[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 168 (Thursday, December 6, 2001)]
[House]
[Pages H8972-H9044]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            BIPARTISAN TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY ACT OF 2001

  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I 
call up House Resolution 306 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 306

       Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
     shall be in order without intervention of any point of order 
     to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 3005) to extend trade 
     authorities procedures with respect to reciprocal trade 
     agreements. The bill shall be considered as read for 
     amendment. The amendment recommended by the Committee on Ways 
     and Means now printed in the bill, modified by the amendment 
     printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying 
     this resolution, shall be considered as adopted. The previous 
     question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, as 
     amended, to final passage without intervening motion except: 
     (1) one hour of debate on the bill, as amended, equally 
     divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
     member of the Committee on Ways and Means; and (2) one motion 
     to recommit with or without instructions.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Reynolds) 
is recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, for the purposes of debate only, I yield 
the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) 
pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During 
consideration of this resolution, all time is yielded for the purpose 
of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 306 is a closed rule providing for 
consideration of H.R. 3005, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority 
Act of 2001, with an hour of debate in the House equally divided and 
controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee 
on Ways and Means.
  The rule waives all points of order against consideration of the 
bill.
  Additionally, the rule provides that the amendment recommended by the 
Committee on Ways and Means now printed in the rule, modified by the 
amendment printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying 
this resolution, shall be considered as adopted.
  Finally, the rule provides for one motion to recommit with or without 
instructions.
  Before I begin, there are many people responsible for this bipartisan 
compromise legislation on the floor today. The leadership of this House 
has been remarkable in educating Members and in reaching out to address 
their concerns. The gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas), and the gentleman from Illinois 
(Mr. Crane) have been the driving force behind free trade; and I thank 
them and our colleagues on the other side of the aisle, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Dooley), the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. 
Jefferson), and the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Tanner), for their 
diligence and their perseverance.
  Mr. Speaker, there was a time when this country could boast that we 
were the world leader in shaping the rules for international trade, 
globalization and open markets. Sadly, this is no longer the case.
  There are more than 130 regional trade agreements in force today, but 
only three including the United States. To our south, Mexico has trade 
deals in at least 28 countries, while across the ocean, the European 
Union has trade agreements with 27 other countries.
  In 1999 one-third of the world exports were covered by EU agreements. 
Only one-tenth of the world exports were covered by U.S. agreements, 
sending dollars and jobs to competitors that should have been in the 
United States.
  We are the most competitive Nation in the world, yet we rank 26th in 
the world in bilateral investment treaties.
  We have nearly completed the first year of the 21st century, the new 
millennium; yet America's trade agenda is still puttering along in a 
slow lane while our trade partners around the globe speed past us, and 
every day we get left behind, and our economy and our families are hurt 
even more.
  Each day that America delays, other countries throughout the world 
are entering into trade agreements without us, gradually surrounding 
the United States with a network of trade agreements that benefit their 
workers, their farmers, their businesses and their economies at the 
expense of us. In short, our trading partners are writing the rules of 
world trade without us.
  How important is this to American jobs and the American economy?
  In my State, international trade is a primary generator of business 
and job growth. In the Buffalo area, the highest manufacturing 
employment sectors are also among the State's top merchandise export 
industries, including electronics, fabricated metals, industrial 
machinery, transportation equipment and food products. Consequently, as 
exports increase, employment in these sectors will also increase.

  From family farms to the high-tech start-ups to established 
businesses and manufacturers, increasing free and fair trade will keep 
our economy going and create jobs in our community.
  With America at war, now may seem like the time for our country to 
close

[[Page H8973]]

its borders and discourage global interaction. Nothing could be further 
from the truth.
  Never has it been more apparent that we need to enhance and 
strengthen friendships around the world, and what better way to build 
coalitions than with free trade.
  In the 1960 Democratic platform, President Kennedy put it best in the 
following message that is relevant both then as it is now. World trade 
is more than ever essential to world peace. We must therefore resist 
the temptation to accept remedies that deny American producers and 
consumers access to world markets and destroy the prosperity of our 
friends in the non-Communist world.
  We can neither deny nor ignore the correlation between peace and free 
trade.
  Not only does the war on terrorism influence the need for free trade, 
but the anticipated economic opportunities for American workers, 
farmers and companies will provide a much needed boost to our uncertain 
economy.
  Just look at the facts. One in 10 Americans, nearly 12 million 
people, work at jobs that depend on exports of goods and services. 
American farmers exported $51 billion in agricultural products and 
crops last year that supported 750,000 jobs.
  In New York alone, my home State, the number of companies exported 
increased 61 percent from 1992 to 1998. Currently, the wages of New 
York workers in jobs supported by exports are 13 to 18 percent higher 
than the national average. The imports provide consumers and businesses 
in New York with wider choice in the marketplace, thereby enhancing 
living standards and contributing to competitiveness.
  The world is not waiting while the United States putters along. Trade 
Promotion Authority offers the best chance for the United States to 
reclaim leadership in opening foreign markets, expanding global 
economic opportunities for American producers and workers, and 
developing the virtues of democracy around the world.
  The President has said open trade is not just an economic 
opportunity, it is a moral imperative. The prosperity and integrity of 
global democracy is at stake, and it is incumbent upon us to pull into 
the fast lane in order to reap the benefits of free trade.
  What we ask for today is nothing new. Until its expiration in 1994, 
every President from Richard Nixon through Bill Clinton has enjoyed the 
right of Trade Promotion Authority. This President deserves the same 
right.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to do the right thing for America. 
Support this rule and the underlying legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Reynolds), my 
good friend, for yielding me the customary 30 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, at the risk of being the House contrarian this morning, 
I again rise in strong opposition to this unfair rule and equally 
strong opposition to the underlying bill.
  At the outset, let me explain the procedural problems with this rule 
that was reported late last night. Recently, we have heard so much 
about the new spirit of bipartisanship that is flowering throughout 
D.C. Unfortunately, the majority members of the House Committee on 
Rules must not have gotten this memo.
  Mr. Speaker, I remember well the times that Republican after 
Republican came to this floor to decry so-called unfair, heavy-handed 
tactics that my party used when we held the majority in this Chamber. 
At that time, Republicans were outraged and incredulous each time an 
important bill came to the House floor under a closed rule which 
prohibited serious debate.
  This is the exact rule that the Republicans would like us to work 
under today. So I say to my Republican colleagues, where is the 
outrage? Where is the disdain? My guess is that the disdain and outrage 
are packed and ready to go on 4 o'clock planes that they are trying to 
catch today. What other reason could there be for closing off such 
important debate?
  Let there be no mistake, Mr. Speaker. The bill that we consider today 
will have profound and long lasting effects on every State in this 
great country and on citizens throughout the world, and instead of 
allowing a fair and open debate, the majority is trying to squelch the 
voices that they wish not to hear.
  No amendments or substitute are permitted to this bill. The gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Rangel), one of the most respected and distinguished 
Members of this body, a Member who has served nearly 27 years on the 
House Committee on Ways and Means, who knows as much about trade as 
anybody in the House of Representatives, will not be permitted to offer 
an amendment or substitute to this bill. Frankly, this is not simply 
unfair; it is offensive.
  Moreover, there were a number of other Members who came to the 
Committee on Rules late last night to ask that their amendments be 
permitted to be offered. They were all denied their request.
  What are Americans being denied the right to hear about? One example, 
the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Wu), our thoughtful colleague, would 
have liked to offer an amendment making human rights considerations a 
principal objective of our trade compacts. If this rule passes, the 
gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Wu) will not be able to offer his 
commonsense amendment.
  Another example, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters) had 
sensible amendments related to some of our neediest trading partners in 
Africa. Like the Wu and Rangel amendment, the American people will be 
denied the right to hear the gentlewoman from California's amendment.
  How the majority is not embarrassed to bring such a rule to the House 
floor is simply beyond my comprehension.
  Setting aside for a moment the gross problem with this rule, there 
are significant concerns related to the underlying bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I am disappointed that the Trade Promotion Authority, 
formerly Fast Track, legislation completely ignores the legitimate 
concerns many people have raised about the negative impact of current 
trade policies on working families, the environment, family farmers, 
consumers, small- and mid-sized businesses, people of color and women 
here in the United States and around the world.
  At a time when more than 700,000 layoffs have been announced since 
September 11, more than 2 million Americans have lost their jobs this 
year; and on the heels of the largest bankruptcy filing in the history 
of our country, where thousands more will soon receive a pink slip, the 
other side of the aisle is coming to the floor today to lay the 
foundation for the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs by more 
Americans in the immediate future.
  To top it off, just a short while ago this body reauthorized funding 
for trade adjustment assistance in anticipation of imminent job losses 
from future trade agreements.

