[Congressional Record Volume 148, Number 19 (Thursday, February 28, 2002)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1352-S1366]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS OF INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. HAGEL (for himself, Mr. Dayton, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Cleland, 
        Mr. Warner, Mr. Breaux, Mr. Bunning, Ms. Mikulski, and Mrs. 
        Boxer):
  S. 1973. A bill to amend the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch 
Act to exclude certain basic allowances for housing of a member of a 
uniformed service from the determination of eligibility for free and 
reduced price meals of a child of the member; to the Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
  Mr. HAGEL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of 
the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1973

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN MILITARY BASIC ALLOWANCES FOR 
                   HOUSING FOR DETERMINATION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR 
                   FREE AND REDUCED PRICE MEALS.

       Section 9(b) of the Richard B. Russell National School 
     Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1758(b)) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``(7) Exclusion of certain military housing allowances.--
     For the 2-year period beginning on the date of enactment of 
     this paragraph, the amount of a basic allowance provided 
     under section 403 of title 37, United States Code, on behalf 
     of a member of a uniformed service for housing that is 
     acquired or constructed under subchapter IV of chapter 169 of 
     title 10, United States Code, or any related provision of 
     law, shall not be considered to be income for the purpose of 
     determining the eligibility of a child of the member for free 
     or reduced price lunches under this Act.''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. LEAHY (for himself and Mr. Grassley):
  S. 1974. A bill to make needed reforms in the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and for other purposes; to the committee on the 
Judiciary.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I rise today, joined by my good friend 
Senator Grassley, to introduce the FBI Reform Act of 2002. This bill 
stems from the lessons learned during a series of Judiciary Committee 
hearings on oversight of the FBI that I chaired beginning last June. 
Even more recently, the important changes which are being made under 
the FBI's new leadership after the September 11 attacks and the new 
powers granted the FBI by the USA PATRIOT Act have resulted in FBI 
reform becoming an pressing matter of national importance.
  Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax attacks last 
fall, we have relied on the FBI to detect and prevent acts of 
catastrophic terrorism that endanger the lives of the American people 
and the institutions of our country. The men and women of the FBI are 
performing this task with great professionalism at home and abroad. I 
think that we have all felt safer as a result of the full mobilization 
of the FBI's dedicated Special Agents, its expert support personnel, 
and its exceptional technical capabilities. We owe the men and women of 
the FBI our thanks.
  For decades the FBI has been an outstanding law enforcement agency 
and a vital member of the United States intelligence community. As our 
hearings and recent events have shown, however, there is room for 
improvement at

[[Page S1353]]

the FBI. We must face the mistakes of the past, and make the changes 
needed to ensure that they are not repeated. In meeting the 
international terrorist challenge, the Congress has an opportunity and 
obligation to strengthen the institutional fibre of the FBI based on 
lessons learned from recent problems the Bureau has experienced.
  This view is not mine alone. When Director Bob Mueller testified at 
his confirmation hearings last July, he forthrightly acknowledged 
``that the Bureau's remarkable legacy of service and accomplishment has 
been tarnished by some serious and highly publicized problems in recent 
years. Waco, Ruby Ridge, the FBI lab, Wen Ho Lee, Robert Hanssen, and 
the McVeigh documents--these familiar names and events remind us all 
that the FBI is far from perfect and that the next director faces 
significant management and administrative challenges.'' Since then, the 
Judiciary Committee has forged a constructive partnership with Director 
Mueller to get the FBI back on track.
  Congress sometimes has followed a hands-off approach about the FBI. 
But with the FBI's new increased powers, with our increased reliance on 
them to stop terrorism, and with the increased funding requested in the 
President's budget will come increased scrutiny. Until the Bureau's 
problems are resolved and new challenges overcome, we have to take a 
hands-on approach.
  Indeed our hearings and other oversight activities have highlighted 
tangible steps the Congress should take in an FBI reform bill as part 
of this hands-on approach. Last year's hearings demonstrated the need 
to improve FBI internal accountability, extend whistleblower 
protection, end the double-standard for discipline of senior FBI 
executives, enhance the FBI's internal security program to protect 
against espionage as occurred in the Hanssen case, and modernize the 
FBI's information technology systems. Since last year's oversight 
hearings, the committee has explored additional management issues that 
are reflected in the FBI Reform Act. Senator Grassley called attention 
to concerns about the practices of the FBI and other Federal criminal 
investigative agencies in reporting and using statistics on their 
investigations. In addition, FBI officials responsible for protecting 
its facilities informed us of difficulties in retaining the most 
qualified people on the FBI's own police force to protect some of our 
nation's most important and, unfortunately, most targeted facilities.

  When Director Mueller announced the first stage of his FBI 
reorganization last December, he stressed the importance of taking a 
comprehensive look at the FBI's missions for the future, and Deputy 
Attorney General Thompson's office has told us that the Attorney 
General's management review of the FBI is considering this matter. 
Director Mueller has stated that the second phase of FBI reorganization 
will be part of a ``comprehensive plan to address not only the new 
challenges of terrorism, but to modernize and streamline the Bureau's 
more traditional functions. . . .'' Thus, through our hearings, our 
other oversight efforts, and the statements and efforts of the new 
management team at the FBI, an initial list of challenges facing the 
FBI has been developed.
  The provisions in the FBI Reform Act address each of these 
challenges.
  Titles I, II, and VII of the FBI Reform Act strengthen the system for 
uncovering and reviewing FBI misconduct and imposing appropriate 
discipline, so that there is appropriate accountability. Title I 
creates statutory jurisdiction for the DOJ Inspector General over 
allegations of misconduct in the FBI. It brings the statutory 
authorities of the Justice Department's Inspector General into line 
with the administrative regulations adopted by the Attorney General on 
July 11, 2001, ensuring that there will be no return to a system in 
which the FBI enjoyed unique exemption for scrutiny by an independent 
Inspector General. Title II strengthens whistleblower protection for 
FBI employees and protects them from retaliation for reporting 
wrongdoing. Title VII eliminates statutory disparities in disciplinary 
penalties for Senior Executive Service and non-SES personnel.
  The committee received testimony in our oversight hearings showing 
that, too often, the independence that is part of the FBI's culture 
crossed the line into arrogance. Senator Danforth expressed concern to 
the committee about entrenched executives at the FBI who had created a 
closed and insular culture resistant to disclosure of mistakes and to 
reforms. His concern was echoed in testimony the committee heard from 
experienced FBI Special Agents, including a unit chief in the FBI's own 
Office of Professional Responsibility, who told us of a ``club'' 
mentality among some Bureau executives who viewed any criticism or 
change as a threat to their careers.
  If there was one message from these witnesses, it was that FBI 
executives needed to be more willing to admit their mistakes. Too often 
their response was to shield the Bureau from embarrassment by 
sacrificing accountability and needed reform. For example, Senator 
Danforth testified that the FBI helped fan the flames of conspiracy 
theories at Waco by covering up evidence that it used pyrotechnic 
rounds, even though they had nothing to do with starting the fire. The 
FBI culture demanded covering up rather than admitting a mistake. Of 
course, as the FBI painfully discovered, the price for circling the 
wagons in this way can be the loss of public confidence.

  The Justice Department Inspector General is in a position to conduct 
an independent investigation that enables the Attorney General and the 
FBI Director to hold FBI personnel accountable and learn the necessary 
lessons from mistakes. When Director Mueller was asked at his 
confirmation hearing about a separate FBI Inspector General, he 
replied, ``If I were the Attorney General I might have some concern 
about a separate Inspector General feeding the perception that the FBI 
was a separate institution accountable only to itself. And I'm not 
certain in my own mind whether or not what the accountability you seek 
cannot be discharged by an Inspector General with appropriate personnel 
in the Department of Justice, as opposed to establishing another 
Inspector General in the FBI.'' Attorney General Ashcroft decided to 
follow this route, and Title I of the FBI Reform Act codifies his 
action.
  The committee also heard disturbing testimony about retaliation 
against FBI Agents who are tasked to investigate their colleagues or 
who discuss issues with the Congress, either directly or through 
cooperation with the General Accounting Office, which assists in 
congressional oversight. Therefore, Title II is important to ensure 
that the Federal whistleblower protection laws protect FBI personnel to 
the greatest extent possible. Senator Grassley deserves great credit 
for stressing the need for this provision and developing the language 
in the bill. The bill extends whistleblower protections to employees 
who report wrongdoing to their supervisors or to Congress, and ensures 
that whistleblowers will enjoy basic procedural protections, including 
the normal procedures and judicial review provided under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, if they are subjected to retaliation. It 
also ensures that those who report wrongdoing to the Office of the 
Special Counsel have access to the normal Merit System Protection Board 
rights if retaliated against.
  Title VII addresses the issue of a double standard for discipline of 
senior executives. Internal investigations must lead to fair and just 
discipline. A troubling internal FBI study that was released at the 
committee's July hearing documented a double standard at work, with 
senior FBI executives receiving a slap on the wrist for the same kind 
of conduct that would result in serious discipline for lower level 
employees. At his confirmation hearing, Director Mueller said it is 
``very important that there be no double standards in accountability. I 
know there have been allegations that senior FBI officials are 
sometimes treated more leniently than more junior employees. Any such 
double standard would be fundamentally unfair and enormously 
destructive to employee morale.'' Title VII embodies that principle by 
eliminating the disparity in authorized punishments between Senior 
Executive Service members and other Federal employees.
  The Hanssen espionage case was a tremendous shock to the nation and 
to the FBI. A trusted and experienced FBI Supervisory Special Agent was 
found

[[Page S1354]]

to have sold many of the nation's most sensitive national security 
secrets to the Soviet Union and to Russia. Just as the Ames case forced 
the CIA to revamp its security program after 1994, the Hanssen case 
requires major changes in FBI security. Former FBI and CIA Director 
William Webster chairs a commission that is completing its review of 
lessons learned from the Hanssen case for the Attorney General and the 
FBI Director. It is my hope that Judge Webster will testify before 
the Judiciary Committee when his report is complete to present his 
unclassified findings and recommendations. The FBI Reform Act includes 
provisions that are based on the Judiciary Committee's initial 
oversight hearings and we remain open to incorporating the considered 
recommendations and reforms for which the Webster Commission may call.

