further production or destruction programs. We must pay much 
more attention to making certain that all weapons and materials of mass 
destruction are identified, continuously guarded, and systematically 
destroyed.
  As the United States and our allies have sought to address the 
threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the 
aftermath of September 11, we have come to the realization that, in 
many cases, we lack the appropriate tools to address these 
threats. Traditional avenues of approach such as arms control treaties 
and various multilateral sanction regimes have met with some success, 
but there is still much work to do. In some cases, it is unlikely that 
the existing multilateral frameworks and non-proliferation tools retain 
much utility. In fact, several nations have announced their intention 
to continue to flout international norms such as the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.

  Beyond Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union, Nunn-
Lugar-style cooperative threat reduction programs aimed at weapons 
dismantlement and counter-proliferation do not exist. The ability to 
apply the Nunn-Lugar model to states outside the former Soviet Union 
would provide the United States with another tool to confront the 
threats associated with weapons of mass destruction.
  The precise replication of the Nunn-Lugar program will not be 
possible everywhere. Clearly, many states will continue to avoid 
accountability for programs related to weapons of mass destruction. 
When nations resist such accountability, other options must be 
explored. When governments continue to contribute to the WMD threat 
facing the United States, we must be prepared to apply diplomatic and 
economic power, as well as military force.
  Yet we should not assume that we cannot forge cooperative non-
proliferation programs with some critical nations. The experience of 
the Nunn-Lugar program in Russia has demonstrated that the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary outcomes based on 
mutual interest. No one would have predicted in the 1980s that American 
contractors and DOD officials would be on the ground in Russia 
destroying thousands of strategic systems. If we are to protect 
ourselves during this incredibly dangerous period, we must create new 
non-proliferation partners and aggressively pursue any non-
proliferation opportunities that appear. The Nunn-

[[Page S2011]]

