[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 178 (Thursday, December 20, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13871-S13884]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY ACT OF 2001
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, under the unanimous consent agreement,
can we turn to S. 1214 and ask the clerk to report?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the bill by title.
A bill (S. 1214) to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936
to establish programs to ensure greater security for U.S.
Seaports, and for other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
South Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. HOLLINGS. In my 5 minutes, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Arizona, my ranking member--this is really a bipartisan initiative--
Senator Graham of Florida who has been a leader in this regard and also
Senator Hutchison of Texas.
I also thank the distinguished director of the Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee, Mr. Kevin Kayes; Mr. Carl Bentzel, the expert
on port security who has been working on this over the past several
years; and Mr. Matthew Morrissey.
We actually reported the bill before September 11 of this year. We
have been working diligently to take care of the concerns on both sides
of the aisle and both sides of the Capitol. We think this measure can
pass expeditiously, as soon as the House returns.
Following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, we have worked hard to
improve the security of America's transportation system, starting with
the airline security bill just signed into law. However, protecting
America from terrorist threats is only as effective as the weakest line
of defense. That means every mode of transportation must be secured,
including maritime transportation.
The United States has more than 1,000 harbor channels and 25,000
miles of inland, intracoastal, and coastal waterways. Those waterways
serve 361 ports and have more than 3,700 terminals handling passengers
and cargo. The U.S. marine transportation system each year moves more
than 2 billion tons of domestic and international freight, imports 3
billion tons of oil, transports 134 million passengers by ferry, and
hosts more than 7 million cruise ship passengers. Of the more than 2
billion tons of freight, the majority of cargo is shipped in huge
containers from ships directly onto trucks and railcars that
immediately head onto our highways and rail systems. However less than
2 percent of those containers are ever checked by Customs or law
enforcement officials. The volume of maritime trade is expected to more
than double by the year 2020, making maritime security even more
important for the future. This is a gaping hole in our national
security that must be fixed--and it must be fixed before enemies of the
United States try to exploit our weakness.
Before discussing the specifics of our bill, I want to read an
excerpt from a chilling story published October 8 in the The Times of
London:
Intelligence agencies across the world are examining Osama
bin Laden's multimillion [dollar] shipping interests. He
maintains a secret fleet, under a variety of flags of
convenience, allowing him to hide his ownership and transport
goods, arms, drugs, and recruits with little official
scrutiny.
Three years ago, nobody paid much attention to a crew
unloading cargo from a rusting freighter tied up on the
quayside in Mombasa, Kenya. The freighter was part of Osama
bin Laden's merchant fleet and the crew were delivering
supplies for the team of suicide bombers who weeks later
would blow up the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Bin
Laden's covert shipping interests were revealed at the trial
of the bombers, but until now security services have been
slow to track down how many vessels he operates.
Lloyd's List International reported that a NATO country's
intelligence service has identified more than 20 merchant vessels
believed to be linked to Osama bin Laden. Those vessels are now subject
to seizure in ports all over the world. Some of the vessels are thought
to be owned outright by bin Laden's business interests, while others
are on long-term charter.
Several weeks ago, a suspected member of the Al Qaeda terrorist
network
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was arrested in Italy after he tried to stow-away in a shipping
container heading to Toronto. The container was furnished with a bed, a
toilet, and its own power source to operate the heater and
recharge batteries. According to the Toronto Sun, the man also had a
global satellite telephone, a laptop computer, an airline mechanics
certificate, and security passes for airports in Canada, Thailand and
Egypt.
These two stories really bring home this issue of seaport security.
Except for those of us who live in port cities like Charleston,
Americans often do not think about their ports--the ports that load
industrial and consumer goods onto trucks and railroad cars heading
directly to their hometowns. Therefore, security provided through our
seaports ultimately affects landlocked communities in the heartland of
the United States. Of the cargo imported and exported into the United
States, 95 percent arrives through our seaports; the balance is shipped
through land and air borders. The potential damage and destruction that
can be accomplished through security holes at our seaports potentially
exceeds any other mode of transportation. And yet we have failed to
make seaport security a priority.
Many of our busiest seaports are not only near large cities, they are
in the core of cities like Charleston, Boston, Miami, and Seattle.
These seaports have been the historic hubs of economic growth, and, in
some cases, they have existed for close to four centuries. By
comparison, our rail infrastructure is 150 years old and most of our
aviation infrastructure is less than 60 years old. The port areas in
many cities have become increasingly attractive places to live because
many people want a view of the water, and to live near the coast. So we
are facing a major problem: the number of people who want to live close
to the waterfront is growing rapidly, but the open nature of our
seaports exposes them to risks associated with maritime trade,
including the transport of hazardous materials.
Most Americans would be surprised to discover there is no unified
federal plan for overseeing the security of the international borders
at our seaports. And that's what seaports are: international borders
that must be protected as well as our land borders with Canada and
Mexico. Yet we have failed to make them secure. The U.S. Coast Guard
and Customs Service are doing an outstanding job, but they are
outgunned. In the year 2000, we imported 5.5 million trailer truckloads
of cargo. Due to that volume, seaports, according to the Customs
Service, are only able to inspect between 1 to 2 percent of containers.
In other words, potential terrorists and drug smugglers have a 98
percent chance of randomly importing illegal and dangerous materials.
When traveling by airplane, we walk through metal detectors, our
luggage is X-rayed, and Customs officials may interview us and check
our bags. The inspection rate is 100 percent. At our land border
crossings, every single car and truck driver is stopped and
interviewed, or at least reviewed by the federal government. Again, the
inspection rate is 100 percent. However, at a U.S. seaport, a person
has a 98 percent chance of importing a 48-foot truckload of cargo with
no inspection at all. One marine container can carry more heroin than
is used in the United States in one year. Some of these containers can
carry as much as 30 tons, or 60,000 pounds of cargo. A medium sized
tanker can carry as much as 32 million gallons of petroleum or
hazardous materials. Nearly one-quarter of all hazardous materials are
moved via water, most of it in bulk form via huge tankers. These
shipments of oil or hazardous materials--most of them carried by
foreign vessels--are especially dangerous targets for terrorists.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, we must take action to
better secure our maritime borders.
The Congress recently approved a new law that spends $3.2 billion to
improve security at our airports. The highway reauthorization bill--
TEA-21 passed in 1998--directed $140 million a year for five years to
improve roads and security infrastructure at our land borders. We
annually fund the Border Patrol to guard against illegal entry at our
land borders. At U.S. seaports, the federal government provides
officers from the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service--but the federal government
invests nothing in security infrastructure at our seaports. We leave
that up to the state-controlled port authorities and private marine
terminal operators. Thus, we have essentially abrogated the federal
responsibility of our international seaport borders to states and the
private sector.
Like airline security, seaport and international border security is
one of the prime responsibilities of the federal government. We must
meet the challenge head-on with enough resources to address these
serious issues of national security, and to help our partners at the
state and local levels protect their own communities. While these
security holes at our seaports may be less obvious to the public, they
do exist. Because of the magnitudes of the cargoes, the proximity of
cargo delivery to large populations, and the transportability that
water confers to certain hazardous materials or oil, seaports lacking
adequate security are more vulnerable to attack and sabotage than our
airports or land borders.
A couple years ago, Senator Bob Graham convinced President Clinton to
appoint a commission to look at seaport security. At the time, the main
focus of port security was stopping illegal drugs, the smuggling of
people, and cargo theft. While those problems still exist, the new--and
very real--threat of terrorism strikes right at the heart of our
national defense.
The Interagency Commission on Crime and Security at U.S. Seaports
issued a report in September 2000 that said security at U.S. seaports
``ranges from poor to fair.'' Let me repeat that: 17 federal agencies
reviewed our port security system and found that it is in poor shape.
According to the Commission:
Control of access to the seaport or sensitive areas within
the seaports is often lacking. Practices to restrict or
control the access of vehicles to vessels, cargo receipt and
delivery operations, and passenger processing operations at
seaports are either not present or not consistently enforced,
increasing the risk that violators could quickly remove cargo
or contraband. Many ports do not have identification cards
issued to personnel to restrict access to vehicles, cargo
receipt and delivery operations, and passenger processing
operations.
At many seaports, the carrying of firearms is not
restricted, and thus internal conspirators and other
criminals are allowed armed access to cargo vessels and
cruise line terminals. In addition, many seaports rely on
private security personnel who lack the crime prevention and
law enforcement training and capability of regular police
officers.
The report also found that port-related businesses did not know where
to report cargo theft and other crimes, and that federal, state and
local law enforcement agencies responsible for a port's security rarely
meet to coordinate their work.
That is what our legislation does--it creates mechanisms to integrate
all these different security agencies and their security efforts at our
seaports and the railways and highways that converge at our seaports.
Our seaport security bill also directly funds more Customs officers,
more screening equipment, and the building of important security
infrastructure.
Each agency is good at what they do individually. But they will be
even stronger working together, sharing information and tactics, and
coordinating security coverage at our seaports. More teamwork between
these federal, state and local agencies--along with our security
partners in the private sector--will produce a more secure seaport
environment that is stronger than the sum of each agency's individual
efforts.
S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, requires the
Secretary of Transportation to chair a National Maritime Security
Advisory Committee. The Secretary is required to request participation
of the U.S. Customs Service and invite the participation of other
federal agencies with an interest in crime or threats of terrorism at
U.S. seaports. The bill also authorizes the establishment of
subcommittees, including a subcommittee comprised of Federal, State,
and local government law enforcement agencies to address port security
issues, and law enforcement-sensitive matters.
The Committee is required to advise on long-term solutions for
maritime and port security; coordination of information-sharing and
operations
[[Page S13873]]
among federal, state and local governments, and area and local port and
harbor security committees; conditions for maritime security loan
guarantees and grants; and the development of a National Maritime
Security Plan. Given the varied nature and geographical structure of
our port system, it will be important to consider private sector input.
A one-size-fits-all approach will not work because we are looking at a
wide variety of waterside facilities and maritime transportation-
related infrastructure.
