[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 168 (Thursday, December 6, 2001)]
[House]
[Pages H8972-H9044]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
BIPARTISAN TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY ACT OF 2001
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I
call up House Resolution 306 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 306
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it
shall be in order without intervention of any point of order
to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 3005) to extend trade
authorities procedures with respect to reciprocal trade
agreements. The bill shall be considered as read for
amendment. The amendment recommended by the Committee on Ways
and Means now printed in the bill, modified by the amendment
printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying
this resolution, shall be considered as adopted. The previous
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, as
amended, to final passage without intervening motion except:
(1) one hour of debate on the bill, as amended, equally
divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority
member of the Committee on Ways and Means; and (2) one motion
to recommit with or without instructions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Reynolds)
is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, for the purposes of debate only, I yield
the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings)
pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During
consideration of this resolution, all time is yielded for the purpose
of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 306 is a closed rule providing for
consideration of H.R. 3005, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority
Act of 2001, with an hour of debate in the House equally divided and
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee
on Ways and Means.
The rule waives all points of order against consideration of the
bill.
Additionally, the rule provides that the amendment recommended by the
Committee on Ways and Means now printed in the rule, modified by the
amendment printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying
this resolution, shall be considered as adopted.
Finally, the rule provides for one motion to recommit with or without
instructions.
Before I begin, there are many people responsible for this bipartisan
compromise legislation on the floor today. The leadership of this House
has been remarkable in educating Members and in reaching out to address
their concerns. The gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), the
gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas), and the gentleman from Illinois
(Mr. Crane) have been the driving force behind free trade; and I thank
them and our colleagues on the other side of the aisle, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Dooley), the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr.
Jefferson), and the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Tanner), for their
diligence and their perseverance.
Mr. Speaker, there was a time when this country could boast that we
were the world leader in shaping the rules for international trade,
globalization and open markets. Sadly, this is no longer the case.
There are more than 130 regional trade agreements in force today, but
only three including the United States. To our south, Mexico has trade
deals in at least 28 countries, while across the ocean, the European
Union has trade agreements with 27 other countries.
In 1999 one-third of the world exports were covered by EU agreements.
Only one-tenth of the world exports were covered by U.S. agreements,
sending dollars and jobs to competitors that should have been in the
United States.
We are the most competitive Nation in the world, yet we rank 26th in
the world in bilateral investment treaties.
We have nearly completed the first year of the 21st century, the new
millennium; yet America's trade agenda is still puttering along in a
slow lane while our trade partners around the globe speed past us, and
every day we get left behind, and our economy and our families are hurt
even more.
Each day that America delays, other countries throughout the world
are entering into trade agreements without us, gradually surrounding
the United States with a network of trade agreements that benefit their
workers, their farmers, their businesses and their economies at the
expense of us. In short, our trading partners are writing the rules of
world trade without us.
How important is this to American jobs and the American economy?
In my State, international trade is a primary generator of business
and job growth. In the Buffalo area, the highest manufacturing
employment sectors are also among the State's top merchandise export
industries, including electronics, fabricated metals, industrial
machinery, transportation equipment and food products. Consequently, as
exports increase, employment in these sectors will also increase.
From family farms to the high-tech start-ups to established
businesses and manufacturers, increasing free and fair trade will keep
our economy going and create jobs in our community.
With America at war, now may seem like the time for our country to
close
[[Page H8973]]
its borders and discourage global interaction. Nothing could be further
from the truth.
Never has it been more apparent that we need to enhance and
strengthen friendships around the world, and what better way to build
coalitions than with free trade.
In the 1960 Democratic platform, President Kennedy put it best in the
following message that is relevant both then as it is now. World trade
is more than ever essential to world peace. We must therefore resist
the temptation to accept remedies that deny American producers and
consumers access to world markets and destroy the prosperity of our
friends in the non-Communist world.
We can neither deny nor ignore the correlation between peace and free
trade.
Not only does the war on terrorism influence the need for free trade,
but the anticipated economic opportunities for American workers,
farmers and companies will provide a much needed boost to our uncertain
economy.
Just look at the facts. One in 10 Americans, nearly 12 million
people, work at jobs that depend on exports of goods and services.
American farmers exported $51 billion in agricultural products and
crops last year that supported 750,000 jobs.
In New York alone, my home State, the number of companies exported
increased 61 percent from 1992 to 1998. Currently, the wages of New
York workers in jobs supported by exports are 13 to 18 percent higher
than the national average. The imports provide consumers and businesses
in New York with wider choice in the marketplace, thereby enhancing
living standards and contributing to competitiveness.
The world is not waiting while the United States putters along. Trade
Promotion Authority offers the best chance for the United States to
reclaim leadership in opening foreign markets, expanding global
economic opportunities for American producers and workers, and
developing the virtues of democracy around the world.
The President has said open trade is not just an economic
opportunity, it is a moral imperative. The prosperity and integrity of
global democracy is at stake, and it is incumbent upon us to pull into
the fast lane in order to reap the benefits of free trade.
What we ask for today is nothing new. Until its expiration in 1994,
every President from Richard Nixon through Bill Clinton has enjoyed the
right of Trade Promotion Authority. This President deserves the same
right.
I strongly urge my colleagues to do the right thing for America.
Support this rule and the underlying legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Reynolds), my
good friend, for yielding me the customary 30 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, at the risk of being the House contrarian this morning,
I again rise in strong opposition to this unfair rule and equally
strong opposition to the underlying bill.
At the outset, let me explain the procedural problems with this rule
that was reported late last night. Recently, we have heard so much
about the new spirit of bipartisanship that is flowering throughout
D.C. Unfortunately, the majority members of the House Committee on
Rules must not have gotten this memo.
Mr. Speaker, I remember well the times that Republican after
Republican came to this floor to decry so-called unfair, heavy-handed
tactics that my party used when we held the majority in this Chamber.
At that time, Republicans were outraged and incredulous each time an
important bill came to the House floor under a closed rule which
prohibited serious debate.
This is the exact rule that the Republicans would like us to work
under today. So I say to my Republican colleagues, where is the
outrage? Where is the disdain? My guess is that the disdain and outrage
are packed and ready to go on 4 o'clock planes that they are trying to
catch today. What other reason could there be for closing off such
important debate?
Let there be no mistake, Mr. Speaker. The bill that we consider today
will have profound and long lasting effects on every State in this
great country and on citizens throughout the world, and instead of
allowing a fair and open debate, the majority is trying to squelch the
voices that they wish not to hear.
No amendments or substitute are permitted to this bill. The gentleman
from New York (Mr. Rangel), one of the most respected and distinguished
Members of this body, a Member who has served nearly 27 years on the
House Committee on Ways and Means, who knows as much about trade as
anybody in the House of Representatives, will not be permitted to offer
an amendment or substitute to this bill. Frankly, this is not simply
unfair; it is offensive.
Moreover, there were a number of other Members who came to the
Committee on Rules late last night to ask that their amendments be
permitted to be offered. They were all denied their request.
What are Americans being denied the right to hear about? One example,
the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Wu), our thoughtful colleague, would
have liked to offer an amendment making human rights considerations a
principal objective of our trade compacts. If this rule passes, the
gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Wu) will not be able to offer his
commonsense amendment.
Another example, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters) had
sensible amendments related to some of our neediest trading partners in
Africa. Like the Wu and Rangel amendment, the American people will be
denied the right to hear the gentlewoman from California's amendment.
How the majority is not embarrassed to bring such a rule to the House
floor is simply beyond my comprehension.
Setting aside for a moment the gross problem with this rule, there
are significant concerns related to the underlying bill.
Mr. Speaker, I am disappointed that the Trade Promotion Authority,
formerly Fast Track, legislation completely ignores the legitimate
concerns many people have raised about the negative impact of current
trade policies on working families, the environment, family farmers,
consumers, small- and mid-sized businesses, people of color and women
here in the United States and around the world.
At a time when more than 700,000 layoffs have been announced since
September 11, more than 2 million Americans have lost their jobs this
year; and on the heels of the largest bankruptcy filing in the history
of our country, where thousands more will soon receive a pink slip, the
other side of the aisle is coming to the floor today to lay the
foundation for the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs by more
Americans in the immediate future.
To top it off, just a short while ago this body reauthorized funding
for trade adjustment assistance in anticipation of imminent job losses
from future trade agreements.
{time} 1215
Talk about a self-fulfilling prophecy.
You see, Mr. Speaker, today we are not voting on one trade agreement
versus another. Rather, we are voting on giving the President open-
ended authority to go ahead and commit the United States to trade
agreements without allowing Congress substantive consultation on the
specifics of the agreement. To provide this open-ended authority to the
President without requiring that environmental and labor standards be
included in any trade agreement is nothing short of hammering another
nail in the coffin of hundreds of American industries nationwide.
I support free trade. I was told last night in the Committee on Rules
meeting that the manager's amendment will protect agriculture; that it
will protect sugar in my State. Well, it did not. I have in the past,
and will again, support free trade. However, any free trade agreement
must be a fair trade agreement.
It is outrageous to expect the American agricultural industry to
compete with South American, Central American, or Asian agricultural
industries who are not required to pay their workers a minimum living
wage and are not held to the same environmental standards as farmers
here in the U.S.
Don't believe me? Look at what NAFTA did to my home state of Florida,
specifically the agriculture industry. From citrus to sugar and from
rice to tomatoes, Florida's agricultural industry has lost thousands of
jobs as a direct
[[Page H8974]]
result of NAFTA. While Mexican farmers have profited, companies have
closed and Florida no longer have jobs.
The President has made it no secret that the first thing he will do
with fast track authority is to move forward with the Free Trade Area
of the Americas agreement. The FTAA agreement, as currently written,
could result in Florida's citrus and sugar industries, along with fruit
and vegetable industries nationwide, ceasing to exist. South American
farmers who pay their workers pennies and do nothing to preserve the
land they grow or the environment they pillage, could wipe out the U.S.
agriculture industry before we know what hit us.
As I mentioned at the outset and for the reasons just explained, I
oppose adoption of this rule.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), the distinguished chairman of
the Committee on Rules, and an architect of this important legislation.
(Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule. This
is a fair rule. Yes, it is a closed rule, but this rule is about
procedure. My colleagues are either for granting the President Trade
Promotion Authority or they are against granting the President Trade
Promotion Authority. So I do not know what all this argument is about
all these other issues.
Yes, we have worked long and hard to fashion a package. The gentleman
from California (Mr. Thomas), the chairman of the Committee on Ways and
Means, and a wide range of people on both sides of the aisle have
worked on this issue, and now we have come down to the point where
Members of Congress will have to make a choice. They will either vote
``yes'' to give the President authority or they will vote ``no,'' and
that is what this rule provides us with the opportunity to do.
It is very fair, it is very balanced, and it is, quite frankly, the
way rules that have addressed trade issues in the past have been
addressed. So this is nothing new. When our friends on the other side
of the aisle, Mr. Speaker, were in the majority, this is exactly the
way they moved the rules dealing with trade issues. And so we have
learned from you all so well. So we are following your model to a T
here, and thank you very much for setting the example for us.
Mr. Speaker, we all know that last week we learned with absolute
certainty that our economy is faced with economic recession. It is a
great difficult time for many of us. Many of our fellow Americans have
been laid off. There is a great deal of suffering taking place. We are
all aware of that, and we know it was dramatically exacerbated
following September 11. What we are about to do, Mr. Speaker, I
believe, may be one of the most important things that can help us turn
the corner for those Americans who are suffering today.
What is it that trade agreements mean for America? They will provide
and have traditionally provided targeted tax relief to America's
working families by giving them access to high-quality products at low
prices. They create better, higher-paying jobs by prying open new
markets for America's world-class goods and services around the world.
And we know that those involved in the area of exports traditionally
earn between 13 and 18 percent higher income levels than those goods
that are produced simply for domestic consumption here in the United
States. So by prying open new markets, we create opportunities for
higher wage rates for American workers.
They also provide that very important and powerful link between
nations who want to participate peacefully in the global marketplace.
And, Mr. Speaker, I believe that every shred of empirical evidence that
we have leads us to conclude that American exports and American trade
provide us the opportunity to do one of the most important things that
we can, and that is export our western values throughout the world.
We know that as we deal with this challenging war against terrorism,
trying to expand economic opportunity so that people have choices will
go a long way towards dealing with this issue. The global leadership
role that the President has played, especially since September 11, has
been heralded by Democrats and Republicans alike. And I believe that
this tool which we are on the verge of giving him will be able to go a
long way towards effectively dealing with this issue.
This is a positive, very positive rule. It is a good bill. My
colleagues should join in strong support of it, and I thank my
colleague for yielding me this time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5
minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel), the
dean of the New York delegation and a 27-year-member of the Committee
on Ways and Means.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I take the floor in opposition to the rule.
And I regret that the distinguished chairman of the committee has left
the floor, because I do believe that, being in the minority, that the
Committee on Rules has been extremely fair in giving Democrats an
opportunity, not to pass anything and not to get any votes from them,
but at least to give us the opportunity as the minority to have our
views heard.
This bill has been called a bipartisan bill. And you can call it
bipartisan all day and all night, this year and next year, but you can
put wings on a pig and he cannot fly. This is not a bipartisan bill.
Bipartisan means, to the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means,
walking down the hall with Rangel and giving him an opportunity to talk
about trade. If I miss that, then I miss the bipartisanship.
This was never discussed in the subcommittee, it never was discussed
in the full committee, never discussed with Democrats, but there were
meetings with two Democrats with the chairman. And he concluded after
those conversations that ended compromise, that ended discussion, and
that was the end product.
Now, we are used to that on the Committee on Ways and Means, because
my chairman truly believes that he was violated by former chairman Dan
Rostenkowski, and he is going to spend the rest of his legislative
career making us pay for it. That is okay. We all understand that and
we will work with it. But we always thought the Committee on Rules was
different. We always thought the Committee on Rules knew that they were
in the majority, the Republicans; they had the votes, so they at least
would let us have an opportunity to express ourselves.
We know that we have the constitutional responsibility to deal in
trade, but we know it is the President, like the head of any State,
that has the responsibility to do it. But when you delegate your
responsibility, there should be some checks, there should be some
balances, there should be some credibility as to what you are doing.
We know Republicans are concerned about labor standards. They do not
support slave labor and child labor. They would like people to
organize. We believe that we would not want foreigners to have a better
opportunity in investment than Americans. We believe Republicans truly
believe that the Congress should not just be consulted but should
protect its constitutional right to make certain that foreign
organizations do not destroy the laws that we have.
But just to be so afraid that we will be heard because you do not
have the votes or you have not bought enough votes or you do not have
enough vehicles to talk about what you are going to give in some other
field that you do not even give us a chance to tell you that we believe
let us have TPA, let us have fast track, but we think there is a better
way to do it.
Why would you not give the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin) an
opportunity to show you what we have worked on? Is he someone that is a
protectionist; someone that stood up to the United Auto Workers in
Detroit; someone that we would not have had a bill with China had he
not worked with the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter)? You know it
and I know it.
What about the gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui)? He worked so
hard for NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement. Who can deny
that this man has dedicated his life to free trade?
What about the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott)? He will not
be able to be heard on the bill that we crafted; someone that opened
the doors for trade with sub-Saharan Africa?
[[Page H8975]]
Are you so afraid of another view, are you so frightened that we will
be heard and that you would lose some of the votes?
And then this terrorism thing. How dare people say that we are not
fighting the war against terrorism because we do not do what the
gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) says that we should do. Fighting
the war against terrorism, the President says, requires a bipartisan
approach. It means that it is not chairmen who run and rule; it is
bipartisanship, Democrats and Republicans working together, working
their will, and presenting something to us.
But I tell you this: If you really believe that doing the right thing
with unemployment compensation and doing the right thing with health,
when you have not done the right thing all year, that you are going to
pick up some votes in doing it, and for those people who do not like
the bill but are concerned about the crises and the hardships of people
who have lost their jobs, and they are going to take a promise from the
majority to trust them, vote for this bill and they will do the right
thing for health insurance, if you believe that, I have a great bridge
in Brooklyn I would like to discuss with you.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume
to comment that listening to the comments of the dean of the delegation
from New York, and listening to his remarks as the ranking member of
the Committee on Ways and Means, ranking minority member, there are a
lot of views to life. I have this glass of water. Some would say that
it is half empty. I prefer to look at it as half full.
I do not know that any of us totally have an exact definition of what
bipartisanship is. This is an up-or-down vote. This is not a Republican
or a Democrat issue. We are either for free and fair trade and giving
the President the authority to enter bilateral agreements or we are
not. That is what that rule is about, to bring the bill to the floor
and vote it up or down.
I look at it as bipartisanship, the same way I look at this half full
glass of water that is on this table. There are six sponsors, three
Democrats, three Republicans. About as bipartisan as I have seen
anything be around here, with the gentleman from California (Mr.
Dreier), the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas), the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Crane), the gentleman from California (Mr. Dooley), the
gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson), and the gentleman from
Tennessee (Mr. Tanner).
I hope that the Members, as they come and listen to this debate and
as they cast their vote, will see that it is, once and for all, a
simple rule that gives us the opportunity to vote for a decision to
give the promotion authority to the President and have free and fair
trade or we do not.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Diaz-Balart), a member of the Committee on Rules.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from New York for
yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, this is a crucial moment, a crossroad for democracy in
the Western Hemisphere. I recognize that there are legitimate concerns
anytime Congress cedes authority granted to it by the Constitution. I,
in fact, opposed granting President Clinton this authority. I did not
trust him. But I trust President Bush. I voted last night in the House
Committee on Rules to grant the President Trade Promotion Authority,
and I will do so today as well on the House floor.
We have a unique opportunity to strengthen democracy in the Western
Hemisphere. Nations in this hemisphere are facing numerous challenges
that threaten their fledgling democracies, including narco-trafficking
and terrorism. One of the surest ways to support democracy in our
hemisphere is by facilitating the emergence of a common market of the
Americas, the free trade area of the Americas, the FTAA. I strongly
support free trade among free peoples; free trade among free peoples is
good economically and it is ethical.
An FTAA that incorporates a strong, enforceable democracy requirement
is the best hope for protecting unstable democracies and for exporting
it to where tyranny now reins.
The European Community, now the European Union, insisted on democracy
as a requirement for membership, and that contributed directly and
effectively to the democratization of Spain and Portugal after the
deaths of dictators Francisco Franco and Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in
the decade of the 1970s.
The Declaration of Quebec City of April 2001, from the most recent
Summit of the Americas, the process, Mr. Speaker, leading to the FTAA,
made a similar commitment to democracy: The maintenance and
strengthening of the rule of law and strict respect for the democratic
system are, at the same time, a goal and a shared commitment and are an
essential condition of our presence at this and future summits, all of
the democratically elected heads of State in the hemisphere stated in
April in Quebec. Consequently, disruption of the democratic order in a
state of the Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the
participation of that state's government in the Summit of the Americas
process.''
{time} 1230
The Summit of the Americas process is clearly headed in the right
direction, but strong leadership by the United States is needed to make
democracy in the entire hemisphere a permanent reality. Without Trade
Promotion Authority, President Bush would not be able to achieve an
FTAA with a strong democracy requirement. Accordingly, it is crucial
that we pass Trade Promotion Authority for the President today.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I remind the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Diaz-Balart)
that certainly he remembers after NAFTA we lost considerable jobs in
the State of Florida; and with the Free Trade Area of the Americas
agreement, the likelihood is that can occur again.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Levin).
(Mr. LEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, the notion that the U.S. has been standing
still in trade is nonsense. Africa, CBI, Jordan, China, NTR, Cambodia,
in the last few years, indeed, globalization is here to stay. The main
issue today is not free trade versus protectionism. That is an old
label for a new bottle of issues.
This is primarily a debate among supporters of expanding trade,
whether to shape trade policy to maximize its benefits and minimize its
losses. Supporters of the Thomas bill believe no. Essentially more
trade is always better whatever the term, so they are comfortable with
providing vague negotiating objectives, running away from issues like
labor and the environment and leaving Congress in essentially the role
of a consultant.
This is not time for a one-dimensional approach. It is a new world,
new nations, expanding issues. For example, on core labor standards,
the Rangel approach is clear and effective, a principal negotiating
objective, increasingly enforcing ILO core labor standards. Thomas,
each nation is essentially left on its own no matter how inadequate its
laws. And the manager's amendment that was suddenly introduced last
night only makes it worse, leaving a weak provision essentially
powerless in its enforcement.
On investment, the Rangel bill is clear and unambiguous. No greater
rights for foreign investors. The Thomas bill dances around this issue.
Then on the role of Congress, those of us who see the need to shape
trade want to ensure an active and ongoing role for Congress. This is a
necessary corollary of the fact that trade is more important than ever.
The Thomas bill only enhances the role of Congress as a consultant,
tracking the Archer-Crane language of 3 years ago.
The manager's amendment tried to beef this up by saying any Member
can put forth a resolution to withdraw Fast Track; but it only reaches
the floor if it goes through the Committee on Ways and Means and the
Committee on Rules.
In this and so many other ways, the Thomas bill sometimes talks the
talk, but does not walk the walk. We can and must do better: expand and
shape trade. Fast Track authority is a major delegation of authority.
We should do it the right way. Thomas does not do
[[Page H8976]]
so. Rangel does. Vote ``yes'' on Rangel and vote ``no'' on Thomas.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Keller).
Mr. KELLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, and this is why: 95 percent
of the world's population is outside of the United States. It is
critical that we give the President the tools he needs to open up
markets all across the world for our goods and services. By increasing
America's export markets, we will increase the number of high-paying
high-tech jobs in the United States.
A good example of that is the Recoton Corporation in central Florida,
which is the Nation's largest consumer electronics manufacturer in the
area of car stereo speakers. Recoton's president, Mr. Bob Borchardt, is
also the chairman of the Electronics Industry Alliance.
Mr. Borchardt tells me that only 10 percent of his company's sales
are outside of North America, and that passing Trade Promotion
Authority will help open up foreign markets and will result in his
company creating many new jobs in central Florida.
Mr. Speaker, now is not the time to isolate America. Let us pass TPA
and give our economy a much-needed boost.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Wu).
(Mr. WU asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. WU. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a former technology and trade
attorney. I have negotiated international trade agreements. I am in
favor of international trade, and we do need to build a stable
consensus in favor of international trade. But from my personal
experience, I know that there are winners and there are losers in
trade; and we must work to ensure, to ensure, that this rising tide of
international trade truly lifts all boats instead of leaving some
behind. This requires meaningful protection of the environment, of
labor rights, and most importantly to me, of human rights. This bill,
the Thomas bill, does not do so. I reluctantly oppose the bill.
Mr. Speaker, we proposed amendments to improve this bill last night.
They were all rejected by the Committee on Rules. Therefore, I strongly
oppose the rule under which this bill is considered.
With respect to the environment, I call Members' attention to page
18, section 2(b)(11)(B) of this bill. It constitutes a huge loophole.
This bill is literally a Trojan horse with respect to the environment.
There is no meaningful protection for the environment in this bill. The
manager's amendment exacerbates this problem, and I quote from the
manager's amendments, ``No retaliation may be authorized based on labor
standards and levels of environmental protection.'' I think the
language speaks for itself. This bill is a Trojan horse with respect to
the environment.
With respect to some other basic rights, such as Americans knowing
what they eat, I call Members' attention to page 14, section
2(b)(10)(viii)(II). This takes away our right to know what we eat. The
amendment that the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Bono) passed
earlier this year would be eviscerated by this particular provision.
The chairman would undoubtedly say it would be based on good science. I
think this would be the kind of science that we get from the cigarette
companies who have yet to find a real scientific link between cancer
and smoking.
Finally, my core issue of human rights. Who will speak for those who
are in jail or who are intimidated into silence if we do not? There are
temporary trade advantages in suppressing human rights. Mussolini made
the trains run on time, and making the trains run on time can
temporarily benefit an economy. But in the long term, democracy and
human rights are both good for individuals and they are good for
business because complex societies, it is like geology when tectonic
plates come against each other: that energy can be released in little
earthquakes that are barely felt. We call those elections. Or we can
permit those plates to lock up and have cataclysmic earthquakes. We
call those revolutions. Revolutions are always bad for business.
Good human rights is good business for the long term, but there are
temporary advantages to be had by the suppression of human rights. When
we have a bill which promotes trade and protects human rights, I will
support that bill. That day is not today.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Illinois (Mrs. Biggert), who has worked diligently to help make this
legislation come before the House.
Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule on H.R. 3005
to grant Trade Promotion Authority. Few are the occasions on which
Members of this body have the opportunity to shape the course of our
long-term economic future as we have on this TPA vote today.
Without TPA, America will be forced onto the sidelines, watching as
other nations form agreements which shut our products and services out
of the most promising new markets. Without TPA, America will see its
role as world leader transformed into world follower. Even our most
innovative and successful companies will find themselves making a back
seat to foreign competitors.
What is at stake here are the lives and livelihoods of current and
future generations of American workers. Their productivity and
creativity are second to none, and yet second to all this is what we
will be if we tie the hands of our President. Let us untie the hands of
the President, allowing his negotiators to bring home the best deals
for America. I urge Members to support the rule and TPA.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell).
Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, this is a very critical issue. We are
arguing the rule. I want both sides to know these are the rules of the
Constitution of the United States. Article 1 section 8 is very clear.
In the last 20 years this Congress has given up its powers to the
executive branch of government. We have had folks on the other side
talk about it. It is very clear what article 1 section 8 says about
what our responsibilities are.
In the movie ``Thelma and Louise,'' Thelma turns to Louise and says,
``Don't settle.'' We are settling here. We are settling for an erosion
not only of the Constitution of the United States, an erosion of labor
rights, an erosion of environmental security, an erosion of our trade
imbalance which has risen to $435 billion, a $62 billion erosion
according to NAFTA itself. We are making a big mistake if we vote
``yes.''
This is not a question of to trade or not to trade; this is a
question of having the right rules at the right time. I ask Members to
read article 1 section 8. Did constituents send Members here to give up
their responsibility to the President of the United States on trade
issues? Then change the Constitution. Change the Constitution is my
recommendation if that is what Members wish to do.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, in listening to that debate, I would just reflect that
there was a time when the Nation could boast that we were the world
leader in shaping those rules for international trade and globalization
and open markets. Sadly, this is no longer the case.
In my opening remarks I also reflected that each President from
President Nixon to President Clinton had this authority, and that it
was important to look at giving our sitting President the same
authority, for the simple fact that while we would give the ability to
negotiate, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell) would know full
well that this Congress, and future Congresses, under its authority
that would be given to the President, would cast a vote for each and
every agreement as our Constitution protects, and any rules that may be
there. It is clear that this Congress will ratify any of those
agreements. The authority would allow the President to enter into those
bilateral agreements.
Mr. Speaker, we are behind. There are 130 regional trade agreements
in force today with only three in the United States. Mexico has 28. The
European Union has 27 with other countries. It is important that we
move forward to protect our jobs and grow our jobs and treat the
opportunity of the
[[Page H8977]]
global economy as the United States marketplace.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr.
Pence).
{time} 1245
Mr. PENCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman for his
leadership and for yielding me time, and rise in strong support of the
rule and of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act today.
Mr. Speaker, I believe the question before this House, and, in many
ways, before America today, is who do you trust? Do you trust the
shuttered version of America that says that we will keep our own rules
and we will keep to ourselves and we will maintain our place in the
world, or do you trust the American worker and do you trust the
American President at such a time as this?
Well, I stand today to say that I trust the American worker. The
great American companies, large and small, when given an opportunity to
compete in the world, not only, Mr. Speaker, do we compete, but we win,
and we win consistently.
We know in Indiana that trade means jobs, $1.5 billion from this
relatively small midwestern State in agricultural goods alone last
year, supporting 24,000 jobs on and off the farm. And it is not only
good for big business, as some on the other side might say. Ninety
percent of exports in this country come from companies with less than
500 employees, and for every $1 billion in increased exports, Mr.
Speaker, we create 20,000 new jobs here in America that pay an average
of 17 percent more than similar jobs in the domestic economy.
I trust the American worker to compete and to win. But I also rise
today to say that I trust the President. Along with more than 80
percent of the American people today, I trust President George W. Bush
to put America's interests first in the world, to put American jobs, to
put America's security, to put American agriculture, manufacturing,
steel, all of the rest on the international negotiating table first.
I believe this President, particularly this fall, has earned our
trust and earned our respect, and I urge all of my colleagues, trust
the American worker, trust the American President; vote yes on the rule
and the bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds to
remind the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence) that American workers
cannot buy food with trust and cannot pay mortgages with trust.
Certainly none of us distrust the President. I trust the American
worker, but the American worker has a problem having jobs under the
lack of consultation that we provide here.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished ranking member,
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Frost), a person that has done an
outstanding job not only on trade, but on the Committee on Rules, in
trying to provide fair and open rules for all the Members of this body.
Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
Mr. Speaker, since September 11, the world has watched this Nation,
from the President and the Congress to the U.S. military abroad and the
American people here at home, pull together to wage war on terrorism.
Unfortunately, America's desperately needed economic recovery has
been a different matter. Our economy has been in recession since March,
long before September 11, according to the experts. Millions and
millions of people are unemployed across the country. In the past few
months alone, hundreds of thousands of hard-working Americans have lost
their jobs.
Meanwhile, just months after Republicans passed budget-busting
trillion dollar tax breaks, the administration is now admitting that
the surplus it inherited is gone and America now faces years of growing
debt, threatening priorities from Social Security and Medicare to
homeland security and affordable health care.
How have Republican leaders responded to this problem? With billions
of dollars in tax breaks for big corporations, leaving just crumbs for
laid-off workers. And today, Mr. Speaker, Republican leaders are using
the House to play politics for the 2002 elections. Instead of helping
American workers, Republican leaders are trying to help their own fund-
raising.
Do not take my word for it, Mr. Speaker. The Chairman of the
Republican Campaign Committee spelled it out in the Washington Post a
few days ago. For Republican leaders, he said, this Fast Track bill is
about fund-raising. It does not matter, he bragged, whether this bill
passes or not. Just as long as they can use it to help the Republican
fund-raising, then they will be happy.
So Republican leaders have written a Fast Track bill that
shortchanges working Americans from coast to coast. They have written a
bill that does not protect the environment, and they have written a
bill that represents a dereliction of duty by Congress, an abdication
of our responsibility to protect the people we represent on issues from
food safety to telecommunications.
Mr. Speaker, Democratic leaders on trade fought valiantly for a
bipartisan approach that protects American workers. The gentleman from
New York (Mr. Rangel), the ranking member of the Committee on Ways and
Means, and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin), the ranking member
on the Subcommittee on Trade, tried over and over to work with
Republican leaders, but their overtures were rejected because
Republican leaders wanted a political issue, not a bipartisan bill. And
when the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) and the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Levin) wrote a Democratic substitute, Republican leaders
refused to even let the House vote on it. Thus, Mr. Speaker, did
Republican leaders drive a stake into any hope of bipartisanship on
trade. Indeed, there should be no doubt about how we got to this point.
Republican political gamesmanship has put Fast Track trade authority in
jeopardy.
Mr. Speaker, the American people deserve better. Reject this rule and
force Republican leaders to sit down and work with Democrats. That is
the only way Fast Track will ever get the broad bipartisan support it
needs, and it is the only way we will ever achieve fair and free trade
that benefits American workers.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cox).
Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York for
yielding me time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule, because I support lower
taxes on working Americans. Tariffs are essentially taxes that foreign
countries impose on our products. You pay them whenever you pay taxes
to support unemployment benefits for American workers, because foreign
taxes that discriminate against the United States' goods put American
workers out of work.
Millions more Americans could go to work in manufacturing and in
services if tariffs and trade barriers imposed by foreign countries
were reduced or eliminated. Of course, America's tariffs on foreign
goods and our trade barriers on goods and services are essentially zero
on most of what we consume in this country, so trade negotiations aimed
at reducing tariffs and trade barriers work strongly in our favor. They
mean big gains for American consumers and American workers.
There are many colleagues who have concerns about how future trade
agreements will address issues such as sovereignty, environmental and
labor protections, dumping and other unfair trade practices. But under
this legislation, Congress will get to vote on any final trade
agreement before it would become binding on the United States.
This legislation simply authorizes President Bush to negotiate in
America's behalf, an authority that Congress has granted to every
President from Nixon to Clinton.
Please vote ``aye'' on this rule to bring Trade Promotion Authority
to the floor, so that we can give President Bush and America a chance
to cut foreign taxes and help American workers and consumers.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute
to my very good friend, the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio).
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
Mr. Speaker, Fast Track trade authority is an extraordinary
concession of congressional authority in four critical areas to
regulate and oversee the
[[Page H8978]]
terms of trade. One vote, 62 pages, no amendments, 2 hours of debate.
Now, if the United States had a successful trade policy giving this
President, or any President, a blank check to perpetuate and expand
NAFTA into the FTAA and enhance the powers of WTO, well, that might
make some sense. But the current system is failing miserably. We are
not talking about that here on the floor today, are we?
Last year a record $435 billion trade deficit, 4.5 percent of our
GDP. Many economists say that is unsustainable. 1994 to 2000,
accelerated job loss due to trade. The current system discriminates
against American labor, reduces living wages, safe working conditions,
eviscerates environmental protections and consumer protections. But the
gentleman from New York would somehow say it is necessary to compete in
the world economy.
President Clinton negotiated 300 separate trade agreements: two under
Fast Track trade authority, 298 without it. And, unlike my colleague
from the other side who preceded me and said he opposed this under the
last President but will vote for it now, I am going to vote on policy
and principle, not politics and personalities. It was a bad idea for
President Clinton; it is a bad idea for George Bush.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
(Mr. KIRK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the rule and Trade
Promotion Authority. I wish that opponents of free trade had as much
faith in our workers as our military. As our forces fight and win in
Afghanistan, opponents of free trade say Americans cannot win in
business. Americans are not losers. We are winners, and we need only a
chance to compete to win.
TPA will also lower international import taxes on Americans. As we
start holiday shopping, we pay import taxes on backpacks, shoes and
other clothes for the kids. TPA lowers these taxes, and, in sum, will
put $1,300 in the pockets of American families.
If you like paying import taxes to other countries, vote against free
trade. If you think Americans can compete and win, support Trade
Promotion Authority for our President.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute
to my very good friend, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown), the former
Secretary of State of the State of Ohio.
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Florida for
yielding me time.
Mr. Speaker, 2 months ago Republican leadership and the gentleman
from California (Mr. Thomas) promised us if we voted for money for New
York City, then they would help unemployed workers. They never did.
Then Republican leadership and the gentleman from California (Mr.
Thomas) promised us if we bailed out the airlines, then they would help
unemployed workers. But they never did.
Then Republican leadership and the gentleman from California (Mr.
Thomas) promised if we passed the stimulus package and gave huge tax
cuts to the biggest corporations in America, then they would help
unemployed workers. But they never did.
Now the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) and Republican
leadership are promising us if we vote for Trade Promotion Authority,
then they will help unemployed workers.
Mr. Speaker, when will we ever learn?
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule and
in support of the underlying bill, but I do so only after a couple of
concerns that I have had with respect to our trade policy in this
country have been addressed. Those two concerns are trade issues
dealing with agriculture and trade issues dealing with the textile
industry.
American agriculture and the American textile industry have been the
whipping boys of previous trade agreements. We have been in difficult
times in agriculture all across this country, but I am very satisfied
with the language that has been put into this bill with respect to
American agriculture and how our farmers are going to be treated. That
language says that the House Committee on Agriculture and the Senate
Committee on Agriculture are going to be direct participants in the
discussions about issues relating to agriculture with respect to future
trade agreements under this Trade Promotion Authority. That is the
first step in the right direction that we have seen for American
agriculture when it comes to trade in decades.
With respect to the textile industry, again, we have seen jobs moved
to the south, jobs that cannot be replaced in the American workplace.
We have never had the issue of textiles addressed in our trade
agreements in a positive manner, but yesterday at a meeting at the
White House, the President made a personal commitment that he is going
to be sure that the textile industry does get fair treatment in any
negotiated agreements from a trade perspective under this authority
that he is asking for.
That is all we can ask. If we do not have that, if we do not have
that, where is the American textile industry going today? It is going
to continue to go south, and we do not need that to happen.
We have had thousands of jobs in my great State lost, particularly in
my district, that have been lost over the last 7 to 10 years in the
textile industry. We cannot afford any more of that. The way we ensure
that does not continue to happen is that we have positive trade
agreements and provisions in those trade agreements that are positive
with respect to textiles and agriculture.
Mr. Speaker, I urge strong support of the rule and I urge support of
the underlying bill.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute
to the very thoughtful new Member of Congress, the gentlewoman from
Minnesota (Ms. McCollum).
Ms. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the rule.
Fast Track trade authority affects every single American, and they
probably do not even know it. We import millions of tons of food into
this country. That is a lot of food. In 1993, 8 percent of imported
fruits and vegetables were inspected.
{time} 1300
Since NAFTA, the number is now .7 percent. That is a 91 percent
decrease in the inspections of fruits and vegetables that our children
consume every day.
Minnesota families believe that meats, fruits and vegetables that
they buy comply with our food standards. In these trade agreements
there are no food standards; there are none. We buy strawberries and
grapes tainted with pesticides that are illegal to use in this country.
Congress passes food safety standards and the President's negotiators
trade those standards away because, in their eyes, food safety is a
barrier to free trade.
Mr. Speaker, this rule makes in order an up or down vote on Fast
Track legislation that would forfeit all of the authority of Congress
to directly participate in international trade agreements. Congress
needs careful, deliberate negotiations on future agreements, not a fast
track.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Frelinghuysen).
(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the rule
and of this bill.
Just to give my colleagues an idea of how driven and dependent our
national economy is on international trade, one need not look any
further than my home State of New Jersey. Last year, New Jersey posted
the eighth largest export total of any State in the Nation with a total
of $28.8 billion being sold in export merchandise. This is up more than
38 percent since 1997. Those exports are shipped globally to 204
countries around the world. Most importantly, out of New Jersey's 4.1
million member workforce, over 600,000 people statewide, from Main
Street to Fortune 500 companies, are employed because of exports,
imports, and because of foreign direct investment.
Agilent Technologies, a company in my congressional district,
recently wrote me in support of Trade Promotion Authority. They said,
``Multilateral trade initiatives important to
[[Page H8979]]
Agilent relating to tariff reductions, e-commerce, biotechnology and
international standard-setting are now beginning.''
Mr. Speaker, we need to participate. We need to support the rule, and
we need to support the bill.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/2\
minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
I rise to oppose this rule and to oppose Fast Track. I come from
Cleveland, a steel-producing community which is fighting valiantly to
save 3,200 steelworkers' jobs and to protect the benefits of tens of
thousands of retirees. But Fast Track is a barrier. Fast Track brought
us NAFTA. It prohibits amending trade agreements. We could not amend
NAFTA chapter 11, which grants corporate investors in all-NAFTA
countries the right to challenge any local, State, or Federal
regulations which those corporations say hurt their profits; and then
they are able to get penalty money from the taxpayers of this country.
The sovereign authority of all governments is at stake. Taxpayer
dollars are at stake, even when we stand up for our own rights.
A NAFTA case brought by a foreign-owned steel fabricator company is
trying to overturn. Get this, they are trying to overturn ``Buy
America'' laws that require using American steel in highway projects.
NAFTA allows foreign-owned companies to challenge our Constitution, our
Congress, our right to enact American laws. This would have a
catastrophic impact on steel workers, causing loss of U.S. jobs.
American taxpayers are financing the fight for democracy all over the
world, while our trade laws undermine our democracy here at home.
Vote against this rule and vote against Fast Track. Protect
democracy. Protect American jobs.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Arizona (Mr. Kolbe).
(Mr. KOLBE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule for
Fast Track consideration of Trade Promotion Authority. Mr. Speaker,
this is not about citrus, it is not about steel, it is not about food
inspection or any other product or any other service. It is about
whether or not we believe we should have enough confidence in the
President of the United States to go on the world stage with other
negotiators to implement the trade agenda that was launched at Doha.
Now, in Doha where they set the agenda for the next round of talks,
we got a set of negotiating issues that was extraordinarily favorable
for the United States. It is everything that we could hope for in terms
of what we want to accomplish in the next round of talks. Now we have
to move to the next step. We cannot complete that unless the President
has trade negotiating authority. We can never complete the talks, and
yet, we are on a fast track with this round of talks. No organization,
no country is going to put their best deals on the line if they think
they are going to be changed by the United States Congress. Management
and labor do not go into negotiations and then go back to their board
of directors and their membership to amend the agreement; they submit
it to them for a vote.
That is what we are talking about doing here with Fast Track. It is
not about whether or not we like the agreement, because we do not have
an agreement. The opportunity to consider that will come later.
One prominent Democrat from the Clinton administration, who would be
known to every Member of this body, just 2 nights ago at a dinner told
me that the framework legislation that is proposed here today goes much
further than President Clinton or President Gore would ever have been
able to offer. It goes a long way. It makes the environment and it
makes labor rights principal negotiating objectives to support those.
We need to have the confidence in our President to get this job done,
and we do not compromise our ability to say yes or to say no to any
agreement that is negotiated.
With the crisis that we face in the world, this is not the time to
say that our President should not be able to move forward to protect
American interests abroad, American economic interests. Agree to this.
Say yes to Trade Promotion Authority.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters), my very good friend.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for
yielding me this time.
I rise to oppose this rule and this bill. H.R. 3005 supports the
expansion of trade rules that allow pharmaceutical companies to
challenge countries that distribute essential medicines to people who
desperately need them. This bill would make it more difficult for
developing countries to make HIV-AIDS medicines available to people
with AIDS. Twenty-five million people are living with AIDS in Africa.
Our trade policy should not cost them their lives.
This bill would also make it more difficult for the United States to
respond to bioterrorist attacks. When the United States needed to
acquire a large supply of the antibiotic Cipro to respond to the recent
anthrax attacks, we knew that the health of the American people was
more important than the profits of pharmaceutical companies. We had to
get tough. The WTO could have ruled against us. Our trade policies
should preserve our ability to respond to bioterrorist attacks in the
future.
I offered an amendment to restore the rights of all countries to
protect public health and ensure access to essential medicines, but my
amendment was not made in order.
I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the rule and ``no'' on the
bill.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel), the distinguished ranking member
of the Committee on Ways and Means.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I say to my colleagues that we still have an
opportunity to do what the President would have us to do. Sure, he
wants Trade Promotion Authority, but he also wants bipartisanship. I
think it is good for the Congress. I think it is good for the country.
All of my colleagues know that we have not enjoyed this within the
Committee on Ways and Means. That is what the Committee on Rules is all
about.
The Committee on Rules is the legislative traffic cops. They can set
us straight. They can shatter the wounds of partisanship that have been
built up.
Since the attack on the United States of America, we have worked
together, not as Democrats and Republicans, but as a united Congress.
They can reject this rule and send us back to the table. They can tell
the Committee on Ways and Means to have open negotiations. They can say
that the Democratic ideas are just as patriotic, just as sincere, and
that we support the war against terrorism the same as Republicans. If
they do not do that, if they do not give us an opportunity to be heard.
What they are saying is, it is our way or it is the highway.
I do not think it is fair. We have a stimulation package that we are
working on, and we are trying to give the President what he wants in
order to spur the economy. We are not supposed to do it as Republicans
and Democrats; we are supposed to come together as responsible Members
of Congress.
So I ask my colleagues to vote against this rule. It is not well
thought out. It should not be just one-sided. Give us an opportunity to
work together and to bring a product to our colleagues; and if we
cannot do it, then at the very least, let there be an alternative for
Members to vote for.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Linder), a member of the Committee on Rules.
(Mr. LINDER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LINDER. Mr. Speaker, I have a whole raft of information from my
staff talking about the benefits of trade and the economy, on jobs; and
I will submit that for the Record. But let me just raise a confusing
question. Why in the world does this House want to take itself out of
the picture?
Absent TPA, we have no voice. The President negotiates with any
nation
[[Page H8980]]
in the world a trade agreement and brings it to the Senate as a treaty
for their approval or disapproval, amendment or no amendment. If it is
amended, it goes back to the other nation, and they have to negotiate a
second time. I would not blame any executive of another nation to not
want to deal with us, to have to go through two negotiations.
This House claims to be concerned about such things as labor and
environment and human rights. Failing to pass TPA takes us out of the
picture. We are silent. We have no voice.
Under TPA, the President can go to any nation, negotiate any
agreement, and bring it back to the House and the Senate for an up or
down vote. If we do not like the agreement, we can vote it down. If we
do not like the lack of consultation, defeat it. But at least keep us
in the game. Absent TPA, this House is silent.
Mr. Speaker, I do not understand how we are going to shape any future
agreement, have any consultative effect, if the President just chooses
to go to treaties and deals with the Senate. We need to get in the
ballgame. We have the lowest tariffs in the world. Reaching trade
agreements with other nations simply serves to lower their tariffs and
open markets for our companies to sell into the global economy. We need
to be in the global economy, where 95 percent of the citizens of the
world live, not here. I cannot understand why some would want to take
us out of the picture.
Mr. Speaker, the only voice the House has on any trade agreement is
if we pass authority for the President to reach agreements and bring
them back to us for up or down votes. I cannot imagine why anyone would
oppose this.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule. Today we have a
tremendous opportunity to stimulate the economy, secure jobs, uplift
the poor, improve wages, and prove our global competitiveness. With a
single vote, we can change the course of millions of lives.
America produces many of the highest quality services, the most
bountiful crops, and the most advanced technologies in the world.
Today, we have the opportunity to ensure that all of these are shared
with foreign nations.
Trade is also vital to our own national well-being and our economic
recovery. Nationwide, one in ten American jobs depends on exports.
These jobs are in a range of industries and service fields, and yet the
one consistency among them is that they pay more than jobs in non-
trading industries. According to the Department of Commerce, trade-
oriented industries pay one-third more--approximately $15,000 more per
employee--than non-trading industries.
Recent studies have further shown that if global trade barriers were
cut by one-third, the world economy would increase by more than $600
billion a year. Eliminating trade barriers altogether would increase
the global economy by nearly $2 trillion. The infusion of this much
capital into the world market would serve as an engine of economic
growth and improve the standard of living for all Americans.
Given the significance of trade to our economic future, it is
imperative that Congress pass trade promotion authority. TPA requires a
collaborative partnership between Congress and the President, and both
must actively participate in order to properly frame treaty
negotiations. In fact, TPA statutorily requires that the President
engage in frequent and substantive consultations with Congress before,
during, and throughout negotiations on a free trade agreement. These
consultations allow Congress to make clear its priorities and concerns,
and the President then incorporates such mandates into negotiations. In
return, Congress commits to an up or down vote on the treaty without
amendments. While some members will argue that our opportunity for
debate is stifled because of our inability to offer amendment, it is
worth noting that without TPA members of the House of Representatives
could neither vote on nor offer amendments to the treaty at all.
Clearly, TPA is justified, it is responsible, and it is needed--and
the time for TPA is now. Tariffs in the United States are among the
lowest in the world. However, we face severe restrictions when we ship
our goods overseas. In fact, while the average U.S. tariff is 4.8
percent, American goods are subject to tariffs of 11 percent in Chile,
13.5 percent in Argentina, 14.6 percent in Brazil, and a staggering
45.6 percent in Thailand.
To give you one example of the anti-competitiveness of foreign
tariffs, we can look at a Caterpillar tractor. If that tractor is made
in the U.S. and it shipped to Chile, it faces nearly $15,000 in tariffs
and duties. If that tractor is made in Canada and is then shipped to
Chile, the tariff and duties are zero. Clearly, reducing foreign
tariffs is critical to ensuring that companies continue to build their
factories in the U.S. And TPA is the greatest tool at our disposal for
leveling the playing field to provide U.S. businesses access to the
world's populations.
I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for the rule and H.R. 3005.
This bill will help American regain its competitiveness, enabling the
rebirth of prosperity and economic security.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Houston, Texas (Mr. Green), my very good friend.
Mr. GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to both the
rule and H.R. 3005, the legislation granting the President Fast Track
Authority.
This is not the time to allow more countries greater access to our
domestic markets. We need much tighter controls at our borders, and we
need to let the global economy recover before we even begin considering
opening our doors to even further trade expansion.
Foreign countries experiencing an economic slowdown always view the
United States as a place to dump their excess goods. Japan, Russia, and
South American countries have devastated our domestic steel industry
through dumping. This illegal trade practice eliminates the thousands
of high-paying American jobs tied directly to the steel industry and
the thousands who support it.
In addition, the House of Representatives has done nothing to help
the thousands of displaced travel, tourism, and hospitality workers who
lost their jobs as a result of September 11. Increased foreign trade
automatically means a loss in good blue collar jobs which means our
constituents' jobs will be on the line today.
The House of Representatives has a spotty record in protecting
displaced workers, especially from the textile, agriculture, and auto
industries as a result of NAFTA; and that is why I oppose both the rule
and the bill.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining
time.
Mr. Speaker, I keep hearing my colleagues talk about, come back and
have an up or down vote. What part of procedural versus substantive
consultation do they not understand? As a matter of fact, what part of
``deficit'' do they not understand as it pertains to our trade policy?
We have not had time, because they did not give us time; and last night
I asked for an additional 2 hours and was denied that time. We have not
had time to talk about the fact that antitrust laws are going to change
without any consultation and without any input from Members of this
body.
{time} 1315
We have not had time to talk about the sovereignty issues, and I hope
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) and his committee can get to
that issue because it is critical.
It is clear from this bill, the underlying bill, that foreign
investors have an advantage over domestic persons in the United States,
and the tribunals are held in secret. As a former judge, I cannot abide
that. I must have my colleagues understand that it would be
inappropriate to take American property in a secret forum, and that is
what this measure permits. It does not permit that the United States
Trade Representative come before us.
I ask my colleagues, please, vote against this rule and vote against
the underlying bill.
Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I have heard today we should continue debating the bill,
stall, or put it off; what is fair, unfair; water it down, pick it
apart, and confuse the facts.
Mr. Speaker, the world is not waiting while the United States putters
along. Trade Promotion Authority offers the best chance for the United
States to reclaim its leadership in opening foreign markets, expanding
global economic opportunities for American producers and workers, and
developing the virtues of democracy around the world.
The prosperity and integrity of global democracies is at stake, and
it is incumbent upon us to pull into the fast lane in order to reap the
benefits of fair trade.
What we ask today is nothing new. Until its expiration in 1994, every
President from Richard Nixon through Bill Clinton has enjoyed the right
of Trade Promotion Authority. This President deserves that same right.
[[Page H8981]]
I strongly urge my colleagues to do the right thing for America:
Support this rule and the underlying legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the
previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The question is on the
resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the
ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a
quorum is not present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 224,
nays 202, not voting 7, as follows:
[Roll No. 479]
YEAS--224
Aderholt
Akin
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barr
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bereuter
Biggert
Bilirakis
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Boozman
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carson (OK)
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Coble
Collins
Combest
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dooley
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Everett
Ferguson
Flake
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Fossella
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goss
Graham
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Grucci
Gutknecht
Hansen
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Horn
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Issa
Istook
Jefferson
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kerns
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
Mica
Miller, Dan
Miller, Gary
Miller, Jeff
Moran (KS)
Morella
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Ortiz
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Paul
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reynolds
Riley
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schaffer
Schrock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Souder
Stearns
Stump
Sununu
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Traficant
Upton
Vitter
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins (OK)
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (FL)
NAYS--202
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Baca
Baird
Baldacci
Baldwin
Barcia
Barrett
Becerra
Bentsen
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson (IN)
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Ford
Frank
Frost
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green (TX)
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hill
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hoeffel
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
John
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Lucas (KY)
Luther
Lynch
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Mascara
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Mink
Mollohan
Moore
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Phelps
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott
Serrano
Sherman
Shows
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Strickland
Stupak
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thurman
Tierney
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Visclosky
Waters
Watson (CA)
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
NOT VOTING--7
Andrews
Hostettler
Meek (FL)
Quinn
Roemer
Roukema
Young (AK)
{time} 1342
Messrs. LUCAS of Kentucky, GUTIERREZ and EVANS changed their vote
from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the resolution was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated against:
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 479, the rule on Trade
Promotion Authority, I was detained on the Senate side attending an
education event. As a conferee on the elementary Secondary Education
Act, I was participating in a public forum advocating full funding for
children with disabilities. Had I been present, I would have voted
``nay.''
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 306, I call up
the bill (H.R. 3005) to extend trade authorities procedures with
respect to reciprocal trade agreements, and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
{time} 1345
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Pursuant to House Resolution
306, the bill is considered read for amendment.
The text of H.R. 3005 is as follows:
H.R. 3005
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND FINDINGS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
(b) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The expansion of international trade is vital to the
national security of the United States. Trade is critical to
the economic growth and strength of the United States and to
its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships
promote security and prosperity. Trade agreements today serve
the same purposes that security pacts played during the Cold
War, binding nations together through a series of mutual
rights and obligations. Leadership by the United States in
international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and
peace throughout the world.
(2) The national security of the United States depends on
its economic security, which in turn is founded upon a
vibrant and growing industrial base. Trade expansion has been
the engine of economic growth. Trade agreements maximize
opportunities for the critical sectors and building blocks of
the economy of the United States, such as information
technology, telecommunications and other leading
technologies, basic industries, capital equipment, medical
equipment, services, agriculture, environmental technology,
and intellectual property. Trade will create new
opportunities for the United States and preserve the
unparalleled strength of the United States in economic,
political, and military affairs. The United States, secured
by expanding trade and economic opportunities, will meet the
challenges of the twenty-first century.
SEC. 2. TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.
(a) Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives.--The overall
trade negotiating objectives of the United States for
agreements subject to the provisions of section 3 are--
(1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market
access;
(2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers and
distortions that are directly related to trade and that
decrease market opportunities for United States exports or
otherwise distort United States trade;
(3) to further strengthen the system of international
trading disciplines and procedures, including dispute
settlement;
(4) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, and
promote full employment in
[[Page H8982]]
the United States and to enhance the global economy;
(5) to ensure that trade and environmental policies are
mutually supportive and to seek to protect and preserve the
environment and enhance the international means of doing so,
while optimizing the use of the world's resources; and
(6) to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of
children consistent with core labor standards of the
International Labor Organization (as defined in section 9(2))
and an understanding of the relationship between trade and
worker rights.
(b) Principal Trade Negotiating Objectives.--
(1) Trade barriers and distortions.--The principal
negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade
barriers and other trade distortions are--
(A) to expand competitive market opportunities for United
States exports and to obtain fairer and more open conditions
of trade by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff
barriers and policies and practices of foreign governments
directly related to trade that decrease market opportunities
for United States exports or otherwise distort United States
trade; and
(B) to obtain reciprocal tariff and nontariff barrier
elimination agreements, with particular attention to those
tariff categories covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
(2) Trade in services.--The principal negotiating objective
of the United States regarding trade in services is to reduce
or eliminate barriers to international trade in services,
including regulatory and other barriers that deny national
treatment and market access or unreasonably restrict the
establishment or operations of service suppliers.
(3) Foreign investment.--The principal negotiating
objective of the United States regarding foreign investment
is to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting
barriers to trade-related foreign investment by--
(A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of
national treatment;
(B) freeing the transfer of funds relating to investments;
(C) reducing or eliminating performance requirements,
forced technology transfers, and other unreasonable barriers
to the establishment and operation of investments;
(D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and
compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States
legal principles and practice;
(E) providing meaningful procedures for resolving
investment disputes; and
(F) seeking to improve mechanisms used to resolve disputes
between an investor and a government through--
(i) mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims;
(ii) procedures to ensure the efficient selection of
arbitrators and the expeditious disposition of claims; and
(iii) procedures to increase transparency in investment
disputes.
(4) Intellectual property.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States regarding trade-related
intellectual property are--
(A) to further promote adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights, including through--
(i)(I) ensuring accelerated and full implementation of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)), particularly with
respect to meeting enforcement obligations under that
agreement; and
(II) ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or
bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual property
rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a
standard of protection similar to that found in United States
law;
(ii) providing strong protection for new and emerging
technologies and new methods of transmitting and distributing
products embodying intellectual property;
(iii) preventing or eliminating discrimination with respect
to matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope,
maintenance, use, and enforcement of intellectual property
rights;
(iv) ensuring that standards of protection and enforcement
keep pace with technological developments, and in particular
ensuring that rightholders have the legal and technological
means to control the use of their works through the Internet
and other global communication media, and to prevent the
unauthorized use of their works; and
(v) providing strong enforcement of intellectual property
rights, including through accessible, expeditious, and
effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement
mechanisms; and
(B) to secure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory market
access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon
intellectual property protection.
(5) Transparency.--The principal negotiating objective of
the United States with respect to transparency is to obtain
wider and broader application of the principle of
transparency through--
(A) increased and more timely public access to information
regarding trade issues and the activities of international
trade institutions;
(B) increased openness at the WTO and other international
trade fora by increasing public access to appropriate
meetings, proceedings, and submissions, including with regard
to dispute settlement and investment; and
(C) increased and more timely public access to all
notifications and supporting documentation submitted by
parties to the WTO.
(6) Improvement of the wto and multilateral trade
agreements.--The principal negotiating objectives of the
United States regarding the improvement of the World Trade
Organization, the Uruguay Round Agreements, and other
multilateral and bilateral trade agreements are--
(A) to achieve full implementation and extend the coverage
of the World Trade Organization and such agreements to
products, sectors, and conditions of trade not adequately
covered; and
(B) to expand country participation in and enhancement of
the Information Technology Agreement and other trade
agreements.
(7) Regulatory practices.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States regarding the use of
government regulation or other practices by foreign
governments to provide a competitive advantage to their
domestic producers, service providers, or investors and
thereby reduce market access for United States goods,
services, and investments are--
(A) to achieve increased transparency and opportunity for
the participation of affected parties in the development of
regulations;
(B) to require that proposed regulations be based on sound
science, cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, or other
objective evidence;
(C) to establish consultative mechanisms among parties to
trade agreements to promote increased transparency in
developing guidelines, rules, regulations, and laws for
government procurement and other regulatory regimes; and
(D) to achieve the elimination of government measures such
as price controls and reference pricing which deny full
market access for United States products.
(8) Electronic commerce.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to electronic
commerce are--
(A) to ensure that current obligations, rules, disciplines,
and commitments under the World Trade Organization apply to
electronic commerce;
(B) to ensure that--
(i) electronically delivered goods and services receive no
less favorable treatment under trade rules and commitments
than like products delivered in physical form; and
(ii) the classification of such goods and services ensures
the most liberal trade treatment possible;
(C) to ensure that governments refrain from implementing
trade-related measures that impede electronic commerce;
(D) where legitimate policy objectives require domestic
regulations that affect electronic commerce, to obtain
commitments that any such regulations are the least
restrictive on trade, nondiscriminatory, and transparent, and
promote an open market environment; and
(E) to extend the moratorium of the World Trade
Organization on duties on electronic transmissions.
(9) Reciprocal trade in agriculture.--(A) The principal
negotiating objective of the United States with respect to
agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United
States exports of agricultural commodities in foreign markets
substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities
afforded foreign exports in United States markets and to
achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in bulk,
specialty crop, and value-added commodities by--
(i) reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or
other charges that decrease market opportunities for United
States exports--
(I) giving priority to those products that are subject to
significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of major
producing countries; and
(II) providing reasonable adjustment periods for United
States import-sensitive products, in close consultation with
the Congress on such products before initiating tariff
reduction negotiations;
(ii) reducing tariffs to levels that are the same as or
lower than those in the United States;
(iii) reducing or eliminating subsidies that decrease
market opportunities for United States exports or unfairly
distort agriculture markets to the detriment of the United
States;
(iv) allowing the preservation of programs that support
family farms and rural communities but do not distort trade;
(v) developing disciplines for domestic support programs,
so that production that is in excess of domestic food
security needs is sold at world prices;
(vi) eliminating Government policies that create price-
depressing surpluses;
(vii) eliminating state trading enterprises whenever
possible;
(viii) developing, strengthening, and clarifying rules and
effective dispute settlement mechanisms to eliminate
practices that unfairly decrease United States market access
opportunities or distort agricultural markets to the
detriment of the United States, particularly with respect to
import-sensitive products, including--
(I) unfair or trade-distorting activities of state trading
enterprises and other administrative mechanisms, with
emphasis on requiring price transparency in the operation of
state trading enterprises and such other
[[Page H8983]]
mechanisms in order to end cross subsidization, price
discrimination, and price undercutting;
(II) unjustified trade restrictions or commercial
requirements, such as labeling, that affect new technologies,
including biotechnology;
(III) unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions,
including those not based on scientific principles in
contravention of the Uruguay Round Agreements;
(IV) other unjustified technical barriers to trade; and
(V) restrictive rules in the administration of tariff rate
quotas;
(ix) eliminating practices that adversely affect trade in
perishable or cyclical products, while improving import
relief mechanisms to recognize the unique characteristics of
perishable and cyclical agriculture;
(x) ensuring that the use of import relief mechanisms for
perishable and cyclical agriculture are as accessible and
timely to growers in the United States as those mechanisms
that are used by other countries;
(xi) taking into account whether a party to the
negotiations has failed to adhere to the provisions of
already existing trade agreements with the United States or
has circumvented obligations under those agreements;
(xii) taking into account whether a product is subject to
market distortions by reason of a failure of a major
producing country to adhere to the provisions of already
existing trade agreements with the United States or by the
circumvention by that country of its obligations under those
agreements;
(xiii) otherwise ensuring that countries that accede to the
World Trade Organization have made meaningful market
liberalization commitments in agriculture;
(xiv) taking into account the impact that agreements
covering agriculture to which the United States is a party,
including the North American Free Trade Agreement, have on
the United States agricultural industry; and
(xv) maintaining bona fide food assistance programs and
preserving United States market development and export credit
programs.