  Title III of the FBI Reform Act would establish a Career Security 
Program in the FBI and Title IV would establish an FBI 
Counterintelligence Polygraph Program for screening personnel in 
exceptionally sensitive positions with specific safeguards. In 
addition, as a result of concerns about terrorist attacks against FBI 
targets, Title V would authorize an FBI police force as part of 
comprehensive security enhancements.
  The FBI Career Security Program would bring the FBI into line with 
other U.S. intelligence agencies that have strong career security 
professional cadres whose skills and leadership are dedicated to the 
protection of agency information, personnel, and facilities. The 
challenges of espionage, information technology vulnerability, and the 
FBI's high profile as a target of terrorist attack require that the FBI 
match or exceed the best security programs in the intelligence and 
national security community. This can only be achieved by a fundamental 
change that reverses the tendency, found too often in civilian 
agencies, to treat security as a secondary mission and security 
assignments as obstacles to career advancement. Before the Hanssen 
case, an FBI Special Agent experienced as a criminal investigator might 
be assigned for a few years to a security position and then move on 
without building continuity of security expertise. Turnover in FBI 
security work was high, the top rank was Headquarters Section Chief.
  Director Mueller has changed direction by creating a Assistant 
Director position to head a new Security Division and supporting the 
principle of a Security Career Program. I support this change. Title II 
of the FBI Reform Act provides the statutory mandate and tools to 
achieve this goal based on the experience of the Defense Department in 
reforming its acquisition career program. The key requirements are 
leadership and accountability in a Security Director, creation of 
security career program boards, designation of security positions, 
identification of security career paths requiring appropriate training 
and experience, and development of education programs for security 
professionals. To help ensure that security professionals gain stature 
comparable to Special Agents, the program would limit the preference 
for Special Agents in considering persons for security positions. FBI 
security managers would complete a security management course 
accredited by the Joint Security Training Consortium recently formed by 
the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense.
  The FBI Counterintelligence Polygraph Program that would be 
established under Title III of the Act also addresses the security 
issue. Title III recognizes the security value of polygraph screening, 
but provides specific safeguards for those who may be subject to 
adverse action based on polygraph exams. Screening procedures must 
address the problems of ``false positive'' responses, limit adverse 
actions taken solely by reason of physiological reactions in an 
examination, ensure quality assurance and control, and allow subjects 
to have prompt access to unclassified reports on examinations that 
relate to adverse actions against them. Title III is based upon the 
simple conviction that increased security and protection of employee 
rights can and must coexist at the FBI.
  Title IV of the Act provides long overdue statutory authorization for 
a permanent FBI Police force, to protect critical FBI facilities. It 
would provide the men and women who currently guard the highest risk 
targets with the same pay and benefits as members of the Uniformed 
Division of the United States Secret Service. Today the FBI police 
force operating under delegated authority from the General Services 
Administration has been unable to retain skilled personnel at a rate 
commensurate with the threat and the need for experienced leadership. 
The FBI Reform Act would bring the FBI police force generally into line 
not only with the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service, but also 
with the Capitol Police and the Supreme Court police. It is intended to 
be consistent with the current Memorandum of Agreement between the FBI 
and the Metropolitan Police Force of the District of Columbia with 
respect to FBI buildings and grounds covered in Washington, D.C..
  The Attorney General has directed Deputy Attorney General Thompson to 
lead a management review of the FBI, while Director Mueller has already 
begun reorganizing the Bureau. Congress must participate in reviewing 
the FBI's structure and identifying its future priorities. The FBI is 
being called on today to protect the national security from terrorist 
and intelligence threats mounted from abroad. FBI investigations now 
extend overseas far more often because of our government's decision to 
use law enforcement as an instrument of national security along with 
diplomacy, military deployments, and intelligence operations. At the 
same time, it must continue with other uniquely Federal areas of 
enforcement. Title VI requires a set of reports that would enable 
Congress to engage the Executive branch in a constructive dialogue 
building a more effective FBI for the future.
  To help Congress participate in charting the FBI's course, Title VI 
directs the Attorney General to submit a comprehensive report on the 
legal authorities for FBI programs and activities. In the late 1970s 
the Judiciary Committee considered enactment of a legislative charter 
for the FBI that would spell out its authorities and responsibilities. 
That proposal was set aside in 1980 despite determined efforts by then-
Judiciary Committee Chairman Kennedy, Judge Webster and Attorney 
General Civiletti to reach agreement. The time is ripe to revive 
consideration of this effort.
  In addition to a comprehensive charter, Congress should consider 
whether the FBI should continue to have responsibility for the broad 
range of investigations that it is currently expected to conduct. I 
believe we have gone too far in federalizing criminal law enforcement 
and that more responsibilities which are not uniquely federal can be 
transferred back to the states. In addition, even within the Federal 
law enforcement family, numerous agencies perform redundant functions. 
The Attorney General's report would recommend whether the FBI should 
continue to have all its current investigative responsibilities, 
whether existing legal authority for any FBI program or activity should 
be modified or repealed, and whether the FBI must or should have 
express statutory authority for new or existing programs or activities.
  Title VI also recognizes that the task of modernizing FBI's 
information technology and management is as important as setting the 
FBI's future missions. Judiciary Committee oversight hearings have 
documented, and Director Mueller has acknowledged, that the FBI must 
overcome years of neglect in this regard. Congress is providing the 
funds, especially in the FY 2002 Counterterrorim Supplemental for 
technology assistance. We must ensure, however, that the FBI can and 
does use these funds effectively. There is concern that the FBI may 
need greater flexibility than is allowed under current law to procure 
new technologies. Congress also needs to see detailed plans as to how 
the FBI plans to update its information technology systems. 
Unfortunately, the Department of Justice and the FBI have not provided 
quarterly status reports on the principal FBI computer upgrade program, 
known as TRILOGY, as requested in the Appropriations act for FY 2001. 
Title VI directs the Attorney General to address these concerns in a 
comprehensive report on FBI information management and technology.

[[Page S1355]]

  Finally, Title VI requires the Comptroller General to investigate and 
complete a report on how statistics are reported and used by Federal 
law enforcement agencies, including the FBI. Senator Grassley has 
focused attention on the question whether the FBI and other agencies 
may be double-counting criminal investigations and arrests in the 
reporting of accomplishments. We also need to ascertain whether the FBI 
and other agencies properly use the statistics which they compile in 
making management decisions. It is important to get the facts and 
recommendations that put the FBI into the context of the full spectrum 
of Federal law enforcement agencies. Title VI ensures that the GAO can 
complete this important task by requiring agencies to comply with its 
requests for the information that is necessary to assist in preparing 
this report.
  The legislation which Senator Grassley and I introduce today is just 
one part of a bipartisan, hands-on approach to FBI reform. The 
committee plans additional oversight hearings to consider the Justice 
Department Inspector General's report on the belated production of 
documents in the Oklahoma City bombing case and the report of Judge 
Webster's Commission on the security lessons of the Robert Hanssen 
espionage case. The committee also intends to hear from Director 
Mueller and Deputy Attorney General Thompson on their response to these 
reports and on their actions and goals in reorganizing the FBI and 
charting its management course for the future.
  At the same time, we are focusing oversight attention on key aspects 
of FBI and law enforcement performance in connection with the September 
11 terrorist attacks and the lessons learned for developing an 
effective counterterrorism and homeland security program. As 
contemplated by the sunset provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act, we must 
monitor the implementation of new surveillance and investigative powers 
provided to strengthen counterterrorism efforts and, in some 
provisions, law enforcement and counterintelligence generally.
  The FBI Reform Act is designed to strengthen the FBI as an 
institution that has a unique role as both a law enforcement agency and 
a member of the intelligence community. As the Judiciary Committee 
continues its oversight work and more is learned about recent FBI 
performance, additional legislation may prove necessary. Especially 
important will be the lessons from the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the anthrax attacks, and implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act and 
other counterterrorism measures. Strengthening the FBI cannot be 
accomplished overnight, but today, with the introduction of FBI Reform 
Act, we take an important step into the future.
  For all of these reasons, I am pleased to introduce this legislation 
with Senator Grassley. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the 
bill be printed in the Record along with the sectional analysis.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1974

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation Reform Act of 2002''.

                    TITLE I--IMPROVING FBI OVERSIGHT

     SEC. 101. AUTHORITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INSPECTOR 
                   GENERAL.

       Section 8E of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
     App.) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b), by striking paragraphs (2) and (3) 
     and inserting the following:
       ``(2) except as specified in subsection (a) and paragraph 
     (3), may investigate allegations of criminal wrongdoing or 
     administrative misconduct by an employee of the Department of 
     Justice, or may, in the discretion of the Inspector General, 
     refer such allegations to the Office of Professional 
     Responsibility or the internal affairs office of the 
     appropriate component of the Department of Justice; and
       ``(3) shall refer to the Counsel, Office of Professional 
     Responsibility of the Department of Justice, allegations of 
     misconduct involving Department attorneys, investigators, or 
     law enforcement personnel, where the allegations relate to 
     the exercise of the authority of an attorney to investigate, 
     litigate, or provide legal advice, except that no such 
     referral shall be made if the attorney is employed in the 
     Office of Professional Responsibility.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) The Attorney General shall ensure by regulation that 
     any component of the Department of Justice receiving a 
     nonfrivolous allegation of criminal wrongdoing or 
     administrative misconduct by an employee of the Department of 
     Justice shall report that information to the Inspector 
     General.''.

     SEC. 102. REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

       (a) Appointment of Oversight Official Within the Office of 
     Inspector General.--
       (1) In general.--The Inspector General of the Department of 
     Justice shall direct that 1 official from the office of the 
     Inspector General be responsible for supervising and 
     coordinating independent oversight of programs and operations 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation until September 30, 
     2003.
       (2) Continuation of oversight.--The Inspector General may 
     continue individual oversight in accordance with paragraph 
     (1) after September 30, 2003, at the discretion of the 
     Inspector General.
       (b) Inspector General Oversight Plan for the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice shall submit to the Chairman and 
     ranking member of the Committees on the Judiciary of the 
     Senate and the House of Representatives, a plan for oversight 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which plan may 
     include--
       (1) an audit of the financial systems, information 
     technology systems, and computer security systems of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation;
       (2) an audit and evaluation of programs and processes of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation to identify systemic 
     weaknesses or implementation failures and to recommend 
     corrective action;
       (3) a review of the activities of internal affairs offices 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including the 
     Inspections Division and the Office of Professional 
     Responsibility;
       (4) an investigation of allegations of serious misconduct 
     by personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
       (5) a review of matters relating to any other program or 
     operation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the 
     Inspector General determines requires review; and
       (6) an identification of resources needed by the Inspector 
     General to implement a plan for oversight of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation.
       (c) Report on Inspector General for Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall submit a 
     report and recommendation to the Chairman and ranking member 
     of the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the 
     House of Representatives concerning whether there should be 
     established, within the Department of Justice, a separate 
     office of the Inspector General for the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation that shall be responsible for supervising 
     independent oversight of programs and operations of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation.

                   TITLE II--WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION

     SEC. 201. INCREASING PROTECTIONS FOR FBI WHISTLEBLOWERS.

       Section 2303 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to 
     read as follows:

     ``Sec. 2303. Prohibited personnel practices in the Federal 
       Bureau of Investigation

       ``(a) Definition.--In this section, the term `personnel 
     action' means any action described in clauses (i) through (x) 
     of section 2302(a)(2)(A).
       ``(b) Prohibited Practices.--Any employee of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation who has the authority to take, direct 
     others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, 
     shall not, with respect to such authority, take or fail to 
     take a personnel action with respect to any employee of the 
     Bureau or because of--
       ``(1) any disclosure of information by the employee to the 
     Attorney General (or an employee designated by the Attorney 
     General for such purpose), a supervisor of the employee, the 
     Inspector General for the Department of Justice, or a Member 
     of Congress that the employee reasonably believes evidences--
       ``(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or
       ``(B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of 
     authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public 
     health or safety; or
       ``(2) any disclosure of information by the employee to the 
     Special Counsel of information that the employee reasonably 
     believes evidences--
       ``(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or
       ``(B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of 
     authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public 
     health or safety,

     if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and 
     if such information is not specifically required by Executive 
     order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense 
     or the conduct of foreign affairs.
       ``(c) Individual Right of Action.--Chapter 12 of this title 
     shall apply to an employee of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation who claims that a personnel action has been 
     taken under this section against the employee as a reprisal 
     for any disclosure of information described in subsection 
     (b)(2).
       ``(d) Regulations.--The Attorney General shall prescribe 
     regulations to ensure that a personnel action under this 
     section shall not

[[Page S1356]]

     be taken against an employee of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation as a reprisal for any disclosure of information 
     described in subsection (b)(1), and shall provide for the 
     enforcement of such regulations in a manner consistent with 
     applicable provisions of sections 1214 and 1221, and in 
     accordance with the procedures set forth in sections 554 
     through 557 and 701 through 706.''.

                 TITLE III--FBI SECURITY CAREER PROGRAM

     SEC. 301. SECURITY MANAGEMENT POLICIES.

       The Attorney General shall establish policies and 
     procedures for the effective management (including accession, 
     education, training, and career development) of persons 
     serving in security positions in the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation.

     SEC. 302. DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

       (a) In General.--Subject to the authority, direction, and 
     control of the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation (referred to in this title as the 
     ``Director'') shall carry out all powers, functions, and 
     duties of the Attorney General with respect to the security 
     workforce in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (b) Policy Implementation.--The Director shall ensure that 
     the policies of the Attorney General established in 
     accordance with this Act are implemented throughout the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation.

     SEC. 303. DIRECTOR OF SECURITY.

       The Director shall appoint a Director of Security, or such 
     other title as the Director may determine, to assist the 
     Director in the performance of the duties of the Director 
     under this Act.

     SEC. 304. SECURITY CAREER PROGRAM BOARDS.

       (a) Establishment.--The Director acting through the 
     Director of Security shall establish a security career 
     program board to advise the Director in managing the hiring, 
     training, education, and career development of personnel in 
     the security workforce of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation.
       (b) Composition of Board.--The security career program 
     board shall include--
       (1) the Director of Security (or a representative of the 
     Director of Security);
       (2) the senior officials, as designated by the Director, 
     with responsibility for personnel management;
       (3) the senior officials, as designated by the Director, 
     with responsibility for information management;
       (4) the senior officials, as designated by the Director, 
     with responsibility for training and career development in 
     the various security disciplines; and
       (5) such other senior officials for the intelligence 
     community as the Director may designate.
       (c) Chairperson.--The Director of Security (or a 
     representative of the Director of Security) shall be the 
     chairperson of the board.
       (d) Subordinate Boards.--The Director of Security may 
     establish a subordinate board structure to which functions of 
     the security career program board may be delegated.