The bill will mandate, for the first time ever, that all ports and
waterfront facilities have a comprehensive security plan approved by
the Secretary of Transportation. An element of port security often
overlooked are the intermodal means for transporting cargo from the
ships: railroads, highways, and barges. The bill requires that all the
modes of transportation converging at the port be covered by a port's
security plan. To make the entire waterfront environment more secure,
any facility that might pose a threat to the public must tender
security plans to the Coast Guard for review and approval.
However, we will do more than just mandate security plans. We will
have security experts to assess waterfront and port security, and
provide those assessments to the individuals in charge of making
security plans. Assessment information will be invaluable in helping
the industry use the best information in order to complete effective
security plans. The bill requires the Secretary to incorporate existing
programs and practices when reviewing and approving security plans. The
Department of Transportation will have to take into account the
different security practices of our different ports. The Department
must recognize and harmonize existing security practices to avoid
duplicating costs. However, recognition of existing practices should
not require the Department to endorse or approve faulty security.
At the seaport level, the bill will establish local port security
committees at each U.S. seaport. The section would require membership
of these committees to include representatives of the port authority,
labor organizations, the private sector, and Federal, State, and local
governments and law enforcement. The Committees would be chaired by the
Coast Guard Captain of the Port, and meet 4 times per year. The
Committees would be responsible for coordinating planning and other
port security activities; making recommendations for the port security
evaluations; annually reviewing security plans; and conducting a field
security exercise at least once every 3 years. These committees will
play a vital role--day to day and month to month--coordinating the
actions of law enforcement and the private sector in combating threats
of terrorism and crime.
The bill requires the Secretary of Transportation, in coordination
with the Director of the FBI, ensure that all area maritime counter-
terrorism and incident contingency plans are reviewed, revised, and
updated no less than once every three years. The Secretary shall ensure
that local port security committees conduct annual simulation exercises
for all such plans, and actual practice drills at least once every
three years. The plans should be comprehensive and address terrorist
threats to waterfront facilities and adjacent areas, and also cover
elements of prevention and protection as well as response. I would hope
that the Secretary would take steps to ensure that area maritime
counter-terrorism and incident contingency plans are coordinated with
security plans.
The bill creates standards and procedures for training and certifying
maritime security professionals. The bill requires the Secretary of
Transportation and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center,
``FLETC,'' to establish a Maritime Security Institute for training
security personnel, in accordance with internationally recognized law
enforcement standards. I look forward to working with the Department of
Transportation and the FLETC to establish an Institute to strengthen
and professionalize maritime law enforcement and security forces. I
have worked with FLETC to establish a facility in Charleston, South
Carolina to train Border Patrol personnel. I also look forward to
working with the Secretary and FLETC to establish the Maritime Law
Institute.
The legislation requires the Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of
the Treasury, Secretary of Transportation, and the Attorney General to
work together to establish shared dockside inspection facilities at
seaports for Federal and State agencies. At some U.S. ports, federal
investigators and inspectors do not have any space available to conduct
inspections, and they have to route the cargo to other places before
inspection. In other words, it would be similar to Customs officials at
JFK airport asking arriving international passengers to take a cab to
the Customs headquarters downtown in order to have their bags
inspected. That is just not right.
To improve seaport security tactics, the bill directs the Secretary
of Transportation to immediately establish domestic maritime safety and
security teams for the purpose of responding to terrorist activity,
criminal activity, or other threats to U.S. ports, especially in
strategically important ports. The units shall consist of personnel
trained in anti-terrorism, drug interdiction, navigation assistance,
and facilitating responses to security threats. I want to thank Senator
Edwards for his work on this security team initiative. I was pleased
that we were able to include in the bill two other amendments authored
by Senator Edwards: one promotes research and development funds for
non-intrusive scanning technology; the second establishes standards for
locking marine containers. These amendments will contribute greatly to
increasing security at our seaports.
Ports, terminals, waterfront facilities, and adjacent facilities will
be required to immediately implement interim security measures,
including securing their perimeters. The Secretary of Transportation
will then prescribe regulations for the aforementioned parties to
follow when designing the required maritime security plans. An
important point is that the regulations will require ports to control
and limit personnel access to security-sensitive areas. Ports also will
be required to limit cars and trucks in security-sensitive areas,
restrict firearms and other weapons, coordinate local and private law
enforcement, and develop an evacuation plan. While the bill requires
security programs to be individually tailored due to the varied nature
of different ports, the Department of Transportation regulations will
still require certain elements to be incorporated. In implementing new
regulations, I would hope that the Department would review the
feasibility of establishing a nationwide credentialing process. If we
can harmonize identification procedures, we can eliminate duplication
and reduce costs.
The Secretary of Transportation will write regulations to designate
controlled access areas in the Maritime Facility Security Plan for each
waterfront facility and other covered entities, and require ports to
limit access to security-sensitive information, such as passenger and
cargo manifests. The regulations may require physical searches of
persons entering controlled access areas or exiting such areas,
security escorts, and employment history and criminal background checks
for individuals with unrestricted access to controlled areas or
sensitive information. An individual will be eligible to work in such
positions if they meet the criteria established by the Secretary, and a
background check does not reveal a felony conviction within the
previous 7 years, or release from prison during the previous 5 years.
An individual that otherwise may have been disqualified from a
security-sensitive position may still be hired if the employer
establishes alternate security arrangements acceptable to the
Secretary. The bill would allow the Secretary to access FBI,
fingerprint, and other crime data bases to conduct the background
investigations, and transmit the results to port authorities or other
covered entities. The bill also would require the Secretary and the
Attorney General to establish and collect reasonable fees to pay
expenses incurred for the background checks.
The intent of conducting criminal background checks of port
employees, employers and other maritime transportation-related
employees or employers, is not to upset any of the existing work
relationships or dynamics. Rather the background checks are intended to
identify legitimate criminal
[[Page S13874]]
and national security risks. The Secretary of Transportation will write
regulations outlining how background checks should be conducted, and
will be responsible for conducting the background checks. In the
aviation security bill, we created a Deputy Secretary for
Transportation Security. The person in that position should be
responsible for implementing the national security check program.
The Secretary also will determine which areas are controlled-access
areas. Clearly, not all areas in ports are security risks areas
justifying designation as such. I would suggest that controlled access
areas include areas where ships tie up carrying combustibles, or
storage areas for combustibles or explosives, areas where security
admit credentialed persons into the port or terminal areas, or areas in
the port or terminal where containers are opened or exposed. However,
the Secretary should determine where risk or threat resides, and create
a way to check the backgrounds of individuals who pose a national
security or criminal threat by virtue of their presence in areas
requiring a greater degree of control. Individuals subject to potential
disqualification from positions with access to ocean manifests or
segregated controlled access areas must be given full and adequate due
process, and collected information must be protected from disclosure
and only revealed to the extent that it is pertinent to security
considerations.
The bill would give the Secretary of Transportation additional
authority to address security risks arising from foreign ports, such as
enhanced enforcement against vessels arriving from such port, travel
advisories for passengers, suspension of the right of a United States
vessel to enter such port, and authority to assist foreign port
authorities to maintain an appropriate level of security. The Secretary
of Transportation would be authorized to work through the Secretary of
State to notify foreign countries of security problems with their
ports, and to publish a list of ports with insufficient security that
would be posted prominently at U.S. ports, on passenger tickets, and as
a travel advisory by the State Department. The Secretary of
Transportation, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury,
may prohibit or prescribe conditions of port entry into the U.S. for
any vessel arriving from a port listed as not secure. In particular, I
would like to commend both Senator Kerry, who chairs the Coast Guard
Subcommittee, and Senator Breaux, who chairs the Surface Transportation
and Merchant Marine Subcommittee, for their efforts on this front.
Senators Kerry and Breaux authored another critical section of this
bill: the Sea Marshal program. The bill would authorize the Coast Guard
to board vessels in order to deter, prevent, or respond to acts of
terrorism or otherwise provide for the safety and security of the port
and maritime environment. We would authorize $13 million over five
years for this new Coast Guard enforcement. The provision in question
also requires the Secretary to evaluate the potential of using licensed
U.S. merchant marine personnel to supplement the law enforcement
efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard.
The bill would authorize the President, without prior notice or a
hearing, to suspend the right of any vessel or person of the United
States to enter from a foreign port or depart to a foreign port in
which a condition exists that threatens the safety or security of
passengers, vessels, or crew traveling to that port, or if a public
interest requires the suspension of trade between the United States and
that port. The bill would authorize the imposition of civil penalties
of up to $50,000 for violating the law.
S. 1214 will require that we know more in advance about the cargo and
crew members coming into the United States. The more we know about a
ship's cargo, and where it originated, the better our Customs agents
and other law enforcement officers can target the most suspicious
containers and passengers. Even with more screening equipment, we are
still going to have an inadequate number of inspections. So targeting
the highest risk cargo will be crucial.
The bill requires ships to electronically send their cargo manifests
to the port before gaining clearance to enter. While denying vessel
clearance to land is within the authority of Customs, I would urge that
it be used only in the most extreme cases, and that enforcement
alternatives for handling offending cargo interests be pursued in order
not to disrupt all the other legal cargoes on-board a vessel. Unloading
cargo will be prohibited if it is not properly documented. Advanced
import information is regularly transmitted by nearly 90 percent of the
ocean shippers. But for the shippers who are not transmitting that
information, we will require it. By giving Customs advance cargo
information, we can better screen imported cargo.
Specifically, the legislation requires carriers, including non-
vessel-owning common carriers, to provide by electronic transmission,
cargo manifest information in advance of port entry or clearance.
However, the Secretary of Treasury may exclude classes of vessels for
which the Secretary concludes these manifest requirements are not
necessary, and in some cases such as trucking, where the electronic
transmission may not be possible. Customs should use its authority to
require electronic transmission, but recognize, because of the nature
of certain categories of transport, that it may not be possible to
conduct electronic transmissions in every situation. The bill also
outlines the cargo and route information that must be transmitted to
Customs.