(B)(i) Before commencing negotiations with respect to
agriculture, the United States Trade Representative, in
consultation with the Congress, shall seek to develop a
position on the treatment of seasonal and perishable
agricultural products to be employed in the negotiations
in order to develop an international consensus on the
treatment of seasonal or perishable agricultural products
in investigations relating to dumping and safeguards and
in any other relevant area.
(ii) During any negotiations on agricultural subsidies, the
United States Trade Representative shall seek to establish
the common base year for calculating the Aggregated
Measurement of Support (as defined in the Agreement on
Agriculture) as the end of each country's Uruguay Round
implementation period, as reported in each country's Uruguay
Round market access schedule.
(iii) The negotiating objective provided in subparagraph
(A) applies with respect to agricultural matters to be
addressed in any trade agreement entered into under section
3(a) or (b), including any trade agreement entered into under
section 3(a) or (b) that provides for accession to a trade
agreement to which the United States is already a party, such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
(10) Labor and the environment.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to labor and the
environment are--
(A) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the
United States does not fail to effectively enforce its
environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade
between the United States and that party after entry into
force of a trade agreement between those countries;
(B) to recognize that parties to a trade agreement retain
the right to exercise discretion with respect to
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance
matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of
resources to enforcement with respect to other labor or
environmental matters determined to have higher priorities,
and to recognize that a country is effectively enforcing its
laws if a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable
exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide
decision regarding the allocation of resources;
(C) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading
partners to promote respect for core labor standards (as
defined in section 9(2));
(D) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading
partners to protect the environment through the promotion of
sustainable development;
(E) to reduce or eliminate government practices or policies
that unduly threaten sustainable development;
(F) to seek market access, through the elimination of
tariffs and nontariff barriers, for United States
environmental technologies, goods, and services; and
(G) to ensure that labor, environmental, health, or safety
policies and practices of the parties to trade agreements
with the United States do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminate against United States exports or serve as
disguised barriers to trade.
(11) Dispute settlement and enforcement.--The principal
negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to
dispute settlement and enforcement of trade agreements are--
(A) to seek provisions in trade agreements providing for
resolution of disputes between governments under those trade
agreements in an effective, timely, transparent, equitable,
and reasoned manner, requiring determinations based on facts
and the principles of the agreements, with the goal of
increasing compliance with the agreements;
(B) to seek to strengthen the capacity of the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism of the World Trade Organization to review
compliance with commitments;
(C) to seek provisions encouraging the early identification
and settlement of disputes through consultation;
(D) to seek provisions to encourage the provision of trade-
expanding compensation if a party to a dispute under the
agreement does not come into compliance with its obligations
under the agreement;
(E) to seek provisions to impose a penalty upon a party to
a dispute under the agreement that--
(i) encourages compliance with the obligations of the
agreement;
(ii) is appropriate to the parties, nature, subject matter,
and scope of the violation; and
(iii) has the aim of not adversely affecting parties or
interests not party to the dispute while maintaining the
effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism; and
(F) to seek provisions that treat United States principal
negotiating objectives equally with respect to--
(i) the ability to resort to dispute settlement under the
applicable agreement;
(ii) the availability of equivalent dispute settlement
procedures; and
(iii) the availability of equivalent remedies.
(12) WTO extended negotiations.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States regarding trade in civil
aircraft are those set forth in section 135(c) of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3355(c)) and regarding rules
of origin are the conclusion of an agreement described in
section 132 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 3552).
(c) Promotion of Certain Priorities.--In order to address
and maintain United States competitiveness in the global
economy, the President shall--
(1) seek greater cooperation between the WTO and the ILO;
(2) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties
to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United
States trading partners to promote respect for core labor
standards (as defined in section 9(2)), and report to the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on the content and
operation of such mechanisms;
(3) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties
to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United
States trading partners to develop and implement standards
for the protection of the environment and human health based
on sound science, and report to the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate on the content and operation of such
mechanisms;
(4) conduct environmental reviews of future trade and
investment agreements, consistent with Executive Order 13141
of November 16, 1999 and its relevant guidelines, and report
to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on
such reviews;
(5) review the impact of future trade agreements on United
States employment, modeled after Executive Order 13141, and
report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on
such review;
(6) take into account other legitimate United States
domestic objectives including, but not limited to, the
protection of legitimate health or safety, essential
security, and consumer interests and the law and regulations
related thereto;
(7) have the Secretary of Labor consult with any country
seeking a trade agreement with the United States concerning
that country's labor laws and provide technical assistance to
that country if needed;
(8) with respect to any trade agreement which the President
seeks to implement under trade authorities procedures, submit
to the Congress a report describing the extent to which the
country or countries that are parties to the agreement have
in effect laws governing exploitative child labor;
(9) preserve the ability of the United States to enforce
rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws, and avoid agreements which lessen
the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines
on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, in order
to ensure that United States workers, agricultural producers,
and firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the
benefits of reciprocal trade concessions;
(10) continue to promote consideration of multilateral
environmental agreements and consult with parties to such
agreements regarding the consistency of any such agreement
that includes trade measures with existing environmental
exceptions under Article XX of the GATT 1994; and
(11) report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the
Senate, not
[[Page H8984]]
later than 12 months after the imposition of a penalty or
remedy by the United States permitted by a trade agreement to
which this Act applies, on the effectiveness of the penalty
or remedy applied under United States law in enforcing United
States rights under the trade agreement.
The report under paragraph (11) shall address whether the
penalty or remedy was effective in changing the behavior of
the targeted party and whether the penalty or remedy had any
adverse impact on parties or interests not party to the
dispute.
(d) Consultations.--
(1) Consultations with congressional advisers.--In the
course of negotiations conducted under this Act, the United
States Trade Representative shall consult closely and on a
timely basis with, and keep fully apprised of the
negotiations, the Congressional Oversight Group convened
under section 7 and all committees of the House of
Representatives and the Senate with jurisdiction over laws
that would be affected by a trade agreement resulting from
the negotiations.
(2) Consultation before agreement initialed.--In the course
of negotiations conducted under this Act, the United States
Trade Representative shall--
(A) consult closely and on a timely basis (including
immediately before initialing an agreement) with, and keep
fully apprised of the negotiations, the congressional
advisers for trade policy and negotiations appointed under
section 161 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2211), the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives,
the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Congressional
Oversight Group convened under section 7; and
(B) with regard to any negotiations and agreement relating
to agricultural trade, also consult closely and on a timely
basis (including immediately before initialing an agreement)
with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the
Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the
Senate.
(e) Adherence to Obligations Under Uruguay Round
Agreements.--In determining whether to enter into
negotiations with a particular country, the President shall
take into account the extent to which that country has
implemented, or has accelerated the implementation of, its
obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.
SEC. 3. TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY.
(a) Agreements Regarding Tariff Barriers.--
(1) In general.--Whenever the President determines that one
or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any
foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and
restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that
the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this
Act will be promoted thereby, the President--
(A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries
before--
(i) June 1, 2005; or
(ii) June 1, 2007, if trade authorities procedures are
extended under subsection (c); and
(B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), proclaim--
(i) such modification or continuance of any existing duty,
(ii) such continuance of existing duty-free or excise
treatment, or
(iii) such additional duties,
as the President determines to be required or appropriate to
carry out any such trade agreement.
The President shall notify the Congress of the President's
intention to enter into an agreement under this subsection.
(2) Limitations.--No proclamation may be made under
paragraph (1) that--
(A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate of duty
that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem on the date of the
enactment of this Act) to a rate of duty which is less than
50 percent of the rate of such duty that applies on such date
of enactment; or
(B) increases any rate of duty above the rate that applied
on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) Aggregate reduction; exemption from staging.--
(A) Aggregate reduction.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), the aggregate reduction in the rate of duty
on any article which is in effect on any day pursuant to a
trade agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall not
exceed the aggregate reduction which would have been in
effect on such day if--
(i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem or a reduction of
one-tenth of the total reduction, whichever is greater, had
taken effect on the effective date of the first reduction
proclaimed under paragraph (1) to carry out such agreement
with respect to such article; and
(ii) a reduction equal to the amount applicable under
clause (i) had taken effect at 1-year intervals after the
effective date of such first reduction.
(B) Exemption from staging.--No staging is required under
subparagraph (A) with respect to a duty reduction that is
proclaimed under paragraph (1) for an article of a kind that
is not produced in the United States. The United States
International Trade Commission shall advise the President of
the identity of articles that may be exempted from staging
under this subparagraph.
(4) Rounding.--If the President determines that such action
will simplify the computation of reductions under paragraph
(3), the President may round an annual reduction by an amount
equal to the lesser of--
(A) the difference between the reduction without regard to
this paragraph and the next lower whole number; or
(B) one-half of 1 percent ad valorem.
(5) Other limitations.--A rate of duty reduction that may
not be proclaimed by reason of paragraph (2) may take effect
only if a provision authorizing such reduction is included
within an implementing bill provided for under section 5 and
that bill is enacted into law.
(6) Other tariff modifications.--Notwithstanding paragraphs
(1)(B) and (2) through (5), and subject to the consultation
and layover requirements of section 115 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, the President may proclaim the modification
of any duty or staged rate reduction of any duty set forth in
Schedule XX, as defined in section 2(5) of that Act, if the
United States agrees to such modification or staged rate
reduction in a negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or
harmonization of duties under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization.
(7) Authority under uruguay round agreements act not
affected.--Nothing in this subsection shall limit the
authority provided to the President under section 111(b) of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
(b) Agreements Regarding Tariff and Nontariff Barriers.--
(1) In general.--(A) Whenever the President determines
that--
(i) one or more existing duties or any other import
restriction of any foreign country or the United States or
any other barrier to, or other distortion of, international
trade unduly burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the
United States or adversely affects the United States economy;
or
(ii) the imposition of any such barrier or distortion is
likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or effect;
and that the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives
of this Act will be promoted thereby, the President may enter
into a trade agreement described in subparagraph (B) during
the period described in subparagraph (C).
(B) The President may enter into a trade agreement under
subparagraph (A) with foreign countries providing for--
(i) the reduction or elimination of a duty, restriction,
barrier, or other distortion described in subparagraph (A),
or
(ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on the imposition
of, such barrier or other distortion.
(C) The President may enter into a trade agreement under
this paragraph before--
(i) June 1, 2005; or
(ii) June 1, 2007, if trade authorities procedures are
extended under subsection (c).
(2) Conditions.--A trade agreement may be entered into
under this subsection only if such agreement makes progress
in meeting the applicable objectives described in section
2(a) and (b) and the President satisfies the conditions set
forth in section 4.
(3) Bills qualifying for trade authorities procedures.--(A)
The provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (in
this Act referred to as ``trade authorities procedures'')
apply to a bill of either House of Congress which contains
provisions described in subparagraph (B) to the same extent
as such section 151 applies to implementing bills under that
section. A bill to which this paragraph applies shall
hereafter in this Act be referred to as an ``implementing
bill''.
(B) The provisions referred to in subparagraph (A) are--
(i) a provision approving a trade agreement entered into
under this subsection and approving the statement of
administrative action, if any, proposed to implement such
trade agreement; and
(ii) if changes in existing laws or new statutory authority
are required to implement such trade agreement or agreements,
provisions, necessary or appropriate to implement such trade
agreement or agreements, either repealing or amending
existing laws or providing new statutory authority.
(c) Extension Disapproval Process for Congressional Trade
Authorities Procedures.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in section 5(b)--
(A) the trade authorities procedures apply to implementing
bills submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into
under subsection (b) before July 1, 2005; and
(B) the trade authorities procedures shall be extended to
implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements
entered into under subsection (b) after June 30, 2005, and
before July 1, 2007, if (and only if)--
(i) the President requests such extension under paragraph
(2); and
(ii) neither House of the Congress adopts an extension
disapproval resolution under paragraph (5) before June 1,
2005.
(2) Report to congress by the president.--If the President
is of the opinion that the trade authorities procedures
should be extended to implementing bills described in
paragraph (1)(B), the President shall submit to the Congress,
not later than March 1, 2005, a written report that contains
a request for such extension, together with--
(A) a description of all trade agreements that have been
negotiated under subsection (b) and the anticipated schedule
for submitting such agreements to the Congress for approval;
(B) a description of the progress that has been made in
negotiations to achieve the
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purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this Act,
and a statement that such progress justifies the continuation
of negotiations; and
(C) a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed
to complete the negotiations.
(3) Report to congress by the advisory committee.--The
President shall promptly inform the Advisory Committee for
Trade Policy and Negotiations established under section 135
of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) of the President's
decision to submit a report to the Congress under paragraph
(2). The Advisory Committee shall submit to the Congress as
soon as practicable, but not later than May 1, 2005, a
written report that contains--
(A) its views regarding the progress that has been made in
negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, priorities,
and objectives of this Act; and
(B) a statement of its views, and the reasons therefor,
regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2)
should be approved or disapproved.
(4) Status of reports.--The reports submitted to the
Congress under paragraphs (2) and (3), or any portion of such
reports, may be classified to the extent the President
determines appropriate.
(5) Extension disapproval resolutions.--(A) For purposes of
paragraph (1), the term ``extension disapproval resolution''
means a resolution of either House of the Congress, the sole
matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows:
``That the ____ disapproves the request of the President for
the extension, under section 3(c)(1)(B)(i) of the Trade
Promotion Authority Act of 2001, of the trade authorities
procedures under that Act to any implementing bill submitted
with respect to any trade agreement entered into under
section 3(b) of that Act after June 30, 2005.'', with the
blank space being filled with the name of the resolving House
of the Congress.
(B) Extension disapproval resolutions--
(i) may be introduced in either House of the Congress by
any member of such House; and
(ii) shall be referred, in the House of Representatives, to
the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the
Committee on Rules.
(C) The provisions of sections 152(d) and (e) of the Trade
Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the
floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and
Senate) apply to extension disapproval resolutions.
(D) It is not in order for--
(i) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval
resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance;
(ii) the House of Representatives to consider any extension
disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways
and Means and, in addition, by the Committee on Rules; or
(iii) either House of the Congress to consider an extension
disapproval resolution after June 30, 2005.
(d) Commencement of Negotiations.--In order to contribute
to the continued economic expansion of the United States, the
President shall commence negotiations covering tariff and
nontariff barriers affecting any industry, product, or
service sector, and expand existing sectoral agreements to
countries that are not parties to those agreements, in cases
where the President determines that such negotiations are
feasible and timely and would benefit the United States. Such
sectors include agriculture, commercial services,
intellectual property rights, industrial and capital goods,
government procurement, information technology products,
environmental technology and services, medical equipment and
services, civil aircraft, and infrastructure products. In so
doing, the President shall take into account all of the
principal negotiating objectives set forth in section 2(b).
SEC. 4. CONSULTATIONS AND ASSESSMENT.
(a) Notice and Consultation Before Negotiation.--The
President, with respect to any agreement that is subject to
the provisions of section 3(b), shall--
(1) provide, at least 90 calendar days before initiating
negotiations, written notice to the Congress of the
President's intention to enter into the negotiations and set
forth therein the date the President intends to initiate such
negotiations, the specific United States objectives for the
negotiations, and whether the President intends to seek an
agreement, or changes to an existing agreement; and
(2) before and after submission of the notice, consult
regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Finance of
the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives, such other committees of the House and
Senate as the President deems appropriate, and the
Congressional Oversight group convened under section 7.
(b) Negotiations Regarding Agriculture.--Before initiating
or continuing negotiations the subject matter of which is
directly related to the subject matter under section
2(b)(9)(A)(i) with any country, the President shall assess
whether United States tariffs on agricultural products that
were bound under the Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than
the tariffs bound by that country. In addition, the President
shall consider whether the tariff levels bound and applied
throughout the world with respect to imports from the United
States are higher than United States tariffs and whether the
negotiation provides an opportunity to address any such
disparity. The President shall consult with the Committee on
Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the
Senate concerning the results of the assessment, whether it
is appropriate for the United States to agree to further
tariff reductions based on the conclusions reached in the
assessment, and how all applicable negotiating objectives
will be met.
(c) Consultation With Congress Before Agreements Entered
Into.--
(1) Consultation.--Before entering into any trade agreement
under section 3(b), the President shall consult with--
(A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(B) each other committee of the House and the Senate, and
each joint committee of the Congress, which has jurisdiction
over legislation involving subject matters which would be
affected by the trade agreement; and
(C) the Congressional Oversight Group convened under
section 7.
(2) Scope.--The consultation described in paragraph (1)
shall include consultation with respect to--
(A) the nature of the agreement;
(B) how and to what extent the agreement will achieve the
applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of
this Act; and
(C) the implementation of the agreement under section 5,
including the general effect of the agreement on existing
laws.
(d) Advisory Committee Reports.--The report required under
section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding any
trade agreement entered into under section 3(a) or (b) of
this Act shall be provided to the President, the Congress,
and the United States Trade Representative not later than
30 days after the date on which the President notifies the
Congress under section 3(a)(1) or 5(a)(1)(A) of the
President's intention to enter into the agreement.
(e) ITC Assessment.--
(1) In general.--The President, at least 90 calendar days
before the day on which the President enters into a trade
agreement under section 3(b), shall provide the International
Trade Commission (referred to in this subsection as ``the
Commission'') with the details of the agreement as it exists
at that time and request the Commission to prepare and submit
an assessment of the agreement as described in paragraph (2).
Between the time the President makes the request under this
paragraph and the time the Commission submits the assessment,
the President shall keep the Commission current with respect
to the details of the agreement.
(2) ITC assessment.--Not later than 90 calendar days after
the President enters into the agreement, the Commission shall
submit to the President and the Congress a report assessing
the likely impact of the agreement on the United States
economy as a whole and on specific industry sectors,
including the impact the agreement will have on the gross
domestic product, exports and imports, aggregate employment
and employment opportunities, the production, employment, and
competitive position of industries likely to be significantly
affected by the agreement, and the interests of United States
consumers.
(3) Review of empirical literature.--In preparing the
assessment, the Commission shall review available economic
assessments regarding the agreement, including literature
regarding any substantially equivalent proposed agreement,
and shall provide in its assessment a description of the
analyses used and conclusions drawn in such literature, and a
discussion of areas of consensus and divergence between the
various analyses and conclusions, including those of the
Commission regarding the agreement.
SEC. 5. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.
(a) In General.--
(1) Notification and submission.--Any agreement entered
into under section 3(b) shall enter into force with respect
to the United States if (and only if)--
(A) the President, at least 90 calendar days before the day
on which the President enters into the trade agreement,
notifies the House of Representatives and the Senate of the
President's intention to enter into the agreement, and
promptly thereafter publishes notice of such intention in the
Federal Register;
(B) within 60 days after entering into the agreement, the
President submits to the Congress a description of those
changes to existing laws that the President considers would
be required in order to bring the United States into
compliance with the agreement;
(C) after entering into the agreement, the President
submits to the Congress a copy of the final legal text of the
agreement, together with--
(i) a draft of an implementing bill described in section
3(b)(3);
(ii) a statement of any administrative action proposed to
implement the trade agreement; and
(iii) the supporting information described in paragraph
(2); and
(D) the implementing bill is enacted into law.
(2) Supporting information.--The supporting information
required under paragraph (1)(C)(iii) consists of--
[[Page H8986]]
(A) an explanation as to how the implementing bill and
proposed administrative action will change or affect existing
law; and
(B) a statement--
(i) asserting that the agreement makes progress in
achieving the applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and
objectives of this Act; and
(ii) setting forth the reasons of the President regarding--
(I) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in
achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives
referred to in clause (i);
(II) whether and how the agreement changes provisions of an
agreement previously negotiated;
(III) how the agreement serves the interests of United
States commerce;
(IV) how the implementing bill meets the standards set
forth in section 3(b)(3); and
(V) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in
achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives
referred to in section 2(c) regarding the promotion of
certain priorities.
(3) Reciprocal benefits.--In order to ensure that a foreign
country that is not a party to a trade agreement entered into
under section 3(b) does not receive benefits under the
agreement unless the country is also subject to the
obligations under the agreement, the implementing bill
submitted with respect to the agreement shall provide that
the benefits and obligations under the agreement apply only
to the parties to the agreement, if such application is
consistent with the terms of the agreement. The implementing
bill may also provide that the benefits and obligations under
the agreement do not apply uniformly to all parties to the
agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms
of the agreement.
(b) Limitations on Trade Authorities Procedures.--
(1) For lack of notice or consultations.--
(A) In general.--The trade authorities procedures shall not
apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a
trade agreement entered into under section 3(b) if during the
60-day period beginning on the date that one House of
Congress agrees to a procedural disapproval resolution for
lack of notice or consultations with respect to that trade
agreement, the other House separately agrees to a procedural
disapproval resolution with respect to that agreement.
(B) Procedural disapproval resolution.--For purposes of
this paragraph, the term ``procedural disapproval
resolution'' means a resolution of either House of Congress,
the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as
follows: ``That the President has failed or refused to notify
or consult (as the case may be) with Congress in accordance
with section 4 or 5 of the Trade Promotion Authority Act of
2001 on negotiations with respect to ____________ and,
therefore, the trade authorities procedures under that Act
shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with
respect to that trade agreement.'', with the blank space
being filled with a description of the trade agreement with
respect to which the President is considered to have failed
or refused to notify or consult.
(2) Procedures for considering resolutions.--(A) Procedural
disapproval resolutions--
(i) in the House of Representatives--
(I) shall be introduced by the chairman or ranking minority
member of the Committee on Ways and Means or the chairman or
ranking minority member of the Committee on Rules;
(II) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means
and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules; and
(III) may not be amended by either Committee; and
(ii) in the Senate shall be original resolutions of the
Committee on Finance.
(B) The provisions of section 152(d) and (e) of the Trade
Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the
floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and
Senate) apply to procedural disapproval resolutions.
(C) It is not in order for the House of Representatives to
consider any procedural disapproval resolution not reported
by the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, by the
Committee on Rules.
(c) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--
Subsection (b) of this section and section 3(c) are enacted
by the Congress--
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such are
deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and
such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that
they are inconsistent with such other rules; and
(2) with the full recognition of the constitutional right
of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to
the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same
manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that
House.
SEC. 6. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR WHICH
NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.
(a) Certain Agreements.--Notwithstanding section 3(b)(2),
if an agreement to which section 3(b) applies--
(1) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization,
(2) is entered into with Chile,
(3) is entered into with Singapore, or
(4) establishes a Free Trade Area for the Americas,
and results from negotiations that were commenced before the
date of the enactment of this Act, subsection (b) shall
apply.
(b) Treatment of Agreements.--In the case of any agreement
to which subsection (a) applies--
(1) the applicability of the trade authorities procedures
to implementing bills shall be determined without regard to
the requirements of section 4(a) (relating only to 90 days
notice prior to initiating negotiations), and any procedural
disapproval resolution under section 5(b)(1)(B) shall not be
in order on the basis of a failure or refusal to comply with
the provisions of section 4(a); and
(2) the President shall, as soon as feasible after the
enactment of this Act--
(A) notify the Congress of the negotiations described in
subsection (a), the specific United States objectives in the
negotiations, and whether the President is seeking a new
agreement or changes to an existing agreement; and
(B) before and after submission of the notice, consult
regarding the negotiations with the committees referred to in
section 4(a)(2) and the Congressional Oversight Group.
SEC. 7. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT GROUP.
(a) Members and Functions.--
(1) In general.--By not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and not later than 30 days
after the convening of each Congress, the chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives
and the chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate
shall convene the Congressional Oversight Group.
(2) Membership from the house.--In each Congress, the
Congressional Oversight Group shall be comprised of the
following Members of the House of Representatives:
(A) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on
Ways and Means, and 3 additional members of such Committee
(not more than 2 of whom are members of the same political
party).
(B) The chairman and ranking member, or their designees, of
the committees of the House of Representatives which would
have, under the Rules of the House of Representatives,
jurisdiction over provisions of law affected by a trade
agreement negotiations for which are conducted at any time
during that Congress and to which this Act would apply.
(3) Membership from the senate.--In each Congress, the
Congressional Oversight Group shall also be comprised of the
following members of the Senate:
(A) The chairman and ranking Member of the Committee on
Finance and 3 additional members of such Committee (not more
than 2 of whom are members of the same political party).
(B) The chairman and ranking member, or their designees, of
the committees of the Senate which would have, under the
Rules of the Senate, jurisdiction over provisions of law
affected by a trade agreement negotiations for which are
conducted at any time during that Congress and to which this
Act would apply.
(4) Accreditation.--Each member of the Congressional
Oversight Group described in paragraph (2)(A) and (3)(A)
shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative
on behalf of the President as official advisers to the United
States delegation in negotiations for any trade agreement to
which this Act applies. Each member of the Congressional
Oversight Group described in paragraph (2)(B) and (3)(B)
shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative
on behalf of the President as official advisers to the United
States delegation in the negotiations by reason of which the
member is in the Congressional Oversight Group. The
Congressional Oversight Group shall consult with and provide
advice to the Trade Representative regarding the formulation
of specific objectives, negotiating strategies and positions,
the development of the applicable trade agreement, and
compliance and enforcement of the negotiated commitments
under the trade agreement.
(5) Chair.--The Congressional Oversight Group shall be
chaired by the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the
Committee on Finance of the Senate.
(b) Guidelines.--
(1) Purpose and revision.--The United States Trade
Representative, in consultation with the chairmen and ranking
minority members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the
Senate--
(A) shall, within 120 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, develop written guidelines to facilitate the
useful and timely exchange of information between the Trade
Representative and the Congressional Oversight Group
established under this section; and
(B) may make such revisions to the guidelines as may be
necessary from time to time.
(2) Content.--The guidelines developed under paragraph (1)
shall provide for, among other things--
(A) regular, detailed briefings of the Congressional
Oversight Group regarding negotiating objectives, including
the promotion of certain priorities referred to in section
2(c), and positions and the status of the applicable
negotiations, beginning as soon as practicable after the
Congressional Oversight Group is convened, with more frequent
briefings as trade negotiations enter the final stage;
[[Page H8987]]
(B) access by members of the Congressional Oversight Group,
and staff with proper security clearances, to pertinent
documents relating to the negotiations, including classified
materials;
(C) the closest practicable coordination between the Trade
Representative and the Congressional Oversight Group at all
critical periods during the negotiations, including at
negotiation sites; and
(D) after the applicable trade agreement is concluded,
consultation regarding ongoing compliance and enforcement of
negotiated commitments under the trade agreement.
SEC. 8. ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) In General.--At the time the President submits to the
Congress the final text of an agreement pursuant to section
5(a)(1)(C), the President shall also submit a plan for
implementing and enforcing the agreement. The
implementation and enforcement plan shall include the
following:
(1) Border personnel requirements.--A description of
additional personnel required at border entry points,
including a list of additional customs and agricultural
inspectors.
(2) Agency staffing requirements.--A description of
additional personnel required by Federal agencies responsible
for monitoring and implementing the trade agreement,
including personnel required by the Office of the United
States Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, the
Department of Agriculture (including additional personnel
required to implement sanitary and phytosanitary measures in
order to obtain market access for United States exports), the
Department of the Treasury, and such other agencies as may be
necessary.
(3) Customs infrastructure requirements.--A description of
the additional equipment and facilities needed by the United
States Customs Service.
(4) Impact on state and local governments.--A description
of the impact the trade agreement will have on State and
local governments as a result of increases in trade.
(5) Cost analysis.--An analysis of the costs associated
with each of the items listed in paragraphs (1) through (4).
(b) Budget Submission.--The President shall include a
request for the resources necessary to support the plan
described in subsection (a) in the first budget that the
President submits to the Congress after the submission of the
plan.
SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Agreement on agriculture.--The term ``Agreement on
Agriculture'' means the agreement referred to in section
101(d)(2) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C.
3511(d)(2)).
(2) Core labor standards.--The term ``core labor
standards'' means--
(A) the right of association;
(B) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
(C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor;
(D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and
(E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.
(3) GATT 1994.--The term ``GATT 1994'' has the meaning
given that term in section 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act (19 U.S.C. 3501).
(4) ILO.--The term ``ILO'' means the International Labor
Organization.
(5) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen;
(B) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity
organized under the laws of the United States; and
(C) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity that
is organized under the laws of a foreign country and is
controlled by entities described in subparagraph (B) or
United States citizens, or both.
(6) Uruguay round agreements.--The term ``Uruguay Round
Agreements'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(7)
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(7)).
(7) World trade organization; wto.--The terms ``World Trade
Organization'' and ``WTO'' mean the organization established
pursuant to the WTO Agreement.
(8) WTO agreement.--The term ``WTO Agreement'' means the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered
into on April 15, 1994.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The amendment printed in the bill, modified
by the amendment printed in House Report 107-323, is adopted.
The text of H.R. 3005, as amended, as modified, is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND FINDINGS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
(b) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The expansion of international trade is vital to the
national security of the United States. Trade is critical to
the economic growth and strength of the United States and to
its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships
promote security and prosperity. Trade agreements today serve
the same purposes that security pacts played during the Cold
War, binding nations together through a series of mutual
rights and obligations. Leadership by the United States in
international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and
peace throughout the world.
(2) The national security of the United States depends on
its economic security, which in turn is founded upon a
vibrant and growing industrial base. Trade expansion has been
the engine of economic growth. Trade agreements maximize
opportunities for the critical sectors and building blocks of
the economy of the United States, such as information
technology, telecommunications and other leading
technologies, basic industries, capital equipment, medical
equipment, services, agriculture, environmental technology,
and intellectual property. Trade will create new
opportunities for the United States and preserve the
unparalleled strength of the United States in economic,
political, and military affairs. The United States, secured
by expanding trade and economic opportunities, will meet the
challenges of the twenty-first century.
SEC. 2. TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.
(a) Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives.--The overall
trade negotiating objectives of the United States for
agreements subject to the provisions of section 3 are--
(1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market
access;
(2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers and
distortions that are directly related to trade and that
decrease market opportunities for United States exports or
otherwise distort United States trade;
(3) to further strengthen the system of international
trading disciplines and procedures, including dispute
settlement;
(4) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, and
promote full employment in the United States and to enhance
the global economy;
(5) to ensure that trade and environmental policies are
mutually supportive and to seek to protect and preserve the
environment and enhance the international means of doing so,
while optimizing the use of the world's resources;
(6) to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of
children consistent with core labor standards of the
International Labor Organization (as defined in section
11(2)) and an understanding of the relationship between trade
and worker rights;
(7) to seek provisions in trade agreements under which
parties to those agreements strive to ensure that they do not
weaken or reduce the protections afforded in domestic
environmental and labor laws as an encouragement for trade.
(b) Principal Trade Negotiating Objectives.--
(1) Trade barriers and distortions.--The principal
negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade
barriers and other trade distortions are--
(A) to expand competitive market opportunities for United
States exports and to obtain fairer and more open conditions
of trade by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff
barriers and policies and practices of foreign governments
directly related to trade that decrease market opportunities
for United States exports or otherwise distort United States
trade; and
(B) to obtain reciprocal tariff and nontariff barrier
elimination agreements, with particular attention to those
tariff categories covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
(2) Trade in services.--The principal negotiating objective
of the United States regarding trade in services is to reduce
or eliminate barriers to international trade in services,
including regulatory and other barriers that deny national
treatment and market access or unreasonably restrict the
establishment or operations of service suppliers.
(3) Foreign investment.--The principal negotiating
objective of the United States regarding foreign investment
is to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting
barriers to trade-related foreign investment and, recognizing
that United States law on the whole provides a high level of
protection for investment, consistent with or greater than
the level required by international law, to secure for
investors important rights comparable to those that would be
available under United States legal principles and practice,
by
(A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of
national treatment;
(B) freeing the transfer of funds relating to investments;
(C) reducing or eliminating performance requirements,
forced technology transfers, and other unreasonable barriers
to the establishment and operation of investments;
(D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and
compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States
legal principles and practice;
(E) providing meaningful procedures for resolving
investment disputes;
(F) seeking to improve mechanisms used to resolve disputes
between an investor and a government through--
(i) mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims; and
(ii) procedures to ensure the efficient selection of
arbitrators and the expeditious disposition of claims;
(G) providing an appellate or similar review mechanism to
correct manifestly erroneous interpretations of law; and
(H) ensuring the fullest measure of transparency in the
dispute settlement mechanism, to the extent consistent with
the need to protect information that is classified or
business confidential, by--
(i) ensuring that all requests for dispute settlement are
promptly made public;
[[Page H8988]]
(ii) ensuring that--
(I) all proceedings, submissions, findings, and decisions
are promptly made public;
(II) all hearings are open to the public; and
(iii) establishing a mechanism for acceptance of amicus
curiae submissions from businesses, unions, and
nongovernmental organizations.
(4) Intellectual property.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States regarding trade-related
intellectual property are--
(A) to further promote adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights, including through--
(i)(I) ensuring accelerated and full implementation of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)), particularly with
respect to meeting enforcement obligations under that
agreement; and
(II) ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or
bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual property
rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a
standard of protection similar to that found in United States
law;
(ii) providing strong protection for new and emerging
technologies and new methods of transmitting and distributing
products embodying intellectual property;
(iii) preventing or eliminating discrimination with respect
to matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope,
maintenance, use, and enforcement of intellectual property
rights;
(iv) ensuring that standards of protection and enforcement
keep pace with technological developments, and in particular
ensuring that rightholders have the legal and technological
means to control the use of their works through the Internet
and other global communication media, and to prevent the
unauthorized use of their works; and
(v) providing strong enforcement of intellectual property
rights, including through accessible, expeditious, and
effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement
mechanisms; and
(B) to secure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory market
access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon
intellectual property protection.
(5) Transparency.--The principal negotiating objective of
the United States with respect to transparency is to obtain
wider and broader application of the principle of
transparency through--
(A) increased and more timely public access to information
regarding trade issues and the activities of international
trade institutions;
(B) increased openness at the WTO and other international
trade fora by increasing public access to appropriate
meetings, proceedings, and submissions, including with regard
to dispute settlement and investment; and
(C) increased and more timely public access to all
notifications and supporting documentation submitted by
parties to the WTO.
(6) Anti-corruption.--The principal negotiating objectives
of the United States with respect to the use of money or
other things of value to influence acts, decisions, or
omissions of foreign governments or officials or to secure
any improper advantage in a manner affecting trade are--
(A) to obtain high standards and appropriate domestic
enforcement mechanisms applicable to persons from all
countries participating in the applicable trade agreement
that prohibit such attempts to influence acts, decisions, or
omissions of foreign governments; and
(B) to ensure that such standards do not place United
States persons at a competitive disadvantage in international
trade.
(7) Improvement of the WTO and multilateral trade
agreements.--The principal negotiating objectives of the
United States regarding the improvement of the World Trade
Organization, the Uruguay Round Agreements, and other
multilateral and bilateral trade agreements are--
(A) to achieve full implementation and extend the coverage
of the World Trade Organization and such agreements to
products, sectors, and conditions of trade not adequately
covered; and
(B) to expand country participation in and enhancement of
the Information Technology Agreement and other trade
agreements.
(8) Regulatory practices.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States regarding the use of
government regulation or other practices by foreign
governments to provide a competitive advantage to their
domestic producers, service providers, or investors and
thereby reduce market access for United States goods,
services, and investments are--
(A) to achieve increased transparency and opportunity for
the participation of affected parties in the development of
regulations;
(B) to require that proposed regulations be based on sound
science, cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, or other
objective evidence;
(C) to establish consultative mechanisms among parties to
trade agreements to promote increased transparency in
developing guidelines, rules, regulations, and laws for
government procurement and other regulatory regimes; and
(D) to achieve the elimination of government measures such
as price controls and reference pricing which deny full
market access for United States products.
(9) Electronic commerce.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to electronic
commerce are--
(A) to ensure that current obligations, rules, disciplines,
and commitments under the World Trade Organization apply to
electronic commerce;
(B) to ensure that--
(i) electronically delivered goods and services receive no
less favorable treatment under trade rules and commitments
than like products delivered in physical form; and
(ii) the classification of such goods and services ensures
the most liberal trade treatment possible;
(C) to ensure that governments refrain from implementing
trade-related measures that impede electronic commerce;
(D) where legitimate policy objectives require domestic
regulations that affect electronic commerce, to obtain
commitments that any such regulations are the least
restrictive on trade, nondiscriminatory, and transparent, and
promote an open market environment; and
(E) to extend the moratorium of the World Trade
Organization on duties on electronic transmissions.
(10) Reciprocal trade in agriculture.--(A) The principal
negotiating objective of the United States with respect to
agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United
States exports of agricultural commodities in foreign markets
substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities
afforded foreign exports in United States markets and to
achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in bulk,
specialty crop, and value-added commodities by--
(i) reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or
other charges that decrease market opportunities for United
States exports--
(I) giving priority to those products that are subject to
significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of major
producing countries; and
(II) providing reasonable adjustment periods for United
States import-sensitive products, in close consultation with
the Congress on such products before initiating tariff
reduction negotiations;
(ii) reducing tariffs to levels that are the same as or
lower than those in the United States;
(iii) reducing or eliminating subsidies that decrease
market opportunities for United States exports or unfairly
distort agriculture markets to the detriment of the United
States;
(iv) allowing the preservation of programs that support
family farms and rural communities but do not distort trade;
(v) developing disciplines for domestic support programs,
so that production that is in excess of domestic food
security needs is sold at world prices;
(vi) eliminating Government policies that create price-
depressing surpluses;
(vii) eliminating state trading enterprises whenever
possible;
(viii) developing, strengthening, and clarifying rules and
effective dispute settlement mechanisms to eliminate
practices that unfairly decrease United States market access
opportunities or distort agricultural markets to the
detriment of the United States, particularly with respect to
import-sensitive products, including--
(I) unfair or trade-distorting activities of state trading
enterprises and other administrative mechanisms, with
emphasis on requiring price transparency in the operation of
state trading enterprises and such other mechanisms in order
to end cross subsidization, price discrimination, and price
undercutting;
(II) unjustified trade restrictions or commercial
requirements, such as labeling, that affect new technologies,
including biotechnology;
(III) unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions,
including those not based on scientific principles in
contravention of the Uruguay Round Agreements;
(IV) other unjustified technical barriers to trade; and
(V) restrictive rules in the administration of tariff rate
quotas;
(ix) eliminating practices that adversely affect trade in
perishable or cyclical products, while improving import
relief mechanisms to recognize the unique characteristics of
perishable and cyclical agriculture;
(x) ensuring that the use of import relief mechanisms for
perishable and cyclical agriculture are as accessible and
timely to growers in the United States as those mechanisms
that are used by other countries;
(xi) taking into account whether a party to the
negotiations has failed to adhere to the provisions of
already existing trade agreements with the United States or
has circumvented obligations under those agreements;
(xii) taking into account whether a product is subject to
market distortions by reason of a failure of a major
producing country to adhere to the provisions of already
existing trade agreements with the United States or by the
circumvention by that country of its obligations under those
agreements;
(xiii) otherwise ensuring that countries that accede to the
World Trade Organization have made meaningful market
liberalization commitments in agriculture;
(xiv) taking into account the impact that agreements
covering agriculture to which the United States is a party,
including the North American Free Trade Agreement, have on
the United States agricultural industry; and
(xv) maintaining bona fide food assistance programs and
preserving United States market development and export credit
programs.
(B)(i) Before commencing negotiations with respect to
agriculture, the United States Trade Representative, in
consultation with the Congress, shall seek to develop a
position on the treatment of seasonal and perishable
agricultural products to be employed in the negotiations in
order to develop an international consensus on the treatment
of seasonal or perishable agricultural products in
investigations relating to dumping and safeguards and in any
other relevant area.
(ii) During any negotiations on agricultural subsidies, the
United States Trade Representative shall seek to establish
the common base year for calculating the Aggregated
Measurement of Support (as defined in the Agreement on
Agriculture) as the end of each country's Uruguay Round
implementation period, as reported in
[[Page H8989]]
each country's Uruguay Round market access schedule.
(iii) The negotiating objective provided in subparagraph
(A) applies with respect to agricultural matters to be
addressed in any trade agreement entered into under section
3(a) or (b), including any trade agreement entered into under
section 3(a) or (b) that provides for accession to a trade
agreement to which the United States is already a party, such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
(11) Labor and the environment.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to labor and the
environment are--
(A) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the
United States does not fail to effectively enforce its
environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade
between the United States and that party after entry into
force of a trade agreement between those countries;
(B) to recognize that parties to a trade agreement retain
the right to exercise discretion with respect to
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance
matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of
resources to enforcement with respect to other labor or
environmental matters determined to have higher priorities,
and to recognize that a country is effectively enforcing its
laws if a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable
exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide
decision regarding the allocation of resources; and no
retaliation may be authorized based on the exercise of these
rights or the right to establish domestic labor standards and
levels of environmental protection;
(C) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading
partners to promote respect for core labor standards (as
defined in section 11(2));
(D) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading
partners to protect the environment through the promotion of
sustainable development;
(E) to reduce or eliminate government practices or policies
that unduly threaten sustainable development;
(F) to seek market access, through the elimination of
tariffs and nontariff barriers, for United States
environmental technologies, goods, and services; and
(G) to ensure that labor, environmental, health, or safety
policies and practices of the parties to trade agreements
with the United States do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminate against United States exports or serve as
disguised barriers to trade.
(12) Dispute settlement and enforcement.--The principal
negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to
dispute settlement and enforcement of trade agreements are--
(A) to seek provisions in trade agreements providing for
resolution of disputes between governments under those trade
agreements in an effective, timely, transparent, equitable,
and reasoned manner, requiring determinations based on facts
and the principles of the agreements, with the goal of
increasing compliance with the agreements;
(B) to seek to strengthen the capacity of the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism of the World Trade Organization to review
compliance with commitments;
(C) to seek provisions encouraging the early identification
and settlement of disputes through consultation;
(D) to seek provisions to encourage the provision of trade-
expanding compensation if a party to a dispute under the
agreement does not come into compliance with its obligations
under the agreement;
(E) to seek provisions to impose a penalty upon a party to
a dispute under the agreement that--
(i) encourages compliance with the obligations of the
agreement;
(ii) is appropriate to the parties, nature, subject matter,
and scope of the violation; and
(iii) has the aim of not adversely affecting parties or
interests not party to the dispute while maintaining the
effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism; and
(F) to seek provisions that treat United States principal
negotiating objectives equally with respect to--
(i) the ability to resort to dispute settlement under the
applicable agreement;
(ii) the availability of equivalent dispute settlement
procedures; and
(iii) the availability of equivalent remedies.
(13) WTO extended negotiations.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States regarding trade in civil
aircraft are those set forth in section 135(c) of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3355(c)) and regarding rules
of origin are the conclusion of an agreement described in
section 132 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 3552).
(c) Promotion of Certain Priorities.--In order to address
and maintain United States competitiveness in the global
economy, the President shall--
(1) seek greater cooperation between the WTO and the ILO;
(2) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties
to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United
States trading partners to promote respect for core labor
standards (as defined in section 11(2)), and report to the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on the content and
operation of such mechanisms;
(3) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties
to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United
States trading partners to develop and implement standards
for the protection of the environment and human health based
on sound science, and report to the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate on the content and operation of such
mechanisms;
(4) conduct environmental reviews of future trade and
investment agreements, consistent with Executive Order 13141
of November 16, 1999 and its relevant guidelines, and report
to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on
such reviews;
(5) review the impact of future trade agreements on United
States employment, modeled after Executive Order 13141, and
report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on
such review;
(6) take into account other legitimate United States
domestic objectives including, but not limited to, the
protection of legitimate health or safety, essential
security, and consumer interests and the law and regulations
related thereto;
(7) have the Secretary of Labor consult with any country
seeking a trade agreement with the United States concerning
that country's labor laws and provide technical assistance to
that country if needed;
(8) with respect to any trade agreement which the President
seeks to implement under trade authorities procedures, submit
to the Congress a report describing the extent to which the
country or countries that are parties to the agreement have
in effect laws governing exploitative child labor;
(9) preserve the ability of the United States to enforce
rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws, and avoid agreements which lessen
the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines
on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, in order
to ensure that United States workers, agricultural producers,
and firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the
benefits of reciprocal trade concessions;
(10) continue to promote consideration of multilateral
environmental agreements and consult with parties to such
agreements regarding the consistency of any such agreement
that includes trade measures with existing environmental
exceptions under Article XX of the GATT 1994;
(11) report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the
Senate, not later than 12 months after the imposition of a
penalty or remedy by the United States permitted by a trade
agreement to which this Act applies, on the effectiveness of
the penalty or remedy applied under United States law in
enforcing United States rights under the trade agreement; and
(12) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among
parties to trade agreements to examine the trade consequences
of significant and unanticipated currency movements and to
scrutinize whether a foreign government is engaged in a
pattern of manipulating its currency to promote a competitive
advantage in international trade.
The report under paragraph (11) shall address whether the
penalty or remedy was effective in changing the behavior of
the targeted party and whether the penalty or remedy had any
adverse impact on parties or interests not party to the
dispute.
(d) Consultations.--
(1) Consultations with congressional advisers.--In the
course of negotiations conducted under this Act, the United
States Trade Representative shall consult closely and on a
timely basis with, and keep fully apprised of the
negotiations, the Congressional Oversight Group convened
under section 7 and all committees of the House of
Representatives and the Senate with jurisdiction over laws
that would be affected by a trade agreement resulting from
the negotiations.
(2) Consultation before agreement initialed.--In the course
of negotiations conducted under this Act, the United States
Trade Representative shall--
(A) consult closely and on a timely basis (including
immediately before initialing an agreement) with, and keep
fully apprised of the negotiations, the congressional
advisers for trade policy and negotiations appointed under
section 161 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2211), the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives,
the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Congressional
Oversight Group convened under section 7; and
(B) with regard to any negotiations and agreement relating
to agricultural trade, also consult closely and on a timely
basis (including immediately before initialing an agreement)
with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the
Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the
Senate.
(e) Adherence to Obligations Under Uruguay Round
Agreements.--In determining whether to enter into
negotiations with a particular country, the President shall
take into account the extent to which that country has
implemented, or has accelerated the implementation of, its
obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.
SEC. 3. TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY.
(a) Agreements Regarding Tariff Barriers.--
(1) In general.--Whenever the President determines that one
or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any
foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and
restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that
the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this
Act will be promoted thereby, the President--
(A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries
before--
(i) June 1, 2005; or
(ii) June 1, 2007, if trade authorities procedures are
extended under subsection (c); and
(B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), proclaim--
[[Page H8990]]
(i) such modification or continuance of any existing duty,
(ii) such continuance of existing duty-free or excise
treatment, or
(iii) such additional duties,
as the President determines to be required or appropriate to
carry out any such trade agreement.
The President shall notify the Congress of the President's
intention to enter into an agreement under this subsection.
(2) Limitations.--No proclamation may be made under
paragraph (1) that--
(A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate of duty
that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem on the date of the
enactment of this Act) to a rate of duty which is less than
50 percent of the rate of such duty that applies on such date
of enactment;
(B) notwithstanding paragraph (6), reduces the rate of duty
below that applicable under the Uruguay Round Agreements, on
any agricultural product which was the subject of tariff
reductions by the United States as a result of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, for which the rate of duty, pursuant to
such Agreements, was reduced on January 1, 1995, to a rate
which was not less than 97.5 percent of the rate of duty that
applied to such article on December 31, 1994; or
(C) increases any rate of duty above the rate that applied
on the date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) Aggregate reduction; exemption from staging.--
(A) Aggregate reduction.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), the aggregate reduction in the rate of duty
on any article which is in effect on any day pursuant to a
trade agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall not
exceed the aggregate reduction which would have been in
effect on such day if--
(i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem or a reduction of
one-tenth of the total reduction, whichever is greater, had
taken effect on the effective date of the first reduction
proclaimed under paragraph (1) to carry out such agreement
with respect to such article; and
(ii) a reduction equal to the amount applicable under
clause (i) had taken effect at 1-year intervals after the
effective date of such first reduction.
(B) Exemption from staging.--No staging is required under
subparagraph (A) with respect to a duty reduction that is
proclaimed under paragraph (1) for an article of a kind that
is not produced in the United States. The United States
International Trade Commission shall advise the President of
the identity of articles that may be exempted from staging
under this subparagraph.
(4) Rounding.--If the President determines that such action
will simplify the computation of reductions under paragraph
(3), the President may round an annual reduction by an amount
equal to the lesser of--
(A) the difference between the reduction without regard to
this paragraph and the next lower whole number; or
(B) one-half of 1 percent ad valorem.
(5) Other limitations.--A rate of duty reduction that may
not be proclaimed by reason of paragraph (2) may take effect
only if a provision authorizing such reduction is included
within an implementing bill provided for under section 5 and
that bill is enacted into law.
(6) Other tariff modifications.--Notwithstanding paragraphs
(1)(B), (2)(A), (2)(C), and (3) through (5), and subject to
the consultation and layover requirements of section 115 of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the President may
proclaim the modification of any duty or staged rate
reduction of any duty set forth in Schedule XX, as defined
in section 2(5) of that Act, if the United States agrees
to such modification or staged rate reduction in a
negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or
harmonization of duties under the auspices of the World
Trade Organization.
(7) Authority under Uruguay round agreements act not
affected.--Nothing in this subsection shall limit the
authority provided to the President under section 111(b) of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
(b) Agreements Regarding Tariff and Nontariff Barriers.--
(1) In general.--(A) Whenever the President determines
that--
(i) one or more existing duties or any other import
restriction of any foreign country or the United States or
any other barrier to, or other distortion of, international
trade unduly burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the
United States or adversely affects the United States economy;
or
(ii) the imposition of any such barrier or distortion is
likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or effect;
and that the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives
of this Act will be promoted thereby, the President may enter
into a trade agreement described in subparagraph (B) during
the period described in subparagraph (C).
(B) The President may enter into a trade agreement under
subparagraph (A) with foreign countries providing for--
(i) the reduction or elimination of a duty, restriction,
barrier, or other distortion described in subparagraph (A),
or
(ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on the imposition
of, such barrier or other distortion.
(C) The President may enter into a trade agreement under
this paragraph before--
(i) June 1, 2005; or
(ii) June 1, 2007, if trade authorities procedures are
extended under subsection (c).
(2) Conditions.--A trade agreement may be entered into
under this subsection only if such agreement makes progress
in meeting the applicable objectives described in section
2(a) and (b) and the President satisfies the conditions set
forth in section 4.
(3) Bills qualifying for trade authorities procedures.--(A)
The provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (in
this Act referred to as ``trade authorities procedures'')
apply to a bill of either House of Congress which contains
provisions described in subparagraph (B) to the same extent
as such section 151 applies to implementing bills under that
section. A bill to which this paragraph applies shall
hereafter in this Act be referred to as an ``implementing
bill''.
(B) The provisions referred to in subparagraph (A) are--
(i) a provision approving a trade agreement entered into
under this subsection and approving the statement of
administrative action, if any, proposed to implement such
trade agreement; and
(ii) if changes in existing laws or new statutory authority
are required to implement such trade agreement or agreements,
provisions, necessary or appropriate to implement such trade
agreement or agreements, either repealing or amending
existing laws or providing new statutory authority.
(c) Extension Disapproval Process for Congressional Trade
Authorities Procedures.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in section 5(b)--
(A) the trade authorities procedures apply to implementing
bills submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into
under subsection (b) before July 1, 2005; and
(B) the trade authorities procedures shall be extended to
implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements
entered into under subsection (b) after June 30, 2005, and
before July 1, 2007, if (and only if)--
(i) the President requests such extension under paragraph
(2); and
(ii) neither House of the Congress adopts an extension
disapproval resolution under paragraph (5) before June 1,
2005.
(2) Report to congress by the president.--If the President
is of the opinion that the trade authorities procedures
should be extended to implementing bills described in
paragraph (1)(B), the President shall submit to the Congress,
not later than March 1, 2005, a written report that contains
a request for such extension, together with--
(A) a description of all trade agreements that have been
negotiated under subsection (b) and the anticipated schedule
for submitting such agreements to the Congress for approval;
(B) a description of the progress that has been made in
negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, priorities,
and objectives of this Act, and a statement that such
progress justifies the continuation of negotiations; and
(C) a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed
to complete the negotiations.
(3) Report to congress by the advisory committee.--The
President shall promptly inform the Advisory Committee for
Trade Policy and Negotiations established under section 135
of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) of the President's
decision to submit a report to the Congress under paragraph
(2). The Advisory Committee shall submit to the Congress as
soon as practicable, but not later than May 1, 2005, a
written report that contains--
(A) its views regarding the progress that has been made in
negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, priorities,
and objectives of this Act; and
(B) a statement of its views, and the reasons therefore,
regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2)
should be approved or disapproved.
(4) Status of reports.--The reports submitted to the
Congress under paragraphs (2) and (3), or any portion of such
reports, may be classified to the extent the President
determines appropriate.
(5) Extension disapproval resolutions.--(A) For purposes of
paragraph (1), the term ``extension disapproval resolution''
means a resolution of either House of the Congress, the sole
matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows:
``That the ____ disapproves the request of the President for
the extension, under section 3(c)(1)(B)(i) of the Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, of the trade
authorities procedures under that Act to any implementing
bill submitted with respect to any trade agreement entered
into under section 3(b) of that Act after June 30, 2005.'',
with the blank space being filled with the name of the
resolving House of the Congress.
(B) Extension disapproval resolutions--
(i) may be introduced in either House of the Congress by
any member of such House; and
(ii) shall be referred, in the House of Representatives, to
the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the
Committee on Rules.
(C) The provisions of section 152(d) and (e) of the Trade
Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the
floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and
Senate) apply to extension disapproval resolutions.
(D) It is not in order for--
(i) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval
resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance;
(ii) the House of Representatives to consider any extension
disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways
and Means and, in addition, by the Committee on Rules; or
(iii) either House of the Congress to consider an extension
disapproval resolution after June 30, 2005.
(d) Commencement of Negotiations.--In order to contribute
to the continued economic expansion of the United States, the
President shall commence negotiations covering tariff and
nontariff barriers affecting any industry, product, or
service sector, and expand existing sectoral agreements to
countries that are not parties to those agreements, in cases
where the President determines that such negotiations are
feasible and timely and would benefit the
[[Page H8991]]
United States. Such sectors include agriculture, commercial
services, intellectual property rights, industrial and
capital goods, government procurement, information technology
products, environmental technology and services, medical
equipment and services, civil aircraft, and infrastructure
products. In so doing, the President shall take into account
all of the principal negotiating objectives set forth in
section 2(b).
SEC. 4. CONSULTATIONS AND ASSESSMENT.
(a) Notice and Consultation Before Negotiation.--The
President, with respect to any agreement that is subject to
the provisions of section 3(b), shall--
(1) provide, at least 90 calendar days before initiating
negotiations, written notice to the Congress of the
President's intention to enter into the negotiations and set
forth therein the date the President intends to initiate such
negotiations, the specific United States objectives for the
negotiations, and whether the President intends to seek an
agreement, or changes to an existing agreement;
(2) before and after submission of the notice, consult
regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Finance of
the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives, such other committees of the House and
Senate as the President deems appropriate, and the
Congressional Oversight Group convened under section 7; and
(3) upon the request of a majority of the members of the
Congressional Oversight Group under section 7(c), meet with
the Congressional Oversight Group before initiating the
negotiations or at any other time concerning the
negotiations.
(b) Negotiations Regarding Agriculture.--
(1) In general.--Before initiating or continuing
negotiations the subject matter of which is directly related
to the subject matter under section 2(b)(10)(A)(i) with any
country, the President shall assess whether United States
tariffs on agricultural products that were bound under the
Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound by
that country. In addition, the President shall consider
whether the tariff levels bound and applied throughout the
world with respect to imports from the United States are
higher than United States tariffs and whether the negotiation
provides an opportunity to address any such disparity. The
President shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means
and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the
Senate concerning the results of the assessment, whether it
is appropriate for the United States to agree to further
tariff reductions based on the conclusions reached in the
assessment, and how all applicable negotiating objectives
will be met.
(2) Special consultations on import sensitive products.--
(A) Before initiating negotiations with regard to
agriculture, and, with respect to the Free Trade Area for the
Americas and negotiations with regard to agriculture under
the auspices of the World Trade Organization, as soon as
practicable after the enactment of this Act, the United
States Trade Representative shall--
(i) identify those agricultural products subject to tariff
reductions by the United States as a result of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, for which the rate of duty was reduced on
January 1, 1995, to a rate which was not less than 97.5
percent of the rate of duty that applied to such article on
December 31, 1994;
(ii) consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the
Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate concerning--
(I) whether any further tariff reductions on the products
identified under clause (i) should be appropriate, taking
into account the impact of any such tariff reduction on the
United States industry producing the product concerned; and
(II) whether the products so identified face unjustified
sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions, including those not
based on scientific principles in contravention of the
Uruguay Round Agreements;
(iii) request that the International Trade Commission
prepare an assessment of the probable economic effects of any
such tariff reduction on the United States industry producing
the product concerned and on the United States economy as a
whole; and
(iv) upon complying with clauses (i), (ii), and (iii),
notify the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on
Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry of the Senate of those products identified under
clause (i) for which the Trade Representative intends to seek
tariff liberalization in the negotiations and the reasons for
seeking such tariff liberalization.
(B) If, after negotiations described in subparagraph (A)
are commenced--
(i) the United States Trade Representative identifies any
additional agricultural product described in subparagraph
(A)(i) for tariff reductions which were not the subject of a
notification under subparagraph (A)(iv), or
(ii) any additional agricultural product described in
subparagraph (A)(i) is the subject of a request for tariff
reductions by a party to the negotiations,
the Trade Representative shall, as soon as practicable,
notify the committees referred to in subparagraph (A)(iv) of
those products and the reasons for seeking such tariff
reductions.
(c) Negotiations Regarding Textiles.--Before initiating or
continuing negotiations the subject matter of which is
directly related to textiles and apparel products with any
country, the President shall assess whether United States
tariffs on textile and apparel products that were bound under
the Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound
by that country and whether the negotiation provides an
opportunity to address any such disparity. The President
shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the
Senate concerning the results of the assessment, whether it
is appropriate for the United States to agree to further
tariff reductions based on the conclusions reached in the
assessment, and how all applicable negotiating objectives
will be met.
(d) Consultation With Congress Before Agreements Entered
Into.--
(1) Consultation.--Before entering into any trade agreement
under section 3(b), the President shall consult with--
(A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(B) each other committee of the House and the Senate, and
each joint committee of the Congress, which has jurisdiction
over legislation involving subject matters which would be
affected by the trade agreement; and
(C) the Congressional Oversight Group convened under
section 7.
(2) Scope.--The consultation described in paragraph (1)
shall include consultation with respect to--
(A) the nature of the agreement;
(B) how and to what extent the agreement will achieve the
applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of
this Act; and
(C) the implementation of the agreement under section 5,
including the general effect of the agreement on existing
laws.
(e) Advisory Committee Reports.--The report required under
section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding any
trade agreement entered into under section 3(a) or (b) of
this Act shall be provided to the President, the Congress,
and the United States Trade Representative not later than 30
days after the date on which the President notifies the
Congress under section 3(a)(1) or 5(a)(1)(A) of the
President's intention to enter into the agreement.