                              {time}  1215

  Talk about a self-fulfilling prophecy.
  You see, Mr. Speaker, today we are not voting on one trade agreement 
versus another. Rather, we are voting on giving the President open-
ended authority to go ahead and commit the United States to trade 
agreements without allowing Congress substantive consultation on the 
specifics of the agreement. To provide this open-ended authority to the 
President without requiring that environmental and labor standards be 
included in any trade agreement is nothing short of hammering another 
nail in the coffin of hundreds of American industries nationwide.
  I support free trade. I was told last night in the Committee on Rules 
meeting that the manager's amendment will protect agriculture; that it 
will protect sugar in my State. Well, it did not. I have in the past, 
and will again, support free trade. However, any free trade agreement 
must be a fair trade agreement.
  It is outrageous to expect the American agricultural industry to 
compete with South American, Central American, or Asian agricultural 
industries who are not required to pay their workers a minimum living 
wage and are not held to the same environmental standards as farmers 
here in the U.S.
  Don't believe me? Look at what NAFTA did to my home state of Florida, 
specifically the agriculture industry. From citrus to sugar and from 
rice to tomatoes, Florida's agricultural industry has lost thousands of 
jobs as a direct

[[Page H8974]]

result of NAFTA. While Mexican farmers have profited, companies have 
closed and Florida no longer have jobs.
  The President has made it no secret that the first thing he will do 
with fast track authority is to move forward with the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas agreement. The FTAA agreement, as currently written, 
could result in Florida's citrus and sugar industries, along with fruit 
and vegetable industries nationwide, ceasing to exist. South American 
farmers who pay their workers pennies and do nothing to preserve the 
land they grow or the environment they pillage, could wipe out the U.S. 
agriculture industry before we know what hit us.
  As I mentioned at the outset and for the reasons just explained, I 
oppose adoption of this rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), the distinguished chairman of 
the Committee on Rules, and an architect of this important legislation.
  (Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule. This 
is a fair rule. Yes, it is a closed rule, but this rule is about 
procedure. My colleagues are either for granting the President Trade 
Promotion Authority or they are against granting the President Trade 
Promotion Authority. So I do not know what all this argument is about 
all these other issues.
  Yes, we have worked long and hard to fashion a package. The gentleman 
from California (Mr. Thomas), the chairman of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, and a wide range of people on both sides of the aisle have 
worked on this issue, and now we have come down to the point where 
Members of Congress will have to make a choice. They will either vote 
``yes'' to give the President authority or they will vote ``no,'' and 
that is what this rule provides us with the opportunity to do.
  It is very fair, it is very balanced, and it is, quite frankly, the 
way rules that have addressed trade issues in the past have been 
addressed. So this is nothing new. When our friends on the other side 
of the aisle, Mr. Speaker, were in the majority, this is exactly the 
way they moved the rules dealing with trade issues. And so we have 
learned from you all so well. So we are following your model to a T 
here, and thank you very much for setting the example for us.
  Mr. Speaker, we all know that last week we learned with absolute 
certainty that our economy is faced with economic recession. It is a 
great difficult time for many of us. Many of our fellow Americans have 
been laid off. There is a great deal of suffering taking place. We are 
all aware of that, and we know it was dramatically exacerbated 
following September 11. What we are about to do, Mr. Speaker, I 
believe, may be one of the most important things that can help us turn 
the corner for those Americans who are suffering today.
  What is it that trade agreements mean for America? They will provide 
and have traditionally provided targeted tax relief to America's 
working families by giving them access to high-quality products at low 
prices. They create better, higher-paying jobs by prying open new 
markets for America's world-class goods and services around the world. 
And we know that those involved in the area of exports traditionally 
earn between 13 and 18 percent higher income levels than those goods 
that are produced simply for domestic consumption here in the United 
States. So by prying open new markets, we create opportunities for 
higher wage rates for American workers.
  They also provide that very important and powerful link between 
nations who want to participate peacefully in the global marketplace. 
And, Mr. Speaker, I believe that every shred of empirical evidence that 
we have leads us to conclude that American exports and American trade 
provide us the opportunity to do one of the most important things that 
we can, and that is export our western values throughout the world.
  We know that as we deal with this challenging war against terrorism, 
trying to expand economic opportunity so that people have choices will 
go a long way towards dealing with this issue. The global leadership 
role that the President has played, especially since September 11, has 
been heralded by Democrats and Republicans alike. And I believe that 
this tool which we are on the verge of giving him will be able to go a 
long way towards effectively dealing with this issue.
  This is a positive, very positive rule. It is a good bill. My 
colleagues should join in strong support of it, and I thank my 
colleague for yielding me this time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 
minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel), the 
dean of the New York delegation and a 27-year-member of the Committee 
on Ways and Means.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I take the floor in opposition to the rule. 
And I regret that the distinguished chairman of the committee has left 
the floor, because I do believe that, being in the minority, that the 
Committee on Rules has been extremely fair in giving Democrats an 
opportunity, not to pass anything and not to get any votes from them, 
but at least to give us the opportunity as the minority to have our 
views heard.
  This bill has been called a bipartisan bill. And you can call it 
bipartisan all day and all night, this year and next year, but you can 
put wings on a pig and he cannot fly. This is not a bipartisan bill. 
Bipartisan means, to the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, 
walking down the hall with Rangel and giving him an opportunity to talk 
about trade. If I miss that, then I miss the bipartisanship.
  This was never discussed in the subcommittee, it never was discussed 
in the full committee, never discussed with Democrats, but there were 
meetings with two Democrats with the chairman. And he concluded after 
those conversations that ended compromise, that ended discussion, and 
that was the end product.
  Now, we are used to that on the Committee on Ways and Means, because 
my chairman truly believes that he was violated by former chairman Dan 
Rostenkowski, and he is going to spend the rest of his legislative 
career making us pay for it. That is okay. We all understand that and 
we will work with it. But we always thought the Committee on Rules was 
different. We always thought the Committee on Rules knew that they were 
in the majority, the Republicans; they had the votes, so they at least 
would let us have an opportunity to express ourselves.
  We know that we have the constitutional responsibility to deal in 
trade, but we know it is the President, like the head of any State, 
that has the responsibility to do it. But when you delegate your 
responsibility, there should be some checks, there should be some 
balances, there should be some credibility as to what you are doing.
  We know Republicans are concerned about labor standards. They do not 
support slave labor and child labor. They would like people to 
organize. We believe that we would not want foreigners to have a better 
opportunity in investment than Americans. We believe Republicans truly 
believe that the Congress should not just be consulted but should 
protect its constitutional right to make certain that foreign 
organizations do not destroy the laws that we have.
  But just to be so afraid that we will be heard because you do not 
have the votes or you have not bought enough votes or you do not have 
enough vehicles to talk about what you are going to give in some other 
field that you do not even give us a chance to tell you that we believe 
let us have TPA, let us have fast track, but we think there is a better 
way to do it.
  Why would you not give the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin) an 
opportunity to show you what we have worked on? Is he someone that is a 
protectionist; someone that stood up to the United Auto Workers in 
Detroit; someone that we would not have had a bill with China had he 
not worked with the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter)? You know it 
and I know it.
  What about the gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui)? He worked so 
hard for NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement. Who can deny 
that this man has dedicated his life to free trade?
  What about the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott)? He will not 
be able to be heard on the bill that we crafted; someone that opened 
the doors for trade with sub-Saharan Africa?