Lugar/CTR Expansion Act would be a first step down that road. 
Ultimately, a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency, and 
safety must be established in every nation with a WMD program.
  My legislation is designed to empower the Administration to respond 
to both emergency proliferation risks and less-urgent cooperative 
opportunities to further non-proliferation goals. When the Defense 
Department identifies a non-proliferation opportunity that is not time 
sensitive, when the near-term threat of diversion or theft is low, it 
should consult with Congress. In such a scenario my bill would require 
the Secretary of Defense to notify the appropriate congressional 
entities of his intent to utilize unobligated Nunn-Lugar funds and to 
describe the legal and diplomatic framework for the application of non-
proliferation assistance. Congress would have time to review the 
proposal and consult with the Department of Defense. This process would 
closely parallel the existing notification and obligation procedures 
that are in place for Nunn-Lugar activities in the former Soviet Union.
  However, proliferation threats sometimes require an instantaneous 
response. If the Secretary of Defense determines that we must move more 
quickly than traditional consultation procedures allow, my legislation 
provides the Pentagon with the authority to launch emergency 
operations. We must not allow a proliferation or WMD threat to ``go 
critical'' because we lacked the foresight to empower DOD to respond. 
In the former Soviet Union the value of being able to respond to 
proliferation emergencies has been clearly demonstrated. Under Nunn-
Lugar the United States has undertaken time-sensitive missions like 
Project Sapphire in Kazakstan and Operation Auburn Endeavor in Georgia 
that have kept highly vulnerable weapons and materials of mass 
destruction from being proliferated.
  This type of scenario does not mean Congress will abandon its 
oversight responsibilities; the Secretary of Defense will be required 
to report to the appropriate congressional entities within 72 hours of 
launching of a mission describing the emergency and the conditions 
under which the assistance was provided. The review process permits 
Congress to investigate the incident and decide if the authority needs 
to be restricted or amended.
  In consulting with the administration on this legislation, we 
explored how to create the flexibility necessary to respond to WMD 
threats while protecting congressional prerogatives and maintaining the 
necessary checks and balances. Accordingly, I have included several 
conditions beyond the strenuous reporting requirements.
  First, my bill permits the Secretary of Defense to provide equipment, 
goods, and services but does not include authority to provide cash 
directly to the project or activity. This preserves one of the basic 
tenets of the program: Nunn-Lugar is not foreign aid. In fact, more 
than 80 percent of Nunn-Lugar funds have been awarded to American firms 
to carry out dismantlement and non-proliferation assistance programs in 
the former Soviet Union.
  The bill also requires the Secretary of Defense to avoid singling out 
any particular existing Nunn-Lugar project as an exclusive or 
predominate source of funds for emergency projects outside the former 
Soviet Union. In other words, it is my intent that the Pentagon utilize 
resources from a number of different Nunn-Lugar projects so as to 
reduce any impact on the original, on-going Nunn-Lugar program in the 
former Soviet Union. The Secretary also is required to the maximum 
extent practicable, to replace any program funds taken on emergency 
operations in the next annual budget submission or supplemental 
appropriations request.
  Lastly, if the Pentagon employs the emergency authority to carry out 
non-proliferation or dismantlement activities in two consecutive years 
in the same country, the Secretary of Defense must submit another 
report to Congress. This report would analyze whether a new Nunn-Lugar-
style program should be established with the country in question. If 
the Pentagon has successfully carried out cooperative threat reduction 
activities 2 years in a row with a country, we should explore how to 
expand this cooperation. We should also recognize that where sustained 
cooperation has been developed it is likely to be more efficient to 
provide assistance through an established Nunn-Lugar-style program.
  The Nunn-Lugar/CTR Expansion Act can make valuable contributions to 
the implementation of the war on terrorism and our non-proliferation 
policy. It is not a silver bullet, and it cannot be used in every 
circumstance, but it is our best option in carrying out cooperative 
non-proliferation activities outside the former Soviet Union.
  There are always risks when expanding a successful venture into new 
areas, but we must give the Administration every opportunity to 
interdict and neutralize the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. This new venture, like its predecessor, will take time to 
organize and to establish operating procedures. But I am hopeful that a 
decade from now, we will look back on this effort and rejoice in our 
persistent and successful efforts to provide great security for our 
country and the world at critical moments of decision.
  I ask my colleagues to join with me in passing this important 
legislation.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. DeWine and Mr. Feingold):
  S. 2027. A bill to implement effective measures to stop trade in 
conflict diamonds, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, today I have introduced a new bill along 
with Senator Mike DeWine, a Republican from Ohio, and Senator Russ 
Feingold, a Democrat from Wisconsin, which intends to address the U.S. 
response to the scourge of conflict diamonds.
  In war-torn areas in Africa, rebels and human rights abusers, with 
the complicity of some governments, have exploited the diamond trade, 
particularly alluvial diamond fields, to fund their guerrilla wars, to 
murder, rape, and mutilate innocent civilians, and kidnap children to 
be part of their guerrilla forces.
  Since November, the press has reported a connection between al-Qaida 
operatives and conflict diamonds. Those connections were noted in 
advance of the September 11 attack. It stands to reason that when we 
have a terrorist organization and a country such as the United States 
in concert with its allies trying to trace the financial transactions 
that fund this terrorism, the terrorists will look for some other coin 
of the realm, some other way to fund their operations. Conflict 
diamonds turned out to be one of the most easy, portable, and least 
detected way to do it.
  It is quite clear that Hezbollah, another terrorist organization in 
the Middle East, has had a long history of dealing in conflict 
diamonds.
  While the conflict diamond trade comprises anywhere from an estimated 
3 to 15 percent of the legitimate diamond trade, it threatens to damage 
an entire industry worldwide, an industry that is important to the 
economies of many countries and critical to a number of developing 
countries in Africa.
  How does it work?
  The terrorists go into the diamond fields where the natives of West 
Africa are trying to find these alluvial diamonds in the streams and 
the mud as they used to pan for gold in California and Alaska. They 
terrorize the local natives. They line them up in a row and walk 
through and hack off their feet and their hands until the natives and 
the miners in the circumstance are absolutely terrified. They threaten 
them with mutilation, with rape, and torture, destroying their villages 
and their lives. They literally become slaves to these terrorists, who 
then grab the diamonds and sell them into the terrorist networks.
  Governments, the international diamond industry, and nongovernmental 
religious organizations have worked hard to address this complicated 
issue. They have set an impressive example of public and private 
cooperation. For the last 18 months, many countries involved in the 
Kimberly Process have been working to design a new regimen to govern 
the trade in rough diamonds. About 70 percent, by some estimates, of 
all the diamonds that are mined and found in the world are sold in the 
United States. The United States needs to show a leadership role in 
dealing with conflict diamonds so the terrorists know it is not going 
to be easy. We

[[Page S2012]]

are going to make it more difficult. We are going to try to establish 
controls so we know if diamonds were brought into the trade by illegal 
or legal means.
  Last year, I introduced a bill called the Clean Diamonds Act, S. 
1084, along with Senators DeWine and Feingold, to reflect the consensus 
that had developed between the religious and human rights communities 
and the diamond industry on the U.S. response to this issue. Senator 
Judd Gregg, who had introduced his own amendments and legislation 
dealing with this issue in the past, joined in cosponsoring our bill, 
as did a bipartisan group of 11 additional Senators.