(f) ITC Assessment.--
(1) In general.--The President, at least 90 calendar days
before the day on which the President enters into a trade
agreement under section 3(b), shall provide the International
Trade Commission (referred to in this subsection as ``the
Commission'') with the details of the agreement as it exists
at that time and request the Commission to prepare and submit
an assessment of the agreement as described in paragraph (2).
Between the time the President makes the request under this
paragraph and the time the Commission submits the assessment,
the President shall keep the Commission current with respect
to the details of the agreement.
(2) ITC assessment.--Not later than 90 calendar days after
the President enters into the agreement, the Commission shall
submit to the President and the Congress a report assessing
the likely impact of the agreement on the United States
economy as a whole and on specific industry sectors,
including the impact the agreement will have on the gross
domestic product, exports and imports, aggregate employment
and employment opportunities, the production, employment, and
competitive position of industries likely to be significantly
affected by the agreement, and the interests of United States
consumers.
(3) Review of empirical literature.--In preparing the
assessment, the Commission shall review available economic
assessments regarding the agreement, including literature
regarding any substantially equivalent proposed agreement,
and shall provide in its assessment a description of the
analyses used and conclusions drawn in such literature, and a
discussion of areas of consensus and divergence between the
various analyses and conclusions, including those of the
Commission regarding the agreement.
SEC. 5. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.
(a) In General.--
(1) Notification and submission.--Any agreement entered
into under section 3(b) shall enter into force with respect
to the United States if (and only if)--
(A) the President, at least 90 calendar days before the day
on which the President enters into the trade agreement,
notifies the House of Representatives and the Senate of the
President's intention to enter into the agreement, and
promptly thereafter publishes notice of such intention in the
Federal Register;
(B) within 60 days after entering into the agreement, the
President submits to the Congress a description of those
changes to existing laws that the President considers would
be required in order to bring the United States into
compliance with the agreement;
(C) after entering into the agreement, the President
submits to the Congress, on a day on which both Houses of
Congress are in session, a copy of the final legal text of
the agreement, together with--
(i) a draft of an implementing bill described in section
3(b)(3);
(ii) a statement of any administrative action proposed to
implement the trade agreement; and
(iii) the supporting information described in paragraph
(2); and
(D) the implementing bill is enacted into law.
(2) Supporting information.--The supporting information
required under paragraph (1)(C)(iii) consists of--
(A) an explanation as to how the implementing bill and
proposed administrative action will change or affect existing
law; and
(B) a statement--
(i) asserting that the agreement makes progress in
achieving the applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and
objectives of this Act; and
(ii) setting forth the reasons of the President regarding--
[[Page H8992]]
(I) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in
achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives
referred to in clause (i);
(II) whether and how the agreement changes provisions of an
agreement previously negotiated;
(III) how the agreement serves the interests of United
States commerce;
(IV) how the implementing bill meets the standards set
forth in section 3(b)(3); and
(V) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in
achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives
referred to in section 2(c) regarding the promotion of
certain priorities.
(3) Reciprocal benefits.--In order to ensure that a foreign
country that is not a party to a trade agreement entered into
under section 3(b) does not receive benefits under the
agreement unless the country is also subject to the
obligations under the agreement, the implementing bill
submitted with respect to the agreement shall provide that
the benefits and obligations under the agreement apply only
to the parties to the agreement, if such application is
consistent with the terms of the agreement. The implementing
bill may also provide that the benefits and obligations under
the agreement do not apply uniformly to all parties to the
agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms
of the agreement.
(b) Limitations on Trade Authorities Procedures.--
(1) For lack of notice or consultations.--
(A) In general.--The trade authorities procedures shall not
apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a
trade agreement or trade agreements entered into under
section 3(b) if during the 60-day period beginning on the
date that one House of Congress agrees to a procedural
disapproval resolution for lack of notice or consultations
with respect to such trade agreement or agreements, the other
House separately agrees to a procedural disapproval
resolution with respect to such trade agreement or
agreements.
(B) Procedural disapproval resolution.--(i) For purposes
of this paragraph, the term ``procedural disapproval
resolution'' means a resolution of either House of Congress,
the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as
follows: ``That the President has failed or refused to notify
or consult in accordance with the Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2001 on negotiations with respect to
____________ and, therefore, the trade authorities procedures
under that Act shall not apply to any implementing bill
submitted with respect to that trade agreement or
agreements.'', with the blank space being filled with a
description of the trade agreement or agreements with respect
to which the President is considered to have failed or
refused to notify or consult.
(ii) For purposes of clause (i), the President has ``failed
or refused to notify or consult in accordance with the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001'' on
negotiations with respect to a trade agreement or trade
agreements if--
(I) the President has failed or refused to consult (as the
case may be) in accordance with section 4 or 5 with respect
to the negotiations, agreement, or agreements;
(II) guidelines under section 7(b) have not been developed
or met with respect to the negotiations, agreement, or
agreements;
(III) the President has not met with the Congressional
Oversight Group pursuant to a request made under section 7(c)
with respect to the negotiations, agreement, or agreements;
or
(IV) the agreement or agreements fail to make progress in
achieving the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives
of this Act.
(2) Procedures for considering resolutions.--(A) Procedural
disapproval resolutions--
(i) in the House of Representatives--
(I) may be introduced by any Member of the House;
(II) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means
and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules; and
(III) may not be amended by either Committee; and
(ii) in the Senate may be introduced by any Member of the
Senate.
(B) The provisions of section 152(d) and (e) of the Trade
Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the
floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and
Senate) apply to a procedural disapproval resolution
introduced with respect to a trade agreement if no other
procedural disapprovement resolution with respect to that
trade agreement has previously been considered under such
provisions of section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974 in that
House of Congress during that Congress''.
(C) It is not in order for the House of Representatives to
consider any procedural disapproval resolution not reported
by the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, by the
Committee on Rules.
(c) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--
Subsection (b) of this section and section 3(c) are enacted
by the Congress--
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such are
deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and
such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that
they are inconsistent with such other rules; and
(2) with the full recognition of the constitutional right
of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to
the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same
manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that
House.
SEC. 6. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR WHICH
NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.
(a) Certain Agreements.--Notwithstanding section 3(b)(2),
if an agreement to which section 3(b) applies--
(1) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization,
(2) is entered into with Chile,
(3) is entered into with Singapore, or
(4) establishes a Free Trade Area for the Americas,
and results from negotiations that were commenced before the
date of the enactment of this Act, subsection (b) shall
apply.
(b) Treatment of Agreements.--In the case of any agreement
to which subsection (a) applies--
(1) the applicability of the trade authorities procedures
to implementing bills shall be determined without regard to
the requirements of section 4(a) (relating only to 90 days
notice prior to initiating negotiations), and any procedural
disapproval resolution under section 5(b)(1)(B) shall not be
in order on the basis of a failure or refusal to comply with
the provisions of section 4(a); and
(2) the President shall, as soon as feasible after the
enactment of this Act--
(A) notify the Congress of the negotiations described in
subsection (a), the specific United States objectives in the
negotiations, and whether the President is seeking a new
agreement or changes to an existing agreement; and
(B) before and after submission of the notice, consult
regarding the negotiations with the committees referred to in
section 4(a)(2) and the Congressional Oversight Group.
SEC. 7. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT GROUP.
(a) Members and Functions.--
(1) In general.--By not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and not later than 30 days
after the convening of each Congress, the chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives
and the chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate
shall convene the Congressional Oversight Group.
(2) Membership from the house.--In each Congress, the
Congressional Oversight Group shall be comprised of the
following Members of the House of Representatives:
(A) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on
Ways and Means, and 3 additional members of such Committee
(not more than 2 of whom are members of the same political
party).
(B) The chairman and ranking member, or their designees, of
the committees of the House of Representatives which would
have, under the Rules of the House of Representatives,
jurisdiction over provisions of law affected by a trade
agreement negotiations for which are conducted at any time
during that Congress and to which this Act would apply.
(3) Membership from the senate.--In each Congress, the
Congressional Oversight Group shall also be comprised of the
following members of the Senate:
(A) The chairman and ranking Member of the Committee on
Finance and 3 additional members of such Committee (not more
than 2 of whom are members of the same political party).
(B) The chairman and ranking member, or their designees, of
the committees of the Senate which would have, under the
Rules of the Senate, jurisdiction over provisions of law
affected by a trade agreement negotiations for which are
conducted at any time during that Congress and to which this
Act would apply.
(4) Accreditation.--Each member of the Congressional
Oversight Group described in paragraph (2)(A) and (3)(A)
shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative
on behalf of the President as official advisers to the United
States delegation in negotiations for any trade agreement to
which this Act applies. Each member of the Congressional
Oversight Group described in paragraph (2)(B) and (3)(B)
shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative
on behalf of the President as official advisers to the United
States delegation in the negotiations by reason of which the
member is in the Congressional Oversight Group. The
Congressional Oversight Group shall consult with and provide
advice to the Trade Representative regarding the formulation
of specific objectives, negotiating strategies and positions,
the development of the applicable trade agreement, and
compliance and enforcement of the negotiated commitments
under the trade agreement.
(5) Chair.--The Congressional Oversight Group shall be
chaired by the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the
Committee on Finance of the Senate.
(b) Guidelines.--
(1) Purpose and revision.--The United States Trade
Representative, in consultation with the chairmen and ranking
minority members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the
Senate--
(A) shall, within 120 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, develop written guidelines to facilitate the
useful and timely exchange of information between the Trade
Representative and the Congressional Oversight Group
established under this section; and
(B) may make such revisions to the guidelines as may be
necessary from time to time.
(2) Content.--The guidelines developed under paragraph (1)
shall provide for, among other things--
(A) regular, detailed briefings of the Congressional
Oversight Group regarding negotiating objectives, including
the promotion of certain priorities referred to in section
2(c), and positions and the status of the applicable
negotiations, beginning as soon as practicable after the
Congressional Oversight Group is convened, with more frequent
briefings as trade negotiations enter the final stage;
(B) access by members of the Congressional Oversight Group,
and staff with proper security clearances, to pertinent
documents relating to the negotiations, including classified
materials;
[[Page H8993]]
(C) the closest practicable coordination between the Trade
Representative and the Congressional Oversight Group at all
critical periods during the negotiations, including at
negotiation sites; and
(D) after the applicable trade agreement is concluded,
consultation regarding ongoing compliance and enforcement of
negotiated commitments under the trade agreement.
(c) Request for Meeting.--Upon the request of a majority of
the Congressional Oversight Group, the President shall meet
with the Congressional Oversight Group before initiating
negotiations with respect to a trade agreement, or at any
other time concerning the negotiations.
SEC. 8. ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) In General.--At the time the President submits to the
Congress the final text of an agreement pursuant to section
5(a)(1)(C), the President shall also submit a plan for
implementing and enforcing the agreement. The implementation
and enforcement plan shall include the following:
(1) Border personnel requirements.--A description of
additional personnel required at border entry points,
including a list of additional customs and agricultural
inspectors.
(2) Agency staffing requirements.--A description of
additional personnel required by Federal agencies responsible
for monitoring and implementing the trade agreement,
including personnel required by the Office of the United
States Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, the
Department of Agriculture (including additional personnel
required to implement sanitary and phytosanitary measures in
order to obtain market access for United States exports), the
Department of the Treasury, and such other agencies as may be
necessary.
(3) Customs infrastructure requirements.--A description of
the additional equipment and facilities needed by the United
States Customs Service.
(4) Impact on state and local governments.--A description
of the impact the trade agreement will have on State and
local governments as a result of increases in trade.
(5) Cost analysis.--An analysis of the costs associated
with each of the items listed in paragraphs (1) through (4).
(b) Budget Submission.--The President shall include a
request for the resources necessary to support the plan
described in subsection (a) in the first budget that the
President submits to the Congress after the submission of the
plan.
SEC. 9. COMMITTEE STAFF.
The grant of trade promotion authority under this Act is
likely to increase the activities of the primary committees
of jurisdiction in the area of international trade. In
addition, the creation of the Congressional Oversight Group
under section 7 will increase the participation of a broader
number of Members of Congress in the formulation of United
States trade policy and oversight of the international trade
agenda for the United States. The primary committees of
jurisdiction should have adequate staff to accommodate these
increases in activities.
SEC. 10. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
(a) In General.--Title I of the Trade Act of 1974 (19
U.S.C. 2111 et seq.) is amended as follows:
(1) Implementing bill.--
(A) Section 151(b)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(1)) is amended by
striking ``section 1103(a)(1) of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, or section 282 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act'' and inserting ``section 282 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or section 5(a)(1) of the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
(B) Section 151(c)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(c)(1)) is amended by
striking ``or section 282 of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act'' and inserting ``, section 282 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, or section 5(a)(1) of the Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
(2) Advice from international trade commission.--Section
131 (19 U.S.C. 2151) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 123 of this Act
or section 1102 (a) or (c) of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' and inserting ``section 123 of
this Act or section 3(a) or (b) of the Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority Act of 2001,''; and
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``section 1102 (b) or
(c) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988''
and inserting ``section 3(b) of the Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority Act of 2001'';
(B) in subsection (b), by striking ``section
1102(a)(3)(A)'' and inserting ``section 3(a)(3)(A) of the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''; and
(C) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 1102 of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' and
inserting ``section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2001,''.
(3) Hearings and advice.--Sections 132, 133(a), and 134(a)
(19 U.S.C. 2152, 2153(a), and 2154(a)) are each amended by
striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' each place it appears and
inserting ``section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2001,''.
(4) Prerequisites for offers.--Section 134(b) (19 U.S.C.
2154(b)) is amended by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting
``section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act
of 2001''.
(5) Advice from private and public sectors.--Section 135
(19 U.S.C. 2155) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(1)(A), by striking ``section 1102 of
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and
inserting ``section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2001'';
(B) in subsection (e)(1)--
(i) by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988'' each place it appears and
inserting ``section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2001''; and
(ii) by striking ``section 1103(a)(1)(A) of such Act of
1988'' and inserting ``section 5(a)(1)(A) of the Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''; and
(C) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 1101 of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting
``section 2 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act
of 2001''.
(6) Transmission of agreements to congress.--Section 162(a)
(19 U.S.C. 2212(a)) is amended by striking ``or under section
1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988''
and inserting ``or under section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
(b) Application of Certain Provisions.--For purposes of
applying sections 125, 126, and 127 of the Trade Act of 1974
(19 U.S.C. 2135, 2136(a), and 2137)--
(1) any trade agreement entered into under section 3 shall
be treated as an agreement entered into under section 101 or
102, as appropriate, of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111
or 2112); and
(2) any proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to
a trade agreement entered into under section 3 shall be
treated as a proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant
to a trade agreement entered into under section 102 of the
Trade Act of 1974.
SEC. 11. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Agreement on agriculture.--The term ``Agreement on
Agriculture'' means the agreement referred to in section
101(d)(2) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C.
3511(d)(2)).
(2) Core labor standards.--The term ``core labor
standards'' means--
(A) the right of association;
(B) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
(C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor;
(D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and
(E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.
(3) GATT 1994.--The term ``GATT 1994'' has the meaning
given that term in section 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act (19 U.S.C. 3501).
(4) ILO.--The term ``ILO'' means the International Labor
Organization.
(5) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen;
(B) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity
organized under the laws of the United States; and
(C) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity that
is organized under the laws of a foreign country and is
controlled by entities described in subparagraph (B) or
United States citizens, or both.
(6) Uruguay round agreements.--The term ``Uruguay Round
Agreements'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(7)
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(7)).
(7) World trade organization; wto.--The terms ``World Trade
Organization'' and ``WTO'' mean the organization established
pursuant to the WTO Agreement.
(8) WTO agreement.--The term ``WTO Agreement'' means the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered
into on April 15, 1994.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas)
and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) each will control 30
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas).
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Any bill of this magnitude that comes to the floor will always have a
history of would have, could have, should have; but what is more
difficult about this bill than most is that my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle have been forced to diminish the contribution from my
colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dooley), the very brave
and knowledgeable members of the Committee on Ways and Means, the
gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Tanner), and the gentleman from Louisiana
(Mr. Jefferson).
Both the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Tanner) and the gentleman from
Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson) are members of the Subcommittee on Trade of
the Committee on Ways and Means, that subcommittee that deals on an
ongoing, everyday basis with this issue. They are among the most
knowledgeable in the House. But because some of my friends on the other
side are so driven to deny the President the use of this legislative
tool, that somehow the fact that the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Levin), working with the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter),
someone who is not on the Committee on Ways and Means, is to be held up
as
[[Page H8994]]
an example of the way we should operate, but when members of the
Committee on Ways and Means get together to work on this problem, that
is a model to blast, to argue it is not bipartisan, to argue the
product is not any good and whether they mean to or not.
I took this time at the beginning, regardless of what the vote is at
the end, to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Dooley), to thank
the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Jefferson), to thank the gentleman
from Louisiana (Mr. Tanner), and to thank their staffs. For almost 5
months we have worked on what was said to be an impossible project, to
resolve the differences that drove us not to provide this power to the
President previously. I voted for that. I will vote it for any
President, but to trash my colleagues who are powerful enough in terms
of their belief that something needed to be done, for my colleagues to
carry the day by defeating this is unworthy of any Member.
Attack me, I understand it. I am one of the targets and the symbols;
but do not, do not, do not derogate the contribution of those Democrats
who were strong enough and who believed enough in this to work together
in an intellectually honest way, to produce a product that ironically
is better than any product that has ever been brought to this floor in
a number of ways, which we will talk about.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 4 minutes
to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson) to allocate as he sees
fit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Matsui), a senior member, one who has worked so hard on
the alternative to the majority bill.
Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Rangel), the ranking Democrat member of the committee, for yielding me
the time.
Let me just say this. I am holding in my hands two volumes. These are
pieces of legislation that was passed in 1994. It was to implement the
Uruguay Rounds and basically put in place the World Trade Organization.
I do not say this as somebody who actually produced this legislation
along with my colleague the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Crane).
I have been a free trader for the last 23 years, since I have been in
the United States Congress. I show my colleagues these documents,
mainly because we took an up or down vote in 1994, after about 5 hours
of debate, and passed this legislation, 5,000 pages.
The Uruguay Round, which passed 7 years ago, was basically about
reducing tariffs and eliminating quotas. We had a little about
intellectual property, but it was basically about tariffs and quotas.
This next round, the round that we just witnessed in Doha, the
beginning of, will be a round in which we not only talk about tariffs
and quotas, which will be a small part of it, but it will be about
antitrust laws. It will be about food safety laws. It will be about
changes in hundreds of government regulations in the United States.
The United States Trade Representative will be able to go through the
back door, through the World Trade Organization, and make major changes
in domestic regulations and domestic laws; and if my colleagues think
these volumes are big, wait till we see 4 or 5 years from now when
these negotiations are continued. We will see a volume four or five
times larger than this, and we will have 4 hours of debate on the floor
of the House, and we have to vote yes or no; and I will guarantee my
colleagues they will not know for 2 or 3 years what will be in this
legislation.
We might find that there will be a situation where basically we will
be making major changes in antitrust laws, and we will not even know
whether the consumer will be protected. This is why the legislation
should go down, and we should review it again.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
What we will hear from the other side all day is would have, could
have, should have. Would have, could have, should have; would have,
could have, should have; would have, could have, should have; would
have, could have, should have.
At some point my colleagues have to decide whether or not the
President needs this power. It is going to have to be done in a
bipartisan way, and we have a bipartisan product in front of us.
Mr. Speaker, I place in the Record the ``Statement of Administration
Policy,'' which begins: ``The Administration strongly supports H.R.
3005.''
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management
and Budget,
Washington, DC, December 5, 2001.
Statement of Administration Policy
H.R. 3005--Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001
(Rep. Thomas (R) CA and 5 cosponsors)
The Administration strongly supports H.R. 3005 and looks
forward to working with the Congress to provide the President
with the authority and flexibility to secure the greatest
possible trade opportunities for America's farmers, workers,
producers, and consumers. H.R. 3005 would provide Trade
Promotion Authority for the President and would establish
special procedures for the consideration of legislation to
implement trade agreements.
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) is about asserting American
leadership, strengthening the American economy, and creating
American jobs.
A congressional grant of TPA takes on renewed importance
with the launch of new global trade negotiations. These
negotiations can open markets and provide job creating
opportunities for every sector of the American economy. But
the President can strike the best deal for American workers
and families only with approval of TPA. TPA's enactment will
send a powerful signal to our trading partners that the
United States is committed to free and open trade.
TPA is also essential to put the United States back at the
table to help set the rules of the trading game. Our global
influence diminished in recent years as other countries moved
ahead while we have been stalled. There are currently more
than 130 free trade agreements in the world. The United
States is party to only three.
The Bush Administration is committed to consultations with
Congress to help ensure that the Administration's negotiating
objectives reflect the views of our elected representatives,
and that they will have regular opportunities to provide
advice throughout the negotiating process. H.R. 3005 deepens
the traditional partnership between the Executive branch and
the Congress through the creation of a joint Congressional
Oversight Group with broad bipartisan representation from all
the Committees that have jurisdiction over a part of a trade
negotiation.
Without TPA, the United States will fall behind in shaping
the rules of globalization, our new momentum for trade will
be undercut, and the confidence and growth necessary for
economic recovery will be weakened.
Passage of H.R. 3005 will send a strong signal of U.S.
leadership in trade liberalization.
What does this package do? Obviously it creates the power to
negotiate specific agreements, which will come to us later, without
ability to equivocate or disagree. This legislation is the best in
terms of agricultural objectives we have ever seen. It is the best in
foreign investment we have ever seen. It is the best in electronic
commerce we have ever seen. It is the best in intellectual property. It
is the best in foreign relations, and for the first time treated
equally with trade is labor and the environment. It is the best we have
ever seen in a dispute resolution, and it is the most comprehensive
oversight and scrutiny ever presented to the Congress. It is more
bipartisan, more representative, and more effective in terms of
expanding the number of Members who are able to deal with these issues.
In addition to that, after we took the product, put together by my
friends that I had mentioned earlier, we then went and talked to
additional Members. Through this process of talking to Members, what do
they think of this work product, and from their perspective how can it
be improved, they said we want to make sure there is not a race to the
bottom on the labor and the environmental standards. We did that.
They said we want to make sure that no foreign investors when we go
to court have greater rights than any U.S. citizen. Okay. We did that.
They said they want to make sure that if there is foreign currency
changes, that it is not foreign currency manipulation for the purpose
of getting a trade advantage. We said that is a good idea. It is in the
bill.
Members asked for special consideration in terms of import-sensitive
products. They have gotten it in three
[[Page H8995]]
different locations because clearly they are threatened if they are
import sensitive.
Members asked that the administration not reduce textile tariffs when
they are negotiating with another country that, as the gentleman from
California (Mr. Matsui) held up in terms of the Uruguay Round, where
other countries said they would reduce their tariff and they have not.
We said they are right. We are going to make sure that our negotiators
do not lower our tariffs when the other country they are negotiating
with have higher tariffs.
Members asked for an improved consultation and opportunity to
actually withdraw trade promotion authority if the administration
failed to consult. In a number of ways, we said, they are right; we
will enhance it.
Finally, on the oversight, not just the committee's of jurisdiction,
but every committee whose jurisdiction would be affected by the
potential legislation, the administration has to come to us at the
beginning of the process, during the process, and at the end of the
process. They have to satisfy the Members of Congress on transparency
and information transfer.
The administration does not determine when they are through. The
administration does not determine how much information is to be made
available. For the first time in any agreement, it is the Congress that
controls how much information the administration has to provide.
In every aspect, this is a better negotiating tool than we have ever
seen in the past. It is bipartisan. It is something that the President
has said he desperately needs for a number of reasons; and there is no
solid, substantial reason that this should not pass today.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that we extend the
time for debate for 1 hour in view of the fact that the Committee on
Rules did not see fit to give the Democrats a substitute, in view of
the fact that the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) put this bill
together in the middle of the night without a hearing, and we are now
finding sometimes for the first time what is in it.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, and I do plan
to object, I am very proud of the way the Committee on Rules has put
together this package, and I do not believe that this was done in the
middle of the night.
I believe, as I said in my statement during the debate on the rule,
we are faced with an up or down vote on whether or not we are going to
grant the President this very important Trade Promotion Authority, and
I happen to believe that we have been talking about this for a long
period of time.
During debate of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Hall) said let us move ahead and let us vote.
So, Mr. Speaker, I object.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, with deep disappointment, I yield such time
as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. George Miller).
(Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California asked and was given permission to
revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to
this legislation.
Ladies and Gentlemen, Trade Promotion Authority is being sold to
Americans as a few different things. The Bush Administration has called
today's vote an act of patriotism, now more necessary than ever. House
Republican leaders, in a suspicious midnight conversion, are now
feverishly promising gifts to its critics in return for their support.
Well folks, you can wrap this vote up in red, white and blue. You can
tie it with a bow and put it under the tree. But either way, this trade
bill is neither patriotic nor a gift. It is a dagger into our basic
rights and our standard of living.
Americans are being asked to make three sacrifices in exchange for
President Bush's trade policy. They are being asked to give up their
middle-class lifestyle, their environmental concerns, and their public
health. For all those Americans who think that sounds like a raw deal--
and they are right--I urge my colleagues to vote a resounding ``no'' on
this very bad trade deal.
When NAFTA was passed in 1993, its supporters promised nothing but
blue skies for hard-working Americans. Using fast-track authority.
President Clinton hurdled the bill through Congress without a truly
meaningful debate in Congress on the effects of such a trade agreement.
Millions of Americans have paid a high price for that lack of candor
eight years ago. A recent report shows that 3 million actual and
potential jobs disappeared from the American economy between 1994 and
2000 due to NAFTA and the accelerated trade deficits it caused. In my
home State of California, over 300,000 manufacturing jobs--good jobs,
well-paying jobs--crossed the border during the last 6 years. The
economic surge and booming stock market of the 1990s masked a harsh
reality for millions of American workers--for them, NAFTA has meant
nothing more than a pink slip.
Despite this, President Bush and others in Congress would expand
NAFTA further. If this bill passes, it would allow the Administration
to eventually spread NAFTA's misery to over 30 other nations in our
hemisphere and further exacerbate job losses in our own country.
America's workers had hoped for a different kind of generosity from the
American government. After losing their jobs to NAFTA a few years ago,
they waited for training programs. In the wake of September 11, they
waited for help that instead went to corporations. And they are waiting
still, listening to empty promises that TPA will help bring back their
jobs.
In the last day, realizing that they are perilously close to losing
this vote on fast track, Republican leaders have suddenly become
concerned about the needs of America's working men and women. They are
now promising more trade adjustment assistance, for example. That would
be nice. But their bill does not guarantee more trade adjustment
assistance, it just authorizes it. We've been there before. Their bill
continue to fail to address the deeper pitfalls that fast track poses
for working families.
Fast Track also poses a serious threat to the environment. Frankly,
it is insulting to my colleagues and all Americans when fast track
proponents claim that their bill includes strong language that
adequately addresses environmental concerns. One look at NAFTA shows
why we should be terrified at extending current trade rules to future
agreements.
Chapter 11, a provision intended to protect multinational
corporations from their host states, has been abused by corporations
that refuse to be bound by lawfully decided and publicly supported
environmental regulations. California was one of the first states to
run into the chapter 11 problem when it tried to protect its
environment from the harmful effects of MTBE. When California halted
the use of the gasoline additive, a Canadian corporation called
Methanex sued the United States under NAFTA's chapter 11 for almost one
billion dollars because of lost revenue it said it would incur from
California's decision to protect its environment. Luckily, however,
America remains a democracy where important environmental decisions are
reached in a fair, open manner.
Consider this frightening, fast track reality: If foreign companies
operating in the U.S. don't want to play by our rules, they get their
cases decided before a secret tribunal accountable to no one. This lack
of democracy doesn't bother the administration. The environment has
become a defendant without rights. Rights are reserved for multi-
national corporations.
Like pharmaceutical companies, for example. According to the Bush
administration, demanding higher labor standards in our trade
agreements is an imposition of values. On the other hand, when we force
other countries to rigidly adhere to our own intellectual property
laws, this is sound policy. A principal negotiating objective in this
bill is to achieve the elimination of, ``price controls and reference
pricing which deny full market access for United States products''. I
don't think such a narrow-minded, market-driven approach is justifiable
in the face of an HIV/AIDS pandemic that has decimated much of Africa.
Since the horrible events of September 11, public health experts have
warned that our country must reduce its vulnerability to potential
biological and chemical terrorism. The American Public Health
Association doesn't support this bill because it represents a risk to
the safety of America's food supply.
Let me quote Dr. Mohammad Akhter, Executive Director of the American
Public Health Association:
With our system of imported food safety so flimsy, the last
thing we need is an executive mandate for more porous
borders.
Executive mandate is exactly what this bill is. It stomps on the
constitutional authority granted to Congress over international
commerce. On these grounds alone, this bill is unconstitutional. But
add to that criticism the hostility that this bill shows toward labor
rights, environmental protection and public health, and you have a bill
that is indefensible and should be voted down here today. A vote
against fast track is a vote to defend the rights
[[Page H8996]]
and liberties that we hold so dear. It is a vote to support working men
and women in America. It is a vote to protect our environment, our
public health and our values.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), a member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
(Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from California
(Mr. Thomas) said, ``would have, could have and should have.'' Let us
add another part of that, ``want to,'' because as a free trader here I
strongly urge my colleagues today to vote against this particular
version of Fast Track Authority. The bill, put together by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) and the gentleman from Michigan
(Mr. Levin) is far superior, and I hope that that version will pass by
the end of the hour we have to debate.
While being more modern perhaps than their previous offerings, the
Republican bill still fails to give adequate voice to the new realities
of trade negotiations, that decisions made impact our constituents in
many more ways than they used to, because the negotiations no longer
simply attempt to lower tariffs or to reduce direct restraints on
trade.
Hence, the goals the United States should pursue need to be more
clearly articulated in any legislation, the issues that we do not
always see at the surface in Fast Track Authority. The role of Congress
needs to be far more extensive in order to bring about a successful
conclusion.
These new realities are knitted together in a far more comprehensive
manner by the Rangel-Levin version of Fast Track Authority than the
Republicans have proposed. We all would be better off in the long run
by a decision to negotiate, in a meaningful way, bipartisan legislation
rather than forcing this through this afternoon.
{time} 1400
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Crane), the chairman of the Subcommittee
on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means.
Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time, and I rise in strong support of H.R. 3005.
This bill is about arming the President and his team with the
authority to achieve trade agreements written in the best interest of
U.S. farmers, companies, and workers. It ensures that the President
will negotiate according to clearly defined goals and objectives
written by Congress.
Trade is fundamental to our relations with other nations. As the
President strives to neutralize international threats to our security,
TPA is an essential tool for him to have to use in the campaign to
build coalitions around the world that work with us to guard freedom.
H.R. 3005 strikes a two-way partnership between the President and
Congress on our common objectives for international trade negotiations
in which the United States participates. Its passage will ensure that
the world knows that Americans speak with one voice on issues vital to
our economic security.
My colleagues know I am not one who is enthusiastic about putting
labor and environmental matters on the trade agenda, and my original
TPA bill, H.R. 2149, which had 100 cosponsors, was completely clean in
this respect. But to protect our country's interests internationally, I
acknowledged the necessity of forging a meeting of minds on these
sensitive issues with our colleagues on the other side of the aisle.
The final result of difficult compromises over 5 months is the bill
before us today.
TPA simply offers the opportunity for us to negotiate from a position
of strength, and does not in any way constitute final approval of any
trade agreement. Under this bill, Congress and the American people
retain full authority to approve or disapprove any trade agreement at
the time the President presents it to Congress.
While we have delayed these last 7 years to pass TPA, other countries
have accelerated their claims to new markets. The U.S. is the world's
greatest exporter, sending almost $1 trillion worth of goods and
services to foreign consumers. Expanding trade remains the linchpin of
any successful strategy to increase long-term noninflationary economic
growth.
In my home State of Illinois, over 400,000 jobs are tied directly to
exports. These jobs are more secure and pay over 15 percent more than
nontrade-related jobs. According to a study by the National Association
of Manufacturers, companies that manufacture for export are almost 10
percent less likely to go out of business than others. These firms pay
better benefits. In Illinois, these good, high paying, trade-related
jobs are often in the machinery, agriculture, information technology,
and chemical sectors. These are the types of jobs that will not be
created if we reject the opportunities of the international marketplace
by voting no on H.R. 3005.
In these times of economic dislocation, we cannot afford to deny
President Bush a primary tool of economic growth. Americans have never
been reluctant to compete head to head with our trading partners. We
should not dash the best chance we have of creating a better future of
dynamic economic growth and success for our workers, businesses, and
farmers in international markets.
I urge a ``yes'' vote on H.R. 3005.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Sawyer).
(Mr. SAWYER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the measure before
us, confident that we can do better.
Mr. Speaker, I bring credentials to this discussion.
I have supported trade initiatives since I came to Congress. And I
continue to believe that Presidential trade negotiating authority is an
important tool. But it must be the right kind of authority, suited to
our time. And the bill before us does not provide that.
Trade negotiations have moved far beyond the issue of tariffs. These
negotiations now affect our nation's tax laws, intellectual property
standards, insurance system, and agricultural programs. These are
issues that would not have occurred to Congress when we launched GATT
after World War II. Our trade laws must change with the times. The
volume and content of international trade has expanded enormously in
the past decade. And the scope of trade agreements has expanded well
beyond the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means in the last
quarter century. Trade affects all of our constituents on a daily
basis, and we must strengthen our responsibility to speak for them.
Congress must now expand its capacity to engage negotiators over the
often long and complex course of modern trade agreements. We need an
expanded, independently informed, and active set of Congressional
advisers. And if the President's negotiators are obviously not
fulfilling their stated objectives, Members must have an opportunity to
vote on a resolution of disapproval that does not have to be passed
first by the Ways and Means Committee. Congress must have an integral
role, more than just more vague promises from the Administration to
consult with us. If the consultations, or rather lack of them, that
bring us to this juncture today are an example of what our colleagues
have in mind, it is an empty promise indeed. Giving Congress real
participatory oversight of the negotiations is the best way to build
Congressional support for the agreements that are ultimately reached.
It is simply not true to say that opponents of the Thomas bill are
opponents of free trade. That statement ignores the honest effort led
by Mr. Rangel to craft a bill that will accomplish the objective of
promoting trade without sacrificing our capacity to continue to work
towards basic environmental and labor standards.
A vote against today's bill is not an attempt to hold free trade
hostage until the rest of the world matches our labor standards. The
Rangel alternative expects nothing of the sort. A vote against the bill
is a vote to go back to work on legislation that will engage our
partners in a real dialogue. We must ensure, at a minimum, that
countries do not weaken their labor and environment laws to attract
investment. It is a vote to go back to work on a bill that will create
the relationship that should naturally exist between the World Trade
Organization and the International Labor Organization. It is a vote to
ensure that the rules we set up do not give foreign investors greater
rights in America than Americans themselves enjoy.
I look to the future, and I know we can build a bipartisan consensus
for trade promotion authority. That is crucial because any trade
negotiating framework must have the confidence
[[Page H8997]]
of more than a narrow, partisan majority in order to command real
respect for trade agreements that flow from it. The bill before us
today, regrettably, does not do that. We can do better.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Cardin), a distinguished member of the Committee on Ways
and Means.
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I support granting the President Trade
Promotion Authority, but I oppose the bill we are considering today. I
have supported fast track authority for NAFTA, for GATT, I supported
PNTR, but I oppose this bill.
The reason I oppose it is that the landscape for trade legislation
has changed, yet our delegation of authority to our President has not.
Let me just cite one example.
We talk about putting in our authority that we expect to make
progress on labor standards by enforcing one's own laws. Yet when we
accomplished that for Jordan, the first thing we did was to weaken our
ability to enforce those standards.
Let us take a look at antidumping laws. We passed legislation in this
body that said we would not weaken our antidumping and countervailing
duty laws. Yet in Doha we put that on the table for negotiations. So at
least we would think that this underlying bill would make a principal
objective of trade that we do not weaken our own laws in this regard.
But, no, we put it as a third priority. What message is that to our
trading partners? We can do better.
Support the motion to recommit with the Rangel bill, then we really
will give the right authority to the President. I urge rejecting the
underlying bill and supporting the motion to recommit.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Herger), a member of the Committee on
Ways and Means.
Mr. HERGER. Mr. Speaker, this is without a doubt one of the most
important votes any of us will cast this Congress. Today we are
deciding whether or not we will give American workers and American
companies the support they need to open international markets.
Nowhere is trade more important than on the farm. Last year, more
than $140 million worth of dried plums, $600 million worth of almonds,
were exported from the State of California, much of it from my northern
California district. California exports 80 percent of its cotton, 70
percent of its almonds, and 40 percent of its rice, yet our farmers
face an average tariff rate of 62 percent. These barriers will never be
eliminated until we give the President Trade Promotion Authority.
I strongly urge my colleagues to support TPA.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield an additional 2
minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson.)
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Without objection, the
gentleman from Louisiana will control 2 additional minutes.
Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Moran).
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Moran).
Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I want to address myself
particularly to the Democratic side of the aisle, not necessarily to
all of the Democratic Caucus, because I understand that many of us are
in districts that have high concentrations of organized labor, have
high concentrations of textiles and other industries that could be
adversely affected by trade. But I know that there are at least 60
Members who represent districts that are highly dependent upon trade,
that in fact represent the highest economic growth sectors of this
economy; technology, telecommunications, professional services products
throughout the manufacturing sector benefit from international trade.
All of our constituents benefit by lower prices in products and
services as a result of trade. In fact, all of us have constituents
whose incomes are 15 percent greater because they are in export-related
jobs.
The reality is that this bill in fact, is bipartisan, and nobody
outside the boundaries of the Beltway cares about personalities or
process. They look at policy. From a policy standpoint, we have
enforceable standards on labor and the environment. We have the
availability of the use of sanctions for all such negotiating
objectives. We have transparency in all commercial transactions.
This is the most substantial progress in U.S. trade policy with
respect to labor and the environment that we have ever had the
opportunity to vote for. This is a good bill. It is one we should all
support. I urge its approval.
Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to
the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks).
(Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Trade
Promotion Authority Act of 2001. This is outstanding legislation.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3005 is legislation that will grant to the
President Fast Track negotiating authority for certain trade
agreements. I am convinced, Mr. Speaker, that this authority is
necessary to ensure that the United States remains a global leader on
free trade, and to enable this President and future Presidents to
continue to work to open foreign markets to American goods.
Clearly in today's global economy, our Nation has a major interest in
reducing barriers to international trade, with more and more American
jobs dependent upon our ability to market our goods and services to
overseas customers. And certainly in my State of Washington, which is
the most trade-dependent in the Nation, our ability to trade freely
with foreign nations sustains an enormous portion of our economy. In
Washington, we exported more than $33 billion in goods each year,
estimated to sustain more than 1 million jobs. The Puget Sound area of
our State was recently described as the most export-dependent U.S.
metropolitan area. So this is an issue that relates very much to the
creation of new jobs in our region, and certainly it plays a major role
in the national economy as well, helping to improve our balance of
trade and provide jobs for American workers in the 21st century.
And these are good jobs. These are not low wage service jobs that
have been generated from the growth of international trade in my State.
They are family-wage jobs that pay substantially greater than the
national average. We are talking about thousands of union machinists
making airplanes at the Boeing Company, about software developers at
Microsoft, mill workers who fabricate aluminum at Kaiser, chipmakers at
Intel, and workers at Weyerhauser who produce lumber wood products.
Trade is not just important to large businesses and big corporations.
In my state, there are many more small businesses than big ones that
owe their income to international trade.
There are many small companies that supply machine and airplane parts
that go into the aircraft that we sell overseas, thousands of farmers
that grow apples and wheat, and countless small, family-owned mills
that process timber and sell the products in Asian and other overseas
markets. And there are jobs that are sustained by these exporters:
Bankers, teachers, restaurant workers, plumbers, lawyers and countless
others.
The economic recession has had a severe impact on the State of
Washington. The end of the high technology boom and the effect that the
attacks on September 11 have had on the aircraft industry has been
devastating. Currently, we are suffering the highest unemployment rate
in the Nation--6.6 percent.
My highest priority as a Member of Congress has always been jobs.
Increasing our trade and exports with other countries means jobs for
Americans and jobs for people in Washington State. In my judgment, the
fastest way out of this recession is to tear down the barriers other
nations have put up against American goods and services, enabling our
manufacturers and other businesses to access new markets. I believe in
the ability of our workers and businesses to compete against anybody
and win.
Some of my colleagues claim that Trade Promotion Authority is not
needed; that the President can already conduct trade negotiations
without expedited authority granted by Congress. This is true, the
President can negotiate an agreement with other nations. However, what
we have found since Fast Track authority lapsed in 1994 is that other
nations are unwilling to negotiate with us knowing that any agreement
reached with the administration would likely be changed by Congress
without consultation or consideration of the views of the other party
to the agreement. This is why President Clinton strongly urged Congress
to extend Fast Track authority several years ago.
[[Page H8998]]
We are falling behind. Of the more than 130 free trade agreements in
the world today, the United States is a party to only three. The
European Union, by contrast, is a party to more than 27. Because they
cannot negotiate a fair deal with the United States, other countries
are choosing to buy European-made manufactured goods and agricultural
commodities, putting our factory workers and farmers at a distinct
disadvantage.
I urge my colleagues to consider very seriously how a vote against
this bill will affect our nation's ability to compete in the global
marketplace. I also ask that you think about how important this bill is
to enable our economic recovery. For both of these reasons, I encourage
my colleagues to join me in support of H.R. 3005.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Shaw), a member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, ``Made in the USA'' is a badge of pride. It is a symbol
of quality. It is a symbol of good workmanship. It is not a symbol of
protectionism. The greatest, largest economy in the world cannot be
afraid of free trade. The most free country, the strongest country in
the world, cannot be afraid to give to their President the same
authority that every other President and Prime Minister in this world
has today.
Let us give this authority to the President. We are not voting on a
treaty. We are simply voting on the authority of the President to go
forward. The rest of the world is going towards free trade. We are
going to lose markets to the countries that have free trade. Let us
support this bill. It is very important to give the President this
authority.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Kind).
Mr. KIND. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding me this
time, and I rise reluctantly in opposition to H.R. 3005 today.
I say reluctantly, because I believe in trade, the necessity for it
to achieve economic growth and expanded opportunities for all of our
workers, I believe the President needs this authority, and I have
supported all trade agreements in Congress since I have been here; this
debate today, however, is not about being for trade or against trade,
it is about establishing the rules of trade in the 21st century.
The world is very different than it has been in the past when trade
negotiations were, by and large, about reducing trade barriers, quotas,
and tariffs. There are many more complex and evolving issues involving
trade: labor and environmental standards, antitrust, health and safety
standards, privacy standards. The major issue for trade in the 21st
century will be the harmonization of these different standards. And the
question is do we harmonize upwards or downwards? Do we improve
standards around the globe or is it a race to the bottom?
That is why I, along with the gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui),
believe there needs to be a greater institutional role for Congress to
have consistent with our Article I, section 8 responsibilities in the
Constitution. But I resent the fact that many of us have had to come
begging in the 11th hour to get the majority party and the
administration to do right by American workers today with an adequate
worker relief package which is the right thing to do anyway. That
should not occur. It should have been dealt with months ago, but
instead it came to this. Trade policy should not be partisan or
personality driven. Let's instead do it right.
So unfortunately I rise in opposition and encourage support for the
motion to recommit.
As our Nation leads the world into the 21st century, we should not
shy from opportunities to guide and expand global trade. Opening up
foreign markets to American goods not only provides economic growth
potential, but also exposes American ideals to people around the globe.
I cannot, however, support the majority's trade authority legislation
because it does little service to real problems facing this Nation,
refuses to guide trade negotiations in a positive way, and
unnecessarily maintains a weak constitutional role for Congress in
regulating international commerce, which is our obligation under
article 1, section 8 of the Constitution.
In a world fused by global integration and communication,
international trade has become a linchpin of not only our national
economy, but also the economies of most nations. We must remember that
today's vote, however, is not about promoting or suppressing trade
between the United States and other nations. This vote is about how our
Federal Government goes about the process of regulating commerce
between nations.
Our Founding Fathers deliberately put Congress in control of
regulating commerce with foreign nations. With the impact of tariffs
and duties directly affecting their diverse constituencies, Members
have a responsibility to weigh in on the regional impacts of these
mechanisms. Today's trade environment is constantly changing, with
nontariff trade issues impacting all aspects of our economy and law.
Issues including antitrust law, intellectual property, and
pharmaceutical costs, along with concerns over regulatory
harmonization, require intense negotiations at a new level.
Nonetheless, the role of Congress should not be ignored as it is in
H.R. 3005, but reestablished in recognition of these new challenges. To
this end, I encourage my colleagues to consider the establishment of a
Congressional Trade Office that could analyze the implications of trade
negotiations, and address the concerns of Congress. Such an office
would also be able to provide all Members, not just certain committee
leaders, with information on the range of issues facing each region in
a nonpartisan, objective fashion.
In formulating a trade authority bill that will help establish how
America engages the rest of the world in the 21st century, I had hoped
this Congress would seize the opportunity to move toward positive,
fundamental changes in world trade agreements. Unfortunately, by
forcing a partisan trade bill, the House leadership dismissed this
opportunity, effectively limiting our Nation's ability to advance
international labor, health, safety, and environmental standards, as
well as improve transparency in international organizations.
Developing trade relations between the United States and foreign
nations is often mutually beneficial on economic, societal, and
political fronts. We cannot, however, ignore that with such engagement,
competition increases and can result in winners and losers.
In my home town of La Crosse, WI, Isola Laminate Systems recently
laid off 190 skilled workers due in part to a worsening economy, but
also due to government trade policies relating to textiles. These laid
off workers should have every opportunity to receive adequate benefits,
including health and training, through Trade Adjustment Assistance.
While the majority has thrown a bone to workers in regard to increased
TAA assistance, the shortcomings of TAA have not been resolved.
Moreover, it is important that any real Trade Adjustment Assistance
reform provide benefits to our Nation's agricultural producers.
America's family farmers are impacted by our trade agreements through
markets being both gained and lost. Unfortunately, agricultural
producers are not currently eligible for trade adjustment assistance
even though family farms are going out of business at record levels.
Providing income assistance and job employment skills should be as
important for America's farmers as it is for our Nation's industrial
workers.
As recent reports have indicated, our Nation's economy has been in
recession since March 2001. In combination with immediate and long-term
economic losses associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11,
the economy's downturn has resulted in faltered businesses and laid-off
workers. In response, Congress has done little to come to the aid of
displaced workers throughout the country, despite demands by Members
and promises from the House leadership. In an effort to push
unemployment legislation I, along with some of my colleagues, sent a
letter on October 24, 2001 to the majority leadership stating our
refusal to support Trade Promotion Authority unless displaced worker
aide is addressed beforehand. The 11th hour promise to recommend action
on unemployment benefits for our Nation's affected workers is not
concrete, not encouraging, and not enough.
As a supporter of increased trade opportunity, I consider this vote
very important. H.R. 3005 as it currently stands, however, does not
provide assurances that the concerns of western Wisconsin residents
will be adequately addressed in future trade negotiations. If Congress
is going to cede some of its authority over the regulation of commerce
with foreign nations, such a proposal should be based on deliberate
policy and not partisan politics. The failure of the House leadership
to come to the negotiating table and work in a bipartisan manner on
this important issue is shameful. I strongly encourage my colleagues to
pass the motion to recommit and include language from the Rangel-Levin-
Matsui Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act, which more
accurately addresses the issues of international labor and
environmental concerns, and strengthens the critical role Congress
should play formulating trade.
Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
[[Page H8999]]
Texas (Mr. Stenholm), the ranking member of the Committee on
Agriculture.
(Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of Trade Promotion
Authority and the bill before us today. The truth about trade is that
there always are both successes and failures, winners and losers. But
for our Nation as a whole, the indisputable fact is trade is a net
positive.
When it comes to agriculture, the successes have outweighed the
failures. American farmers and ranchers now make a quarter of our sales
to overseas markets. Next year, agriculture exports are expected to
exceed $54.5 billion, making a net trade surplus of $14.5 billion. That
is just a fraction of what could be possible if we had freer and fairer
markets.
For workers who have lost in trade in the past, I sincerely believe
that the best and perhaps only way to fix what has failed is through
new negotiations that level the playing field. We must speak and act
with a united voice and a unified voice that is forged through a close
partnership between Congress and the executive branch. That is the
vision of the compromise bill before us today.
There is a dear price to be paid for delay. American farmers and
ranchers cannot afford for us to stand by and watch the rest of the
world unite behind trade. We need to participate. Support this bill
today.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle), a member of the Committee on Ways and
Means and the chairman of the Committee on the Budget in the House of
Representatives.
(Mr. NUSSLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, promoting international trade is essential
to our economy and to our ability to secure America's future. Granting
the President authority to improve and expand trade agreements is
essential to securing America's future. We cannot say that we are for
trade if we vote against promoting trade authority for the President.
Let me talk about agriculture. Agriculture would probably be the
biggest beneficiary under this agreement and under this legislation.
Thirty-five percent of agricultural goods from my district alone are
exported. If you walk out into a corn field and count the rows, 1 of
every 5 corn rows in Iowa is exported.
But it is not just agriculture. In my district, 217 manufacturers in
little old Iowa, in the Second District, export on a regular basis.
John Deere, 1 of every 4 green tractors that come off the line is
exported overseas. Thirty-five thousand jobs nationwide are export
dependent.
Revitalize our economy, create jobs, pass Trade Promotion Authority.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maine
(Mr. Allen).
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time, and I rise to support the Rangel- Levin bill and oppose the
Thomas bill, which contains provisions favoring the pharmaceutical
industry that will make it harder for Americans and our trading
partners to get access to affordable medicines.
The Thomas bill will force the Third World's poorest countries to
move more quickly to pay the First World's high drug prices in order to
treat diseases like AIDS. Unlike the Rangel-Levin bill, the Thomas bill
completely ignores the health needs of developing countries.
The Thomas bill directs the elimination of government measures, such
as price controls and reference pricing, used by many trading partners,
to keep prescription drugs affordable. This is not a proper trade
objective, it is a greed objective for the pharmaceutical industry.
{time} 1415
By forcing higher drug prices in Canada, it could deprive many
American seniors of an inexpensive source of drugs. In the U.S., it
could force repeal of the deep discounts available for veterans and
those on Medicaid. In the name of free trade, the Thomas bill protects
the monopolies of this country's most profitable industry, and hurts
the world's poorest disease-ridden countries. Vote down this bill.
Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Oklahoma (Mr. Carson).
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Oklahoma (Mr. Carson).
(Mr. CARSON of Oklahoma asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. CARSON of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlemen for
yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today as one of the distressingly few Democrats
in support of a grant of Trade Promotion Authority to President Bush.
My support of TPA springs from the recognition that trade is really
part of a larger debate on the proper role of America in the world
today. It is a debate that echoes in the halls of the Pentagon and the
National Security Council, as well as those of our trade
representatives, and that is waged with arguments in Doha but with arms
in the Hindu Kush.
Many of my colleagues in the Democratic Party state their belief in
free trade, but nonetheless refuse to support TPA unless it includes
provisions mandating other nations' compliance with our own
environmental and labor standards. Alas, this notion, if enacted, would
render TPA a nullity, a mere piece of paper that in the prelude
expresses support for trade but which, in the details, mocks that
claim. None of the developing nations with which we aspire to negotiate
new trade agreements will accept strict labor and environmental
provisions.
And equally as important, the best way to improve labor and
environmental standards, given many nations' social conditions, is to
increase the wealth of the developing world, which trade will do, while
also increasing our own wealth. It is a no-lose proposition.
To reject TPA is, in the end, to reject trade itself, which is a
disaster for the country and the world, and, for my own party, a
refusal to live up to its historic obligation to support free trade.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today as one of the distressingly few Democrats
in support of a grant of Trade Promotion Authority to President Bush.
My support of TPA springs from the recognition that trade is really
part of a larger debate on the proper role of America in the world
today. It is a debate that echoes in the halls of the Pentagon and
National Security Council, as well as those of our trade
representatives, and that is waged with arguments in Doha but with arms
in the Hindu Kush.
Since Adam Smith first articulated the case for free trade in the
18th century, economists, no matter whether liberal or conservative,
have acknowledged with near-unanimity the merits of trade
liberalization. Trade increases wealth for participating countries,
ensures access to high-quality products, and guarantees the efficient
use of resources. As Smith recognized, it pays for a country to
specialize in what it does best, even if that country can do everything
better than its trading partners. This is the essence of comparative
advantage.
Many of my colleagues in the Democratic Party state their belief in
free trade, but nonetheless refuse to support TPA unless it includes
provisions mandating other nation's compliance with our own
environmental and labor standards. Alas, this notion, if enacted, would
render TPA a nullity--a mere piece of paper that, in the prelude,
expresses support for trade but which, in the details, mocks that
claim. None of the developing nations with which we aspire to negotiate
new trade agreements will accept strict labor and environmental
provisions. And, equally as important, the best way to improve labor
and environmental standards, given many nation's social conditions, is
to increase the wealth of the developing world, which trade will do,
while also increasing our own wealth. It's no-lose proposition.
It is true that, while the nation tremendously benefits from trade,
certain sectors of our economy can be hurt. That is why, as Democrats,
we must support and expand Trade Adjustment Assistance, the portability
of health insurance benefits, more assistance to the International
Labor Organization and other non-governmental organizations that do the
heavy lifting on labor and environmental issues, and even wage
insurance for displaced workers. But at no cost should we scuttle one
of the great achievements of the post-war era: the liberalization of
trade. To reject TPA is, in the end, to reject trade itself, which is a
disaster for the country and the world, and, for my own party, a
refusal to live up to our historic obligation to reach out to the
world, bringing prosperity to our own workers and those abroad, too.
[[Page H9000]]
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Washington (Ms. Dunn).
Ms. DUNN. Mr. Speaker, I represented 700,000 in the suburbs of
Seattle and Tacoma. One-third of the jobs held by these people are
related to trade. Reducing trade barriers has never been more important
in the Puget Sound area. If we do not expand exports and open new
markets for Boeing jets and Microsoft software, we lose more jobs in
the Northwest. For Boeing workers, TPA means keeping the aircraft
industry viable in our community. Over $18 billion worth of aircrafts
were exported last year. Traditionally, half of Boeing's aircraft sales
are for overseas customers, a trend that will continue in the future.
For our farmers, TPA means that more people will have access to the
finest products in the world; 33 percent of Washington State
commodities, valued at $1.8 billion go to the international market.
For our high-tech firms, TPA means strengthening intellectual
property standards. The software industry loses $12 billion annually
due to counterfeiting and piracy. Reducing piracy in China alone could
generate $1 billion of revenue for the Northwest.
For women entrepreneurs, women-owned businesses involved in
international trade have higher growth rates, develop more innovations,
and create more jobs in their communities. Support TPA.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Ohio (Ms. Kaptur).
Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``no'' vote on the Thomas bill so
we can ultimately bring up the Rangel-Levin bill which takes an
important step to restore this body's constitutional mandate in trade
making so that trade regimes lift all people. Why pass another same-old
same-old trade bill that will bring us more lost jobs, more bankrupt
farmers with the lowest prices in history with growing trade deficits
every single year.
Fast Track procedures simply do not work. This Congress has the
ability to write trade agreements that leaves no sector behind,
recognizes worker rights, and a clean safe environment for each of the
world's citizens. Put a human face on globalization; vote ``no'' on the
Thomas bill and let us meet our constitutional obligations in this
Chamber to write trade bills that work for everyone.
Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Dooley), who has been a real leader in forging a
bipartisan effort on this bill.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Dooley).
(Mr. DOOLEY of California asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DOOLEY of California. Mr. Speaker, it was a pleasure to work with
the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson), the gentleman from
California (Mr. Thomas), the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Tanner), and
many others in drafting what I believe is a significant step forward in
developing Trade Promotion Authority.
Mr. Speaker, why is this important? It is important so the United
States can maximize its influence and maximize its leadership
internationally. It is important for the United States to demonstrate
how we can lead and expand not only economic opportunities for the
working people and the businesses in our country, but also demonstrate
through this policy of economic engagement, which is embodied in our
trade agreements, that we can do more to empower people throughout the
world.
When we look at those individuals in the developing world, every
dollar in their per capita income that they see improved gives them
greater purchasing power; but also with the improvement in their
quality of life and their economy, we see the advancement of human
rights, of civil liberties, and also the advancement of democracy.
What we are able to do in this Trade Promotion Authority is to ensure
that we are not only going to make progress in expanding the economic
opportunities; but also for the first time, we are going to be able to
provide the ability to see the enhancement of environmental and labor
standards internationally through our trade agreements.
What was also important for all of us to realize was that the only
way we can again provide that leadership is to ensure that we can get
these countries to the negotiating tables. A lot of the alternative
proposals that have been offered for Trade Promotion Authority,
unfortunately, would result in very few countries being interested to
participate in negotiations with the United States.
A failure to pass Trade Promotion Authority will have significant
impacts. In the last few weeks we have heard that Brazil and Bolivia
would fail to participate in a Free Trade Area to the America agreement
without the passage of TPA.
Following the Doha agreement, we have France that made a strong
statement that they would not be interested in participating in the
next round of negotiations if the United States President did not have
TPA. This is important to our economy and workers, and also to the
developing world.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Doggett), member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, here we have the ``fast'' Fast Track being
rammed through Congress, with all amendments and alternatives blocked
and 1 hour for 435 Members to debate this bill. When the House
Republican leadership acts in such a high-handed manner before the bill
is even passed it can hardly be expected to cooperate and collaborate
after Fast-Track authority is granted.
As a strong advocate for more international commerce, I have
supported trade agreements with China, the Caribbean Basin, Africa,
Jordan and most recently, the Andean region. The real issue today is
not whether to expand trade, but how. In the Ways and Means Committee I
sought unsuccessfully to obtain one simple guarantee: that foreign
investors would not be given more rights than American citizens.
Foreign investors should not be granted the right to eviscerate our
environmental, health, safety and consumer laws, in secret investor
tribunals beyond the review of the press, public, and watchdog groups.
I cannot support unlimited authority to negotiate international
agreement impacting the environment for an Administration whose
environmental record has ranged from indifference to outright
hostility. That is why the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, the
League of Conservation voters and every major environmental group in
this country is opposing this legislation. It relegates the role of
Congress to little more than preparing a Christmas wish list, hoping
that an Executive Santa Claus will deliver. I am not against taking a
fast track to more trade; I am against any proposal that does not give
the Congress a steering wheel and a brake when the administration takes
the wrong track for the environment.
Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Tennessee (Mr. Tanner), who has been a real partner in this effort.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Tennessee (Mr. Tanner).
Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlemen for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, this has been an honest, intellectual exercise in a
negotiation to try to do something for this country which desperately
needs to be done. The irony of part of this argument today is the very
means by which we address child labor, labor and environmental
standards of all sorts, is through a vehicle just like we have the vote
on today. It is the only way Congress can participate, and it ought to
be done. The irony is if we turn it down, what have we done? Nothing.
Absolutely nothing, and Congress has no voice at all in what goes on
around the world in the area of the world marketplace. That is really
pathetic.
The other thing I would like to say, if Members believe, as I think
everyone has to, that we can grow more food in this country than we can
consume, that we can make more products and stuff than we can sell and
buy from one another, then it is an economic fact of life, not a
political argument, that those engaged in surplus production are going
to lose their jobs. That is not
[[Page H9001]]
a political argument; that is an economic fact.
How do we save those jobs, how do we create new jobs, is by exports
so that people in this country can work to make, as an earlier speaker
said, tractors in Iowa to send to the rest of the world. That is what
this is about: jobs in this country.
Mr. Speaker, if we turn this down, we are going to wait awhile, 1, 2,
3 years, I will tell Members what is going to happen. Maybe 4, 5 years
from now we are going to wake up and the economic partnerships which
have been created between the Asians, the South Americans and the
European Union, we are going to be wondering what happened to the
United States leadership, to the United States jobs and to the United
States role as a leader in the world.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Becerra), a member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Speaker, I would support Fast Track legislation that
meaningfully addresses the areas of labor and the environment, and
provides an effective mechanism for congressional participation. This
bill does not. I urge my colleagues to vote against H.R. 3005.