[[Page H8975]]

  Are you so afraid of another view, are you so frightened that we will 
be heard and that you would lose some of the votes?
  And then this terrorism thing. How dare people say that we are not 
fighting the war against terrorism because we do not do what the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) says that we should do. Fighting 
the war against terrorism, the President says, requires a bipartisan 
approach. It means that it is not chairmen who run and rule; it is 
bipartisanship, Democrats and Republicans working together, working 
their will, and presenting something to us.
  But I tell you this: If you really believe that doing the right thing 
with unemployment compensation and doing the right thing with health, 
when you have not done the right thing all year, that you are going to 
pick up some votes in doing it, and for those people who do not like 
the bill but are concerned about the crises and the hardships of people 
who have lost their jobs, and they are going to take a promise from the 
majority to trust them, vote for this bill and they will do the right 
thing for health insurance, if you believe that, I have a great bridge 
in Brooklyn I would like to discuss with you.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume 
to comment that listening to the comments of the dean of the delegation 
from New York, and listening to his remarks as the ranking member of 
the Committee on Ways and Means, ranking minority member, there are a 
lot of views to life. I have this glass of water. Some would say that 
it is half empty. I prefer to look at it as half full.
  I do not know that any of us totally have an exact definition of what 
bipartisanship is. This is an up-or-down vote. This is not a Republican 
or a Democrat issue. We are either for free and fair trade and giving 
the President the authority to enter bilateral agreements or we are 
not. That is what that rule is about, to bring the bill to the floor 
and vote it up or down.
  I look at it as bipartisanship, the same way I look at this half full 
glass of water that is on this table. There are six sponsors, three 
Democrats, three Republicans. About as bipartisan as I have seen 
anything be around here, with the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Dreier), the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas), the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Crane), the gentleman from California (Mr. Dooley), the 
gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson), and the gentleman from 
Tennessee (Mr. Tanner).
  I hope that the Members, as they come and listen to this debate and 
as they cast their vote, will see that it is, once and for all, a 
simple rule that gives us the opportunity to vote for a decision to 
give the promotion authority to the President and have free and fair 
trade or we do not.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Diaz-Balart), a member of the Committee on Rules.
  Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from New York for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a crucial moment, a crossroad for democracy in 
the Western Hemisphere. I recognize that there are legitimate concerns 
anytime Congress cedes authority granted to it by the Constitution. I, 
in fact, opposed granting President Clinton this authority. I did not 
trust him. But I trust President Bush. I voted last night in the House 
Committee on Rules to grant the President Trade Promotion Authority, 
and I will do so today as well on the House floor.
  We have a unique opportunity to strengthen democracy in the Western 
Hemisphere. Nations in this hemisphere are facing numerous challenges 
that threaten their fledgling democracies, including narco-trafficking 
and terrorism. One of the surest ways to support democracy in our 
hemisphere is by facilitating the emergence of a common market of the 
Americas, the free trade area of the Americas, the FTAA. I strongly 
support free trade among free peoples; free trade among free peoples is 
good economically and it is ethical.
  An FTAA that incorporates a strong, enforceable democracy requirement 
is the best hope for protecting unstable democracies and for exporting 
it to where tyranny now reins.
  The European Community, now the European Union, insisted on democracy 
as a requirement for membership, and that contributed directly and 
effectively to the democratization of Spain and Portugal after the 
deaths of dictators Francisco Franco and Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in 
the decade of the 1970s.
  The Declaration of Quebec City of April 2001, from the most recent 
Summit of the Americas, the process, Mr. Speaker, leading to the FTAA, 
made a similar commitment to democracy: The maintenance and 
strengthening of the rule of law and strict respect for the democratic 
system are, at the same time, a goal and a shared commitment and are an 
essential condition of our presence at this and future summits, all of 
the democratically elected heads of State in the hemisphere stated in 
April in Quebec. Consequently, disruption of the democratic order in a 
state of the Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the 
participation of that state's government in the Summit of the Americas 
process.''

                              {time}  1230

  The Summit of the Americas process is clearly headed in the right 
direction, but strong leadership by the United States is needed to make 
democracy in the entire hemisphere a permanent reality. Without Trade 
Promotion Authority, President Bush would not be able to achieve an 
FTAA with a strong democracy requirement. Accordingly, it is crucial 
that we pass Trade Promotion Authority for the President today.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I remind the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Diaz-Balart) 
that certainly he remembers after NAFTA we lost considerable jobs in 
the State of Florida; and with the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
agreement, the likelihood is that can occur again.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Levin).
  (Mr. LEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, the notion that the U.S. has been standing 
still in trade is nonsense. Africa, CBI, Jordan, China, NTR, Cambodia, 
in the last few years, indeed, globalization is here to stay. The main 
issue today is not free trade versus protectionism. That is an old 
label for a new bottle of issues.
  This is primarily a debate among supporters of expanding trade, 
whether to shape trade policy to maximize its benefits and minimize its 
losses. Supporters of the Thomas bill believe no. Essentially more 
trade is always better whatever the term, so they are comfortable with 
providing vague negotiating objectives, running away from issues like 
labor and the environment and leaving Congress in essentially the role 
of a consultant.
  This is not time for a one-dimensional approach. It is a new world, 
new nations, expanding issues. For example, on core labor standards, 
the Rangel approach is clear and effective, a principal negotiating 
objective, increasingly enforcing ILO core labor standards. Thomas, 
each nation is essentially left on its own no matter how inadequate its 
laws. And the manager's amendment that was suddenly introduced last 
night only makes it worse, leaving a weak provision essentially 
powerless in its enforcement.
  On investment, the Rangel bill is clear and unambiguous. No greater 
rights for foreign investors. The Thomas bill dances around this issue.
  Then on the role of Congress, those of us who see the need to shape 
trade want to ensure an active and ongoing role for Congress. This is a 
necessary corollary of the fact that trade is more important than ever. 
The Thomas bill only enhances the role of Congress as a consultant, 
tracking the Archer-Crane language of 3 years ago.
  The manager's amendment tried to beef this up by saying any Member 
can put forth a resolution to withdraw Fast Track; but it only reaches 
the floor if it goes through the Committee on Ways and Means and the 
Committee on Rules.
  In this and so many other ways, the Thomas bill sometimes talks the 
talk, but does not walk the walk. We can and must do better: expand and 
shape trade. Fast Track authority is a major delegation of authority. 
We should do it the right way. Thomas does not do

[[Page H8976]]

so. Rangel does. Vote ``yes'' on Rangel and vote ``no'' on Thomas.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Keller).
  Mr. KELLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the 
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, and this is why: 95 percent 
of the world's population is outside of the United States. It is 
critical that we give the President the tools he needs to open up 
markets all across the world for our goods and services. By increasing 
America's export markets, we will increase the number of high-paying 
high-tech jobs in the United States.
  A good example of that is the Recoton Corporation in central Florida, 
which is the Nation's largest consumer electronics manufacturer in the 
area of car stereo speakers. Recoton's president, Mr. Bob Borchardt, is 
also the chairman of the Electronics Industry Alliance.
  Mr. Borchardt tells me that only 10 percent of his company's sales 
are outside of North America, and that passing Trade Promotion 
Authority will help open up foreign markets and will result in his 
company creating many new jobs in central Florida.
  Mr. Speaker, now is not the time to isolate America. Let us pass TPA 
and give our economy a much-needed boost.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Wu).
  (Mr. WU asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. WU. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a former technology and trade 
attorney. I have negotiated international trade agreements. I am in 
favor of international trade, and we do need to build a stable 
consensus in favor of international trade. But from my personal 
experience, I know that there are winners and there are losers in 
trade; and we must work to ensure, to ensure, that this rising tide of 
international trade truly lifts all boats instead of leaving some 
behind. This requires meaningful protection of the environment, of 
labor rights, and most importantly to me, of human rights. This bill, 
the Thomas bill, does not do so. I reluctantly oppose the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, we proposed amendments to improve this bill last night. 
They were all rejected by the Committee on Rules. Therefore, I strongly 
oppose the rule under which this bill is considered.
  With respect to the environment, I call Members' attention to page 
18, section 2(b)(11)(B) of this bill. It constitutes a huge loophole. 
This bill is literally a Trojan horse with respect to the environment. 
There is no meaningful protection for the environment in this bill. The 
manager's amendment exacerbates this problem, and I quote from the 
manager's amendments, ``No retaliation may be authorized based on labor 
standards and levels of environmental protection.'' I think the 
language speaks for itself. This bill is a Trojan horse with respect to 
the environment.
  With respect to some other basic rights, such as Americans knowing 
what they eat, I call Members' attention to page 14, section 
2(b)(10)(viii)(II). This takes away our right to know what we eat. The 
amendment that the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Bono) passed 
earlier this year would be eviscerated by this particular provision. 
The chairman would undoubtedly say it would be based on good science. I 
think this would be the kind of science that we get from the cigarette 
companies who have yet to find a real scientific link between cancer 
and smoking.
  Finally, my core issue of human rights. Who will speak for those who 
are in jail or who are intimidated into silence if we do not? There are 
temporary trade advantages in suppressing human rights. Mussolini made 
the trains run on time, and making the trains run on time can 
temporarily benefit an economy. But in the long term, democracy and 
human rights are both good for individuals and they are good for 
business because complex societies, it is like geology when tectonic 
plates come against each other: that energy can be released in little 
earthquakes that are barely felt. We call those elections. Or we can 
permit those plates to lock up and have cataclysmic earthquakes. We 
call those revolutions. Revolutions are always bad for business.
  Good human rights is good business for the long term, but there are 
temporary advantages to be had by the suppression of human rights. When 
we have a bill which promotes trade and protects human rights, I will 
support that bill. That day is not today.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Illinois (Mrs. Biggert), who has worked diligently to help make this 
legislation come before the House.
  Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule on H.R. 3005 
to grant Trade Promotion Authority. Few are the occasions on which 
Members of this body have the opportunity to shape the course of our 
long-term economic future as we have on this TPA vote today.
  Without TPA, America will be forced onto the sidelines, watching as 
other nations form agreements which shut our products and services out 
of the most promising new markets. Without TPA, America will see its 
role as world leader transformed into world follower. Even our most 
innovative and successful companies will find themselves making a back 
seat to foreign competitors.
  What is at stake here are the lives and livelihoods of current and 
future generations of American workers. Their productivity and 
creativity are second to none, and yet second to all this is what we 
will be if we tie the hands of our President. Let us untie the hands of 
the President, allowing his negotiators to bring home the best deals 
for America. I urge Members to support the rule and TPA.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell).
  Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, this is a very critical issue. We are 
arguing the rule. I want both sides to know these are the rules of the 
Constitution of the United States. Article 1 section 8 is very clear. 
In the last 20 years this Congress has given up its powers to the 
executive branch of government. We have had folks on the other side 
talk about it. It is very clear what article 1 section 8 says about 
what our responsibilities are.
  In the movie ``Thelma and Louise,'' Thelma turns to Louise and says, 
``Don't settle.'' We are settling here. We are settling for an erosion 
not only of the Constitution of the United States, an erosion of labor 
rights, an erosion of environmental security, an erosion of our trade 
imbalance which has risen to $435 billion, a $62 billion erosion 
according to NAFTA itself. We are making a big mistake if we vote 
``yes.''
  This is not a question of to trade or not to trade; this is a 
question of having the right rules at the right time. I ask Members to 
read article 1 section 8. Did constituents send Members here to give up 
their responsibility to the President of the United States on trade 
issues? Then change the Constitution. Change the Constitution is my 
recommendation if that is what Members wish to do.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, in listening to that debate, I would just reflect that 
there was a time when the Nation could boast that we were the world 
leader in shaping those rules for international trade and globalization 
and open markets. Sadly, this is no longer the case.
  In my opening remarks I also reflected that each President from 
President Nixon to President Clinton had this authority, and that it 
was important to look at giving our sitting President the same 
authority, for the simple fact that while we would give the ability to 
negotiate, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell) would know full 
well that this Congress, and future Congresses, under its authority 
that would be given to the President, would cast a vote for each and 
every agreement as our Constitution protects, and any rules that may be 
there. It is clear that this Congress will ratify any of those 
agreements. The authority would allow the President to enter into those 
bilateral agreements.
  Mr. Speaker, we are behind. There are 130 regional trade agreements 
in force today with only three in the United States. Mexico has 28. The 
European Union has 27 with other countries. It is important that we 
move forward to protect our jobs and grow our jobs and treat the 
opportunity of the

