[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 179 (Thursday, January 3, 2002)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2523-E2524]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                               H.R. 3343

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. TED STRICKLAND

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                       Thursday, January 3, 2002

  Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Speaker, I have spoken on the floor on many 
occasions about the damage brought to our nation's energy security as a 
result of the privatization of the United States Enrichment Corporation 
in July of 1998. Through the thorium cleanup legislation before us 
today, I am pleased Congress will take out an insurance policy to 
ensure that we have the capacity to produce the nuclear fuel needed to 
supply our nation's nuclear power reactors in the event of supply 
interruptions. That insurance policy authorizes the Secretary of Energy 
to carry out necessary activities at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion 
Plant in Piketon, Ohio to maintain our country's uranium enrichment 
capability. Such activities include placing 3 million Separative Work 
Units (SWU) of capacity on cold standby at the Piketon, Ohio facility.
  I am pleased that the Speaker of the House, the Under Secretary of 
Energy Bob Card, and the Energy and Commerce Committee were able to 
work together to craft this legislation. I note that legislation to 
authorize Cold Standby at the Portsmouth plant was included as an 
amendment to the ``Energy Advancement and Conservation Act of 2001'' 
(H.R. 2587) during mark up in the Energy and Commerce Committee, but it 
was stripped in the Rules Committee and was not ruled in order as part 
of the package of amendments considered on the floor during debate on 
H.R. 4. I am pleased that there is bipartisan agreement on authorizing 
Cold Standby.
  Today, over 20 percent of our nation's electricity supply comes from 
nuclear power. While there is general agreement that we should not be 
dependent on foreign supplies for our energy requirements, our 
country's nuclear fuel imports have increased dramatically in a few 
short years. Out nation now depends on imports for approximately 77 
percent of the nuclear fuel that powers our nation's nuclear powered 
electricity plants. U.S. utilities require 11.0 million SWU of 
enrichment services each year; approximately 8.5 million SWU is 
imported and the remainder is produced at the Paducah, Kentucky plant 
operated by USEC. Approximately 5.5 million SWU comes from Russia as 
part of the US-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Agreement, and 3.0 
million SWU are imported from European producers.
  The Portsmouth uranium enrichment plant was shuttered by USEC, Inc. 
in June 2001, three years ahead of the earliest closure date agreed to 
in the ``Treasury Agreement.'' The Treasury Agreement was intended to 
assure post-privatization compliance by USEC with the statutory 
requirements contained in the USEC Privatization Act of 1996, including 
the obligations to maintain a reliable and economic source of domestic 
uranium enrichment services. The Treasury Agreement also was intended 
to see that operation of the Department of Energy's two uranium 
enrichment plants continued until December 31, 2004 or until new, more 
efficient laser based technology is deployed.
  USEC terminated its laser-based technology development less than a 
year after privatization, and today it has no credible prospects for 
deploying new technology for the foreseeable future.
  Indeed, NRC and industry reports reveal that USEC's finances are 
precarious at best. The USEC operated Gaseous Diffusion Plant in 
Paducah, Kentucky presently operates at a deficit, and there is 
widespread concern that USEC management will close this plant, leaving 
the U.S. completely dependent on foreign sources of fuel. I urge the 
Administration to prevent our nation from losing its entire enrichment 
industry and to take the steps needed to promote the deployment of 
competitive centrifuge technology at both Portsmouth and Paducah. It is 
ironic that 3 years ago the U.S. was in a position to be fully self-
reliant for its own nuclear fuel supply and today we are on the verge 
of losing that capability.
  A single, uneconomic enrichment plant and no foreseeable prospects 
for new enrichment technology is not what Congress intended when it 
authorized privatization of USEC. I note that the Energy Department has 
sent the Energy and Commerce Committee draft language providing the 
Secretary with the authority to operate the gaseous diffusion plants 
and to sell low enriched uranium in order to meet domestic 
requirements. I believe that once the Energy and Commerce Committee has 
had the chance to evaluate the proposed framework for assuring domestic 
enrichment supply, there will be support to take the additional steps 
to begin to repair the damage caused the USEC Privatization.
  There are a number of significant policy concerns associated with 
USEC's premature closing of the Portsmouth enrichment plant and the 
absence of replacement technology coming on-stream in the interim. 
Specifically, these challenges are:
  (1) Loss of approximately one-half of the U.S. capability to produce 
enriched uranium;
  (2) Increased dependence on the Russian HEU Agreement such that a 
disruption could result in USEC's inability to meet its obligations. 
This raises both energy security concerns at home and national security 
concerns abroad with respect to enrichment and plutonium recycling (for 
example, the U.S. committed to supply Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
with enriched uranium as an incentive to avoid use of plutonium based 
fuels for electricity generation);
  (3) The U.S. government has liabilities and obligations under 
Sections 3108 and 3109 of the USEC Privatization Act to honor all sales 
contracts entered into by USEC prior to the date of privatization in 
the event USEC fails to fulfill its obligations;
  (4) Today's trend toward just-in-time fuel procurement further 
increases vulnerability to supply disruption; and