  In the House of Representatives, Congressmen Tony Hall and Frank Wolf 
have been leaders on this issue. They introduced several bills to 
address it. They worked with the Ways and Means Committee and the 
administration to pass the bill last November, H.R. 2722, the Clean 
Diamonds Trade Act, which, while a step forward, I am afraid, did not 
do enough to meet the original intent of our congressional effort. I 
had hoped Senator DeWine, Senator Feingold, and I might be able to work 
out an agreement with the administration to make some changes to 
strengthen the House-passed bill, but unfortunately that has not 
happened.
  In the meantime, the international effort is continuing. Talks that 
we hope will one day lead to a final session of the Kimberly Process 
are underway today, tomorrow, and Wednesday in Ottawa. I am concerned 
key issues remain unresolved or have been addressed in ways that could 
undermine the whole initiative, leading to the failure to produce an 
effective Kimberly agreement.
  Specifically, the negotiators need to address the issues of 
independent monitoring, the collection of reliable statistics, and the 
need for a coordinating body to implement the agreed-upon system of 
controls on rough diamond exports. In addition, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office, in its February 13 testimony entitled ``Significant 
Challenges Remain in Deterring Trade in Conflict Diamonds,'' outlined 
other potential witnesses in transparency, accountability, and risk 
assessment, particularly relating to controls from the mine to export.
  We have decided we need to introduce a new, stronger Senate version 
of the Clean Diamonds Trade Act to move this issue forward and to 
address developments such as the revelations about terrorist 
exploitation of diamonds and the potential weaknesses in the 
international agreement.
  Think about these diamonds moving across the world. You can put a 
fortune in your hand, put it into your pocket, and walk through any 
metal detector undetected. You can carry them on an airplane around the 
world, use them as people would use gold ingots or checking accounts. 
They are fungible wherever you go.
  Our bill includes a broad definition of conflict diamonds, so it 
covers the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, not 
simply areas that have been singled out by the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions. Our definition also covers the terrorists named by 
President George Bush in his Executive Order 13224.
  The House bill does not give the authority to the President that he 
has already under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and 
has already in fact exercised to implement existing U.N. Security 
Council resolutions, nor does the House bill require the President to 
do anything to respond to this problem.
  Our bill requires the President to prohibit the importation of rough 
diamonds from countries not taking effective measures to stop the trade 
in conflict diamonds if that prohibition is in the foreign policy 
interest of the United States.
  It is clear to me those responsible for the conflict diamond trade 
will stop at nothing in their efforts to circumvent the international 
efforts being negotiated. To transform a rough diamond into a polished 
diamond for purposes of import classification, all someone needs to do 
is make one cut. That distinction in the House-passed bill is a 
terrible loophole. The importation of polished diamonds or jewelry 
containing diamonds is a potentially huge loophole as well through 
which conflict diamonds could have been imported into the United 
States. The House-passed bill did not protect against that loophole.

  The House bill also does not require but only permits the President 
to prohibit the importation of specific shipments of polished diamonds 
or jewelry containing diamonds into our country, if he has credible 
evidence they were produced from conflict diamonds. Our bill requires 
it.
  Our bill also permits the President to prohibit the importation of 
polished diamonds and jewelry containing diamonds from countries that 
do not take effective measures to stop the trade in conflict diamonds.
  With these two provisions, we hope to send a strong message that the 
United States will close the polished diamond and diamond jewelry 
loopholes so that American consumers can have confidence that the 
diamond they buy for an engagement, an anniversary, or another 
milestone in their lives is from a legitimate and responsible source.
  Finally, our bill eliminates the safe harbor provision contained in 
the House bill which would allow circumvention of the Kimberly Process 
before an agreement were even finalized. While these negotiations are 
proceeding and while we are trying to secure the cooperation of all 
parties concerned, this is not the time to undercut it.
  The world was shocked and horrified by the murder, mutilation, and 
terror imposed on the people of Sierra Leone by rebels funded with 
conflict diamonds. The moral outcry by religious and human rights 
groups galvanized governments and the diamond industry to address the 
problem. Now is the time to close the deal and to secure an effective 
agreement, not an exercise in public relations. Now is also the time to 
have strong U.S. legislation to say to the world the United States will 
do as much as it can to stop this scourge.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.

