[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 177 (Wednesday, December 19, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13696-S13697]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             THE URGENT NEED FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

 Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise to submit for the Record an 
article written by Brian T. Kennedy, vice president of the Claremont 
Institute, entitled ``The Urgent Need for Ballistic Missile Defense.'' 
Published in the Imprimis publication of Hillsdale College, Mr. Kennedy 
persuasively argues that ``the United States is defenseless against 
[the] mortal danger . . . of a ballistic missile attack.''
  In view of the events of September 11, I commend this article to the 
Senate for review as a cautionary warning to the U.S. Government of the 
potential danger of failing to meet its fundamental constitutional 
obligation to ``provide for the common defense.''
  The article follows.

                       [From Imprimis, Nov. 2001]

             The Urgent need for Ballistic Missile Defense

                         (By Brian T. Kennedy)

       On September 11, our nation's enemies attacked us using 
     hijacked airliners. Next time, the vehicles of death and 
     destruction might well be ballistic missiles armed with 
     nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. And let us be 
     clear: The United States is defenseless against this mortal 
     danger. We would today have to suffer helplessly a ballistic 
     missile attack, just as we suffered helplessly on September 
     11. But the dead would number in the millions and a 
     constitutional crisis would likely ensue, because the 
     survivors would wonder--with good reason--if their government 
     were capable of carrying out its primary constitutional duty 
     to ``provide for the common defense.''


                           The Threat is Real

       The attack of September 11 should not be seen as a 
     fanatical act of individuals like Osama Bin Laden, but as 
     deliberate act of a consortium of nations who hope to remove 
     the U.S. from its strategic positions in the Middle East, in 
     Asia and the Pacific, and in Europe. It is the belief of such 
     nations that the U.S. can be made to abandon its allies, such 
     as Israel, if the cost of standing by them becomes too high. 
     It is not altogether unreasonable for our enemies to act on 
     such a belief. The failure of U.S. political leadership, over 
     a period of two decades, to respond proportionately to 
     terrorist attacks on Americans in Lebanon, to the first World 
     Trade Center bombing, to the attack on the Khobar Towers in 
     Saudi Arabia, to the bombings of U.S. embassies abroad, and 
     most recently to the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, likely 
     emboldened them. They may also have been encouraged by 
     observing our government's unwillingness to defend Americans 
     against ballistic missiles. For all of the intelligence 
     failures leading up to September 11, we know with absolute 
     certainty that various nations are spending billions of 
     dollars to build or acquire strategic ballistic missiles with 
     which to attack and blackmail the United States. Yet even 
     now, under a president who supports it, missile defense 
     advances at a glacial pace.
       Who are these enemy nations, in whose interest it is to 
     press the U.S. into retreating from the world stage? Despite 
     the kind words of Russian President Vladimir Putin, 
     encouraging a ``tough response'' to the terrorist attack of 
     September 11, we know that it is the Russian and Chinese 
     governments that are supplying our enemies in Iraq. Iran, 
     Libya, and North Korea with the ballistic missile 
     technology to terrorize our nation. Is it possible that 
     Russia and China don't understand the consequences of 
     transferring this technology? Are Vladimir Putin and Jiang 
     Zemin unaware that countries like Iran and Iraq are known 
     sponsors of terrorism? In light of the absurdity of these 
     questions, it is reasonable to assume that Russia and 
     China transfer this technology as a matter of high 
     government policy, using these rogue states as proxies to 
     destabilize the West because they have an interest in 
     expanding their power, and because they know that only the 
     U.S. can stand in their way.
       We should also note that ballistic missiles can be used not 
     only to kill and destroy, but to commit geopolitical 
     blackmail. In February of 1996, during a confrontation 
     between mainland China and our democratic ally on Taiwan, Lt. 
     Gen. Xiong Guang Kai, a senior Chinese official, made an 
     implicit nuclear threat against the U.S., warning our 
     government not to interfere because Americans ``care more 
     about Los Angeles than they do Taipei.'' With a minimum of 20 
     Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) currently 
     aimed at the U.S., such threats must be taken seriously.


               the strategic terror of ballistic missiles

       China possesses the DF-5 ballistic missile with a single, 
     four-megaton warhead. Such a warhead could destroy an area of 
     87.5 square miles, or roughly all of Manhattan, with its 
     daily population of three million people. Even more 
     devastating is the Russian SS-18, which has a range of 7,500 
     miles and is capable of carrying a single, 24-megaton warhead 
     or multiple warheads ranging from 550 to 750 kilotons.
       Imagine a ballistic missile attack on New York or Los 
     Angeles, resulting in the death of three to eight million 
     Americans. Beyond the staggering loss of human life, this 
     would take a devastating political and economic toll. 
     Americans' faith in their government--a government that 
     allowed such an attack--would be shaken to its core. As for 
     the economic shock, consider that damages from the September 
     11 attack, minor by comparison, are estimated by some 
     economists to be