The bill prohibits the export of cargo unless properly documented,
and no marine terminal operator may load, or cause to be loaded, any
cargo that is not documented. The bill requires the U.S. Customs
Service to be notified of improperly documented cargo that has remained
in a marine terminal for more than 48 hours, and authorizes that cargo
to be searched, seized, and forfeited. Undocumented cargo should not
sit in port areas for extended periods of time. Specifically, shippers
who file Shippers Export Declarations (SED) by paper shall be required
to provide a copy of the SED to the carrier; shippers who file their
SEDs electronically shall be required to provide the carrier with a
complete master bill of lading or equivalent shipping instructions,
including the Automated Export System number. While it is important
that we obtain certain crucial pieces of information about cargo,
Customs should recognize that certain elements of cargo information,
such as weight discrepancies, may fluctuate and shippers should not be
held responsible for 100 percent accuracy. The bill creates civil
penalties for violating documentation requirements.
An important part of the legislation creates new requirements for the
documentation and electronic transmission of passenger information in
advance of entry or clearance into a port. It is imperative that the
United States have advanced information on foreign passengers and crew
members to ensure that we are not admitting security risks. Evidence
indicates that materials used in terrorist attacks in Kenya and
Tanzania were shipped by vessels owned and operated by Osama bin Laden.
More information--and more credible information--about foreign entrants
will be vital given the volume of vessels, cargo and crew members
entering into U.S. waters. In establishing such regulations, Customs
should work with all federal agencies to harmonize data reporting
requirements to ensure that entrants into the United States only need
to file one form. Policies such as INS pre-qualification of crew
members between specific pre-approved train routes between the United
States and Canada should be allowed to continue. Such policies ensure
advance compliance, and stimulate regular cross-border operation, while
not jeopardizing security.
I am also pleased that we were able to accept an amendment authored
by Senator Cleland to allow the Commissioner of Customs to develop a
pilot program to pre-clear cargo coming into the United States if it is
determined that such program would improve the security and safety of
U.S. ports. However, before implementation of such a program, Customs
must determine that it would not compromise existing procedures for
ensuring the safety of these ports and the United States. The pilot
program should be used to determine whether we can successfully shift
the evaluation of cargo and cargo security to points outside the United
States, and also ensure that the subsequent delivery of cargo is
accomplished in a
[[Page S13875]]
way that protects against tampering and maintains the integrity of the
cargo seal.
The bill directs the Customs Service to improve reporting of imports,
including consigned items and goods, of in-bond goods arriving at U.S.
seaports. Current policies can sometimes allow goods to travel into the
United States, and travel for, in some instances, up to 37 days,
without recording formal entry. The bill will require the reporting of
in-bond movements prior to arrival to ensure advance filing of
information identifying the cosignor, consignee, country of origin, and
the 6-digit harmonized tariff code. The new information must be
electronically filed by the importer of record, or its agent. This
information will better enable Customs to track cargo and to intercept
any suspicious cargoes in a more timely fashion. This reporting is not
intended to reflect formal entry, but will allow Customs to use their
targeting system on in-bond cargoes, where current policies make it
difficult to enter relevant targeting data.
Within 6 months of the bill's enactment, the bill would require a
report that evaluates the feasibility of establishing a general
database to collect information about the movements of vessels, cargo,
and maritime passengers in order to identify criminal threats, national
and economic security threats, and threats of terrorism. The Secretary
would submit a report of the findings to Congress. Among several
requirements, the report must estimate potential costs and benefits of
using public and private databases to collect and analyze information,
including the feasibility of establishing a Joint Inter-Agency Task
Force on Maritime Intelligence. Additional information, and
coordination of information will be crucial in allowing law enforcement
to evaluate threats in advance of U.S. arrival, ultimately, policies
allowing us to identify risks abroad will help us avoid being forced to
rely on policies of deterrence and prevention on U.S. soil.
Perhaps most importantly, we need to give seaport authorities the
resources to get the job done. It would be great if we could simply
declare our ports to be more secure. However, it takes money to make
sure the international borders at our seaports are fully staffed with
Customs, law enforcement, and Immigration personnel. It takes money to
make sure they have modern security equipment, including the latest
scanners to check cargo for the most dangerous materials. And it takes
money to build the physical infrastructure of a secure port.
Our bill will provide $219 million over four years directly to these
important national security functions. Cargo ships currently pay a tax
on the gross registered tonnage the ship can carry. That tax rate, in
current law, is scheduled to decline beginning in 2003. Our bill will
simply extend the existing tax rate--which has been imposed since
1986--until 2006. All those revenues will be directed to help beef up
security. These tax revenues will have to be appropriated, but they can
only be spent on the programs authorized by this seaport security bill.
However, the funds provided directly by the tonnage tax extension are
insufficient to cover all of the port security needs. So the bill
includes additional authorizations of $965.5 million that Congress can
appropriate as our colleagues come to realize the important security
needs that must be met in the defense of our nation. Absent the
realization of these authorized funds, Congress will be imposing an
unfunded mandate on states and the private sector to secure our
nation's maritime border.
The money will help pay for many of the items previously mentioned,
and additionally will be focused on building infrastructure at our
seaports, including gates and fencing, security-related lighting
systems, remote surveillance systems, concealed video systems, and
other security equipment. The bill will directly fund and authorize
$390 million in grants to local port security projects. Specifically,
the bill amends the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to provide grants for
security projects, of which the federal government will pay up to 75
percent. Projects under $25,000 would not have a matching requirement,
and the Secretary may approve federal contributions above 75 percent to
a project the Secretary deems to have high merit.
The bill also will fund loan guarantees that, according to regular
credit risk premiums for federal loans, could cover as much as $3.3
billion in long term loans to port authorities acting to improve their
security infrastructure. The loans could not cover more than 87.5
percent of the actual cost of a security infrastructure project, and
can extend for up to 25 years. The loan guarantee mechanism allows the
federal government to leverage funds by extending credit to cover loans
for security infrastructure, and can help port authorities reduce their
capital costs for security infrastructure by amortizing it over time.
Ultimately, this policy will help us build an infrastructure at our
maritime borders in the most cost-effective way. The bill makes
directly available and authorizes $166 million to cover the credit
risks of loans extended under this provision.
U.S. Customs officers must be able to screen more than just 2 percent
of the cargo coming into our seaports. Investing in new screening
technologies will help human screeners inspect more cargo, and detect
the most dangerous shipments. To increase the amount of cargo screened,
the bill authorizes $145 million for FY02 for additional Customs
personnel, and to help Customs update their computer systems consistent
with the requirements of this bill. Especially important is that the
bill directly funds and authorizes $168 million to purchase non-
intrusive screening and detection equipment for the U.S. Customs
Service.
While we cannot expect to screen every marine container entering into
the United States, we need to provide some expectation of inspection,
or create some level of deterrence to dissuade smugglers from using the
intermodal system to smuggle cargo. We are so busy investing in a anti-
ballistic missile defense system, we fail to see perhaps even a greater
threat: a cargo container equipped with a digital global positioning
system can be delivered anywhere in the United States for less than
$5,000. Why would the enemies of America spend millions on a rocket
launcher and go up against the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy when they
could spend $5,000 to ship a container full of explosives or other
dangerous materials that has only a two percent chance of being
inspected?
The bill also will authorize $75 million to establish a grant program
to fund the development, testing, and transfer of technology to enhance
security at U.S. seaports. The screening technology would focus on
finding explosives or firearms, weapons of mass destruction, chemical
and biological weapons. The grants may not exceed 75 percent of the
research program.
This bill is the product of bipartisan compromise. I want to thank
the Administration for their efforts to produce this legislation. The
Maritime Administration, Coast Guard and Office of the Secretary all
played a vital role in helping draft the bill. I had intended to work
to include legislation that would increase various maritime criminal
statutes. Unfortunately, in the crush of time we were unable to clear
these amendments. I think that both Senator McCain and I agree that
these amendments are really important to be included in final
legislation on seaport security, and I will work with him, and Chairman
Leahy and Ranking Member Hatch of the Judiciary Committee to include
provisions updating our maritime criminal laws.
The bill would require the Secretary of Transportation to prepare and
publish a National Maritime Transportation Security Plan for prevention
and response to maritime crime and terrorism. The plan would include an
allocation of duties among federal departments and agencies and among
state and local governments and agencies; procedures and techniques for
preventing and responding to acts of crime or terrorism; and
designation of the federal official who shall be the Federal Maritime
Security Coordinator for each area for which an Area Maritime Security
Plan is required and prepared. Additionally, the bill would also
require the Secretary of Transportation to establish Area Maritime
Security Committees comprised of members appointed by the Secretary.
Each Area Maritime Security Committee would be required to prepare a
maritime security plan, and work with state and local officials to
enhance contingency
[[Page S13876]]
planning. Each Area Maritime Security Plan must be submitted to the
Secretary of Transportation. The plans are required to outline how to
respond to an act of maritime crime or terrorism in or near the area,
describe the area covered by the plan, and describe in detail how the
plan is integrated with other security plans. This requirement is
similar to the planning requirements that we mandated in the Oil
Pollution Act for oil spill response, and will help ensure that we have
local, regional and national level responses to maritime crime and
terrorism. The bill would also authorize the Secretary of
Transportation to issue regulations establishing requirements for
vessel security plans and programs for vessels calling on United States
ports, would also authorize the Secretary of Transportation, in
consultation with the Attorney General, to require crewmembers aboard
vessels calling on the United States ports to carry and present upon
demand such identification as the Secretary determines.
The bill would require the Secretary of Transportation and the
Secretary of Treasury to establish a joint task force to work with
ocean shippers in the development of a system to track data for
shipments, containers, and contents. The Secretaries also would work
with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop
enhanced performance standards for in-bond seals and locks for use on
or in containers used for water-borne cargo shipments.
The bill includes a number of reporting requirements to assess our
progress on seaport security. I would like to thank Senator Nelson of
Florida for his amendment asking for a Coast Guard and Navy study on
the feasibility of creating a Center for Coastal and Maritime Security.
We all look forward to the results of this important study.