Mr. Speaker, article 1 of the Constitution empowers this body,
Congress, to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Over the past 250
years of our Nation's existence, for only 20 of those years, from 1974
to 1994, has this body granted the President authority for fast
tracking any trade agreement. In those 20 years, five agreements were
signed. In contrast, during the 8 years of the Clinton administration,
300 agreements were signed with countries from Belarus to Japan to
Uzbekistan.
We can do this without Fast Track. We should have Fast Track, but it
should be a Fast Track that gives us a clear road map of where this
authority will take us.
We owe it to the American people not to abandon the American worker
or consumer. Until we have Fast Track legislation that guarantees where
we will protect our workers and consumers, we should not support Fast
Track legislation. Vote ``no'' on H.R. 3005.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I am someone who has never voted against
trade legislation on this floor. But unfortunately, the President and
the Republican leadership have missed an opportunity to move beyond the
partisan and narrow ideological divide.
The provisions of the bill of the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Rangel) which dealt with labor standards, multilateral environmental
agreements and the elimination of the chapter 11 imbalance could have
produced a bill which would have provided 250 ``yes'' votes on this
floor.
{time} 1430
But, instead, we are not even allowed to vote on it. We are only
given 30 minutes to debate it. It is a travesty. Instead, the majority
will be created by horse trading on citrus, on textiles, and on
whatever else we will find out when we read the paper over the next 1
or 2 weeks. It is a terrible way to create trade policy. At a time when
our Nation expects the best, we are falling short. It is shameful, it
is unnecessary.
I urge a ``no'' vote. Come back, do it right. There will be an
opportunity.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. McDermott), one of the active Members on trade.
(Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks and include extraneous material.)
Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 3005,
the Trade Promotion Authority Act of ``Fast Track'' as it is commonly
called.
Let me first say that there probably isn't a Member in the House that
has voted in favor of more trade legislation that I have. No part of
the country is more dependent on trade than the district I represent in
Congress. Almost one fourth of the jobs in the greater Seattle area are
generated through trade. Trade fosters peaceful international
relations, raised the quality of life of working families in our
country as well as those in our partner nations. I have supported many
trade agreements--MFN for China, NAFTA, AGOA and the Reciprocal Trade
Agreement Authorities Act of 1998--but like any trader, I try to learn
from experience, and be careful that I only endorse agreements that
advance our national goals.
In the past year, our country lost more than one million
manufacturing jobs. We have an economy in very deep trouble. Weak prior
to September 11th, on that terrible day, it began to hemorrhage.
Mr. Speaker, during the 8 years of prosperity of the Clinton
administration, the United States negotiated more than 300 treaties. In
fact, only 4 years ago, there were those who said on this floor that
without Fast Track, Chile would never negotiate a treaty with us. At
the end of President Clinton's administration, Chile said they will.
And several months ago the President of Costa Rica announced his
country would negotiate with the United States, again without Fast
Track. Brazil's Minister Councilor stated at a New America Forum that
the slow pace of current FTAA negotiations, begun without Fast Track,
has nothing to do with the absence of Fast Track, and everything to do
with the United States' refusal to negotiate about citrus, meat and
steel, products with which Brazil feels it has a competitive advantage
on the table.
Now, there are a lot of us who have never voted against trade bills.
Never. Nobody has a district more dependent on trade than me. One out
of four jobs in my district comes from foreign trade. But when you keep
Congress out of it, when you do not give us a meaningful role, I cannot
support it.
A major problem with Representative Thomas' bill is its failure to
constrain trade negotiators from repeating the mistakes in NAFTA's
chapter 11 on investment. Foreign corporations are using NAFTA's
investment chapter to challenge core governmental functions such as
California's power to protect groundwater and the application of
punitive damages by a Mississippi jury to deter corporate fraud. At the
time of its ratification, few supporters of NAFTA realized that its
investment chapter opened the door to such challenges. Now we know the
potential impact of language being considered for inclusion in the FTAA
and other agreements. H.R. 3005 fails to address the danger that the
mistakes of NAFTA's chapter 11 will be repeated in negotiations for a
Free Trade Area for the Americas and other future agreements.
The Thomas bill would not protect multilateral environmental
agreements from being challenged as barriers to trade. These critical
agreements safeguard biodiversity, regulate trade in endangered
species, protect the ozone layer and control persistent organic
pollutants. The Thomas bill does nothing to discourage countries from
lowering or eliminating their environmental standards to gain unfair
trade advantages. It also fails to promote meaningful improvement in
environmental protection and cooperation.
The executive branch--and its Office of U.S. Trade Representative--
must not be given fast track authority that allows it to negotiate more
agreements that provide sweeping and controversial protections of
property rights at the expense of traditional government authority to
protect fair business competition, the environment, public health,
worker safety and similar public responsibilities. Rather than
compromising these legitimate governmental regulations, international
trade and investment agreements should pursue standards of
nondiscrimination that put U.S. companies and foreign companies on a
level playing field.
I urge rejection of the Thomas bill and urge you to vote for the
Levin-Rangel substitute.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Florida (Mrs. Thurman), a member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Thomas bill today. The
amendment that was approved by the Committee on Rules last night
recognizes some the issues facing Florida agriculture, but,
regrettably, this is not the real deal.
As we have seen in the past, the administration can still trade away
America's specialty ag products to gain market access for other
products abroad. This is the same empty promise. It did not work in
1998 and it will not work now. Florida farmers have a very long memory.
They are families who have fed this country for generations. They have
struggled against the tide of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round agreements,
and many of them have lost.
[[Page H9002]]
I would like to close with just a letter sent yesterday by the
Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association. Unlike some others in this who
continue to talk about it being good for agriculture, this is what
Florida agriculture says: ``Agriculture provides Florida with a strong
economic foundation, which is especially important during this economic
uncertainty. That foundation could be seriously jeopardized as a result
of trade agreements, most notably the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
that would be negotiated under TPA.''
Please vote against this bill.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Sherman).
(Mr. SHERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Will the gentleman take the
sticker off his lapel, please, as he addresses the House.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, over the last decades, we have moved from
the largest creditor Nation to the largest debtor Nation in the world.
We now run a trade deficit of nearly half a trillion dollars every
year. The dollar is on the road to crashing sometime in the next decade
or so, and this bill makes it all more certain and makes it happen
faster.
It provides access to the American markets to those with the very
lowest labor standards and the lowest environmental standards. It will
pressure us to see our trade deficit even get larger, or to cut our own
environmental standards, labor standards and wage rates in order to
compete. It deprives us of the opportunity to demand trade bills that
are fair and to involve Congress in making sure that the trade bills do
not simply increase trade, but increase exports more than imports. The
nonlegal barriers imposed, particularly by China, but other countries
as well, will ensure large trade deficits if we pass Fast Track now.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North
Carolina (Mr. Price).
(Mr. PRICE of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, during my time in this
body, I have generally supported trade agreements and the granting of
so-called Fast Track negotiating authority to the President. The
vigorous pursuit of bilateral and regional and world trade agreements
is an essential adaptation to the economic reality our country faces.
But not just any agreements will suffice. As we consider giving
negotiating authority to the President, it is important to make certain
our negotiating framework has kept pace with changes in the scope and
impact of trade. In my judgment, the bill before us today fails that
test.
It is not a totally deficient bill. In fact, it takes some important
steps towards addressing labor and environmental standards. But the
bill that the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) and his
collaborators produced should have been a starting point for wider
collaboration and negotiation, not a take-it-or-leave-it end point. Had
that occurred, this bill would give greater weight to basic labor
standards, would have stronger nonderogation provisions, and would more
adequately protect our environmental laws from challenges by foreign
investors.
We also, Mr. Speaker, need more assertive involvement by the
President, both in urging all parties on Capitol Hill toward
accommodation and in making his own negotiating objectives clear. It
would be easier to vote for this bill, despite its deficiencies, had we
heard from the President a convincing declaration that he is determined
not to put our country at a disadvantage by virtue of the labor and
environmental standards we maintain, and that he will instruct his
negotiators to give these matters high priority.
Mr. Speaker, we should defeat this bill and do the job right early
next year.
Mr. Speaker, I rise as a supporter of free and fair trade and of an
expansive American trade policy. Entrepreneurs, corporate leaders,
workers, and farmers in my North Carolina district have proven their
ability to compete in the new world marketplace, and although our state
has also seen more than its share of job losses and industrial decline,
a great deal of our growth and expanding prosperity have been generated
by international trade.
Therefore, during my time in this body, I have generally supported
trade agreements, the granting of normal trading relationship status to
China and other countries, and the granting of so-called ``fast track''
negotiating authority to the President. My view is and has been that we
cannot continue to grow and to bring better jobs and expanding
opportunity to our country by isolating ourselves or protecting
ourselves from competition. We must confidently and aggressively enter
the world marketplace, and the vigorous pursuit of bilateral, regional
and world trade agreements is an essential adaption to the economic
reality that we face.
Not just an agreements will suffice, however. As we anticipate the
challenges we face in the next five years, we must understand that
trade has greatly increased in volume and in value, that it will
increasingly involve nations with very different economic and social
structures from ours, and that the labor, environmental, safety, and
other policies and standards that we and other countries uphold are
highly relevant to the advantages or disadvantages we may experience as
we trade. Moreover, our ability to protect and improve such standards
in the context of trade agreements will greatly affect the impact of
trade on our own quality of life and on conditions in the countries
with which we do business.
So as we consider critically important legislation to give
negotiating authority to the President and to specify our negotiating
objectives, it is important to get it right--to understand these
changes in the scope and impact of trade and to make certain our
negotiating framework has kept pace. In my judgment, the bill before us
today fails that test.
It is not a totally deficient bill; in fact, it takes important steps
toward addressing labor and environmental standards and giving them a
status commensurate with other negotiating objectives. The bill that
Mr. Thomas and his collaborators produced should have been seen as the
starting point for wider collaboration and negotiation, not a take-it-
or-leave-it end-point. Had that broader, bipartisan collaboration taken
place, the bill would have given greater weight to the ILO's core labor
standards in bilateral and regional negotiations and would have
mandated the pursuit of a WTO working group on labor. It would have
more strongly stipulated that agreements should have non-derogation
clauses--that is, understanding that parties should not relax their
labor or environmental laws in order to gain a trading advantage. It
would have reduced barriers to investment while ensuring the integrity
of our environmental law, by providing that foreign investors would
have no greater rights in the U.S. than U.S. investors. And it would
have given Congress a stronger role in overseeing negotiations and
holding negotiators accountable. In all of these areas, the Rangel-
Levin substitute offers reasonable alternatives that deserve more
consideration than they got.
Mr. Speaker, the flawed process and flawed product are intertwined.
If this bill passes today, it will be by the narrowest of margins on a
largely partisan basis. That does not bode well for future trade
agreements or for our country's trading posture. And it did not have to
be this way. A more inclusive bipartisan process would produce a far
superior bill that would pass by a large bipartisan majority, and that
in turn would greatly strengthen the hand of the President and his
representatives as they enter critical negotiations. That is the kind
of outcome we can have if we defeat this bill and do it right early
next year.
In this endeavor, we need more assertive involvement by the
President, both in urging all parties on Capitol Hill toward
accommodation and in making his own negotiating objectives clear.
Proponents of TPA rightly point out that we are not writing actual
trade agreements here and that the enabling legislation should not be
overly prescriptive. Considerable presidential discretion is necessary
and desirable. But that also places a burden of responsibility and
accountability on the President to inform Congress and the public as to
how he intends to use his discretion and what negotiating objectives he
will vigorously pursue. It would be easier to vote for the bill before
us today, despite its deficiencies, had we heard from the President a
convincing declaration that he is determined not to put our country at
a disadvantage by virtue of the labor and environmental standards we
maintain, and that he will instruct his negotiators to give these
matters high priority.
But we have not heard such a declaration, and so the deficiencies of
this enabling legislation become all the more troubling. The Rangel-
Levin substitute, while not perfect, is a better alternative. And if
the motion to recommit fails, I ask my colleagues to vote against this
version of TPA, so that early next year we can produce legislation that
more adequately expressed this body's and this country's bipartisan
support for expanded trade and that puts
[[Page H9003]]
our future trade negotiations on the firmest possible footing.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).
(Mr. ENGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the bill.
The TPA bill does not require countries to implement any meaningful
standards on labor rights. The bill simply requires that a country
enforce its existing laws--however weak they may be.
The TPA bill does not contain any meaningful protections for the
environment. The bill does nothing to prevent countries from lowering
their environmental standards to gain unfair trade advantages.
The TPA bill is gross abdication of Congress' power. Congress may
vote on a disapproval resolution, but only to certify that the
Administration has ``failed to consult'' with Congress. Furthermore,
unlike current Jackson-Vanik disapproval resolutions on trade, no floor
vote is even allowed unless the disapproval resolution is first
approved by the Ways and Means and Finance Committees--thereby bottling
up the resolution in committee.
The U.S. has now officially entered an economic recession, and
millions of workers are suffering. Neither the Administration nor the
Republican-controlled House has made any attempt to help unemployed
workers find new jobs, get unemployment benefits, or maintain health
coverage. Yet, here we stand again on the floor of the House--presented
with legislation that helps huge companies at the expense of American
workers.
This bill is bad for America. Defeat this bill and let's get to work
on helping American workers and the American economy.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to my good friend the
gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Clement).
Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Rangel), first, for always fighting for the working men
and women of this great country.
Mr. Speaker, I am concerned, like a lot of people, about the lack of
opportunity to debate on this important issue, but I stand here in
opposition to Fast Track, to H.R. 3005.
After several years of unprecedented growth, technological
advancements, medical and scientific innovations, increased
globalization, our economy is undergoing a dramatic slowdown.
We know about layoffs, we know about bankruptcies, and people are
really concerned about their jobs and about their future. And we need
to be concerned right now about the future of American workers and
protecting our environment. All must be factored into the TPA vote and
the long-term equation for the U.S. trade agenda.
I have always supported trade bills, but I cannot support this. We
have got this legislation before us now, and I question the
Constitutional authority concerning this bill because it affects our
Congress and our involvement in trade issues. Vote no.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield such time as he
may consume to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Camp), a member of the
Committee on Ways and Means.
(Mr. CAMP asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, Michigan ranks fourth in exports. Our family
farmers export 40 percent of what they produce. I will vote yes on TPA,
because fair and free trade means a secure economy and better jobs.
It's official. Our country is in a recession, but Congress is working
to help turn our economy around. One way we can do that is to expand
our nation's trading opportunity by giving the president Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA). This legislation will provide him the
ability to negotiate sound trade agreements that will give our economy
the boost it greatly needs.
Today we will vote on this important trade legislation which will
open more markets by eliminating and reducing trade barriers,
benefitting family farmers, employers small businesses, manufacturers,
working men and women, and consumers. A vote today for fair free trade
today would be the equivolent of a $1,300 to $2,000 tax cut for the
average American family. This is good news for local economies in all
50 states, including Michigan.
My state has much to gain from free trade. We've already seen that
with the North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which helped Michigan
exports grow faster than overall U.S. exports. Michigan ranked the
fourth highest in exports in 2000 with exports sales of merchandise
totaling $51.6 billion, up more than 24 percent from 1999. We live in
an export-dependent state with export sales of $5,193 for every state
resident. Opening more markets through free trade will only encourage
more economic growth in Michigan through exporting.
Economic growth from free trade also translates into more better,
high-paying jobs. Export-related jobs pay 13 to 18 percent higher than
the national average. Additionally, workers in exporting plants have
greater job security because they are 9 percent less likely to shut
down than those plants that do not export. In Michigan, we have 372,900
jobs directly dependent upon manufactured exports, in addition to the
more than 370,000 they support directly and indirectly.
Michigan farmers, who exported an estimated $868 million in
agricultural products last year, are also important to the entire
state's economy. Our state exports about 22 percent to 32 percent of
what Michigan farmers produce. Already we have seen the benefits of
free trade on our farmers who sell more soybean oil in South Korean now
that the country is reducing its tariff by 14.5 percent from 1995 to
2004. In the Philippines, they too are reducing their tariffs on
soybean mean from 10 percent to 3 percent.
While we have made progress in bringing down trade barriers, more
must be done. Fair, free trade means a secure economy, and more and
better jobs for Michigan residents as well as all Americans. This week
I will vote to give the president Trade Promotion Authority because we
will all win from passing this legislation. This trade bill will
provide him with the tools he needs to pull us out of this recession
and put our economy back on the right track.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins), an extremely valuable member of
the committee and one who helped us out in bringing this trade bill to
where it is today.
(Mr. COLLINS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
Mr. Speaker, as I have traveled throughout the Third District of
Georgia, touring textile plants, talking to small business people in
towns where textile plants have closed, I have repeatedly heard from
those people that they are tired of trade agreements that have exported
more jobs in their area than it has exported products. They are tired
of agreements that have exported plants, seeing those plants relocated
offshore, outside of the United States, all because of weak trade
agreements.
In many ways, we have been our own worst enemy when it comes to the
textile areas because we have repeatedly said no, no, no. But this time
we took a different direction, because I have at this point to commend
the gentleman from California (Chairman Thomas), the President, the
USTR Representative and Secretary Don Evans of Commerce, because as we
went to them and expressed our concerns and our problems, they
listened. Not only did they listen, Mr. Speaker, but they reacted to
those problems.
Many of the things that you heard the chairman repeat and talk about
earlier are provisions that strengthen this bill, provisions in this
bill that will strengthen not only the bill, but strengthen future
trade agreements, so that we do promote the exporting of goods.
This President needs the authority to be able to negotiate, to be at
the table to sell our products. And that is what it is all about,
products that are manufactured and produced and services that are
rendered by people of this country.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues, support the President on this. He
has a good track record in the few months that he has been in office.
He has already addressed the dumping of steel in this country that
hurts steelworkers, the dumping of softwood from Canada that hurt many
mill workers across this country. In Doha he resisted the pressure from
those who wanted to accelerate the phaseout of quotas and tariffs on
textiles. He has a good record. He is our leader. He can be the leader
and promoter of goods from this country in the international trade
market.
I urge support and passage of this Trade Promotion Authority.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to support Trade Promotion Authority to allow the
President to sell American goods and services. That's right, Mr.
Speaker. The President is and should be the number one salesperson for
American goods and services. He must be a leader in International
trade, promoting America the same
[[Page H9004]]
way he is leading in the international fight against terrorism.
American workers need a salesperson.
Now, I say to you, Mr. Speaker and to the leadership in the Congress,
the American worker has grown tired and weary of trade agreements which
export American jobs rather than American goods and services. The
American worker is tired of deep pocket CEO's of major corporations
sending their Washington lobbyists to urge the passage of trade
agreements and then within a short time announcing a plant closing in
the U.S., only to relocate to Mexico or some other country. The
American worker deserves trade agreements which promote the products
they produce or services they deliver. To assist and ensure the
President promotes the American worker, this bill contains legislative
language and report language requiring the President, when negotiating
with other nations to do the following:
First, it requires reciprocating trade agreements. In exchange for
allowing the selling of international products in our nation, it
requires the same consideration for American goods.
Second, it requires the President to negotiate on rules of origin for
U.S. content in products to be assembled elsewhere and sold back in the
U.S.
Third, it requires the President to discuss and monitor the
difference in value of currency in the negotiating country when
compared to the strong U.S. Dollar.
Mr. Speaker, parameters, such as these are instructions to the
President that American workers want to be engaged in the International
marketplace. But such engagement must be fair to all, not free to some
at the expense of American jobs.
Mr. Speaker, I have full confidence the President will follow these
and other instructions set forth by Congress. He has already shown
tremendous support for American jobs by calling the hand of those
nations which have dumped steel in the United States at the expense of
the steel worker. He has called Canada's hand for exporting subsidized
soft wood lumber to the U.S. by proving they were engaged in dumping
excess lumber at the expense of the American worker. He placed a tariff
on lumber from Canada rather than negotiating a new agreement at the
expense of the American worker.
Yes, Mr. Speaker, American workers standing on the assembly line need
to and want to trade in an international market. But they want to be
able to sell their products, not just buy from other countries. This
bill will give the President the authority to negotiate and provide
instructions on how to approach those negotiations.
I urge passage of Trade Promotion Authority so we can assist American
workers with their jobs, sell their goods and services, and keep our
economy strong.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Inslee).
(Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. INSLEE. Mr. Speaker, consider the tale of two of my constituents.
Greg is a computer software genius at Microsoft. His intellectual
property is frequently stolen from him overseas, and he could use a
President with Trade Promotion Authority to try to prevent that theft.
And now consider my constituent, John, who came up to me in the lobby
of a building the other day and said, ``I just got laid off from
Boeing. I am 56 years old. I am worried. I don't know what I am going
to do, and I need help.''
For the last 2 months, while we have passed bailout after bailout,
this Congress has done nothing for the American worker. Nothing. And we
have to learn if we are going to advance a trade agenda, we have to
make sure we respect both the Gregs and the Johns of the world.
Yes, you can run over the Democrats on the floor of this House, but
you cannot run over the legitimate needs of working people and the
environment time after time, and then expect us to develop a trade
agenda with the support of the American people.
Vote no on this today. Come back, develop a realistic package of
worker protection, and we will pass what we need for our international
agenda.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is a real pleasure for me to yield 1
minute to my colleague and friend from California (Mr. Hunter) to speak
on this issue since some of you have known his history.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding me time.
Mr. Speaker, in early September, I was gearing up as usual to oppose
this Fast Track. And then our country was attacked, and today as we all
know, we have Marine expeditionary forces, American carrier battle
groups, tactical aircraft, Special Operations forces, in theater, in
combat in Afghanistan.
Heading those forces, those American forces, is one man, the American
President, and for the next couple of months, in my estimation, more
than ever, his successes are going to be our successes, his losses are
going to be our losses.
I, as all my colleagues know, do not like Fast Track, I do not like
free trade. But I like less the idea of weakening this President in
this time of great national emergency.
For that reason, this time, this once, I am voting yes.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), a distinguished leader of Congress.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding me
time.
Mr. Speaker, first, I want to adopt the remarks of the gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. Price): One minute is too short a time to
substantively discuss obviously so important an issue. But I want to
say that I reject the rationale of the gentleman from California who
spoke immediately before me. I do not believe that a vote ``no'' will
weaken the President. What a vote ``no'' will do is strengthen the
process in this House.
{time} 1445
The American public elected 435, not 221 or 222, but 435 of us; and
they expected us to come together, to work together, to reason
together, and to produce a product. I believe had that process been
followed, this product would be better.
Like the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price) who spoke before
me, I have supported Fast Track, PNTR, and NAFTA. Why? Because I
believe that trade is an important aspect of the economic well-being of
our country and of our workers. But I believe that this process needs
to be open; and if so, it will be a better one. Reject this bill.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 30 seconds to the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon) for the purpose of engaging in a
colloquy.
Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the amendments in section 3
dealing with trade-sensitive commodities would limit the President's
proclamation authority so that tariff reductions could not be
implemented without specific congressional approval. It is also my
understanding that the bill restricts the ability of the administration
to reduce tariffs on sensitive agricultural industries. Finally, the
bill requires that import-sensitive agricultural products such as
citrus be fully evaluated by the ITC prior to tariff negotiations and
that any probable adverse effects be the subject of remedial proposals
by the administration. Is that the gentleman's understanding?
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, yes, that is my
understanding as well.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Brown).
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
this time.
In the first year of the Bush Presidency, we have lost 1 million
manufacturing jobs. We are officially in a recession. The stock market
has dropped precipitously. This body has done little for the economy,
and this body has done nothing for laid-off workers. They promised us
during the airline bailout bill that they would help laid-off workers.
They promised us during the stimulus package and the tax cuts for the
richest Americans and the largest corporations in this country that
they would help laid-off workers. They did not deliver. Now, during
Trade Promotion Authority, they are promising again to help laid-off
workers.
Mr. Speaker, our history of flawed trade agreements has led to a
trade deficit with the rest of the world that has surged to a record
$435 billion. The Department of Labor reported that NAFTA alone is
responsible, and these are conservative estimates, for the loss of
approximately 300,000 U.S. jobs.
Our trade agreements go to great lengths to protect investors. Our
trade agreements go to great lengths to protect property rights. But
these agreements never include enforceable provisions for public
health, for the environment, and for laid-off workers.
[[Page H9005]]
Mr. Speaker, I ask for a ``no'' vote on Fast Track Trade Promotion
Authority.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Knollenberg).
Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
this time.
Today's vote on Trade Promotion Authority is a critical test of our
leadership and commitment to creating jobs in this country. Trade
equals jobs.
In my home State of Michigan, 372,000 jobs are dependent, dependent
upon manufactured exports; and those jobs pay upwards of 18 percent
more than the average job. That is good for America.
But here is what is bad. We have a serious problem. Look at the
white; look at the red. This map shows that America is becoming
isolated, America is isolated, while others expand trade around us.
There are exactly 133 trade agreements that are in place today, but
the U.S. is party to only three. That is where we are today. How about
tomorrow?
We are leading the world in an effort to eradicate terrorism. We must
lead the world in expanding free markets and creating new jobs through
trade. Look at this again. This is the U.S., in case my colleagues
cannot see. The red is all of those countries, 111 countries that are
involved with free trade agreements. We must pass TPA. Let us vote for
TPA.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi), a national leader.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished ranking member for
yielding me this time and for his initiative that he is presenting here
today. I, unfortunately, rise in opposition to the legislation before
us.
Mr. Speaker, today we have the opportunity to create a new trade
framework for a new century. I had hoped to be able to support Fast
Track Authority for President Bush, as I had supported Fast Track
Authority for his father, President Bush, at an earlier time. I wanted
to do this, and I had hopes that we could do so with a trade promotion
act that reflected our Nation's concerns about the importance of the
environment and workers' rights. If this bill had done so, it would
have passed this House overwhelmingly. Instead, if it passes at all, it
will squeak through based on a handful of promises. I wish my
colleagues to consider the true value of those promises as they cast
their votes.
So here we are with an economy in recession and hundreds of thousands
of American families struggling with the realities of unemployment.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose this legislation. Anyone
who does not see the connection between the economy and the environment
is on the wrong side of the future. Vote ``no'' on this trade
promotion.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
(Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, there are some in this Chamber who will not
vote for any kind of trade agreement, and there are others that will
vote for every kind of trade agreement, thinking it is a panacea. As a
New Democrat, I believe in incorporating new ideas into our trade
agreements, especially to help our workers.
When I voted for the African Trade Agreement, I heard we would help
workers. When I voted for the Caribbean Basin initiative, I heard, we
will not forget about the workers. When I voted for the China agreement
I heard, once again, we will eventually get to the workers.
Well, it is time now to help American workers and their families. In
the Tokyo Round we introduced tariff levels as a new idea. In the
Uruguay Round we introduced intellectual property as a new idea. In the
Doha rounds we introduced antitrust laws as a new idea, and now we
should have the new idea of saying there should be a floor of
protecting against child labor, not mandating a minimum wage, but
saying, child labor is wrong and it is not going to be in future trade
agreements between the United States and other countries. Defeat this
bill.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Weller).
(Mr. WELLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. WELLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bipartisan effort
to help Illinois farmers, workers, and small businesses expand their
business opportunities.
Mr. Speaker, trade promotion authority or TPA gives the President the
authority to negotiate and bring back trade agreements to Congress with
assurances of an up or down vote. Now more than ever, our President
needs the clout to negotiate trade agreements to protect both the
economic and national security of our nation.
America's workers and businesses now export over $1.8 million of
goods and services per minute, which fuels economic growth, job
creation, and technological innovation. 12 million Americans owe their
jobs to foreign exports and more than 25 percent of our $8 trillion
economy is tied to foreign trade.
The high tech industry is the largest manufacturing sector in the
U.S. by employment, sales, and exports. The high tech sector is also
the largest merchandise exporter in the U.S. In 2000, high tech exports
accounted for 29 percent of U.S. merchandise exports. TPA allows the
access to new markets overseas that the high tech industry needs to
expand and grow.
Since 1994, the U.S. has failed to implement a single free trade
agreement with any nation. 130 free trade agreements exist worldwide,
with the U.S. participating in only two. Open trade will create new
markets for our workers, including workers in the high tech industry.
TPA will not only spur economic growth, but it will create new jobs and
new income.
Mr. Speaker, TPA is especially important to our friends in the
agriculture community. My home state of Illinois ranks 5th in
nationwide exports of agricultural products by exporting $2.7 billion
in 1999 alone. Income from Illinois exports equates to $110 per acre
for corn and soybeans.
Even with its huge output of agricultural products, demand for the
top five agricultural products from Illinois is growing. NAFTA and GAAT
trade agreements help prove that TPA will increase this demand further.
America's farmers export about one-third of their total crop
production. Future sales and growth are directly tied to whether the
U.S. can negotiate trade agreements with foreign countries. If we don't
supply other countries' needs, someone else will!
The time is now to give the President TPA, which has lapsed since
1994. TPA is good for small businesses, the high tech sector,
agriculture, and for the economy in general.
I urge my colleagues to vote for H.R. 3005 and give the President the
trade negotiating authority that is needed to help jumpstart our
economy.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Watts), the chairman of the Republican
Conference and someone who understands that this bill is about jobs,
about helping the unemployed and, for the first time in the history of
a trade agreement, includes labor and the environment.
Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, the question before us today is
the following: Should we vote to stop small businesses and farmers from
exporting more of their goods, or should we vote to grow America's
export market? Should we ignore the new economy, or should we look for
new ways to open new markets?
My home State of Oklahoma is the third largest producer of wheat in
the country. We export half of our wheat out of the United States. By
giving the President Trade Promotion Authority, farmers will have more
opportunities to export their products to new consumers and new
markets.
Mr. Speaker, opponents of giving the President Trade Promotion
Authority may have had a mainstream argument 50 years ago, but we are
in a new century. The arguments being made by foes of expanded trade is
rooted in what was, not what is; and it certainly does not think about
what can be.
The choice is simple. We can continue business as usual. Our economy
is in a recession, corporate profits are down, unemployment is up, and
the gross domestic product has dropped at the fastest rate in 10 years.
Companies are even skipping their Christmas party this year, trying to
save a few bucks.
Or we can look for new ways to give our economy a boost. Allowing the
President to have the freedom and flexibility to negotiate down trade
barriers and tariffs is good for the economy, good for jobs, good for
farmers,
[[Page H9006]]
good for small businesses, and good for the consumer.
Mr. Speaker, this is about the old versus the new, yesterday versus
tomorrow, walls versus bridges, fear versus competence. It is about
America. Our character, our ingenuity, our employees are the best in
the world. We can compete with anybody in the world, but we must give
the President the authority and the flexibility to trade or to
negotiate these barriers and tariffs down that hurt American products.
I ask my colleagues to vote for international trade. Vote ``yes.''
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to my dear misguided
friend, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson).
Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I think I thank the gentleman for the
extra 30 seconds.
I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) for his
efforts to reach a bipartisan consensus on this bill and the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Rangel) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin)
for the comity that they have shown us in our efforts, along with the
gentleman from California (Mr. Dooley) and the gentleman from Tennessee
(Mr. Tanner) for the unique partnership that we have been able to forge
on this bill.
I rise in strong support of the legislation. Why should Democrats
support this bill? I think the first reason, Mr. Speaker, is because of
our legacy. Earlier this week, Jeff Sachs commented in the Wall Street
Journal that Democrats have a strong legacy of promoting democracy and
free trade, highlighting the efforts of Woodrow Wilson, F.D.R.'s
initiation of trade liberalization in the Great Depression, Truman's
postwar launch of multilateral trade in the GATT, JFK's call for deep
tariff reductions, and Bill Clinton's completion of the Uruguay Round
and the leadership in founding of the World Trade Organization.
Regarding the multilateral trade negotiations, Sachs pointed out that
while this round is being launched under a Republican administration,
it might well be completed by a Democratic one. The Dillon Round was
launched by Eisenhower and finished by Kennedy. The Tokyo Round was
launched by Nixon, but completed by Carter, and the Uruguay Round was
launched by Reagan and completed by Clinton.
History tells us, Mr. Speaker, this issue is about how our Nation
engages the world over trade issues through the institution of the
Presidency, not about a particular President. That is why I supported
Fast Track under former President Bush, former President Clinton; and
that is why I support granting Trade Promotion Authority now.
Why should Democrats support this bill? Because it advances
Democratic trade principles in a meaningful and balanced way. For the
first time, ILO Core Labor standards will now be considered on par with
commercial interests in the context of trade agreements and
negotiations. For the first time, our proposal provides meaningful ways
for the U.S. to assist countries in improving their labor standards.
Principal negotiating objectives require the President to assist in
building the capacities for countries to respect worker rights, the
right of association, the right to bargain collectively, a prohibition
on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor, a minimum age for
employment of children, and acceptable worker conditions. The bill also
requires countries to enforce the labor and environmental laws. Our
bill includes substantive and enforceable standards on labor and the
environment.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson).
Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for the time.
Why should Democrats support this bill? Because this debate is not
one of pure philosophy. It has meaningful and powerful implications for
the United States and the world, and we can be sure that the world is
watching and waiting for our leadership on this important issue.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Bonior), the minority whip.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, what are we doing here today? In the midst
of a recession, we are debating a bill that will cost even more
American workers their hard-earned paychecks that they pour their
hearts and their souls into every single day. We have lost over 150,000
jobs in Michigan, 3 million across the country with these bad trade
deals over the last decade.
When a factory closes in Detroit or Saginaw or Flint or Kalamazoo, we
not only lose those good-paying jobs, we cripple a whole community. We
take away the tax base so there is no money there for fire and police
and schools and businesses. No one goes unaffected.
Our trade agreements should promote human rights and democracy, they
should improve working conditions across the world, and they should
protect our environment and the quality of life.
{time} 1500
If we give the President Fast Track Authority, we will have no
opportunity to push for these protections. We will abandon our
constitutional responsibility. For the American people, Fast Track will
be a bullet train to the unemployment line.
Vote ``no'' on the Thomas Fast Track and preserve the voice of the
people in our trade decisions.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield such time as he
may consume to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Ramstad), a member of
the committee.
(Mr. RAMSTAD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
On behalf of Minnesota jobs, Minnesota businesses, Minnesota farmers,
and Minnesota's future, I rise in strong support of Trade Promotion
Authority.
Mr. Speaker, the vote before us today is absolutely critical to
America's economic recovery and security. It is no exaggeration to call
it one of the most important votes we will cast this decade.
Our President needs Trade Promotion Authority so he can open markets
for American products, create jobs and get the best deal possible for
our businesses and workers.
Every President since President Ford had this important tool in his
trade arsenal until it expired in 1994.
Now more than ever, TPA is vital to our economic security. The U.S.
economy is increasingly international in scope, and it is clear that
expanding trade is absolutely imperative to spur economic growth.
Over 25 percent of the growth in our national economy over the last
decade is tied directly to international trade. Last year alone, my
home state of Minnesota exported over $17.5 billion in goods and
services. This is an increase of over $6 billion in the last decade.
Over 270,000 jobs in Minnesota manufacturing exist because of trade,
and trade-related jobs pay 13 to 18 percent more than other jobs.
The U.S. is rapidly falling behind in our efforts to sell our
products abroad. We are a party to just 3 of the nearly 130 free trade
agreements currently in force around the world. And while Europe, our
main competitor, continues to negotiate free trade agreements with the
rest of the world, the U.S. remains outside the process. Our interests
are being ignored.
Mr. Speaker, TPA will help our President negotiate trade agreements
that open up international markets for U.S. goods and services. Let's
give the President the tool he needs to create jobs, help workers and
rescue our ailing economy.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield such time as he
may consume to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Kolbe), someone who has
been a stalwart on trade.
(Mr. KOLBE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of Trade Promotion
Authority.
Mr. Speaker, much has been made here today about how trade promotion
authority can be a real shot in the arm for a struggling economy.
Other members have pointed out how TPA is a critical tax cut for
American consumers, workers, and companies. That, too, is true.
However, I want to talk about 3 other reasons why TPA is so critical
for America.
First, TPA strengthens our national security. Capitalism, trade, and
the rule of law support freedom. Freedom and stable economies support
the growth of democracies. And democracies conduct peaceful commerce
among themselves. TPA for President Bush is vital to bolster the global
trading system. That system is critical to US national security.
Second, TPA is critical if we are going to do more than spout
rehtoric about helping the developing world. Each year we pass a
foreign
[[Page H9007]]
operations bill. While countries appreciate it, it is pennies on the
dollar compared to the resources they need and compared to the benefits
that might flow from a new round of trade liberalization. Open markets,
capitalism, and foreign direct investment are the real tools they
need--not foreign aid.
And third, passing TPA is critical to US global leadership. We stand
at a pivotal moment in world history. Our country fought two world
wars, defeated the Soviet Empire in the Cold War, and adopted a foreign
policy to spread democratic values, ideas, and beliefs around the
world. We achieved much in the 20th century. We must not put that at
risk in the 21st century.
Secretary of State Colin Powell says Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
is ``an essential part of our diplomatic tool kit.'' He urges that we
not allow our ``broader foreign policy agenda to be hijacked by the
terrorists,'' and points out that ``trade helps create a secure
international environment within which Americans can prosper.''
Trade promotion authority is critical for our national security,
foreign policy, and US leadership abroad. Vote ``yes'' on H.R. 3005.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield such time as she
may consume to gentlewoman from Connecticut (Mrs. Johnson), a member of
the Committee on Ways and Means.
Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, our security interests are
global. Our economic interests are global.
As we stand here today, since 1990, the European community has
negotiated 27 free trade agreements. Do Members understand that every
one of those free trade agreements socks in European products, European
standards? Their electrical outlets are different than ours. They get
into that market, they get their goods in and our goods are out.
We act here on this more as if there are not negotiations that are
going to go forward. They are going to go forward. The issue is, will
America lead or will America follow. Are we going to allow jobs to be
created in America, or are we going to let them go to Europe?
Watch this standards issue. Soon to enter the EU is Croatia. They are
about to pass a bill that bans biotech materials. What will that do to
agricultural exports from America? Do we not want a President at that
table demanding science-based standards?
This is about trade of American products to grow our economy and
create jobs. I urge support.
Mr. Speaker, as our security interests are global, so are our
economic interests. If we want to create new jobs and protect existing
jobs at home, we must open new markets to American products abroad.
Since traditional trading authority expired in 1994, we have lost
customers to other countries because they can now sell their goods
without high tariffs simply because they have been at the negotiating
table and have made trade agreements that shut us out.
Of the 130 existing free trade agreements, America is a party to only
2--with Israel and the NAFTA countries. Since 1990, the EU has
completed negotiations on 27 free trade agreements and is currently
negotiating 15 more.
The United States has missed out on dozens of opportunities to create
economic pacts with other nations that want to buy goods made by
American workers. We are now not only losing markets and customers, one
by one, but are losing our position as a leader at the table that
shapes the international trading system.
By not being there, we allow Europe to set standards that work
against American products, slowing U.S. economic growth now and for
decades ahead. According to the USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service,
Croatia, a country that aspires to future EU membership, currently
plans to go further than the EU on biotech Croatia has a draft law in
process that would institute an outright ban on any products containing
biotech materials. So we simply must have our President at the table to
insist on science-based standards to protect and open markets to
American products.
TPA is essential for our nation to remain prosperous, and passage
will have a great impact on the workers I represent. Connecticut's
economy is very export-dependent. Last year, Connecticut's export sales
of merchandise totaled $13.2 billion, supporting more than 180,000
jobs. Viewed on a per capita basis, Connecticut ranks 6th nationally,
with export sales of $3,860 for every state resident. 85 percent of our
exporters were small and medium-sized businesses.
Export-related jobs tend to be good, high-paying jobs. Wages of
workers in jobs supported by exports are 13 to 18 percent higher than
the national average. Export-related jobs are also more secure, as
exporting plants are 9 percent less likely to shut down than comparable
non-exporting plants.
Trade agreements do work: Total exports from Connecticut to NAFTA
countries (Mexico and Canada) in 1999 were 44 percent higher than 1993,
before NAFTA.
They are also good for consumers and are equivalent to tax cuts, as
trade agreements reduce tariffs and provide lower-priced goods. The
average American family of four could see an annual income gain of
nearly $2500 from a global reduction in tariffs and trade barriers--the
objective of negotiations.
TPA is good for workers, and good for consumers alike. Furthermore,
world trade negotiations are going to proceed. The only issue is will
America lead--or follow. At the very moment when our President has
provided strong and able leadership, diplomatic skill and sound
judgement to unite the world against terrorism and create a more
peaceful future, why would we not empower him to provide the same
leadership to the economic discussions on which our prosperity and the
economic growth of the nation depends?
I urge my colleagues to support passage of this needed legislation.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Eshoo), a gentlewoman who has worked hard over the
years on trade issues.
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished ranking member of
the committee, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel), for yielding
time to me.
Mr. Speaker, I have but a few brief moments to come to the microphone
today, not to urge Members one way or the other on the issue that is
before us, but to state why, with really a heavy heart, why I am not
supporting the first trade issue since I have come to the Congress
since 1992.
In my congressional district, which is the home to Silicon Valley, we
have scores of unemployed workers. They are part of that two-thirds of
the American work force that are not eligible for unemployment benefits
because they are contract workers.
I know what the new economy produced. I have faith in the industrial
leaders in my congressional district and other places. I believe they
will help restore the economic well-being of our country.
But we in the Congress have an obligation to stand next to those
workers in my district and across the country that are part of the
economic collateral of 9-11 and before that. That is why I rise. I
asked for a vote on an economic package that would deal with them
first, and on the heels of that, support trade assistance.
So it is with a great deal of regret that I state that I cannot and
will not vote for the bill because of it.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Combest), the chairman of the Committee on
Agriculture.
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 3005. Trade
Promotion Authority is a win for American agriculture. It is a vital
tool that the Bush administration must have in order to fight for the
American farmers and ranchers in the global marketplace.
In all of my 17 years in Congress, I have never seen a President more
committed and focused on American agriculture. President Bush has
stated that it is his intention that agriculture remains at the
cornerstone of his administration's trade program, that his commitment
to the American farmers and ranchers in all aspects is constant and
strong.
The President has firmly stated to me that the American farmer and
rancher will be the beneficiaries of Trade Promotion Authority, and I
intend to work with the administration and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture to ensure that the best interests of our farmers and
ranchers are kept in the minds of American trade negotiators.
H.R. 3005 clearly provides that the Committee on Agriculture must be
involved in all discussions and consultations during negotiations and
immediately prior to signing any agreement. As chairman of that
committee, I intend to make sure that that happens. I will continue to
work with the administration to make sure that American agriculture
uses all the tools necessary to compete on the global stage.
I rise today in support of H.R. 3005. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)
is a win for American agriculture and is a vital tool that the
[[Page H9008]]
Bush administration must have in order to fight for the American
farmers and ranchers in the global marketplace. In all of my 17 years
of Congress, I have never seen a President more committed to and
focused on American agriculture. President Bush has stated that it is
his intention that agriculture remains the cornerstone of his
administration's trade program and that his commitment to American
farmers and ranchers in all aspects is strong and constant. Therefore I
support granting the President trade negotiating authority and urge my
colleagues to do the same.
The President has firmly stated to me that America's farmers and
ranchers will be the beneficiaries of trade promotion authority. I
intend to work with the administration and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture to ensure that the best interests of our farmers and
ranchers are kept in mind as agricultural trade negotiations proceed.
Since U.S. farmers and ranchers produce much more than is consumed in
the United States, exports are vital to the prosperity and success of
U.S. farmers and ranchers. TPA will give the President the flexibility
to take advantage of market-opening opportunities, while maintaining
the closest possible consultation with Congress. It is important that
American farmers and ranchers see agriculture trade and new trade
agreements as a positive force. Officials administering trade issues
must both understand production agriculture here at home and the fierce
competition in worldwide agricultural trade.
H.R. 3005 clearly provides that the Committee on Agriculture must be
involved in all discussions and consultations during trade negotiations
and immediately prior to signing any trade agreement. As chairman of
the committee I intend to make sure that happens. I will continue to
work with the administration to make sure that American agriculture
uses all the tools necessary to compete on the global stage, while
maintaining our international obligations.
As President Bush has said, the success of agriculture contributes to
the strength of this Nation. Our President recognizes that the
worldwide agricultural market has been rigged against farmers who play
fair. Through trade negotiations we can achieve a more level playing
field . . . and, as President Bush says, that is good news for the
world's most productive food producers--the American farmers. I urge my
colleagues to support H.R. 3005 and grant the President trade promotion
authority.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio).
(Mr. DeFAZIO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the bill.
Mr. Speaker, there are so many problems with the fast-track trade
negotiating authority legislation under consideration today that it's
hard to know where to begin. In short, H.R. 3005 will cede blanket
authority to the President to negotiate future trade agreements that
perpetuate and expand the failed U.S. trade policies of the most recent
administrations with no meaningful checks and balances from Congress.
These failed trade policies, including the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and most-favored
nation status for China, all of which I opposed, have, to varying
degrees, contributed to massive job loss and job dislocation, soaring
trade deficits, eroding U.S. sovereignty, plummeting farm commodity
prices, and degraded environmental conditions. I will speak more about
these issues in a minute. But first, I'd like to address the more
fundamental question of whether fast-track is an appropriate or
necessary delegation of constitutional authority. Proponents of fast-
track and H.R. 3005 would have you believe that if Congress fails to
grant this special negotiating authority to the President that the U.S.
economy and the global economy will come to a screeching halt and
allies will refuse to negotiate new trade agreements with us. That is
sheer nonsense.
Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
exclusive authority ``to regulate commerce with foreign nations.''
Fast-track negotiating authority, which allows the President to
negotiate trade agreements with virtually no input from Congress and
forces Congress to vote yes or no on the agreement without the
opportunity for amendments, destroys the checks and balances built into
the Constitution. This is not a partisan issue for me. I helped defeat
legislation twice to grant former President Clinton fast-track trade
negotiating authority. My opposition to fast-track is due to my desire
to protect the constitutional prerogatives of Congress, as well as my
belief that American workers and the U.S. economy have not been well-
served by current U.S. trade policies. In essence, in one 62 page bill
and one single vote, fast-track delegates four critical constitutional
powers of Congress regarding trade. Under the fast-track process
envisioned in H.R. 3005, Congress gives up:
The authority to decide the terms for trade--any negotiating
objectives set by Congress are not binding on the Administration or
enforceable by Congress in any practical way; the ability to enter into
trade pacts of its own design--the Administration will sign an
agreement, thus locking in commitments, before Congress votes up or
down, leaving no opportunity for amendment; the authority to draft
laws--the administration will have the authority to write implementing
legislation for trade agreements that can change federal laws to
conform to the agreement without any additional congressional checks;
and, the ability to set the congressional schedule--H.R. 3005 per-sets
the floor procedures for final consideration of any trade agreements
negotiated with fast-track.
Given this wholesale delegation of our constitutional
responsibilities, it stands to reason that fast-track proponents must
be under the assumption that all wisdom on trade matters rests with
those at the White House, the U.S. Trade Representative's office, and
the Department of Commerce. I find that insulting, and given the
pathetic record of previous trade agreements, absolutely incorrect.
Mr. Speaker, it is useful to step back and look at the historical
basis for fast-track. Fast-track was a Nixon-era presidential power
grab. While proponents say that every president since Gerald Ford has
had fast-track negotiating authority, what they don't say is that it
has only been used a handful of times--to negotiate the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Tokyo Round and Uruguay Round,
the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the U.S.-Canada FTA, and
the NAFTA. The Clinton administration alone claimed to have negotiated
nearly 300 separate trade agreements. Of these, only the GATT Uruguay
Round and NAFTA were done using fast-track. Further, it is not just
minor trade agreements that have been negotiated without fast-track.
Major agreements like the Jordan FTA, our bilateral agreement on
China's accession to the WTO, the Information Technology Agreement, the
Financial Services Agreement, and the Basic Telecommunications
Agreement were all negotiated without fast-track.
Rather than granting the executive branch carte blanche negotiating
authority, it seems that Congress would be well-advised to reassert its
constitutional prerogatives and rein in the freelance negotiating done
by successive administrations without clear authorization from
Congress. This is particularly true since trade agreements now deal
with far more than just setting tariff and quota levels, which were
primarily of interest to industry. Today's international commercial
agreements impact much broader areas of public policy, including the
environment, consumer and worker safety, and a vast array of domestic
regulatory standards. The public and America's congressional
representatives have a greater need to monitor negotiations and have
meaningful input into the outcome. That is impossible under the
legislation on the floor today.
H.R. 3005 eviscerates Congress' constitutional role on trade. It
includes essentially worthless provisions requiring ``consultation''
with Congress by the executive branch. This type of requirement has
been routively ignored in recent trade negotiative, and no doubt will
be disregarded under the current administration. Proponents of fast-
track also claim that the President needs this authority to negotiate
trade agreements that will be good for the U.S. economy. If that's what
the President was actually going to do, it might make some sense to
provide him some leeway. Unfortunately, the record of U.S. trade policy
shows otherwise. For example, consider our runaway trade deficit. Last
year, the U.S. trade deficit reached a record $435 billion, up from
$271 billion in 1999. The trade deficit currently stands at an
unprecedented 4.5 percent of the overall U.S. economy. Including
interest payments, our net foreign debt is 22 percent of GDP and is on
a trajectory to reach 40 percent of GDP in 5 years. Argentina's
experience should serve as a warning. Argentina, whose economy is
suffering a total collapse with the government threatening to default
on its debt, has a net foreign debt of 50 percent of GDP.
Why does the trade deficit matter? The U.S. trade deficit is financed
by borrowing, often from foreign investors and foreign countries. This
is money that future generations of people living in the U.S. will have
to pay back to people living elsewhere, with interest. And when foreign
creditors begin to call in their loans, it will be the American worker
and the American family who pay the price caused by the indifference of
policymakers in Washington. Just ask workers in Argentina.
Is this really a problem? Yes. In December of 1999, well-known
market-watcher Standard & Poor's put the U.S. financial system on its
watch list of 20 countries that are ``vulnerable to a credit bust.''
Surprisingly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is generally
recognized as a tool of the U.S. Treasury Department, has acknowledged
the teetering nature
[[Page H9009]]
of the present U.S. financial condition. In a recent consultation with
the U.S., the IMF noted, ``The sustainability of the large U.S. current
account deficit hinges on the ability of the United States to continue
to attract sizable capital inflows. Up to now, these inflows in large
part have reflected the perceived attractiveness of the U.S. investment
environment, but such perceptions are subject to continuous
reappraisal.'' In other words, foreign investors could wake up
tomorrow, look at the large U.S. current accounts deficit, question
whether we'll be able to pay our bills, change their minds about the
attractiveness of the U.S. investment environment, and plunge the U.S.
into a financial and economic crisis.
As an article in the Wall Street Journal on August 14, 2000, pointed
out, ``Although he's often credited with omniscience, Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan admitted his uncertainty about the trade
deficit in testimony before the House of Representatives last month.''
Greenspan testified ``At some point, something has got to give, and we
don't know what it's going to be.''
The Chief Economist at Deutsche Bank Research was quoted in the Wall
Street Journal saying, ``Confidence in the U.S.A. could abruptly
collapse before the rest of the world is firmly back on its feet.'' Mr.
Walter went on to say, ``It is, at any rate, not out of the question
that capital flows into the U.S.A. will dry up, and that the dollar
will take a rapid dive . . .''
Paul Krugman, a mainstream, establishment economist wrote in his
column in the New York Times on March 26, 2000, that ``. . . even the
most successful economy must sooner or later export enough to pay for
its imports. Our current position, where we pay for many of our imports
by attracting inflows of capital--in effect by selling the rest of the
world claims on our future exports--cannot go on forever.'' Krugman
went on to write something that could turn out to be prophetic, ``The
trouble, you see, is that in economics, as in life, what you don't pay
attention to can hurt you.''
It may not be so far in the future that foreign investors lose
confidence in the U.S. economy and the dollar and flee to other
currencies as has happened in England, Mexico, Southeast Asia, Brazil,
and Russia in the past few years. Of course, then the IMF can come to
the rescue, force a structural adjustment program on us, and demand
export-led economic growth. Maybe then we can reduce our trade deficit.
Catherine Mann of the Institute for International Economics (IIE) has
done research to try to determine at what point deficits become
unsustainable. The IIE is a respected, non-partisan research
organization that generally supports unfettered globalization. Ms. Mann
examined Canada, Australia, and Finland and seven other economically
advanced nations with big trade deficits during the past 20 years. What
she found should be a wake-up call to American policymakers. According
to her research, 4.2 percent of GDP is the limit a current accounts
deficit can research before the economy begins to implode. The U.S.
deficit has already reached and surpassed this benchmark.
It is also worth providing a bit of historical perspective. It the
early 1970s, the deteriorating trade balance was considered so severe
that in August 1971, the Nixon administration made the historic
decision to abandon the dollar's gold convertibility and allowed it to
float other currencies. What were these shockingly high deficits that
led to this decision? A mere 0.1 percent and 0.5 percent of GDP in 1971
and 1972, respectively, minuscule compared to today's deficits. Even
the widely heralded ``new economy'', which sacrifices manufacturing in
favor of high-technology products and the service sector, is unlikely
to improve the trade deficit. So-called post-industrial businesses earn
very little from exports and therefore will contribute little to
improving our balance of payments problem. Microsoft's exports
typically only account for one-quarter of its total sales revenue.
Merrill Lynch is a classic service business. While the firm generates
about one-quarter of its revenue outside the U.S., most of it doesn't
count as U.S. exports since it generally serves foreign customers from
offices in the markets concerned. According to an article in the
American Prospect on August 14, 2000, `` . . . it is apparent, that
even in a good year, less than 5 percent of the firm's revenues
contribute to the American balance of payments.''
Ignoring U.S. trade deficits and continuing to pursue the same-old
failed trade policies is not sound policy, and could lead to an
economic catastrophe. For this reason, Congress must maintain its
constitutional prerogatives on trade, and oppose fast track. Failed
U.S. trade policies and subsequent trade deficits have also cost
millions of high-paying jobs across the country. H.R. 3005 will help
accelerate this job loss by continuing to force U.S. workers--who are
the highest educated, best trained, most productive workers in the
world--to compete with exploited workers in developing countries who
often make only a few dollars a day in dangerous work environments.
Various analysts have identified many negative consequences of
massive, persistent trade deficits: a sharp rise in income inequality
and stagnation of incomes for average workers; the shifting composition
of employment away from high-paying manufacturing jobs with benefits to
lower-wage service sector jobs; and decreased research and development
spending, which hurts our long-term economic competitiveness; among
other problems. According to the Economic Policy Institute, the U.S.
has lost 3 million jobs from 1994-2000 due to the U.S. trade deficit.
Job-loss associated with the trade deficit increased six times more
rapidly between 1994-2000 than between 1989-1994. Every state and the
District of Columbia has suffered significant losses. Ten states, led
by California, lost over 100,000 jobs each. My home State of Oregon has
lost more than 41,000 jobs.
There are many parts of my district in Southwest Oregon that never
benefitted from the so-called economic boom of the 1990's. So, while
proponents of fast-track will argue that trade has led to a net
increase in jobs that proclamation rings hollow to many communities in
Southwest Oregon. We've seen our friends and neighbors lose high-
paying, family-wage jobs with health care benefits. If they've been
able to find work at all after being laid-off, it's for less pay, more
hours, and fewer benefits.
In addition to these sometimes abstract, macro-level impacts, U.S.
trade policies that sacrifice U.S. jobs and industrial capacity have
main street impacts. The micro-level impact of factories leaving small,
often single company towns is devastating on families and communities.
The domino effect of plant closures has been linked to: increased
domestic violence and substance abuse, reduced purchasing power for
other businesses in the area that used to depend on higher wage factory
workers as their customer base, a reduced tax base that decreases the
ability of the local government to provide necessary services, and
eventually, population flight that exacerbates the latter two problems.
Of course, it's not just workers who have lost as Congress delegated
complete authority to negotiate trade agreements to the executive
branch. Farmers and rural communities have been utterly devastated.
NAFTA and other trade agreements were held out as a beacon of hope for
America's farmers. New market openings were promised in which farmers
could sell their surplus crops. All would become rich. This never
happened.
While giant agribusinesses exporters have certainly benefitted, the
vast majority of family farmers have struggled against a flood of cheap
imports from developing nations. In addition, U.S. farmers have,
despite commitments to the contrary, been unable to open new markets
for their products as other nations stubbornly maintain both tariff and
non-tariff barriers to U.S. agriculture products. In addition, trade
rules discourage country-of-origin labeling, which could allow
consumers to pick U.S. grown produce, beef, or other commodities.
The statistics pointing to the failure of U.S. trade policy for
farmers are clear: The U.S. balance of trade in farm products has
fallen 57 percent since 1996. Prices for major commodities have fallen
nearly 50 percent. 72,000 family farms disappeared in the mid to late
1990s. U.S. farm income is projected to decline nine percent in the
next year.
Farmers should be wary of predictions that granting fast track will
lead to new export markets. We've heard this all before, and farmers
are falling further and further behind. Various forecasts by government
agencies, private researchers, and lobbyists predicted steady growth in
exports through the 1990s. These forecasts all proved to be backwards.
U.S. farm exports dropped 22 percent between 1996-2000. At the same
time, farm imports rose by nearly 10 percent.
A series of articles in The Oregonian highlighted the plight of
farmers in my state. One article detailed the unfair trade practices by
Chilean fruit growers that is causing Oregon farmers to go out of
business. U.S. imports of Chilean red raspberries more than doubled
between 1998 and 2000. That increased Chile's share of the U.S. market
to 36 percent, up from 27 percent in 1998. The U.S. International Trade
Commission issued a preliminary ruling in favor of U.S. growers on the
allegation of illegal dumping, but the ruling came too late for many
family farmers. On the whole, Chile exports $900 million worth of
agriculture products to the U.S. every year, around six times as much
as it imports.
The story is the same for many other commodities and many other
trading partners. Oregon wheat farmers had asked me to support
permanent most-favored-nation status for China because of the supposed
huge market opportunities. However, China has a massive surplus of
wheat and no need to buy U.S. wheat. Shipments by Oregon wheat growers
have sat and rotted in Chinese ports.
It is worth quoting Dr. Willard Cochrane, former chief economist at
the Department of
[[Page H9010]]
Agriculture, at length on the folly of U.S. trade policy as it relates
to agriculture. He recently wrote:
It does not make sense to pursue a strategy of pushing
exports when the global demand is weak. To sell more of our
farm commodities in that situation requires us to price them
below the going market price, and thereby pull sales away
from our competitors. This would, of course, invite
retaliation in which those competitors (like Brazil and
Argentina) came back at us by cutting their prices still
further. This is not the way to profit from the export
market--it is the formula for an expensive price war.
For the U.S., this is a terrible solution. The world prices
for products like soybeans and corn are already below the
costs of production for most U.S. producers. To expand your
sales by selling more at still lower price is no way to get
well financially and to stay in business. This practice can
only transfer the costs to the U.S. taxpayer, as we are
continually forced to provide emergency payments to farmers
because of extremely low prices.
The global demand for American farm products cannot be
manipulated at the beck and call of American policy makers.
Foreign importers are not going to increase their purchase of
American food products because U.S. policymakers want them to
do so. Imports of American farm products will increase again
only as those importing countries pull out of their economic
slump and consumer incomes begin to rise.
Fantisizing about solving the price and income problems of
American farmers through instantaneous global demand
expansion is life fantasizing over winning the Power-ball
Lottery. The chances of success are about the same. Farmers
generally, and family farmers in particular, would be better
served by forgetting about fixing the broken export market
for farm commodities, and concentrating their energies on
enacting legislation designed to strengthen rural
communities, reduce the pollution of America's farmland and
rivers, and increase competition among suppliers of non-farm
produced inputs on the production side, and among handlers
and processors on the marketing side.
I am also opposed to the fast-track legislation drafted by Chairman
Thomas because it will help accelerate the destruction of the
environment both here at home and around the world. Further, it will do
nothing to ensure basic labor rights for workers around the world.
Proponents of fast-track would have us believe that incorporating labor
rights and environmental protections that are enforceable in the exact
same manner as the commercial provisions in trade agreements is an
inappropriate mixture of economic issues with so-called ``social''
issues. That is, at best, a shallow and disingenuous analysis.