[[Page S13697]]

     nearly 1.3 trillion dollars, roughly one-fifth of GNP.
       Missile defense critics insist that such an attack could 
     never happen, based on the expectation that the U.S. would 
     immediately strike back at whomever launched it with an equal 
     fury. They point to the success of the Cold War theory of 
     Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). But even MAD is premised 
     on the idea that the U.S. would ``absorb'' a nuclear strike, 
     much like we ``absorbed'' the attack of September 11. 
     Afterwards the President, or surviving political leadership, 
     would estimate the losses and then employ our submarines, 
     bombers, and remaining land-based ICBMs to launch a 
     counterattack. This would fulfill the premise of MAD, but it 
     would also almost certainly guarantee additional ballistic 
     missile attacks from elsewhere.
       Consider another scenario. What if a president, in order to 
     avoid the complete annihilation of the nation, came to terms 
     with our enemies? What rational leader wouldn't consider such 
     an option, given the unprecedented horror of the alternative? 
     Considering how Americans value human life, would a Bill 
     Clinton or a George Bush order the unthinkable? Would any 
     president launch a retaliatory nuclear strike against a 
     country, even one as small as Iraq, if it meant further 
     massive casualties to American citizens? Should we not agree 
     that an American president ought not to have to make such a 
     decision? President Reagan expressed this simply when he said 
     that it would be better to prevent a nuclear attack than to 
     suffer one and retaliate.
       Then there is the blackmail scenario. What if Osama Bin 
     Laden were to obtain a nuclear ballistic missile from 
     Pakistan (which, after all, helped to install the Taliban 
     regime), place it on a ship somewhere off our coast, and 
     demand that the U.S. not intervene in the destruction of 
     Israel? Would we trade Los Angeles or New York for Tel Aviv 
     or Jerusalem? Looked at this way, nuclear blackmail would be 
     as devastating politically as nuclear war would be 
     physically.


                  roadblock to defense: the abm treaty

       Signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1972, 
     the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty forbids a national missile 
     defense. Article I, Section II reads: ``Each Party undertakes 
     not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of 
     its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and 
     not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region 
     except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.'' 
     Article III allows each side to build a defense for an 
     individual region that contains an offensive nuclear force. 
     in other words, the ABM Treaty prohibits our government from 
     defending the American people, while allowing it to defend 
     missiles to destroy other peoples.
       Although legal scholars believe that this treaty no longer 
     has legal standing, given that the Soviet Union no longer 
     exists, it has been upheld as law by successive 
     administrations--especially the Clinton administration--
     and by powerful opponents of American missile defense in 
     the U.S. Senate.
       As a side note, we now know that the Soviets violated the 
     ABM Treaty almost immediately. Thus the Russians possess 
     today the world's only operable missile defense system. 
     Retired CIA Analyst William Lee, in the ABM Treaty Charade, 
     describes a 9,000-interceptor system around Moscow that is 
     capable of protecting 75 percent of the Russian population. 
     In other words, the Russians did not share the belief of U.S. 
     arms-control experts in the moral superiority of purposefully 
     remaining vulnerable to missile attack.


                     How to Stop Ballistic Missiles

       For all the bad news about the ballistic missile threat to 
     the U.S., there is the good news that missile defense is well 
     within our technological capabilities. As far back as 1962, a 
     test missile fired from the Kwajaleen Atoll was intercepted 
     (within 500 yards) by an anti-ballistic missile launched from 
     Vanderberg Air Force Base. The idea at the time was to use a 
     small nuclear warhead in the upper atmosphere to destroy 
     incoming enemy warheads. But it was deemed politically 
     incorrect--as it is still today--to use a nuclear explosion 
     to destroy a nuclear warhead, even if that warhead is racing 
     toward an American city. (Again, only we seem to be squeamish 
     in this regard: Russia's aforementioned 9,000 interceptors 
     bear nuclear warheads.) So U.S. research since President 
     Reagan reintroduced the idea of missile defense in 1983 has 
     been aimed primarily at developing the means to destroy enemy 
     missiles through direct impact or ``hit-to-kill'' methods.
       American missile defense research has included ground-
     based, sea-based and space-based interceptors, and air-based 
     and space-based lasers. Each of these systems has undergone 
     successful, if limited, testing. The space-based systems are 
     especially effective since they seek to destroy enemy 
     missiles in their first minutes of flight, known also as the 
     boost phase. During this phase, missiles are easily 
     detectible, have yet to deploy any so-called decoys or 
     countermeasures, and are especially vulnerable to space-based 
     interceptors and lasers.
       The best near-term option for ballistic missile defense, 
     recommended by former Reagan administration defense 
     strategist Frank Gaffney, is to place a new generation of 
     interceptors, currently in research, aboard U.S. Navy Aegis 
     Cruisers. These ships could then provide at least some 
     missile defense while more effective systems are built. Also 
     under consideration is a ground-based system in the 
     strategically important state of Alaska, at Fort Greely and 
     Kodiak Island. This would represent another key component in 
     a comprehensive ``layered'' missile defense that will include 
     land, sea, air and space.