We have made dramatic improvements to this bill since it was first
approved by the Commerce Committee before the terrorist attacks. And I
want to thank Senator McCain for working with me to co-sponsor this
manager's amendment to the previous version of our seaport security
bill, S. 1214. Senator McCain does not have many seaports in Arizona,
but he understands that the cargo, materials and people who come
through our seaports make their way quickly inland on trains and
highways. So even if you are living in the desert, the security of our
seaports affects all of us. I also would like to recognize and thank
Rob Freeman of Senator McCain's staff, who invested hours of time and
effort to finalize this product.
I also must recognize the extraordinary efforts of Senator Bob
Graham, who began working to improve port security long ago and put
this issue on our radar screen. Senator Graham's home state of Florida
has been wrestling with issues of crime, theft and drug smuggling at
its seaports for many years. And while the federal government failed to
address these problems, the state of Florida invested millions of
dollars of its own resources to improve port security, which has helped
the communities surrounding those ports. But they will still need much
more. The states should not carry the entire burden of protecting the
international boarders at our seaports. And yet, the problems had
become so severe, that the state of Florida, led in part by Bob Graham,
decided it had to act on its own. Senator Graham's leadership was vital
as we developed this seaport security bill long before the terrorist
attacks of September 11. I would also like to thank the fine work of
Senator Graham's staffer, Tandy Barrett, she also worked very hard on
this legislation.
The initiatives in S. 1214 can help protect America and its citizens
from potential terrorist threats against seaports and intermodal
connections throughout the country. These initiatives will not make
maritime transportation immune from attack. But this bill takes the
necessary preventative steps to better protect the American public. I
urge my colleagues to support this legislation that is vital to
protecting our national security.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, once again I thank Chairman Hollings for
his efforts to address identified safety and security problems at our
Nation's seaports. The legislation before us today is designed to
address port security lapses that have been under review by the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation for the past two
years. After hearings earlier this year and last year, the Commerce
Committee reported out S. 1214 in August. The bill is intended to
provide both the guidance and funding needed to improve seaport
security. I commend Chairman Hollings' leadership on this very
important issue to transportation safety and security.
It is widely reported that transportation systems are the target of
40 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide. Since September 11, we have
been working on a bipartisan basis to address the nation's most
pressing needs in the wake of the terrorist attacks. The Senate
Commerce Committee has been conducting a series of hearings to gain the
information we need to help us evaluate potential transportation
security risks and determine how best to respond to those potential
risks.
While it is impossible to precisely quantify, there is no question
that an attack on any one of our nation's 361 seaports would have far-
reaching effects. With 95 percent of our Nation's foreign trade moving
through our seaports, the impact of such an attack would ripple through
our Nation. Businesses nationwide would face problems getting supplies
and exporting finished goods. Our entire economy would be impacted.
Both the Hart-Rudman Report on Homeland Security and the Interagency
Commission on Crime and Seaport Security found our seaports to be
vulnerable to crime and terrorism. While there is no way to make our
Nation's seaports completely crime free and impenetrable to terrorist
attacks, the bill before us today is a very strong first step in
closing the gaps in national security that now exist at our seaports.
I want to point out to my colleagues that the Commerce Committee had
acted on S. 1214 prior to the September 11 attacks. As a result of the
attacks, members of the committee and others have worked together to
further modify the legislation to provide direction and funding to the
agencies involved to focus their efforts not only on decreasing crime
in our seaports, but to also increase protection against terrorist
attacks.
In our efforts to increase our nation's seaport security, we have
worked to take into account not only the wide range of threats and
crimes surrounding our seaports, but also the unique nature of our
ports. As I have said before, a ``one-size-fits-all'' approach will not
work. Our ports are complex and diverse in both geography and
infrastructure. This is why we have worked to ensure this provides for
direct local input into the development of security plans for their
ports, as well as for response plans for local responders should an
attack occur.
S. 1214 would help address a wide range of security shortcomings at
our Nation's seaport that were identified in the Interagency Commission
on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports that was issued September 2000.
According to the Commission's report, seaport crime encompasses a broad
range of crimes, including the importation of illicit drugs,
contraband, and prohibited or restricted merchandise; stowaways and
alien smuggling; trade fraud and commercial smuggling; environmental
crimes; cargo theft; and the unlawful exportation of controlled
commodities and munitions, stolen property, and drug proceeds. These
crimes are violations of federal law, and therefore, the primary
responsibility for enforcement falls to Federal agencies. This bill
would give those agencies the authority and funding needed to make up
for these shortcomings.
Additionally, the bill would provide much needed improvements in
preventing terrorist attacks at our Nation's seaports. While seaports
represent an important component of the nation's transportation
infrastructure, seaports' level of vulnerability to attack is high, and
such an attack, as I just mentioned, has the potential to cause
significant damage. The commission found little control over the access
of vehicles and personnel to vessels, cargo receipt and delivery
operations, and passenger processing operations. The main problem they
were able to identify was the lack of a generally accepted standard for
physical, procedural, and personnel security at
[[Page S13877]]
seaports that left seaports wide open for attack. This bill will allow
the Department of Transportation, along with Federal, state and local
law enforcement to take actions to close the security holes at ports
nationwide.
The bill would authorize $1.18 billion for seaport safety and
security. The bill would require, for the first time ever, the
Department of Transportation to assess the security status of U.S.
seaports and require each port and related facility to submit security
plans for review and approval. The bill would also improve advance
reporting requirements for entry into the United States, provide more
funding for screening equipment, facilitate law enforcement
coordination at U.S. seaports, and authorize grants and loan guarantees
to seaports and marine terminal operators to help finance the purchase
of security equipment and defray the costs of security infrastructure.
I want to mention that while the Congress has already worked to
approve aviation security legislation, and we are now moving forward on
port security, both Chairman Hollings and I remain committed to
continuing our agenda during the next session to address transportation
security issues in all modes of transportation, including railroads and
buses.
I urge my colleagues swift approval of this critical legislation.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, allow me to congratulate our distinguished
chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Hollings, for his
outstanding work in putting together S. 1214, The Maritime and Port
Security Improvement Act. I also wish to congratulate Senators Graham
and McCain for all of their hard work in moving this very important
legislation that is crucial to homeland defense.
I also wish to recognize Carl Bentzel of the Commerce Committee for
his years of hard work in putting this legislation together.
I thank Senator Hollings for including several provisions from S.
1589, the Port Threat and Security Act of 2001, in the final version of
his bill. If I may, I would like to discuss the provisions from S. 1589
that were included in the final version of S. 1214.
Senator Breaux and I recently held oversight hearings before our
respective Subcommittees on the Coast Guard and its role in improving
maritime security after the terrible attacks of September 11. As
Senators Hollings and Breaux well know, even before September 11 our
maritime and port security was in sorry shape. However, the attacks on
New York and Washington made it clear we need to go farther afield to
guard against terrorism and other crimes.
We need to improve our base of information to identify bad actors
throughout the maritime realm. A provision of the bill would help us
identify those nations whose vessels and vessel registration procedures
pose potential threats to our national security. It would require the
Secretaries of Transportation and State to prepare an annual report for
the Congress that would list those nations whose vessels the Coast
Guard has found would pose a risk to our ports, or that have presented
our government with false, partial, or fraudulent information
concerning cargo manifests, crew identity, or registration of the
vessel. In addition the report would identify nations that do not
exercise adequate control over their vessel registration and ownership
procedures, particularly with respect to security issues. We need hard
information like this if we are to force ``flag of convenience''
nations from providing cover to criminals and terrorists.
This is very important as Osama bin Laden has used flags of
convenience to hide his ownership in various international shipping
interests. In 1998 one of bin Laden's cargo freighters unloaded
supplies in Kenya for the suicide bombers who later destroyed the
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. To that end, the bill requires the
Administration to report on actions they have taken, or would
recommend, to close these loopholes and improve transparency and
registration procedures, either through domestic or international
action--including action at the International Maritime Organization.
This legislation would also establish a national Sea Marshal program
to protect our ports from the potential use of vessels as weapons of
terror. Sea Marshals have recently been used in San Francisco and Los
Angeles, and is supported strongly by the maritime pilots who, like
airline pilots, are on the front lines in bringing vessels into U.S.
ports. Sea Marshals would be used in ports that handle materials that
are hazardous or flammable in quantities that make them potential
targets of attack. The Coast Guard has taken a number of steps
including using armed Coast Guard personnel to escort a Liquid Natural
Gas, LNG, tankers into Boston since September 11. Prior to September 11
these vessels were escorted by Coast Guard vessels into the port but no
armed guards were present on the vessel. I strongly believe that having
armed personnel, such as Sea Marshals, on these high interest vessels
is very important and will considerably increase security in our
nation's ports, including Boston. The ability of terrorists to board a
vessel and cause a deliberate release of LNG or gasoline for that
matter is very real. Sea Marshals will make it much more difficult for
this to happen. The Secretary of Transportation would be responsible
for evaluating the potential use of Federal, State, or local government
personnel as well as documented United States Merchant Marine personnel
to supplement Coast Guard personnel as Sea Marshals. In addition it is
my hope that the Secretary will establish training centers around the
country for the Sea Marshal program. I further believe that the U.S.
Merchant Marine Academy or any of the State maritime academies would
make excellent locations for such training centers.
Lastly, this legislation would allow the President to prohibit any
vessel, U.S. flagged or foreign, from transporting passengers or cargo
to and from a foreign port that does not have adequate security
measures as determined by the Secretary of Transportation. I would like
to remind my colleagues that a similar provision exists in the airline
industry and I see no reason why the President should not have the
power to suspend vessel traffic to and from ports with inadequate
security, just like he can now do with international airports. The
stakes are simply too high Mr. President, we cannot allow shipping
containers to enter this country unless adequate security exists in
foreign ports to prevent weapons of mass destruction from being loaded.
In addition we should not allow cruise ships carrying U.S. passengers
to visit foreign passenger ports that do not have adequate security.
I again wish to congratulate Senator Hollings on this landmark
legislation and to thank him for including several provisions from S.