[[Page H8977]]

global economy as the United States marketplace.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Pence).

                              {time}  1245

  Mr. PENCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman for his 
leadership and for yielding me time, and rise in strong support of the 
rule and of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act today.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe the question before this House, and, in many 
ways, before America today, is who do you trust? Do you trust the 
shuttered version of America that says that we will keep our own rules 
and we will keep to ourselves and we will maintain our place in the 
world, or do you trust the American worker and do you trust the 
American President at such a time as this?
  Well, I stand today to say that I trust the American worker. The 
great American companies, large and small, when given an opportunity to 
compete in the world, not only, Mr. Speaker, do we compete, but we win, 
and we win consistently.
  We know in Indiana that trade means jobs, $1.5 billion from this 
relatively small midwestern State in agricultural goods alone last 
year, supporting 24,000 jobs on and off the farm. And it is not only 
good for big business, as some on the other side might say. Ninety 
percent of exports in this country come from companies with less than 
500 employees, and for every $1 billion in increased exports, Mr. 
Speaker, we create 20,000 new jobs here in America that pay an average 
of 17 percent more than similar jobs in the domestic economy.
  I trust the American worker to compete and to win. But I also rise 
today to say that I trust the President. Along with more than 80 
percent of the American people today, I trust President George W. Bush 
to put America's interests first in the world, to put American jobs, to 
put America's security, to put American agriculture, manufacturing, 
steel, all of the rest on the international negotiating table first.
  I believe this President, particularly this fall, has earned our 
trust and earned our respect, and I urge all of my colleagues, trust 
the American worker, trust the American President; vote yes on the rule 
and the bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds to 
remind the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Pence) that American workers 
cannot buy food with trust and cannot pay mortgages with trust. 
Certainly none of us distrust the President. I trust the American 
worker, but the American worker has a problem having jobs under the 
lack of consultation that we provide here.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished ranking member, 
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Frost), a person that has done an 
outstanding job not only on trade, but on the Committee on Rules, in 
trying to provide fair and open rules for all the Members of this body.
  Mr. FROST. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, since September 11, the world has watched this Nation, 
from the President and the Congress to the U.S. military abroad and the 
American people here at home, pull together to wage war on terrorism.
  Unfortunately, America's desperately needed economic recovery has 
been a different matter. Our economy has been in recession since March, 
long before September 11, according to the experts. Millions and 
millions of people are unemployed across the country. In the past few 
months alone, hundreds of thousands of hard-working Americans have lost 
their jobs.
  Meanwhile, just months after Republicans passed budget-busting 
trillion dollar tax breaks, the administration is now admitting that 
the surplus it inherited is gone and America now faces years of growing 
debt, threatening priorities from Social Security and Medicare to 
homeland security and affordable health care.
  How have Republican leaders responded to this problem? With billions 
of dollars in tax breaks for big corporations, leaving just crumbs for 
laid-off workers. And today, Mr. Speaker, Republican leaders are using 
the House to play politics for the 2002 elections. Instead of helping 
American workers, Republican leaders are trying to help their own fund-
raising.
  Do not take my word for it, Mr. Speaker. The Chairman of the 
Republican Campaign Committee spelled it out in the Washington Post a 
few days ago. For Republican leaders, he said, this Fast Track bill is 
about fund-raising. It does not matter, he bragged, whether this bill 
passes or not. Just as long as they can use it to help the Republican 
fund-raising, then they will be happy.
  So Republican leaders have written a Fast Track bill that 
shortchanges working Americans from coast to coast. They have written a 
bill that does not protect the environment, and they have written a 
bill that represents a dereliction of duty by Congress, an abdication 
of our responsibility to protect the people we represent on issues from 
food safety to telecommunications.
  Mr. Speaker, Democratic leaders on trade fought valiantly for a 
bipartisan approach that protects American workers. The gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Rangel), the ranking member of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin), the ranking member 
on the Subcommittee on Trade, tried over and over to work with 
Republican leaders, but their overtures were rejected because 
Republican leaders wanted a political issue, not a bipartisan bill. And 
when the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) and the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Levin) wrote a Democratic substitute, Republican leaders 
refused to even let the House vote on it. Thus, Mr. Speaker, did 
Republican leaders drive a stake into any hope of bipartisanship on 
trade. Indeed, there should be no doubt about how we got to this point. 
Republican political gamesmanship has put Fast Track trade authority in 
jeopardy.
  Mr. Speaker, the American people deserve better. Reject this rule and 
force Republican leaders to sit down and work with Democrats. That is 
the only way Fast Track will ever get the broad bipartisan support it 
needs, and it is the only way we will ever achieve fair and free trade 
that benefits American workers.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Cox).
  Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York for 
yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule, because I support lower 
taxes on working Americans. Tariffs are essentially taxes that foreign 
countries impose on our products. You pay them whenever you pay taxes 
to support unemployment benefits for American workers, because foreign 
taxes that discriminate against the United States' goods put American 
workers out of work.
  Millions more Americans could go to work in manufacturing and in 
services if tariffs and trade barriers imposed by foreign countries 
were reduced or eliminated. Of course, America's tariffs on foreign 
goods and our trade barriers on goods and services are essentially zero 
on most of what we consume in this country, so trade negotiations aimed 
at reducing tariffs and trade barriers work strongly in our favor. They 
mean big gains for American consumers and American workers.
  There are many colleagues who have concerns about how future trade 
agreements will address issues such as sovereignty, environmental and 
labor protections, dumping and other unfair trade practices. But under 
this legislation, Congress will get to vote on any final trade 
agreement before it would become binding on the United States.
  This legislation simply authorizes President Bush to negotiate in 
America's behalf, an authority that Congress has granted to every 
President from Nixon to Clinton.
  Please vote ``aye'' on this rule to bring Trade Promotion Authority 
to the floor, so that we can give President Bush and America a chance 
to cut foreign taxes and help American workers and consumers.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute 
to my very good friend, the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio).
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, Fast Track trade authority is an extraordinary 
concession of congressional authority in four critical areas to 
regulate and oversee the