Representative Sander Levin, one of the leading Democratic supporters
of previous trade agreements, put it best when he said labor and
environmental issues ``are fundamentally economic issues that are
directly relevant to the structure of international competition. In the
domestic context, we don't hesitate to say that `right to work' laws or
emissions standard, to pick two examples, are issues that affect
economic competition. Indeed, it was the economic relevance of the
right of workers to associate, organize and bargain that made it so
central in early, decades-long struggles in our nation. Accordingly, it
is illogical and inconsistent to suggest these issues are irrelevant
with respect to international commerce and competition. Certainly,
labor or environmental issues can have `social' aspects that may
involve humanitarian or human rights considerations, or considerations
about conservation of natural resources. But it is unrealistic to
suggest that as the issues operate among nations, they are not in
substantial measure economic in their nature. Indeed, the intensity of
the controversy over them, especially between nations, is in good part
because they are economic, and not just `social.' ''
The Economic Strategy Institute (ESI), a pro-trade think-tank that
includes former officials of the Reagan administration has also
concluded that these are economic issues and that labor standards are
appropriate. ESI economist Peter Morici wrote in his book Labor
Standards and the Global System that, ``An international regime that
permitted importing countries to embargo or impose tariffs on goods
made with exploited labor would increase wages, speed development and
increase growth in countries where labor is exploited if these measures
caused governments or producers to take corrective actions. . . .
Better enforcement of [core worker] rights would likely promote trade
that increases incomes and growth, both in industrialized and
developing countries.'' He went on to write, ``Permitting workers to
bargain collectively reduces distortions in the economy and results in
a more efficient allocation of resources, more exports, and higher GDP.
In contrast, denying workers the right to bargain collectively
perpetuates distortions in the labor market, and results in an inferior
allocation of resources.''
That being the case, why do fast-track proponents who oppose
guaranteed workers rights favor a lower GDP for developing countries, a
distorted labor market, and an inferior allocation of resources? Free
traders pride themselves on promoting economic efficiency. Yet,
economic efficiency depends on workers having rights. The Thomas bill,
H.R. 3005, does not even guarantee that trade agreements will recognize
the five core International Labor Organization standards: the right to
freely associate, the right to bargain collectively, and bans on child
labor, compulsory labor, and discrimination.
Environmental protection receives similarly shabby treatment under
H.R. 3005. The bill includes no provisions that prevent countries from
lowering their environmental standards to produce an economic
advantage. The bill does not require the negotiation of trade
agreements that improve environmental standards. Environmental
protections negotiated via multilateral environmental agreements (MEA)
are put at-risk. Citizens have few, if any, rights to protest when
governments fail to enforce environmental laws, or labor laws for that
matter. Even the language in H.R. 3005 that supposedly promotes
environmental consideration is meaningless since it is non-binding on
the administration's trade negotiators.
I have visited the U.S.-Mexico border since the enactment of NAFTA.
It is a virtual wasteland. Environmental protection is not a natural
result of so-called free trade agreements. Environmental protection
must be a mandatory objective, enforceable through the same dispute
resolution process as commercial provision in trade agreements. H.R.
3005 falls far short of that standard.
Finally, as if destroying American jobs, rural communities, and the
environment weren't enough, the misguided U.S. trade policies that
would be perpetuated by the fast-track bill before us today represent a
frontal assault on U.S. sovereignty.
H.R. 3005 proposes to expand NAFTA's notorious chapter 11 provision,
for the first time, allows a private company to sue a sovereign foreign
government in the event a country takes an action that is ``tantamount
to expropriation.'' Unfortunately, the definition of ``tantamount to
expropriation'' turned out to be extraordinarily broad. In other words,
if federal, state, or local elected officials take action, such as
through passing a law or regulation, that a company believes unfairly
limits their ability to make a profit, that company can sue to get the
law or regulation overturned or to get monetary compensation for ``lost
profits'' resulting from the action.
We have over seven years of experience with the radical investment
deregulation included in chapter 11 of NAFTA. During the NAFTA debate,
critics of the treaty, like myself, were told that fears about the
forced overturning of consumer safety, health, or environmental laws or
regulations were unfounded. Unfortunately, events have proven those
fears to have been quite prophetic. A string of chapter 11 cases has
forced the repeal of public health and environmental laws in Canada and
Mexico, and, at least two cases have been filed against the United
States. There may be more, but because of the secrecy surrounding these
proceedings, it is hard to know.
In Methanex v. U.S., a Canadian corporation is suing to overturn a
California law enacted to protect its clean water supply, and thus the
health of its citizens. In Loewen v. U.S., another Canadian company is
essentially arguing that the U.S. tort system--whereby juries are able
to send strong messages via large damage awards to businesses who
abuse, defraud, or endanger their customers--is illegal. In other
cases, Canada has been forced to overturn a ban on a suspected toxin,
the United Parcel Service has sued challenging the existence of the
Canadian postal service, and a Canadian steel company has sued over
``Buy American'' laws for highway construction projects in the United
States.
The investor protections included in NAFTA, and those envisioned by
H.R. 3005, are much broader than previous investment provisions in
international agreements. These investor rights are exercised in
secretive tribunals that issue binding decisions without regard to
consumer health and safety or the environment. And, these investor
protections are increasingly being used by businesses as a first resort
to influence the sovereign lawmaking and regulatory processes of
individual countries rather than as a last resort for egregious conduct
by governments. The end-result forces taxpayers to fork over their
hard-earned dollars to compensate corporations for our sovereign right
as citizens to protect our health and safety. I believe that federal,
state, and local governments should be able to act to protect the
public interest without being unnecessarily restrained by trade
agreements. Unfortunately, H.R. 3005 says otherwise.
Mr. Speaker, the American people are far ahead of their elected
officials in understanding the need to halt and reverse the race to the
bottom in labor, human rights, and environmental standards around the
world.
A recent study by the School of Public Affairs at the University of
Maryland found 93
[[Page H9011]]
percent of Americans agree that ``countries that are part of
international trade agreements should be required to maintain minimum
standards for working conditions.'' Further, over 80 percent wanted to
bar products made by children under the age of 15. Seventy-eight
percent said the WTO should consider labor standards and the
environment when it makes decisions on trade. Seventy-four percent said
countries should be able to restrict the imports of products if they
are produced in a way that damages the environment. Seventy-four
percent also said we have a moral obligation to ensure foreign workers
do not have to work in harsh or unsafe working conditions. Polls by
other independent organizations have drawn similar conclusions.
Our current trade policies allow multinational corporations to
receive all the benefits of expanded trade with no corresponding
obligations to workers, public health, or the environment. We must
reject the claims of proponents of H.R. 3005 that the choice is between
unfettered ``free'' trade or no trade at all.
Let's be clear. Fast-track, and the agreements that would be
negotiated with it, are not about ``free'' trade. No one will be
arguing for the complete removal of tariffs, quotas, or other barriers
to trade. No one will be arguing for the uninhibited movement of
citizens. And, no one will propose doing away with patents, copyrights
or other intellectual property protections which, while they have an
economic rationale, are protectionist and violate the dictates of
``free'' trade. Rather, the debate today is about who will write the
rules for trade and who those rules will benefit. I believe Congress
must not abdicate our constitutional duty to write the rules, and to do
so in a way that benefits average working families, public health and
safety, the environment, and the U.S. economy.
I urge my colleagues to oppose H.R. 3005.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott), a member of the Committee on
Ways and Means and an active member on trade.
Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, the last round of negotiations came down
with 5,000 pages of rules and regulations. We have today out here in 1
hour set up the process by which we are going to do this all over
again.
The majority would have us believe that it is not even worth taking
the time to look at any alternative. They say, well, you can have a
motion to recommit. We can have 5 minutes to talk about the process by
which we arrive at 5,000 pages of trade legislation.
If Members think that is fair, if Members think that is what people
sent the 435 of us here to do, they ought to vote for this. But if
Members think we need a little more time, and we have been here for
almost 11 months, and we come down here at the last minute and we have
less than an hour for 5,000 pages.
It does not work. They are going to have to come back again.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), the chairman of the Committee
on Rules, which shares jurisdiction over trade packages, including this
one.
(Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, on this, the 60th birthday of our friend,
the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, it is important to
note that we are on the verge of casting the single most important vote
of the 107th Congress. Why? Because it deals with the two very
important issues of our economy and the U.S. role in the world, our
leadership role.
We know that the attack that was launched on the United States first
hit the World Trade Center, where people from 80 nations around the
world were killed, and it was the worst attack on our civilian
population ever. They knew exactly what they were doing. They were
trying to undermine the leadership role we are playing.
The fact is, the world is moving dramatically towards free trade. The
President of Brazil said in a speech just a couple of months ago in
Portuguese, ``Exportamos o moremos,'' export or die. He understands
that very well.
We as a Congress need to give this authority to the President so that
he can pry open new markets for U.S. workers, producers, farmers, and
businesses.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I hope the worst thing that happens today on the
birthday of the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) is defeat of
this bill and that the rest of the day goes well for him.
But the best thing that could happen for the country is that we
defeat the bill and try to do it the right way.
Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), the minority leader.
(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, first I want to recognize the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Rangel), the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Bonior),
the gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui), and the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Levin) for a tremendous job in putting together the
motion to recommit that we will be talking about in a few moments. They
are truly hard workers, and they truly care about a good trade policy
for our country. I thank them for the hard work that they did to put
this together.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to ask Members to vote yes on the motion to
recommit; and if it does not prevail, I ask Members to vote no on the
underlying bill that has been presented here by the Committee on Ways
and Means.
Let me first say that I would have hoped that we could have been on
the floor today with worker relief. We are 11-plus weeks since
September 11. We have thousands of workers who have lost their jobs.
While we seem to find time for insurance company relief and airline
company relief, and now a big trade bill, and lots of appropriation
bills, all of which are important and all of which have great support,
we cannot seem to find time to take care of the most important thing in
front of us.
I said last week, I guess it is because we are not unemployed. If one
is unemployed, unemployment is the biggest problem. They cannot get
health insurance today. They cannot support their families. I talk to
unemployed workers every day. Their problems are right now, this week,
today. I would hope that we would get relief for them soon. They need
it. We have to do it. They deserve it. Rather than taking up every
other manner of bill, I hope we would take that up.
But let me direct my remarks to the bill from the Committee on Ways
and Means and why I think it is ill-advised and why the kind of bill
that will be presented on the motion to recommit I think is the right
way to go.
Let me say that over 20 years now, we have made great progress, in my
view, on trade policy in America. Trade policy today is not what it was
20 years ago. There is a good reason for that. In trade negotiations,
20 years ago the only thing that was ever really considered were
tariffs. It was a matter of trying to get down high protective tariffs
all over the world so that trade would take place between countries.
Today, we have moved way down the road and the issues are not just
tariffs, the issues are really about compatibility: how do we get
intellectual property laws in countries to be properly enforced; how do
we get capital laws to be enforced.
What we have brought to the table and tried to get on the table is
the question of whether or not labor laws, human rights laws,
environmental laws, health and safety laws, should be just as much a
part of trade negotiations as intellectual property laws and capital
laws.
Now, we have made a lot of progress. We had a treaty with Jordan that
was recently brought to the Congress that dealt with those matters, to
the satisfaction of the Government of Jordan and to the satisfaction of
the United States.
We now go to another WTO Round. There are lots of other free trade
treaties that we want to negotiate, that we should negotiate; but it is
vital and important that the full range of issues that should be in
those negotiations are on the table in the core text of the treaties.
I was at Microsoft last week, and one of the executives at Microsoft
said to me, our intellectual property is still being pirated in China.
We are not being paid for our Windows software in China. They can buy
it on the street corner, pirated copies. You need to do more, he said,
to enforce the intellectual property agreements that are in the
treaties with the WTO and now China.
Labor unions, workers, people concerned about the environment, people
[[Page H9012]]
worried about health and safety laws have the same feeling about things
they care about. At the end of the day, I think what this comes down to
is what one worries about.
What do Members care about? If they care about getting wages up in
countries abroad, if they think trade is a long march to bring about
compatibility across the world so that we have real compatibility in
countries, if we really worry about having consumption as well as
production, if Members believe we have to build economies all over the
world from the bottom up so people have enough money in their pocket to
really buy things, then they would agree with me that we need to have a
little bit different trade policy that I think is suggested in the
motion to recommit, and not suggested in the bill the Committee on Ways
and Means brought forward.
{time} 1515
Now, let me end with this. I was in Pueblo, Mexico recently and I met
with people in a factory there that went on strike, put together an
independent union, something that has not often happened. And they won
their strike because the leader of the new independent union, a woman,
went to each house of every worker in that plant and got them to
support the strike. And they said to me, when I met with them, how
great it would have been had we had a provision in a trade treaty with
Mexico that they could have used to try to get labor laws in Mexico to
be properly enforced so it would have been easier for them to succeed
in what they finally succeeded in. One of the first times that it has
happened.
I think we need to help people like that in our own self-interest and
in the interest of our economy. Trade is a critical issue going forward
for this country.
I agree with a lot of the statements that have been made on the other
side of the aisle. We are the leader, we are the one that needs to
bring trade policies to the world. But in order to do it correctly we
have to insist that all the right issues be on the table. And that is
what this debate is about.
I urge Members to vote yes on the motion to recommit. I urge Members
to vote no if that motion to recommit does not succeed. We can come
back here, I am confident if we turn down this ill-advised bill, and we
can reach a bipartisan consensus on a trade bill that should get 400
votes on the floor of this House of Representatives. Let us do that and
do it very soon.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hastert), the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me time.
Mr. Speaker, it is always an honor to take this floor. It is an honor
to have these debates because, let no one be fooled, this is one of the
defining debates of this Congress. The gentleman who stood up and spoke
before, just prior to my taking the floor, is a person who leads the
other side of the aisle, a person who I have a great deal of respect
for. We do not always agree. As a matter of fact, there are a lot of
times we do not agree. But some of the things he talked about today I
do agree with.
We talked about unemployed workers. We have seen 700,000 workers in
this country lose their jobs since September 11. We need to stimulate
our economy. We need to support those things that make this economy
work. And one of the ways to do that is to be aggressive, something
that we have not been able to do for a number of years; go overseas,
make the agreements, make the deals that we have to, sell our products,
put our people to work, create jobs in this country, and stimulate and
pass legislation that gives the President of the United States the
abilities to go out and make those agreements.
We have talked about maybe this bill does not have all of the good
things in it maybe other bills did. We have talked about the Jordan
trade agreement we just passed a short time ago. But I can tell you,
this bill has those agreements in it that were in the Jordan trade
agreement. The issues of workers, the issues of environment are put
into this agreement, put in this bill.
They talk about being able to negotiate on the international property
rights. I understand the problems of trading with China and trading
with other places that do not quite have the laws that we have. But
unless you have the structure so that our administration and others can
go forward and negotiate and lay down the agreements so that we can
protect ourselves with international property rights and others, we
will never get them, because you cannot do it by waving a wand and you
cannot do it by coercion. You have to do it by negotiation, and you
have to have the ability to do that.
I stood on this floor 5 years ago to give then President Clinton the
ability for Fast Track authority. I did that because I thought it was
the right thing to do. I did it because I thought the President of the
United States, regardless of party, ought to be able to go out to make
agreements and negotiations and then bring them back to this Congress
for us to agree with or to disagree with.
Today I rise in support of this legislation giving a new President
Trade Promotion Authority. And I urge all of my colleagues to do it. As
I said, this is a defining vote for this Congress. This Congress will
either support our President, who is fighting a courageous war on
terrorism and redefining American world leadership, or it will undercut
the President at the worst possible time.
David McCurdy, a former member of this body, now head of a high-tech
trade group, said, this vote is every bit as important as our vote to
give the President the authority to fight the war on terrorism; this
vote is being watched today closely by our allies and by our
adversaries.
Ironically, there is more at stake here if we fail than if we
succeed. If this vote prevails, the President has the authority to
negotiate further trade agreements. That is it. The President still has
to bring those agreements back to Congress for approval. If we do not
like those deals we can still reject them. But if we vote down this
legislation, we send a terrible signal to the rest of the world. We say
to the world that the Congress will not trust the President to lead on
trade. We say to the world that Congress is not interested in promoting
trade. We say to the world that we fight a war around this world on
terrorism, that we would rather retreat to splendid isolationism than
engage in the world economy.
That is the wrong choice. The world keeps spinning without us. There
are 170 free trade agreements around the world that have been
negotiated in the last several years. We have been party to two, two,
T-W-O, two, one, two, of those agreements out of 170. That means that
we have not engaged. We are not there.
We can either watch from the sidelines or we can get in the game. Our
high-tech communities, our farmers, our manufacturing sectors, our
sectors, they all want us to be in the game. They understand that
American leadership on trade means more than American jobs and a better
standard of living for our workers.
Many of you are concerned about your constituents. You have a right
to be concerned about your constituents. But the constituents in this
Nation want us to take steps now to promote long-term economic security
now and for the future. American leadership on trade means better
economic security for our workers.
Let me conclude by simply saying, reject isolationism, reject
protectionism. Vote instead for the American leadership. Vote for
American jobs. Vote for better economic growth. Vote to support the
President this time, especially in a time of war. Vote for Trade
Promotion Authority.
Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant support of this
legislation, which would provide trade promotion authority to the
President. Every President since 1974 has had expanded trade authority,
but Congress allowed the provision to expire in 1994, and our
subsequent efforts to pass TPA have been unsuccessful.
As someone who has supported free and fair trade throughout my
Congressional career, the vote on this issue has been particularly
difficult because of the process the House Leadership utilized to draft
this legislation. More specifically, I believe while real progress was
made, more could have been done to address the Democratic concerns in
trade negotiations.
I also object to the timing of this measure, which is being
considered prior to enactment
[[Page H9013]]
of unemployment insurance legislation for those affected by the
recession and the September 11 terrorist attacks. I also wish this
legislation had incorporated more meaningful language on reform of the
trade adjustment assistance program. Only after intense pressure and
the prospect of failure did the House Leadership and the White House
concede that more must be done meet the needs of American workers
suffering from the recession and those who lose their job as a direct
result of trade. With my colleague, Anna Eshoo, I have offered
legislation that presents a real reform of the TAA program, and I am
hopeful that the Senate companion to this bill--S. 1209--is considered
in short order by the full Senate, and serves as the primary vehicle
for conference consideration.
Despite these concerns, I believe passage of this legislation is
needed to produce strong trade agreements that open and expand markets
for U.S. goods and service. To create new opportunities for American
workers and their families, Congress must support policies that
encourage growth and increased living standards in the U.S. Passage of
this legislation will send a strong signal to the rest of the world
that the President and Congress are prepared to work together to
reaffirm U.S. leadership on global trade, and provides much needed
momentum to advance new and existing trade negotiations around the
world.
While I do not believe the underlying bill went far enough in
creating Congressional consultation, I was pleased with the inclusion
of language creating a Congressional Oversight Group, comprised of
members from all relevant committees, who are the briefed regularly,
have access to negotiating documents and become accredited members to
the U.S. delegation to ongoing trade negation. This measure also allows
Congress to limit the ability of TPA procedures as a result of an
Administration's failure to consult. And at the end of every
negotiation, Congress retains the most important protection against an
agreement that is not in our nation's interest--the right to approve or
disapprove the final agreement.
I also believe passage of this legislation is needed to continue to
foster economic growth worldwide. Indeed, trade and economic growth
provides the mechanism to help our developing countries expand their
middle class and improve their standard of living. Since the end of
World War II, the liberalization of trade has helped to produce a six-
fold increase in growth in the world economy and a tripling of per
capita income that has enable hundreds of million of families escape
from poverty and establish a higher standard of living. I believe
passage of this bill helps us to continue to advance those goals which
support not only our economic growth potential, but also helps preserve
our national security.
This bill does provide for issue related to enforcement of labor and
environmental laws to be principal objectives in any trade agreement
negotiated under TPA and that there can be no backsliding on current
law. This is a strong achievement when compared to earlier versions
including the original Crane bill. This measure requires the President
to determine a remedy to meet any non-enforcement, and I believe such a
provision provides an Administration with the latitude necessary to
negotiate reasonable enforcement provision, without mandating specific
penalties--an action that would keep many of our prospective trading
partners away from the negotiating table.
It would be wrong to ignore the public ambivalence regarding
globalization, and we must recognize that while trade provides an
overall benefit, there are those who lose, and the result can be
devastating to working families and entire committees. It is important
that as the bill works it way through the legislative process, that
there is clear followthrough on commitments to provide enhanced
unemployment assistance and health benefits. Further, I strongly urge
that any final package include an enhanced and expanded TAA provision
like that proposed in H.R. 3359. Lacking that, I and others, I believe,
will find it hard to support a conference report.
Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, as we debate trade authority, let's not
forget the fastest growing and most exciting segment of American
exporters--our small business exporters. Trade Promotion Authority
surely will assist our negotiators in lowering barriers for this most
promising engine of our exporting industries. Small businesses and
family farmers in America will especially benefit from new trade
agreements because exporting is the only sure way they can do business
overseas. With Trade Promotion Authority, the President can more
quickly ink foreign trade deals that will give our small businesses new
markets to sell their goods and services.
The role of small business in our domestic economy is well
documented. America's 25 million-plus small companies are the backbone
of our economy. They create three of every four new jobs, produce most
innovations, and generate over half of the nation's private gross
domestic product.
The role of small business in international trade is less well known.
In fact, small businesses account for nearly 97 percent of the total
number of all U.S. exporters. The number of small business exporters
has tripled over the past decade or so, increasing to over 224,000
small businesses directly involved in exporting. Small businesses now
account for 29 percent of total merchandise export sales spread
throughout every industrial classification. What is more surprising is
that the fastest growth among small business exporters has been with
companies employing fewer than 20 employees. These very small
businesses represented 69 percent of all exporting companies in 1999.
Obviously, trade is essential to their future and to all they employ--
particularly at a time when our economy is facing difficulties. That's
why groups like the Small Business Exporters Association has strongly
endorsed H.R. 3005. Please find enclosed a copy of their letter to me.
Our nation also is poised to expand its exports in services, which is
the fastest growing sector of our economy and one in which small firms
thrive. In fact, the service sector accounts for 80 percent of U.S.
Gross Domestic Product and U.S. employment--83 million jobs. These
service jobs are good paying jobs--their average annual income of
$32,865 a year slightly exceeds the average annual income of
manufacturing jobs. Although we in Congress tend to think of trade
primarily in terms of goods, our services trade is where we have our
competitive edge. The U.S. is the world's largest exporter of
services--services such as telecommunications and information
technology, insurance, securities, banking and funds management,
energy, legal and educational services, accounting, express delivery,
travel and tourism. This sector has created more than 20 million new
jobs since 1998, generates a $76.5 billion annual trade surplus, and
provides the greatest opportunity to increase American prosperity
through international trade. To capitalize on our competitive edge and
gain the benefits in economic prosperity and jobs, we need to remove
the many kinds of complex barriers that now block our trade.
In my own district in northern Illinois, small manufacturers are
learning that if they want to remain in business they must begin
tapping new markets in Canada, Mexico, and overseas. In 1999, the
Rockford metropolitan area exported $857.2 million worth of goods and
services, an increase of 64 percent since 1993, to practically every
area of the world. As exporting opportunities become known, northern
Illinois small and family owned businesses are taking advantage of
them. For example, a tool and die business with 40 employees attended a
successful trade mission to Mexico with the Administrator of the U.S.
Small Business Administration.
Despite these encouraging statistics and trends, there is much more
work to do. While small business exporters have more than tripled in
number, they still form less than one percent of all small businesses
in the United States. Even among these cutting-edge small firms, nearly
two-thirds sold to just one foreign market in 1999. In fact, 76 percent
of small business exporters sold less than $250,000 worth of goods
abroad. In other words, many of these small firms are ``casual''
exporters.
The key is to encourage more small businesses to enter the trade
arena and then to prod the ``casual'' small business exporters into
becoming more active. If we were able to move in this direction, it
could boost our exports by several billion dollars. We need to get
these engines of our domestic economic growth fully engaged in the
global marketplace. Hopefully, when Trade Promotion Authority is
returned from the other chamber, it will contain a provision to create
an Assistant United States Trade Representative for Small Business.
Trade barriers are insurmountable for small business. While most
large companies can either export or set up a factory overseas, most
small business exporters have only one choice--that is to export from
America. In addition, there are many complicated issues that face small
business exporters, such as streamlining foreign customs practices.
Trade Promotion Authority will give the President the tools he needs to
negotiate away these unfair trade barriers.
Trade Promotion Authority has been granted to the last six American
Presidents. It simply gives the President the ability to negotiate
trade agreements in a timely fashion. Once a trade deal is inked, the
House and Senate have 90 days to approve it on an up or down vote.
Under the version considered today, Congress will be more involved than
ever in foreign trade deals because the bill creates a Congressional
Oversight Group to oversee negotiations and consult with the
Administration throughout the process.
Currently, more than 134 trade agreements exist in the world and the
United States is party to only two of them. Trade Promotion Authority
would help the President open new markets to American products,
knocking down unfair tariffs and foreign trade practices and preserving
and creating more high-paying jobs
[[Page H9014]]
in the United States. American jobs that involve exporting pay 13 to 18
percent more than other jobs.
Expanded trade is needed now more than ever. In these tough economic
times, American workers need work. This legislation will not only
preserve jobs, but it will give our employers new markets to increase
their business so they can put unemployed Americans back to work where
they belong.
Economic studies show that a new World Trade Organization (WTO) round
would produce enormous benefits for the United States. If the round
reduced existing tariffs and all service barriers by one-third, it has
the potential to add $177 billion to the U.S. economy. Removal of all
trade barriers would add $537 billion to the U.S. economy, $450 billion
of which would be from services.
Services and agricultural negotiations need to be re-energized by a
successful new trade round. Nothing would assist American success in
these talks, and continuing bilateral and multilateral negotiations,
than the passage of Trade Promotion Authority. Without a new round,
these negotiations will run out of steam, and our companies, economy,
and job-creation potential will suffer.
Renewing TPA will show our trading partners that we have the
political will to start and conclude serious negotiations. I urge my
colleagues' support of H.R. 3005.
Small Business Exporters Association,
Washington, DC, December 5, 2001.
Rep. Don Manzullo,
House Small Business Committee, 2361 Rayburn House Office
Building, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Rep. Manzullo: As the Chairman of the House Small
Business Committee, you are one of Congress, most committed
advocates of small business growth and prosperty. The Small
Business Exporters Association urges you to act on that
commitment tomorrow--by voting for Trade Promotion Authority
for this and future Presidents.
This issue is sometimes seen as a struggle between the
priorities of big business and big labor. It is anything but.
As the nation's oldest and largest association dedicated
exclusively to small and mid-size US exporters, SBEA is
hearing loud and clear from its members that TPA may well
make or break their ability to compete globally.
Though the number of small business exporters in the US has
tripled, reaching more than 200,000, smaller exporters face
huge new challenges, and our progress is at risk. The high
cost of the dollar in foreign currencies and the worldwide
economic softening have dealt serious blows to our ability to
sell abroad.
We're also losing customers as free trade agreements spread
around the world--without the US--and our products grow more
expensive as a result.
Big businesses can deal with the high dollar and the free
trade agreements by shifting production overseas. Small
business can't. Price us out of a market and we're out.
America loses the sales, jobs and economic growth.
The vote on TPA tomorrow will send a powerful signal--
whether Congress intends to strengthen a strategic growth
area of the American economy, or accentuate a downward
economic spiral.
SBEA understands that compromises will be necessary in the
months ahead. There are many interests affected by US trade
agreements. We support those compromises. But a vote against
TPA is not a vote for compromise. It is a vote to end the
discussion.
We hope that you will stand with small business tomorrow.
Regards,
James Morrison.
____
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise not in opposition to
free trade, or trade promotion authority. I come to the floor today to
register my opposition to the form Chairman Thomas and the Republican
leadership have chosen H.R. 3005. For the ``Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2001'' is anything but, simply does not fully address
the well founded concerns many Americans have about international trade
policy.
Let me begin by stating that I am in favor of sensible, sustainable
international trade. The United States is a major part of the global
economy, and the health of this nation and its workers depends upon the
ability of American producers and service providers to have access to
markets to conduct business. It was Democratic President John F.
Kennedy who stated, ``A rising tide lifts all boats.'' I firmly believe
that in the case of international trade, this sentiment rings true, and
that an economically stable world where every nation can aspire to a
standard of living that reflects the elbow grease and ingenuity of its
people is within our reach.
Mr. Speaker, I have genuine concerns about the current state of the
global economy. Over the last two years economic slowdown has impacted
the entire world. The Bush administration has finally acknowledged that
not only are we in a recession, but that we have been a recession since
March. The recent tragedies associated with September 11 and the U.S.
Postal Service have shaken the confidence of this nation's workforce
even more, and despite the thousands of jobs that have been lost, the
families who have suffered the most from the sum total of events have
been least on the agenda of the Republican Majority in this Congress.
My own district, Texas' 18th is a glaring example of the competition
that exists between ensuring the stability of working families and
adapting to the realities of the new global economy. Recently, the
economic tide caught up with Enron, a major global employer in my
district. Though I have every confidence in Houston to set the ship
back on course, thousands of families will be the losers in the
interim, and that weighs heavily on my mind.
International trade is vital to the health of my district. The
Business Roundtable estimates that exports directly support 10,000 jobs
in my district. Another 55,000 jobs with wholesalers and service
providers either wholly or partially depend upon export sales. By the
same token, though NAFTA has lead to a 100 percent increase in Texas
exports to Canada and Mexico, this trade agreement has resulted in
severe distress to America's steel industry. It has cost literally
thousands of U.S. jobs and forced district manufacturers like Maas
Flange to seek and obtain a remedy from the International Trade
Commission.
Every Member here today can outline a similar set of tensions when
determining the best course of action for their district. In the years
since Trade Promotion Authority, or Fast Track, expired in 1994, we
have had the opportunity to witness the need for free trade. We have
also learned the reality that the trade rules can have a profound
impact on labor forces as well as the local and global environments. As
a legislator, I take seriously my constitutional obligations to balance
these competing interests. Thus, I believe that any system of trade
guidelines dispensed to the President should fully discharge our
constitutional obligations and responsibilities to our respective
districts.
H.R. 3005--railroaded through committee by Chairman Thomas--does not
strike this balance. At best, the legislation pays lip service to the
concerns of the labor and environmental communities, and fails to
substantively address the concerns of the American people that our
trade policy be constitutionally sound.
To begin, H.R. 3005 does not require countries to implement any of
the five core ILO standards; the right of association; the right to
collective bargaining; bans on child labor; compulsory labor; or
discrimination. H.R. 3005 requires only that a country enforce its
existing law--whatever law that happens to be. Through proponents of
the legislation claim that H.R. 3005 does require countries to consider
labor standards, the bill constructs these core standards as mere
``general negotiating objectives.''
Thus, negotiation on, or implementation of, labor considerations in
trade agreements enacted under this formula would not be subject to the
economic realities of a global trade regime. Instead, they would be
subject to the whims of the negotiators and their political agenda. The
bill also requires countries to continue to enforce whichever labor
standards they have, rather than recognizing the ILO conventions.
Consequently, rather than ensuring that we foster positive labor
standards with our trading partners in order to keep multinational
corporations from exploiting foreign workforces to the detriment of
their domestic workers, this bill would encourage it. No greater
incentive to stabilize worker conditions around the world is contained
in this bill, than in previous versions of Trade Promotion Authority
that were voted down by this Body. Yet this bill is supposed to help
create and keep American Jobs.
H.R. 3005 also falls severely short of incorporating the
environmental externalities associated with international trade as a
component part of the trade regime. This bill considers environmental
objectives to be ``general negotiating objectives as well.
However, H.R. 3005 does not require any concrete action from U.S.
negotiators. The bill requires only that the President ``consult'' with
other countries and ``promote consideration'' of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements. Thus, the bill contains no real assurances
that the environment will be respected. H.R. 3005 would also allow
greater rights for foreign investors in U.S. than U.S. firms due to its
mimicry of NAFTA's chapter 11 rules regarding expropriation and
takings, and it does not address key concerns raised under NAFTA
investment rules that allow for the challenge of laws which are
``tantamount to expropriation.'' Last Minute changes to H.R. 3005 in
this area are an indication of the flawed philosophy behind the Thomas
legislation; the Leadership has paid too little attention too late in
this process to convince this Body that labor and the environment are
legislative priorities of U.S. international trade, and they should be.
Finally, this bill does not fully discharge Congress' Constitutional
obligations regarding U.S. trade. Simply put, H.R. 3005 includes no
effective mechanism for congressional participation in developing
international trade. The
[[Page H9015]]
bill includes only more consultations and a recycled oversight
mechanism from the 1988 law that was never used, which requires the
Ways and Means and Finance Committees to act as gatekeepers. This
function has never previously been utilized effectively, and there is
no reason to assume this will change.
The Leadership of this House has made a mistake with this
legislation. Recent trade agreements with Jordan and the Andean
countries prove that Congressional priorities and international trade
can be reconciled. Thus, to send a bill to the floor which does not
ensure that the recent trends in U.S. Law are respected is an
irresponsible way to conduct trade policy. As such, despite my support
of free trade, I cannot support the trade regime fostered by this
legislation.
Only H.R. 3019 fosters trade in a manner that considers its effects
on workforces, the environment, our national sovereignty, and our
constitutional obligations as members of Congress. The bill makes
international labor standards a specific negotiating objective of the
Free Trade Area of the Americas, and it requires the creation of a
Working Group on Trade and Labor within the WTO. H.R. 3019 also
provides a real mechanism for members of Congress to play an ongoing
role in this increasingly important sector by structuring a review
process of ongoing negotiations and increasing congressional oversight
of negotiating objectives.
International trade is vital to the people of the 18th district of
Texas. So too are their jobs, the environment, and the freedom of our
nation. It is our mandate as legislators to balance these interests for
the good of our nation. The H.R. 3005 version of trade promotion
authority does not do this, and I therefore cannot support it. By
putting politics before policy, the Republican leadership has ruined an
opportunity to ``lift all boats,'' for only the H.R. 3019 version of
Trade Promotion Authority has the opportunity to ride a ``rising tide''
of support to passage.
Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 3005,
the ``Fast Track'' Trade Promotion Authority bill and in support of the
Rangel substitute in the motion to recommit.
As a member of this House and as a member of the California Assembly
prior to my election to the House, I have been a long-time supporter of
free trade policies. As a Californian, I understand very well the many
advantages that come from open markets, the lowering of tariffs, and
the elimination of other trade barriers that prevent American products
from competing on a level playing field in overseas markets.
American workers are the most productive workers in the world, and
consumers around the world desire quality American products. I strongly
believe that given a level playing field, American companies will
thrive in overseas markets.
I am also well aware of the value of open markets to American
consumers. Americans are shrewd consumers. Their open-minded attitude
in considering and purchasing quality goods produced in other countries
instills competition in both American and foreign companies which, in
turn, lowers prices for American families and increases their real
income.
Knowing the many benefits of increased trade between the U.S. and
other countries, I voted for the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and for many years, I have supported legislation to increase
trade, such as ``most favored nation'' status for China. I did so
because of promises made to address the negative impacts of free trade
agreements on U.S. workers and industries. However, once the trade
agreement passed these promises were ignored and forgotten.
Since the passage of NAFTA, on numerous occasions, I have loudly
voiced my concerns to Cabinet officials and trade negotiators about the
necessity to live up to the promises to help displaced workers.
One such promise was the establishment of the Community Adjustment
and Investment Program--CAIP--which was intended to provide financial
assistance for American companies located in NAFTA trade-affected
areas. In practice however, CAIP did little to help these companies. In
fact, CAIP was never of any assistance to the garment industry located
in my district, which experienced enormous job losses after the passage
of NAFTA. CAIP's overly stringent eligibility requirements completely
overlooked textile manufacturing companies too small to qualify or who
did not meet the job loss threshold requirements. This essentially
makes the CAIP program meaningless and ineffective.
Meanwhile, last year the Los Angeles Times reported that employment
in the Los Angeles garment trade dipped below 100,000 for the first
time since NAFTA was enacted in 1994, with nearly 13,000 jobs lost
since 1997 alone. The jobs lost have almost exclusively been blue-
collar sewing jobs.
Knowing that adequate and appropriate safeguards are not currently in
place to help our nation's displaced workers, I cannot support
extending Trade Promotion Authority to the President. I also cannot
support this bill, because it does not sufficiently address my growing
concerns regarding issues of labor standards, environmental
protections, and congressional oversight on trade negotiations.
I regret that the Rules Committee has recommended a closed rule on
this bill specifically blocking Democrats from offering amendments to
address the concerns regarding this bill.
However, while I will oppose the Thomas bill, I will support the
Rangel substitute in the motion to recommit. The Rangel bill includes
provisions that address many of my concerns about labor rights,
environmental protections, and congressional review. First, the Rangel
substitute sets out clear negotiating objectives for labor standards.
The Rangel substitute forbids slave labor, and outlines strict rules on
the use of child labor, and on the freedom of workers to associate and
bargain collectively. The Thomas bill, in contrast, has no requirement
that a country's laws include any of the five core International Labor
Organization standards.
Second, the Rangel substitute sets out clear negotiating objectives
for environmental standards. The Rangel substitute would commit
countries to enforcing their own national environmental laws and
prevent them from waiving existing standards for the purpose of gaining
a competitive advantage. The Thomas bill does little to ensure that
environmental rules established by Multilateral Environmental
Agreements have equal status to other provisions of trade agreements.
Third, the Rangel bill ensures a continuing and active role for
Congress in setting U.S. trade policy. It does this by replacing the
ineffective mechanisms included in the 1988 ``fast track'' law with a
procedure for structured biennial review of ongoing trade negotiations
subject to fast track. It also gives Congress an opportunity to pass a
resolution of disapproval if the U.S. decides to inaugurate a new
regional or multilateral trade negotiation. The Rangel bill helps to
ensure that Congress is an active participant in important
negotiations. The Thomas bill's approach is to view Congress as an
occasional consultant.
In short, although it is not perfect, I believe the Rangel substitute
addresses most of the legitimate concerns that have been raised about
the negotiation of free-trade agreements.
Free trade agreements and free trade policies are desirable goals,
but we should never forget that they also impact many Americans
adversely. By requiring implementation of labor and environmental
standards, together with the active involvement of Members of Congress
both Republican and Democratic administrations are likely to construct
trade policies consistent with our principles as a society.
The Rangel substitute is the best vehicle for achieving this goal. I
urge my colleagues to support the motion to recommit and oppose the
Thomas bill.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Speaker, trade is clearly an important component of
our national economy. Accordingly, I strongly support fair trade laws
that ensure a competitive foundation for American exports by promoting
American values. Fair trade laws ensure that workers and the
environment do not get exploited for shortsighted profits; free and
unfettered trade agreements trade away American jobs. The language in
H.R. 3005 provides hollow promises to the environment and American
workers. For years, supporters of these agreements have argued that
trade is the cure-all for the American economy. To the contrary, the
U.S. economy has been struggling for some time now, and we have empty
trade accords to thank for it. We simply cannot have free trade at any
cost.
Clearly, now is not the time to pass fast-track authority. In the
third quarter of this year, economic activity fell 1.1%; there is
virtual agreement that the United States economy is in recession. Last
year, the U.S. trade deficit reached a record $435 billion. Including
interest payments, the United State's net foreign debt is 22% of the
gross domestic product.
Not surprisingly, personal bankruptcies hit an all-time high of 1.4
million this year. The unemployment rate has been rising steadily, and
the number of laid-off workers receiving unemployment benefits rose to
3.8 million last month, the highest level since I came to Congress. But
there's more: Industrial construction is at its lowest level in 7
years. Since last July, 1.5 million U.S. manufacturing jobs have been
lost, and 26 steel companies have gone bankrupt.
These conditions hit too close to home for my constituents. In my
home state of Illinois, the fourth-largest economy in the union,
economic activity has fallen for seven straight months. Output at
factories in the Chicago area has contracted for 14 straight months.
Last month, a Clorox plant in my district closed and laid off 95
workers. Furthermore, a 3M tape production facility announced it would
be shutting down as well, displacing 270 hard-
[[Page H9016]]
working Chicagoans. Both companies cited the global economic downturn
as the reason for these closures.
Mr. Speaker, given a fair environment, our workers will out-perform
any competitors. But we cannot compete with countries that subjugate
their environment and pay their workers 90 cents per day. Now, in the
midst of a recession, we are asked to vote to further these problems. I
urge a ``no'' vote on H.R. 3005. Now is definitely not the time for
fast track authority.
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice strong support for
free and fair trade but also my opposition to the Representative
Thomas' Fast-Track bill. As a cofounder and a current leader of the New
Democrats, I am dedicated to finding new and innovative approaches to
expanding our trade opportunities. Over the course of my six terms in
Congress, I have demonstrated a strong record on free trade by voting
for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Africa
Growth and Opportunity Act, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (BCI),
Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China (PNTR), and most recently
the Andean Trade Promotion Act.
The global landscape for trade among nations continues to grow in
complexity, however, as more nations enter the international market to
trade goods and services. Just as we advocate more efficient, fiscally
responsible government that encourages economic growth, so must we
support free and fair trade agreements that recognize the challenges
faced by American workers in the age of globalization. The opportunity
exists for the United States to act as a world leader by enacting
strong trade provisions that protect the American worker and the
environment. The Thomas bill missed this opportunity by failing to
enact meaningful labor and environmental standards.
If you look at past free trade negotiations leading up to the Doha
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization last month, the
incremental increase in complexity and detail involved in trade
negotiations is striking. In 1979, the Tokyo Round Agreement included
only six areas for negotiation. Some of these issued areas included
tariff levels, government procurement, and technical product standards.
In 1994, the Uruguay Round negotiations integrated upwards of sixteen
areas for trade negotiation including new issues such as intellectual
property rights and trade in agriculture. In November 2001, the Doha
Ministerial WTO Negotiations included upwards of 26 areas for debate.
Among the issues open for negotiation were anti-trust laws, electronic
commerce, and product labeling to name a few.
As trade negotiations between nations involve more issues, there is
absolutely no excuse to exclude new compliance standards regarding
labor and the environment. This is the time for the United States to
take the lead to ensure that American jobs are protected at home and
that human rights laws are enforced by our trading partners.
The Thomas bill falls well short of a guarantee for strong labor
standards. By merely requiring a country to enforce its own existing
labor laws, the Thomas bill provides no U.S. leadership on the
treatment of the world's laborers. In fact, the five core International
Labor Organization (ILO) standards are not even enforced. A commitment
to principles like opposition to forced labor and child labor should be
non-negotiable priorities of any future trade deals. The Fast-Track
proposal does not require that our trade partners agree to these basic
standards. Furthermore, an incentive must be in place for our trading
partners to achieve fair and responsible labor standards and under the
Thomas bill this will not happen.
The Thomas bill falls short of any meaningful protections for the
environment, as well. Because only voluntary negotiating objectives are
in place, trading partners can lower their environmental standards to
gain unfair trade advantages. Furthermore, the Thomas bill does not
block foreign investors lawsuits from challenging domestice
environmental laws.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, during these times of uncertainty brought
about by the war on terrorism and an apparent economic slowdown, we
must heed the challenge to think anew when it comes to U.S. Trade
Policy. We must balance our commitment to trading our goods and
services abroad while also ensuring the protection and well-being of
our workers. The Thomas bill is unbalanced and would represent a step
backwards in our pursuit for free and fair trade.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I commend the diligent efforts of the
distinguished chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, the gentleman
from California, Mr. Thomas, my colleagues and their staff members in
drafting and sponsoring H.R. 3005, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2001.
This measure has been referred to as the most environmentally and
labor responsive legislation regarding Trade Promotion Authority (i.e.
Fast Track) to be sponsored by the Congress. However, I share the
concerns raised by my constituents in that H.R. 3005's labor and
environmental standards do not go far enough to ensure a level playing
field in trade agreements. H.R. 3005 refers to environmental and labor
provisions as negotiating objectives. Nevertheless, our trade history
reveals that during the past 25 years including labor rights, and now
environmental rights, as ``negotiating objectives'' do not guarantee
that these provisions will actually be included in trade agreements.
The geopolitical and trade landscape has changed. Of the 142 members
comprising the World Trade Organization (WTO), 100 are classified as
developing nations and 30 are referred to as lesser-developed nations.
Why is this important? It is important because with China's accession
into the WTO, those 130 nations will then become more forceful in
promoting their own trade agendas. What H.R. 3005 does is create an
incentive for a nation to create a more favorable trade agreement for
itself by lowering its environmental and labor standards. At best, many
of these nations' labor and environmental standards are substandard.
As drafted, the overall negotiating objective of H.R. 3005 is to
promote respect for worker rights. My constituents are concerned that
the worker rights provisions do not guarantee that ``core'' labor
standards are included in the corpus of prospective trade agreements.
By core labor standards, I refer to the International Labor
Organization's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work: freedom of association, the right to organize and for collective
bargaining, and the rights to be free from child labor, forced labor
and employment discrimination, which many people throughout the world
are confronted with.
My constituents are troubled that H.R. 3005 does not require any
signatory to an agreement to improve or even to maintain that its
domestic laws comply with the standards of the International Labor
Organization. Among H.R. 3005's principal objectives is a provision
entitled labor and the environment, which calls for the signatories to
trade agreements to enforce their own environment and labor laws. Our
nation as a leader in the global trade community must set the example
by encouraging our prospective trading partners to raise their labor
and environmental standards before we enter into any trade agreements
with them. In the end, it will be the United States which is called
upon to provide the resources to clean up environmental disasters and
to bail out collapsed economies that failed as a result of substandard
labor conditions.
Through their first-hand accounts, my constituents report that
workers in many nations in which we seek to enter into bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements are subjected to exploitation, harassment
and worse for exercising their rights to collective bargaining, and are
forced to work under harsh conditions. For example, in our own
hemisphere more than 33 percent of the complaints filed with the
International Labor Organization's Committee on Free Association
originate in the Andean region. I understand that new labor laws in
Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru undermine the right to collective
bargaining, and there are scores of reports from NGO's regarding
unconscionable violations of the most fundamental rights for workers
and their union representatives. The AFL-CIO reports that since January
2001, more than 93 union members in Colombia have been murdered, while
the perpetrators have gone unpunished.
How the United States engages in trade negotiations and its practices
are crucial not only for our future, but for our democratic process.
Since our Nation's conduct is scrutinized worldwide we should set the
right example. Events during the recent World Trade Organization
negotiations in Doha, Qatar have made this fact even more apparent.
That organization is seeking to adopt a worldwide ``Investor-State
Clause'' during its next round of discussions. This clause was written
into Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for
the purpose of protecting businesses from expropriation by foreign
governments. However, its application deviates from its original
purpose of protecting signatories from expropriations.
NAFTA Chapter 11 cases such as Methanex v. United States, allow a
foreign investor to sue a signatory government if their company's
assets, including lost profits and other intangibles are damaged by our
laws or regulations. The provisions of Chapter 11 call for an
arbitration panel, which meets in secret, and its findings are not
subject to public disclosure.
NAFTA's Chapter 11 standard of proof is much lower than what our own
courts would require in a commercial case. The standard is whether the
regulation illegitimately injured a company's investments and can be
construed as an expropriation, which generally requires a physical
taking of property or assets, even though in Chapter 11 cases no assets
were physically taken. By virtue of this provision, our laws may be
challenged in ways not foreseen by our Congress and in ways that are
inconsistent with our own court's judicial interpretation, which are
rendered irrelevant by
[[Page H9017]]
NAFTA's Chapter 11 provision. Methanex is seeking 970 million dollars.
Mr. Speaker, we must seek out ways to make trade compatible with
conservation of the environment and by adhering to core labor and
environmental standards that are both incorporated into the body of a
trade agreement and enforceable.
Accordingly, I am not able to support H.R. 3005.
Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Trade
Promotion Authority Act of 2001. This important legislation will allow
the United States to negotiate trade agreements in order to increase
exports and stimulate our economic recovery here at home. It will also
enable the President and Congress to work together to advance our
interests around the world by guaranteeing Congress substantial
participation in trade negotiations and allowing the President the
authority to sign meaningful agreements.
Today's economy is dependent on global trade. Therefore, American
businesses must have access to foreign markets. There must be a level
playing field. Farmers throughout my state of Kansas depend on foreign
markets to purchase significant portions of their crops and livestock.
And in a time where productivity exceeds the ability of the domestic
market to absorb current production levels, the need to create overseas
customers is more important than ever. In fact, Agriculture must export
one-third of its production because it is nearly three times more
dependent on exports than other sectors.
Mr. Speaker, it's not just agriculture which benefits from free
trade. Boeing, the largest exporter in the United States, sells more
than half of its commercial planes to overseas customers. Last year,
the company, which employs nearly 200,000 Americans, reported that one-
third of its sales were to international customers.
Expanded trade has never been more important. Economists agree that
America is in a recession and we must work to get our economy moving
again, This is an opportunity to boost the economy by opening new
markets.
This bill ultimately saves American consumers money, it increases
American exports, it creates American jobs, and it guarantees that the
United States will remain the world's economic leader.
I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority Act.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, this has been a long day in a needlessly
partisan fight.
I support Trade Promotion Authority and have voted for it in the
past. The bill I voted for in 1998 is not as good as the text before us
today.
I represent a trade-dependent district, and understand very well why
trade helps our economy.
But context matters. Our country was in a serious economic recession
before September 11, and now faces enormous hardships just as the
holiday season arrives. Forty-one thousand workers are out of jobs in
the communities surrounding Los Angeles International Airport. Their
airline and airport-affiliated jobs evaporated in the aftermath of 9-
11.
Workers first, Mr. Chairman. Those workers and those negatively
impacted by September 11 and trade must be helped first before we pass
TPA.
I support the package of worker benefits that the House leadership
supports: $20 billion for unemployment, health insurance and worker
training. The President has told me he supports it too.
My wish was that working together we could vote and pass it first as
evidence that we would keep our promises to workers.
Sadly we didn't. Sadly I can't support TPA today until we do.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of Trade Promotion
Authority. As a lifelong supporter of improved trade opportunities for
American producers, my inclination always is to begin with a favorable
disposition toward trade bills which come before Congress. I am
convinced that American producers can, and do, win with freer and
fairer trade. Certainly, not every conceivable trade bill deserves
support but, in general, I am strongly persuaded that increased trade
opportunities improve the lives and pocketbooks of American workers. I
also believe that enhanced trade is a potent mechanism for America to
export our values, practices and democracy along with our products.
Unfortunately, early messages from the current administration forced
me to question whether enhanced trade authority would be prudently used
if granted this year. In particular, I was sorely disappointed by
statements by the current Administration which made me doubt their
understanding of both domestic and international farm policies and,
particularly, the impact of those policies on the producers of our
Nation's food and fiber. I am not going to be party to a unilateral
disarmament of our farmers and ranchers for someone else's partisan
philosophical reasons.
Furthermore, the early handling of this issue by both the
Administration and the House leadership confirmed what has appeared to
me throughout the year as legislative arrogance. While it may be
numerically possible to pass bills with Republican-only votes,
ultimately there is a price to be paid for this sort of shortsighted
partisanship by either party. Successful trade legislation always has
required bipartisan support; when the well of good will has been
drained by earlier legislative battles fought entirely on partisan
grounds, issues like trade arrive with inadequate troops supporting the
effort.
All of that being said, I am reassured both by several conversations
I personally have had and by those which have been reported to me from
colleagues who share some of my concerns. As a naturally optimistic
person, I am willing to hope that this experience might signal an
awakening to political and legislative realities by some important
players in both the executive and legislative branches.
With my chairman on the Agriculture Committee, I am supporting the
trade promotion authority legislation before us today. I do believe
that the enhanced congressional consultation and oversight in the
current bill are vital for ensuring that our constituents' views and
needs are respected by our trade negotiators. I highly commend this and
other improvements made by my colleagues John Tanner, Bill Jefferson,
and Carl Dooley.
The truth about trade is that there always are both successes and
failures, winners and losers. But for the Nation as a whole, trade is a
net positive.
When it comes to agriculture, the successes have outweighed the
failures. American farmers and ranchers now make a quarter of their
sales to overseas markets; U.S. agriculture consistently enjoys a trade
surplus; and next year agricultural exports are expected to reach $54.5
billion, producing a trade surplus of $14.5 billion. But that is just a
fraction of what could be possible with freer and fairer markets.
According to the U.S. Trade Representative, NAFTA, and the Uruguay
Round have resulted in higher incomes and lower prices for goods, with
benefits amounting to $1,300 to $2,000 a year for an average American
family of four, NAFTA has also produced a dramatic increase in trade
between the United States and Mexico. In 1993, United States-Mexico
trade totaled $81 billion. Last year, our trade hit $247 billion--
nearly half a million dollars per minute.
U.S. exports to our NAFTA partners increased 104 percent between 1993
and 2000; U.S. trade with the rest of the world grew only half as fast.
Increased trade supports good jobs. In the five years following the
implementation of NAFTA, employment grew 22 percent in Mexico, and
generated 2.2 million jobs. In Canada, employment grew 10 percent, and
generated 1.3 million jobs. And in the United States, employment grew
more than 7 percent, and generated about 13 million jobs.
But as I said before, I acknowledge that there are those who do not
win in the short run under certain trade situations. For workers who
have lost in trade in the past, I also believe that the best--and
perhaps only--way to fix what has failed is through new negotiations,
which level the playing field. We must speak with a unified voice that
is forged through a close partnership between Congress and the
executive branches. That is envisioned in the compromise bill.
We in agriculture have only begun to reap the benefits of a half
century of trade negotiations under GAIT and the WTO, which have
reduced the average tariff on industrial goods to about 4 percent. That
is a fraction if the 62 percent tariff that is imposed on our exports
of agricultural products.
Indeed, reform of agricultural trade policies begun in the Uruguay
Round provided not only additional market access for agriculture but,
perhaps more importantly, it provided the necessary framework to
improve market access in future negotiations.
Now is the time to press forward with additional trade reforms that
will improve market access for our agricultural products.
In addition to tariff barriers, U.S. agricultural exports must
compete with subsidies from foreign governments. Europe alone spends 75
times more in agricultural export subsidies than does the United
States. In fact, Europe spent $91 billion last year to support
agriculture, almost twice the $49 billion spent by the United States.
Europe is aggressively pursuing trade agreements with other
countries, already securing free-trade or special customs agreements
with 27 countries, 20 of which it completed in the last 10 years. And
the EU is negotiating another 15 accords right now. Last year, the
European Union and Mexico--the second-largest market for American
exports--entered into a free trade agreement. Japan is negotiating a
free-trade agreement with Singapore, and is exploring free trade
agreements with Mexico, Korea, and Chile.
There is a price to pay for our delay in negotiating new trade
agreements. For example,
[[Page H9018]]
U.S. exports to Chile face an 8-percent tariff, but Canada exports to
Chile without the tariff because of the Canada-Chile trade agreement.
As a result, United States wheat and potato farmers are now losing
market share in Chile to Canadian exports.
American farmers and ranchers can't afford for us to stand by and
watch the world write new trade rules. The United States needs to lead
a new round of negotiations, and we need trade promotion authority to
do it.
I encourage my colleague to support the compromise bill today and you
will be supporting American farmers and ranchers as well as other
business men and women who have the capacity to strengthen our economy
as well as their own livelihoods if they are just given the chance.
With millions of jobs and billions of dollars at stake, we cannot
afford to be partisan or cavalier with this vote. My hope is that this
week we will produce not only a legislative victory on Trade Promotion
Authority but also a blueprint for greater respect and improved working
relations between the parties on substantive national policy.
Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I cannot vote for this bill.
I believe in free trade and am philosophically opposed to
protectionism. I am particularly sensitive to the economic challenges
faced by the ``high technology'' sector of our economy, and believe
that there was an opportunity to craft a bill that would have secured
broad bipartisan support on trade. Unfortunately, this bill falls short
of that bipartisan promise.
The stakes on trade promotion authority--or ``fast track''--have
changed, along with the global trade landscape. Easing barriers to
trade no longer simply involves tariffs or quotas. In our increasingly
globalized world, trade negotiations involve areas that used to be
considered U.S. domestic law--from regulatory standards and antitrust
laws to food safety and prescription drug patents, to name just a few.
And because the trade landscape has changed, I--along with many of my
colleagues--believe that the way in which we go about negotiating those
trade agreements should be different than it has been in the past, when
Congress agreed to limit its role in this important aspect of national
policy.
Now, even more than before, broad support is needed for any bill that
would relinquish the authority of Congress to represent the nation by
reviewing agreements or decisions reached by the Executive. If we are
going to vote to reduce congressional review and give favorable
treatment to trade agreements, we should at least provide that these
agreements meet certain minimum standards. The stakes--for American
workers and for the environment--are too high for us to do otherwise.
In June of this year, the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Crane
introduced a fast-track bill that was roundly criticized as not
providing a strong enough role for Congress and not addressing concerns
about labor or environmental standards. As Ways and Means Chairman
Thomas prepared his revised legislation, many of my colleagues and I
had hoped that he might have better understood that building a
bipartisan consensus requires consultation of Members on both sides of
the aisle. Only then could Chairman Thomas's bill have correctly been
named the ``Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act.''
So I was disappointed when H.R. 3005 was introduced, as it was clear
that Chairman Thomas wasn't willing to work to gain broad support for
his bill. In contrast, in my view, the version of the legislation
introduced by Ways and Means Ranking Member Rangel and Trade
Subcommittee Ranking Member Levin would take important steps in the
right direction and would provide a better foundation for developing
sound legislation.
But the rule under which this bill is being debated does not even
provide for consideration of the Rangel-Levin bill as an alternative.
Although the rule does make some slight improvements to the Thomas
bill, the changes are too little and too late.
It is incumbent on us in Congress to continue to work to update our
trade policy to take account of this changed landscape. That means we
need a trade promotion bill that includes a stronger role for Congress,
and stronger environmental and labor provisions. The Thomas bill before
us does not measure up, and I cannot support it.
Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, I urge the House of Representatives to
reject this ``fast-track'' trade legislation--this bill will not meet
our trade goals, and will hurt rather than help our needed economic
recovery.
Many industries, such as the U.S. steel industry, are being hard-hit
by subsidized foreign imports, yet this bill does not require U.S.
negotiators to seek wide protections such as the United States needs
from such dumping by foreign countries in key areas such as steel,
lumber, cement, and agriculture products.
Moreover, this bill will not attack the key trade steps we need to
take--rather, we need a revised U.S. trade policy that will eliminate
the record-level trade deficit, protect U.S. jobs and the U.S. economy,
and promote U.S. exports. This bill before the House of Representatives
will only mean more U.S. jobs lost to overseas, subsidized
manufacturers.
The U.S. can compete with any nation in the world as long as the
competition is fair, but this legislation will actually encourage other
countries to avoid U.S. anti-dumping laws, and worsen rather than
strengthen our economy. It also fails to strengthen overseas worker
rights and require environmental progress.
Yes, we need a revised U.S. trade policy, but we need one that
protects U.S. jobs and stimulates economic growth. This bill does not
reach that goal at all, and it should be rejected by the House of
Representatives as a statement that we will stand-up for the U.S.
economy and protect U.S. jobs rather than sending business and jobs
overseas.
Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to H.R.
3005, a bill to grant the President fast track trade negotiating
authority. The bill before us today is weaker on labor and
environmental language than the 1988 fast track bill used to negotiate
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As witnessed by the
surge of imports and loss of millions of jobs since NAFTA's enactment,
Congress must hold the President accountable for negotiating trade
agreements that are stronger than that of NAFTA--not weaker.
While gross U.S. exports rose 61.5% between 1994 and 2000, presumably
as a result of NAFTA, imports rose by 80.5% over the same period
resulting in over 3 million trade-related job losses. California led
the states in job losses with over 300,000 jobs lost to NAFTA's
explosion in imports. Proponents of the last fast track bill assured us
that more jobs would be created than would be lost. Clearly, this is
not the case. Now, Mr. Thomas is asking Congress to support a bill that
is weaker than the fast track language used to negotiate NAFTA. I warn
my colleagues not to be fooled into believing that promises made to
provide benefits in an economic stimulus package to workers who have
recently lost their jobs, will come close to justly compensating the
millions of workers who have already lost their high-paying
manufacturing jobs. Nor will it suffice in protecting those who have
yet to see unemployment from the trade negotiations that have yet to be
signed.
I want to make one thing clear: H.R. 3005 does not help U.S. workers.
This bill is intended to protect and promote multinational investments.
The bill neglects to provide any enforceable requirements that the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) negotiate any of the five core
International Labour Organization standards. We need USTR to negotiate
an agreement that commits countries to implement and enforce in their
domestic laws both the right to associate and bargain collectively, and
prohibitions on child labor, compulsory labor and discrimination in
hiring. When workers are not given these basic rights, they are
exploited. This is what has happened with NAFTA. Workers in the U.S.
are given these rights but this is not the case in Mexico. So rather
than continue to pay a decent wage to a U.S. union worker, a factory
owner can move the business to a country where there are no labor laws
and labor costs are lower than in the U.S. Although Mexico has seen a
significant increase in manufacturing with NAFTA, Mexican manufacturing
workers have seen a 21% decrease in their wages. Mexico's burgeoning
middle class has yet to materialize and the working poor have spiraled
deeper into poverty. Clearly, the 1988 fast track negotiating authority
hurt U.S. workers as much as it hurt Mexican workers. Congress must
insist on stronger trade negotiating objectives to protect U.S. workers
as well as the exploited workers around the globe. The Thomas proposal
fails to do so.
Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, corporations have been given unprecedented
immunity from domestic statute through global trade agreements. H.R.
3005 embraces NAFTA's Chapter 11 provisions, which vitiate U.S. statute
in deference to foreign corporations. This has the consequences of
hurting the environment as well as public safety. Intended as an
investor protection measure, Chapter 11 allows foreign-based
corporations to seek damages from governments that engage in
protectionist behavior and interfere with corporations' abilities to
fully realize anticipated profits.
Californians have confronted the ludicrous protections Chapter 11
provides for investors while consumer safety and the environment are
made to suffer. The Canadian-based Methanex Corporation has sued the
U.S. under NAFTA's Chapter 11 provisions, because California's phase-
out of the harmful gasoline additive, MTBE, has hurt the price of
Methanex stock. MTBE contaminated California's drinking water due to
underground gasoline storage tank leaks. Logically, California
lawmakers have ordered the additive out of their gasoline, even if it
means slightly higher gas prices at the pump. However, if the
[[Page H9019]]
closed-door NAFTA dispute panel decides in favor of Methanex, taxpayers
could be slapped with a billion dollar fine. The Thomas proposal before
us does nothing to address this egregious flaw in the NAFTA agreement.
In fact, it encourages similar provisions in future trade agreements.
The current fast track bill being considered does nothing to protect
U.S. jobs, does nothing to protect the environment and does nothing to
protect U.S. consumers. Until such issues are addressed in binding
legislative language. I cannot support fast track trade negotiating
authority. I encourage my colleagues to do join me and vote no on H.R.
3005.
Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, we are asked today to grant the President so-
called trade promotion authority, authority that has nothing to do with
free trade. Proponents of this legislation claim to support free trade,
but really they support government-managed trade that serves certain
interests at the expense of others. True free trade occurs only in the
absence of interference by government, that's why it's called
``free''--it's free of government taxes, quotas, or embargoes. The term
``free-trade agreement'' is an oxymoron. We don't need government
agreements to have free trade; but we do need to get the federal
government out of the way and unleash the tremendous energy of the
American economy.
Our founders understood the folly of trade agreements between
nations; that is why they expressly granted the authority to regulate
trade to Congress alone, separating it from the treaty-making power
given to the President and Senate. This legislation clearly represents
an unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority to the
President. Simply put, the Constitution does not permit international
trade agreements. Neither Congress nor the President can set trade
policies in concert with foreign governments or international bodies.
The loss of national sovereignty inherent in government-managed trade
cannot be overstated. If you don't like GATT, NAFTA, and the WTO, get
ready for even more globalist intervention in our domestic affairs. As
we enter into new international agreements, be prepared to have our
labor, environmental, and tax laws increasingly dictated or at least
influenced by international bodies. We've already seen this with our
foreign sales corporation tax laws, which we changed solely to comply
with a WTO ruling. Rest assured that TPA will accelerate the trend
toward global government, with our Constitution fading into history.
Congress can promote true free trade without violating the
Constitution. We can lift the trade embargo against Cuba, end Jackson-
Vanik restrictions on Kazakhstan, and repeal sanctions on Iran. These
markets should be opened to American exporters, especially farmers. We
can reduce our tariffs unilaterally--taxing American consumers hardly
punishes foreign governments. We can unilaterally end the subsidies
that international agreements purportedly seek to reduce. We can simply
repeal protectionist barriers to trade, so-called NTB's, that stifle
economic growth.
Mr. Speaker, we are not promoting free trade today, but we are
undermining our sovereignty and the constitutional separation of
powers. We are avoiding the responsibilities with which our
constituents have entrusted us. Remember, congressional authority we
give up today will not be restored when less popular Presidents take
office in the future. I strongly urge all of my colleagues to vote NO
on TPA.
Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Speaker, a vote in favor of Trade Promotion Authority
today will be a vote in favor of U.S. workers, it will be a vote in
favor of increased exports, and it will be a vote in favor of economic
growth.
This bill will have a positive effect on all aspects of the U.S.
economy, not the least of which will be the services sector.
Last year the U.S. exported $295 billion in services, compared to
imports of $215 billion, leading to an $80 billion surplus in services
trade.
Between 1989 and 1999, 20.6 million new U.S. jobs were added to the
economy in service related industries. These knowledge-based jobs
account for 80% of the total private sector employment in the U.S.
Today we have the opportunity to either expand this number by voting
in favor of H.R. 3005, or to begin to erode these impressive figures by
denying the President the tools he needs to negotiate strong free trade
agreements.
As Chairman of the Financial Services Committee I understand how
important this bill is to maintain our competitiveness in the
international arena. Earlier this year, the Committee held hearings in
which representatives from the insurance, banking and securities
industries testified that barriers to overseas markets will severely
affect their ability to compete with foreign based financial service
providers.
Financial services firms contributed more than $750 billion to U.S.
Gross domestic Product in 1999, nearly 8% of total GDP. Over 6 million
employees support the products and services these firms offer. TPA will
eliminate impediments to foreign markets and enable financial service
providers to continue to act as the engine that drives economic growth.
Approximately 80 percent of the world's GDP and half of the world's
equity and debt markets are located outside the U.S. More than 96% of
the world's population resides overseas, with India and China alone
accounting for 2.3 billion people. Many of the best future growth
opportunities lie in ``non-U.S.'' markets.
If U.S. service providers cannot access these markets or operate on a
level playing field overseas we will be left behind by foreign
financial service providers.
I strongly urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 3005. Our
workers need it, our exporters need it and our economy needs it.
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, trade promotion authority enhances the United
States' ability to negotiate agreements that help American workers and
businesses. Just as we can't repeal the laws of gravity, we can't
ignore the fact that we live in a world with a global economy.
It is estimated if global trade barriers could be cut by just one-
third, the world economy would grow more than $600 billion each year.
Talk about economic stimulus--this is it!
Trade promotion authority will open new markets. Without this
authority, trading partners will not put forth meaningful offers.
Tariffs on American products won't be reduced, and our economy will
grow at a much slower rate.
Passing this bill signals to the world we are committed to global
trade and free markets. It allows the United States to take a
leadership role in building international trading systems based on
American principles of market-based economics and fair play.
Giving the President the authority to negotiate trade agreements is
good for Connecticut, the United States and every country involved.
Exports accounted for almost one quarter of all U.S. economic growth
in the last 10 years. Trade promotion authority should pass without
delay.
Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, this debate on ``Fast Track'' is not about
whether or not the U.S. should be participating in the global economy--
we all agree on that. This debate is about HOW we are going to
participate in that economy.
In this time of economic recession, I feel that we have
responsibility to the American worker and the workers around the globe
to ensure that American labor standards are enforced globally. It is
unacceptable that American jobs are being shipped overseas to countries
that refuse to pass or enforce minimal labor protections.
As many of us can remember all too well, Fast Track Trade Authority
was last used to pass the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
in 1993. While the Administration claims that NAFTA is a resounding
success, I contend that this is far from the truth.
It is estimated that NAFTA has cost nearly 1 million U.S.
manufacturing jobs and tens of thousands of family owned farms to go
out of business. In my home state of New Jersey, alone, it is estimated
by the U.S. Department of Labor that more than 20,000 jobs were
directly lost due to NAFTA's scope.
NAFTA has also been a disaster in the area of environment protection
and public health. Since passage, pollution also in the U.S. Mexico
border has created worsening environmental and public health threats in
the area. Along the border, the occurrence of some environmental
diseases, including hepatitis, is two or three times the national
average, due to lack of sewage treatment and safe drinking water.
This is unacceptable. In my mind, no matter what this Administration
promises, Fast Track only causes the quality of life in America to be
compromised.
My friends--I say, fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame
on me. I urge my colleagues--don't be fooled again. We have already
allowed the word of past Administrations cost thousands of American
jobs and further destroy our environment. Let's not make the same
mistake again.
Vote ``no'' on Fast Track.
Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3005,
the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act (``TPA''), which will open
up new markets for our businesses here in the United States. This bill
is about breaking down trade barriers abroad and expanding
opportunities for American workers. This legislation recognizes the
reality of today's global economy and equips our country with the tools
necessary to maintain America's leadership throughout the world.
I would be remiss if I did not voice my concern about the timing of
today's debate. At times like this, we must work together. Yet for a
number of understandable reasons, this bill is far from enjoying bi-
partisan support. Nevertheless, I do not control the agenda; thus, here
we are debating the bill without the fullest support it could enjoy.
[[Page H9020]]
The evolving nature of the trade debate is evident. Instead of
discussing whether to address labor and environmental issues in the
text of TPA and future trade agreements, Congress is discussing how to
address these concerns. I believe this bill has taken a giant step
forward since the last floor vote in 1998. While not perfect, for the
first time ever in a TPA bill labor and environmental standards will
receive parity in enforcement alongside subjects covered in trade
agreements such as foreign investment and intellectual property. This
is in stark contrast to the Archer TPA bill which called for preventing
countries from weakening labor and environmental standards to attract
investment but was silent on enforcement. Clearly, H.R. 3005 moves the
trade debate forward.
Mr. Speaker, the simple fact that 96 percent of the world's consumers
live outside of our borders is irrefutable evidence that in order to
grow our economy, we must grow our exports. Hence, international trade
is critical to our nation's continued economic expansion.
An estimated 12 million jobs in the United States depend on exports
of goods and services. Furthermore, opening markets has created more
than 20 million new jobs in the US since 1992. Jobs related to exports
generally pay as much as 18 percent more than the national average.
Consumers also benefit in the form of affordable prices for many
products. In fact, our existing trade agreements provide annual
benefits of $1,300 to $2,000 for the average American family of four
from the combined effects of lower prices and increased income.
Free trade is not exclusively for the giant business conglomerates.
Our trade agreements enable small (less than 100 employees) and medium
size businesses (less than 500 employees) to compete in international
markets. According to the Department of Commerce, in 1998, more than 92
percent of Florida's 22,295 exporting companies were small and medium
sized businesses. In the district I represent, 85 percent of exporters
are small businesses that employ fewer than 100 employees.
Mr. Speaker, international markets are vital to my state's economic
well-being. Florida's economy is export-dependent, with export sales of
$1,515.00 for every state resident. Florida merchandise and
agricultural exports support an estimated 183,700 jobs, while service
industry exports support an estimated 364,000 jobs. Last year, in the
Tampa Bay area alone, nearly 500 local companies and independent
business people profited from approximately $2.6 billion in exports to
international markets.
My fellow colleagues, we need to pass TPA as soon as possible. Unless
we pass TPA, our businesses and workers will be forced to sit on the
sideline and watch our global competitors take advantage of free trade
agreements. Of the more than 130 free trade agreements (FTAs) in force
worldwide, only 3 include our country. One of our main trade
competitors, the European Union, has free trade agreements with 27
countries.
Mr. Speaker, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) will be
virtually impossible to negotiate by 2005 without TPA. The FTAA is
setting the stage for significant trade opportunities--particularly,
the opportunity to assure that the rules of trade that will be
developed are fair and sufficiently advantageous to our country. It is
an agreement that will benefit 34 countries, consisting of 800 million
people with a combined GDP of $13 trillion. The potential benefits of
increased trade with Latin America for our nation and the State of
Florida are tremendous. In Florida, Latin America and the Caribbean are
our most important markets, accounting for about 80 percent of all
exports from the state. Furthermore, over the past three years, eight
of the top 10 Florida-origin export destinations were FTAA countries.
As for Brazil, one of Florida's largest export destinations, the
average Brazilian tariff on U.S. goods is almost 14 percent, compared
with under 3 percent for Brazilian products entering the U.S.
Mr. Speaker, as I have said in the past, I recognize that increased
global competition will put some industries at risk and that with the
overwhelming number of winners there will be some losers. We will have
to work harder to ensure every American worker can participate in our
global economy, and the government has an important role to play in
educating, training and retraining today's and tomorrow's workers with
the skills they need not just to survive but to prosper in an
increasingly global economy.
By passing TPA, the Congress is delegating a significant amount of
authority to the executive branch. Thus, it is essential that the
Congress have a meaningful role during the trade negotiating process,
while recognizing the importance of providing flexibility necessary to
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to negotiate the best
deal possible for America. In the future, I expect the executive branch
to work closely with the Congress throughout any trade negotiations as
required by this legislation.
Mr. Speaker, in conclusion, this legislation is critical for the
United States. TPA will empower the President to negotiate trade
agreements that will open more markets for American goods and services,
create jobs, and reduce costs for farmers, workers, consumers, and
entrepreneurs. Refusal to pass TPA would put American workers at a
disadvantage.
I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 3005.
Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, my district is composed of hard working
Americans who build tractors, refrigerators, and furnaces. Blood, sweat
and tears are what brings home the bacon in my district. But their way
of life is endangered by both this bill and our flawed trade policy.
This year, two steel mills in my district closed their doors forever.
I have witnesses numerous other manufacturing plants close because they
are not allowed to compete fairly against foreign imports. Some of
these very companies have reopened facilities overseas only to export
their products back into the U.S.
In the past few months, I have assisted hundreds of my layed-off
constituents in filing for unemployment and TAA benefits. These hard
working folks have lost their jobs because we have set course on a
flawed trade policy that puts cheap imports ahead of their good paying
jobs. Trade Promotion Authority is a dangerous leap of faith for an
administration that has pursed a unsound trade policy.
Our flawed trade policy has most recently led to the demise of our
nation's steel industry. The inaction of Congress and the willingness
of the President's chief trade negotiator to eliminate anti-dumping
regulations has driven US steel into the ground. And we want to give
them even more authority to negotiate trade agreements?
Mr. Speaker, my district is blessed with thousands of acres of the
most fertile farmland in the country where John Deere revolutionized
agriculture with the invention of the steel plow. The farmers in my
district have struggled as corn and soybean prices have dropped in half
over the last five years. In these times of rock bottom crop prices,
they depend more than ever on farm subsidies. But, in the infinite
wisdom of our trade policy we have offered to eliminate these
indispensable price supports. I cannot in good faith support a fast
track bill at the same time the administration tries to kill the price
supports that my farmers depend on.
I am further ashamed our flawed trade policy does little to further
human rights. We blindly turn our heads when countries use children,
prisoners, and slave labor to undercut American workers. This does not
represent the values of the people I represent, but it represents the
trade policy of an administration that now wants even more latitude in
trade negotiations.
Mr. Speaker, I am proud to represent a working class district, where
folks still make a living by the sweat of their brow. I made a promise
to protect their jobs and support their economic security. This
administration has instead pursued a flawed trade policy and has let
them down at every major trade negotiation. They now want even more
latitude in negotiating trade agreements. My Colleagues, I cannot and
will not support this administration's request for fast track authority
and urge you to vote against this bill.
Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 3005, a bill
to provide the President with the authority to negotiate international
agreements and submit them to Congress for and up-or-down vote, without
amendment.
Last month, the United States and other members of the World Trade
Organizations launched a new round of trade negotiations. The members
agreed to a far-reaching agenda, covering topics from e-commerce to
manufactured goods to financial services and, most importantly to North
Dakota, agriculture. With such an ambitious agenda to tackle, an
agreement is not expected for at least four years.
For agriculture, the new agenda gives us cause for both hope and
concern. On the positive side, the agenda calls for the eventual
elimination of export subsidies, which the Europeans have used to rob
market share from U.S. farmers. In addition, the efforts of some
countries to reopen prior agreements in order to erect scientifically
unjustified barriers to U.S. commodities were rejected. The agenda's
commitment to achieve substantial new market opening measures also
stands to benefit U.S. farmers, who earn $1 out of very $3 from export
sales.
On the hand, I am troubled that U.S. trade officials have so freely
offered to negotiate our export credit guarantee program, which is not
an export subsidy but a program to help finance U.S agriculture exports
at commercial rates. I am concerned that the new round of negotiations
could expose our sugar beet industry--worth $1 billion annually to the
Red River Valley--to unlimited imports of subsidized product sold dump
market prices.
[[Page H9021]]
What's worse, even as our government was putting the export credit and
sugar programs squarely on the table, the Europeans were staunchly
defending their own subsidies and the Canadian government was declaring
the Wheat Board to be off-limits. Although U.S. attempts to ``lead by
example'' in trade negotiations may win points with free-trade
theorists, it will not in win trade agreements. We should vigorously
defend our programs and yield concessions only when we receive
concessions in exchange.
The farm bill debate has also reflected what I believe to be the
Administration's flawed approach to trade policy. Among its reasons for
opposing the House farm bill, the Administration said that restoring a
price safety net for family farmers would undermine our trade
negotiating position. I believe, quite the contrary, that a renewed
commitment to our farmers in the form of strong farm bill improves our
negotiating position. If the U.S. withdraws support for our farmers
unilaterally, what incentive do the Europeans have to negotiate away
their tremendous subsidy advantage?
The negotiations launched earlier this month have a long way to go.
Only time will tell whether our hopes for American agriculture will be
realized or our concerns will prove well founded. Before these
negotiations have even begun, however, Congress is being asked to
approve fast track, a bill authorizing the President to negotiate trade
agreements and submit them to Congress for an up-or-down vote, without
amendment.
I believe it would be unwise to approve fast track before we know
whether these negotiations are headed in a positive direction for
American agriculture. Let's make sure that the Europeans will not be
allowed to maintain their overwhelming subsidy advantage and that the
Canadian Wheat Board won't be able to continue to exploit its monopoly
position to the detriment of our farmers. Let's make sure that our
sugar industry won't be hung out to dry and that the Administration
won't try to undo our domestic farm program in trade negotiations.
Once we have greater confidence that these trade negotiations are
serving the interests of our farmers, we can move forward with fast
track authority. Until our concerns have been addressed, however, we
should not give our trade negotiators the blank-check they are seeking.
For now, there are too many open questions for us to give up our right
to amend future trade agreements.
Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, this country is in a new era. We have not
faced such times of trepidation since the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is
well established that countries who trade, who are engaged in business
with one another, are less inclined to fight, and more willing to
cooperate among mutual beneficial matters. Ultimately, trade is about
freedom and economic prosperity. And in some cases, prosperity has been
the case for certain sectors of the American economy.
Unfortunately, such has not been the case in my district in Florida.
There are number of small farmers and businesses who were decimated by
NAFTA and imports from Mexico. Promises made by our government were
promises un-kept. The specific provisional relief promised to the
tomato growers, for instance, was applied for after implementation of
NAFTA, and subsequently these farmers were denied that relief.
Under NAFTA, Florida exports in total agriculture products dropped
from $6.1 million to 1.9 million between 1993 and 1996. Only in the
year 2000, did exports climb above the 1993 level--but the damage was
done.
Earlier today, the House voted to reauthorize the Trade Adjustment
Assistance program, a program designed to aid workers and firms who
have been affected by the impact of foreign trade. This program alone
serves as a reminder that not everyone in our country benefits from
free trade . . . including small farmers and businesses in my district.
Now I understand the need to engage in free trade and I support free
trade. However, I also support fair trade. Additional provisions have
been included in HR 3005 that allows for greater consultation among
Congressional committees regarding import sensitive commodities. The
language also recognizes the need to treat such products in a different
manner during trade negotiations than other products. Though I am
grateful for the attempt at addressing these issues, I believe it does
not go far enough.
Without adequate protection and enforcement of our trade laws, and
the ability to provide sufficient relief for affected markets--such
provisions are less than meaningful.
I have had the opportunity to speak with the President regarding my
concerns and those of my constituents. I understand the need to use
Trade Promotion Authority as a tool in the war against terrorism and to
address our faltering economy. We are at war. And for that reason these
are special circumstances. The President needs to be supported and he
can use this agreement to help America in its fight against terrorism.
For this reason I am voting for Trade Promotion Authority.
Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr.. Speaker, I rise today to speak about H.R. 3005,
the Trade Promotion Authority Act.
The vote on this bill has been a very difficult decision for me. My
home county and my hometown have been hit hard in recent months by
layoffs and closures of textile manufacturing plants. In many of these
towns, several generations of families have worked at these textile
plants, and when the plants closed our way of life was shaken and our
hometown identities were forever changed.
I hurt for each and every worker who has lost a textile job and for
each and every family that faces economic uncertainty as a result of
these layoffs. We must provide them generous assistance to meet their
short-term needs. We must provide them the education and training to
equip them with the skills to fill 21st century jobs. And we must pass
policies for economic growth that will create those employment
opportunities.
But, Mr. Speaker, the fact is that defeating Trade Promotion
authority will not bring back a single textile job that we've lost.
Defeating Trade Promotion Authority instead will wave a white flag of
surrender to our economic competitors around the world and will mean
fewer jobs to replace the ones we've lost.
The workers in my home state have proven that we can compete and win
in the world economic arena. Last year, my state's export sales totaled
$15 billion, a 10.3 percent increase in one year. In the seven-year
period between 1993 and 2000, North Carolina's exports grew by 88
percent. Those exports fueled tremendous economic growth, created
unprecedented employment opportunities and placed North Carolina at the
forefront of America's global economic leadership.
In the latest available data, North Carolina depends on manufactured
exports for 285,600 jobs. That is the seventh highest total in the
United States. 6,869 companies--including 5,609 small and medium-sized
businesses--export from North Carolina. The number of companies
exporting from North Carolina rose 79 percent between 1992 and 1998.
Our state is truly export-dependent, and we need Trade Promotion
Authority to break down barriers to overseas markets so that our
technology, agriculture, manufacturing and other sectors can expand on
our progress in international competition. If we fail to gain access to
these markets, it is a guaranteed fact that our overseas economic
competitors will exploit that opportunity and deal a huge blow to our
global economic leadership. Every $1 billion in exports creates 20,000
jobs here in America, and a successful multilateral trade agreement
could reasonably result in expanding exports by $200 billion a year
producing 4 million new jobs here in America. And jobs supported by
exports pay significantly higher wages than jobs that only support
domestic markets. Clearly, expanding exports is the key to expanding
prosperity for American workers, and Trade Promotion Authority is the
key to expanding exports.
It is important to note that this bill is not itself a trade
agreement. It simply provides the President the authority past
Presidents, both Democrats and Republicans, have traditionally enjoyed
to negotiate with our trading partners to obtain the best deal possible
for America's economy. I want the President to know that I intend to
hold his feet to the fire to make sure he looks out for the best
interests of my constituents in those negotiations. And I want the
committees of jurisdiction to exercise their Congressional oversight
role vigilantly. I certainly reserve the right to oppose any trade deal
that is not in the best interests of North Carolina, and I will not
hesitate to exercise that right. I have voted against trade deals in
the past. In short, I'm going to be watching these negotiations like a
hawk.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I am compelled by the fact that we are a nation
at war. All Americans are united behind the President as he and our
nation's military seek to rid the world of the terrorist threat.
Although I may disagree with the President on some of his domestic
policies, this is a matter of major international importance.
In conclusion, I will vote ``yes'' on H.R. 3005, and I urge my
colleagues to join me in doing so.
Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my support for H.R.
3005, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001.
I have the honor to represent Montgomery County, Maryland, a county
rich in high technology such as communications technology and
biotechnology. Trade is important to our economy.
I believe Trade Promotion Authority will be good for the economy of
Montgomery County and the State of Maryland as well as our country.
Trade is important to our economy; last year Maryland sold more than $5
billion worth of exports to nearly 200 foreign markets.
Trade is also good for Maryland's entrepreneurs and small businesses.
The number of Maryland companies exporting increased 51 percent from
1992 to 1998. This is significant;
[[Page H9022]]
more than 81 percent of Maryland's 3,472 companies that export are
small- and medium-sized businesses. Trade data also shows that an
estimated 58,900 Maryland jobs depend on manufactured exports. One in
every seven manufacturing jobs in Maryland--24,700 jobs--is tied to
exports. Wages of workers in jobs supported by exports are 13 to 18
percent higher than the national average. Maryland exported an
estimated $200 million in agricultural products in 1999.
Indeed, Maryland has benefited from previous trade agreements. For
example, total exports from Maryland to NAFTA countries (Mexico and
Canada) in 1999 were 56 percent higher than 1993, before NAFTA.
This negotiating authority expired in 1994, and during that time
other countries have been moving forward with trade agreements while
the United States has been stalled. There are more than 130
preferential trade and investments agreements in the world today, and
the United States is a party to only two.
The European Union has free trade or special customs agreements with
27 countries, 20 of which it completed in the last 10 years. And the EU
is negotiating another 15 accords right now. Our inaction hurts
American businesses, farmers, ranchers, and workers as they find
themselves shut out of the many preferential trade and investment
opportunities.
Mr. Speaker, I believe in free and fair trade and a strong economy.
In times of growth our Nation has been able to move forward on
important social issues and make the world a better place for all.
Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss the trade policy
of the United States. We are scheduled to vote in the House of
Representatives this week on approving Trade Promotion Authority (TPA),
what used to be called ``Fast Track'' Authority. I will vote against
it, as I did in 1998. I will do so for several reasons, but primarily
because the United States has signed few effective trade pacts in
recent memory. Since the early 1980s the United States has become the
greatest debtor nation in the world, and that trade deficit continues
to grow, with devastating impacts for the working men and women of this
country. While corporate CEOs continue to earn record-breaking
salaries, their employees face reduced wages and benefits or worse--
they are laid off while their jobs are moved abroad. We continue to
export good, high-paying American manufacturing jobs to places like
Mexico and China, where workers are paid little and enjoy few
protections from abuse.
I agree that we need to create export markets for our goods,
especially our agricultural products. To that end, I have voted to end
the trade embargo against Cuba. However, this must be done on terms
that are fair to the United States. The list of unfair reciprocal trade
agreements we currently have with other countries boggles the mind. Our
products are taxed at extremely high rates in those countries, while
their products enter our markets virtually tax-free.
The supporters of TPA will tell you that the President needs this
authority to negotiate trade pacts, such as the next round of world
trade talks that has been put in motion by the recently concluded
conference in Doha, Qatar. But TPA is not necessary to negotiate trade
pacts. In fact, TPA expired in 1994, and we have reached several bad
agreements since then, notably terms to allow China to enter the World
Trade Organization, a deal I also did not support. The only thing TPA
guarantees is that Congress is shut out of the negotiating process,
left to ratify whatever agreement the President negotiates. And when
the time comes to vote, Congress is told that while this might not be
the best deal, it is the only one on the table and that we cannot waste
the years it took to reach it by it voting down. It is a vicious cycle
that imprisons American workers, and I will not vote to revive it.
The North American Free Trade Agreement is a good example of this
process. Eight years ago, the passage of NAFTA brought many promises:
200,000 new jobs annually in the United States; higher wages for
Mexican workers; an increased trade surplus with Mexico and a cleaner
environment and improved health in the boarder regions. In fact, the
opposite has happened--none of these promises have materialized.
Supporters of NAFTA promised great things for America's trade surplus
with Mexico and Canada. These, too, have failed to materialize. While
gross exports to NAFTA countries have increase dramatically--147
percent to Mexico and 66 percent to Canada--imports from these
countries have increased more dramatically. U.S. imports have increased
248 percent from Mexico and 79 percent from Canada. The trade deficit
with Mexico and Canada was nine billion dollars in 1993; by 2000, it
had ballooned to $60 billion. NAFTA was supposed to reduce these
numbers. Instead, the trade deficit has increased.
Instead of creating 1.6 million jobs over eight years, NAFTA has
eliminated 766,000 jobs. In my home state of Illinois, over 37,000
people have lost their jobs as a result of NAFTA. These were the good
paying manufacturing jobs I referenced above. Most of these jobs have
been relocated to Mexico, where the labor and environmental standards
are lower than in America.
Even if American jobs were not relocated to Mexico and elsewhere,
many companies have leveled this threat at their employees. Workers are
told if they do not agree to the company's terms, their jobs will go to
Mexico. As a result, workers settle for contracts with lower wages and
fewer benefits in collective bargaining. This occurred recently with
the Tower Automotive plant in my congressional district. A recent
newspaper article described it this way, ``Earlier this month, Tower
Automotive has said in order to save money, it was subcontracting the
Lincoln Aviator program to Metalsa, a company in Monterey, Mexico.''
Fortunately, Tower Automotive decided to stay in the U.S., but the
threat to move remains as an option for Tower and other businesses.
Since the enactment of NAFTA, wages for industrial workers in the
United States have decreased. These workers comprise 73% of our
nation's industrial workforce and account for most of our middle- and
low-wage workers. When manufacturing jobs leave the country, displaced
workers who can find work generally receive pay that is 13% less than
they received in their previous job. These jobs are primarily in the
service industry, where wages pay only 77% of those in the
manufacturing sector. The jobs lost as a result of NAFTA were good
paying jobs held by individuals who most likely do not have a college
education. These workers have a harder time finding re-employment and
need these jobs the most.
The trade deficit is not only a problem of the rich getting richer
and the poor poorer--it is a national security issue. Our nation is
currently at war. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, the U.S. military is engaged in military actions
against the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden. Young Americans are putting
their lives on the line every day to defend the values of this great
nation. Does it make sense that while American troops are in harm's
way, the U.S. is rapidly losing its ability to produce steel due to the
flood of illegally imported steel? If the current trend continues, we
will not have a steel industry in the U.S., leaving our national
defense vulnerable.
In September, I testified before the International Trade Commission
regarding the Section 201 investigation into U.S. steel imports. I
represent the 12th Congressional District of Illinois, which includes
Alton, Granite City, and other areas with great steel traditions.
Sadly, Alton is no longer a steel town. Laclede Steel announced in July
that it will shut its doors permanently, ending an 86-year history in
Alton and throwing 550 employees out of work. The impact on the local
economy has been severe. Of course, Laclede is not alone. Since 1997,
26 domestic mills have filed for bankruptcy. This trend must not be
allowed to continue. The hardworking men and women of the United States
and their families cannot bear the price of misguided foreign
industrial policies any longer.
However, the U.S. representatives at the Doha conference did not see
it that way. Even after the House of Representatives passed a
resolution requesting that the president preserve the ability of the
U.S. to rigorously enforce its trade laws, particularly anti-dumping
laws, the American representatives at Doha permitted the anti-dumping
regulations to be re-examined. If allowed to happen, this will further
damage American steel producers.
So where does U.S. trade policy stand on the week of the vote to
grant the president TPA? A record of unfair trade agreements that
ignore worker rights and environmental protections, hundreds of
thousands of good, high paying manufacturing jobs continuing to leave
the country, and vital American interest left close to extinction. Not
a pleasant picture.
Mr. Speaker, given this bleak backdrop, I will not vote for TPA. It
will minimize the role that Congress plays in trade agreements at a
time when congressional oversight is needed most. The Bush
administration has demonstrated by its action in Doha that it does not
have the best interests of American workers in mind. Congress must work
to ensure that more damage is not done. I urge my colleagues to join me
in fighting for the American worker by opposing Trade Promotion
Authority.
Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant
opposition to H.R. 3005, the Trade Promotion Authority Act.
Words probably cannot fully convey how disappointed I am in being
forced to vote ``No'' on H.R. 3005. Up to now, since coming to Congress
in 1993, I have compiled a pro-trade voting record that is second to
none. I have supported NAFTA, U.S. entry into the WTO, normalizing
trading relations with China and Vietnam, expanding trading relations
with the countries of sub-Sahara Africa and the Carribean, and most
recently to establish free trade with Jordan. I strongly believe that,
our nation has the most to gain from opening new
[[Page H9023]]
markets and improving upon a rules-based trading system.
I am also disappointed because I fully appreciate the extraordinary
effort put forth by my friends, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Tanner, and Mr.
Dooley, in helping to craft this bill. Throughout this process, they
were willing to listen to concerns that I and other members expressed.
They performed admirably in pushing forward Democratic principles in
negotiating this bill with the majority. Their steadfastness produced a
great deal of progress in addressing concerns on how trade impacts
labor and the environment and in addressing the plight of recently
displaced workers.
The majority has represented enactment of trade promotion authority
as economic stimulus that will help pull the nation out of the current
recession. I also recall the Administration representing this bill as
something we must pass in the context of our war against terrorism. I
don't doubt that expanding trade is in the national interest, but both
of those arguments are exaggerated and misplaced. Trade does create
better jobs for American workers that pay higher wages and add more to
the economy. However, trade's benefits manifest themselves over the
long-term; passing this bill will have very little effect on pulling
the economy out of the current recession.
It is in the context of this recession and the September 11 tragedy
that I have weighed my vote on trade promotion authority. Passing trade
authority may well be in our national interest, but over the short
term, it will not do anything except add to the anxiety that workers
who have been or are on the verge of being laid off are experiencing
now. Conscience dictates that before I support granting trade
promotion, I must ensure that their immediate needs and concerns are
addressed. I have concluded that Congress and the Administration has
fallen well short of what we must do in this area, and for this
reasons, I must vote against H.R. 3005.
On September 21, we passed a bill to provide immediate financial
assistance to the airline industry in the wake of the September 11
tragedy. Some of my colleagues objected on the grounds that we should
provide assistance contemporaneously to the workers laid off by the
airlines. I supported that bill because I understood that maintaining
the viability of the airline industry was necessary to preserve the
jobs of those who were not laid off. I was also assuaged by assurances
that we would have a bill on the floor the following week to provide
assistance to airline workers. That promise was not kept.
September 11 also exacerbated the recession that the country has
apparently been experiencing since Spring. Following the tragedy, there
was bipartisan agreement that Congress should pass an economic stimulus
package to speed recovery and to provide broad safety net assistance to
workers affected by the recession. Instead, the majority rammed through
the House a tax package providing tax breaks on offshore profits,
accelerated capital gains, and retroactively repealing a provision in
the tax code that ensures that corporations are not able to wholly
avoid paying taxes. At the same time, the bill provided a minimal level
of unemployment and health care assistance to laid off workers. Besides
not bringing our country out of recession, the bill was essentially a
slap in the fact to working class Americans.
Now, we are on the verge of voting on H.R. 3005. Several weeks ago, I
indicated to its principal supporters that in order to attract my
support, I would have to witness real progress on helping displaced
workers, and not just vague promises and commitments. In response,
Chairman Thomas unveiled several new items. Principal among them is a
provision in the TAA bill to provide $2 billion over 2 years for
workers affected by the September 11 attacks. The Chairman also
signaled his intention to offer proposals relating to health insurance
and extension of unemployment benefits in the context of the ongoing
negotiations with the Senate over the stimulus package. I appreciate
Chairman Thomas' good faith efforts, particularly his willingness to
include a provision to suspend federal income taxes on unemployment
benefits. This is actually a bill that I personally introduced earlier
this Congress.
These proposals fall short of what I would like but they do appear to
be substantial progress. Unfortunately, since they do come at the last
minute, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding whether this is
enough. Furthermore, the bulk of these proposals would need to be
included in a final stimulus package, in which negotiations are ongoing
over contentious issues. I am basically being asked to trust that these
proposals will be improved upon where necessary and enacted into law,
in spite of the fact that we have had months to do complete work on
these items.
I have concluded that I owe it to working class Americans that I
should not simply take a leap of faith. For too long, they have been
suffering while Congress has sat on its hands. I do not think it is
unreasonable for us to wait on passing TPA legislation until we have
passed legislation to help the unemployed.
I am fully willing to revisit this issue if, later in this Congress,
we do in fact provide the relief that displaced workers deserve. Today,
however, my vote is ``no.''
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R.
3005, the Fast Track Trade Authority bill.
The President has requested Fast Track Trade Authority whereby
Congress agrees to consider trade agreements without amendment and with
limited debate. The administration says that unless we pass this bill,
it will not be able to finalize a new round of worldwide trade talks or
complete smaller trade deals.
This is simply not true. Without Fast Track Trade Authority, the
Clinton administration negotiated more than 300 trade agreements.
President Bush has finalized the Vietnam-U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement
and begun work on the Free Trade Agreement of the Americaas.
Denying Fast Track Trade Authority at this time will not hinder the
president's ability to negotiate large multi-national trade agreements.
The World Trade Organization will not finalize the next round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for at least another five
years.
Fast Track Trade Authority is actually a tool to aid powerful
corporations searching the globe for cheap labor by ignoring basic
workers' rights, environmental safeguards, enforceable sanctions, and
Congressional input.
H.R. 3005 includes negotiating objectives promoting worker rights,
yet these objectives are hollow. The bill relies on the self-
enforcement of a country's worker rights laws.
This bill does not require trade agreements with clear provisions to
protect workers' rights. It does not require countries to agree to
adhere to the International Labor Organization's core labor standards,
including bans on child and slave labor.
American needs trade agreements that instantly go before a dispute
settlement panel if a country violates internationally recognized labor
standards, such as the right to collective bargaining. All trade
agreements need enforcement provisions which allow for prompt and full
compliance with a dispute settlement panel's decisions.
Proponents of Fast Track Trade Authority believe that the Trade
Adjustment Assistance program we reauthorized today will assist
individuals who will lose their jobs to future trade agreements.
Workers who lost their jobs to NAFTA will vouch that this program
cannot replace their jobs and does not provide the health benefits that
they desperately need while looking for new jobs. All of us want to
help workers and should support this program, but the reauthorization
does not overcome the weaknesses of Fast Track Trade Authority.
H.R. 3005 states that environmental concerns are a negotiating
objective of trade agreements, but it only requires consultative
mechanisms for strengthening trading partner's environmental and human
health standards.
The Thomas fast-track bill will expand controversial ``investor''
rules that empower foreign corporations to sue over environmental laws
if laws, regulations, or court orders interfere in any way with a
company's ability to do business.
H.R. 3005 requires the president to consult with Congressional
committees and prepare reports about child labor and the effectiveness
of enforcing workers rights. These provisions do not give Congress the
power to ensure that trade agreements conform to basic international
labor provisions and environmental policies.
With the economy in a recession and 7.7 million unemployed Americans
looking for work, we cannot expose working families to unfair trade
agreements that allow corporations to move into countries with weak
labor standards.
We cannot expose workers to flawed trade agreements such as NAFTA
that cost American workers 766,030 jobs in the steel textile, apparel,
manufacturing, and other sectors of our economy.
I urge my colleagues to vote against H.R. 3005 and protect our
environment and American workers from unfair trade agreements.
Ms. SOLIS. Mr. Speaker, For my colleagues pondering their vote on
Fast Track Trade Negotiating Authority. And for the American public. I
ask you to envision this scene. It was August, 1995. In my district--El
Monte, California.
Not two years after the North American Free Trade Agreement narrowly
passed this House.
During a pre-dawn raid, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
comes to the rescue, literally, of seventy-two Thai immigrants working
in a garment factory.
I say ``working,'' but what I really mean is involuntary servitude.
These women, forced into slave labor, worked eighteen hours a day in a
seven-unit apartment building that served as a sweatshop. Actually, a
prison. Some of the women had not been let out of the filthy factory
surrounded by razor wire for seven years.
[[Page H9024]]
Now, many of you find it hard to believe this kind of horrific scene
could take place in the United States. Well, it did happen. And not
only did it happen in my community, it happens in communities
throughout the world.
The United States should not reinforce the existence of such horrific
practices. And yet, we do--at the behest of a global economy. The
presence of sweatshops here and abroad corresponds directly with trade
levels.
The number of workers employed by maquiladoras in Mexico has tripled
since the passage of NAFTA. Now, that may sound good to some. But, you
must look close at the picture.
Workers caught in maquiladoras on our Southern border are faced daily
with extremely low wages and unsafe labor practices. Take the Han Young
factory in Tijuana, Mexico for instance. The Han Young factory
manufactures parts for Hyundai trucks. This factory has repeatedly
failed to provide a safe working environment for its employees. The
company refused to provide safety shoes and glasses, chemical resistant
gloves, respirators, and face shields. There are even puddles of water
beneath high-powered cables--and faulty cranes that repeatedly dropped
tractor trailer chassis while they were being worked on. And when the
workers tried to band together to create a bargaining unit in order to
remedy these serious health risks--the company engaged in a campaign of
intimidation in order to stop unionization.
Our unbridled pursuit of trade is leading to the further exploitation
of the poor throughout the world. I agree that we must engage in trade.
However, the most powerful country in the world should be committed to
engaging only in fair trade. Our trade agreements must include labor
and environmental protections. For, if we do not take the lead on these
issues, who will? And, if the plight of the working poor is not enough
to persuade you to support a fair trade agreement, please consider the
harm that will come to our environment. Many of my Republican
colleagues understand the importance of protecting our global
environment.
And we need only look to the Qatar World Trade Organization
negotiations to understand that our U.S. Trade Representative does not
consider the environment to be priority. In fact, while in Qatar, the
USTR agreed to revisit the status of international environmental
treaties already in effect. These negotiations could lead to further
destruction of our environment by enabling the WTO to review these
agreements. Environmental agreements should not be subject to review by
an organization whose sole purpose is to promote business and trade. As
we have learned from our environmental movement here, business
interests many times conflict with environmental interests. Trade
agreements and environmental agreements should remain independent of
each other in order to maintain the integrity of both.
Join me in opposing H.R. 3005. This version of Fast Track does not
ensure safety to workers nor safety to our environment. The world looks
to us as leaders in trade. Therefore, we should fulfill that role
responsibly and include enforceable labor and environmental protections
in all of our trade deals.
Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, From the debate thus far on Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA), it is clear to me that the legislative process works
best when Democrats and Republicans move forward together.
Unfortunately, the effort to pass TPS this Congress is a poor
demonstration of Congress' ability to cooperate and compromise. At this
particular moment in American history, I find that troubling.
I would like nothing better than to vote for the passage of TPA. Over
the past several years, I have supported almost every free trade
measure to come before the House of Representatives because I believe
that the health of the American economy is dependent on new and more
open markets. I believe that the future wages of the American worker
are dependent on our ability to do two things: secure new markets for
American goods and services and enhance the education and skills of our
current workforce.
But markets do not open overnight. Negotiating new and more open
markets is a complicated process made even more complicated by the
procedural process in Congress. Without a straight up or down vote on a
trade agreement, Congress could be bogged down forever in amendments
and in congressional politics. If the congressional amendment process
came into play, our President would no longer have the credibility to
negotiate agreements. All 435 Members of the House cannot be the
American trade negotiators.
I understand this. I believe that the President, Democrat or
Republican, should have the flexibility that TPA affords to negotiate
and pass trade agreements.
But the details of TPA do matter. The USTR has moved from negotiating
tariffs to non-tariff barriers to trade. What this means is that
instead of just negotiating reductions in tariffs, our trade
negotiators will be negotiating substantive changes in American law.
In the next round, the plan is to make changes in antitrust laws. The
protections currently provided by the American patent system may also
be amended through trade. Copyright protection is up for discussion.
These laws, antitrust and intellectual property, are enormously
important to the economic viability of the United States. Just as
American laws are harmonized in trade negotiations, the role of
Congress's Congressional Committees must evolve from procedural
consultations to ones that are substantively consultative.
While I have raised this issue again and again over the past several
months, the Thomas bill has left this issue unaddressed. Interestingly,
a role is provided for review of agricultural policy as well as for
financial services. But are potatoes and rice more important that
patents and antitrust laws? I think not.
The USTR must submit to the relevant Congressional Committees,
including the Judiciary Committee, and not just to the Ways and Means
Committee, information that informs Members which provisions of
existing US law are being changed.
Just a few years ago, I was surprised as a Member of the Judiciary
Committee to find that I could not insert a salary floor amendment into
a bill pertaining to H-1B nonimmigrants because we had made a trade
commitment in the General Agreement on Trade in Services not to put in
such a condition. An alternative system that was negotiated, but not
approved by Congress, was inserted by GATT. This made it impossible for
Members of Congress to make changes to domestic law without violating
US trade obligations. When I asked my colleagues on the Committee if
they had heard of such a change in the law, I got a lot of blank looks.
They were as surprised as I was.
And I'm not surprised that they didn't know because the implementing
legislation of the Uruguay Round Agreements was hundreds of pages long.
Such changes are not limited to immigration law. The same thing could
happen in a area like antitrust if an agreement on competition policy
is reached. Professor Daniel Tarullo, a Professor of Law at Georgetown
University wrote in a letter to Senator Leahy that a ``competition
agreement in the WTO could seriously compromise the integrity of US
antitrust policy and for that matter the competition policies of other
nations.''
We know that antitrust law is explicitly ``on the table'' for the
next round. While I don't disagree that this is an appropriate topic
for discussion, I cannot agree that US antitrust laws should be changed
without the review and involvement of the Judiciary Committee.
The Judiciary Committee should have the same access to these issues
as the Agriculture Committee has relative to agricultural issues in the
Thomas bill. While I do not support a unduly burdensome process, I
believe there must be a happy medium between the Rangel and Thomas
approaches. That is why I believe we should wait to vote on TPA.
Again, I would like nothing more than to vote for a Trade Promotion
Authority measure that takes into consideration the proper role of
Congress and its Committees. I appreciate the ways & Means Committee's
work on this bill, but we are not there yet.
Mrs. McCARTHY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R.
3005, which is similar to a bill that failed two years ago, that
establishes expedited procedures for congressional consideration of
trade agreements negotiated by the President. Under H.R. 3005, the
Trade Promotion Authority Act (TPA), the Administration would be
required to consult with Congress before signing a trade agreement, but
once the agreement is formally submitted to Congress, both houses must
consider the agreement within 90 days without amending the tentative
agreement.
As a New Democrat, I believe in the fundamental concept of free
trade. Eliminating unfair foreign trade barriers leads to greater
exports by the United States and potential increases in production. It
is important that America not be left on the sidelines as trade
agreements are negotiated without our participation. However, free
trade must occur on an equal playing field.
Unfortunately, this particular, H.R. 3005, does not sufficiently
address important concerns that were expressed two years ago. For
example, this legislation does not require countries to implement any
meaningful standards on labor rights. These include the five core
International Labor Organization (ILO) standards: the rights of
association and collective bargaining, bans against child labor,
compulsory labor, and discrimination.
The bill simply details negotiating objectives on labor rights, but
does nothing to ensure that any final trade agreement will actually
include those provisions. In addition, this legislation simply requires
a country to enforce its existing law--however weak that law may be.
Furthermore, this bill contains only voluntary negotiating objectives
on the environment. It
[[Page H9025]]
does nothing to prevent countries from lowering their environmental
standards to gain unfair trade advantages, and would do nothing to
protect multilateral environmental agreements from trade challenges.
Moreover, it does nothing to block foreign investor lawsuits from
challenging domestic environmental laws. Future trade agreements could
include provisions like Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) which allow foreign investors to undermine U.S.
environmental, safety, and health law on the basis of unfair trade.
Lastly, I am concerned over the lack of congressional action prior to
the signing of any trade agreement; only consultations. Congress may
vote on a disapproval resolution, but only to certify that the
Administration has ``failed to consult'' with Congress. Moreover, under
this bill Congress would give up the right to amend trade agreements--
even those that are controversial and which dramatically alter domestic
law--in exchange for optional negotiating objectives. Any trade
agreement should be under the purview of the House of Representatives,
not the House of Consultants.
I am disappointed that these issues were not resolved prior to floor
consideration. The trade policy of the United States must benefit the
entire country, not simply select interest groups. We must strive and
enter into trade agreements that are not only free, but fair.
Unfortunately, H.R. 3005, like its predecessor, fails to remedy the
concerns associated with expedited trade agreements.
Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill.
And let me say right up front: I stand here before you today as a free
trader.
Those of you who know me know that I believe in the principles of
free trade and global commerce. I have fought to open and expand
markets for US goods and services time and time again, right here in
this chamber.
Those who know me know that I believe that the freedom to trade
across borders, if handled responsibly, is a wonderful way to raise
living standards, create jobs, and protect the environment around the
world--particularly in those countries that need help the most.
But this vote is about much more than that. It's about the fact that
the very nature of international trade has changed radically.
Trade is no longer primarily about tariffs and quotas. It's about
changing domestic laws. The constitutional authority to make law is at
the heart of our role as a Congress and of our sovereignty as a nation.
When international trade negotiators sit down to hammer out
agreements, they are talking about harmonizing `non-tariff barriers to
trade' that may include everything from antitrust laws to food safety.
Now, I believe the President and the USTR should be able to negotiate
trade deals as efficiently as possible. There's no questions about
that.
But that does not mean that Congress must concede to the Executive
Branch its constitutional authority over foreign commerce and domestic
law without adequate assurances that Congress will be an active
participant in the process.
Congress should be a partner, not a mere spectator or occasional
consultant to the process. The Thomas bill does not ensure that.
Think about what may be bargained away at the negotiating table: our
own domestic environmental protections . . . food safety laws . . .
competition policies.
That's the air we breathe, the food our children eat, and the way
Americans do business.
With all due respect to Robert Zoellick, I want George Miller, John
Conyers, and John Dingell in on those discussions.
Now, Chairman Thomas says that he has fixed the problem of
Congressional participation by adding a bit of technical language here
and there.
Of course, these changes do nothing to affect the labor and
environmental provisions in this bill, which we all know are sorely
lacking.
But let me be clear: these amendments are pure window-dressing.
Beneath the jargon, all he's done is give himself, as Chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee, the ability to bottle up any attempt to
revoke fast track authority, no matter how far the negotiators have
strayed from Congressional trade objectives.
With all due respect to the Chairman, I cannot cede my constitutional
responsibility to his stewardship.
Mr. Speaker, the nature of trade has changed, and fast track
authority must change with it. I ardently believe in the principles of
free trade. But I will not put my constitutional authority over
domestic law and my responsibility to my own constituents on a fast
track to the executive branch.
I urge my colleagues to vote no on this legislation. Thank you.
Beneath the jargon, all he's done is give himself, as Chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee, the ability to bottle up any attempt to
revoke fast track authority, no matter how far the negotiators have
strayed from Congressional trade objectives.
With all due respect to the Chairman, I cannot cede my constitutional
responsibility to his stewardship.
Mr. Speaker, the nature of trade has changed, and fast track
authority must change with it. I ardently believe in the principles of
free trade. But I will not put my constitutional authority over
domestic law and my responsibility to my own constituents on a fast
track to the executive branch.
I urge my colleagues to vote no on this legislation.
Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, as I have conveyed to you, my
concern is that as we pursue international trade agreements, we must
enter those negotiations recognizing the special needs of our fruit and
vegetable sector, and Florida citrus in particular. While many of our
commodities enjoy significant federal subsidies, fruit and vegetable
producers do not have these same subsidies. Florida's $9 billion citrus
industry potentially faces significant competition from Brazil. Brazil
enjoys a cost-of-production far below that of U.S. agricultural
producer. Today's tariffs on Brazilian orange juice account for the
wide difference in cost-of-production between the U.S. and Brazil.
Also, Brazilian fruit can be treated with pesticides that are banned in
the U.S. This raises issues of safety, double standards, and
competitive advantages. Any further reduction in the tariff schedule
for Brazilian orange juice under FTAA could cause significant harm to
Florida's citrus industry.
Mr. Speaker, we had requested the inclusion of language in the bill
specifically excluding export sensitive products such as perishable
fruits and vegetables, and related products such as frozen orange
juice. That specific language is not in your bill.
Mr. Speaker, it is my understanding that the amendments in section
three dealing with trade sensitive commodities, would limit the
President's proclamation authority so that tariff reductions could not
be implemented without specific Congressional approval.
It is also my understanding that these special provisions provide a
strong indication that these sensitive agriculture industries, such as
citrus, should not be the subject of further tariff reductions in
negotiations covered under this act?
Finally, it is my understanding that these provisions require that
the Administration identify that the import sensitive agriculture
products, such as citrus, be fully evaluated by the ITC prior to any
tariff negotiations and that any probable adverse effects be the
subject of remedial proposals by the Administration.
As this bill moves from the House to the other body and to
conference, there will be additional opportunity to address the
concerns of this industry. I am pleased that the Chairman has indicated
he is willing to work with me and other members of the Florida
Congressional delegation to address any additional concerns.
Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to the
Trade Promotion Authority bill offered by Chairman Thomas.
My problem here is not with the concept of giving the President trade
promotion authority, my problem is with passing a TPA bill that fails
to address basic labor and congressional oversight requirements.
The labor provisions in this bill are a sham.
This legislation calls only for the non-degradation of a potential
trading partner's labor laws.
Under this bill, Malaysian companies could continue to pay a ten year
old child, five cents for a day's work.
In this example, the Malaysian firm would only be in violation if it
paid the same child four cents for a day's work.
The Thomas labor requirements run counter to common sense.
There is a reason that the International Labor Organization
established the five core labor standards.
The rights of association and collective bargaining, and bans on
child labor, compulsory labor and discrimination are essential
components to all trade agreements.
We must insist that our trade partners respect and abide by these
standards without exception.
The notion of Congressional oversight has fallen short in this bill,
as well.
H.R. 3005 provides no effective mechanism for Congressional
participation. It only includes an element of the 1988 law that was
never implemented.
Congress must have the authority to oversee these agreements on a
periodic basis, and have the ability to present resolutions of
disapproval should the need arise.
The bottom line is that this bill is totally deficient on many
levels.
The Ranking Member, Mr. Rangel, had a substitute that would have met
the requirements necessary to negotiate trade agreements in good faith.
Unfortunately, the Republicans would not allow the Democratic bill to
see the light of day.
[[Page H9026]]
Let's pass a TPA bill that makes sense.
This bill certainly does not.
Therefore, I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill.
Mr. KLECZKA. Mr. Speaker, almost 11 weeks have passed since the
Speaker indicated that the House would take up legislation to help
those who were unemployed due to the September 11th attacks and the
slowing economy. To date we have not completed action on proposals to
extend unemployment compensation, to address health insurance for
people who lost coverage through their former employer, or to provide
health insurance coverage for those who did not have health benefits
through their employer.
Today we are asked to consider another bill that would benefit large
businesses at the expense of the American worker. The legislation
before us would grant the President the ability to negotiate trade
agreements with other countries and then send them to the Congress for
it's up or down vote.
Congress should be part of careful and deliberate negotiations on all
trade agreements. They should not be put on the fast-track. Such a
take-it-or-leave-it approach strongly favors any agreement submitted by
the Administration, regardless of its flaws or impact on our workers
and the environment. A recent trade agreement between the United States
and Jordan was not subject to fast-track procedures, but was approved
by Congress nevertheless. This measure required labor and environmental
issues to be part of the core negotiating objectives. If Congress has
not been a part of constructing that agreement, those objectives would
surely have been left out of the accord.
The most appalling aspect of this bill is the fact that it fails to
address the continuing problem of varying labor and environmental
standards throughout the world. The bill requires only that a country
enforce its own laws--however bad they may be in terms of worker rights
and working conditions. There is no real requirement that a country's
law include any of the five core labor standards--bans on child labor,
discrimination, slave labor and the rights to associate and to bargain
collectively.
Therefore, this bill would allow countries that do not provide basic
protections to children under 14 who work in factories, that allow the
use of slave labor, or that deny workers the basic right to associate
and bargain collectively, to continue to do so. It is nearly impossible
for American companies and their employees to compete against foreign
businesses that pay poverty wages.
Nor does the bill direct that concrete steps be taken to integrate
existing or future multilateral environmental agreements with trade
agreements. Instead, the bill says we do not care whether your
companies pollute the water or poison the air. This bill says we do not
care how safe your products are and it allows foreign investors in the
U.S. to challenge our own right to enact environmental and other public
interest laws within our borders.
Our trade agreements should not forsake the interests of U.S. workers
and industries, for the option of foreign companies flooding our
markets with cheap products, forcing American businesses to close there
doors and send their workers to the unemployment line.
Trade agreements have far-reaching effects on the U.S. economy,
workers and the environment and at a time when the economy is in a
recession and America is waging a war overseas, the jobs of American
workers should not be put at additional risk by this legislation.
This bill differs little from the fast track bill voted down by the
House in 1998 and it should be voted down today as well.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, One of my priorities in Congress is the
support of trade policies that require environmental protections,
support human rights and fair labor conditions while strengthening the
economies of my community and of nations around the world.
Trade has tremendous potential for achieving these objectives, but
only if our trade policy is carefully crafted. We must ensure that we
are using our maximum leverage to achieve the above goals. We need to
appreciate how the world is chaning--in regards to the positive
transformative powers trade can have for societies around the world as
well as the potential negative impact trade can have here at home.
International trade provisions can now undermine other U.S. provisions
of law ranging from immigration to anti-trust. One example is the
provisions in NAFTA that appear to place foreign investors in a
position superior to their American counterparts, potentially enabling
them to evade our environmental protections.
I believe these problems are not insurmountable or even all that
difficult to tackle. The provisions of HR 3019, authored by Ranking
Member Rangel, would establish core labor standards as the point of
departure for any new free trade agreement in the Americas. In HR 3019
foreign investors would not be given greater rights than domestic
investors, and the United States would be empowered to enforce
multilateral environmental agreements where both parties have accepted
their obligations.
With a determined expression of outreach and commitment on the part
of the President and the Speaker of the House, we can and should have a
trade bill that garners at least 250 votes, helping lift trade above
today's fiercely ideological partisan contention. Instead, if this bill
passes, it will win a narrow majority over bitter opposition from many
people who are actually leaders for international trade. Bringing this
legislation to the House floor in this form, under these conditions,
borders on the irresponsible. There is no reason to play ``Russian
roulette'' with our national trade policy in order to accentuate
partisan differences. Securing votes with incremental concessions on
items like citrus and steel, and backing away form agricultural reform
is a poor way to pass legislation and is no way to form an enduring
coalition in support of trade promotion. I have implored the President
to defuse the situation. I fear it will come back to haunt him and his
Administration and make progress in the trade arena needlessly
difficult for years to come.
The decision to attempt a narrow partisan victory continues a
troubling trend in the House of Representatives. Legislation dealing
with terrorism, airline security, insurance protection and economic
stimulus did not need to be partisan and indeed there were strong
bipartisan bills available. The decision by the House Republican
leadership to push for narrow partisan victories at the expense of
sound bipartisan policy, with the acquiescence or in some cases the
outright support of the Administration, is not just bad policy, it's
the wrong thing to do, when the country desperately wants to be united
solving our problems.
I sadly but resolutely vote against this legislation. I will continue
to speak out in support of the importance of Trade Promotion Authority.
I will work with people on both sides of the aisle and our talented
Trade Representative Robert Zoellick to secure a true bipartisan
solution to other trade related issues.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my strong opposition to
H.R. 3005, the Thomas Fast Track bill.
I strongly support free trade, but it must be fair and not at the
expense of American jobs, workers' rights, the environment, or our
Constitution.
We cannot sacrifice jobs in the pursuit of imaginary profits,
especially now with our economy stumbling.
We are losing jobs every day, while our trade deficits get larger and
larger. And those deficits have expanded since NAFTA was passed.
The Economic Policy Institute reports that Americans have lost 3
million actual and potential jobs since NAFTA.
California alone has suffered over 300,000 jobs in trade-related
losses.
We must stem this tide and signing over Congress' trade authority is
not the way to do that.
Nor should we sacrifice our environment or the public health.
Under the terms of Chapter 11 of NAFTA, California is currently being
sued by a Canadian corporation because our state's efforts to phase out
MTBE from our gasoline and eliminate that potential carcinogen from our
water supply have cut into their profits.
Fast track would open up our environmental laws to foreign lawsuits.
It would undermine efforts to let consumers know if they are eating
genetically modified foods.
It would threaten international environmental protections.
Finally, fast track undercuts the authority of this very Congress to
protect our constituents.
The Constitution specifically grants Congress ``the power to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations.''
We should not vote to give that power away.
I urge you to oppose this bill. We don't have to jump on to a fast
track that will lead to a train wreck.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member rises today to express his
very strong support for H.R. 3005, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2001. This Member would like to thank the
distinguished Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee from
California (Mr. Thomas) for both introducing this legislation and for
his efforts in moving this legislation forward to today's House Floor
debate. Additional appreciation is expressed to the distinguished
Chairman of the House Rules Committee from California (Mr. Dreier) for
his efforts in expediting the consideration of this legislation.
Under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, Congress
would agree to vote ``yeas'' or ``no'' on any trade agreement in its
entirety, without amendments. This Member in the past has always
supported Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), or ``Fast-Track Authority''
as it was previously called, because
[[Page H9027]]
this Member is fully convinced it is required for the President, acting
through the United States Trade Representative, to conclude trade
agreements with foreign nations. Certainly, TPA is necessary to give
our trading partners confidence that the agreements which the U.S.
negotiates will not be changed by Congress. Without the enactment of
TPA, the United States will continue to fall further behind in
expanding its export base and that will cost America thousands of
potential jobs. Granting TPA to the President is absolutely essential
for America to reach towards its export potential.