                                S. 2027

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Clean Diamond Trade Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) Funds derived from the sale of rough diamonds are being 
     used by rebels, state actors, and terrorists to finance 
     military activities, overthrow legitimate governments, 
     subvert international efforts to promote peace and stability, 
     and commit horrifying atrocities against unarmed civilians. 
     During the past decade, more than 6,500,000 people from 
     Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the 
     Congo have been driven from their homes by wars waged in 
     large part for control of diamond mining areas. A million of 
     these are refugees eking out a miserable existence in 
     neighboring countries, and tens of thousands have fled to the 
     United States. Approximately 3,700,000 people have died 
     during these wars.
       (2) The countries caught in this fighting are home to 
     nearly 70,000,000 people whose societies have been torn apart 
     not only by fighting but also by terrible human rights 
     violations.
       (3) Human rights advocates, the diamond trade as 
     represented by the World Diamond Council, and the United 
     States Government recently began working to block the trade 
     in conflict diamonds. Their efforts have helped to build a 
     consensus that action is urgently needed to end the trade in 
     conflict diamonds.
       (4) The United Nations Security Council has acted at 
     various times under chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
     Nations to address threats to international peace and 
     security posed by conflicts linked to diamonds. Through these 
     actions, it has prohibited all states from exporting weapons 
     to certain countries affected by such conflicts. It has 
     further required all states to prohibit the direct and 
     indirect import of rough diamonds from Angola and Sierra 
     Leone unless the diamonds are controlled under specified 
     certificate of origin regimes and to prohibit absolutely for 
     a period of 12 months the direct and indirect import of rough 
     diamonds from Liberia.
       (5) In response, the United States implemented sanctions 
     restricting the importation of rough diamonds from Angola and 
     Sierra Leone to those diamonds accompanied by specified 
     certificates of origin and fully prohibiting the importation 
     of rough diamonds from Liberia. In order to put an end to the 
     emergency situation in international relations, to maintain 
     international peace and security, and to protect its 
     essential security interests, and pursuant to its obligations 
     under the United Nations Charter, the United States is now 
     taking further action against trade in conflict diamonds.

[[Page S2013]]

       (6) Without effective action to eliminate trade in conflict 
     diamonds, the trade in legitimate diamonds faces the threat 
     of a consumer backlash that could damage the economies of 
     countries not involved in the trade in conflict diamonds and 
     penalize members of the legitimate trade and the people they 
     employ. To prevent that, South Africa and more than 30 other 
     countries are involved in working, through the ``Kimberley 
     Process'', toward devising a solution to this problem. As the 
     consumer of a majority of the world's supply of diamonds, the 
     United States has an obligation to help sever the link 
     between diamonds and conflict and press for implementation of 
     an effective solution.
       (7) Articles XX and XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
     and Trade 1994 allow members of the World Trade Organization 
     to take measures to deal with situations such as that 
     presented by the current trade in conflict diamonds without 
     violating their World Trade Organization obligations.
       (8) Failure to curtail the trade in conflict diamonds or to 
     differentiate between the trade in conflict diamonds and the 
     trade in legitimate diamonds could have a severe negative 
     impact on the legitimate diamond trade in countries such as 
     Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Tanzania.
       (9) Initiatives of the United States seek to resolve the 
     regional conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa which facilitate the 
     trade in conflict diamonds.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Conflict diamonds.--The term ``conflict diamonds'' 
     means--
       (A) rough diamonds the importation of which is prohibited 
     by United Nations Security Council Resolutions because that 
     trade is fueling conflict;
       (B) in the case of rough diamonds not covered by 
     subparagraph (A), rough diamonds used by any armed movement 
     or an ally of an armed movement to finance or sustain 
     operations to carry out systematic human rights abuses or 
     attacks against unarmed civilians; or
       (C) diamonds that evidence shows fund the al-Qaeda 
     international terrorist network and related groups designated 
     under Executive Order No. 13224 of September 23, 2001 (66 
     Federal Register 49079).
       (2) Diamonds.--The term ``diamonds'' means diamonds 
     classifiable under subheading 7102.31.00 or subheading 
     7102.39.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
     States.
       (3) Polished diamonds.--The term ``polished diamonds'' 
     means diamonds classifiable under subheading 7102.39.00 of 
     the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.
       (4) Rough diamonds.--The term ``rough diamonds'' means 
     diamonds that are unworked, or simply sawn, cleaved, or 
     bruted, classifiable under subheading 7102.31.00 of the 
     Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.
       (5) United states.--The term ``United States'', when used 
     in the geographic sense, means the several States, the 
     District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or 
     possession of the United States.