     SEC. 305. DESIGNATION OF SECURITY POSITIONS.

       (a) Designation.--The Director shall designate, by 
     regulation, those positions in the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation that are security positions for purposes of 
     this Act.
       (b) Required Positions.--In designating security positions 
     under subsection (a), the Director shall include, at a 
     minimum, all security-related positions in the areas of--
       (1) personnel security and access control;
       (2) information systems security and information assurance;
       (3) physical security and technical surveillance 
     countermeasures;
       (4) operational, program, and industrial security; and
       (5) information security and classification management.

     SEC. 306. CAREER DEVELOPMENT.

       (a) Career Paths.--The Director shall ensure that 
     appropriate career paths for personnel who wish to pursue 
     careers in security are identified in terms of the education, 
     training, experience, and assignments necessary for career 
     progression to the most senior security positions and shall 
     make available published information on those career paths.
       (b) Limitation on Preference for Special Agents.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in the policy 
     established under paragraph (2), the Attorney General shall 
     ensure that no requirement or preference for a Special Agent 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (referred to in this 
     title as a ``Special Agent'') is used in the consideration of 
     persons for security positions.
       (2) Policy.--The Attorney General shall establish a policy 
     that permits a particular security position to be specified 
     as available only to Special Agents, if a determination is 
     made, under criteria specified in the policy, that a Special 
     Agent--
       (A) is required for that position by law;
       (B) is essential for performance of the duties of the 
     position; or
       (C) is necessary for another compelling reason.
       (3) Report.--Not later than December 15 of each year, the 
     Director shall submit to the Attorney General a report that 
     lists--
       (A) each security position that is restricted to Special 
     Agents under the policy established under paragraph (2); and
       (B) the recommendation of the Director as to whether each 
     restricted security position should remain restricted.
       (c) Opportunities To Qualify.--The Attorney General shall 
     ensure that all personnel, including Special Agents, are 
     provided the opportunity to acquire the education, training, 
     and experience necessary to qualify for senior security 
     positions.
       (d) Best Qualified.--The Attorney General shall ensure that 
     the policies established under this Act are designed to 
     provide for the selection of the best qualified individual 
     for a position, consistent with other applicable law.
       (e) Assignments Policy.--The Attorney General shall 
     establish a policy for assigning Special Agents to security 
     positions that provides for a balance between--
       (1) the need for personnel to serve in career enhancing 
     positions; and
       (2) the need for requiring service in each such position 
     for sufficient time to provide the stability necessary to 
     carry out effectively the duties of the position and to allow 
     for the establishment of responsibility and accountability 
     for actions taken in the position.
       (f) Length of Assignment.--In implementing the policy 
     established under subsection (b)(2), the Director shall 
     provide, as appropriate, for longer lengths of assignments to 
     security positions than assignments to other positions.
       (g) Performance Appraisals.--The Director shall provide an 
     opportunity for review and inclusion of any comments on any 
     appraisal of the performance of a person serving in a 
     security position by a person serving in a security position 
     in the same security career field.
       (h) Balanced Workforce Policy.--In the development of 
     security workforce policies under this Act with respect to 
     any employees or applicants for employment, the Attorney 
     General shall, consistent with the merit system principles 
     set out in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 2301(b) of title 
     5, take into consideration the need to maintain a balanced 
     workforce in which women and members of racial and ethnic 
     minority groups are appropriately represented in Government 
     service.

     SEC. 307. GENERAL EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXPERIENCE 
                   REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--The Director shall establish education, 
     training, and experience requirements for each security 
     position, based on the level of complexity of duties carried 
     out in the position.
       (b) Qualification Requirements.--Before being assigned to a 
     position as a program manager or deputy program manager of a 
     significant security program, a person--
       (1) must have completed a security program management 
     course that is accredited by the Intelligence Community-
     Department of Defense Joint Security Training Consortium or 
     is determined to be comparable by the Director; and
       (2) must have not less than 6 years experience in security, 
     of which not less than 2 years were performed in a similar 
     program office or organization.

     SEC. 308. EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS.

       (a) In General.--The Director, in consultation with the 
     Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of 
     Defense, shall establish and implement education and training 
     programs for persons serving in security positions in the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (b) Other Programs.--The Director shall ensure that 
     programs established under subsection (a) are established and 
     implemented, to the maximum extent practicable, uniformly 
     with the programs of the Intelligence Community and the 
     Department of Defense.

     SEC. 309. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT APPROVAL.

       (a) In General.--The Attorney General shall submit any 
     requirement that is established under section 307 to the 
     Director of the Office of Personnel Management for approval.
       (b) Final Approval.--If the Director does not disapprove 
     the requirements established under section 307 within 30 days 
     after the date on which the Director receives the 
     requirement, the requirement is deemed to be approved by the 
     Director of the Office of Personnel Management.

          TITLE IV--FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE POLYGRAPH PROGRAM

     SEC. 401. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Polygraph Program.--The term ``polygraph program'' 
     means the counterintelligence screening polygraph program 
     established under section 402.
       (2) Polygraph Review.--The term ``Polygraph Review'' means 
     the review of the scientific validity of the polygraph for 
     counterintelligence screening purposes conducted by the 
     Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph 
     of the National Academy of Sciences.

     SEC. 402. ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.

       Not later than 6 months after publication of the results of 
     the Polygraph Review, the Attorney General, in consultation 
     with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
     the Director of Security of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, shall establish a counterintelligence 
     screening polygraph program for the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation that consists of periodic polygraph 
     examinations of employees, or contractor employees of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation who are in positions 
     specified by the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation as exceptionally sensitive in order to minimize 
     the potential for unauthorized release or disclosure of 
     exceptionally sensitive information.

[[Page S1357]]

     SEC. 403. REGULATIONS.

       (a) In General.--The Attorney General shall prescribe 
     regulations for the polygraph program in accordance with 
     subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code 
     (commonly referred to as the Administrative Procedures Act).
       (b) Considerations.--In prescribing regulations under 
     subsection (a), the Attorney General shall--
       (1) take into account the results of the Polygraph Review; 
     and
       (2) include procedures for--
       (A) identifying and addressing false positive results of 
     polygraph examinations;
       (B) ensuring that adverse personnel actions are not taken 
     against an individual solely by reason of the physiological 
     reaction of the individual to a question in a polygraph 
     examination, unless--
       (i) reasonable efforts are first made independently to 
     determine through alternative means, the veracity of the 
     response of the individual to the question; and
       (ii) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     determines personally that the personnel action is justified;
       (C) ensuring quality assurance and quality control in 
     accordance with any guidance provided by the Department of 
     Defense Polygraph Institute and the Director of Central 
     Intelligence; and
       (D) allowing any employee or contractor who is the subject 
     of a counterintelligence screening polygraph examination 
     under the polygraph program, upon written request, to have 
     prompt access to any unclassified reports regarding an 
     examination that relates to any adverse personnel action 
     taken with respect to the individual.

     SEC. 404. REPORT ON FURTHER ENHANCEMENT OF FBI PERSONNEL 
                   SECURITY PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 9 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation shall submit to Congress a report setting forth 
     recommendations for any legislative action that the Director 
     considers appropriate in order to enhance the personnel 
     security program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (b) Polygraph Review Results.--Any recommendation under 
     subsection (a) regarding the use of polygraphs shall take 
     into account the results of the Polygraph Review.

                          TITLE V--FBI POLICE

     SEC. 501. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (2) FBI buildings and grounds.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``FBI buildings and grounds'' 
     means--
       (i) the whole or any part of any building or structure 
     which is occupied under a lease or otherwise by the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation and is subject to supervision and 
     control by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
       (ii) the land upon which there is situated any building or 
     structure which is occupied wholly by the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation; and
       (iii) any enclosed passageway connecting 2 or more 
     buildings or structures occupied in whole or in part by the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (B) Inclusion.--The term ``FBI buildings and grounds'' 
     includes adjacent streets and sidewalks not to exceed 500 
     feet from such property.
       (3) FBI police.--The term ``FBI police'' means the 
     permanent police force established under section 502.

     SEC. 502. ESTABLISHMENT OF FBI POLICE; DUTIES.

       (a) In General.--Subject to the supervision of the Attorney 
     General, the Director may establish a permanent police force, 
     to be known as the FBI police.
       (b) Duties.--The FBI police shall perform such duties as 
     the Director may prescribe in connection with the protection 
     of persons and property within FBI buildings and grounds.
       (c) Uniformed Representative.--The Director, or designated 
     representative duly authorized by the Attorney General, may 
     appoint uniformed representatives of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation as FBI police for duty in connection with the 
     policing of all FBI buildings and grounds.
       (d) Authority.--
       (1) In general.--In accordance with regulations prescribed 
     by the Director and approved by the Attorney General, the FBI 
     police may--
       (A) police the FBI buildings and grounds for the purpose of 
     protecting persons and property;
       (B) in the performance of duties necessary for carrying out 
     subparagraph (A), make arrests and otherwise enforce the laws 
     of the United States, including the laws of the District of 
     Columbia;
       (C) carry firearms as may be required for the performance 
     of duties;
       (D) prevent breaches of the peace and suppress affrays and 
     unlawful assemblies; and
       (E) hold the same powers as sheriffs and constables when 
     policing FBI buildings and grounds.
       (2) Exception.--The authority and policing powers of FBI 
     police under this subsection shall not include the service of 
     civil process.
       (e) Pay and Benefits.--
       (1) In general.--The rates of basic pay, salary schedule, 
     pay provisions, and benefits for members of the FBI police 
     shall be equivalent to the rates of basic pay, salary 
     schedule, pay provisions, and benefits applicable to members 
     of the United States Secret Service Uniformed Division.
       (2) Application.--Pay and benefits for the FBI police under 
     paragraph (1)--
       (A) shall be established by regulation;
       (B) shall apply with respect to pay periods beginning after 
     January 1, 2003; and
       (C) shall not result in any decrease in the rates of pay or 
     benefits of any individual.

     SEC. 503. AUTHORITY OF METROPOLITAN POLICE FORCE.

       This title does not affect the authority of the 
     Metropolitan Police Force of the District of Columbia with 
     respect to FBI buildings and grounds.

                           TITLE VI--REPORTS

     SEC. 601. REPORT ON LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR FBI PROGRAMS AND 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than December 31, 2002, the 
     Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report describing 
     the statutory and other legal authority for all programs and 
     activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall describe--
       (1) the titles within the United States Code and the 
     statutes for which the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     exercises investigative responsibility;
       (2) each program or activity of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation that has express statutory authority and the 
     statute which provides that authority; and
       (3) each program or activity of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation that does not have express statutory authority, 
     and the source of the legal authority for that program or 
     activity.
       (c) Recommendations.--The report submitted under subsection 
     (a) shall recommend whether--
       (1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation should continue to 
     have investigative responsibility for each statute for which 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation currently has 
     investigative responsibility;
       (2) the legal authority for any program or activity of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation should be modified or 
     repealed;
       (3) the Federal Bureau of Investigation should have express 
     statutory authority for any program or activity of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation for which the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation does not currently have express statutory 
     authority; and
       (4) the Federal Bureau of Investigation should--
       (A) have authority for any new program or activity; and
       (B) express statutory authority with respect to any new 
     programs or activities.

     SEC. 602. REPORT ON FBI INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND 
                   TECHNOLOGY.