1589. This legislation will ensure that the United States has the
tools, the information, and the personnel to guard against waterborne
threats to our Nation and our citizens.
Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, as many of my colleagues might know, my
State of Louisiana depends heavily on maritime trade and
transportation. After all, Louisiana is darn near close to being
underwater, so I always have had an affinity for things that float.
Louisiana is fortunate to have the Mississippi River, along which
barges haul grain, wheat and corn from the heartland of America, and
coal from Wyoming. Our fortune extends to the fisheries resources of
the Gulf of Mexico and our oil and gas resources in the outer
continental shelf. We have invested in maritime-related oil and gas
technologies to make that exploration as safe as possible. The Port of
New Orleans, Lake Charles, and South Louisiana--as well as the other
Louisiana ports--are major seaports handling containerized bulk and
breakbulk cargoes, as well as passengers. The shipbuilding and repair
industries employ thousands, as does the marine construction and
dredging industry.
My constituents live close to waterways and the the Gulf of Mexico,
and in many cases earn their living from our marine transportation
system and its associated industries. So, as the Chairman of the
Surface Transportation and Merchant Subcommittee--and as a resident of
a State that relies so much on the smooth operation of its waterways
and ports--maritime security is one of my primary concerns.
The security of our commercial sea and river ports has rarely been
the focus of our national security plans. We have invested millions of
dollars to
[[Page S13878]]
protect our airports and our land borders, but very little toward
making sure that the goods and people arriving at our ports do not
jeopardize our security. We know that Osama bin Laden controls a
network of ships that hides his ownership. We have to assume that other
terrorists and terrorist networks do, too. Therefore it is imperative
that we take a more active Federal role in protecting the international
boundaries of our seaports.
There is no unified Federal plan for overseeing security at the
international borders of our sea ports. Right now the responsibility of
building secure sea and river ports rests with states like Louisiana,
its port authorities, and the private sector. That was a poor model for
national security when we were fighting drugs and international
smuggling--and it is totally inadequate after September 11 as we face
the threat of terrorism.
That is why we must pass S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act.
For the first time we will require Federal approval of port security
programs. These plans will have to meet rigorous standards for security
infrastructure, screening equipment, evacuation plans, access controls,
and background checks for workers in security-sensitive areas.
We also will require more information about the cargo and passengers
arriving at our ports. Right now we do not know enough about the ships
and the cargo that call 24 hours a day. We need to change that
immediately. We will require that ships electronically transmit their
cargo manifests--and if the manifest does not match the cargo, it will
not be unloaded. We also will check crew and passenger manifest
information to identify people who could pose a security threat. My
Subcommittee held a hearing on rail and maritime security in the
aftermath of the events of September 11. At that hearing we heard
testimony that the Republic of Panama had issued more than one thousand
false documents that allow unauthorized personnel to operate on-board
their vessels.
More information--and more reliable information--is the key to
fighting crime and terrorism. The more we know about these ships,
including who owns them and where they have been, the better we can
target our law enforcement resources at our ports to check on the most
suspicious loads. We need to know who is on these ships, and,
eventually, be able to quickly check the names with a computer database
of known terrorists or other associates of international criminal
organizations.
This bill will require Federal, State and local law enforcement
officials to better coordinate the sharing of that information. If a
local police officer arrests someone for breaking into a secure area of
the port, timely sharing of that information with State and Federal
officials might help identify the person as part of a larger
international network. It is critical that Customs agents work with the
local police, that the State police work with Immigration officials,
and that the FBI work with local port authorities. That type of
cooperation will dramatically improve port security. Seaports have many
different agencies and jurisdictions. So this bill attempts to
harmonize their efforts, and will require the Coast Guard, in their
role as Captain of the Port, to lead the coordination of law
enforcement.
The businesses that operate in seaports also play a crucial security
role. They must be brought into a cooperative environment in which a
port's law enforcement information is communicated and shared
confidentially with privately-hired security officers. In return,
private security officers must have a direct line to share information
with Federal, State, and local authorities.
To verify that the cargo loads match the manifests, we will need more
Customs officials to check that cargo. Incredibly, only 2 percent of
the cargo containers arriving at our ports are ever checked by Customs
officials. That is a huge hole in our national security system that
must be fixed. We seek to close this security hole by directly granting
and authorizing more than $168 million for the purchase of non-
intrusive screening and detection equipment to be used by U.S. Customs
officers. These Customs officers are on the front lines of protecting
our country from the importation of illegal and dangerous goods. We
must give them the latest technology and the most modern cargo
screening equipment available.
We also must help the private sector and the port authorities meet
these national security challenges. This problem would be must more
simple to solve it the United States had national seaports under the
control of the Federal Government--or if the Federal Government
directly funded seaport infrastructure. However, that is not the case.
Maritime infrastructure is owned by States and by the private sector.
But the Federal Government has a role to play here for homeland
security. We cannot force States and the private sector to comply with
security mandates, yet not provide funding. The legislation will
directly fund and authorize $390 million in grants to local port
security projects. The bill also will fund loan guarantees that could
cover as much as $3.3 billion in long term loans to port authorities
acting to improve their security infrastructure. Upgrading that
infrastructure means installing modern gates and fencing, security-
related lighting systems, remote surveillance systems, concealed video
systems, and other security equipment that contributes to the overall
level of security at our ports and waterfront facilities.
Some of our shipping companies may worry that these new procedures
requiring more security and customs checks will slow the flow of
international commerce. But as we did in the airline security bill, we
can strike the balance between increased security and the convenience
of our open country and economy. In Louisiana, our sea and river ports
are a way of life, and an integral part of our economy. We have some of
the largest seaports in America, and the Mississippi River runs through
the heart of Louisiana. The river is a super-highway of commerce that
helps drive our State's economy.
Security and the protection of our people from harm always will be
our primary goal. However, we must do it in a way that does not
dramatically slow the movement of goods that run our just-in-time-
delivery economy. The answer to that problem is technology.
New scanners are now on the market that can x-ray and scan an entire
48-foot cargo container. Customs currently depends primarily on gamma-
ray systems that are adequate for seeing through small vehicles or
loosely-packed crates. But more powerful X-ray based machines--already
used in Israel, the Netherlands, and Hong Kong--can pierce several
inches of steel and peer through more densely packed boxes. These
machines can see everything from false compartments down to the buttons
on a remote control. And they can be programmed to spot ``density
signatures'' that indicate explosive and nuclear materials. The more
the Federal Government, ports and the private sector invest in using
this new scanning technology, the fewer cargo containers and boxes will
have to be opened and searched by hand. That will increase the
efficiency of international commerce and trade--while at the same time
making our nation more secure.
Investing in scanners is even more critical when you consider that
the expanding global economy raises the volume of seaborne shipping by
7 to 10 percent each year. In other words, the amount of goods arriving
and departing through our seaports is expected to double by 2020. While
that increased trade will benefit our economy, it also poses a national
security threat if we are unable to keep pace with the growing volume
of goods and people passing through our ports.
That is why the private sector must get behind our efforts--and
behind this bill. Before September 11, port security was something of
an afterthought. We are now facing new threats. The more we invest in
the infrastructure of making our ports secure, the less likely that
your key products and supplies will be delayed at the ports due to
increased security. As public officials, our primary duty is to protect
public safety and national security. If the private sector engages and
cooperates with our efforts, there will be less impact from that
tightened security upon the free flow of goods and supplies through our
major seaports. That is a public-private partnership that can work--and
protect America at the same time.
[[Page S13879]]
We have made the investments at our airports and at our land borders
to counter threats of terrorism and other international criminal
organizations. It is now time to invest in the security of the
international borders at our seaports, in order to protect our nation
and our local seaport communities.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise to thank Chairman
Hollings and ranking member McCain for agreeing to include in S. 1214,
the Port and Maritime Security Act, a Coast Guard and Navy study to
evaluate the merits of establishing a Center for Coastal and Maritime
Security.
The events of September 11 cruelly illustrated the challenges we face
in providing comprehensive and reliable security for our homeland.
There is no challenge more daunting than the integration of our
Federal, State and Local law enforcement agencies and their coordinated
efforts with our Armed Forces to protect our vast and complex maritime
and industrial areas.
My amendment directs the administration to seriously consider
establishing an institution that can provide integrated and coordinated
training for the organization, planning and execution of security
systems necessary to protect our vulnerable ports and coasts from
potential terrorist attacks.
I am grateful for the inclusion of language directing this study
because the U.S. Navy's Coastal Systems Station in Panama City, Florida
is uniquely staffed with coastal security experts to help the Coast
Guard conduct this assessment. In analyzing the costs and benefits of a
Coastal and Maritime Security Center, I urge the Coast Guard to work
closely with the Coastal Systems Station to ensure the best possible
recommendation for the Administration and Congress.
Mr. President, I am confident that the study directed by this
language will conclude that an investment in interagency integrated
education and training to improve the protection of our ports and
harbors is in the very best interests of our national security.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, this bill would take a significant step
toward securing our Nation against future terrorist actions.
Just as we have unanimously decided to bolster security at our
airports, we must also improve the overall security and cargo
processing operations at U.S. seaports.
If nothing else, September 11 has demonstrated the need to do more to
secure our Nation from terror--whether it comes from land, sky or sea.
Before discussing the specifics of this legislation, it is important to
describe the circumstances that have caused the security crisis at our
seaports.
Seaports represent an important component of the Nation's
transportation infrastructure.
Each year, thousands of ships, and millions of passengers, enter and
leave the United States through seaports.
It is estimated that 95 percent of the cargo that enters the country
from noncontiguous countries does so through the Nation's 361 coastal
and inland ports.
Alarmingly, less than 2 percent of this enormous number of cargo
containers are actually inspected.
Over the next 20 years, the total volume of imported and exported
goods at seaports is expected to increase threefold.
Waterborne cargo alone contributes more than $750 billion to the U.S.
gross domestic product and creates employment for 13 million people.
Despite the massive volume of cargo that moves through our Nation's
ports, there are no Federal security standards or guidelines protecting
our citizens from potentially lethal cargo.