[[Page H8978]]

terms of trade. One vote, 62 pages, no amendments, 2 hours of debate.
  Now, if the United States had a successful trade policy giving this 
President, or any President, a blank check to perpetuate and expand 
NAFTA into the FTAA and enhance the powers of WTO, well, that might 
make some sense. But the current system is failing miserably. We are 
not talking about that here on the floor today, are we?
  Last year a record $435 billion trade deficit, 4.5 percent of our 
GDP. Many economists say that is unsustainable. 1994 to 2000, 
accelerated job loss due to trade. The current system discriminates 
against American labor, reduces living wages, safe working conditions, 
eviscerates environmental protections and consumer protections. But the 
gentleman from New York would somehow say it is necessary to compete in 
the world economy.
  President Clinton negotiated 300 separate trade agreements: two under 
Fast Track trade authority, 298 without it. And, unlike my colleague 
from the other side who preceded me and said he opposed this under the 
last President but will vote for it now, I am going to vote on policy 
and principle, not politics and personalities. It was a bad idea for 
President Clinton; it is a bad idea for George Bush.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
  (Mr. KIRK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the rule and Trade 
Promotion Authority. I wish that opponents of free trade had as much 
faith in our workers as our military. As our forces fight and win in 
Afghanistan, opponents of free trade say Americans cannot win in 
business. Americans are not losers. We are winners, and we need only a 
chance to compete to win.
  TPA will also lower international import taxes on Americans. As we 
start holiday shopping, we pay import taxes on backpacks, shoes and 
other clothes for the kids. TPA lowers these taxes, and, in sum, will 
put $1,300 in the pockets of American families.
  If you like paying import taxes to other countries, vote against free 
trade. If you think Americans can compete and win, support Trade 
Promotion Authority for our President.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute 
to my very good friend, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown), the former 
Secretary of State of the State of Ohio.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Florida for 
yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, 2 months ago Republican leadership and the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Thomas) promised us if we voted for money for New 
York City, then they would help unemployed workers. They never did.
  Then Republican leadership and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Thomas) promised us if we bailed out the airlines, then they would help 
unemployed workers. But they never did.
  Then Republican leadership and the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Thomas) promised if we passed the stimulus package and gave huge tax 
cuts to the biggest corporations in America, then they would help 
unemployed workers. But they never did.
  Now the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) and Republican 
leadership are promising us if we vote for Trade Promotion Authority, 
then they will help unemployed workers.
  Mr. Speaker, when will we ever learn?
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Chambliss).
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule and 
in support of the underlying bill, but I do so only after a couple of 
concerns that I have had with respect to our trade policy in this 
country have been addressed. Those two concerns are trade issues 
dealing with agriculture and trade issues dealing with the textile 
industry.
  American agriculture and the American textile industry have been the 
whipping boys of previous trade agreements. We have been in difficult 
times in agriculture all across this country, but I am very satisfied 
with the language that has been put into this bill with respect to 
American agriculture and how our farmers are going to be treated. That 
language says that the House Committee on Agriculture and the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture are going to be direct participants in the 
discussions about issues relating to agriculture with respect to future 
trade agreements under this Trade Promotion Authority. That is the 
first step in the right direction that we have seen for American 
agriculture when it comes to trade in decades.
  With respect to the textile industry, again, we have seen jobs moved 
to the south, jobs that cannot be replaced in the American workplace. 
We have never had the issue of textiles addressed in our trade 
agreements in a positive manner, but yesterday at a meeting at the 
White House, the President made a personal commitment that he is going 
to be sure that the textile industry does get fair treatment in any 
negotiated agreements from a trade perspective under this authority 
that he is asking for.
  That is all we can ask. If we do not have that, if we do not have 
that, where is the American textile industry going today? It is going 
to continue to go south, and we do not need that to happen.
  We have had thousands of jobs in my great State lost, particularly in 
my district, that have been lost over the last 7 to 10 years in the 
textile industry. We cannot afford any more of that. The way we ensure 
that does not continue to happen is that we have positive trade 
agreements and provisions in those trade agreements that are positive 
with respect to textiles and agriculture.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge strong support of the rule and I urge support of 
the underlying bill.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute 
to the very thoughtful new Member of Congress, the gentlewoman from 
Minnesota (Ms. McCollum).
  Ms. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the rule. 
Fast Track trade authority affects every single American, and they 
probably do not even know it. We import millions of tons of food into 
this country. That is a lot of food. In 1993, 8 percent of imported 
fruits and vegetables were inspected.

                              {time}  1300

  Since NAFTA, the number is now .7 percent. That is a 91 percent 
decrease in the inspections of fruits and vegetables that our children 
consume every day.
  Minnesota families believe that meats, fruits and vegetables that 
they buy comply with our food standards. In these trade agreements 
there are no food standards; there are none. We buy strawberries and 
grapes tainted with pesticides that are illegal to use in this country. 
Congress passes food safety standards and the President's negotiators 
trade those standards away because, in their eyes, food safety is a 
barrier to free trade.
  Mr. Speaker, this rule makes in order an up or down vote on Fast 
Track legislation that would forfeit all of the authority of Congress 
to directly participate in international trade agreements. Congress 
needs careful, deliberate negotiations on future agreements, not a fast 
track.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Frelinghuysen).
  (Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the rule 
and of this bill.
  Just to give my colleagues an idea of how driven and dependent our 
national economy is on international trade, one need not look any 
further than my home State of New Jersey. Last year, New Jersey posted 
the eighth largest export total of any State in the Nation with a total 
of $28.8 billion being sold in export merchandise. This is up more than 
38 percent since 1997. Those exports are shipped globally to 204 
countries around the world. Most importantly, out of New Jersey's 4.1 
million member workforce, over 600,000 people statewide, from Main 
Street to Fortune 500 companies, are employed because of exports, 
imports, and because of foreign direct investment.
  Agilent Technologies, a company in my congressional district, 
recently wrote me in support of Trade Promotion Authority. They said, 
``Multilateral trade initiatives important to

[[Page H8979]]