     SEC. 4. MEASURES TO PREVENT IMPORTS OF CONFLICT DIAMONDS.

       (a) Authority of the President.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the President shall prohibit, in whole or 
     in part, the importation into the United States of rough 
     diamonds, and may prohibit the importation into the United 
     States of polished diamonds and jewelry containing diamonds, 
     from any country that does not take effective measures to 
     stop trade in conflict diamonds as long as the prohibition is 
     consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United 
     States, including the international obligations of the United 
     States, or is pursuant to United Nations Security Council 
     Resolutions on conflict diamonds.
       (b) Effective Measures.--For purposes of this Act, 
     effective measures are measures that--
       (1) meet the requirements of United Nations Security 
     Council Resolutions on trade in conflict diamonds;
       (2) meet the requirements of an international arrangement 
     on conflict diamonds, including the recommendations of the 
     Kimberley Process, as long as the measures also meet the 
     requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
     on trade in conflict diamonds; or
       (3) contain the following elements, or their functional 
     equivalent, if such elements are sufficient to meet the 
     requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
     on trade in conflict diamonds:
       (A) With respect to exports from countries where rough 
     diamonds are extracted, secure packaging, accompanied by 
     officially validated documentation certifying the country of 
     origin, total carat weight, and value.
       (B) With respect to exports from countries where rough 
     diamonds are extracted, a system of verifiable controls on 
     rough diamonds from mine to export.
       (C) With respect to countries that reexport rough diamonds, 
     a system of controls designed to ensure that no conflict 
     diamonds have entered the legitimate trade in rough diamonds.
       (D) Verifiable recordkeeping by all companies and 
     individuals engaged in mining, import, and export of rough 
     diamonds within the territory of the exporting country, 
     subject to inspection and verification by authorized 
     government authorities in accordance with national 
     regulations.
       (E) Government publication on a periodic basis of official 
     rough diamond export and import statistics.
       (F) Implementation of proportionate and dissuasive 
     penalties against any persons who violate laws and 
     regulations designed to combat trade in conflict diamonds.
       (G) Full cooperation with the United Nations or other 
     official international bodies examining the trade in conflict 
     diamonds, especially with respect to any inspection and 
     monitoring of the trade in rough diamonds.
       (c) Exclusions.--The provisions of this section do not 
     apply to--
       (1) rough diamonds imported by or on behalf of a person for 
     personal use and accompanying a person upon entry into the 
     United States; or
       (2) rough diamonds previously exported from the United 
     States and reimported by the same importer, without having 
     been advanced in value or improved in condition by any 
     process or other means while abroad, if the importer declares 
     that the reimportation of the rough diamonds satisfies the 
     requirements of this paragraph.

     SEC. 5. PROHIBITION OF POLISHED DIAMONDS AND JEWELRY.

       The President shall prohibit specific entries into the 
     customs territory of the United States of polished diamonds 
     and jewelry containing diamonds if the President has credible 
     evidence that such polished diamonds and jewelry were 
     produced with conflict diamonds.

     SEC. 6. ENFORCEMENT.

       (a) In General.--Diamonds and jewelry containing diamonds 
     imported into the United States in violation of any 
     prohibition imposed under section 4 or 5 are subject to the 
     seizure and forfeiture laws, and all criminal and civil laws 
     of the United States shall apply, to the same extent as any 
     other violation of the customs and navigation laws of the 
     United States.
       (b) Proceeds From Fines and Forfeited Goods.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the proceeds 
     derived from fines imposed for violations of section 4(a), 
     and from the seizure and forfeiture of goods imported in 
     violation of section 4(a), shall, in addition to amounts 
     otherwise available for such purposes, be available only 
     for--
       (1) the Leahy War Victims Fund administered by the United 
     States Agency for International Development or any successor 
     program to assist victims of foreign wars; and
       (2) grants under section 131 of the Foreign Assistance Act 
     of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2152a).

     SEC. 7. REPORTS.