       (a) In General.--Not later than December 31, 2002, the 
     Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     information management and technology programs of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation including recommendations for any 
     legislation that may be necessary to enhance the 
     effectiveness of those programs.
       (b) Contents of Report.--The report submitted under 
     subsection (a) shall provide--
       (1) an analysis and evaluation of whether authority for 
     waiver of any provision of procurement law (including any 
     regulation implementing such a law) is necessary to 
     expeditiously and cost-effectively acquire information 
     technology to meet the unique need of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation to improve its investigative operations in 
     order to respond better to national law enforcement, 
     intelligence, and counterintelligence requirements;
       (2) the results of the studies and audits conducted by the 
     Strategic Management Council and the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice to evaluate the information management 
     and technology programs of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, including systems, policies, procedures, 
     practices, and operations; and
       (3) a plan for improving the information management and 
     technology programs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (c) Results.--The results provided under subsection (b)(2) 
     shall include an evaluation of--
       (1) information technology procedures and practices 
     regarding procurement, training, and systems maintenance;
       (2) record keeping policies, procedures, and practices of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation, focusing particularly on 
     how information is inputted, stored, managed, utilized, and 
     shared within the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
       (3) how information in a given database is related or 
     compared to, or integrated with, information in other 
     technology databases within the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation;
       (4) the effectiveness of the existing information 
     technology infrastructure of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation in supporting and accomplishing the overall 
     mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
       (5) the management of information technology projects of 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation, focusing on how the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation--
       (A) selects its information technology projects;
       (B) ensures that projects under development deliver 
     benefits; and
       (C) ensures that completed projects deliver the expected 
     results; and

[[Page S1358]]

       (6) the security and access control techniques for 
     classified and sensitive but unclassified information systems 
     in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (d) Contents of Plan.--The plan provided under subsection 
     (b)(3) shall ensure that--
       (1) appropriate key technology management positions in the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation are filled by personnel with 
     experience in the commercial sector;
       (2) access to the most sensitive information is audited in 
     such a manner that suspicious activity is subject to near 
     contemporaneous security review;
       (3) critical information systems employ a public key 
     infrastructure to validate both users and recipients of 
     messages or records;
       (4) security features are tested by the National Security 
     Agency to meet national information systems security 
     standards;
       (5) all employees in the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     receive annual instruction in records and information 
     management policies and procedures relevant to their 
     positions;
       (6) a reserve is established for research and development 
     to guide strategic information management and technology 
     investment decisions;
       (7) unnecessary administrative requirements for software 
     purchases under $2,000,000 are eliminated;
       (8) full consideration is given to contacting with an 
     expert technology partner to provide technical support for 
     the information technology procurement for the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation;
       (9) procedures are instituted to procure products and 
     services through contracts of other agencies, as necessary; 
     and
       (10) a systems integration and test center, with the 
     participation of field personnel, tests each series of 
     information systems upgrades or application changes before 
     their operational deployment to confirm that they meet proper 
     requirements.

     SEC. 603. GAO REPORT ON CRIME STATISTICS REPORTING.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 9 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall submit to the Committees on the Judiciary of the 
     Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the issue 
     of how statistics are reported and used by Federal law 
     enforcement agencies.
       (b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall--
       (1) identify the current regulations, procedures, internal 
     policies, or other conditions that allow the investigation or 
     arrest of an individual to be claimed or reported by more 
     than 1 Federal or State agency charged with law enforcement 
     responsibility;
       (2) identify and examine the conditions that allow the 
     investigation or arrest of an individual to be claimed or 
     reported by the Offices of Inspectors General and any other 
     Federal agency charged with law enforcement responsibility;
       (3) examine the statistics reported by Federal law 
     enforcement agencies, and document those instances in which 
     more than 1 agency, bureau, or office claimed or reported the 
     same investigation or arrest during the years 1998 through 
     2001;
       (4) examine the issue of Federal agencies simultaneously 
     claiming arrest credit for in-custody situations that have 
     already occurred pursuant to a State or local agency arrest 
     situation during the years 1998 through 2001;
       (5) examine the issue of how such statistics are used for 
     administrative and management purposes;
       (6) set forth a comprehensive definition of the terms 
     ``investigation'' and ``arrest'' as those terms apply to 
     Federal agencies charged with law enforcement 
     responsibilities; and
       (7) include recommendations, that when implemented, would 
     eliminate unwarranted and duplicative reporting of 
     investigation and arrest statistics by all Federal agencies 
     charged with law enforcement responsibilities.
       (c) Federal Agency Compliance.--Federal law enforcement 
     agencies shall comply with requests made by the General 
     Accounting Office for information that is necessary to assist 
     in preparing the report required by this section.

                  TITLE VII--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

     SEC. 701. ALLOWING DISCIPLINARY SUSPENSIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE 
                   SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE FOR 14 DAYS OR LESS.

       Section 7542 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking ``for more than 14 days''.
                                  ____


                  S. 1974--Section-by-Section Analysis


                                title i

       Title I of this bill provides for improved Department of 
     Justice and Congressional oversight of the FBI by ensuring 
     that the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector 
     General, ``OIG'', is authorized to investigate allegations of 
     misconduct at the FBI and requiring a report to the Judiciary 
     Committees on how the OIG carries out this new authority. 
     This title is consistent with provisions in the DOJ 
     Authorization Act, S. 1319/H.R. 2215, which have passed the 
     Senate by unanimous consent.
     Section 101. Authority of Department of Justice Inspector 
         General
       This section would amend Section 8E of the Inspector 
     General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to provide explicit 
     statutory authority for the OIG to investigate all 
     allegations of criminal or administrative misconduct by DOJ 
     employees, including FBI personnel. The OIG is also 
     authorized to refer certain matters to the FBI Office of 
     Professional Responsibility or to the internal affairs office 
     of the appropriate component of the Department. The Attorney 
     General is directed to promulgate regulations implementing 
     this OIG authority.
       For many years, the FBI was excluded from OIG jurisdiction 
     and the FBI's own internal Office of Professional 
     Responsibility had sole authority to investigate FBI 
     personnel misconduct, unless the Attorney General made an 
     exception. The FBI's exclusive domain to investigate its own 
     misconduct was unique in the Department and created the 
     appearance of a conflict of interest. On July 11, 2001, 
     Attorney General Ashcroft issued a new rule expanding the 
     OIG's jurisdiction over the FBI. This section is consistent 
     with, and codifies, the Attorney General's new rule.
     Section 102. Review of the Department of Justice
       To ensure that the OIG has the necessary structure and 
     resources to effectively assume its new jurisdiction over the 
     FBI and that the Congress is fully informed of such needs, 
     this subsection requires the Inspector General to: 1. appoint 
     an official to help supervise and coordinate oversight 
     operations and programs of the FBI during the transition 
     period; 2. conduct a comprehensive study of the FBI and 
     report back to the Judiciary Committees with a plan for 
     auditing and evaluating various parts of FBI, including 
     information technology, and for effective continued OIG 
     oversight; and 3. report back to the Judiciary Committee on 
     whether an Inspector General for the FBI should be 
     established.


                                title ii

       This title of the bill amends Title 5, U.S.C. Sec. 2303, to 
     enhance the whistle blower protection provided to FBI 
     employees and protect them from retaliation.
     Section 201. Providing whistle blower protection for FBI 
         employees
       Section 2303 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to 
     expand the types of disclosures that trigger whistle blower 
     protections by protecting disclosures, which the employee 
     ``reasonably believes'' evidences misconduct, to the OIG, the 
     Congress, a supervisor of the employee, or the Special 
     Counsel (an office of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 
     ``MSPB'', provided for by 5 U.S.C. Sec. 1214). The amendment 
     would also ensure that the procedural protections of the 
     Administrative Procedure Act, including but not limited to 5 
     U.S.C. sections 554-57 and 701-706, would be followed in 
     cases where a complaint of retaliation was made by an FBI 
     employee. These procedural protections include, among other 
     things, an impartial decision maker and decision based on the 
     ``record'' of any proceedings without ex parte contacts and 
     judicial review as provided. Current laws and regulations 
     which allow for the protection of classified material would 
     also be available for such proceedings in appropriate 
     situations. The amendment, in new subsection (c), provides an 
     individual right of action as provided under Chapter 12 of 
     Title 5 before the MSPB. The amendment, in new subsection 
     (d), requires the Attorney General to prescribe regulations 
     to ensure that the title is enforced at the FBI.


                               title iii

       Title III requires the FBI to establish a career security 
     program to enhance the internal security of the FBI and 
     ensure that appropriate management tools and resources are 
     devoted to that task. Security professional career 
     development requirements would be modeled generally on the 
     statutory Department of Defense Acquisition Career Program.
     Sections 301-305. Establishing and defining career security 
         program
       Section 301 requires the Attorney General to establish 
     policies and procedures for career management of FBI security 
     personnel. Section 302 authorizes the Attorney General to 
     delegate to the FBI Director the Attorney General's duties 
     with respect to the FBI security workforce. Section 303 
     directs the FBI Director to appoint a Security Director, who, 
     under Section 304, would chair a security career program 
     board to advise in managing hiring, training, education, and 
     career development. Section 305 directs the FBI Director to 
     designate certain positions as security positions, with 
     responsibility for personnel security and access control, 
     information systems security, information assurance, physical 
     security, technical surveillance countermeasures, 
     operational, program and industrial security, and information 
     security and classification management.
     Sections 306-309. Career development and training
       Section 306 requires that career paths to senior positions 
     would be published. FBI Special Agents would not have 
     preference for a security position, and no positions would be 
     restricted to Special Agents unless the Attorney General 
     makes a special determination. All FBI personnel would have 
     the opportunity to acquire the education, training and 
     experience needed for senior security positions. The Attorney 
     General would ensure that policies are designed to select the 
     best qualified individuals, consistent with other applicable 
     law. Consideration would also be given to the need for a 
     balanced workforce.
       Section 307 would direct that education, training, and 
     experience requirements would be established for each 
     position. Before assignment as manager or deputy manager of a

[[Page S1359]]

     significant security program, a person would have to complete 
     a security program management course accredited by the Joint 
     DoD-Intelligence Security Training Consortium or determined 
     to be comparable by the Director, and have 6 years security 
     experience including 2 years in a similar program. Section 
     308 directs the Director, in consultation with the DCI and 
     Secretary of Defense, to establish education and training 
     programs for FBI security personnel that are, to the maximum 
     extent practical, uniform with Intelligence and DoD programs. 
     Section 309 sets forth the process for approval of 
     requirements set forth under section 307.


                                title iv

       This title would require the Attorney General to establish 
     an FBI Counterintelligence Polygraph Program for personnel in 
     exceptionally sensitive positions that reflects the results 
     of a pending National Academy of Sciences review of the 
     validity of the polygraph, within 6 months after publication 
     of that review. The regulations would be prescribed in 
     accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act. A similar 
     requirement for the Department of Energy was passed in the 
     latest Defense Authorization Act.
     Sections 401-404. Definitions, establishment of program, 
         regulations, report
       Section 402 requires the establishment of a 
     counterintelligence screening polygraph program consisting of 
     periodic polygraph examinations of employees and contractors 
     with access to sensitive compartmented information, special 
     access program information, on restricted data. This program 
     shall be established within 6 months of the publication of 
     the results of the report of the Committee to Review the 
     Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph of the National Academy 
     of Sciences. Section 403 directs that the program have 
     procedures that address ``false positive'' results and ensure 
     quality assurance and control in accordance with guidance 
     from the DoD Polygraph Institute and the DCI. No adverse 
     personnel action could be taken solely by reason of 
     physiological reactions on an exam without further 
     investigation and personal decision by the Director. 
     Employees could have prompt access to unclassified reports on 
     their exams that relate to adverse personnel action. Section 
     404 requires a report within 9 months of the enactment of the 
     Act on any further legislative action appropriate in the 
     personnel security area.


                                title v

       This title provides statutory authorization for an already 
     existing FBI police force that protects FBI buildings and 
     adjacent streets. Currently, the FBI police suffers from a 
     high rate of turnover due to lower pay and fewer benefits 
     than the Uniformed Division of Secret Service or Capitol and 
     Supreme Court police. This title would close the disparity.
     Sections 501-503. Definitions; establishment; authority of 
         metropolitan police
       Section 501 defines the terms ``Director,'' ``FBI buildings 
     and grounds,'' and ``FBI police'' as used in the title. 
     Section 502 authorizes the FBI Director to establish the FBI 
     police, subject to the Attorney General's supervision, to 
     protect persons and property within FBI buildings and 
     grounds, including adjacent streets and sidewalks within 500 
     feet. FBI buildings and grounds would include any building 
     occupied by the FBI and subject to FBI supervision and 
     control, the land on which such building is situated, and 
     enclosed passageways connecting such buildings. FBI police 
     would be uniformed representatives of the FBI with authority 
     to make arrests and otherwise enforce federal and D.C. laws, 
     carry firearms, prevent breaches of the peace, suppress 
     unlawful affrays and unlawful assemblies, and hold the same 
     powers as sheriffs and constables. FBI police would not have 
     authority to serve civil process. Pay and benefits would be 
     equivalent to pay and benefits for the Secret Service 
     Uniformed Division. Section 503 provides that the authority 
     of the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police would not be 
     affected by this title.


