[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 177 (Wednesday, December 19, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S13678-S13679]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
MAINTAIN OUR BALKAN COMMITMENT
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to take issue with Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld's comments yesterday in Brussels, in which he
called for reducing NATO forces in Bosnia by one-third by the end of
next year.
I find Secretary Rumsfeld's proposal both faulty in its logic, and
dangerous in its implications.
Mr. Rumsfeld based his suggestion upon the allegation that the size
of the NATO mission in Bosnia, known as SFOR, is ``putting an
increasing strain on both our forces and our resources when they face
growing demands from critical missions in the war on terrorism.''
From this assertion, one might think that the United States and NATO
have massive numbers of troops in Bosnia. In fact, SFOR's strength is
now about 18,400 troops. The U.S. contingent is only 3,100.
According to the Pentagon's new Quadrennial Defense Review, we must
be able to ``swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts
while preserving the option of decisive victory, including regime
change or occupation and conduct a limited number of smaller-scale
contingency operations.''
By any calculation, therefore, we should have plenty of troops and
materiel to handle the smaller-scale operation in Bosnia and still meet
our commitments elsewhere in the war on terrorism.
In short, Secretary Rumsfeld's argument that Bosnia is a serious
drain on our war-fighting capabilities simply doesn't wash.
I should also point out that we have already greatly reduced the size
of the NATO-led operation in Bosnia. The current level of 18,400 troops
is down from an original 60,000. The 3,100 Americans are down from an
original 20,000.
Moreover, why should we quit a game in the fourth quarter when we're
winning? Bosnia and Herzegovina still has many problems, but even the
harshest critic of our policy there must admit that significant
progress has been made since the Dayton Accords were signed six years
ago. For example, there non-nationalist, multi-ethnic coalitions now
govern both the Federation and the national parliaments. All of the
political, economic, and social
[[Page S13679]]
progress has been made possible by the umbrella of SFOR.
But the victory is not complete. In that context, I'm rather
surprised that Secretary Rumsfeld juxtaposed Bosnia with the war on
terrorism, because al-Qaeda is known to have cells in Bosnia. The Saudi
Arabian who co-starred with Osama bin Laden in the grotesque video from
Afghanistan, which nauseated the civilized world, had previously fought
with the mujahedin in Bosnia.
Mr. President, extirpating al-Qaeda from Bosnia is reason enough to
keep the three thousand American troops there.
I have been to Bosnia nearly every year since the outbreak of
hostilities in 1992. I have talked with most of the leading politicians
of all ethnic groups. I have visited the headquarters of the combined
Muslim-Croat Federation Army outside Sarajevo and reviewed the troops
there. I have met with local officials from Banja Luka and Brcko in the
north to Mostar in the south. No one, Mr. President, no one - - thinks
that the current peace and progress in Bosnia could survive a premature
withdrawal of NATO, especially American, troops.
Rather than setting an artificial date for withdrawal of NATO forces
from Bosnia, we should concentrate on finishing the job, and then
withdraw victoriously.
Moreover, the United States is sending a totally confusing message to
the world, friends and foes alike. The same week that we reopen our
embassy in Kabul, and James Dobbins, our envoy to Afghanistan, declares
that we are there to stay, we announce that we will leave Bosnia within
twelve months!
How seriously can Afghans take Mr. Dobbins' declaration? Can the
Afghans possibly think that we will stay the course there when we won't
do it in the Balkans?
Or are we perhaps planning to transfer some American troops from
Bosnia to peacekeeping duty in Afghanistan? I don't think so. Secretary
Rumsfeld and others in the Administration frequently declare that
peacekeeping duty is a poor use of the American military.
Unfortunately, however, the Administration's mantra runs afoul of the
so-called Strategic Concept, the document which guides overall NATO
strategy. The Strategic Concept lists ethnic and religious conflicts
like Bosnia among the greatest threats to the Alliance.
If we're going to opt out of NATO peace enforcing missions, and we're
going to exclude NATO from our anti-terrorist military campaigns as we
have done in Afghanistan, then what does that tell our allies about our
commitment to NATO? I suppose we'll agree to keep an American general
as Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
Unfortunately, Secretary Rumsfeld's arbitrary deadline-setting in
Bosnia fits right into the Administration's announcement that we will
withdraw unilaterally from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with
Russia, a decision whose folly I criticized on this floor less than a
week ago.
This administration's foreign and defense policy is driven by
ideology, not by a realistic threat assessment. A stable Europe is the
precondition for our pursuing terrorists in Central Asia, the Far East,
or the Middle East. Since we continue to preach ``in together, out
together'' in the Balkans, what will we do if our European NATO
partners point out twelve months from now--as is likely to be the
case--that there is still need for SFOR to remain in Bosnia?
In that case the administration's theory will collide with the hard
facts of reality. Whether reality or ideology will win out will be more
than an academic question. The future, both of the Balkans, and of
NATO, may depend on the answer.
The American people should recognize the risky gamble that Mr.
Rumsfeld's rigid ideology asks us to embark upon.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I wanted to comment to the
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee about how much I appreciate
his leadership, how much of a privilege it has been for me to be a
member of that committee, along with the distinguished Senator from
Connecticut, another leader of the committee, and how much you have
taught me and how much you have encouraged me.
With that background, I am going to Afghanistan on January 3, and I
am really looking forward to bringing back a report to the committee
that might be of value as we discuss the future of the coalition,
keeping it together, of all of those countries in the region that we
will visit, as well as for the future of Afghanistan.
I commend the chairman of the committee for how he has been so
steadfast in his insistence for the role of women in the new Government
of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has a history of having very prominent
women in the professions. Of course, all that disappeared with the
Taliban. It is time to reassert the rights of women and, particularly,
in our case, to insist on that as they form the government. It is with
a great deal of appreciation I say to my chairman and to the chairman
of the subcommittee how much I thank them for their leadership.
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