The Federal Government does not provide the resources for technology
that an adequately screen cargo moving through our ports, leaving them
vulnerable to criminal activity--from smuggling to cargo theft to
terrorism.
Security at our maritime borders is given substantially less Federal
consideration than airports or land borders.
At U.S. seaports, the Federal Government invests nothing in
infrastructure, other than the human presence of the U.S. Coast Guard,
U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
and whatever equipment those agencies have on-hand to accomplish their
mandates.
Physical infrastructure is provided by State or local controlled port
authorities, or by private sector marine terminal operators.
There are no controls, or requirements in place, except for the
minimal standards promulgated by the Coast Guard for the protection of
cruise ship passenger terminals.
Essentially, where seaports are concerned, we have abrogated the
Federal responsibility of border control to the State and private
sector.
In the face of these new challenges, it appears that the U.S. port
management system has fallen behind the rest of world.
We lack a comprehensive, nation-wide strategy to address the security
issues that face our seaport system.
In early 1998--in response to the almost daily reports of crime and
narcotics trafficking at Florida seaports, and following the day I
spent working with the Customs Service at Tampa's Port Manatee on
October 14, 1997--I began an investigation of the security situation at
seaports throughout the nation. At that time, and perhaps even more so
today, I was very concerned that our seaports, unlike our airports,
lacked the advanced security procedures and equipment that are
necessary to prevent acts of terrorism, cargo theft and drug
trafficking.
Based on this workday, and subsequent investigation, I asked
President Clinton to establish a Federal commission to evaluate both
the nature and extent of crime and the overall state of security in
seaports and to develop recommendations for improvement.
In response to my request, President Clinton established the
Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports on April
27, 1999.
In October 2000, the Commission issued its final report, which
outlines many of the common security problems discovered in U.S.
seaports. Among other conclusions, the Commission found that: one,
intelligence and information sharing among law enforcement agencies
needs to be improved at many ports; two, that many ports do not have
any idea about the threats they face, because vulnerability assessments
are not performed locally;
Three, that a lack of minimum security standards at ports and at
terminals, warehouses, and trucking firms leaves many ports and port
users vulnerable to theft, pilferage, and unauthorized access by
criminals; and four, advanced equipment, such as small boats, cameras,
vessel tracking devices, and large scale X-rays, are lacking at many
high-risk ports.
Our legislation addresses the problems of our seaports by instructing
the Attorney General to coordinate the reporting of seaport related
crimes with State law enforcement officials, so as to harmonize the
reporting of data on cargo theft.
The bill would also increase the criminal penalties for cargo theft.
To address the lack of minimum security standards at America's
seaports, the bill would require security programs to be developed by
each port or marine terminal.
Each security program will be submitted to the Security of
Transportation for review and approval.
These security programs would require maintenance of both physical
and procedure security for passengers, cargoes, crew members, and
workers; provisions for establishing secure areas within a waterfront;
creation of a credentialing process to limit access to restricted areas
so only authorized individuals gain admittance; restriction of
vehicular access; development of an evacuation process from port areas
in the event of a terrorist attack or other such emergency; and
establish security awareness for all employees.
Our bill requires the Coast Guard, in consultation with the
appropriate public and private sector officials and officials and
organizations, develop a system of providing port security-threat
assessments for U.S. seaports. The bill would authorize $60 million
over 4 years to carry out this provision.
The Seaport Commission report found that current inspection levels of
containerized cargo are insufficient to counter potential security
risks.
This bill will authorized $168 million over five yeas, for the
Customs Service to purchase non-intrusive screening and detection
equipment for use at U.S. seaports.
It would also authorize $145 million for 1,200 new customs inspector
positions, and 300 new customs agent positions.
[[Page S13880]]
The bill would also create a research and development grant program
to provide grants up to 75 percent of the cost of construction,
acquisition or deployment of technology to help develop non-intrusive
inspection technologies.
The bill would authorize $15 million annually for fiscal year 2002 to
fiscal year 2006 for this purpose.
Implementing the provisions of the Port and Maritime Security Act of
2001 will produce concrete improvements in the efficiency, safety, and
security of our Nation's seaports, and will result in a demonstrable
benefit for those who are currently pay tonnage duties.
This legislation is long overdue--that became all too apparent the
morning of September 11. Not only is it required to facilitate future
technological advances and the anticipated increases in international
trade, but it would ensure that we have the sort of security controls
necessary to protect our borders from threats of illegal aliens, drug
smuggling and terrorism.
As we work to lift our Nation's fear of travel in our skies, we must
also move to guarantee their safety on our seas.
This bill does not affect just those states with ports.
Each day 16,000 containers arrive in the United States. A single
container can hold 30 tons.
These containers are either transported by truck or by rail
throughout the United States.
To illustrate my point, I have a chart here which depicts a normal
route of a cargo container entering the Port of Los Angeles and
arriving in New York.
These containers travel across America, often more than a dozen
States before reaching their destination.
Our seaports are our first line of defense in preventing a potential
tragedy.
Seaports play one of the most critical roles in expanding our
international trade and protecting our borders from international
threats.
The ``Port and Maritime Security Act'' recognizes the importance of
our seaports and devotes the necessary resources to move ports into the
21st century.
I urge my colleagues to look towards the future by supporting this
critical legislation--and by taking action to protect one of our most
valuable tools for promoting economic growth.
Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I rise today to express my strong support
for S. 1214, the Port Security and Improvement bill. This legislation
is overdue and absolutely needed in broadening our response to the
threat of terrorism.
The Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in
U.S. Seaports, issued in the fall of 2000, indicates that ``the state
of security in U.S. seaports generally ranges from poor to fair, and in
a few cases, good.'' Now that this country is acutely aware of the
repercussions of overlooking transportation security weaknesses,
Congress would be severely remiss if we did not act promptly to improve
on the ``poor to fair'' rating at our ports.
I believe that technology can play an important role in ensuring the
integrity, safety, and security of goods coming into this country via
ship. To that end, my amendment that is included in S. 1214 establishes
a pilot program run and defined by the Customs Service to examine
different technologies and how they can be employed to verify that a
container's contents are what they say they are and that they have not
been tampered with during transport. Shippers and transporters using
effective such technologies could then enter U.S. ports on an expedited
basis. With 95 percent of foreign trade entering or leaving the U.S.
via ship, allowing a quicker entrance by certain ``trusted shippers''
will allow a quicker conveyance to American consumers.
Already, I have seen outstanding demonstrations from people all over
this country of their detection technologies and how they can be used
to improve security. My amendment is a challenge to these innovators to
develop such technologies for use in the shipping world.
Additionally, I have heard testimony from maritime experts that
America needs to find ways to ``push its borders back.'' By ``pushing
back'' our borders the intention is to ensure the integrity and
inspection of goods entering the country at points farther out from our
physical borders. If this process can be taken care of in a foreign
port, confidence in the integrity of the goods increases and time is
saved by domestic inspectors who can use their resources elsewhere. My
amendment would allow the securing of goods in the port of origin so
that when these goods arrive in the U.S. we can be assured of their
safety.
I thank Senator Hollings for his help with my amendment, and I look
forward to working with Customs to implement this program, which I
believe will be helpful to get goods to market in safe but timely
manner.
nuclear devices detection
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am encouraged that the Senate is
poised to pass legislation bolstering security at our Nation's 361
seaports. I thank the members of the Senate Commerce Committee for
their hard work on this bill.
While often out of the public eye, ports and harbors across the
United States are America's economic gateways. Every year, U.S. ports
handle over 800 million tons of cargo, valued at approximately $600
billion. If you exclude border commerce with Mexico and Canada, our
ports handle 95 percent of U.S. trade. Two of the busiest ports of the
nation are in California, at Long Beach and Oakland.
Yet, just 1 or 2 percent of the 11 million shipping containers
reaching our ports are inspected each year. The Federal Government has
taken steps to beef up security along our northern and southern
borders. And we are addressing aviation security. But just about
everything that arrives by ship is waved through.
This bill will strengthen law enforcement at our ports by
establishing a federal port security task force and providing more
funding for local efforts to boost port security. It is crucial that we
increase cargo surveillance and inspections. And it is crucial that we
provide our Customs agents and other port security forces with the
equipment needed to detect chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of
mass destruction, WMD.
Osama bin Laden has stated that he considers it his ``religious
duty'' to obtain such weapons.
Earlier this month, the director general of the International Atomic
Energy Agency warned, ``The willingness of terrorists to commit suicide
to achieve their evil aims makes the nuclear terrorism threat far more
likely than it was before September 11th.'' According to the Agency,
there have been 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear material since 1993
and 201 cases of trafficking in medical and industrial radioactive
material. Sadly, it is no longer beyond the pale to imagine that bin
Laden and his associates might try to smuggle a nuclear device or so-
called ``dirty bomb'' onto a cargo ship entering one of our busy
seaports and then detonate it.
I was prepared to offer an amendment to make it quite clear that
references in the bill to chemical, biological, or other weapons of
mass destruction include nuclear devices.
Mr. HOLLINGS. If the senior Senator from California will yield, I
assure her that is our intent. Where was authorize activities or
funding to step up survelliance, inspection, and detection of WMDs at
our seaports, we would want to target any kind of nuclear devices as
well as chemical and biological weapons.
So, for instance, any authorizations in the bill for the purchase of
detection equipment could be used to buy radiation pagers for the
Customs agents who inspect cargo, or for radiation detectors on cargo
X-ray machines, or to retrofit existing X-ray machines with sensitive
sodium iodide detectors.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the chairman for his clarification. It is
absolutely vital that we upgrade our detection technology. Oakland's
Howard Marine Terminal, for instance, is less than once-half mile from
Jack London Square, a major tourist attraction. Ships that travel into
and out of the Port of Oakland terminal pass within 400 yards of the
Square.
Immediately following the September 11th attacks, a 920-foot tanker
carrying 33 million gallons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) was
prevented from entering Boston Harbor. The tanker was kept 6 to 8 miles
offshore while authorities figured out a way to safeguard the Harbor.
It was not until November 4--with Coast Guard escorts--that the tanker
was allowed into the harbor.