                                title vi

       This title requires two separate reports by the Attorney 
     General and one by the General Accounting Office.
     Section 601. FBI authority and mission
       Section 601 requires the Attorney General to submit a 
     report to Congress on the legal authority for FBI programs 
     and activities, identifying those that have express statutory 
     authority and those that do not. The FBI does not have a 
     statutory charter. One was proposed in 1979 but never 
     enacted. Many FBI functions including its national 
     intelligence and counterintelligence activities are 
     authorized by Executive order rather than by statute. This 
     section also requires the Attorney General to recommend the 
     criminal statutes for which the FBI should have investigative 
     responsibility, whether the authority for any FBI program or 
     activity should be modified or repealed, whether the FBI 
     should have express statutory authority for any program or 
     activity for which it does not currently have such authority, 
     and whether the FBI should have authority for any new program 
     or activity.
     Section 602. FBI information management
       Section 602 requires the Attorney General to submit a 
     report on FBI information management and technology, 
     including whether the authority is needed to waive normal 
     procurement regulations. The report would provide the results 
     of pending Justice Management Council studies and Inspector 
     General audits and submitting a 10-point plan for improving 
     FBI information management and technology to ensure that 1. 
     appropriate FBI technology management positions are filled by 
     personnel with commercial sector experience, 2. access to the 
     most sensitive information is audited so that suspicious 
     activity is subject to near contemporaneous review, 3. 
     critical information systems employ a public key 
     infrastructure, 4. security features are tested by the 
     National Security Agency, 5. FBI employees receive annual 
     instruction in records and information management, 6. a 
     research and development reserve is established, 7. undue 
     requirements for less costly software purchases are 
     eliminated, 8. contracting with an expert technology partner 
     is considered, 9. procedures are instituted to procure 
     through contracts of other agencies as necessary, and 10. 
     system upgrades are tested before operational deployment.
     Section 603. GAO report on crime statistics reporting
       Section 603 requires the General Accounting Office to 
     report on how crime statistics are reported and used by 
     Federal law enforcement agencies. Specifically, the report 
     would identify policies that allow a case to be claimed or 
     reported by more than one law enforcement agency, the 
     conditions that allow such reporting to occur, the number of 
     such cases reported during a 4-year period, similar multiple 
     claims of credit for arrests, the use of such statistics for 
     administrative and management purposes, and relevant 
     definitions. The report would include recommendations for how 
     to eliminate unwarranted and duplicative reporting. Federal 
     law enforcement agencies would be required to comply with GAO 
     requests for information necessary to prepare the report.


                               title vii

       This title would address the issue of the ``double 
     standard'' in the FBI, to prevent lower level employees from 
     being more harshly disciplined than senior FBI officials. 
     Section 7542 of title 5, United States Code, would be amended 
     to allow disciplinary suspensions of SES members for 14 days 
     or less, as is the case for other federal personnel. Current 
     law provides only for suspension ``for more than 14 days.''
     Section 702. Allowing disciplinary suspensions of members of 
         the senior executive service for 14 days or less
       This section would lift the minimum of 14 days suspension 
     that applies in the FBI's SES disciplinary cases and thereby 
     provide additional options for discipline in SES cases and 
     encourage equality of treatment. The current inflexibility of 
     disciplinary options applicable to SES officials was cited at 
     a Senate Judiciary Committee oversight hearing in July, 2001, 
     as one underlying reason for the ``double standard'' in FBI 
     discipline. In effect, those deciding the discipline of SES 
     employees are often left with the choice of an overly harsh 
     penalty or no penalty at all--so they decide not to impose 
     any meaningful disciplinary action.

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, I am pleased to introduce with Senator 
Leahy a bill to reform the FBI. For almost a decade I have been engaged 
in FBI oversight and during that time I have seen numerous scandals and 
coverups. While Director Mueller is working to address these problems, 
Congress also has a role to play in the overhaul of the FBI. The FBI 
reform bill is designed to address the accountability problems that 
have plagued the FBI for years. The bill expands the Department of 
Justice Inspector General's jurisdiction, protects FBI whistleblowers, 
creates an FBI Security Career program and a Counterintelligence 
Polygraph program, enhances the FBI police force, and mandates various 
reports by the Attorney General.
  I have advocated some of these measures, particularly those dealing 
with protecting whistleblowers and expanding the jurisdiction of the 
DOJ Inspector General's Office to include the FBI. Let me provide some 
more detail about the most important provisions in the bill.
  In the past the FBI's own internal Office of Professional 
Responsibility was tasked with the sole authority to investigate the 
misconduct of FBI personnel. Clearly this constitutes a conflict of 
interest. In fact, no other area of the Department of Justice maintains 
this type of accountability system.
  Last summer, Attorney General Ashcroft issued an order which changed 
that situation by expanding the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Justice Office of Inspector General to encompass both the FBI and the 
DEA. Specifically, the order gave the DOJ Inspector General primary 
jurisdiction over allegations of misconduct against employees of the 
FBI and DEA. Previously, the Inspector General could not initiate an 
investigation within the FBI or the DEA, without receiving permission 
from the Deputy Attorney General. I commended Attorney General 
Ashcroft's order because I had been saying for many years that the FBI 
should not be allowed to police

[[Page S1360]]

itself. I was encouraged that the establishment of a free and 
independent oversight entity would have a beneficial impact on the 
FBI's management culture.
  The bill codifies the Attorney General's order making it a permanent 
fixture in the plan to reform the FBI. Specifically, the bill provides 
statutory authority for the DOJ Office of Inspector General to 
investigate all allegations of criminal and administrative misconduct 
by DOJ employees, including those in the FBI and the DEA. However, it 
does not abolish the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility, OPR, 
but rather gives the DOJ Inspector General discretion to refer certain 
investigations to the FBI OPR. Because the FBI OPR is particularly good 
at investigating certain types of low level offenses, it is good that 
the Inspector General will have this discretion.
  The bill also contains much needed protections for 
FBI whistleblowers. As many of you know, I believe that good government 
requires that the brave men and women who blow the whistle on 
wrongdoing be protected. I have been an active champion of the rights 
of federal whistleblowers since 1983. This is because of my strong 
belief that disclosures of wrongdoing by whistleblowers are an integral 
part of our system of checks and balances. Whistleblowers ensure that 
waste, fraud, and abuse are brought to light. Whistleblowers play a 
critical role in ensuring that public health and safety problems are 
exposed.

  I truly believe that reform at the FBI will only occur when FBI 
employees feel free to blow the whistle on wrongdoing. Since the FBI 
was excluded from the Whistleblower Protection Act I have been 
concerned about the retaliation that is often perpetrated against 
whistleblowers at the FBI, such as Dr. Fred Whitehurst, who speak out 
about abuses and problems with the system.
  So, the bill gives FBI whistleblowers the same rights and protections 
that other Federal employees currently possess. When FBI employees are 
retaliated against for blowing the whistle, they can avail themselves 
of all the protections afforded them by the Whistleblower Protection 
Act.
  Since the FBI has made the fight against terrorism its top priority, 
many would be FBI whistleblowers may blow the whistle on wrongdoing 
that involves national security issues. Because of the need to keep 
that information secure, the bill directs the Attorney General to 
formulate regulations to provide specific protections for these 
employees consistent with the relevant portions of the WPA and the 
Administrative Procedures Act.
  Our FBI reform bill addresses several other issues that contribute to 
the FBI's culture of arrogance. I have believed for a long time that 
one of the biggest contributors to this culture is the cumbersome and 
unwieldy jurisdiction of the FBI. The Bureau currently investigates 
over 300 different federal offenses, which are divided between violent 
crime, white collar crime, organized crime, drugs, national security, 
and civil rights. Contained within these areas are numerous instances 
of concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction with other Federal law 
enforcement agencies.

  Despite having what many would describe as an already overburdened 
array of jurisdiction, the FBI has established a campaign of 
jurisdictional encroachment. This ``Pacman'' philosophy of the Bureau's 
past has only served to feed the culture of arrogance. I pointed this 
problem out to the DOJ and was pleased to hear of the Attorney General 
and the FBI Director's intention to put a stop to that ``Pacman'' 
mentality and limit the FBI's investigatory scope.
  But, this will be a complex issue. Just as Congress has been 
complicit in the FBI's expansion, we will need to be involved in the 
divestiture. The Department of Justice's Strategic Plan states that the 
FBI will focus on building and maintaining its utmost capacity to 
detect, deter, counter, and prevent terrorist activity. The plan also 
encourages the FBI to promote and, when available, use new legislation 
and authorities to conduct investigations of terrorist incidents.
  It is ironic that in light of this, the FBI continues to view many 
violations that it has traditionally investigated as being of strategic 
importance. Why are environmental crimes, health care fraud, bank 
robbery, telemarketing and financial institution fraud, computer 
intrusions, intellectual property crimes, and credit card fraud still 
viewed by the FBI as of strategic importance? I understand that 
terrorism investigations could potentially involve any one, or a 
number, of the above violations, but there are many other Federal 
regulatory and investigative agencies that have established historic 
expertise in these same program areas.
  In its reorganization, the FBI needs to scale back on some of its law 
enforcement activities which are duplicated by other Federal and state 
agencies. The Bureau needs to completely jettison some of these areas, 
but in other areas the Bureau could simply take a secondary role, 
allowing another agency to take the lead. It is my hope that by scaling 
back on certain FBI investigative activities, the FBI will send a 
positive signal in dealing with its counterparts in state, local, and 
federal government.
  To assist in cutting back on the FBI's jurisdiction, the bill directs 
the Attorney General to report to Congress on the legal authority for 
FBI programs and activities, identifying those that have express 
statutory authority and those that don't. The bill also requires the 
Attorney General to recommend what criminal statutes he believes the 
FBI should have investigative responsibility for. This report will help 
Congress, as we continue to address the FBI's culture of arrogance.
  Another issue that contributes to the FBI's culture of arrogance is 
the collection, use, and reporting of crime statistics. It is often the 
case in Federal law enforcement that several agencies will claim credit 
for a single arrest. This double and triple counting of arrests leads 
to an inflation of statistics that often misrepresents the actual work 
load of the various agencies. This is a problem because these 
statistics are used by federal law enforcement agencies, including the 
FBI, to justify increases in their funding.

  To get a handle on the exact nature and extent of this problem, our 
bill directs the GAO to conduct a review of how crime and investigation 
statistics are reported and used by Federal law enforcement agencies. 
This report will assist us in future legislation on this issue.
  There are many more reforms contained in our FBI reform bill, but 
there is just one more that I want to focus on today. This reform is a 
change in the way employees of the Senior Executive Service are 
punished.
  Last summer, four exceptional and courageous FBI agents alerted the 
Judiciary Committee to the fact that there exists a gross inequality in 
the way Senior Executive Service (SES) employees of the FBI and rank 
and file agents are disciplined. SES employees are given a slap on the 
wrist for their infractions, while the rank and file agents are often 
punished to the letter of the law. This issue was further exposed by a 
GAO report on the investigation of the Larry Potts Retirement Dinner 
scandal. That report reemphasized what had been reveled in the FBI Law 
Enforcement Ethics Unit's position paper, ``FBI SES Accountability, a 
Higher Standard or a Double Standard.'' These two reports document the 
existence of a double standard.
  I was glad to see that former Director Freeh abolished the SES Review 
Board, but I'm not sure it was a sufficient change for a culture that 
has historically treated SES employees with kid gloves.
  So our FBI Reform bill attempts to address this problem by providing 
some flexibility in how SES employees can be punished. The Senate 
Judiciary Committee has heard repeatedly that this inflexibility is one 
of the main causes for the inequality in punishment at the FBI. 
Currently, the minimum suspension that SES employees can receive is 14 
days, to the Bureau's management is often left with the choice of an 
overly harsh penalty or no penalty at all--so often they decide not to 
impose any meaningful disciplinary action.
  Specifically, our bill would lift the 14-day minimum suspension for 
SES disciplinary cases to provide for additional options in 
disciplining senior executive employees. Hopefully, this change will 
help to remedy this double standard.