Agilent relating to tariff reductions, e-commerce, biotechnology and 
international standard-setting are now beginning.''
  Mr. Speaker, we need to participate. We need to support the rule, and 
we need to support the bill.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1\1/2\ 
minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  I rise to oppose this rule and to oppose Fast Track. I come from 
Cleveland, a steel-producing community which is fighting valiantly to 
save 3,200 steelworkers' jobs and to protect the benefits of tens of 
thousands of retirees. But Fast Track is a barrier. Fast Track brought 
us NAFTA. It prohibits amending trade agreements. We could not amend 
NAFTA chapter 11, which grants corporate investors in all-NAFTA 
countries the right to challenge any local, State, or Federal 
regulations which those corporations say hurt their profits; and then 
they are able to get penalty money from the taxpayers of this country.
  The sovereign authority of all governments is at stake. Taxpayer 
dollars are at stake, even when we stand up for our own rights.
  A NAFTA case brought by a foreign-owned steel fabricator company is 
trying to overturn. Get this, they are trying to overturn ``Buy 
America'' laws that require using American steel in highway projects. 
NAFTA allows foreign-owned companies to challenge our Constitution, our 
Congress, our right to enact American laws. This would have a 
catastrophic impact on steel workers, causing loss of U.S. jobs. 
American taxpayers are financing the fight for democracy all over the 
world, while our trade laws undermine our democracy here at home.
  Vote against this rule and vote against Fast Track. Protect 
democracy. Protect American jobs.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Arizona (Mr. Kolbe).
  (Mr. KOLBE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this rule for 
Fast Track consideration of Trade Promotion Authority. Mr. Speaker, 
this is not about citrus, it is not about steel, it is not about food 
inspection or any other product or any other service. It is about 
whether or not we believe we should have enough confidence in the 
President of the United States to go on the world stage with other 
negotiators to implement the trade agenda that was launched at Doha.
  Now, in Doha where they set the agenda for the next round of talks, 
we got a set of negotiating issues that was extraordinarily favorable 
for the United States. It is everything that we could hope for in terms 
of what we want to accomplish in the next round of talks. Now we have 
to move to the next step. We cannot complete that unless the President 
has trade negotiating authority. We can never complete the talks, and 
yet, we are on a fast track with this round of talks. No organization, 
no country is going to put their best deals on the line if they think 
they are going to be changed by the United States Congress. Management 
and labor do not go into negotiations and then go back to their board 
of directors and their membership to amend the agreement; they submit 
it to them for a vote.
  That is what we are talking about doing here with Fast Track. It is 
not about whether or not we like the agreement, because we do not have 
an agreement. The opportunity to consider that will come later.
  One prominent Democrat from the Clinton administration, who would be 
known to every Member of this body, just 2 nights ago at a dinner told 
me that the framework legislation that is proposed here today goes much 
further than President Clinton or President Gore would ever have been 
able to offer. It goes a long way. It makes the environment and it 
makes labor rights principal negotiating objectives to support those. 
We need to have the confidence in our President to get this job done, 
and we do not compromise our ability to say yes or to say no to any 
agreement that is negotiated.
  With the crisis that we face in the world, this is not the time to 
say that our President should not be able to move forward to protect 
American interests abroad, American economic interests. Agree to this. 
Say yes to Trade Promotion Authority.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters), my very good friend.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for 
yielding me this time.
  I rise to oppose this rule and this bill. H.R. 3005 supports the 
expansion of trade rules that allow pharmaceutical companies to 
challenge countries that distribute essential medicines to people who 
desperately need them. This bill would make it more difficult for 
developing countries to make HIV-AIDS medicines available to people 
with AIDS. Twenty-five million people are living with AIDS in Africa. 
Our trade policy should not cost them their lives.
  This bill would also make it more difficult for the United States to 
respond to bioterrorist attacks. When the United States needed to 
acquire a large supply of the antibiotic Cipro to respond to the recent 
anthrax attacks, we knew that the health of the American people was 
more important than the profits of pharmaceutical companies. We had to 
get tough. The WTO could have ruled against us. Our trade policies 
should preserve our ability to respond to bioterrorist attacks in the 
future.
  I offered an amendment to restore the rights of all countries to 
protect public health and ensure access to essential medicines, but my 
amendment was not made in order.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the rule and ``no'' on the 
bill.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel), the distinguished ranking member 
of the Committee on Ways and Means.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I say to my colleagues that we still have an 
opportunity to do what the President would have us to do. Sure, he 
wants Trade Promotion Authority, but he also wants bipartisanship. I 
think it is good for the Congress. I think it is good for the country. 
All of my colleagues know that we have not enjoyed this within the 
Committee on Ways and Means. That is what the Committee on Rules is all 
about.
  The Committee on Rules is the legislative traffic cops. They can set 
us straight. They can shatter the wounds of partisanship that have been 
built up.
  Since the attack on the United States of America, we have worked 
together, not as Democrats and Republicans, but as a united Congress. 
They can reject this rule and send us back to the table. They can tell 
the Committee on Ways and Means to have open negotiations. They can say 
that the Democratic ideas are just as patriotic, just as sincere, and 
that we support the war against terrorism the same as Republicans. If 
they do not do that, if they do not give us an opportunity to be heard. 
What they are saying is, it is our way or it is the highway.
  I do not think it is fair. We have a stimulation package that we are 
working on, and we are trying to give the President what he wants in 
order to spur the economy. We are not supposed to do it as Republicans 
and Democrats; we are supposed to come together as responsible Members 
of Congress.
  So I ask my colleagues to vote against this rule. It is not well 
thought out. It should not be just one-sided. Give us an opportunity to 
work together and to bring a product to our colleagues; and if we 
cannot do it, then at the very least, let there be an alternative for 
Members to vote for.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Linder), a member of the Committee on Rules.
  (Mr. LINDER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LINDER. Mr. Speaker, I have a whole raft of information from my 
staff talking about the benefits of trade and the economy, on jobs; and 
I will submit that for the Record. But let me just raise a confusing 
question. Why in the world does this House want to take itself out of 
the picture?
  Absent TPA, we have no voice. The President negotiates with any 
nation

[[Page H8980]]

in the world a trade agreement and brings it to the Senate as a treaty 
for their approval or disapproval, amendment or no amendment. If it is 
amended, it goes back to the other nation, and they have to negotiate a 
second time. I would not blame any executive of another nation to not 
want to deal with us, to have to go through two negotiations.
  This House claims to be concerned about such things as labor and 
environment and human rights. Failing to pass TPA takes us out of the 
picture. We are silent. We have no voice.
  Under TPA, the President can go to any nation, negotiate any 
agreement, and bring it back to the House and the Senate for an up or 
down vote. If we do not like the agreement, we can vote it down. If we 
do not like the lack of consultation, defeat it. But at least keep us 
in the game. Absent TPA, this House is silent.
  Mr. Speaker, I do not understand how we are going to shape any future 
agreement, have any consultative effect, if the President just chooses 
to go to treaties and deals with the Senate. We need to get in the 
ballgame. We have the lowest tariffs in the world. Reaching trade 
agreements with other nations simply serves to lower their tariffs and 
open markets for our companies to sell into the global economy. We need 
to be in the global economy, where 95 percent of the citizens of the 
world live, not here. I cannot understand why some would want to take 
us out of the picture.
  Mr. Speaker, the only voice the House has on any trade agreement is 
if we pass authority for the President to reach agreements and bring 
them back to us for up or down votes. I cannot imagine why anyone would 
oppose this.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule. Today we have a 
tremendous opportunity to stimulate the economy, secure jobs, uplift 
the poor, improve wages, and prove our global competitiveness. With a 
single vote, we can change the course of millions of lives.
  America produces many of the highest quality services, the most 
bountiful crops, and the most advanced technologies in the world. 
Today, we have the opportunity to ensure that all of these are shared 
with foreign nations.
  Trade is also vital to our own national well-being and our economic 
recovery. Nationwide, one in ten American jobs depends on exports. 
These jobs are in a range of industries and service fields, and yet the 
one consistency among them is that they pay more than jobs in non-
trading industries. According to the Department of Commerce, trade-
oriented industries pay one-third more--approximately $15,000 more per 
employee--than non-trading industries.
  Recent studies have further shown that if global trade barriers were 
cut by one-third, the world economy would increase by more than $600 
billion a year. Eliminating trade barriers altogether would increase 
the global economy by nearly $2 trillion. The infusion of this much 
capital into the world market would serve as an engine of economic 
growth and improve the standard of living for all Americans.
  Given the significance of trade to our economic future, it is 
imperative that Congress pass trade promotion authority. TPA requires a 
collaborative partnership between Congress and the President, and both 
must actively participate in order to properly frame treaty 
negotiations. In fact, TPA statutorily requires that the President 
engage in frequent and substantive consultations with Congress before, 
during, and throughout negotiations on a free trade agreement. These 
consultations allow Congress to make clear its priorities and concerns, 
and the President then incorporates such mandates into negotiations. In 
return, Congress commits to an up or down vote on the treaty without 
amendments. While some members will argue that our opportunity for 
debate is stifled because of our inability to offer amendment, it is 
worth noting that without TPA members of the House of Representatives 
could neither vote on nor offer amendments to the treaty at all.
  Clearly, TPA is justified, it is responsible, and it is needed--and 
the time for TPA is now. Tariffs in the United States are among the 
lowest in the world. However, we face severe restrictions when we ship 
our goods overseas. In fact, while the average U.S. tariff is 4.8 
percent, American goods are subject to tariffs of 11 percent in Chile, 
13.5 percent in Argentina, 14.6 percent in Brazil, and a staggering 
45.6 percent in Thailand.
  To give you one example of the anti-competitiveness of foreign 
tariffs, we can look at a Caterpillar tractor. If that tractor is made 
in the U.S. and it shipped to Chile, it faces nearly $15,000 in tariffs 
and duties. If that tractor is made in Canada and is then shipped to 
Chile, the tariff and duties are zero. Clearly, reducing foreign 
tariffs is critical to ensuring that companies continue to build their 
factories in the U.S. And TPA is the greatest tool at our disposal for 
leveling the playing field to provide U.S. businesses access to the 
world's populations.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for the rule and H.R. 3005. 
This bill will help American regain its competitiveness, enabling the 
rebirth of prosperity and economic security.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Houston, Texas (Mr. Green), my very good friend.
  Mr. GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to both the 
rule and H.R. 3005, the legislation granting the President Fast Track 
Authority.
  This is not the time to allow more countries greater access to our 
domestic markets. We need much tighter controls at our borders, and we 
need to let the global economy recover before we even begin considering 
opening our doors to even further trade expansion.
  Foreign countries experiencing an economic slowdown always view the 
United States as a place to dump their excess goods. Japan, Russia, and 
South American countries have devastated our domestic steel industry 
through dumping. This illegal trade practice eliminates the thousands 
of high-paying American jobs tied directly to the steel industry and 
the thousands who support it.
  In addition, the House of Representatives has done nothing to help 
the thousands of displaced travel, tourism, and hospitality workers who 
lost their jobs as a result of September 11. Increased foreign trade 
automatically means a loss in good blue collar jobs which means our 
constituents' jobs will be on the line today.
  The House of Representatives has a spotty record in protecting 
displaced workers, especially from the textile, agriculture, and auto 
industries as a result of NAFTA; and that is why I oppose both the rule 
and the bill.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I keep hearing my colleagues talk about, come back and 
have an up or down vote. What part of procedural versus substantive 
consultation do they not understand? As a matter of fact, what part of 
``deficit'' do they not understand as it pertains to our trade policy? 
We have not had time, because they did not give us time; and last night 
I asked for an additional 2 hours and was denied that time. We have not 
had time to talk about the fact that antitrust laws are going to change 
without any consultation and without any input from Members of this 
body.