TPA will enhance Nebraska's agricultural exports. According to
estimates from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Nebraska ranked
fourth among all states with agricultural exports of $3.1 billion in
2000. These exports represented about 35 percent of the state's total
farm income of $8.9 billion in 2000. In addition to increasing farm
prices and income, agricultural exports support about 44,800 jobs both
on and off the farm. The top three agricultural exports in 2000 were
live animals and red meats ($1 billion), feed grains and products ($769
million) and soybeans and products ($454 million). However, Nebraska
agricultural exports still encounter high tariff and a whole range of
significant nontariff barriers worldwide.
At the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial in Doha,
Qatar, trade ministers representing over 140 countries agreed to a
Declaration which launched a comprehensive multilateral trade
negotiation that covered a variety of areas including agriculture. The
trade objectives in this Declaration called for a reduction of foreign
agriculture export subsidies, as well as improvements in agriculture
market access. In order to help meet these trade negotiation
objectives, TPA would give the President through the United States
Trade Representative the authority to conclude trade agreements which
are in the best interest of American farmers and ranchers.
This legislation is very important for Nebraska because our states
economy is very export-dependent. According to the U.S. Department of
Commerce International Trade Administration, Nebraska has export sales
of $1,835 for every state resident. Moreover, 1,367 companies,
including 998 small and medium-sized businesses with under 500
employees, exported from Nebraska in 1998. Therefore, TPA is critical
to help remove existing trade barriers to exports of Nebraska goods and
services.
To illustrate the urgency for TPA, it must be noted that the U.S. is
only party to free trade agreements with Mexico and Canada through
NAFTA and with Israel and Jordan. However, Europe currently has entered
27 free trade agreements and it is currently negotiating 15 more such
agreements. In addition, there are currently over 130 preferential
trade agreements in the world today. Without TPA, many American
exporters will continue to lose important sales to countries which have
implemented preferential trade agreements. For example, many American
exporters are currently losing export sales to Chile because Canadian
exporters face lower tariffs there under a Canada-Chile trade
agreement.
This Member would like to focus on the following five subjects are
they relate to the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001:
financial services; labor and the environment; congressional
consultation; the constitutionality of TPA; and the foreign policy and
national security implications of TPA.
First, as the Chairman of the House Financial Services Subcommittee
on International Monetary Policy and Trade, this Member has focused on
the importance of financial services trade, which includes banking,
insurance, and securities. This Subcommittee was told in a June 2001
hearing that U.S. trade in financial services equaled $20.5 billion in
2000. This is a 26.7 percent increase from the U.S.'s 1999 financial
services trade data. Unlike the current overall U.S. trade deficit,
U.S. financial services trade had a positive balance of $8.8 billion in
2000.
The numbers for U.S. financial services trade have the potential to
significantly increase if TPA is enacted into law. The U.S. is the
preeminent world leader in financial services. TPA would further
empower the United States Trade Representative to negotiate with
foreign nations to open these insurance, banking, and securities
markets and to expand access to these diverse financial service
products.
Certainly, TPA would particularly benefit U.S. financial services
trade as it relates to the Free Trade Area of the Americas since many
of the involved countries are emerging markets where there will be an
increasing demand for sophisticated financial services. Furthermore,
TPA would also benefit financial services trade as it is part of the
larger framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In 2000, GATS members began a
new round of service negotiations.
Second, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001 includes
important labor and environmental provisions. For example, among other
provisions, TPA adds a principal U.S. negotiating objective to ensure
that a party to a trade agreement does not fail to effectively enforce
its own labor or environmental laws. This type of provision was also
included in the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement which was signed into
law on September 28, 2001 (Public Law No. 107-43).
Third, it is important to note that this legislation has strong
congressional consultation provisions for before, during, and after the
negotiations of trade agreements. For example, the President is
required, before initiating negotiations, to provide written notice and
to consult with the relevant House and Senate committees of
jurisdiction and a Congressional Oversight Group at least 90 calendar
days prior to entering into trade negotiations. This Congressional
Oversight Group, who would be accredited as official advisers to the
United States Trade Representative, would provide advice regarding
formulation of specific objectives, negotiating strategies and
positions, and development of the trade agreement. In addition, TPA
would not apply to an agreement if both Houses separately agree to a
procedural disapproval resolution within any 60-day period stating that
the Administration has failed to consult Congress.
Fourth, enactment of TPA is required to secure a constitutionally
sound basis for American trade policy in the globalized economic
environment focusing our country today. Under Article II of the U.S.
Constitution, the President is given the authority to negotiate
treaties and international agreements. However, under Article I of the
U.S. Constitution, Congress is given the power to regulate foreign
commerce. In this TPA legislation, any trade agreement still has to be
approved by Congress by a ``yes'' or ``no'' vote, without any
amendments, by both the House and the Senate before it can be signed
into law. As a result, TPA does not impinge upon the exclusive power of
Congress to regulate foreign commerce. Furthermore, the U.S.
Constitution does not ban the adoption of a Senate or House rule which
prohibits amendments from being offered to a bill during Floor
consideration. In fact, the House considers bills almost every
legislative week which cannot be amended on the Suspension Calendar.
Fifth, extending TPA to the President has critical national security
implications. Indeed, the terrorist attacks of September 11th highlight
the extend to which American security is placed at risk when the U.S.
fails to remain engaged in areas around the world. Many countries of
Central America, South America, Asia, and Africa have fragile
democratic institutions and market economies. They remain in peril of
falling into the hands of unfriendly regimes unless the U.S. helps to
develop the kind of economic stability underpinning democratic
societies that enhanced trading opportunities can provide.
In conclusion, for the above stated reasons and many others, this
Member strongly supports TPA because it is absolutely critically
important to the health and the future growth of the U.S. economy.
Therefore, this Member very strongly urges his colleagues to support
H.R. 3005. This is probably the most important vote of the 107th
Congress.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, H.R. 3005, a measure granting
Trade Promotion Authority, TPA, to President Bush, an authority which
lapsed in 1994. One of the most important votes we will be asked to
cast in this Congress, the enactment of this measure is essential to
our national interest and our long-term economic growth and prosperity.
Without this authority, U.S. negotiators will continue to find
themselves outside looking in on trade competitors concluding one trade
agreement after another that protects their interests and ignores ours.
There are over 130 such preferential agreements in place today and the
U.S. is a party to only three.
Our trade competitors have clearly taken advantage of our inability
to negotiate without this authority. Our NAFTA trade partners, Canada
and Mexico, have, for example, signed preferential trade agreements
with other countries of South and Central America ensuring that our
exporters are at a competitive disadvantage.
Our hopes for this hemisphere rest upon the economic advancement of
all. And during the past decade there were many positive signs as
almost every country in the region embraced the free market and
implemented a far-reaching series of economic reforms, thereby laying
the foundation for sustained growth. We are only at the beginning of
this process, however.
Too many in this rich hemisphere remain poor; too many countries
remain underdeveloped; and too many workers are denied access to
increased economic opportunities. There are many obstacles that need to
be overcome in this effort, but one easy way to
[[Page H9028]]
expand economic opportunity for every country in this hemisphere is to
remove its outdated and self-limiting barriers to trade. This is what
the Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) represents: the recognition that
protectionism is a dead end street and that the economic interests of
each country are best advanced through cooperation and an openness to
the world.
President Bush has rightly made the FTAA the centerpiece of U.S.
policy towards the hemisphere, but we cannot succeed in this effort
without trade promotion authority.
We now find ourselves in the ironic situation that the greatest
advocates of this agreement are the countries of Central and South
America which formerly blockaded themselves virtually every U.S.
proposal for expanded cooperation. Now it is they who are knocking on
our door, preaching the benefits of cooperation.
A ``no'' voted today will only ties the hands of our trade
negotiators who are trying to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers, to
increase economic opportunity here and abroad, and to jump-start the
global economy.
NAFTA and the most recent global trade agreement (the ``Uruguay
Round'') have saved the average American family $1,300 to $2,000 each
year from the combined effect of income increases and lower prices for
imports. These two agreements are estimated to have increased overall
U.S. national income by approximately $50 billion a year.
Many Members, on the Republican as well as Democratic side of the
aisle, are concerned, however, that granting the President ``a blank
check'' to negotiate trade agreements could compromise our values and
set back efforts to reform the World Trade Organization.
But the text of the proposed trade legislation clearly spells out our
commitment to democracy, improved trade and environmental policies,
respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent with
the core labor standards of the International Labor Organization.
It also includes our commitment to greater openness and transparency
inside the global rule-making body, the World Trade Organization and to
much greater public access to its dispute settlement proceedings.
For those members who remain unconvinced that the President would put
his TPA authority to good use, I emphasize that Congress retains the
right to approve or disapprove any trade agreement negotiated under the
TPA authority. Any Member can vote down any future trade agreement if
he or she feels that it doesn't promote our economic security.
Our failure to grant the President this vitally needed authority will
lead to the continuing loss of American influence in global trade
debates and a continuation of the global economic recession. The U.S.
has long been the engine of the global economy and without this key
trade authority we will be hard pressed to lead Europe and Asia back
onto the growth path of the 1990s.
At this critical point in our global anti-terrorism battle, it is
also essential, in my view, that we enable the President to build
stable trade relationships with our key coalition partners.
We can--and should--esnure that the views of our committee are fully
taken into account in the drafting of any future trade negotiations,
and I will help to ensure that this takes place.
Without TPA, we won't have the tools needed to jump start the global
economy to help lift us out of economic recession.
With TPA, they can finish the task of building a Free Trade Area of
the Americas and negotiating a new trade round. With TPA, our President
can once again exercise leadership to foster open markets, democracy
and economic development.
Security and trade issues are increasingly linked. Bringing China,
and eventually Russia, into the world trading system will help to
ensure that these and other countries will strengthen the rule of law
and promote more open economic systems.
NATO's role in the world is only as strong as the economies of its
members and without TPA and a new round of trade negotiations the
global recession is likely to be that much longer and deeper.
Support the President and pass H.R. 3005.
Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support H.R. 3005,
the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001.
I believe passage of this important legislation is crucial to
America's economic interest, especially in light of the recession. H.R.
3005 is significant because it seeks to renew the President's fast
track or trade promotion authority (TPA) to negotiate trade agreements
with other nations. This legislation would ensure that the United
States can effectively negotiate away foreign tariff barriers as well
as non-tariff barriers that now exclude U.S. products. It gives the
U.S. credibility to negotiate tough trade deals while preserving
Congress' right to approve or disapprove them. More importantly, if the
U.S. fails to be a leading participant in future negotiations on
multilateral, bilateral and sectoral agreements, we will see a negative
effect on our competitive ability to sell our goods in overseas
markets. Our global economy demands that the President have TPA to open
up foreign markets to United States products and ensure continued
economic prosperity for American consumers and workers. For this
reason, I fully support giving the President this important tool that
every President, except for President Bill Clinton, has had since 1974.
TPA allows the President to enter into trade agreements reducing,
eliminating, or otherwise affecting U.S. tariff and non-tariff
barriers. It essentially commits the Congress to vote on those
agreements (without amendments or revisions) within a limited period of
time. Under H.R. 3005, the President must also consult and coordinate
with Congress throughout the negotiating process. In any event, if
Congress does not like the end result, members can simply vote against
the total package.
Mr. Speaker, 95 percent of the world's consumers living outside of
the United States. Let me repeat: 95 percent of the world's consumers
live outside the U.S. That means quite simply, that the continued
growth of the U.S. economy depends upon our success in eliminating
trade barriers around the globe. Since 1993, U.S. exports have
contributed to nearly one-third of the nation's economic growth and
have increased three times faster than overall income. Moreover,
between 1986 and 1994, jobs supported by exports rose 63 percent more
than four times faster than overall private industry job growth.
Free trade is especially important to the Commonwealth of Virginia.
In 1996, Virginia exported goods worth $10.9 billion, 4.8 percent
higher than in 1995. As the 16th largest exporter among the 50 states,
Virginia industries have benefitted tremendously from international
trade, particularly in the high-tech, industrial machinery,
transportation equipment, and chemical and fabricated metal products
exporting sectors.
U.S. technology companies are the single largest merchandise
exporters in the United States, accounting for 20 percent of all
merchandise exports. Exports from the U.S. have more than doubled
during the last decade. In particular, high-tech services such as
computer, data processing and other information services are booming.
While these exports are vital, imports are also important. They help
keep inflation in check, give consumers greater choice, create jobs,
and allow U.S. companies to use the best technology available so they
can increase their productivity and competitiveness.
Since TPA lapsed in 1993, the U.S. has been forced to sit on the
sidelines while our foreign competitors aggressively pursued their own
economic interests through trade agreements. For example: both Canada
and Mexico now have free trade agreements with Chile; the Latin
American Southern Cone Common Market (``Mercosur''), which consists of
Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, has agreements with Chile and
Bolivia and is negotiating trade arrangements with other countries in
Latin America; Japan and the European Union are working toward trade
arrangements with countries in Latin America and Asia; and Members of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are implementing a
free trade area.
The President must have the authority to begin hammering out fair and
balanced trade agreements that will clinch America's leadership role in
the world market and improve the standard of living for American
families. H.R. 3005 is a reasonable compromise that will enable the
United States to stimulate economic growth, exercise leadership, and
provide new opportunities for American companies, workers and their
families. The U.S. is not keeping pace with our foreign competitors in
opening up markets. We are party to only two of the more than 130 free
trade agreements, and 43 of the 1,800 bilateral investment agreements
in force today. The impact of U.S. inaction cannot be overstated: we
face discriminatory tariffs; our service sectors are often at a
competitive disadvantage against their foreign rivals; product
standards are established that favor our foreign competitors; and
foreign companies are often granted more favorable investment terms.
By granting the President this authority we will guarantee that the
U.S. remains both the political and economic world leader. Right now,
while the U.S. stands on the sidelines, other nations have gotten the
jump on negotiating trade agreements that benefit their domestic
interest.
U.S. exporters lose out on investment opportunities while the
Congress debates whether we as a nation should be engaged in serious
world trade. The time for debate is over; the time for action is now.
Without the authority provided by this legislation, U.S. negotiators
will not be able to sit across the table from our largest trading
partners and reach agreements that lower tariffs, increase transparency
and lessen onerous regulations in prospective markets. Instead, it
[[Page H9029]]
will be our trading partners who negotiate free trade pacts among
themselves, excluding U.S. workers and businesses from the benefits of
open markets. We cannot afford to sit idly by while other nations seize
the mantle of leadership on trade matters from the United States.
The September 11th attacks on America and the ensuing sluggish
economy make it more important than ever for Congress to give the
President unfettered authority to tear down barriers to trade and
investment, expand markets for U.S. farmers and businesses, and create
higher-skilled, higher-paying jobs for American workers. Because TPA is
crucial to these objectives, I urge all of my colleagues to vote in
favor of H.R. 3005
Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3005, the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority and encourage its overwhelming
passage.
Mr. Speaker, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle claim that
trade promotion authority will result in a diminished quality of life
while creating low paying jobs in countries around the world.
This could not be further from the truth and our trade with Mexico is
the perfect example to illustrate this point.
Since NAFTA, wages in Mexico increased at an average annual rate of
10.3 percent from 1995-2000.
The standard of living in Mexico between 1993-1999 increased at an
average annual rate of 8 percent.
Approximately 1.7 million jobs have been created in Mexico since mid-
1995, according to Mexican government figures.
Moreover unemployment in Mexico fell from nearly 6.3 percent in 1995
to just over 2.5 percent in 1999.
In the year 2000, U.S. companies have had direct investment worth $35
million in Mexico, up from $17 billion in 1994.
Not only is NAFTA raising the standard of living and creating jobs in
Mexico, but it is doing so in the United States as well.
NAFTA allowed U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico to rise by $149
billion, leading to new sales that helped create nearly three million
jobs.
Export-related jobs pay on average 13-16 percent more than comparable
domestic jobs.
United States trade interests will continue to suffer if we do not
grant the President trade promotion authority.
In an editorial that appeared in the Wall Street Journal, European
Union commissioner for trade, Pascal Lamy, was quoted as saying that,
``If the United States does not get this mandate quickly, then no one
will negotiate.''
Brazilian Ambassador Rubens Barbosa has warned that a TPA failure
would all but sink talks for a new 34-country Free Trade Area of the
Americas.
In Chile, United States exports are being displaced as Chilean buyers
switch away from United States made products and increasingly buy goods
from suppliers in countries with which Chile has a free trade
agreement.
The United States has lost 6 percentage points of the Chilean import
market since 1997, resulting in the loss of more than $800 million
annually in exports to Chile.
This represents a loss of more than 10,000 American Jobs. The point
is clear.
Increased international trade and investments will create
opportunities for American companies and American workers, lifting the
world's standard of living and creating even more demand for American
goods and services.
I urge passage of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). All time for debate has
expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 306, the previous question is ordered on
the bill, as amended.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Rangel
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. RANGEL. I am, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Rangel moves to recommit the bill H.R. 3005 to the
Committee on Ways and Means with instructions that the
Committee report back to the House forthwith with the
following amendment:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is the following:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Negotiating objectives.
Sec. 3. Congressional trade advisers.
Sec. 4. Trade agreements authority.
Sec. 5. Commencement of negotiations.
Sec. 6. Congressional participation during negotiations.
Sec. 7. Implementation of trade agreements.
Sec. 8. Treatment of certain trade agreements.
Sec. 9. Additional report and studies.
Sec. 10. Additional implementation and enforcement requirements.
Sec. 11. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 12. Definitions.
SEC. 2. NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.
(a) Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives.--The overall
trade negotiating objectives of the United States for
agreements subject to the provisions of section 4 are the
following:
(1) To obtain clear and specific commitments from trading
partners of the United States to fulfill existing
international trade obligations according to existing
schedules.
(2) To obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market
access for United States agricultural products, manufactured
and other nonagricultural products, and services.
(3) To obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers to
trade, including barriers that result from failure of
governments to publish laws, rules, policies, practices, and
administrative and judicial decisions.
(4) To ensure effective implementation of trade commitments
and obligations by strengthening the effective operation of
the rule of law by trading partners of the United States.
(5) To oppose any attempts to weaken in any respect the
trade remedy laws of the United States.
(6) To increase public access to international, regional,
and bilateral trade organizations in which the United States
is a member by developing such organizations and their
underlying agreements in ways that make the resources of such
organizations more accessible to, and their decisionmaking
processes more open to participation by, workers, farmers,
businesses, and nongovernmental organizations.
(7) To ensure that the dispute settlement mechanisms in
multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements lead to
prompt and full compliance.
(8) To ensure that the benefits of trade extend broadly and
fully to all segments of society.
(9) To pursue market access initiatives that benefit the
world's least-developed countries.
(10) To ensure that trade rules take into account the
special needs of least-developed countries.
(11) To promote enforcement of internationally recognized
core labor standards by trading partners of the United
States.
(12) To promote the ongoing improvement of environmental
protections.
(13) To promote the compatibility of trade rules with
national environmental, health, and safety standards and with
multilateral environmental agreements.
(14) To identify and pursue those areas of trade
liberalization, such as trade in environmental technologies,
that also promote protection of the environment.
(15) To ensure that existing and new rules of the WTO and
of regional and bilateral trade agreements support
sustainable development, protection of endangered species,
and reduction of air and water pollution.
(16) To ensure that existing and new rules of the WTO and
of regional and bilateral agreements are written,
interpreted, and applied in such a way as to facilitate the
growth of electronic commerce.
(b) Principal Negotiating Objectives Under the WTO.--The
principal negotiating objectives of the United States under
the auspices of the WTO are the following:
(1) Reciprocal trade in agriculture.--The principal
negotiating objective of the United States with respect to
agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United
States exports of agricultural commodities in foreign markets
equal to the competitive opportunities afforded foreign
exports in United States markets and to achieve fairer and
more open conditions of trade in bulk, specialty crop, and
value-added commodities by doing the following:
(A) Reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or
other charges that decrease market opportunities for United
States exports, giving priority to those products that are
subject to significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of
major producing countries and providing reasonable adjustment
periods for import sensitive products of the United States,
in close consultation with the Congress.
(B) Eliminating disparities between applied and bound
tariffs by reducing bound tariff levels.
(C) Enhancing the transparency of tariff regimes.
(D) Tightening disciplines governing the administration of
tariff rate quotas.
(E) Eliminating export subsidies.
(F) Eliminating or reducing trade distorting domestic
subsidies.
(G) When negotiating reduction or elimination of export
subsidies or trade distorting domestic subsidies with
countries that maintain higher levels of such subsidies than
the United States, obtaining reductions from other countries
to United States subsidy levels before agreeing to reduce or
eliminate United States subsidies.
[[Page H9030]]
(H) Preserving United States market development programs,
including agriculture export credit programs that allow the
United States to compete with other foreign export promotion
efforts.
(I) Maintaining bona fide food aid programs.
(J) Allowing the preservation of programs that support
family farms and rural communities but do not distort trade.
(K) Eliminating state trading enterprises, or, at a
minimum, adopting rigorous disciplines that ensure
transparency in the operations of such enterprises, including
price transparency, competition, and the end of
discriminatory policies and practices, including policies and
practices supporting cross-subsidization, price
discrimination, and price undercutting in export markets.
(L) Eliminating practices that adversely affect trade in
perishable or seasonal products, while improving import
relief mechanisms to recognize the unique characteristics of
perishable and seasonal agriculture. Before commencing
negotiations with respect to agriculture, the Trade
Representative, in consultation with the Congress, shall seek
to develop a position on the treatment of perishable and
seasonal food products to be employed in the negotiations in
order to develop an international consensus on the treatment
of such products in antidumping, countervailing duty, and
safeguard actions and in any other relevant area.
(M) Taking into account whether a party to the negotiations
has failed to adhere to the provisions of already existing
trade agreements with the United States or has circumvented
obligations under those agreements.
(N) Taking into account whether a product is subject to
market distortions by reason of a failure of a major
producing country to adhere to the provisions of already
existing trade agreements with the United States or by the
circumvention by that country of its obligations under those
agreements.
(O) Taking into account the impact that agreements covering
agriculture to which the United States is a party, including
NAFTA, have had on the agricultural sector in the United
States.
(P) Ensuring that countries that accede to the WTO have
made meaningful market liberalization commitments in
agriculture.
(Q) Treating the negotiation of all issues as a single
undertaking, with implementation of early agreements in
particular sectors contingent on an acceptable final package
of agreements on all issues.
(2) Trade in services.--The principal negotiating objective
of the United States with respect to trade in services is to
further reduce or eliminate barriers to, or other distortions
of, international trade in services by doing the following:
(A) Pursuing agreement by WTO members to extend their
commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(in this section also referred to as ``GATS'') to--
(i) achieve maximum liberalization of market access in all
modes of supply, including by removing restrictions on the
legal form of an investment or on the right to own all or a
majority share of a service supplier, subject to national
security exceptions;
(ii) remove regulatory and other barriers that deny
national treatment, or unreasonably restrict the
establishment or operations of service suppliers in foreign
markets;
(iii) reduce or eliminate any adverse effects of existing
government measures on trade in services;
(iv) eliminate additional barriers to trade in services,
including restrictions on access to services distribution
networks and information systems, unreasonable or
discriminatory licensing requirements, the administration
of cartels or toleration of anticompetitive activity,
unreasonable delegation of regulatory powers to private
entities, and similar government acts, measures, or
policies affecting the sale, offering for sale, purchase,
distribution, or use of services that have the effect of
restricting access of services and service suppliers to a
foreign market; and
(v) grandfather existing concessions and liberalization
commitments.
(B) Strengthening requirements under GATS to ensure that
regulation of services and service suppliers in all respects,
including by rulemaking, license-granting, standards-setting,
and through judicial, administrative, and arbitral
proceedings, is conducted in a transparent, reasonable,
objective, and impartial manner and is otherwise consistent
with principles of due process.
(C) Continuing to oppose strongly cultural exceptions to
obligations under GATS, especially relating to audiovisual
services and service providers.
(D) Preventing discrimination against a like service when
delivered through electronic means.
(E) Pursuing full market access and national treatment
commitments for services sectors essential to supporting
electronic commerce.
(F) Broadening and deepening commitments of other countries
relating to basic and value added telecommunications,
including by--
(i) strengthening obligations and the implementation of
obligations to ensure competitive, nondiscriminatory access
to public telecommunication networks and services for
Internet service providers and other value-added service
providers; and
(ii) preventing anticompetitive behavior by major
suppliers, including service suppliers that are either
government owned or controlled or recently government owned
or controlled.
(G) Broadening and deepening commitments of other countries
relating to financial services.
(3) Trade in manufactured and nonagricultural goods.--The
principal negotiating objectives of the United States with
respect to trade in manufactured and nonagricultural goods
are the following:
(A) To eliminate disparities between applied and bound
tariffs by reducing bound tariff levels.
(B) To negotiate an agreement that includes reciprocal
commitments to eliminate duties in sectors in which tariffs
are currently approaching zero.
(C) To eliminate tariff and nontariff disparities remaining
from previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations that
have put United States exports at a competitive disadvantage
in world markets, especially tariff and nontariff barriers in
foreign countries in those sectors where the United States
imposes no significant barriers to imports and where foreign
tariff and nontariff barriers are substantial.
(D) To obtain the reduction or elimination of tariffs on
value-added products that provide a disproportionate level of
protection compared to that provided to raw materials.
(E) To eliminate additional nontariff barriers to trade,
including--
(i) anticompetitive restrictions on access to product
distribution networks and information systems;
(ii) unreasonable or discriminatory inspection processes;
(iii) the administration of cartels, or the promotion,
enabling, or toleration of anticompetitive activity;
(iv) unreasonable delegation of regulatory powers to
private entities;
(v) unreasonable or discriminatory licensing requirements;
and
(vi) similar government acts, measures, or policies
affecting the sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution, or use of goods that have the
effect of restricting access of goods to a foreign market.
(4) Trade in civil aircraft.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to civil
aircraft are those contained section 135(c) of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3555(c)).
(5) Rules of origin.--The principal negotiating objective
of the United States with respect to rules of origin is to
conclude the work program on rules of origin described in
Article 9 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin.
(6) Dispute settlement.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to dispute
settlement are the following:
(A) To improve enforcement of decisions of dispute
settlement panels to ensure prompt compliance by foreign
governments with their obligations under the WTO.
(B) To strengthen rules that promote cooperation by the
governments of WTO members in producing evidence in
connection with dispute settlement proceedings, including
copies of laws, regulations, and other measures that are the
subject of or are directly relevant to the dispute, other
than evidence that is classified on the basis of national
security, and evidence that is business confidential.
(C) To pursue rules for the management of translation-
related issues.
(D) To require that all submissions by governments to
dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body be made
available to the public upon submission, providing
appropriate exceptions for only that information included in
a submission that is classified on the basis of national
security or that is business confidential.
(E) To require that meetings of dispute settlement panels
and the Appellate Body with parties to a dispute are open to
other WTO members and the public and provide for in camera
treatment of only those portions of a proceeding dealing with
evidence that is classified on the basis of national security
or that is business confidential.
(F) To require that transcripts of proceedings of dispute
settlement panels and the Appellate Body be made available to
the public promptly, providing appropriate exceptions for
only that information included in the transcripts that is
classified on the basis of national security or that is
business confidential.
(G) To establish rules allowing for the submission of
amicus curiae briefs to dispute settlement panels and the
Appellate Body, and to require that such briefs be made
available to the public, providing appropriate exceptions for
only that information included in the briefs which is
classified on the basis of national security or that is
business confidential.
(H) To strengthen rules protecting against conflicts of
interest by members of dispute settlement panels and the
Appellate Body, and promoting the selection of such members
with the skills and time necessary to decide increasingly
complex cases.
(I) To pursue the establishment of formal procedures under
which dispute settlement panels, the Appellate Body, and the
Dispute Settlement Body seek advice from other fora of
competent jurisdiction, such as the International Court of
Justice, the ILO, representative bodies established under
international environmental agreements, and scientific
experts.
(J) To ensure application of the requirement that dispute
settlement panels and the Appellate Body apply the standard
of review
[[Page H9031]]
established in Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement and
clarify that this standard of review should apply to cases
under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
and the Agreement on Safeguards.
(7) Sanitary and phytosanitary measures.--The principal
negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to
sanitary and phytosanitary measures are the following:
(A) To oppose reopening of the Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
(B) To affirm the compatibility of trade rules with
measures to protect human health, animal health, and the
phytosanitary situation of each WTO member by doing the
following:
(i) Reaffirming that a decision of a WTO member not to
adopt an international standard for the basis of a sanitary
or phytosanitary measure does not in itself create a
presumption of inconsistency with the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and that
the initial burden of proof rests with the complaining party,
as set forth in the determination of the Appellate Body in
EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), AB-1997-4,
WT/DS26/AB/R, January 16, 1998.
(ii) Reaffirming that WTO members may take provisional
sanitary or phytosanitary measures where the relevant
scientific evidence is insufficient, so long as such measures
are based on available pertinent information, and members
taking such provisional measures seek to obtain the
additional information necessary to complete a risk
assessment within a reasonable period of time. For purposes
of this clause, a reasonable period of time includes
sufficient time to evaluate the potential for adverse effects
on human or animal health arising from the presence of
additives, contaminants, toxins, or disease-causing organisms
in food, beverages, or feedstuffs.
(8) Technical barriers to trade.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to technical
barriers to trade are the following:
(A) To oppose reopening of the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade.
(B) Recognizing the legitimate role of labeling that
provides relevant information to consumers, to ensure that
labeling regulations and standards do not have the effect of
creating an unnecessary obstacle to trade or are used as a
disguised barrier to trade by increasing transparency in the
preparation, adoption, and application of labeling
regulations and standards.
(9) Trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights.--The principal negotiating objectives of the United
States with respect to trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights are the following:
(A) To oppose extension of the date by which WTO members
that are developing countries must implement their
obligations under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (in this section also referred
to as the ``TRIPs Agreement''), pursuant to paragraph 2 of
Article 65 of that agreement.
(B) To oppose extension of the moratorium on the
application of subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII
of the GATT 1994 to the settlement of disputes under the
TRIPs Agreement, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 64 of the
TRIPs Agreement.
(C) To oppose any weakening of existing obligations of WTO
members under the TRIPs Agreement.
(D) To ensure that standards of protection and enforcement
keep pace with technological developments, including ensuring
that rightholders have the legal and technological means to
control the use of their works through the Internet and other
global communication media, and to prevent the unauthorized
use of their works.
(E) To prevent misuse of reference pricing classification
systems by developed countries as a way to discriminate
against innovative pharmaceutical products and innovative
medical devices, without challenging legitimate reference
pricing systems not used as a disguised restriction on trade.
(F)(i) To clarify that under Article 31 of the TRIPs
Agreement WTO members are able to adopt measures necessary to
protect the public health and to respond to situations of
national emergency or extreme urgency, including by taking
actions that have the effect of increasing access to
essential medicines and medical technologies.
(ii) In situations involving infectious diseases, to
encourage WTO members that take actions described under
clause (i) to also implement policies--
(I) to address the underlying causes necessitating the
actions, including, in the case of infectious diseases,
encouraging practices that will prevent further transmission
and infection;
(II) to take steps to stimulate the development of the
infrastructure necessary to deliver adequate health care
services, including the essential medicines and medical
technologies at issue;
(III) to ensure the safety and efficacy of the essential
medicines and medical technologies involved; and
(IV) to make reasonable efforts to address the problems of
supply of the essential medicines and medical technologies
involved (other than by compulsory licensing), consistent
with the obligation set forth in Article 31 of the TRIPs
Agreement.
(iii) To encourage members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development and the private sectors in their
countries to work with the United Nations, the World Health
Organization, and other relevant international organizations,
including humanitarian relief organizations, to assist least-
developed and developing countries, in all possible ways, in
increasing access to essential medicines and medical
technologies including through donations, sales at cost,
funding of global medicines trust funds, and developing and
implementing prevention efforts and health care
infrastructure projects.
(10) Transparency.--The principal negotiating objectives of
the United States with respect to transparency are the
following:
(A) To pursue the negotiation of an agreement--
(i) requiring that government laws, rules, and
administrative and judicial decisions be published and made
available to the public so that governments, businesses, and
the public have adequate notice of them;
(ii) requiring adequate notice before new rules are
promulgated or existing rules amended;
(iii) encouraging governments to open rulemaking to public
comment;
(iv) establishing that any administrative proceeding
conducted by the government of any WTO member relating to any
of the WTO Agreements and applied to the persons, goods, or
services of any other WTO member shall be conducted in a
manner that--
(I) gives persons of any other WTO member affected by the
proceeding reasonable notice, in accordance with domestic
procedures, of when the proceeding is initiated, including a
description of the nature of the proceeding, a statement of
the legal authority under which the proceeding is initiated,
and a general description of any issues in controversy;
(II) gives such persons a reasonable opportunity to present
facts and arguments in support of their positions prior to
any final administrative action, when time, the nature of the
proceeding, and the public interest permit; and
(III) is in accordance with domestic law; and
(v) requiring each WTO member--
(I) to establish or maintain judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative tribunals (impartial and independent of the
office or authority entrusted with administrative
enforcement) or procedures for the purpose of the prompt
review and, where warranted, correction of final
administrative actions regarding matters covered by any of
the WTO Agreements;
(II) to ensure that, in such tribunals or procedures,
parties to the proceeding are afforded a reasonable
opportunity to support or defend their respective positions;
and
(III) to ensure that such tribunals or procedures issue
decisions based on the evidence and submissions of record or,
where required by domestic law, the record compiled by the
office or authority entrusted with administrative
enforcement.
(B) To pursue a commitment by all WTO members to improve
the public's understanding of and access to the WTO and its
related agreements by--
(i) encouraging the Secretariat of the WTO to enhance the
WTO website by providing improved access to a wider array of
WTO documents and information on the trade regimes of, and
other relevant information on, WTO members;
(ii) promoting public access to council and committee
meetings by ensuring that agendas and meeting minutes
continue to be made available to the public;
(iii) ensuring that WTO documents that are most informative
of WTO activities are circulated on an unrestricted basis or,
if classified, are made available to the public more quickly;
(iv) seeking the institution of regular meetings between
WTO officials and representatives of nongovernmental
organizations, businesses and business groups, labor unions,
consumer groups, and other representatives of civil society;
and
(v) supporting the creation of a committee within the WTO
to oversee implementation of the agreement reached under this
paragraph.
(11) Government procurement.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to government
procurement are the following:
(A) To seek to expand the membership of the Agreement on
Government Procurement.
(B) To seek conclusion of a WTO agreement on transparency
in government procurement.
(C) To promote global use of electronic publication of
procurement information, including notices of procurement
opportunities.
(12) Trade remedy laws.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to trade remedy
laws are the following:
(A) To preserve the ability of the United States to enforce
vigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping,
countervailing duty, and safeguard laws, and not enter into
agreements that lessen in any respect the effectiveness of
domestic and international disciplines--
(i) on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, or
(ii) that address import increases or surges, such as under
the safeguard remedy,
in order to ensure that United States workers, farmers and
agricultural producers, and
[[Page H9032]]
firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the benefits
of reciprocal trade concessions.
(B) To eliminate the underlying causes of unfair trade
practices and import surges, including closed markets,
subsidization, government practices promoting, enabling, or
tolerating anticompetitive practices, and other forms of
government intervention that generate or sustain excess,
uneconomic capacity.
(13) Trade and labor market standards.--The principal
negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to
trade and labor market standards are the following:
(A) To achieve a framework of enforceable multilateral
rules as soon as practicable that leads to the adoption and
enforcement of core, internationally recognized labor
standards, including in the WTO and, as appropriate, other
international organizations, including the ILO.
(B) To update Article XX of the GATT 1994, and Article XIV
of the GATS in relation to core internationally recognized
worker rights, including in regard to actions of WTO members
taken consistent with and in furtherance of recommendations
made by the ILO under Article 33 of the Constitution of the
ILO.
(C) To establish promptly a working group on trade and
labor issues--
(i) to explore the linkage between international trade and
investment and internationally recognized worker rights (as
defined in section 502(a)(4) of the Trade Act of 1974),
taking into account differences in the level of development
among countries;
(ii) to examine the effects on international trade and
investment of the systematic denial of those worker rights;
(iii) to consider ways to address such effects; and
(iv) to develop methods to coordinate the work program of
the working group with the ILO.
(D) To provide for regular review of adherence to core
labor standards in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
established in Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement.
(E) To establish a working relationship between the WTO and
the ILO--
(i) to identify opportunities in trade-affected sectors of
the economies of WTO members to improve enforcement of
internationally recognized core labor standards;
(ii) to provide WTO members with technical and legal
assistance in developing and enforcing internationally
recognized core labor standards; and
(iii) to provide technical assistance to the WTO to assist
with the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.
(14) Trade and the environment.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to trade and the
environment are the following:
(A) To strengthen the role of the Committee on Trade and
Environment of the WTO, including providing that the
Committee would--
(i) review and comment on negotiations; and
(ii) review potential effects on the environment of WTO
Agreements and future agreements of the WTO on liberalizing
trade in natural resource products.
(B) To provide for regular review of adherence to
environmental standards in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
of the WTO.
(C) To clarify exceptions under Article XX(b) and (g) of
the GATT 1994 to ensure effective protection of human,
animal, or plant life or health, and conservation of
exhaustible natural resources.
(D) To amend Article XX of the GATT 1994 and Article XIV of
the GATS to include an explicit exception for actions taken
that are in accordance with those obligations under any
multilateral environmental agreement accepted by both parties
to a dispute.
(E) To amend Article XIV of the GATS to include an
exception for measures relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.
(F) To give priority to trade liberalization measures that
promote sustainable development, including eliminating duties
on environmental goods, and obtaining commitments on
environmental services.
(G) To reduce subsidies in natural resource sectors
(including fisheries and forest products) and export
subsidies in agriculture.
(H) To improve coordination between the WTO and relevant
international environmental organizations in the development
of multilaterally accepted principles for sustainable
development, including sustainable forestry and fishery
practices.
(15) Institution building.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to institution
building are the following:
(A) To strengthen institutional mechanisms within the WTO
that facilitate dialogue and coordinate activities between
nongovernmental organizations and the WTO.
(B) To seek greater transparency of WTO processes and
procedures for all WTO members by--
(i) promoting the improvement of internal communication
between the Secretariat and all WTO members; and
(ii) establishing points of contact to facilitate
communication between WTO members on any matter covered by
the WTO Agreements.
(C) To improve coordination between the WTO and other
international organizations such as the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the International
Monetary Fund, the ILO, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, and the United Nations Environment
Program to increase the effectiveness of technical assistance
programs.
(D) To increase the efforts of the WTO, both on its own and
through partnerships with other institutions, to provide
technical assistance to developing countries, particularly
least-developed countries, to promote the rule of law, to
assist those countries in complying with their obligations
under the World Trade Organization agreements, and to address
the full range of challenges arising from implementation of
such obligations.
(E) To improve the Trade Policy Review Mechanism of the WTO
to cover a wider array of trade-related issues.
(16) Trade and investment.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to trade and
investment are the following:
(A) To pursue further reduction of trade-distorting
investment measures, including--
(i) by pursuing agreement to ensure the free transfer of
funds related to investments;
(ii) by pursuing reduction or elimination of the exceptions
to the principle of national treatment; and
(iii) by pursuing amendment of the illustrative list
annexed to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (in this section also referred to as the ``TRIMs
Agreement'') to include forced technology transfers,
performance requirements, minimum investment levels, forced
licensing of intellectual property, or other unreasonable
barriers to the establishment or operation of investments as
measures that are inconsistent with the obligation of
national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III
of the GATT 1994 or the obligation of general elimination of
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of
Article XI of the GATT 1994.
(B) To seek to strengthen the enforceability of and
compliance with the TRIMs Agreement.
(17) Electronic commerce.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to electronic
commerce are the following:
(A) Make permanent and binding the moratorium on customs
duties on electronic transmissions declared in the WTO
Ministerial Declaration of May 20, 1998.
(B) Ensure that current obligations, rules, disciplines,
and commitments under the WTO apply to electronically
delivered goods and services.
(C) Ensure that the classification of electronically
delivered goods and services ensures the most liberal trade
treatment possible.
(D) Ensure that electronically delivered goods and services
receive no less favorable treatment under WTO trade rules and
commitments than like products delivered in physical form.
(E) Ensure that governments refrain from implementing
trade-related measures that impede electronic commerce.
(F) Where legitimate policy objectives require domestic
regulations that affect electronic commerce, to obtain
commitments that any such regulations are nondiscriminatory,
transparent, and promote an open market environment.
(G) Pursue a procompetitive regulatory environment for
basic and value-added telecommunications services abroad, so
as to facilitate the conduct of electronic commerce.
(H) Focus any future WTO work program on electronic
commerce on educating WTO members regarding the benefits of
electronic commerce and on facilitating the liberalization of
trade barriers in areas that directly impede the conduct of
electronic commerce.
(18) Developing countries.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to developing
countries are the following:
(A) To enter into trade agreements that promote the
economic growth of both developing countries and the United
States and the mutual expansion of market opportunities.
(B) To ensure appropriate phase-in periods with respect to
the obligations of least-developed countries.
(C) To coordinate with the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and other international institutions to
provide debt relief and other assistance to promote the rule
of law and sound and sustainable development.
(D) To accelerate tariff reductions that benefit least-
developed countries.
(19) Current account surpluses.--The principal negotiating
objective of the United States with respect to current
account surpluses is to develop rules to address large and
persistent global current account imbalances of countries,
including imbalances that threaten the stability of the
international trading system, by imposing greater
responsibility on such countries to undertake policy changes
aimed at restoring current account equilibrium, including
expedited implementation of trade agreements where feasible
and appropriate or by offering debt repayment on concessional
terms.
(20) Trade and monetary coordination.--The principal
negotiating objective of the United States with respect to
trade and monetary coordination is to foster stability in
international currency markets and develop
[[Page H9033]]
mechanisms to assure greater coordination, consistency, and
cooperation between international trade and monetary systems
and institutions in order to protect against the trade
consequences of significant and unanticipated currency
movements.
(21) Access to high technology.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to access to
high technology are the following:
(A) To obtain the elimination or reduction of foreign
barriers to, and of acts, policies, or practices by foreign
governments which limit, equitable access by United States
persons to foreign-developed technology.
(B) To seek the elimination of tariffs on all information
technology products, infrastructure equipment, scientific
instruments, and medical equipment.
(C) To pursue the reduction of foreign barriers to high
technology products of the United States.
(D) To enforce and promote the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, and ensure that standards, conformity
assessments, and technical regulations are not used as
obstacles to trade in information technology and
communications products.
(E) To require all WTO members to sign the Information
Technology Agreement of the WTO, and to expand and update
product coverage under that agreement.
(22) Corruption.--The principal negotiating objectives of
the United States with respect to the use of money or other
things of value to influence acts, decisions, or omissions of
foreign governments or officials or to secure any improper
advantage in a manner affecting trade are the following:
(A) To obtain standards applicable to persons from all
countries participating in the applicable trade agreement
that are equivalent to, or more restrictive than, the
prohibitions applicable to issuers, domestic concerns, and
other persons under section 30A of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 and sections 104 and 104A of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
(B) To implement mechanisms to ensure effective enforcement
of the standards described in subparagraph (A).
(23) Implementation of existing commitments and improvement
of the wto and the wto agreements.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to
implementation of existing commitments under the WTO are the
following:
(A) To ensure that all WTO members comply fully with
existing obligations under the WTO according to existing
commitments and timetables.
(B) To strengthen the ability of the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism within the WTO to review implementation by WTO
members of commitments under the WTO.
(C) To undertake diplomatic and, as appropriate, dispute
settlement efforts to promote compliance with commitments
under the WTO.
(D) To extend the coverage of the WTO Agreements to
products, sectors, and conditions of trade not adequately
covered.
(c) Negotiating Objectives for the FTAA.--The principal
negotiating objectives of the United States in seeking a
trade agreement establishing a Free Trade Area for the
Americas are the following:
(1) Reciprocal trade in agriculture.--The principal
negotiating objective of the United States with respect to
agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United
States exports of agricultural commodities in foreign markets
equal to the competitive opportunities afforded foreign
exports in United States markets and to achieve fairer and
more open conditions of trade in bulk, specialty crop, and
value-added commodities by doing the following:
(A) Reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or
other charges that decrease market opportunities for United
States exports, giving priority to those products that are
subject to significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of
major producing countries and providing reasonable adjustment
periods for import sensitive products of the United States,
in close consultation with Congress.
(B) Eliminating disparities between applied and bound
tariffs by reducing bound tariff levels.
(C) Enhancing the transparency of tariff regimes.
(D) Tightening disciplines governing the administration of
tariff rate quotas.
(E) Establishing mechanisms to prevent agricultural
products from being exported to FTAA members by countries
that are not FTAA members with the aid of export subsidies.
(F) Maintaining bona fide food aid programs.
(G) Allowing the preservation of programs that support
family farms and rural communities but do not distort trade.
(H) Eliminating state trading enterprises or, at a minimum,
adopting rigorous disciplines that ensure transparency in the
operations of such enterprises, including price transparency,
competition, and the end of discriminatory practices,
including policies supporting cross-subsidization, price
discrimination, and price undercutting in export markets.
(I) Eliminating technology-based discrimination against
agricultural commodities, and ensuring that the rules
negotiated do not weaken rights and obligations under the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures.
(J) Eliminating practices that adversely affect trade in
perishable or seasonal products, while improving import
relief mechanisms to recognize the unique characteristics of
perishable and seasonal agriculture. Before proceeding with
negotiations with respect to agriculture, the Trade
Representative, in consultation with the Congress, shall seek
to develop a position on the treatment of perishable and
seasonal food products to be employed in the negotiations in
order to develop a consensus on the treatment of such
products in dumping or safeguard actions and in any other
relevant area.
(K) Taking into account whether a party to the negotiations
has failed to adhere to the provisions of already existing
trade agreements with the United States or has circumvented
obligations under those agreements.
(L) Taking into account whether a product is subject to
market distortions by reason of a failure of a major
producing country to adhere to the provisions of already
existing trade agreements with the United States or by the
circumvention by that country of its obligations under those
agreements.
(M) Taking into account the impact that agreements covering
agriculture to which the United States is a party, including
NAFTA, have on the United States agricultural industry.
(2) Trade in services.--The principal negotiating objective
of the United States with respect to trade in services is to
achieve, to the maximum extent possible, the elimination of
barriers to, or other distortions of, trade in services in
all modes of supply and across the broadest range of service
sectors by doing the following:
(A) Pursuing agreement to treat negotiation of trade in
services in a negative list manner whereby commitments will
cover all services and all modes of supply unless particular
services or modes of supply are expressly excluded.
(B) Achieving maximum liberalization of market access in
all modes of supply, including by removing restrictions on
the legal form of an investment or on the right to own all or
a majority share of a service supplier, subject to national
security exceptions.
(C) Removing regulatory and other barriers that deny
national treatment, or unreasonably restrict the
establishment or operations of service suppliers in foreign
markets.
(D) Eliminating additional barriers to trade in services,
including restrictions on access to services distribution
networks and information systems, unreasonable or
discriminatory licensing requirements, administration of
cartels or toleration of anticompetitive activity,
unreasonable delegation of regulatory powers to private
entities, and similar government acts, measures, or policies
affecting the sale, offering for sale, purchase,
distribution, or use of services that have the effect of
restricting access of services and service suppliers to a
foreign market.
(E) Grandfathering existing concessions and liberalization
commitments.
(F) Pursuing the strongest possible obligations to ensure
that regulation of services and service suppliers in all
respects, including by rulemaking, license-granting,
standards-setting, and through judicial, administrative, and
arbitral proceedings, is conducted in a transparent,
reasonable, objective, and impartial manner and is otherwise
consistent with principles of due process.
(G) Strongly opposing cultural exceptions to services
obligations, especially relating to audiovisual services and
service providers.
(H) Preventing discrimination against a like service when
delivered through electronic means.
(I) Pursuing full market access and national treatment
commitments for services sectors essential to supporting
electronic commerce.
(J) Broadening and deepening existing commitments by other
countries relating to basic and value-added
telecommunications, including by--
(i) strengthening obligations and the implementation of
obligations to ensure competitive, nondiscriminatory access
to public telecommunication networks and services for
Internet service providers and other value-added service
providers; and
(ii) preventing anticompetitive behavior by major
suppliers, including service suppliers that are either
government owned or controlled or recently government owned
or controlled.
(K) Broadening and deepening existing commitments of other
countries relating to financial services.
(3) Trade in manufactured and nonagricultural goods.--The
principal negotiating objectives of the United States with
respect to trade in manufactured and nonagricultural goods
are the following:
(A) To eliminate disparities between applied and bound
tariffs by reducing bound tariff levels.
(B) To negotiate an agreement that includes reciprocal
commitments to eliminate duties in sectors in which tariffs
are currently approaching zero.
(C) To eliminate tariff and nontariff disparities remaining
from previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations that
have put United States exports at a competitive disadvantage
in world markets, especially tariff and nontariff barriers in
foreign countries in those sectors where the United States
imposes no significant barriers to imports and where foreign
tariff and nontariff barriers are substantial.
[[Page H9034]]
(D) To obtain the reduction or elimination of tariffs on
value-added products that provide a disproportionate level of
protection compared to that provided to raw materials.
(E) To eliminate additional nontariff barriers to trade,
including--
(i) anticompetitive restrictions on access to product
distribution networks and information systems;
(ii) unreasonable or discriminatory inspection processes;
(iii) the administration of cartels, or the promotion,
enabling, or toleration of anticompetitive activity;
(iv) unreasonable delegation of regulatory powers to
private entities;
(v) unreasonable or discriminatory licensing requirements;
and
(vi) similar government acts, measures, or policies
affecting the sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution, or use of goods that have the
effect of restricting access of goods to a foreign market.
(4) Dispute settlement.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to dispute
settlement are the following:
(A) To provide for a single effective and expeditious
dispute settlement mechanism and set of procedures that
applies to all FTAA agreements.
(B) To ensure that dispute settlement mechanisms enable
effective enforcement of the rights of the United States,
including by providing, in all contexts, for the use of all
remedies that are demonstrably effective to promote prompt
and full compliance with the decision of a dispute settlement
panel.
(C) To provide rules that promote cooperation by the
governments of FTAA members in producing evidence in
connection with dispute settlement proceedings, including
copies of laws, regulations, and other measures that are the
subject of or are directly relevant to the dispute, other
than evidence that is classified on the basis of national
security, and evidence that is business confidential.
(D) To require that all submissions by governments to FTAA
dispute panels and any appellate body be made available to
the public upon submission, providing appropriate exceptions
for only that information included in a submission that is
classified on the basis of national security or that is
business confidential.
(E) To require that meetings of FTAA dispute panels and any
appellate body with the parties to a dispute are open to
other FTAA members and the public and provide for in camera
treatment of only those portions of a proceeding dealing with
evidence that is classified on the basis of national security
or that is business confidential.
(F) To require that transcripts of proceedings of FTAA
dispute panels and any appellate body be made available to
the public promptly, providing appropriate exceptions for
only that information included in the transcripts that is
classified on the basis of national security or that is
business confidential.
(G) To establish rules allowing for the submission of
amicus curiae briefs to FTAA dispute panels and any appellate
body, and to require that such briefs be made available to
the public, providing appropriate exceptions for only that
information included in the briefs that is classified on the
basis of national security or that is business confidential.
(H) To pursue rules protecting against conflicts of
interest by members of FTAA dispute panels and any appellate
body, and promoting the selection of members for such panels
and appellate body with the skills and time necessary to
decide increasingly complex cases.
(I) To pursue the establishment of formal procedures under
which the FTAA dispute panels and any appellate body seek
advice from other fora of competent jurisdiction, such as
the International Court of Justice, ILO, representative
bodies established under international environmental
agreements, and scientific experts.
(5) Trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights.--The principal negotiating objectives of the United
States with respect to trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights are the following:
(A) To ensure that the provisions of a regional trade
agreement governing intellectual property rights that is
entered into by the United States reflects a standard of
protection similar to that found in United States law.
(B) To provide strong protection for new and emerging
technologies and new methods of transmitting and distributing
products embodying intellectual property.
(C) To prevent or eliminate discrimination with respect to
matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope,
maintenance, use, and enforcement of intellectual property
rights.
(D) To ensure that standards of protection and enforcement
keep pace with technological developments, including ensuring
that rightholders have the legal and technological means to
control the use of their works through the Internet and other
global communication media, and to prevent the unauthorized
use of their works.
(E) To provide strong enforcement of intellectual property
rights, including through accessible, expeditious, and
effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement
mechanisms.
(F) To secure fair, equitable and nondiscriminatory market
access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon
intellectual property protection.
(G) To prevent misuse of reference pricing classification
systems by developed countries as a way to discriminate
against innovative pharmaceutical products and innovative
medical devices, without challenging valid reference pricing
systems not used as a disguised restriction on trade.
(H)(i) To ensure that FTAA members are able to adopt
measures necessary to protect the public health and to
respond to situations of national emergency or extreme
urgency, including taking actions that have the effect of
increasing access to essential medicines and medical
technologies, where such actions are consistent with
obligations set forth in Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement.
(ii) In situations involving infectious diseases, to
encourage FTAA members that take actions described under
clause (i) to also implement policies--
(I) to address the underlying causes necessitating the
actions, including, in the case of infectious diseases,
encouraging practices that will prevent further transmission
and infection;
(II) to take steps to stimulate the development of the
infrastructure necessary to deliver adequate health care
services, including the essential medicines and medical
technologies at issue;
(III) to ensure the safety and efficacy of the essential
medicines and medical technologies involved; and
(IV) to make reasonable efforts to address the problems of
supply of the essential medicines and medical technologies
involved (other than by compulsory licensing).
(iii) To encourage FTAA members and the private sectors in
their countries to work with the United Nations, the World
Health Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank, the
Organization of American States, and other relevant
international organizations, including humanitarian relief
organizations, to assist least-developed and developing
countries in the region in increasing access to essential
medicines and medical technologies through donations, sales
at cost, funding or global medicines trust funds, and
developing and implementing prevention efforts and health
care infrastructure projects.
(6) Transparency.--The principal negotiating objectives of
the United States with respect to transparency are the
following:
(A) To pursue the negotiation of an agreement--
(i) requiring that government laws, rules, and
administrative and judicial decisions be published and made
available to the public so that governments, businesses and
the public have adequate notice of them;
(ii) requiring adequate notice before new rules are
promulgated or existing rules amended;
(iii) encouraging governments to open rulemaking to public
comment;
(iv) establishing that any administrative proceeding by any
FTAA member relating to any of the FTAA agreements and
applied to the persons, goods, or services of any other FTAA
member shall be conducted in a manner that--
(I) gives persons of any other FTAA member affected by the
proceeding reasonable notice, in accordance with domestic
procedures, of when the proceeding is initiated, including a
description of the nature of the proceeding, a statement of
the legal authority under which the proceeding is initiated,
and a general description of any issues in controversy;
(II) gives such persons a reasonable opportunity to present
facts and arguments in support of their positions prior to
any final administrative action, when time, the nature of the
proceeding, and the public interest permit; and
(III) is in accordance with domestic law; and
(v) requiring each FTAA member--
(I) to establish or maintain judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative tribunals (impartial and independent of the
office or authority entrusted with administrative
enforcement) or procedures for the purpose of the prompt
review and, where warranted, correction of final
administrative actions regarding matters covered by any of
the FTAA agreements;
(II) to ensure that, in such tribunals or procedures,
parties to the proceeding are afforded a reasonable
opportunity to support or defend their respective positions;
and
(III) to ensure that such tribunals or procedures issue
decisions based on the evidence and submissions of record or,
where required by domestic law, the record compiled by the
office or authority entrusted with administrative
enforcement.
(B) To require the institution of regular meetings between
officials of an FTAA secretariat, if established, and
representatives of nongovernmental organizations, businesses
and business groups, labor unions, consumer groups, and other
representatives of civil society.
(C) To continue to maintain, expand, and update an official
FTAA website in order to disseminate a wide range of
information on the FTAA, including the draft texts of the
agreements negotiated pursuant to the FTAA, the final text of
such agreements, tariff information, regional trade
statistics, and links to websites of FTAA member countries
that provide further information on government regulations,
procedures, and related matters.
(7) Government procurement.--The principal negotiating
objectives for the United
[[Page H9035]]
States with respect to government procurement are the
following:
(A) To seek the acceptance by all FTAA members of the
Agreement on Government Procurement.
(B) To seek conclusion of an agreement on transparency in
government procurement.
(C) To promote global use of electronic publication of
procurement information, including notices of procurement
opportunities.
(8) Trade remedy laws.--The principal negotiating
objectives for the United States with respect to trade remedy
laws are the following:
(A) To preserve the ability of the United States to enforce
vigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping,
countervailing duty, and safeguard laws, and not enter into
agreements that lessen in any respect the effectiveness of
domestic and international disciplines--
(i) on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, or
(ii) that address import increases or surges, such as under
the safeguard remedy,
in order to ensure that United States workers, farmers and
agricultural producers, and firms can compete fully on fair
terms and enjoy the benefits of reciprocal trade concessions.
(B) To eliminate the underlying causes of unfair trade
practices and import surges, including closed markets,
subsidization, promoting, enabling, or tolerating
anticompetitive practices, and other forms of government
intervention that generate or sustain excess, uneconomic
capacity.
(9) Trade and labor market standards.--The principal
negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to
trade and labor market standards are the following:
(A) To include enforceable rules that provide for the
adoption and enforcement of the following core labor
standards: the right of association, the right to bargain
collectively, and prohibitions on employment discrimination,
child labor, and slave labor.
(B) To establish as the trigger for invoking the dispute
settlement process with respect to the obligations under
subparagraph (A)--
(i) an FTAA member's failure to effectively enforce its
domestic labor standards through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade or
investment; or
(ii) an FTAA member's waiver or other derogation from its
domestic labor standards for the purpose of attracting
investment, inhibiting exports by other FTAA members, or
otherwise gaining a competitive advantage,
recognizing that--
(I) FTAA members retain the right to exercise discretion
with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and
compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the
allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other
labor matters determined to have higher priorities; and
(II) FTAA members retain the right to establish their own
domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly
labor policies, laws, and regulations, in a manner consistent
with the core labor standards identified in subparagraph (A).
(C) To provide for phased-in compliance for least-developed
countries comparable to mechanisms utilized in other FTAA
agreements.
(D) To create an FTAA work program that--
(i) will provide guidance and technical assistance to FTAA
members in supplementing and strengthening their labor laws
and regulations, including, in particular, laws and
regulations relating to the core labor standards identified
in subparagraph (A); and
(ii) includes commitments by FTAA members to provide market
access incentives for the least-developed FTAA members to
improve adherence to and enforcement of the core labor
standards identified in subparagraph (A), and to meet their
schedule for phased-in compliance on or ahead of schedule.
(E) To provide for regular review of adherence to core
labor standards.
(F) To create exceptions from the obligations under the
FTAA agreements for--
(i) products produced by prison labor or slave labor, and
products produced by child labor proscribed by Convention 182
of the ILO; and
(ii) actions taken consistent with, and in furtherance of,
recommendations made by the ILO.
(10) Trade and the environment.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to trade and the
environment are the following:
(A) To obtain rules that provide for the enforcement of
environmental laws and regulations relating to--
(i) the prevention, abatement, or control of the release,
discharge, or emission of pollutants or environmental
contaminants;
(ii) the control of environmentally hazardous or toxic
chemicals, substances, materials and wastes, and the
dissemination of information related thereto; and
(iii) the protection of wild flora or fauna, including
endangered species, their habitats, and specially protected
natural areas, in the territory of FTAA member countries.
(B) To establish as the trigger for invoking the dispute
settlement process--
(i) an FTAA member's failure to effectively enforce such
laws and regulations through a sustained or recurring course
of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade or
investment, or
(ii) an FTAA member's waiver or other derogation from its
domestic environmental laws and regulations, for the purpose
of attracting investment, inhibiting exports by other FTAA
members, or otherwise gaining a competitive advantage,
recognizing that--
(I) FTAA members retain the right to exercise discretion
with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and
compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the
allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other
environmental matters determined to have higher priorities;
and
(II) FTAA members retain the right to establish their own
levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental
development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify
accordingly environmental policies, laws, and regulations.