[[Page S1361]]

  In conclusion, I urge my colleagues to support this bill to foster 
reform in the FBI. The Bureau is crucial in the war on terrorism. Let's 
fix the problems we have helped to create, so that the FBI can again be 
he best at what it does.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. Smith of Oregon, Mr. Daschle, 
        Mr. Jeffords, Mrs. Clinton, Mrs. Hutchison, Ms. Mikulski, Ms. 
        Snowe, Mrs. Boxer, Ms. Collins, Ms. Landrieu, Mr. Chafee, Mrs. 
        Murray, Mrs. Lincoln, Ms. Stabenow, Ms. Cantwell, Mrs. 
        Carnahan, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Torricelli, Mr. Nelson of Nebraska, 
        Mr. Johnson, Mr. Reed, Mr. Breaux, Mr. Corzine, Mr. Leahy, Mr. 
        Reid, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Nelson of Florida, Mr. Graham, and Mr. 
        Dodd):
  S. 1976. A bill to provide for a comprehensive Federal effort 
relating to treatments for, and the prevention of cancer, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I rise today to introduce the 
National Cancer Act of 2002. This bill is co-sponsored by Senators 
Gordon Smith, Daschle, Jeffords, Clinton, Hutchison, Mikulski, Snowe, 
Boxer, Collins, Landrieu, Chafee, Murray, Lincoln, Stabenow, Cantwell, 
Carnahan, Schumer, Torricelli, Ben Nelson, Johnson, Reed, Breaux, 
Corzine, Leahy, Reid, Kerry, and Bill Nelson.
  Today, cancer is the Nation's second cause of death, trailing heart 
disease. Over the next 30 years, cancer will surpass heart disease and 
become the leading cause of death as the baby boomers age.
  This bill represents a comprehensive national battle plan to 
reenergize the Nation's war on cancer, a war begun when President 
Richard Nixon on January 22, 1971 proposed to Congress that we launch a 
war on cancer.
  That commitment was a critical first step. But it is clear that we 
must take further steps to address the scourge of cancer in every 
respect.
  The bill we are introducing today is the product of more than 3 years 
and hundreds of hours of work.
  I am the vice-chair of the National Dialogue on Cancer. In 
discussions with cancer experts from this group, it became clear to me 
that the National Cancer Act of 1971 was out of date.
  We are now in the genomic era, on the cusp of discoveries and cures 
that we could only have dreamed about in 1971. The science of cancer 
has advanced dramatically with the revolution in molecular and cellular 
biology creating unprecedented opportunities for understanding how 
genetics, environmental risk factors, and lifestyle factors relate to 
cancer. The explosion in knowledge about the human genome and molecular 
biology will enable scientists to better target cancer drugs.
  I believe the opportunity for new drugs is so bright, we might well 
find a cure for cancer in my lifetime.
  With these advances, I thought it was time to update the National 
Cancer Act of 1971 to reflect these advances in science.
  I asked John Seffrin, CEO of the American Cancer Society, and Dr. 
Vincent DeVita, Director of the Yale Cancer Center, to form a special 
committee of cancer experts to provide recommendations on a battle plan 
to conquer cancer.
  The committee produced an ambitious plan and what I tried to do was 
take the most important components, given the current budget situation, 
and develop a piece of legislation that could pass the Senate.
  On November 7, 2001, President George Bush commended the work of the 
committee when he wrote, ``The journey ahead will not be easy. But 30 
years ago, no one would have imagined coming as far as we have. Working 
together, we will take the next steps necessary to defeat this deadly 
disease.'' I invite him today to join me in taking these steps.
  Finding a cure for cancer is a very personal goal. I lost both my 
father, Leon Goldman, and my husband, Bert Feinstein, to cancer. I saw 
its ravages firsthand, and I experienced the frustrations, the 
difficulties, and the loneliness that people suffer when a loved-one 
has cancer. I determined that I would do all I could to reduce the 
number of people who go through this devastating experience.
  And it is my great hope that this legislation will help do just that, 
and enable us to find a cure for cancer in my lifetime.
  This may in fact be the most important thing I do in the Senate.
  There are several reasons we need a major attack on cancer. Much has 
changed since 1971. The way we prevent, diagnose, treat, conduct 
research, and understand cancer has changed dramatically.
  Cancer is a disease of aging and as the American population ages, 
cancer incidence will grow by 29 percent by 2010 and cancer deaths by 
25 percent. The number of Americans over age 65 will double in the next 
30 years.
  Since 1971, survival rates for some cancers have improved, while 
others have not. More and more people live with cancer. Compared to 
1971, twice as many people, 8.9 million in 1997, are living with a 
history of cancer.
  Since 1971, more cancer care has moved from inpatient to outpatient 
settings. Some families find themselves virtually becoming nurses to 
their loved ones in their homes.
  Since 1971, more research is collaborative, between the public and 
private sectors, and more cancer research requires a multi-disciplinary 
approach.
  Since 1971, the biotechnology industry has blossomed and provided a 
broad array of new treatment options, promising even more innovations 
in cancer care.
  Since 1971, computer technology and communications have expanded and 
increased in complexity, making the accessing and transmitting of 
information more widespread, more readily available and transforming 
research methodologies.
  While the science of cancer has seen revolutionary change, there are 
still many gaps in the system, especially from the patient's 
perspective.
  Just three months ago, the President's Cancer Panel in their report 
titled, Voices of a Broken System: Real People, Real Problems, told us 
that cancer is an ``equal opportunity'' killer, but if you are poor, 
uneducated, or isolated you are doubly disadvantaged in America. They 
said, ``Access to appropriate cancer care is the crucial fundamental 
step needed to relieve the desperate physical suffering, financial 
devastation, and loss of dignity so many people endure when cancer is 
diagnosed.''
  Take cancer screening, for example. Cancer screening can reduce 
cancer mortality. While many screening tools have been developed, 
screening rates are still low, especially for colorectal cancer. 
Screening technologies have improved, but cancer screening rates vary 
by cancer site, by population group, and by health insurance coverage.
  Another ``hole'' in the system: Fewer than 5 percent of adult cancer 
patients participate in cancer trials. Among the elderly, the 
population most likely to get cancer, only 3-4 percent participate. 
Drugs cannot be brought to patients without clinical trials.
  The quality of cancer care is uneven and often based on the pure 
coincidence of where one lives. According to the President's Cancer 
Panel, ``People living in rural, frontier, geographically isolated and 
impoverished inner city areas suffer the most from the uneven 
distribution of cancer care resources and providers. . . .'' Many 
studies show that many cancer patients do not receive optimal care.
  Additionally, the cancer care workforce will face severe shortages, 
particularly in long-term care settings.
  The pipeline of medical researchers is threatened with, the number of 
young physicians entering medical research declining.
  Over 44 million Americans have no health care insurance and those 
that do have uneven coverage. The President's Cancer Panel says that at 
least 31 million Americans have inadequate coverage.
  The National Cancer Act of 2002 takes a multi-pronged approach to 
winning the war against cancer. Here's what the bill will do:
  The advances in science that I spoke of earlier on the human genome 
and molecular biology have thus far produced medications that can 
target cancer cells and leave in tack healthy cells.
  This legislation would enable the National Cancer Institute (NCI) to 
fund

[[Page S1362]]

up to 40 percent of grants over 5 years, up from the current level of 
28 percent. Why is this important? The research is what will bring the 
cure.
  NCI now funds 4,500 research project grants at nearly 600 
institutions every year. This represents 28 percent of the 16,000 grant 
proposals NCI receives. NCI scientists think funding 40 percent will 
allow them to fund the most promising grants. At 28 percent, it does 
not happen.
  Funding basic research is a full frontal assault on cancer, which 
will lead to more breakthroughs, more treatments, and ultimately, I 
believe, to a cure.
  We now have drugs, like Gleevec for Chronic Myeloid Leukemia and 
Herceptin for breast cancer, that can target and destroy cancer cells 
while leaving healthy cells unharmed.
  Patients, who were considered terminal, have taken Gleevec and were 
able to get out of their beds and leave the hospice within days of 
treatment. After one-year of clinical trials for Gleevec, 51 out of 54 
patients were still doing well. With 4,500 Americans diagnosed with 
Chronic Myeloid Leukemia a year, the potential for this drug is 
tremendous.
  And just this month, Gleevec was approved by the FDA to treat another 
cancer Gastrointestinal Stromal Tumors, suggesting that the potential 
for this drug may be even greater than we hope.

  The bill authorizes funds for new and existing research centers to 
conduct translational, multidisciplinary cancer research, and to 
establish networks linking translational research centers to community 
cancer providers, hospitals, clinics, doctors' practices, particularly 
in underserved areas.
  The purpose of this provision is to greatly accelerate the movement 
of basic research to the patient, from the ``bench to the bedside,'' so 
that we can conduct more clinical trials.
  Clinical trials test the safety and efficacy of drugs, devices or new 
medical techniques. They are required for FDA approval. These trials 
require thousands of participating people to help determine if drugs 
are safe and effective.
  But clinical trials are expensive. They involve many people, who 
often have to travel to a cancer center; they involve staff time and 
careful monitoring and recordkeeping. The drug industry says it costs 
on average $500 million to develop a drug; a November 2001 Tufts 
University study puts the cost at $800 million. Whatever it is, it is 
expensive.
  The bill includes several steps to expand clinical trials, those 
research projects that require thousands of people to determine whether 
new drugs are safe and effective.
  First, the bill will provide $100 million per year for new grants for 
what is called ``translational'' research, work that moves promising 
drugs from the ``bench to the bedside.''
  Right now, there are many new drugs under development that are stuck, 
as though in a funnel, because we have not put the resources into 
having the people-based research to test those drugs. There are 
approximately 400 new drugs that are held up in the development process 
because the resources are not available to fund clinical research to 
test those drugs.
  For every one drug approved, 5,000 to 10,000 were initially 
considered. The entire process can take as long as 15 years. NCLAC said 
it takes 12 to 14 years to bring one drug from discovery to patients.
  Second, the bill will require insurers to pay the routine or non-
research costs for people to participate in clinical trials, while the 
drug sponsor would continue to pay the research costs. California 
already requires this coverage by private insurers.
  Third, the bill requires the National Cancer Institute to establish a 
program to recruit patients and doctors to participate in clinical 
trials. Dr. Robert Comis, President of the Coalition of National Cancer 
Cooperative Groups, has said that eight out of ten cancer patients do 
not consider participating in a clinical trial. They are unaware that 
they might have the option. He also has found that physician 
involvement is key.
  We must work all we can to make both physicians and patients more 
aware of the importance of participating.
  Currently, only 4 to 5 percent of adult cancer patients participate 
in clinical cancer trials. But Research America polls found that 61 
percent of Americans would participate in a clinical trial.
  We should heed the example of what is called the ``pediatric model.'' 
Over 60 percent of children with cancer participate in clinical trials. 
Children in these trials get optimal care, with an overall physician 
manager or ``quarterback.'' The five-year survival rates for children 
with cancer have increased significantly.
  In the 1960s, childhood leukemia could not be cured. It was a death 
sentence. Today, 70 percent of children with acute lymphoblastic 
leukemia enter remission. This is but one example of the power and 
importance of clinical trials. An investigational treatment yesterday 
is standard treatment today.
  Only by injecting new funding into cancer research will we enable 
cancer researchers to conduct the trials that are necessary to bring 
promising new drugs to market.
  Scientists say we will stop defining cancer by body part, like breast 
cancer or prostate cancer. Because everyday we are understanding better 
the genetic basis of cancer and can focus drugs on molecular targets, 
we may have, for example, 50 different kinds of breast cancer, defined 
by their genetic basis. As NCI's Dr. Rabson has said, ``As we've come 
to understand the molecular signatures of cancer cells, we can classify 
tumors according to their genetic characteristics.''
  This means that we need to create incentives to encourage companies 
to make these targeted drugs because as we redefine cancer, we will 
have smaller numbers of people who have that particular kind of breast 
cancer. Companies are often reluctant to make drugs for small patient 
populations.
  This legislation would provide tax and marketing incentives to 
encourage pharmaceutical companies to produce ``orphan drugs,'' or 
drugs targeted to small patient populations.
  Beginning with Gleevec and continuing into the future, drugs will 
target a narrow genetic or cellular mutation.
  While this holds great promise for patients, it also means that the 
number of treatments will proliferate, thereby segmenting cancer 
patients into smaller and smaller populations. In some cases, this will 
mean that pharmaceutical companies--for strictly financial reasons--may 
not want to produce a given drug.
  This provision would create incentives for those companies to produce 
and market the drugs targeted to patient populations of less than 
200,000.
  The impact: This will help to ensure that patients receive the 
highest quality care, even when the number of people faced with a 
particular type of cancer is small.
  The bill will create a new initiative to train more cancer 
researchers. Specifically, it will (1) pay off the medical school loans 
of 100 physicians who commit to spend at least 3 years doing cancer 
research; and (2) boost the salaries of postdoctoral fellows from 
$28,000 to $45,000 per year over 5 years.
  Every year, young physicians and researchers avoid the field of 
cancer research because, frankly, they feel they can make more money 
elsewhere. This provision will help reverse that trend and add 
thousands of men and women on the front lines of the fight.
  The physician-scientist is endangered and essential, concluded a 
January 1999 study, showing that the number of first-time M.D. 
applicants for NIH research projects has been declining. The study, 
published in Science, said, ``. . . fewer young M.D.'s are interested 
in or perhaps prepared for careers as independent NIH-supported 
investigators.''
  Young doctors and Ph.Ds do not want to go into cancer research 
because they can make more money elsewhere. Graduating physicians have 
medical school debt averaging $75,000 to $80,000. Because of the low 
pay to be a physician-scientist, these doctors cannot afford to go into 
research.
  Postdoctoral fellows, who conduct the bulk of day-to-day research, 
receive pay that is neither commensurate with their education and 
skills nor adequate. To attract the best and the brightest to the field 
of cancer research, we need to pay them more than $28,000 to start.

