[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 169 (Friday, December 7, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12676-S12677]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          AMERICAN AGRICULTURE'S VULNERABILITY TO BIOTERRORISM

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to address the issue of 
detecting biological agents that could be used in malicious attacks 
against our Nation's agricultural industry.
  Last month, I introduced S. 1560, the Biological Agent-Environmental 
Detection Act of 2001, which calls for the development of new 
technologies to detect disease agents that can be used as terrorist 
weapons against humans.
  I am drafting legislation to address concerns about agricultural 
security that will complement the provisions in S. 1715, the 
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001, which I have cosponsored.
  We have heard testimony in hearings before the Governmental Affairs 
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal 
Services illustrating the vulnerability of American agriculture to acts 
of biological terrorism directed against livestock and crops, commonly 
known as ``agroterrorism.''
  Any agroterrorist attacks could have a profound effect on the overall 
American economy. The combined cash receipts for crops, livestock, and 
poultry in the United States reached nearly $200 billion last year, or 
2 percent of our gross domestic product. An agroterrorist attack would 
also create a ripple effect on businesses that rely on American 
agricultural products, especially grocery stores and restaurants.
  For example, agroterrorist attacks could reach across the 
agricultural industry of Hawaii, which had $521 million in revenues 
last year. Our livestock could be attacked with viral agents such as 
foot and mouth disease. In Hawaii, this would affect the price and 
availability of beef, pork, and dairy products. 51,000 cattle and 
26,000 hogs were brought to market and slaughtered in Hawaii last year, 
while 90 million gallons of milk were produced by the Hawaiian dairy 
industry. Our $100 million pineapple industry could be attacked with a 
nematode pest that causes an estimated 40-percent loss of crop in the 
first year of infection, and 80- to 100-percent losses in subsequent 
crops. Hawaii's growing agricultural tourism industry was worth $26 
million in 2000, and any attacks on Hawaiian agriculture would also 
impact those revenues.
  However, the impact of terrorist attacks against American agriculture 
would not be measured in economic terms alone. A significant loss of 
agricultural production would also affect the health and welfare of our 
nation's citizens, not to mention hundreds of millions of men, women, 
and children around the globe who depend on American agricultural 
production for some part of their daily meals.
  My colleagues are aware of the recent completion of the Human Genome 
Project to map the basic genetic information contained in human 
chromosomes. This vast undertaking involved the sequencing of over 
three billion base pairs of genetic information.
  The diseases that attack crops and livestock are caused primarily by 
bacteria, fungi, and viruses. Each of these microorganisms has its own 
miniature genome that can be sequenced with a fraction of the effort 
involved in the Human Genome Project. For example, only last month, 
scientists at the Department of Energy's Joint Genome Institute 
sequenced the genomes of 15 bacterial species, including plant and 
human pathogens.
  In many cases, we still seek to understand the most rudimentary 
features of disease-causing microorganisms, regardless of whether they 
infect humans, livestock, or plants. By sequencing the DNA of select 
agricultural diseases agents, we can develop diagnostic tests to 
rapidly identify agricultural diseases; we gain fundamental information 
about how each disease is caused; and we learn how to mitigate or 
prevent the negative effects of diseases that infect crops and 
livestock.
  By preparing to detect the intentional spread of disease through 
bioterrorist attacks on America's agriculture, we are also protecting 
American crops and livestock from the accidental or natural spread of 
diseases. With rapid diagnostic tests based on genomic information, we 
can avoid the spread of such diseases as the papaya ringspot virus, 
which is carried by aphids throughout infected orchards in Hawaii. 
However, Hawaii's agricultural system clearly is not the only industry 
that would benefit from pathogen detection systems. The fungal pathogen 
Fusarium, which infects many Hawaiian crops, including sugarcane, 
ginger, and banana, also attacks watermelons in Texas, potatoes in 
Idaho, and tomatoes in Ohio.
  I commend my colleagues for their efforts to protect our urban areas 
from further bioterrorist attacks. However, let's not forget 
agricultural America. We must support the development of rapid 
detection methods that are based on genomic information from disease

[[Page S12677]]

agents that could be used in bioterrorist attacks against American 
agriculture.

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