Mr. HOLLINGS. The Senator from California has raised good points. I
appreciate her interest in the matter and
[[Page S13881]]
her willingness to reach an accommodation with the Commerce Committee.
We certainly want to interdict any nuclear devices as assuredly as we
want to interdict other WMDs.
PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY ACT COLLOQUY
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, we worked hard with the Administration
to incorporate many of their suggested changes in this bill to sharpen
the policy and create a better legislative product. I had intended to
work with Chairman Leahy of the Judiciary Committee to modernize and
update some of our maritime criminal laws to reflect the realities
following the attacks of September 11th, and to strengthen our laws to
protect against maritime terrorism. Unfortunately, the Administration
did not consult or share with the Judiciary Committee the changes in
criminal laws and other matters within the Judiciary Committee's
jurisdiction that were provided to me. I would like to ask the Chairman
of the Judiciary Committee, if he would be willing to work to work with
me and Senator McCain next year to consider whether new criminal
provisions are necessary to enhance seaport security?
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am also very concerned that we develop
policies to more adequately protect our maritime vulnerabilities and
protect the public from the threats emerging as a result of maritime
trade. I would be happy to work with Chairman Hollings and Ranking
Member McCain next year to evaluate whether any gaps in our criminal
laws to protect our maritime safety and seaport security exist and the
appropriate steps we should take to close those gaps and at the same
time ensure that the rights of port employees are protected.
Mr. President, I have also expressed to Chairman Hollings my concerns
that we properly limit access to and use of sensitive law enforcement
information relating to background checks which are provided for in
this bill. Chairman Hollings has assured me that the bill sets strict
and appropriate limits as to both when such access will be required and
how the information will be used once obtained. Additionally, the
Chairman understands my continuing concern over the need for
appropriate due process protections for employees of ports at all
levels who may be subject to background checks. These would include a
hearing that would consider mitigating and extenuating circumstances
related to the individual in question. Am I correct that it is the
intent of the Chairman to ensure that the Department of Transportation
and the nation's ports carry out background checks with proper
safeguards in place that ensure due process protections for employees.
And will the Chairman commit to work with me to that end? I would like
to ask Chairman Hollings if he could explain these provisions?
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, we have included the important
protections and limitations for such use in access in the bill.
Background checks will be limited to those employees who have access to
sensitive cargo information or unrestricted access to segregated
``controlled access areas,'' that is defined areas within ports,
terminals, or affiliated maritime infrastructure which present a
critical security concern. Such controlled access areas could be:
locations where containers will be opened, points where vessels
containing combustible or hazardous materials are berthed and port
security stations. In addition, under this bill the use of background
information, once it is obtained, will be restricted to the minimum
necessary to disqualify an ineligible employee. In other words, only
the minimum amount of law enforcement information necessary to make
eligibility decisions will be shared with port authorities or maritime
terminal operators.
Moreover, this legislation ensures appropriate due process
protections for port employees who may be subject to a background
check. In the legislation the Secretary is required to establish an
appeals process that includes notice and an opportunity for a hearing
for individuals found to be ineligible for employment as prescribed in
Section 106. I also agree that this process should evaluate any
extenuating and mitigating circumstances. I will work to ensure that we
accomplish these objectives as the port security legislation moves
forward.
Security of Inland Waterways
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I rise to engage the distinguished chairman
of the Commerce Committee in a colloquy on very important legislation
he has sponsored--the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001. This
legislation, which I am pleased to have cosponsored, would establish
new Federal safeguards for the security of our ports and maritime
commerce. I would appreciate the chairman clarifying whether the intent
of this legislation is to cover not only the security of ports but also
inland waterways such as the Columbia-Snake River system. This is an
important issue for the Pacific Northwest region because dams on the
Columbia and Snake Rivers are not only critical for maritime
transportation in our region but also a major source of our region's
energy. Barges pass through the locks on these dams every day carrying
gasoline and other explosive cargoes that could disrupt our waterways
or energy production and even put residents downstream at risk of
flooding if these cargoes exploded while in transit through one of the
navigation locks. So I would ask my Chairman whether the authority
provided to the Coast Guard and S. 1214 includes evaluating not just
security for ports but also inland waterways like the Columbia/Snake
River system?
Mr. HOLLINGS. I appreciate the Senator helping to clarify this point.
I know it is especially important for the Senator's home State of
Oregon and the Pacific Northwest region. The answer to the Senator's
question is yes, the intention is to cover all areas affected by
maritime transportation and commerce. The legislation covers not only
seaports but also ``public or commercial structures located within or
adjacent to the marine environment'' including navigation locks.
Mr. WYDEN. I thank the Senator for his clarification. I also ask him
whether under his legislation, the Coast Guard would have authority to
oversee dangerous cargoes transported along the Columbia/Snake River
system as well as cargoes in port?
Mr. HOLLINGS. Under the legislation, the Secretary of Transportation
would issue regulations for security programs for cargo as well for
protecting passengers, crew members and other workers. The authority
for security of cargo is broad enough to cover not only cargoes in port
but also dangerous cargoes anywhere in the maritime navigation system
including those in transit through navigation locks.
Mr. WYDEN. I thank the chairman again for answer and commend him for
his leadership on this important issue.
FREIGHT RAIL SECURITY
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, will my friend, the distinguished
chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, the Senator from South
Carolina, yield for the purpose of engaging in a colloquy?
Mr. HOLLINGS. I will be happy to yield for the purpose.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Commerce
Committee.
Mr. President, I would like to ask the Senator from South Carolina if
he would agree that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, this nation came to a number of stark realizations
about our vulnerabilities and the overall state of our security?
We have become aware that glaring security gaps exist throughout our
nation's transportation system. The Senator from South Carolina has
been a leader in focusing the Senate's attention on the need to improve
the safety of our ports, and he has been steadfast in his support for
additional protections for our nation's rail passengers. I hope that he
will agree with me that as important as improving the security in those
areas is, our job is not complete until we pay similar attention to the
security of our freight rail system.
One of the most serious vulnerabilities in the nation's
transportation system is possibility that terrorists may target
hazardous materials being transported across this nation's vast and
largely unsecured freight rail network. I am sure the Senator is aware
that several studies conclude that the chemical industry is
particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and point to the shipment
of hazardous materials by rail as one of
[[Page S13882]]
the most serious threats to the industry. In fact, I believe that a
study requested by the Senator's Appropriations Subcommittee and due to
be published this month, will come to this very conclusion.
I do not mean to suggest that transportation of chemicals or other
hazardous materials should be curtailed. While the transportation of
hazardous materials poses risks to human health, the expeditious
movement of certain products, like chlorine for municipal water
systems, is absolutely essential for the protection of human health.
The railroad and chemical industries have acknowledged the risks, and
have taken strides toward improving the security of their facilities,
hazardous materials shipments, and rolling stock since the September
11th attacks. These security improvements, and additional security
enhancements that are planned, will be inordinately costly, perhaps
reaching as high as $150 million in this calendar year, and another
$150 million in 2002. I hope the Senator will agree that the
extraordinary and unforeseen nature of the costs being incurred by
hazardous materials shippers, tank car owners, and railroads, combined
with the benefit to human health and public safety that these security
enhancements represent, justifies a program of short-term federal
grants to reimburse or defray some of the post-September 11th security-
related expenses these companies are incurring.
If the Senator from South Carolina does agree with the need to
improve our nation's rail security, and understands the unprecedented
outlays that railroads and shippers have made or will make in the near
future, would he commit to this Senator to hold whatever hearings
deemed necessary, and to schedule a prompt mark-up in the Commerce
Committee early in 2002 for legislation of mine to require the
Secretary of Transportation to conduct a comprehensive terrorism risk
assessment, and to set up a Rail Security Fund to make the types of
grants that we have discussed here today?
Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the Senator for his comments on the state of
our nation's transportation security, and I agree with his assertion
that a complete treatment of our security needs would include
legislation to improve the security of our rail network. I am aware
that the need for the safe and expeditious rail transportation of
chemicals and other hazardous materials is essential for our nation's
economy, and that the movement of some chemicals, including chlorine,
is necessary for the preservation of public health.
I am aware also of the security improvements that have been
undertaken by railroads and hazardous materials shippers. I agree that
the security-related expenses are extraordinary, and that in the
interest of protecting the general public from the effects of a
terrorist attack on hazardous materials shipped by rail, the federal
government should help these companies on a short-term basis to defray
their post-September 11th security-related expenses. I will promise the
Senator from West Virginia that the Commerce Committee will take up the
issue of rail security as early as possible during the next session of
the Congress.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank the Senator from South Carolina, and I thank
the Presiding Officer.
BUS SECURITY ACT
Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I appreciate the chairman's leadership in
promoting safety in all modes of passenger and cargo transportation. In
the Commerce Committee executive session on October 17, the committee
addressed the important issue of passenger rail safety. The committee
approved funding for the upgrading of Amtrak tunnels and bridges
primarily along the much-used Northwest corridor. While I support and
applaud the goal of increasing passenger rail safety and security--in
fact I strongly support this legislation--at the same committee session
I raised the issue of intercity bus security. Attention became acute on
this issue after the October 3 incident on a Greyhound bus that
resulted in the death of seven people. Since that event, there have
been other attempts to cause mayhem on buses, but thankfully, none have
resulted in deaths. With over 774 million intercity bus passengers
annually with companies serving over 4,000 communities, we cannot wait
to act on securing this important mode of transportation.
Mr. HOLLINGS. I appreciate the fact that the Senator from Georgia
brought this matter to the committee's attention. Bus security is in
fact an important issue which unfortunately cannot be appropriately
addressed before the end of this year. I applaud the initiative of the
Senator from Georgia and leadership on this issue and, in particular,
his introduction of S. 1739, which establishes a competitive grant
program to allocate funding to bus companies to increase security and
safety and creates a research and development program for new
technologies to increase bus security and safety. It is my intention to
consider this legislation on the markup calendar of the Commerce
Committee's first executive session of 2002.