[[Page S1363]]

  The National Academy of Sciences in September 2000 called for 
increasing their compensation.
  All too often having cancer is a lonely and frightening experience. 
Cancer patients have a team of doctors, from the primary care physician 
to the radiologist to the oncologist. Patients need one doctor to be in 
charge.
  The Institute of Medicine told the Senate Cancer Coalition in our 
June 16, 1999 hearing that the care that cancer patients get is all too 
often just a matter of circumstance: ``. . . for many Americans with 
cancer, there is a wide gulf between what could be construed as the 
ideal and the reality of Americans' experience with cancer care . . . 
The ad hoc and fragmented cancer care system does not ensure access to 
care, lacks coordination, and is inefficient in its use of resources.'' 
The Institute of Medicine study on the uneven quality of health care 
says, ``Health care today is characterized by more to know, more to 
manage, more to watch, more to do, and more people involved in doing it 
than at any time in the nation's history.''
  The bill will require plans to pay doctors, preferably oncologists, 
to become the overall managers of patients' care, what I call a 
``quarterback physician,'' to be with the patient from diagnosis 
through treatment to prevent the patient from being forced to navigate 
the medical system alone.
  I developed this concept after meeting Dr. Judy Schmidt, a solo-
practicing oncologist from Montana. Dr. Schmidt cares for her patients 
from diagnosis to treatment, and she is really a model for doctors 
across the nation to emulate.
  This ``quarterback physician'' would provide overall management of 
the patient's care among all the providers. Someone would be in charge. 
This provision could save money because good coordination can reduce 
hospitalization costs.
  The bill also authorizes $8 million to the Agency for Health Care 
Research and Quality to convene cancer experts, providers, patients and 
other relevant experts to coordinate the development of practice 
guidelines for optimal cancer care, prevention, palliation, symptom 
management and end-of-life care.
  People cannot get good health care if they have no way to pay for it, 
if insurance plans, public and private, do not cover the basics like 
screenings for cancer.
  My bill will require public plans, like Medicare and Medicaid, and 
private insurance plans to cover five services important to good cancer 
care: (1) cancer screenings; (2) genetic testing and counseling for 
people at risk; (3) smoking cessation; and (4) nutrition counseling.
  The coverage added by this bill is important to preventing cancer. 
Here's an example: On January 31, we read reports of a promising new 
screening test for colon cancer that can find extremely small traces of 
cancer in patients' stool, offering an entirely new approach to finding 
colon cancer, which kills 48,000 Americans annually and is often found 
too late to cure.
  Mammograms, pelvic exams, reducing fat in the diet and stopping 
smoking--all of which could be enhanced by this bill--can stop cancer 
before it is too late.
  Because too many Americans have no way to pay for their health care 
when cancer strikes and because seven percent of cancer patients are 
uninsured, the bill also requires the Institute of Medicine of the 
National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study of the feasibility and 
cost of providing Medicare coverage to individuals at any age who are 
diagnosed with cancer and have no other way to pay for their health 
care.
  Medicare already covers care for people of any age who have End Stage 
Renal Disease and Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, Lou Gehrig's Disease. 
This study could provide helpful guidance to the Congress.
  Because no assault on cancer is complete without a strong cancer 
prevention component, the bill provides funds and requires the Centers 
and Disease Control and Prevention to prepare a model state cancer 
control and prevention program; expand the National Program of 
Comprehensive Cancer Control plans and to assist every state to develop 
a cancer prevention and control program.
  The bill also authorizes $250 million to expand the Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention's breast and cervical cancer screening 
program and authorizes $50 million for CDC to begin screening programs 
for colorectal cancer.
  Today, 16 states now have cancer plans and 16 states are creating or 
updating their plans. States could use these funds to promote cancer 
education and prevention, improve registries, study disparities and 
other uses.
  Because of the aging of the American population, we face a virtual 
explosion of cancer in the coming 30 years. The number of cases will 
double. But the sad fact is that we do not have enough nurses and other 
health care professionals to take care of this expected rise in cancer 
patients.
  My bill will provide $100 million for loans, grants and fellowships 
to train for the full range of cancer care providers, including nurses 
for all settings, allied health professionals, and physicians. The bill 
requires that these applicants have the intention to get a certificate, 
degree, or license and demonstrate a commitment to working in cancer 
care.
  In nursing alone, those critical people on the front line of care, we 
face a national nursing shortage in virtually every setting, say many 
experts, which will peak in the next 10 to 15 years unless steps are 
taken. By 2020, the RN workforce will be 20 percent short of what is 
needed. My home state of California ranks 50th among registered nurses 
per capita.
  And it's not just nurses. The Health Resources Services 
Administration says that the demand of health care professionals will 
grow at twice the rate of other occupations.
  Cancer is primarily a disease of aging. As the baby boomers age, 
there will be more cancer. Cancer care is becoming more and more 
complex as technology improves. Skilled providers, from the nurse 
assistant to the oncologist are needed to administer the complex 
therapies. This bill should provide some help.
  Cancer cannot be conquered without addressing smoking and the use of 
tobacco products. Smoking causes one-third of all cancers, and is the 
cause of approximately 165,000 deaths annually.
  Over the past two decades, we have learned that tobacco companies 
have manipulated the level of nicotine in cigarettes to increase the 
number of people addicted to their product.
  There are more than 40 chemicals in tobacco smoke that cause cancer 
in humans and animals, according to the CDC. Tobacco smoke has toxic 
components, as well as tar, carbon monoxide and other dangerous 
additives.
  The cancer community is united in the belief that the single most 
important preventive measure is to place tobacco products under the 
regulatory control of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
  It is long past time to reduce the addictive nature of cigarettes and 
curtail the marketing of these products to young people--I believe that 
empowering the FDA to regulate tobacco will help do that.
  The U.S. Surgeon General and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention have unequivocally demonstrated that, for example, anti-
smoking campaigns can reduce smoking, a major cause of cancer.
  California is a good example: My state started an aggressive tobacco 
control program in 1989 and throughout the 1990s, tobacco use dropped 
at two to three times faster than the rest of the country.
  Ninety percent of adult smokers being before age 18 and every day, 
3,000 young people become smokers.
  This bill will provide meaningful regulation by the Food and Drug 
Administration of the content and marketing of tobacco products, 
especially the addicting and carcinogenic components. Dr. C. Everett 
Koop, former U.S. Surgeon General, and Dr. David Kessler, former 
Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, wrote in their 1997 
report, cited FDA and other studies and said: ``Nicotine in cigarettes 
and smokeless tobacco has the same pharmacological effects as other 
drugs that FDA has traditionally regulated . . . nicotine is extremely 
addictive . . . and the vast majority of people who use nicotine-
containing cigarettes and smokeless tobacco do so to satisfy their 
craving for the pharmacological effects of nicotine; that is, to 
satisfy their drug-dependence or addiction.''

[[Page S1364]]

  They recommended: ``FDA should continue to have authority to regulate 
all areas of nicotine, as well as other constituents and ingredients, 
and that authority should be made completely explicit.''
  I am pleased that to note that even the Philip Morris Companies has 
acknowledged the need for FDA to regulate tobacco. On their website, 
they say:

       We believe federal legislation that includes granting FDA 
     authority to regulate tobacco products could effectively 
     address many of the complex tobacco issues that concern the 
     public, the public health community and us.

  It is long past time to reduce the addictive nature of cigarettes and 
curtail the marketing of these products to young people. This bill 
gives FDA the power to regulate tobacco products' content, design, 
sale, and marketing.
  The bill requires the NCI and the National Institute for 
Environmental Health Sciences to one or more strategic plans to 
intensify research in the following areas: quality of life for cancer 
patients and survivors; symptom management for patients and survivors; 
palliative care and pain management; health disparities for racial and 
ethnic minorities; cancer prevention; behavioral research associated 
with causing and preventing cancer; environmental risk factors for 
cancer and gene-environment interactions; new imaging and early 
detection technologies and methods; and cancer survivorship.
  Patient advocates and others have called on NCI and other institutes 
to develop a broad and responsive portfolio.
  Experts say we need to learn more about cancer survivorship. People 
used to die quickly of cancer, but today, more and more are living with 
cancer, as many as nine million Americans. Kathleen Foley of Memorial 
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center said, ``While we work to cure the many 
types of cancer, nothing would have greater impact on the daily lives 
of cancer patients and their families than good symptom control and 
supportive therapy.'' Charles S. Cleeland, of the M.D. Anderson Cancer 
Center, said in the June 20, 2001 Washington Post, ``We need a new 
research agenda that focuses on alleviation of disease-related 
distress.'' The National Cancer Policy Board of the Institute of 
Medicine last year recommended that NCI conduct more research on 
palliative care.
  This is an example of an area that needs more emphasis. While NCI's 
work has brought huge advances in understanding, preventing and 
treating cancer, there is no question that we could do more.
  For eight years I have co-chaired the Senate Cancer Coalition. We 
have held eight hearings on cancer. With each hearing, I become more 
and more convinced that we can conquer cancer in my lifetime.
  Polls by Research America show that the public wants their tax 
dollars spent on medical research and that in fact people will pay more 
in taxes for more medical research.
  When Beatle George Harrison died in December of cancer, a Maryland 
nursery school teacher, Jennifer DeBernardis, said: ``All the fame and 
fortune and talent doesn't save you from something like cancer.'' 
Cancer impacts everyone. Everyone knows someone who has had cancer or 
will have cancer.
  I am thoroughly convinced that if we just marshal the resources, we 
can conquer cancer in the 21st century. Let's begin. The road ahead is 
long and treacherous. But if we all work together, I honestly believe 
we can do it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Madam President, I am very pleased and honored 
to join Senator Feinstein today to introduce this very important piece 
of legislation. Our country is very good at waging a winning war, but 
there is one more that we need to wage and win and that is the war on 
cancer.
  I joined Senator Feinstein as an original cosponsor of this for three 
reasons: First of all, because she asked me to. She is a person of 
remarkable leadership on this issue and so many more. Second, it was 
important to her and to me that the other cosponsor be a Republican 
because cancer is not a partisan issue. It attacks us both equally no 
matter how we register at the polls. This is one of those issues where 
truly we ought to be walking in lockstep together as Americans.
  Finally, I know something of the pain that families experience 
through the contraction of cancer. As an honor and a tribute to my own 
mother, whom I recently lost to cancer, I cosponsor this legislation.
  Oregon is a small State relatively--large geographically, but not in 
population--but cancer knows no boundaries as to States or as to 
countries. As we consider the statistics I can give, they apply to my 
State. In percentage terms, they would apply equally to every State. 
Truly, cancer is the second biggest killer in the State of Oregon, 
second only to heart disease. And at current rates, it will soon 
surpass that. This is a war we have to win.
  There are 18,000 new cases of cancer diagnosed among Oregonians every 
year. That is about 50 a day. On average, 19 Oregonians die from cancer 
every day. Breast cancer is the most common form of diagnosed cancer in 
my State. Nine women every day hear the dreaded words: You have breast 
cancer. And every day, one family in Oregon will lose a family member 
to breast cancer. Every 3 days, a child in Oregon is told that he or 
she has cancer. I could go on. The statistics become rather numbing. 
But they are not unique to my State. That makes it all the more tragic 
that this is such a large and growing problem.
  There is something we can do about it. I am proud to say that Senator 
Feinstein has mentioned Dr. Druker of the Oregon Health Sciences 
University. He has, through his study of the genome, the genomic field, 
developed a promising new oral treatment for patients with chronic 
myeloid leukemia, a rare and life-threatening form of cancer. We met a 
wonderful woman yesterday who has been apparently cured on the basis of 
this drug. Gleevec is a target therapy based on new knowledge in this 
important area of research. It is hoped that future advances in cancer 
treatment will be equally as successful at targeting abnormalities with 
curative or less toxic drugs for cancer patients. This legislation will 
help us on this path.
  In the interests of time, I will not review the details of our bill 
that Senator Feinstein has so very ably and eloquently laid out. This 
is a good bill. This is a bill that should pass. It is expensive in 
dollar terms, but how can we put a pricetag on the health of the 
American people, on an issue as painful as this one?
  Again, cancer is not a partisan disease.
  I am proud today to cosponsor the National Cancer Act of 2002. I do 
so as a Republican, but more I do so as an American, and even more I do 
so as a member of the human family.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. CLINTON. Madam President, I rise today on behalf of legislation 
I am introducing along with Senator Feinstein and others to help 
patients and their families around the country who are struggling 
against cancer.
  It has been three decades since we declared war on cancer, and passed 
the National Cancer Act of 1971. And while we have many new weapons in 
our arsenal, new surgical techniques, new drugs like Gleevec, and new 
diagnostic tests to catch cancer in its early stages, the burden of 
this disease on our Nation is still devastating. One out of every two 
Americans will hear these devastating words sometime in their lives: 
``you have cancer.'' It is the second leading cause of death in our 
country--surpassed only by heart disease, and it not only devastates 
the patient; it brings immeasurable pain into the lives of that 
person's family and friends.
  Consider the statistic that 1,500 Americans die of cancer each day--
that's 1 out of every 4 deaths attributable to cancer. And the new 
cases continue to mount. Last year in New York alone there were an 
estimated 83,200 new cases of cancer--including 14,200 cases of breast 
cancer and nearly 4,000 cases of Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma.
  Sadly, cancer has become a part of life for all American families. 
Thanks to research, early detection and treatment, cancer is not 
automatically a death sentence. It can be beaten. And it is even better 
to keep it from occurring in the first place. Our hope for this and 
future generations is this simple dream--that in the long fight against