                   Arguments Against Missile Defense

       Opponents of missile defense present four basic arguments. 
     The first is that ABM systems are technologically 
     unrealistic, since ``hitting bullets with bullets'' leaves no 
     room for error. They point to recent tests of ground-based 
     interceptors that have had mixed results. Two things are 
     important to note about these tests: First, many of the 
     problems stem from the fact that the tests are being 
     conducted under ABM Treaty restrictions on the speed of 
     interceptors, and on their interface with satellites and 
     radar. Second, some recent test failures involve science and 
     technology that the U.S. perfected 30 years ago, such as 
     rocket separation. But putting all this aside, as President 
     Reagan's former science advisor William Graham points out, 
     the difficulty of ``hitting bullets with bullets'' could be 
     simply overcome by placing small nuclear charges on ``hit-to-
     kill'' vehicles as a ``fail safe'' for when they miss their 
     targets. This would result in small nuclear explosions in 
     space, but that is surely more acceptable than the 
     alternative of enemy warheads detonating over American 
     cities.
       The second argument against missile defense is that no 
     enemy would dare launch a missile attack at the U.S., for 
     fear of swift retaliation. But as the CIA pointed out two 
     years ago--and as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld reiterated 
     recently in Russia--an enemy could launch a ballistic missile 
     from a ship off one of our coasts, scuttle the ship, and 
     leave us wondering, as on September 11, who was responsible.
       The third argument is that missile defense can't work 
     against ship-launched missiles. But over a decade ago U.S. 
     nuclear laboratories, with the help of scientists like Greg 
     Canavan and Lowell Wood, conducted successful tests on space-
     based interceptors that could stop ballistic missiles in 
     their boost phase from whatever location they were launched.
       Finally, missile defense opponents argue that building a 
     defense will ignite an expensive arms race. But the 
     production cost of a space-based interceptor is roughly one 
     to two million dollars. A constellation of 5,000 such 
     interceptors might then cost ten billion dollars, a fraction 
     of America's defense budget. By contrast, a single Russian 
     SS-18 costs approximately $100 million, a North Korean Taepo 
     Dong II missile close to $10 million, and an Iraqi Scud B 
     missile about $2 million. In other words, if we get into an 
     arms race, our enemies will go broke. The soviet Union found 
     it could not compete with us in such a race in the 1980s. Nor 
     will the Russians or the Chinese or their proxies be able to 
     compete today.


                          Time For Leadership

       Building a missile defense is not possible as long as the 
     U.S. remains bound by the ABM Treaty of 1972. President Bush 
     has said that he will give the Russian government notice of 
     our withdrawal from that treaty when his testing program 
     comes into conflict with it. But given the severity of the 
     ballistic missile threat, it is cause for concern that we 
     have not done so already.
       Our greatest near-term potential attacker, Iraq, is 
     expected to have ballistic missile capability in the next 
     three years. Only direct military intervention will prevent 
     it from deploying this capability before the U.S. can deploy 
     a missile defense. This should be undertaken as soon as 
     possible.
       Our longer-term potential attackers, Russia and China, 
     possess today the means to destroy us. We must work and hope 
     for peaceful relations, but we must also be mindful of the 
     possibility that they have other plans. Secretary Powell has 
     invited Russia and China to join the coalition to defeat 
     terrorism. This is ironic, since both countries have been 
     active supporters of the regimes that sponsor terrorism. And 
     one wonders what they might demand in exchange. Might they 
     ask us to delay building a missile defense? Or to renegotiate 
     the ABM Treaty?
       So far the Bush administration has not demonstrated the 
     urgency that the ballistic missile threat warrants. It is 
     also troublesome that the President's newly appointed 
     director of Homeland Security, Pennsylvania Governor Tom 
     Ridge, has consistently opposed missile defense--a fact 
     surely noted with approval in Moscow and Beijing. On the 
     other hand, President Bush has consistently supported missile 
     defense, both in the 2000 campaign and since taking office, 
     and he has the power to carry through with his promises.
       Had the September 11 attack been visited by ballistic 
     missiles, resulting in the deaths of three to six million 
     Americans, a massive effort would have immediately been 
     launched to build and deploy a ballistic missile defense. 
     America, thankfully, has a window of opportunity--however 
     narrow--to do so now, before it is too late.
       Let us begin in earnest.

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