Mr. CLELAND. I applaud the chairman's decision to advance the issue
of bus safety. With bus terminals often sharing facilities with both
airports and rail stations, omitting this critical component of the
equation leaves a hole in the system. This mode of transportation is
the largest domestic passenger service provider, and it has grown
without the aid of federal support. Now that they need assistance to
supplement their own efforts and protect our citizenry, it is time for
Congress to act. This industry is made up of many small businesses,
which may not be able to survive if assistance is not given to help
boost security in order to bring passengers back to bus travel.
Otherwise, these businesses may have to increase the cost to the
customer to pay for the necessary security upgrades.
Mr. HOLLINGS. As chairman of the Commerce Committee, I am very aware
of the need of the bus community. It is an important segment of our
transportation infrastructure. I look forward to working with my
colleague from Georgia on his legislation at the earliest opportunity
in 2002.
Mr. CLELAND. I thank the Senator for his support and attention to
this matter, and I look forward to working with you in the future on
this issue of national importance.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I seek unanimous consent to say a few
words about the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 and the
herculean efforts of the Senate Commerce Committee Chairman, Senator
Hollings, to get it passed.
In the aftermath of September 11, most of the legislation considered
in this chamber has been reactive in nature. This bill, like Senator
Byrd's homeland security package, is decidedly different.
This bill is designed to prevent a terrorist attack on one of our
nation's most vulnerable pieces of infrastructure--our ports. This bill
anticipates the possibility of an attack, and sets out to make that
impossible. This is exactly the kind of legislation that we were sent
to Congress to pass.
Yet it would not have passed without the dogged efforts of Senator
Hollings, who forced the issue as most members of Congress were leaving
town.
Finally, I would just like to comment on Senator Holling's use of
David Stockman's The Triumph of Politics, in his remarks today. I too
remember those days in the early 1980's, when the Laffer Curve and
trickle-down economics were coming into vogue. I was a young
congressman then, and I didn't believe it would work.
I still don't. And I share the chairman's disbelief that even after
September 11--when our Nation's vulnerabilities have been so explicitly
exposed and the need for additional security resources has been made so
evident-- we would again travel down that path.
Mr. President, I thank the Chairman for his efforts on this vital
piece of legislation.
PORT SECURITY, S. 1214
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise today to thank Chairman Hollings
and Senator McCain for accepting my amendment to this important bill
will promote security at our Nation's seaports.
America's ports provide invaluable links between American
productivity and markets both here at home and abroad.
Ports are a critical cog in the wheels of our economy. But quite
frankly, our ports are vulnerable.
[[Page S13883]]
History has taught us lessons in vulnerability before, whether it be
the USS Maine in Havana Harbor, the attack on Pearl, or the USS Cole in
Yemen, ships and shipping are always a risky proposition, especially in
the confines of port.
These lessons have new meaning in today's reality of war.
A single attack, on a single ship, in a single U.S. port could render
the entire facility immobile.
What does that mean? No exports of U.S. autos. No freighters carrying
ore on the Great Lakes. No grain barges up or down the Mississippi
Rover. Simply put, No trade.
And perhaps most troubling, no energy.
In my State the Port of Valdez, at the end of the Alaska Pipeline, is
responsible for providing much of the West Coast and Hawaii with its
oil. And in Kenai, the facility sees billions of cubic feet of
Liquified Natural Gas transferred each year.
What would happen if these ports were closed by some horrific act?
How could we move our Nation's domestically produced energy?
These facilities and others around the U.S. demand our best efforts
to protect them.
But a large, and unfortunately growing, role for our ports is the
importation of foreign-produced energy, crude oil, refined petroleum
products and liquified natural gas.
As imported energy becomes a larger share of the U.S. energy supply,
we become more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
The energy trade itself creates new terrorist targets.
In the aftermath of September 11th, the Coast Guard was forced to
suspend LNG shipments in to Boston Harbor for fear of those ships being
used for terror.
What else is aboard those foreign flagged supertankers that enter our
ports from the Middle East?
What is hidden in the holds? Biohazards? Chemical warfare?
What else has that crew been trained to do?
These situations take on a new sense of reality after September 11.
My colleagues are well aware of my efforts to reduce our dependence
on foreign oil and foreign supertankers by using our own domestic
resources.
The longer we wait, the more vulnerable we become.
The majority leader has used parliamentary tactics to subvert the
will of the Senate and delay voting on our energy independence.
That is a debate that still lies before us.
But for today, as long as we remain dependent, we must do all we can
to protect the safety of those ships and that energy.
My amendment which is now included in this bill makes certain that
those who are the most knowledgeable in this most critically-important
aspect of port operations are full participants in the effort to ensure
port security.
It further ensures that when we talk port security, that we're
talking about our Nation's energy security.
I greatly appreciate the willingness of the Chairman, Mr. Hollings,
and the Ranking Republican, Mr. McCain, to accept this amendment.
This amendment will make a strong and much needed bill even stronger.
Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. President, I rise today to support the Port and
Maritime Security Act of 2001 and to speak about the need to protect
our seaports from terrorist attacks.
Our seaports are critically important to our national, and global,
economy. Our seaports enable us to export our goods to the rest of the
world and allow us to import the goods we do not produce domestically.
Ninety-five percent of all U.S. overseas trade is conducted through our
361 public seaports. Roughly 45,000 cargo containers enter the U.S.
every day.
Our seaports are also an important component of our national
security. In the interest of promoting trade, we accept increasing
traffic in and around our seaports as ships, crew and cargo move goods
between our nation and others. Yet even as we do this, we must
recognize that the very volume of cargo moving through our seaports
makes it difficult to adequately guard against a potential terrorist
attack.
Traditionally, our seaports are viewed as highly vulnerable targets
for terrorist attacks. They are open spaces, full of traffic, and
difficult to monitor. Yet an attack against one of our larger seaports
could dramatically impact our domestic economy by destroying cargo,
eliminating jobs, and shutting off trading routes to other shippers.
Unfortunately, we have let our guard down with respect to our
seaports by failing to adequately address the potential for a terrorist
attack. We know how important our seaports are to our national and
global economy, yet at best, inspectors are able to examine only about
two percent of the cargo that passes through our seaports. This means
that the vast majority of cargo entering our seaports is not inspected
before the containers are allowed to move throughout the country. We
can, and must, do better.
We must improve the quality of and deployment of detection technology
and we must make sure that those who guard our seaports are equipped to
prevent an attack. We have technology that scans containers to look for
suspicious materials and shipments. It is in place right now, but not
at all our seaports and not even at all of the largest seaports. We
need to expand the deployment of this type of technology, and make sure
all our seaports are equipped with the best available scanning
technology. We must also make sure that the Coast Guard has the
manpower and equipment it needs to protect our coast and ports and to
respond in the event of an attack.
I am so pleased that we are passing the Port Security Bill. This is
an extremely important piece of legislation and an important component
of our national defense.
I would like to take this moment to thank Chairman Hollings for
working with me on several amendments I had to this important bill.
When the Commerce Committee held hearings on port security back in
July, I raised several issues with the witnesses about the security of
our ports and the ability to protect against a possible terrorist
threat. I have been working since then to develop legislation to
address some of the concerns I had that were confirmed at the hearing.
When the Commerce Committee marked up its port security bill in early
August, I received assurances from Chairman Hollings that we would
continue to work to make sure my concerns were addressed when the bill
came to the Senate floor. At that time, we of course had no idea that
our country was only a month away from such a horrendous terrorist
attack.
But I am pleased that we are now taking up this bill. It will make
our seaports and our nation safer. And I want to again thank the
Chairman and Ranking Member for working with me on these amendments and
for including them in the final bill.
Specifically, these amendments will: improve our ability to safely
handle cargo entering our country; provide the Coast Guard with
additional anti-terrorism resources to protect domestic ports; and
provide for the most modern security technology to be deployed in
seaports.
My first amendment is an anti-tampering amendment that will ensure
that the cargo we accept in our country has not been altered or
interfered with. The amendment improves port security by allowing
Customs to work with ocean shippers to better coordinate the tracking
of cargo in our ports and across our country. It will improve security
by enabling Customs to better assist shippers in preventing cargo
tampering and cargo theft. It will also improve security by enabling
Customs to track containers as they move cross-country to ensure that
they are not diverted for criminal or terrorist purposes.
My second amendment establishes Port and Maritime Security Teams,
teams of Coast Guard personnel with training in anti-terrorism, drug
interdiction, and navigation assistance. These units will operate high-
speed boats that are equipped to patrol our coastal waters and respond
immediately to terrorist or other criminal threats to our coast and
seaports. Similar teams are already used to protect U.S. vessels in
foreign ports, my amendment brings them to our domestic defense.
[[Page S13884]]
My final amendment will ensure that the best available technology is
deployed in our seaports to improve security, identify threats, and
prevent terrorist attacks. The grant program would cover technologies
to deal with such security risks as: explosives, firearms, weapons of
mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons, drug and illegal
alien smuggling, and trade fraud. This amendment is so important,
because the type of cargo and containers that move through seaports are
entirely different than what moves through our airports, and we need to
make sure we are developing technology that recognizes those
differences. Only about 2 percent of the cargo entering our seaports is
inspected, without better technology, we are leaving ourselves too
vulnerable to those who would exploit our seaports for terrorist or
criminal activity.
Again, I would like to express my thanks to Chairman Hollings and
Senator McCain for helping make sure that these amendments were
included in the final bill and for making sure that we take aggressive
action to protect our seaports.
Amendment No. 2690
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there is an
amendment in order. The clerk will report the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Hollings], for
himself, Mr. McCain, and Mr. Graham, proposes an amendment
numbered 2690.
(The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under
``Amendments Submitted.'')
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment. It
is a managers' amendment agreed to by Senators McCain, Graham,
Hutchison, and myself.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No.
2690.
The amendment (No. 2690) was agreed to.
Mr. HOLLINGS. I urge passage of the bill, as amended.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield back all time?
Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield back all time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the
question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read
the third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the
question is, Shall the bill pass?
The bill (S. 1214) was passed.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, may I be recognized?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
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