[[Page S1365]]

this disease, some day we will ultimately win--that keeps so many 
patients and families going.
  This bill we're introducing today can move us closer to making the 
dream a reality. It calls for: Recruiting talented medical experts by 
offering to cover the student loan payments of 100 physicians a year 
who agree to become cancer researchers; supporting the work of NCI 
Cancer centers like Memorial Sloan Kettering and Roswell Park in New 
York; improving cancer care by attracting and training health 
professionals to provide cancer care, to encourage cancer quarterbacks 
that can coordinate a patients care, and improving access to important 
cancer services such as screenings, smoking cessation therapy, genetic 
testing, and counseling about whether to undertake genetic testing.
  While this legislation goes a long way to strengthening the 
biomedical research efforts, we will also be continuing to work with 
the States, communities, and public health institutions to educate the 
public about cancer prevention, to address the risk factors, and 
promote early intervention.
  In the past, the phrase ``public health'' conjured up battles against 
infectious diseases like malaria or tuberculosis. Now with chronic 
diseases, such as heart disease and cancer, as the leading killers, we 
must think about ``public health'' in a new light, and fight 
carcinogens as well as pathogens.
  For instance, this bill affirms FDA's authority over tobacco, the 
carcinogen that is responsible for 1 out of every 3 cancer deaths. Next 
week I will be chairing a hearing in the Subcommittee on Public Health 
to explore the need for better tracking of chronic disease and 
environmental exposure, so that we can identify and understand the 
connections between the environment and diseases like cancer.
  I am a big believer in patient access to clinical trials. In the 
previous administration Medicare and Medicaid began covering the 
routine medical costs of participating in clinical trials, and I 
support extending that coverage to patients who have private insurance 
as well. The Senate-passed Patients' Bill of rights and the legislation 
we're introducing today takes steps toward allowing more cancer 
patients to participate in clinical trials that just might save their 
lives. I will continue fighting to strengthen this important 
cornerstone of patient care and scientific progress.
  Our hope for this legislation and America's war on cancer is simple: 
to move cancer from the medical books to the history books. And to live 
in a world where no one has to hear the words, ``you have cancer,'' 
ever, ever again.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. THURMOND:
  S. 1977. A bill to amend chapter 37 of title 28, United States Code, 
to provide for appointment of United States marshals by the Attorney 
General; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. THRUMOND. Madam President; I rise to introduce legislation that 
would improve the U.S. Marshals Service by making the U.S. Marshal at 
the district level a career position rather than a political one. This 
reform is long overdue and would create an improved management 
structure for the Marshal Service. This legislation would bring the 
Service in line with other Federal agencies that choose their top 
district and field officers by professional advancement, such as the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. As a result of this 
change, we will ensure that highly qualified and experienced 
individuals become U.S. Marshals. I encourage my colleagues to support 
this important reform, which would greatly improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the U.S. Marshals Service.
  The U.S. Marshals Service is the oldest Federal law enforcement 
agency. While its most traditional role is assisting the Federal judges 
and witnesses and by transporting prisoners, it also plays a critical 
role in Federal law enforcement in other ways. For example, it is the 
primary Federal agency responsible for apprehending dangerous fugitives 
from justice, and it conducts many special operations for the Attorney 
General.
  The management of the Marshals Service is unlike any other Federal 
law enforcement agency. While there is a national Director of the 
Marshals Service located in Arlington, VA, each judicial district has a 
U.S. Marshal that is appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate. Consequently, the district U.S. Marshals are in reality 
independent and accountable only to the President. Eduardo Gonzalez, 
past Director of the U.S. Marshals Service, testified before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in 1998 that neither the Director of the Marshals 
Service nor the Attorney General can directly discipline a U.S. 
Marshal. Rather, the President must specifically authorize the 
disciplinary action. Additionally, a House report that accompanied a 
similar reform bill from the 106th Congress stated that the Director of 
the Marshals Service is powerless to demote, suspend, or transfer a 
U.S. Marshal. The current system, therefore, undercuts the leadership 
capacity of the Director of the Marshals Service due to the political 
independence of the U.S. Marshals.
  Each district also has the position of Chief Deputy Marshal, which is 
occupied by a career professional. The Chief Deputy Marshal assists the 
politically-appointed U.S. Marshal, who may have little or no 
experience in law enforcement, and provides continuity and leadership 
in the district offices. The Chief Deputy Marshals are vital to the 
operation of the field offices, providing stability during the comings 
and goings of U.S. Marshals. Due to the inexperience of many U.S. 
Marshals, the Chief Deputy Marshals have assumed critical roles in the 
operation of the field offices. In fact, the Marshals Service website 
states, ``The backbone of the Marshals Service has always been the 
individual Deputy Marshal.'' It is significant that the politically-
appointed U.S. Marshal is not the ``backbone'' of the Service. Rather, 
the Deputy Marshal, who arrives at the position through career 
advancement, is the mainstay of the Marshals Service.
  The Chief Deputies in turn have Supervisory Deputy U.S. Marshals to 
assist them with day-to-day activities. Due to the heavy turnover in 
leadership at the district level, there must be significant support for 
new and inexperienced U.S. Marshals. Therefore, the district level 
offices are heavily staffed. This situation results in an agency that 
is top heavy in management.
  In an excellent book about the U.S. Marshals Service called ``The 
Lawmen'' by Frederick Calhoun, the author asserts that the Marshals 
Service is harmed by the process of appointing district marshals. He 
writes, ``The service remained too politicized. The presidential 
appointment of the U.S. marshals haunted the organization. It could 
never escape the taint of politics as long as its top district manager 
owed their appointments to political favors, not professional 
advancement.'' Mr. Calhoun recognized that because of the political 
appointment of the top field officers, career employees must walk a 
fine line between balancing their allegiances to the temporary U.S. 
Marshal and to headquarters. He goes on to say, ``The deputies dealt 
daily with their political supervisors, who controlled their work 
assignments and annual personnel evaluations, while they looked to 
headquarters for careers and promotions.''
  The current organization of the Marshals Service not only causes 
political strains, but it is also structurally unsound. Wayne Colburn, 
Director of the U.S. Marshals Service in the early 1970s, argued that 
the agency functioned as a ``loosely organized group of ninety-four 
judicial districts'' due to the weakness of the Director. Mr. Colburn 
recognized that the management structure was flawed because the agency 
in effect had ninety-four directors who owed little allegiance to the 
national director. While Mr. Colburn's concerns were alleviated 
somewhat by the Marshals Service Act of 1988, which strengthened the 
policy-making powers of the Director, the Act did not go far enough. 
The Director has centralized authority, yet he is still extremely 
limited in his ability to make personnel and disciplinary decisions 
regarding the politically appointed U.S. Marshals. This situation is 
unacceptable in such an important Federal agency. We owe it to our 
Nation's oldest law enforcement organization to improve its structure 
and to make its operations more efficient.

  I would like to point out that the U.S. Marshals Service has already

[[Page S1366]]

placed some of its most crucial functions under the management of the 
national office, thereby avoiding some of the problems that I have 
discussed so far. For example, the Witness Security Program, which 
ensures the safety of witnesses who testify for the government, is 
administered centrally by the Marshals Service. According to former 
Director Gonzalez's testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
the Witness Security Program's operation was changed because it was not 
functioning correctly at the district level. He said, ``Witness 
Security Inspectors assigned to the districts found they were 
attempting to serve two masters, the headquarters' Witness Security 
Program and the U.S. Marshal.'' This example of internal restructuring 
by the Service demonstrates the need for Congress to enact fundamental 
reform.
  This reform legislation also has the potential to save taxpayer 
money. Mr. Gonzalez testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
that if the political selection of U.S. Marshals were ended, the 
Service would eliminate many field office positions. There would no 
longer be a need to provide the kind of support that is currently 
necessary to assist the political appointees, who often do not have the 
proper experience and expertise. A more streamlined management 
structure would save money and make operations more efficient. 
According to Mr. Gonzalez, the Marshals Service has estimated that this 
change would save over $10 million in the first three years.
  Legislation to change the appointment process for district Marshals 
passed the house in 1997 but did not pass the Senate. That bill, as 
this one, essentially makes the change effective at the start of the 
upcoming four-year term for the President. This bill would be effective 
in January 2005, so that U.S. Marshals appointed by President Bush 
could complete the current four-year term of the Bush Administration.
  It is important to recognize that many district U.S. Marshals who 
have served over the years have been distinguished public servants and 
are fine people. However, others had no experience in law enforcement 
and were not qualified to serve in these important positions.
  For the benefit of the Marshals Service, I urge my colleagues to 
support this important reform measure. It is long overdue. Similar 
reforms have been supported by Presidential commissions under 
Presidents Howard Taft, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin Roosevelt. It is 
time that we professionalized one of our most important law enforcement 
agencies. We owe it to all those who have served honorably during the 
proud history of the U.S. Marshals Service, and we owe it to those who 
entrust their lives to the safekeeping of the U.S. Marshals.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1977

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. APPOINTMENTS OF UNITED STATES MARSHALS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``United 
     States Marshals Service Reform Act of 2002''.
       (b) Appointments of Marshals.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 37 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (A) in section 561(c)--
       (i) by striking ``The President shall appoint, by and with 
     the advice and consent of the Senate,'' and inserting ``The 
     Attorney General shall appoint''; and
       (ii) by inserting ``United States marshals shall be 
     appointed subject to the provisions of title 5 governing 
     appointments in the competitive civil service, and shall be 
     paid in accordance with the provisions of chapter 51 and 
     subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to 
     classification and pay rates.'' after the first sentence;
       (B) by striking subsection (d) of section 561;
       (C) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (h), and 
     (i) of section 561 as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), and 
     (h), respectively; and
       (D) by striking section 562.
       (2) Technical and conforming amendment.--The table of 
     sections for chapter 37 of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking the item relating to section 562.
       (c) Marshals in Office Before Effective Date.--
     Notwithstanding the amendments made by this Act, each marshal 
     appointed under chapter 37 of title 28, United States Code, 
     before the effective date of this Act shall, unless that 
     marshal resigns or is removed by the President, continue to 
     perform the duties of that office until the expiration of 
     that marshal's term and the appointment of a successor.
       (d) Effective Date.--This Act and the amendments made by 
     this Act shall take effect on January 20, 2005, and shall 
     apply to appointments made on and after that date.

                          ____________________