       (a) Annual Reports.--Not later than one year after the 
     effective date of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter, 
     the President shall transmit to Congress a report--
       (1) describing actions taken by countries that have 
     exported diamonds to the United States during the preceding 
     12-month period to implement effective measures to stop trade 
     in conflict diamonds;
       (2) describing any new technologies since the date of 
     enactment of this Act for marking diamonds or determining the 
     origin of rough diamonds;
       (3) identifying those countries that have exported diamonds 
     to the United States during the preceding 12-month period and 
     are not implementing effective measures to stop trade in 
     conflict diamonds and whose failure to do so has 
     significantly increased the likelihood that conflict diamonds 
     are being imported into the United States;
       (4) describing appropriate actions, which may include 
     actions under sections 4 and 5, that may be taken by the 
     United States, or actions that may be taken or are being 
     taken by each country identified under paragraph (3), to 
     ensure that conflict diamonds are not being imported into the 
     United States from such country; and
       (5) identifying any additional countries involved in 
     conflicts linked to rough diamonds that are not the subject 
     of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on conflict 
     diamonds.
       (b) Semiannual Reports.--For each country identified in 
     subsection (a)(3), the President shall, every 6 months after 
     the initial report in which the country was identified, 
     transmit to Congress a report that explains what actions have 
     been taken by the United States or such country since the 
     previous report to ensure that conflict diamonds are not 
     being imported from that country into the United States. The 
     requirement to issue a semiannual report with respect to a 
     country under this subsection shall remain in effect until 
     such time as the country implements effective measures.

     SEC. 8. GAO REPORT.

       Not later than 3 years after the effective date of this 
     Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall 
     transmit a report to Congress on the effectiveness of the 
     provisions of this Act in preventing the importation of 
     conflict diamonds under section 4. The Comptroller General 
     shall include in the report any recommendations on any 
     modifications to this Act that may be necessary.

     SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       (a) International Arrangement.--It is the sense of Congress 
     that the President should take the necessary steps to 
     negotiate an international arrangement, working in concert 
     with the Kimberley Process referred to in section 2(6), to 
     eliminate the trade in conflict diamonds. Such an 
     international arrangement should create an effective global 
     system of controls covering countries that export and import 
     rough diamonds, should

[[Page S2014]]

     contain the elements described in section 4(b)(3), and should 
     address independent monitoring, the collection of reliable 
     statistics on the diamond trade, and the need for a 
     coordinating body or secretariat to implement the 
     arrangement.
       (b) Additional Security Council Resolutions.--It is the 
     sense of Congress that the President should take the 
     necessary steps to seek United Nations Security Council 
     Resolutions with respect to trade in diamonds from additional 
     countries identified under section 7(a)(5).
       (c) Trade in Legitimate Diamonds.--It is the sense of 
     Congress that the provisions of this Act should not impede 
     the trade in legitimate diamonds with countries which are 
     working constructively to eliminate trade in conflict 
     diamonds, including through the negotiation of an effective 
     international arrangement to eliminate trade in conflict 
     diamonds.
       (d) Implementation of Effective Measures.--It is the sense 
     of Congress that companies involved in diamond extraction and 
     trade should make financial contributions to countries 
     seeking to implement any effective measures to stop trade in 
     conflict diamonds described in section 4(b), if those 
     countries would have financial difficulty implementing those 
     measures.

     SEC. 10. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated to the President 
     $5,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to 
     provide assistance to countries seeking to implement any 
     effective measures to stop trade in conflict diamonds 
     described in section 4(b), if those countries would have 
     financial difficulty implementing those measures.

     SEC. 11. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       This Act shall take effect on the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.