(C) To provide for phased-in compliance for least-developed
countries, comparable to mechanisms utilized in other FTAA
agreements.
(D) To create an FTAA work program that--
(i) will provide guidance and technical assistance to FTAA
members in supplementing and strengthening their
environmental laws and regulations based on--
(I) the standards in existing international agreements that
provide adequate protection; or
(II) the standards in the laws of other FTAA members if the
standards in international agreements standards are
inadequate or do not exist; and
(ii) includes commitments by FTAA members to provide market
access incentives for the least-developed FTAA members to
strengthen environmental laws and regulations.
(E) To provide for regular review of adherence to
environmental laws and regulations.
(F) To create exceptions from obligations under the FTAA
agreements for--
(i) measures taken to provide effective protection of
human, animal, or plant life or health;
(ii) measures taken to conserve exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; and
(iii) measures taken that are in accordance with
obligations under any multilateral environmental agreement
accepted by both parties to a dispute.
(G) To give priority to trade liberalization measures that
promote sustainable development, including eliminating duties
on environmental goods, and obtaining commitments on
environmental services.
(11) Institution building.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to institution
building are the following:
(A) To improve coordination between the FTAA and other
international organizations such as the Organization of
American States, the ILO, the United Nations Environment
Program, and the Inter-American Development Bank to increase
the effectiveness of technical assistance programs.
(B) To ensure that the agreements entered into under the
FTAA provide for technical assistance to developing and, in
particular, least-developed countries that are members of the
FTAA to promote the rule of law, enable them to comply with
their obligations under the FTAA agreements, and minimize
disruptions associated with trade liberalization.
(12) Trade and investment.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to trade and
investment are the following:
(A) To reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting
barriers to foreign investment by United States persons and,
recognizing that United States law on the whole provides a
high level of protection for investments, consistent with or
greater than the level required by international law, to
secure for investors the rights that would be available under
United States law, but no greater rights, by--
(i) ensuring national and most-favored nation treatment for
United States investors and investments;
(ii) freeing the transfer of funds relating to investments;
(iii) reducing or eliminating performance requirements,
forced technology transfers, and other unreasonable barriers
to the establishment and operation of investments;
(iv) establishing standards for expropriation and
compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States
legal principles and practice, including by clarifying that
expropriation does not arise in cases of mere diminution in
value;
(v) codifying the clarifications made on July 31, 2001, by
the Free Trade Commission established under Article 2001 of
the NAFTA with respect to the minimum standard of treatment
under Article 1105 of the NAFTA such that--
(I) any provisions included in an investment agreement
setting forth a minimum standard of treatment prescribe only
that level of treatment required by customary international
law; and
(II) a determination that there has been a breach of
another provision of the FTAA, or of a separate international
agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of
the minimum standard of treatment;
(vi) ensuring, through clarifications, presumptions,
exceptions, or other means in the text of the agreement, that
the investor protections do not interfere with an FTAA
[[Page H9036]]
member's exercise of its police powers under its local,
State, and national laws (for example legitimate health,
safety, environmental, consumer, and employment opportunity
laws and regulations), including by a clarification that the
standards in an agreement do not require use of the least
trade restrictive regulatory alternative;
(vii) providing an exception for actions taken in
accordance with obligations under a multilateral
environmental agreement agreed to by both countries involved
in the dispute;
(viii) providing meaningful procedures for resolving
investment disputes;
(ix) ensuring that--
(I) no claim by an investor directly against a state may be
brought unless the investor first submits the claim for
approval to the home government of the investor;
(II) such approval is granted for each claim which the
investor demonstrates is meritorious;
(III) such approval is considered granted if the investor's
home government has not acted upon the submission within a
defined reasonable period of time; and
(IV) each FTAA member establishes or designates an
independent decisionmaker to determine whether the standard
for approval has been satisfied; and
(x) providing a standing appellate mechanism to correct
erroneous interpretations of law.
(B) To ensure the fullest measure of transparency in the
dispute settlement mechanism established, by--
(i) ensuring that all requests for dispute settlement are
promptly made public, to the extent consistent with the need
to protect information that is classified or business
confidential;
(ii) ensuring that--
(I) all proceedings, submissions, findings, and decisions,
are promptly made public; and
(II) all hearings are open to the public, to the extent
consistent with need to protect information that is
classified or business confidential; and
(iii) establishing a mechanism for acceptance of amicus
curiae submissions from businesses, unions, and
nongovernmental organizations.
(13) Electronic commerce.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to electronic
commerce are the following:
(A) To make permanent and binding on FTAA members the
moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions
declared in the WTO Ministerial Declaration of May 20, 1998.
(B) To ensure that governments refrain from implementing
trade-related measures that impede electronic commerce.
(C) To ensure that electronically delivered goods and
services receive no less favorable treatment under trade
rules and commitments than like products delivered in
physical form.
(D) To ensure that the classification of electronically
delivered goods and services ensures the most liberal trade
treatment possible.
(E) Where legitimate policy objectives require domestic
regulations that affect electronic commerce, to obtain
commitments that any such regulations are nondiscriminatory,
transparent, and promote an open market environment.
(F) To pursue a regulatory environment that encourages
competition in basic telecommunications services abroad, so
as to facilitate the conduct of electronic commerce.
(14) Developing countries.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to developing
countries are the following:
(A) To enter into trade agreements that promote the
economic growth of both developing countries and the United
States and the mutual expansion of market opportunities.
(B) To ensure appropriate phase-in periods with respect to
the obligations of least-developed countries.
(C) To coordinate with the Organization of American States,
the Inter-American Development Bank, and other regional and
international institutions to provide debt relief and other
assistance to promote the rule of law and sound and
sustainable development.
(D) To accelerate tariff reductions that benefit least-
developed countries.
(15) Trade and monetary coordination.--The principal
negotiating objective of the United States with respect to
trade and monetary coordination is to foster stability in
international currency markets and develop mechanisms to
assure greater coordination, consistency, and cooperation
between international trade and monetary systems and
institutions in order to protect against the trade
consequences of significant and unanticipated currency
movements.
(16) Access to high technology.--The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to access to
high technology are the following:
(A) To obtain the elimination or reduction of foreign
barriers to, and of acts, policies, or practices by foreign
governments that limit, equitable access by United States
persons to foreign-developed technology.
(B) To seek the elimination of tariffs on all information
technology products, infrastructure equipment, scientific
instruments, and medical equipment.
(C) To pursue the reduction of foreign barriers to high
technology products of the United States.
(D) To enforce and promote the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, and ensure that standards, conformity
assessment, and technical regulations are not used as
obstacles to trade in information technology and
communications products.
(E) To require all parties to sign the Information
Technology Agreement of the WTO and to expand and update
product coverage under such agreement.
(17) Corruption.--The principal negotiating objectives of
the United States with respect to the use of money or other
things of value to influence acts, decisions, or omissions of
foreign governments or officials or to secure any improper
advantage are--
(A) to obtain standards applicable to persons from all FTAA
member countries that are equivalent to, or more restrictive
than, the prohibitions applicable to issuers, domestic
concerns, and other persons under section 30A of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and sections 104 and 104A
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977; and
(B) to implement mechanisms to ensure effective enforcement
of the standards described in subparagraph (A).
(d) Bilateral Agreements.--
(1) Principal negotiating objectives.--The principal
negotiating objectives of the United States in seeking
bilateral trade agreements are those objectives set forth in
subsection (c), except that in applying such subsection, any
references to the FTAA or FTAA member countries shall be
deemed to refer to the bilateral agreement, or party to the
bilateral agreement, respectively.
(2) Adherence to obligations under uruguay round
agreements.--In determining whether to enter into
negotiations with a particular country, the President shall
take into account the extent to which that country has
implemented, or has accelerated the implementation of, its
obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.
(e) Domestic Objectives.--In pursuing the negotiating
objectives under subsections (a) through (d), United States
negotiators shall take into account legitimate United States
domestic (including State and local) objectives, including,
but not limited to, the protection of health and safety,
essential security, environmental, consumer, and employment
opportunity interests and the laws and regulations related
thereto.
SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL TRADE ADVISERS.
Section 161(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.
2211(a)(1)) is amended to read as follows:
``(1) At the beginning of each regular session of
Congress--
``(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall--
``(i) upon the recommendation of the chairman and ranking
member of the Committee on Ways and Means, select 5 members
(not more than 3 of whom are members of the same political
party) of such committee,
``(ii) upon the recommendation of the chairman and ranking
member of the Committee on Agriculture, select 2 members
(from different political parties) of such committee, and
``(iii) upon the recommendation of the majority leader and
minority leader of the House of Representatives, select 2
members of the House of Representatives (from different
political parties), and
``(B) the President pro tempore of the Senate shall--
``(i) upon the recommendation of the chairman and ranking
member of the Committee on Finance, select 5 members (not
more than 3 of whom are members of the same political party)
of such committee,
``(ii) upon the recommendation of the chairman and ranking
member of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry, select 2 members (from different political parties)
of such committee, and
``(iii) upon the recommendation of the majority leader and
minority leader of the Senate, select 2 members of the Senate
(from different political parties),
who shall be designated congressional advisers on trade
policy and negotiations. They shall provide advice on the
development of trade policy and priorities for the
implementation thereof. They shall also be accredited by the
United States Trade Representative on behalf of the President
as official advisers to the United States delegations to
international conferences, meetings, dispute settlement
proceedings, and negotiating sessions relating to trade
agreements.''.
SEC. 4. TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY.
(a) Agreements Regarding Tariff Barriers.--
(1) In general.--Whenever the President determines that one
or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any
foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and
restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that
the purposes, policies, and objectives of this Act will be
promoted thereby, the President--
(A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries
before--
(i) the date that is 5 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act, or
(ii) the date that is 7 years after such date of enactment,
if fast track procedures are extended under subsection (c),
and
(B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), proclaim--
(i) such modification or continuance of any existing duty,
(ii) such continuance of existing duty-free or excise
treatment, or
(iii) such additional duties,
[[Page H9037]]
as the President determines to be required or appropriate to
carry out any such trade agreement.
The President shall notify the Congress of the President's
intention to enter into an agreement under this subsection.
(2) Limitations.--No proclamation may be made under
paragraph (1) that--
(A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate of duty
that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem on the date of the
enactment of this Act) to a rate of duty which is less than
50 percent of the rate of such duty that applies on such date
of enactment; or
(B) increases any rate of duty above the rate that applied
on such date of enactment.
(3) Aggregate reduction; exemption from staging.--
(A) Aggregate reduction.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), the aggregate reduction in the rate of duty
on any article which is in effect on any day pursuant to a
trade agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall not
exceed the aggregate reduction which would have been in
effect on such day if--
(i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem or a reduction of
one-tenth of the total reduction, whichever is greater, had
taken effect on the effective date of the first reduction
proclaimed under paragraph (1) to carry out such agreement
with respect to such article; and
(ii) a reduction equal to the amount applicable under
clause (i) had taken effect at 1-year intervals after the
effective date of such first reduction.
(B) Exemption from staging.--No staging is required under
subparagraph (A) with respect to a duty reduction that is
proclaimed under paragraph (1) for an article of a kind that
is not produced in the United States. The United States
International Trade Commission shall advise the President of
the identity of articles that may be exempted from staging
under this subparagraph.
(4) Rounding.--If the President determines that such action
will simplify the computation of reductions under paragraph
(3), the President may round an annual reduction by an amount
equal to the lesser of--
(A) the difference between the reduction without regard to
this paragraph and the next lower whole number; or
(B) one-half of 1 percent ad valorem.
(5) Other limitations.--A rate of duty reduction that may
not be proclaimed by reason of paragraph (2) may take effect
only if a provision authorizing such reduction is included
within an implementing bill provided for under section 7 and
that bill is enacted into law.
(6) Other tariff modifications.--Notwithstanding paragraphs
(1)(B) and (2) through (5), and subject to the consultation
and layover requirements of section 115 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, the President may proclaim the modification
of any duty or staged rate reduction of any duty set forth in
Schedule XX, as defined in section 2(5) of that Act, if the
United States agrees to such modification or staged rate
reduction in a negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or
harmonization of duties under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization or as part of an interim agreement leading to
the formation of a regional free-trade area.
(7) Authority under uruguay round agreements act not
affected.--Nothing in this subsection shall limit the
authority provided to the President under section 111(b) of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
(b) Agreements Regarding Tariff and Nontariff Barriers.--
(1) In general.--(A) Whenever the President determines
that--
(i) one or more existing duties or any other import
restriction of any foreign country or the United States or
any other barrier to, or other distortion of, international
trade unduly burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the
United States or adversely affects the United States economy,
or
(ii) the imposition of any such barrier or distortion is
likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or effect,
and that the purposes, policies, and objectives of this Act
will be promoted thereby, the President may enter into a
trade agreement described in subparagraph (B) during the
period described in subparagraph (C).
(B) The President may enter into a trade agreement under
subparagraph (A) with foreign countries providing for--
(i) the reduction or elimination of a duty, restriction,
barrier, or other distortion described in subparagraph (A),
or
(ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on the imposition
of, such barrier or other distortion.
(C) The President may enter into a trade agreement under
this paragraph before--
(i) the date that is 5 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act, or
(ii) the date that is 7 years after such date of enactment,
if fast track procedures are extended under subsection (c).
(2) Conditions.--A trade agreement may be entered into
under this subsection only if such agreement substantially
achieves the applicable objectives described in section 2 and
the conditions set forth in sections 5, 6, and 7 are met.
(3) Bills qualifying for fast track procedures.--(A) The
provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (in this
Act referred to as ``fast track procedures'') apply to a bill
of either House of Congress which contains provisions
described in subparagraph (B) to the same extent as such
section 151 applies to implementing bills under that section.
A bill to which this paragraph applies shall hereafter in
this Act be referred to as an ``implementing bill''.
(B) The provisions referred to in subparagraph (A) are--
(i) a provision approving a trade agreement entered into
under this subsection and approving the statement of
administrative action, if any, proposed to implement such
trade agreement;
(ii) if changes in existing laws or new statutory authority
are required to implement such trade agreement, provisions,
necessary or appropriate to implement such trade agreement or
agreements, either repealing or amending existing laws or
providing new statutory authority; and
(iii) provisions to provide trade adjustment assistance to
workers, firms, and communities.
(c) Extension Disapproval Process for Congressional Fast
Track Procedures.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in section 5(c), 6(c),
and 7(b)--
(A) the fast track procedures apply to implementing bills
submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into under
subsection (b) before the date that is 5 years after the date
of the enactment of this Act; and
(B) the fast track procedures shall be extended to
implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements
entered into under subsection (b) on or after the date
specified in subparagraph (A) and before the date that is 7
years after the date of such enactment if (and only if)--
(i) the President requests such extension under paragraph
(2); and
(ii) neither House of the Congress adopts an extension
disapproval resolution under paragraph (6) before the date
specified in subparagraph (A).
(2) Report to congress by the president.--If the President
is of the opinion that the fast track procedures should be
extended to implementing bills to carry out trade agreements
under subsection (b), the President shall submit to the
Congress, not later than 3 months before the expiration of
the 5-year period specified in paragraph (1)(A), a written
report that contains a request for such extension, together
with--
(A) a description of all trade agreements that have been
negotiated under subsection (b) and the anticipated schedule
for submitting such agreements to the Congress for approval;
(B) a description of the progress that has been made in
negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and
objectives of this Act, and a statement that such progress
justifies the continuation of negotiations; and
(C) a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed
to complete the negotiations.
(3) Report to congress by the advisory committee.--The
President shall promptly inform the Advisory Committee for
Trade Policy and Negotiations established under section 135
of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) of the President's
decision to submit a report to the Congress under paragraph
(2). The Advisory Committee shall submit to the Congress as
soon as practicable, but not later than 2 months before the
expiration of the 5-year period specified in paragraph
(1)(A), a written report that contains--
(A) its views regarding the progress that has been made in
negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and
objectives of this Act; and
(B) a statement of its views, and the reasons therefor,
regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2)
should be approved or disapproved.
(4) Report to congress by congressional trade advisers.--
The President shall promptly inform the congressional trade
advisers of the President's decision to submit a report to
the Congress under paragraph (2). The congressional trade
advisers shall submit to the Congress as soon as practicable,
but not later than 2 months before the expiration of the 5-
year period specified in paragraph (1)(A), a written report
that contains--
(A) its views regarding the progress that has been made in
negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and
objectives of this Act; and
(B) a statement of their views, and the reasons therefor,
regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2)
should be approved or disapproved.
(5) Reports may be classified.--The reports under
paragraphs (2) and (3), or any portion of such reports, may
be classified to the extent the President determines
appropriate, and the report under paragraph (4), or any
portion thereof, may be classified.
(6) Extension disapproval resolutions.--(A) For purposes of
paragraph (1), the term ``extension disapproval resolution''
means a resolution of either House of the Congress, the sole
matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows:
``That the ____ disapproves the request of the President for
the extension, under section 4(c)(1)(B)(i) of the
Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001, of the
fast track procedures under that Act to any implementing bill
submitted with respect to any trade agreement entered into
under section 4(b) of that Act after the date that is 5 years
after the date of the enactment of that Act.'', with the
blank space being filled with the name of the resolving House
of the Congress.
(B) Extension disapproval resolutions--
(i) may be introduced in either House of the Congress by
any member of such House; and
[[Page H9038]]
(ii) shall be referred, in the House of Representatives, to
the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the
Committee on Rules.
(C) The provisions of section 152 (d) and (e) of the Trade
Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (d) and (e)) (relating to the
floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and
Senate) apply to extension disapproval resolutions.
(D) It is not in order for--
(i) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval
resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance;
(ii) the House of Representatives to consider any extension
disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways
and Means and, in addition, by the Committee on Rules; or
(iii) either House of the Congress to consider an extension
disapproval resolution after the date that is 5 years after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 5. COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS.
(a) In General.--In order to contribute to the continued
economic expansion of the United States and to benefit United
States workers, farmers, and businesses, the President shall
commence negotiations covering tariff and nontariff barriers
affecting any industry, product, or service sector, in cases
where the President determines that such negotiations are
feasible and timely and would benefit the United States. The
President shall commence negotiations--
(1) to expand existing sectoral agreements to countries
that are not parties to those agreements; and
(2) to promote growth, open global markets, and raise
standards of living in the United States and other countries
and promote sustainable development.
Such sectors include agriculture, commercial services,
intellectual property rights, industrial and capital goods,
government procurement, information technology products,
environmental technology and services, medical equipment and
services, civil aircraft, and infrastructure products.
(b) Consultation Regarding Negotiating Objectives.--With
respect to any negotiations for a trade agreement under
section 4(b), the following shall apply:
(1) The President shall, in developing strategies for
pursuing negotiating objectives set forth in section 2 and
other relevant negotiating objectives to be pursued in
negotiations, consult with--
(A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(B) the congressional trade advisers; and
(C) other appropriate committees of Congress.
(2) The President shall assess whether United States
tariffs on agricultural products that were bound under the
Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound by
the country or countries with which the negotiations will be
conducted. In addition, the President shall consider whether
the tariff levels bound and applied throughout the world with
respect to imports from the United States are higher than
United States tariffs and whether the negotiation provides an
opportunity to address any such disparity. The President
shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the
Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate concerning the results
of the assessment, whether it is appropriate for the United
States to agree to further tariff reductions based on the
conclusions reached in the assessment, and how all applicable
negotiating objectives will be met.
(c) Notice of Initiation; Disapproval Resolutions.--
(1) Notice.--The President shall--
(A) provide, at least 90 calendar days before initiating
the proposed negotiations, written notice to the Congress of
the President's intention to enter into the negotiations and
set forth therein the date the President intends to initiate
such negotiations, the specific negotiating objectives to be
pursued in the negotiations, and whether the President
intends to seek an agreement or changes to an existing
agreement; and
(B) before and after submission of the notice, consult
regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Finance of
the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives, the congressional trade advisers, and
such other committees of the House of Representatives and the
Senate as the President deems appropriate.
(2) Resolutions disapproving initiation of negotiations.--
(A) Inapplicability of fast track procedures to agreements
of which certain notice given.--Fast track procedures shall
not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to
a trade agreement entered into under section 4(b) pursuant to
negotiations with 2 or more countries of which notice is
given under paragraph (1)(A) if, during the 90-day period
referred to in that subsection, each House of Congress agrees
to a disapproval resolution described in subparagraph (B)
with respect to the negotiations.
(B) Disapproval resolutions.--For purposes of this
paragraph, the term ``disapproval resolution'' means a
resolution of either House of Congress, the sole matter after
the resolving clause of which is as follows: ``That the ____
disapproves the negotiations of which the President notified
the Congress on ____, under section 5(c)(1) of the
Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001 and,
therefore, the fast track procedures under that Act shall not
apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to any
trade agreement entered into pursuant to those
negotiations.'', with the first blank space being filled with
the name of the resolving House of Congress, and the second
blank space being filled with the appropriate date.
(3) Procedures for considering resolutions.--(A)
Disapproval resolutions to which paragraph (2) applies--
(i) in the House of Representatives--
(I) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means
and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules; and
(II) may not be amended by either Committee; and
(ii) in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on
Finance.
(B) The provisions of section 152 (c), (d), and (e) of the
Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (c), (d), and (e))
(relating to the consideration of certain resolutions in the
House and Senate) apply to any disapproval resolution to
which paragraph (2) applies. In applying section 152(c)(1) of
the Trade Act of 1974, all calendar days shall be counted.
(C) It is not in order for--
(i) the Senate to consider any joint resolution unless it
has been reported by the Committee on Finance or the
committee has been discharged pursuant to subparagraph (B);
or
(ii) the House of Representatives to consider any joint
resolution unless it has been reported by the Committee on
Ways and Means or the committee has been discharged pursuant
to subparagraph (B).
SEC. 6. CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION DURING NEGOTIATIONS.
(a) Consultations With Congressional Trade Advisers and
Committees of Jurisdiction.--In the course of negotiations
conducted under this Act, the Trade Representative shall--
(1) consult closely and on a timely basis with, and keep
fully apprised of the negotiations, the congressional trade
advisers, the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(2) with respect to any negotiations and agreement relating
to agriculture, also consult closely and on a timely basis
with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the
Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the
Senate; and
(3) consult closely and on a timely basis with other
appropriate committees of Congress.
(b) Guidelines for Consultations.--
(1) Guidelines.--The Trade Representative, in consultation
with the chairmen and ranking minority members of the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives,
the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the congressional
trade advisers--
(A) shall, within 120 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, develop written guidelines to facilitate the
useful and timely exchange of information between the Trade
Representative, the committees referred to in subsection (a),
and the congressional trade advisers; and
(B) may make such revisions to the guidelines as may be
necessary from time to time.
(2) Content.--The guidelines developed under paragraph (1)
shall provide for, among other things--
(A) regular, detailed briefings of each committee referred
to in subsection (a) and the congressional trade advisers
regarding negotiating objectives and positions and the status
of negotiations, with more frequent briefings as trade
negotiations enter the final stages;
(B) access by members of each such committee, the
congressional trade advisers, and staff with proper security
clearances, to pertinent documents relating to negotiations,
including classified materials; and
(C) the closest practicable coordination between the Trade
Representative, each such committee, and the congressional
trade advisers at all critical periods during negotiations,
including at negotiation sites.
(c) Disapproval Resolutions With Respect to Ongoing
Negotiations.--
(1) Negotiations of which notice given.--Fast track
procedures shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted
with respect to a trade agreement entered into under section
4(b) pursuant to negotiations of which notice is given under
section 5(c)(1) if, at any time after the end of the 90-day
period referred to in section 5(c)((1), during the 120-day
period beginning on the date that one House of Congress
agrees to a disapproval resolution described in paragraph
(3)(A) disapproving the negotiations, the other House
separately agrees to a disapproval resolution described in
paragraph (3)(A) disapproving those negotiations. The
disapproval resolutions of the two Houses need not be in
agreement with respect to disapproving any other
negotiations.
(2) Prior negotiations.--Fast track procedures shall not
apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a
trade agreement to which section 8(a) applies if, during the
120-day period beginning on the date that one House of
Congress agrees to a disapproval resolution described in
paragraph (3)(B) disapproving the negotiations for that
agreement, the other House separately agrees to a disapproval
resolution described in paragraph (3)(B) disapproving those
negotiations. The disapproval resolutions of the
[[Page H9039]]
two Houses need not be in agreement with respect to
disapproving any other negotiations.
(3) Disapproval resolutions.--(A) For purposes of paragraph
(1), the term ``disapproval resolution'' means a resolution
of either House of Congress, the sole matter after the
resolving clause of which is as follows: ``That the ____
disapproves the negotiations of which the President notified
the Congress on ____, under section 5(c)(1) of the
Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001 and,
therefore, the fast track procedures under that Act shall not
apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to any
trade agreement entered into pursuant to those
negotiations.'', with the first blank space being filled with
the name of the resolving House of Congress, and the second
blank space being filled with the appropriate date or dates
(in the case of more than 1 set of negotiations being
conducted).
(B) For purposes of paragraph (2), the term ``disapproval
resolution'' means a resolution of either House of Congress,
the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as
follows: ``That the ____ disapproves the negotiations with
respect to ____, and, therefore, the fast track procedures
under the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of
2001 shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with
respect to any trade agreement entered into pursuant to those
negotiations.'', with the first blank space being filled with
the name of the resolving House of Congress, and the second
blank space being filled with a description of the applicable
trade agreement or agreements.
(4) Procedures for considering resolutions.--(A) Any
disapproval resolution to which paragraph (1) or (2)
applies--
(i) in the House of Representatives--
(I) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means
and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules; and
(II) may not be amended by either Committee; and
(ii) in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on
Finance.
(B) The provisions of section 152 (c), (d), and (e) of the
Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (c), (d), and (e))
(relating to the consideration of certain resolutions in the
House and Senate) apply to any disapproval resolution to
which paragraph (1) or (2) applies if--
(i) there are at least 145 cosponsors of the resolution, in
the case of a resolution of the House of Representatives, and
at least 34 cosponsors of the resolution, in the case of a
resolution of the Senate; and
(ii) no resolution that meets the requirements of clause
(i) has previously been considered under such provisions of
section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974 in that House of
Congress during that Congress.
In applying section 152(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, all
calendar days shall be counted.
(C) It is not in order for--
(i) the Senate to consider any joint resolution unless it
has been reported by the Committee on Finance or the
committee has been discharged pursuant to subparagraph (B);
or
(ii) the House of Representatives to consider any joint
resolution unless it has been reported by the Committee on
Ways and Means or the committee has been discharged pursuant
to subparagraph (B).
(5) Computation of certain time periods.--Each period of
time referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be computed
without regard to--
(A) the days on which either House of Congress is not in
session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a
day certain or an adjournment of the Congress sine die; and
(B) any Saturday and Sunday, not excluded under
subparagraph (A), when either House of Congress is not in
session.
(d) Environmental Assessment.--
(1) Initiation of assessment.--Upon the commencement of
negotiations for a trade agreement under section 4(b), the
Trade Representative, jointly with the Chair of the Council
on Environmental Quality, and in consultation with other
appropriate Federal agencies, shall commence an assessment of
the effects on the environment of the proposed trade
agreement.
(2) Content.--The assessment under paragraph (1) shall
include an examination of--
(A) the potential effects of the proposed trade agreement
on the environment, natural resources, and public health;
(B) the extent to which the proposed trade agreement may
affect the laws, regulations, policies, and international
agreements of the United States, including State and local
laws, regulations, and policies, relating to the environment,
natural resources, and public health;
(C) measures to implement, and alternative approaches to,
the proposed trade agreement that would minimize adverse
effects and maximize benefits identified under subparagraph
(A); and
(D) a detailed summary of the manner in which the results
of the assessment were taken into consideration in
negotiation of the proposed trade agreement, and in
development of measures and alternative means identified
under subparagraph (C).
(3) Procedures.--The Trade Representative shall commence
the assessment under paragraph (1) by publishing notice
thereof, and a request for comments thereon, in the Federal
Register and transmitting notice thereof to the Congress. The
notice shall be given as soon as possible after sufficient
information exists concerning the scope of the proposed trade
agreement, but in no case later than 30 calendar days before
the applicable negotiations begin. The notice shall contain--
(A) the principal negotiating objectives of the United
States to be pursued in the negotiations;
(B) the elements and topics expected to be under
consideration for coverage by the proposed trade agreement;
(C) the countries expected to participate in the agreement;
and
(D) the sectors of the United States economy likely to be
affected by the agreement.
(4) Consultations with congress.--The Trade Representative
shall submit to the Congress--
(A) within 6 months after the onset of negotiations, a
preliminary draft of the environmental assessment conducted
under this subsection; and
(B) not later than 90 calendar days before the agreement is
signed by the President, the final version of the
environmental assessment.
(5) Participation of other federal agencies and
departments.--(A) In conducting the assessment required under
paragraph (1), the Trade Representative and the Chair of the
Council on Environmental Quality shall draw upon the
knowledge of the departments and agencies with relevant
expertise in the subject matter under consideration,
including, but not limited to, the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Departments of the Interior, Agriculture,
Commerce, Energy, State, the Treasury, and Justice, the
Agency for International Development, the Council of Economic
Advisors, and the International Trade Commission.
(B) The heads of the departments and agencies identified in
subparagraph (A), and the heads of other departments and
agencies with relevant expertise shall provide such resources
as are necessary to conduct the assessment required under
this subsection.
(6) Consultations with the advisory committee.--(A) Section
135(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155(c)(1)) is
amended in the first sentence--
(i) by striking ``may establish'' and inserting ``shall
establish''; and
(ii) by inserting ``environmental issues,'' after
``defense''.
(B) In developing measures and alternatives means
identified under paragraph (2)(C), the Trade Representative
and the Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality shall
consult with the environmental general policy advisory
committee established pursuant to section 135(c)(1) of the
Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155(c)(1)), as amended by
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph.
(7) Public participation.--The Trade Representative shall
publish the preliminary and final environmental assessments
in the Federal Register. The Trade Representative shall take
into account comments received from the public pursuant to
notices published under this subsection and shall include in
the final assessment a discussion of the public comments
reflected in the assessment.
(e) Labor Review.--
(1) Initiation of review.--Upon the commencement of
negotiations for a trade agreement under section 4(b), the
Trade Representative, jointly with the Secretary of Labor and
the Commissioners of the International Trade Commission, and
in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies,
shall commence a review of the effects on workers in the
United States of the proposed trade agreement.
(2) Content.--The review under paragraph (1) shall include
an examination of--
(A) the extent to which the proposed trade agreement may
affect job creation, worker displacement, wages, and the
standard of living for workers in the United States;
(B) the scope and magnitude of the effect of the proposed
trade agreement on the flow of workers to and from the United
States;
(C) the extent to which the proposed agreement may affect
the laws, regulations, policies, and international agreements
of the United States relating to labor; and
(D) proposals to mitigate any negative effects of the
proposed trade agreement on workers, firms, and communities
in the United States, including proposals relating to trade
adjustment assistance.
(3) Procedures.--The Trade Representative shall commence
the review under paragraph (1) by publishing notice thereof,
and a request for comments thereon, in the Federal Register
and transmitting notice thereof to the Congress. The notice
shall be given not later than 30 calendar days before the
applicable negotiations begin. The notice shall contain--
(A) the principal negotiating objectives of the United
States to be pursued in the negotiations;
(B) the elements and topics expected to be under
consideration for coverage by the proposed trade agreement;
(C) the countries expected to participate in the agreement;
and
(D) the sectors of the United States economy likely to be
affected by the agreement.
(4) Consultations with congress.--The Trade Representative
shall submit to the Congress--
(A) within 6 months after the onset of negotiations, a
preliminary draft of the labor review conducted under this
subsection; and
(B) not later than 90 calendar days before the agreement is
signed by the President, the final version of the labor
review.
[[Page H9040]]
(5) Participation of other departments and agencies.--(A)
In conducting the review required under paragraph (1), the
Trade Representative, the Secretary of Labor, and the
International Trade Commission shall draw upon the knowledge
of the departments and agencies with relevant expertise in
the subject matter under consideration.
(B) The heads of the departments and agencies referred to
in subparagraph (A) shall provide such resources as are
necessary to conduct the review required under this
subsection.
(6) Consultation with the advisory committee.--In
developing proposals under paragraph (2)(D), the Trade
Representative and the Secretary of Labor shall consult with
the labor general policy advisory committee established
pursuant to section 135(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19
U.S.C. 2155(c)(1)), as amended by subsection (d)(6)(A) of
this section.
(7) Public participation.--The Trade Representative shall
publish the preliminary and final labor reviews in the
Federal Register. The Trade Representative shall take into
account comments received from the public pursuant to notices
published under this subsection and shall include in the
final review a discussion of the public comments reflected in
the review.
(f) Notice of Effect on United States Trade Remedies.--
(1) Notice.--In any case in which negotiations being
conducted to conclude a trade agreement under section 4(b)
could affect the trade remedy laws of the United States or
the rights or obligations of the United States under the
Antidumping Agreement, the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, or the Agreement on Safeguards,
except insofar as such negotiations are directly and
exclusively related to perishable and seasonal agricultural
products, the Trade Representative shall, at least 90
calendar days before the President signs the agreement,
notify the Congress of the specific language that is the
subject of the negotiations and the specific possible impact
on existing United States laws and existing United States
rights and obligations under those WTO Agreements.
(2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``trade
remedy laws of the United States'' means section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337), title VII of the Tariff
Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.), chapter 1 of title II
of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.), title III
of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411 et seq.), section
406 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2436), and chapter 2
of title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2451 et
seq.).
(g) Report on Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanism.--If
any agreement concluded under section 4(b) with respect to
trade and investment includes a dispute settlement mechanism
allowing an investor to bring a claim directly against a
country, the President shall submit a report to the Congress,
not later than 90 calendar days before the President signs
the agreement, explaining in detail the meaning of each
standard included in the dispute settlement mechanism, and
explaining how the agreement does not interfere with the
exercise by a signatory to the agreement of its police powers
under its national (including State and local) laws,
including legitimate health, safety, environmental, consumer,
and employment opportunity laws and regulations.
(h) Consultation With Congress Before Agreements Entered
Into.--
(1) Consultation.--Before entering into any trade agreement
under section 4(b), the President shall consult with--
(A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
(B) the congressional trade advisers; and
(C) each other committee of the House and the Senate, and
each joint committee of the Congress, which has jurisdiction
over legislation involving subject matters which would be
affected by the trade agreement.
(2) Scope.--The consultation described in paragraph (1)
shall include consultation with respect to--
(A) the nature of the agreement;
(B) how and to what extent the agreement will achieve the
applicable purposes, policies, and objectives of this Act;
and
(C) the implementation of the agreement under section 7,
including the general effect of the agreement on existing
laws.
(i) Advisory Committee Reports.--The report required under
section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding any
trade agreement entered into under section 4(a) or (b) of
this Act shall be provided to the President, the Congress,
and the Trade Representative not later than 30 calendar days
after the date on which the President notifies the Congress
under section 7(a)(1)(A) of the President's intention to
enter into the agreement.
(j) ITC Assessment.--
(1) In general.--The President, at least 90 calendar days
before the day on which the President enters into a trade
agreement under section 4(b), shall provide the International
Trade Commission (referred to in this subsection as ``the
Commission'') with the details of the agreement as it exists
at that time and request the Commission to prepare and submit
an assessment of the agreement as described in paragraph (2).
Between the time the President makes the request under this
paragraph and the time the Commission submits the assessment,
the President shall keep the Commission current with respect
to the details of the agreement.
(2) ITC assessment.--Not later than 90 calendar days after
the President enters into the agreement, the Commission shall
submit to the President and the Congress a report assessing
the likely impact of the agreement on the United States
economy as a whole and on specific industry sectors,
including the impact the agreement will have on the gross
domestic product, exports and imports, aggregate employment
and employment opportunities, the production, employment, and
competitive position of industries likely to be significantly
affected by the agreement, and the interests of United States
consumers.
(3) Review of empirical literature.--In preparing the
assessment, the Commission shall review available economic
assessments regarding the agreement, including literature
regarding any substantially equivalent proposed agreement,
and shall provide in its assessment a description of the
analyses used and conclusions drawn in such literature, and a
discussion of areas of consensus and divergence between the
various analyses and conclusions, including those of the
Commission regarding the agreement.
(k) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--Section
4(c), section 5(c), and subsection (c) of this section are
enacted by the Congress--
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such are
deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and
such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that
they are inconsistent with such other rules; and
(2) with the full recognition of the constitutional right
of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to
the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same
manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that
House.
SEC. 7. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.
(a) In General.--
(1) Notification, submission, and enactment.--Any agreement
entered into under section 4(b) shall enter into force with
respect to the United States if (and only if)--
(A) the President, at least 120 calendar days before the
day on which the President enters into the trade agreement,
notifies the House of Representatives and the Senate of the
President's intention to enter into the agreement, and
promptly thereafter publishes notice of such intention in the
Federal Register;
(B) the President, at least 90 calendar days before the day
on which the President enters into the trade agreement,
certifies to the Congress the trade agreement substantially
achieves the principal negotiating objectives set forth in
section 2 and those developed under section 5(b)(1);
(C) within 60 calendar days after entering into the
agreement, the President submits to the Congress a
description of those changes to existing laws that the
President considers would be required in order to bring the
United States into compliance with the agreement;
(D) after entering into the agreement, the President
submits to the Congress a copy of the final legal text of the
agreement, together with--
(i) a draft of an implementing bill;
(ii) a statement of any administrative action proposed to
implement the trade agreement; and
(iii) the supporting information described in paragraph
(2); and
(E) the implementing bill is enacted into law.
(2) Supporting information.--The supporting information
required under paragraph (1)(D)(iii) consists of--
(A) an explanation as to how the implementing bill and
proposed administrative action will change or affect existing
law; and
(B) a statement--
(i) asserting that the agreement substantially achieves the
applicable purposes, policies, and objectives of this Act;
and
(ii) setting forth the reasons of the President regarding--
(I) how and to what extent the agreement substantially
achieves the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives
referred to in clause (i), and why and to what extent the
agreement does not achieve other applicable purposes,
policies, and objectives;
(II) how the agreement serves the interests of United
States commerce; and
(III) why the implementing bill and proposed administrative
action is required or appropriate to carry out the agreement;
(iii) describing the efforts made by the President to
obtain international exchange rate equilibrium and any effect
the agreement may have regarding increased international
monetary stability; and
(iv) describing the extent, if any, to which--
(I) each foreign country that is a party to the agreement
maintains non-commercial state trading enterprises that may
adversely affect, nullify, or impair the benefits to the
United States under the agreement; and
(II) the agreement applies to or affects purchases and
sales by such enterprises.
(3) Reciprocal benefits.--In order to ensure that a foreign
country that is not a party to a trade agreement entered into
under section 4(b) does not receive benefits under the
agreement unless the country is also subject to the
obligations under the agreement, the implementing bill
submitted with respect to the agreement shall provide
[[Page H9041]]
that the benefits and obligations under the agreement apply
only to the parties to the agreement, if such application is
consistent with the terms of the agreement. The implementing
bill may also provide that the benefits and obligations under
the agreement do not apply uniformly to all parties to the
agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms
of the agreement.
(b) Limitations on Fast Track Procedures; Concurrence by
Congressional Trade Advisers in President's Certification.--
(1) Concurrence by congressional trade advisers.--The fast
track procedures shall not apply to any implementing bill
submitted with respect to a trade agreement of which notice
was provided under subsection (a)(1)(A) unless a majority of
the congressional trade advisers, by a vote held not later
than 30 days after the President submits the certification to
Congress under subsection (a)(1)(B) with respect to the trade
agreement, concur in the President's certification. The
failure of the congressional trade advisers to hold a vote
within that 30-day period shall be considered to be
concurrence in the President's certification.
(2) Computation of time period.--The 30-day period referred
to in paragraph (1) shall be computed without regard to--
(A) the days on which either House of Congress is not in
session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a
day certain or an adjournment of the Congress sine die; and
(B) any Saturday and Sunday, not excluded under
subparagraph (A), when either House of Congress is not in
session.
SEC. 8. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS.
(a) Certain Agreements.--Notwithstanding section 4(b)(2),
if an agreement to which section 4(b) applies--
(1) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization regarding the rules of origin work program
described in article 9 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin,
(2) is entered into otherwise under the auspices of the
World Trade Organization,
(3) is entered into with Chile,
(4) is entered into with Singapore, or
(5) establishes a Free Trade Area for the Americas,
and results from negotiations that were commenced before the
date of the enactment of this Act, subsection (b) shall
apply.
(b) Treatment of Agreements.--In the case of any agreement
to which subsection (a) applies--
(1) the applicability of the fast track procedures to
implementing bills shall be determined without regard to the
requirements of section 5; and
(2) the President shall consult regarding the negotiations
described in subsection (a) with the committees described in
section 5(b)(1) and the congressional trade advisers as soon
as feasible after the enactment of this Act.
(c) Applicability of Environmental Assessment.--
(1) Uruguay round agreements and ftaa.--With respect to
agreements identified in paragraphs (2) and (5) of subsection
(a)--
(A) the notice required under section 6(d)(3) shall be
given not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act; and
(B) the preliminary draft of the environmental assessment
required under section 6(d)(4) shall be submitted to the
Congress not later than 18 months after such date of
enactment.
(2) Chile and singapore.--With respect to agreements
identified in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), the
Trade Representative shall consult with the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Finance of the Senate to determine the appropriate time
frame for submission to the Congress of an environmental
assessment meeting the requirements of section 6(d)(2).
(3) Rules of origin.--The requirements of section 6(d)(1)
shall not apply to an agreement identified in subsection
(a)(1).
(d) Applicability of Labor Review.--
(1) Uruguay round agreements and ftaa.--With respect to
agreements identified in paragraphs (2) and (5) of subsection
(a)--
(A) the notice required under section 6(e)(3) shall be
given not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act; and
(B) the preliminary draft of the labor review required
under section 6(e)(4) shall be submitted to the Congress not
later than 18 months after such date of enactment.
(2) Chile and singapore.--With respect to agreements
identified in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), the
Trade Representative shall consult with the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Finance of the Senate to determine the appropriate time
frame for submission to the Congress of an environmental
assessment meeting the requirements of section 6(e)(2).
(3) Rules of origin.--The requirements of section 6(e)(1)
shall not apply to an agreement identified in subsection
(a)(1).
SEC. 9. ADDITIONAL REPORT AND STUDIES.
(a) Report on Trade-Restrictive Practices.--Not later than
1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall transmit to the Congress a report on trade-
restrictive practices of foreign countries that are promoted,
enabled, or facilitated by governmental or private entities
in those countries, or that involve the delegation of
regulatory powers to private entities.
(b) Annual Study on Fluctuations in Exchange Rate.--The
Trade Representative shall prepare and submit to the
Congress, not later than ____ of each year, a study of how
fluctuations in the exchange rate caused by the monetary
policies of the trading partners of the United States affect
trade.
SEC. 10. ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
REQUIREMENTS.
At the time the President submits to the Congress the final
text of an agreement pursuant to section 7(a)(1)(C), the
President shall also submit a plan for implementing and
enforcing the agreement. The implementation and enforcement
plan shall include the following:
(1) Border personnel requirements.--A description of
additional personnel required at border entry points,
including a list of additional customs and agricultural
inspectors.
(2) Agency staffing requirements.--A description of
additional personnel required by Federal agencies responsible
for monitoring, implementing, and enforcing the trade
agreement, including personnel required by the Office of the
United States Trade Representative, the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Agriculture (including additional
personnel required to evaluate sanitary and phytosanitary
measures in order to obtain market access for United States
exports), the Department of the Treasury, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Department of the Interior, the
Department of Labor, and such other departments and agencies
as may be necessary.
(3) Customs infrastructure requirements.--A description of
the additional equipment and facilities needed by the United
States Customs Service.
(4) Impact on state and local governments.--A description
of the impact the trade agreement will have on State and
local governments as a result of increases in trade.
(5) Cost analysis.--An analysis of the costs associated
with each of the items listed in paragraphs (1) through (4).
SEC. 11. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
(a) In General.--Title I of the Trade Act of 1974 (19
U.S.C. 2111 et seq.) is amended as follows:
(1) Implementing bill.--
(A) Section 151(b)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(1)) is amended by
striking ``section 1103(a)(1) of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, or section 282 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act'' and inserting ``section 282 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or section 7(a)(1) of the
Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001''.
(B) Section 151(c)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(c)(1)) is amended by
striking ``or section 282 of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act'' and inserting ``, section 282 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, or section 7(a)(1) of the Comprehensive Trade
Negotiating Authority Act of 2001''.
(2) Advice from international trade commission.--Section
131 (19 U.S.C. 2151) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 123 of this Act
or section 1102 (a) or (c) of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' and inserting ``section 123 of
this Act or section 4(a) or (b) of the Comprehensive Trade
Negotiating Authority Act of 2001,''; and
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``section 1102 (b) or
(c) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988''
and inserting ``section 4(b) of the Comprehensive Trade
Negotiating Authority Act of 2001'';
(B) in subsection (b), by striking ``section
1102(a)(3)(A)'' and inserting ``section 4(a)(3)(A) of the
Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001''
before the end period; and
(C) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 1102 of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' and
inserting ``section 4 of the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating
Authority Act of 2001,''.
(3) Hearings and advice.--Sections 132, 133(a), and 134(a)
(19 U.S.C. 2152, 2153(a), and 2154(a)) are each amended by
striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' each place it appears and
inserting ``section 4 of the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating
Authority Act of 2001,''.
(4) Prerequisites for offers.--Section 134(b) (19 U.S.C.
2154(b)) is amended by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting
``section 4 of the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority
Act of 2001''.
(5) Advice from private and public sectors.--Section 135
(19 U.S.C. 2155) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(1)(A), by striking ``section 1102 of
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and
inserting ``section 4 of the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating
Authority Act of 2001'';
(B) in subsection (e)(1)--
(i) by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988'' each place it appears and
inserting ``section 4 of the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating
Authority Act of 2001''; and
(ii) by striking ``section 1103(a)(1)(A) of such Act of
1988'' and inserting ``section 7(a)(1)(A) of the
Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001''; and
(C) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 1101 of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting
``section 2 of the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority
Act of 2001''.
[[Page H9042]]
(6) Transmission of agreements to congress.--Section 162(a)
(19 U.S.C. 2212(a)) is amended by striking ``or under section
1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988''
and inserting ``or under section 4 of the Comprehensive Trade
Negotiating Authority Act of 2001''.
(b) Application of Certain Provisions.--For purposes of
applying sections 125, 126, and 127 of the Trade Act of 1974
(19 U.S.C. 2135, 2136(a), and 2137)--
(1) any trade agreement entered into under section 4 shall
be treated as an agreement entered into under section 101 or
102, as appropriate, of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111
or 2112); and
(2) any proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to
a trade agreement entered into under section 4 shall be
treated as a proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant
to a trade agreement entered into under section 102 of the
Trade Act of 1974.
SEC. 12. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Agreements.--Any reference to any of the following
agreements is a reference to that same agreement referred to
in section 101(d) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19
U.S.C. 3511(d)):
(A) The Agreement on Agriculture.
(B) The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures.
(C) The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.
(D) The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures.
(E) The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
(F) The Agreement on Rules of Origin.
(G) The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
(H) The Agreement on Safeguards.
(I) The General Agreement on Trade in Services.
(J) The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights.
(K) The Agreement on Government Procurement.
(2) Antidumping agreement.--The term ``Antidumping
Agreement'' means the Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
(3) Appellate body; dispute settlement body; dispute
settlement panel; dispute settlement understanding.--The
terms ``Appellate Body'', ``Dispute Settlement Body'',
``dispute settlement panel'', and ``Dispute Settlement
Understanding'' have the meanings given those terms in
section 121 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (35 U.S.C.
3531).
(4) Business confidential.--Information or evidence is
``business confidential'' if disclosure of the information or
evidence is likely to cause substantial harm to the
competitive position of the entity from which the information
or evidence would be obtained.
(5) Congressional trade advisers.--The term ``congressional
trade advisers means the congressional advisers for trade
policy and negotiations designated under section 161(a)(1) of
the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2211(a)(1)).
(6) FTAA.--The term ``FTAA'' means the Free Trade Area of
the Americas or comparable agreement reached between the
United States and the countries in the Western Hemisphere.
(7) FTAA agreement.--The term ``FTAA agreements'' means any
agreements entered into to establish or carry out the FTAA.
(8) FTAA member; ftaa member country.--The terms ``FTAA
member'' and ``FTAA member country'' mean a country that is a
member of the FTAA.
(9) GATT 1994.--The term ``GATT 1994'' has the meaning
given that term in section 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act (19 U.S.C. 3501).
(10) ILO.--The term ``ILO'' means the International Labor
Organization.
(11) Implementing bill.--The term ``implementing bill'' has
the meaning given that term in section 151(b)(1) of the Trade
Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(1)).
(12) NAFTA.--The term ``NAFTA'' means the North American
Free Trade Agreement.
(13) Trade representative.--The term ``Trade
Representative'' means the United States Trade
Representative.
(14) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen;
(B) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity
organized under the laws of the United States; and
(C) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity that
is organized under the laws of a foreign country and is
controlled by entities described in subparagraph (B) or
United States citizens, or both.
(15) Uruguay round agreements.--The term ``Uruguay Round
Agreements'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(7)
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(7)).
(16) WTO.--The term ``WTO'' means the organization
established pursuant to the WTO Agreement.
(17) WTO agreement.--The term ``WTO Agreement'' means the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered
into on April 15, 1994.
Mr. RANGEL (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
that the motion to recommit be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Rangel) is recognized for 5 minutes on his motion to
recommit.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, this is a very emotional time for me, because our
Speaker said that this bill is just as important as fighting the war
against terrorism. I think that is a big stretch, to compare the loss
of American lives at Ground Zero to the passage of this bill as being
on the same level. We cannot bring back those lives at Ground Zero, but
we can get another chance to give the President the authority that so
many of us believe that he wants and he deserves in order to have an
effective trade policy.
We do not believe that under our government and the democratic way
that we expect to legislate, that what we are doing is undercutting the
President of the United States. We believe in our democratic world that
the majority and the minority should have an opportunity to express
themselves, and the fact that someone can pick up some Democratic
friends in the middle of the night does not mean that the process of
having bills and having hearings on bills and amendments on bills and
having the people on the Committee on Ways and Means have an
opportunity to discuss these things means to take away these rights,
and for us to stand up for what we know is morally and legislatively
right, that we are undercutting the President of the United States.
If the Committee on Rules says that we cannot express ourselves, we
will fight on this. But we will salute that flag just as high as
anybody else. And to infer that to vote against this piece of
legislation, which we have no idea where it is going in the Senate,
that it is the end of the day and that we are not fighting, that we are
not as patriotic as the next American, wrong.
I will tell you this: This is just the beginning of our fight against
terrorism, and this should be the beginning of us continuing to fight
hard to maintain bipartisanship in this House and on the other side. We
should not use our fight against terrorism loosely, and we should not
compare the bill before us as the same thing in fighting the war
against terrorism.
I just hope we recognize that we can defeat this bill before us. We
can vote on the motion to recommit. We can make certain that we are
concerned about the rights of kids, that they do not have to be
involved in working in foreign governments and labor and be abused;
protecting the environment; make certain we protect the constitutional
rights of the Members of the House.
We can do all of those things. We can be patriots. We can be
Americans and we can do these things.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Levin).
(Mr. LEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, this debate is about trade and not about
terrorism. It is not about American leadership. America must lead in
trade in the right direction. Trade must expand, and it has to be
shaped as that happens, and that is what we have been doing these last
years. We have voted on these bills. Do not pretend they do not exist.
The Thomas bill would turn back the clock in key areas including
those relating to labor.
{time} 1530
I am an internationalist. This is not about isolationism. It is about
how we shape our role as internationalists. It is not about
protectionism. We are beyond that. Trade is so important that the role
of Congress has to change. We cannot be rubber stamps or silent
partners or consultants. We must be participants.
The Thomas bill falls so far short in that way. Vote, vote for the
motion to recommit; and if that fails, vote against Thomas; and then if
Thomas goes down and the recommittal motion goes down, we will come
back and do it the right way.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the
minority leader.
[[Page H9043]]
Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, as I said previously, I want to commend
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) and the gentleman from
California (Mr. Matsui) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin) for
their hard work on this alternative. They have worked endlessly to put
together what they believe to be the right trade policy for our
country.
I agree with it entirely. I think it is the kind of vision that we
need in trade. I think it is the kind of vision that we will ultimately
come to in trade, and I urge Members to seriously consider voting for
it.
The only way we will get these changes made in trade policy is if we
have the votes to pass this kind of a motion. So I strongly recommend
it to Members.
I honor their hard work and scholarship, their seriousness of
purpose. It is a remarkable job that they have done, and I urge Members
to vote for what I believe to be the right vision on trade for America
now and in the future.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to
recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The gentleman from California
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, most others would oppose this if they had
told us what was in it during their 5 minutes; but that usually is my
job, to tell people what is in the motion to recommit.
First of all, that is the motion to recommit, and I do have to
compliment the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) in which he
utilized patriotism by condemning others using patriotism to urge that
my colleagues support his motion to recommit. Nicely done.
What the minority leader said was that this position contains all the
right issues.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin), who is the author of this,
says that it moves in the right direction; and in fact, the key phrase
from the gentleman from Michigan is it says it is how we should shape
our world.
I want my colleagues to think about a document which the minority
asks us to vote for, which more than 75 pages consists of mandates, of
requirements that others must meet. To give my colleagues the flavor of
the 75 pages of mandates, we only have to get to page 6 when it says
any agreement that comes back must maintain bona fide food aid
programs. Now, what is a bona fide food aid program? Whatever it is,
the agreement between whoever country works with us must maintain a
bona fide food aid program.
My colleagues can imagine 75 pages of maintaining, to preserve, to
promote, to eliminate, to achieve, to explore, to develop, to identify,
to clarify and on and on, that an agreement has to meet these because
they are mandates, and if they do not meet them, guess what? There is a
structure that will judge whether or not those mandates have been met.
First of all, to get an agreement through Congress in this package,
requires that my colleagues vote not once, remember, normally, this is
called Fast Track, that we do not vote once, that we do not have to
vote twice, but we have to vote three times; and every time we have to
achieve a majority.
On those 75 pages of mandates, this is the structure to determine
whether or not the agreement has met the particular mandate. It takes
nine Members of the House and nine Members of the Senate, and it
constructs them so that the nine and the nine just happen to be nine
Democrats and nine Republicans, and if they hold their party line, if
the AFL-CIO is able to hold the party line, any agreement goes down
because to get an agreement not only requires us to go through those
three separate votes, but we then have to on any one of these 75 pages
of mandates, have to get a majority of that structure to go forward.
I know that sometimes bringing countries together over the
negotiating table is difficult to do; and that is why, in committee,
when this was offered as a substitute, with 17 Democrats on the
committee, the leadership of the Committee on Ways and Means, laying
this in front of their Democratic colleagues, did not get 17 vote, did
not get 16 votes, did not get 14 vote, did not get 13 votes. They were
able to muster 12 of the 17 in support of this; and once my colleagues
know what is inside of it, we begin to wonder about the 12 that voted
for it.
That is why they would not spend one minute of their time telling us
what is in this document; but if my colleagues examine it, what it is
is a guarantee that unless and until one or two people's vision over
there of how we shape our world is in each and every document, we will
not have a trade agreement. That is not the way a trade agreement
arrangement should work.
I want to compliment the Democrats that voted against it in Ways and
Means. I want to compliment the Democrats who will vote down the motion
to recommit, and I want to compliment all of those who will support
Trade Promotion Authority for the President.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair
announces that he will reduce to 5 minutes the period of time within
which a vote by electronic device will be taken on the question of the
passage of the bill.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 162,
noes 267, not voting 5, as follows:
[Roll No. 480]
AYES--162
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baird
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett
Becerra
Bentsen
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Boswell
Boucher
Brown (FL)
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson (IN)
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
Deutsch
Doggett
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Frank
Frost
Gephardt
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green (TX)
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hastings (FL)
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hoeffel
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larson (CT)
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lowey
Luther
Lynch
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Mink
Moore
Moran (VA)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Phelps
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Roemer
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott
Serrano
Sherman
Shows
Skelton
Slaughter
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Waters
Watson (CA)
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Woolsey
Wynn
NOES--267
Aderholt
Akin
Armey
Baca
Bachus
Baker
Baldwin
Ballenger
Barr
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bereuter
Biggert
Bilirakis
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Bono
Boozman
Borski
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carson (OK)
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Coble
Collins
Combest
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis (FL)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal
DeLauro
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Dooley
Doolittle
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Everett
Ferguson
Flake
Fletcher
Foley
Forbes
Ford
Fossella
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goode
Goodlatte
Goss
Graham
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Grucci
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Harman
Hart
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
[[Page H9044]]
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Horn
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Issa
Istook
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Kanjorski
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kerns
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Larsen (WA)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lee
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
Mascara
Matheson
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
Mica
Miller, Dan
Miller, Gary
Miller, Jeff
Mollohan
Moran (KS)
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Ortiz
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Paul
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reynolds
Riley
Rivers
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Saxton
Schaffer
Schrock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Souder
Stearns
Stenholm
Strickland
Stump
Stupak
Sununu
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Thurman
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Traficant
Upton
Velazquez
Visclosky
Vitter
Walden
Walsh
Wamp
Watkins (OK)
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Wu
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--5
Hostettler
Meek (FL)
Quinn
Roukema
Young (AK)
{time} 1559
Mr. GREENWOOD, Mr. WALSH, Mrs. CUBIN, Messrs. BROWN of South
Carolina, COX, STRICKLAND, HERGER, BORSKI, MURTHA, Ms. VELAZQUEZ,
Messrs. DOYLE, MASCARA, BRADY of Pennsylvania, RAHALL, HOLDEN, and
KANJORSKI changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. MEEHAN changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
{time} 1600
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Notwithstanding the Chair's
earlier announcement, the time for electronic vote on passage, if
ordered, will be 15 minutes.
The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 215,
noes 214, not voting 5, as follows:
[Roll No. 481]
AYES--215
Akin
Armey
Bachus
Baker
Ballenger
Barr
Barton
Bass
Bentsen
Bereuter
Biggert
Bilirakis
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Boozman
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Bryant
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Cannon
Cantor
Carson (OK)
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Collins
Combest
Cooksey
Cox
Crane
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Cunningham
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal
DeLay
DeMint
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dooley
Doolittle
Dreier
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Etheridge
Everett
Ferguson
Flake
Fletcher
Forbes
Fossella
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Goodlatte
Goss
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Greenwood
Grucci
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hansen
Hart
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Herger
Hill
Hilleary
Hinojosa
Hobson
Horn
Houghton
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Isakson
Issa
Istook
Jefferson
Jenkins
John
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kerns
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas (KY)
Lucas (OK)
Manzullo
Matheson
McCrery
McInnis
McKeon
Mica
Miller, Dan
Miller, Gary
Miller, Jeff
Moore
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Morella
Myrick
Nethercutt
Ney
Northup
Nussle
Ortiz
Osborne
Ose
Otter
Oxley
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Pombo
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Radanovich
Ramstad
Rehberg
Reynolds
Riley
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schaffer
Schrock
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (TX)
Snyder
Souder
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sununu
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauzin
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Thune
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Toomey
Upton
Vitter
Walden
Wamp
Watkins (OK)
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (FL)
NOES--214
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Aderholt
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldacci
Baldwin
Barcia
Barrett
Bartlett
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop
Blagojevich
Blumenauer
Bonior
Borski
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Carson (IN)
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coble
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Deutsch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Duncan
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Foley
Ford
Frank
Frost
Gephardt
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goode
Gordon
Graham
Green (TX)
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoeffel
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind (WI)
Kleczka
Kucinich
LaFalce
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
LaTourette
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Lynch
Maloney (CT)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy (MO)
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McHugh
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Menendez
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Mink
Mollohan
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Norwood
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Phelps
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Putnam
Rahall
Rangel
Regula
Reyes
Rivers
Rodriguez
Roemer
Rogers (KY)
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez
Sanders
Sandlin
Sawyer
Schakowsky
Schiff
Scott
Serrano
Sherman
Shows
Simmons
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thurman
Tierney
Towns
Traficant
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walsh
Waters
Watson (CA)
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (PA)
Wexler
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
NOT VOTING--5
Hostettler
Meek (FL)
Quinn
Roukema
Young (AK)
{time} 1637
Mr. DeMINT changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________