[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 178 (Thursday, December 20, 2001)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E2381]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         TIME TO RATIFY THE CTB

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                         HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY

                            of massachusetts

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, December 20, 2001

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my concern over 
recent reports that the administration is considering the development 
of so-called ``low-yield'' nuclear weapons. While these mini-nukes are 
allegedly being considered to promote a longstanding nonproliferation 
goal of destroying buried stockpiles of chemical and biological 
weapons, testing these weapons would break a 9-year moratorium on 
nuclear testing and would have grave implications for nonproliferation. 
This action would continue to undermine the future of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is already under assault in this 
administration.
  The CTBT is the culmination of a series of incremental efforts to 
stop the threat of nuclear war following the explosion of two nuclear 
weapons during World War II. The radioactive fallout from hundreds of 
test explosions in the 1950's and the near catastrophe of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis strengthened support for a cessation of nuclear 
explosions. These events led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, 
which prohibited all nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in space, 
and under water. Next came the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, which 
limited the explosive force of underground tests, and the Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, which extended that limit to nuclear 
explosions for ``peaceful purposes''. These two treaties were ratified 
in 1990 but fell short of limiting all nuclear explosions.
  The end of the Cold War and the thawing of U.S.-Russia relations 
reinvigorated efforts to seek a total ban of nuclear test explosions. 
In 1994, I cosponsored H. Con. Res. 235, which lauded the President for 
maintaining a moratorium on testing nuclear weapons and for being 
supportive of a comprehensive test ban. With strong international 
support, the CTBT was finally opened to signature in September 1996 and 
was promptly signed by the President. The ball then moved to the 
Senate's court. In September 1997, I cosponsored H. Res. 241, which 
urged the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the 
CTBT. Despite certification by the President that there were no safety 
or reliability concerns about the nuclear arsenal that required 
underground tests, consideration of the Treaty was held hostage by 
politics and, in 1999, was rejected by the Senate.
  Now we come to the present day when 162 States have signed the treaty 
and 87 have ratified it. The Treaty has still not entered into force, 
however, and the United States is not among the ratifiers. The current 
administration has emphatically refused to consider a comprehensive 
test ban and did not even send a representative to the Conference.
  The administration's rejection of the CTBT and withdrawal from the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty send the wrong message to the 
international community about our commitment to nonproliferation. Our 
whole nonproliferation stance is linked to the CTBT, since it signals 
our intention to meet the expectations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT). Under the NPT, nuclear weapons States pledged to work in 
good faith toward total disarmament in exchange for an agreement by 
non-nuclear weapons States to limit their use of nuclear technology to 
peaceful applications. Cessation of testing new weapons is a vital part 
of any serious disarmament plan. If the United States won't even agree 
to consider a test ban, and is clearly signaling its intention to go 
forward with development of nuclear missile defense, how can we 
possibly persuade other nations to forego their weapons programs?
  In this age of heightened concern over terrorist threats we need the 
CTBT now more than ever. Much work remains to be done to reduce the 
threat of terrorists obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction. A 
ban on all nuclear explosions limits the ability of terrorists to 
develop their own nuclear weapons or to acquire them from hostile 
nonnuclear weapons States. The CTBT should be an integral part of our 
anti-terrorism efforts and I urge my colleagues to support its 
ratification. When the President comes to Congress to get the 1994 ban 
on the development of new nuclear weapons lifted I urge my colleagues 
to vote no to the President's request.




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