                              {time}  1315

  We have not had time to talk about the sovereignty issues, and I hope 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) and his committee can get to 
that issue because it is critical.
  It is clear from this bill, the underlying bill, that foreign 
investors have an advantage over domestic persons in the United States, 
and the tribunals are held in secret. As a former judge, I cannot abide 
that. I must have my colleagues understand that it would be 
inappropriate to take American property in a secret forum, and that is 
what this measure permits. It does not permit that the United States 
Trade Representative come before us.
  I ask my colleagues, please, vote against this rule and vote against 
the underlying bill.
  Mr. REYNOLDS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, I have heard today we should continue debating the bill, 
stall, or put it off; what is fair, unfair; water it down, pick it 
apart, and confuse the facts.
  Mr. Speaker, the world is not waiting while the United States putters 
along. Trade Promotion Authority offers the best chance for the United 
States to reclaim its leadership in opening foreign markets, expanding 
global economic opportunities for American producers and workers, and 
developing the virtues of democracy around the world.
  The prosperity and integrity of global democracies is at stake, and 
it is incumbent upon us to pull into the fast lane in order to reap the 
benefits of fair trade.
  What we ask today is nothing new. Until its expiration in 1994, every 
President from Richard Nixon through Bill Clinton has enjoyed the right 
of Trade Promotion Authority. This President deserves that same right.

[[Page H8981]]

  I strongly urge my colleagues to do the right thing for America: 
Support this rule and the underlying legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the 
previous question on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). The question is on the 
resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the 
ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
quorum is not present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 224, 
nays 202, not voting 7, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 479]

                               YEAS--224

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boozman
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carson (OK)
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Coble
     Collins
     Combest
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Gutknecht
     Hansen
     Hart
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kerns
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, Jeff
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Paul
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (FL)

                               NAYS--202

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank
     Frost
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     John
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Phelps
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Andrews
     Hostettler
     Meek (FL)
     Quinn
     Roemer
     Roukema
     Young (AK)

                              {time}  1342

  Messrs. LUCAS of Kentucky, GUTIERREZ and EVANS changed their vote 
from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the resolution was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated against:
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 479, the rule on Trade 
Promotion Authority, I was detained on the Senate side attending an 
education event. As a conferee on the elementary Secondary Education 
Act, I was participating in a public forum advocating full funding for 
children with disabilities. Had I been present, I would have voted 
``nay.''
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 306, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 3005) to extend trade authorities procedures with 
respect to reciprocal trade agreements, and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.

                              {time}  1345

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Pursuant to House Resolution 
306, the bill is considered read for amendment.
  The text of H.R. 3005 is as follows:

                               H.R. 3005

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND FINDINGS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Bipartisan 
     Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
       (b) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The expansion of international trade is vital to the 
     national security of the United States. Trade is critical to 
     the economic growth and strength of the United States and to 
     its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships 
     promote security and prosperity. Trade agreements today serve 
     the same purposes that security pacts played during the Cold 
     War, binding nations together through a series of mutual 
     rights and obligations. Leadership by the United States in 
     international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and 
     peace throughout the world.
       (2) The national security of the United States depends on 
     its economic security, which in turn is founded upon a 
     vibrant and growing industrial base. Trade expansion has been 
     the engine of economic growth. Trade agreements maximize 
     opportunities for the critical sectors and building blocks of 
     the economy of the United States, such as information 
     technology, telecommunications and other leading 
     technologies, basic industries, capital equipment, medical 
     equipment, services, agriculture, environmental technology, 
     and intellectual property. Trade will create new 
     opportunities for the United States and preserve the 
     unparalleled strength of the United States in economic, 
     political, and military affairs. The United States, secured 
     by expanding trade and economic opportunities, will meet the 
     challenges of the twenty-first century.

     SEC. 2. TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.

       (a) Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives.--The overall 
     trade negotiating objectives of the United States for 
     agreements subject to the provisions of section 3 are--
       (1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market 
     access;
       (2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers and 
     distortions that are directly related to trade and that 
     decrease market opportunities for United States exports or 
     otherwise distort United States trade;
       (3) to further strengthen the system of international 
     trading disciplines and procedures, including dispute 
     settlement;
       (4) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, and 
     promote full employment in

[[Page H8982]]

     the United States and to enhance the global economy;
       (5) to ensure that trade and environmental policies are 
     mutually supportive and to seek to protect and preserve the 
     environment and enhance the international means of doing so, 
     while optimizing the use of the world's resources; and
       (6) to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of 
     children consistent with core labor standards of the 
     International Labor Organization (as defined in section 9(2)) 
     and an understanding of the relationship between trade and 
     worker rights.
       (b) Principal Trade Negotiating Objectives.--
       (1) Trade barriers and distortions.--The principal 
     negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade 
     barriers and other trade distortions are--
       (A) to expand competitive market opportunities for United 
     States exports and to obtain fairer and more open conditions 
     of trade by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff 
     barriers and policies and practices of foreign governments 
     directly related to trade that decrease market opportunities 
     for United States exports or otherwise distort United States 
     trade; and
       (B) to obtain reciprocal tariff and nontariff barrier 
     elimination agreements, with particular attention to those 
     tariff categories covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
       (2) Trade in services.--The principal negotiating objective 
     of the United States regarding trade in services is to reduce 
     or eliminate barriers to international trade in services, 
     including regulatory and other barriers that deny national 
     treatment and market access or unreasonably restrict the 
     establishment or operations of service suppliers.
       (3) Foreign investment.--The principal negotiating 
     objective of the United States regarding foreign investment 
     is to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting 
     barriers to trade-related foreign investment by--
       (A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of 
     national treatment;
       (B) freeing the transfer of funds relating to investments;
       (C) reducing or eliminating performance requirements, 
     forced technology transfers, and other unreasonable barriers 
     to the establishment and operation of investments;
       (D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and 
     compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States 
     legal principles and practice;
       (E) providing meaningful procedures for resolving 
     investment disputes; and
       (F) seeking to improve mechanisms used to resolve disputes 
     between an investor and a government through--
       (i) mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims;
       (ii) procedures to ensure the efficient selection of 
     arbitrators and the expeditious disposition of claims; and
       (iii) procedures to increase transparency in investment 
     disputes.
       (4) Intellectual property.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States regarding trade-related 
     intellectual property are--
       (A) to further promote adequate and effective protection of 
     intellectual property rights, including through--
       (i)(I) ensuring accelerated and full implementation of the 
     Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
     Rights referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)), particularly with 
     respect to meeting enforcement obligations under that 
     agreement; and
       (II) ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or 
     bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual property 
     rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a 
     standard of protection similar to that found in United States 
     law;
       (ii) providing strong protection for new and emerging 
     technologies and new methods of transmitting and distributing 
     products embodying intellectual property;
       (iii) preventing or eliminating discrimination with respect 
     to matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, 
     maintenance, use, and enforcement of intellectual property 
     rights;
       (iv) ensuring that standards of protection and enforcement 
     keep pace with technological developments, and in particular 
     ensuring that rightholders have the legal and technological 
     means to control the use of their works through the Internet 
     and other global communication media, and to prevent the 
     unauthorized use of their works; and
       (v) providing strong enforcement of intellectual property 
     rights, including through accessible, expeditious, and 
     effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement 
     mechanisms; and
       (B) to secure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory market 
     access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon 
     intellectual property protection.
       (5) Transparency.--The principal negotiating objective of 
     the United States with respect to transparency is to obtain 
     wider and broader application of the principle of 
     transparency through--
       (A) increased and more timely public access to information 
     regarding trade issues and the activities of international 
     trade institutions;
       (B) increased openness at the WTO and other international 
     trade fora by increasing public access to appropriate 
     meetings, proceedings, and submissions, including with regard 
     to dispute settlement and investment; and
       (C) increased and more timely public access to all 
     notifications and supporting documentation submitted by 
     parties to the WTO.
       (6) Improvement of the wto and multilateral trade 
     agreements.--The principal negotiating objectives of the 
     United States regarding the improvement of the World Trade 
     Organization, the Uruguay Round Agreements, and other 
     multilateral and bilateral trade agreements are--
       (A) to achieve full implementation and extend the coverage 
     of the World Trade Organization and such agreements to 
     products, sectors, and conditions of trade not adequately 
     covered; and
       (B) to expand country participation in and enhancement of 
     the Information Technology Agreement and other trade 
     agreements.
       (7) Regulatory practices.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States regarding the use of 
     government regulation or other practices by foreign 
     governments to provide a competitive advantage to their 
     domestic producers, service providers, or investors and 
     thereby reduce market access for United States goods, 
     services, and investments are--
       (A) to achieve increased transparency and opportunity for 
     the participation of affected parties in the development of 
     regulations;
       (B) to require that proposed regulations be based on sound 
     science, cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, or other 
     objective evidence;
       (C) to establish consultative mechanisms among parties to 
     trade agreements to promote increased transparency in 
     developing guidelines, rules, regulations, and laws for 
     government procurement and other regulatory regimes; and
       (D) to achieve the elimination of government measures such 
     as price controls and reference pricing which deny full 
     market access for United States products.
       (8) Electronic commerce.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to electronic 
     commerce are--
       (A) to ensure that current obligations, rules, disciplines, 
     and commitments under the World Trade Organization apply to 
     electronic commerce;
       (B) to ensure that--
       (i) electronically delivered goods and services receive no 
     less favorable treatment under trade rules and commitments 
     than like products delivered in physical form; and
       (ii) the classification of such goods and services ensures 
     the most liberal trade treatment possible;
       (C) to ensure that governments refrain from implementing 
     trade-related measures that impede electronic commerce;
       (D) where legitimate policy objectives require domestic 
     regulations that affect electronic commerce, to obtain 
     commitments that any such regulations are the least 
     restrictive on trade, nondiscriminatory, and transparent, and 
     promote an open market environment; and
       (E) to extend the moratorium of the World Trade 
     Organization on duties on electronic transmissions.
       (9) Reciprocal trade in agriculture.--(A) The principal 
     negotiating objective of the United States with respect to 
     agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United 
     States exports of agricultural commodities in foreign markets 
     substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities 
     afforded foreign exports in United States markets and to 
     achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in bulk, 
     specialty crop, and value-added commodities by--
       (i) reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or 
     other charges that decrease market opportunities for United 
     States exports--
       (I) giving priority to those products that are subject to 
     significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of major 
     producing countries; and
       (II) providing reasonable adjustment periods for United 
     States import-sensitive products, in close consultation with 
     the Congress on such products before initiating tariff 
     reduction negotiations;
       (ii) reducing tariffs to levels that are the same as or 
     lower than those in the United States;
       (iii) reducing or eliminating subsidies that decrease 
     market opportunities for United States exports or unfairly 
     distort agriculture markets to the detriment of the United 
     States;
       (iv) allowing the preservation of programs that support 
     family farms and rural communities but do not distort trade;
       (v) developing disciplines for domestic support programs, 
     so that production that is in excess of domestic food 
     security needs is sold at world prices;
       (vi) eliminating Government policies that create price-
     depressing surpluses;
       (vii) eliminating state trading enterprises whenever 
     possible;
       (viii) developing, strengthening, and clarifying rules and 
     effective dispute settlement mechanisms to eliminate 
     practices that unfairly decrease United States market access 
     opportunities or distort agricultural markets to the 
     detriment of the United States, particularly with respect to 
     import-sensitive products, including--
       (I) unfair or trade-distorting activities of state trading 
     enterprises and other administrative mechanisms, with 
     emphasis on requiring price transparency in the operation of 
     state trading enterprises and such other