  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, today I wish to talk about legislation 
that Senator Durbin, Senator Feingold, and I introduce today to address 
the continued profitable sale of what we refer to as conflict diamonds. 
We have been working together on this matter for some time, along with 
our colleagues in the House of Representatives, Congressman Tony Hall 
from my home State of Ohio and Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia.
  We have been working to help those in Africa who are suffering at the 
hands of this illicit diamond trade. Last spring, we introduced a 
similar bill to put pressure on the international community to 
implement a global agreement to stem the conflict diamond trade.
  While the House passed a weaker version of that bill last November, 
my Senate colleagues and I have been working with the administration to 
pass a stronger, more meaningful bill. Unfortunately, these 
negotiations thus far have not been successful. That is why we join 
together today in the introduction of a new and even stronger measure: 
legislation that reflects both trade and humanitarian concerns.
  The introduction now is particularly significant, as the 
international community begins the final session of the Kimberly 
Process today in Ottawa.
  During these negotiations, it is critical that the United States send 
a strong message to the international community, a message that says we 
are committed to these efforts and are fighting for a strong, effective 
Kimberly agreement.
  Mr. President, I believe the United States must take this leadership 
role so we can get ultimately the strongest possible agreement. That is 
the message I believe our bill sends today. I will spend a few minutes 
talking about why this bill is so important and why it is vital we get 
a strong measure passed and eventually signed into law.
  The diamond trade is one of the world's most lucrative industries. 
With its extreme profitability, it is not surprising a black market 
trade has emerged alongside the legitimate industry. The sale of 
illicit diamonds has yielded disturbing reports in the media linking 
even Osama bin Laden to this trade. On February 22, 2001, the U.S. 
District Court trial, United States v. Osama bin Laden, attests to 
this.
  Additionally, there is an established link between Sierra Leone's 
diamond trade and well-known Lebanese terrorists.
  It is also not surprising that diamond trading has become an 
attractive and sustainable income source for violent rebel groups 
around the world, particularly in Africa. The information I am talking 
about today in regard to terrorists has been reported in the public 
news media. Currently in Africa, where the majority of the world's 
diamonds are found, there is ongoing strife and struggle resulting from 
the fight for control of the precious gems. While violence has erupted 
in several countries, including Sierra Leone, Angola, the Congo, and 
Liberia, Sierra Leone in particular has one of the worst records of 
violence.
  In that nation, rebel groups, most notably the Revolutionary United 
Front, the RUL, have seized control of many of that country's diamond 
fields. Once in control of a diamond field, the rebels confiscate the 
diamonds. Then they launder them on to the legitimate market through 
other nearby nations, such as Liberia, and ultimately finance their 
terrorist regimes and their continued efforts to overthrow the 
government.

  Over the past decade, the rebels reaped the benefits of at least $10 
billion in smuggled diamonds, and the fact is it could be a lot more 
than that. Since the start of the rebel quest for control of Sierra 
Leone's diamond supply, the children of this small nation have borne 
the brunt of the insurgency. For over 8 years, the RUF has conscripted 
children, often as young as 7 or 8 years old. These soldiers and their 
makeshift army have ripped an estimated 12,000 children from their 
families. After the RUF invaded the capital of Freetown in January 
1999, at least 3,000 children were reported missing.
  As a result of deliberate and systematic brutalization, children 
soldiers have become some of the most vicious and effective fighters 
within the rebel factions. The rebel army, child soldiers included, has 
terrorized Sierra Leone's population, killing, abducting, raping, and 
hacking off the limbs of victims with machetes. This chopping off of 
limbs is the RUF's trademark strategy.
  I believe we can do something about this. We can, in fact, make a 
difference. We have the power to help put an end to the indiscriminate 
suffering and violence in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa. As the 
world's biggest diamond customer, purchasing the majority of the 
world's diamonds, the United States has tremendous clout. With that 
clout, we have the power to remove the lucrative financial incentives 
that drive the rebel groups to trade in diamonds in the first place.
  Simply put, if there is no market for their diamonds, there is little 
reason for the rebels to engage in their brutal campaigns to secure and 
then protect their diamonds. That is why our legislation is aimed at 
removing the rebels' market incentive. We need to work together with 
the international community to facilitate the implementation of a 
system of controls on the export and import of diamonds so that buyers 
can be certain their purchases are not fueling the rebel campaign.
  Specifically, our new bill attempts to move this issue forward and to 
strengthen U.S. policy. For example, our bill would require the 
President to prohibit the importation of rough diamonds from countries 
not taking effective measures to stop the trade in conflict diamonds.
  It also addresses potential loopholes associated with polished 
diamonds and diamond jewelry and includes a broader definition of 
conflict diamonds so that it includes conflicts in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and other areas as well.
  These are a few of the important provisions that were omitted in the 
House version, provisions that are essential in this legislation to 
make the difference we want to make. I urge my colleagues in the Senate 
to support this new bill and send an important message to the 
international community. As I see it, we do have an obligation, I think 
a moral obligation, to help eliminate the financial incentives for the 
illicit traders. We owe it to those who unwittingly buy these conflict 
diamonds but, more importantly, we owe it to the children who have 
suffered far too long.

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