[[Page E2524]]

  (5) Next generation Pebble Bed Modular Reactors being developed by 
the utility industry require fuel enriched to 8 percent U 235, and the 
Portsmouth plant is the only facility in the U.S. that is licensed and 
capable of enriching uranium to that level. This will put the nation in 
the position of having to rely on imports for the next generation of 
nuclear reactors.
  The September 18, 2000 DOE report entitled ``Options for Government 
Response to Energy Security Challenges Facing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle'' 
outlines a variety of scenarios where USEC would not be able to assure 
a reliable supply of uranium fuel.
  Today's legislation authorizing DOE to maintain the Portsmouth 
enrichment plant on Cold Standby serves as an insurance policy for the 
nation's electricity supply against supply disruptions.
  What exactly is entailed in Cold Standby?
  Cold Standby involves placing those portions of the uranium 
enrichment plant needed for 3 million SWU/year production capability in 
a shut-down non-operational condition and performing surveillance and 
maintenance activities necessary to retain the ability to resume 
production after a set of restart activities are conducted. This 
involves treating the cells to remove uranium deposits, buffering the 
process cells with dry air to prevent wet air in-leakage (which would 
destroy the barrier equipment), installation of buffer cell alarms to 
insure that proper integrity is maintained, and establishing procedures 
to keep equipment in a safe condition capable of being restarted. Today 
this takes place under the oversight of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
certificate.
  I am pleased that the Secretary of Energy was able to reprogram 
funding in April 2001 in order to place Portsmouth on Cold Standby when 
the plant closed in June of 2001 and to secure the funds needed to 
winterize these process buildings.
  Long term, I believe the best way to fund Cold Standby is to use a 
portion of the $1.2 billion in funds contained in the USEC Fund that 
are not already reserved under P.L. 105-204 for conversion of depleted 
uranium hexafluoride (DUF6). These funds are held in the Treasury and, 
during the previous administration, these funds were determined by the 
General Counsel of the Office of Management and Budget to be available 
for meeting the expenses of privatization. I urge the OMB to re-examine 
this as a source of funding for Cold Standby and to work with Congress 
to make these funds available.
  Alternatively, the cost of Cold Standby can be met through the use of 
appropriated funds, as was accomplished in the FY 02 Energy and Water 
Development Appropriations Act. Either way, the nation will be 
purchasing insurance against the type of energy supply disruptions that 
could be worse than the problems witnessed in California earlier this 
year.
  As we discussed in the Energy and Commerce Committee, this authority 
to fund ``cold standby'' is not intended to compete for funds from the 
Energy Department's environmental clean-up fund known as the Uranium 
Enrichment Decontamination & Decommissioning (UED&D) Fund.
  While we are increasing the amount of funding from the UED&D Fund, it 
is important to me and my friends from Kentucky and Tennessee that the 
reimbursement for clean up at the thorium site does not shift funds 
from clean up activities at the three uranium enrichment sites. It is 
also important that the burden for cleaning up the thorium site does 
not fall on nuclear power ratepayers. I know the intent of this 
substitute is to address both of those issues by holding harmless the 
uranium enrichment sites' cleanup schedule and protecting our nuclear 
ratepayers from shouldering the additional cost of cleaning up the site 
in West Chicago, Illinois.
  I support this bill.

                          ____________________