[[Page H8983]]

     mechanisms in order to end cross subsidization, price 
     discrimination, and price undercutting;
       (II) unjustified trade restrictions or commercial 
     requirements, such as labeling, that affect new technologies, 
     including biotechnology;
       (III) unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions, 
     including those not based on scientific principles in 
     contravention of the Uruguay Round Agreements;
       (IV) other unjustified technical barriers to trade; and
       (V) restrictive rules in the administration of tariff rate 
     quotas;
       (ix) eliminating practices that adversely affect trade in 
     perishable or cyclical products, while improving import 
     relief mechanisms to recognize the unique characteristics of 
     perishable and cyclical agriculture;
       (x) ensuring that the use of import relief mechanisms for 
     perishable and cyclical agriculture are as accessible and 
     timely to growers in the United States as those mechanisms 
     that are used by other countries;
       (xi) taking into account whether a party to the 
     negotiations has failed to adhere to the provisions of 
     already existing trade agreements with the United States or 
     has circumvented obligations under those agreements;
       (xii) taking into account whether a product is subject to 
     market distortions by reason of a failure of a major 
     producing country to adhere to the provisions of already 
     existing trade agreements with the United States or by the 
     circumvention by that country of its obligations under those 
     agreements;
       (xiii) otherwise ensuring that countries that accede to the 
     World Trade Organization have made meaningful market 
     liberalization commitments in agriculture;
       (xiv) taking into account the impact that agreements 
     covering agriculture to which the United States is a party, 
     including the North American Free Trade Agreement, have on 
     the United States agricultural industry; and
       (xv) maintaining bona fide food assistance programs and 
     preserving United States market development and export credit 
     programs.
       (B)(i) Before commencing negotiations with respect to 
     agriculture, the United States Trade Representative, in 
     consultation with the Congress, shall seek to develop a 
     position on the treatment of seasonal and perishable 
     agricultural products to be employed in the negotiations 
     in order to develop an international consensus on the 
     treatment of seasonal or perishable agricultural products 
     in investigations relating to dumping and safeguards and 
     in any other relevant area.
       (ii) During any negotiations on agricultural subsidies, the 
     United States Trade Representative shall seek to establish 
     the common base year for calculating the Aggregated 
     Measurement of Support (as defined in the Agreement on 
     Agriculture) as the end of each country's Uruguay Round 
     implementation period, as reported in each country's Uruguay 
     Round market access schedule.
       (iii) The negotiating objective provided in subparagraph 
     (A) applies with respect to agricultural matters to be 
     addressed in any trade agreement entered into under section 
     3(a) or (b), including any trade agreement entered into under 
     section 3(a) or (b) that provides for accession to a trade 
     agreement to which the United States is already a party, such 
     as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the United 
     States-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
       (10) Labor and the environment.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to labor and the 
     environment are--
       (A) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the 
     United States does not fail to effectively enforce its 
     environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring 
     course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade 
     between the United States and that party after entry into 
     force of a trade agreement between those countries;
       (B) to recognize that parties to a trade agreement retain 
     the right to exercise discretion with respect to 
     investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance 
     matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of 
     resources to enforcement with respect to other labor or 
     environmental matters determined to have higher priorities, 
     and to recognize that a country is effectively enforcing its 
     laws if a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable 
     exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide 
     decision regarding the allocation of resources;
       (C) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading 
     partners to promote respect for core labor standards (as 
     defined in section 9(2));
       (D) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading 
     partners to protect the environment through the promotion of 
     sustainable development;
       (E) to reduce or eliminate government practices or policies 
     that unduly threaten sustainable development;
       (F) to seek market access, through the elimination of 
     tariffs and nontariff barriers, for United States 
     environmental technologies, goods, and services; and
       (G) to ensure that labor, environmental, health, or safety 
     policies and practices of the parties to trade agreements 
     with the United States do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
     discriminate against United States exports or serve as 
     disguised barriers to trade.
       (11) Dispute settlement and enforcement.--The principal 
     negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to 
     dispute settlement and enforcement of trade agreements are--
       (A) to seek provisions in trade agreements providing for 
     resolution of disputes between governments under those trade 
     agreements in an effective, timely, transparent, equitable, 
     and reasoned manner, requiring determinations based on facts 
     and the principles of the agreements, with the goal of 
     increasing compliance with the agreements;
       (B) to seek to strengthen the capacity of the Trade Policy 
     Review Mechanism of the World Trade Organization to review 
     compliance with commitments;
       (C) to seek provisions encouraging the early identification 
     and settlement of disputes through consultation;
       (D) to seek provisions to encourage the provision of trade-
     expanding compensation if a party to a dispute under the 
     agreement does not come into compliance with its obligations 
     under the agreement;
       (E) to seek provisions to impose a penalty upon a party to 
     a dispute under the agreement that--
       (i) encourages compliance with the obligations of the 
     agreement;
       (ii) is appropriate to the parties, nature, subject matter, 
     and scope of the violation; and
       (iii) has the aim of not adversely affecting parties or 
     interests not party to the dispute while maintaining the 
     effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism; and
       (F) to seek provisions that treat United States principal 
     negotiating objectives equally with respect to--
       (i) the ability to resort to dispute settlement under the 
     applicable agreement;
       (ii) the availability of equivalent dispute settlement 
     procedures; and
       (iii) the availability of equivalent remedies.
       (12) WTO extended negotiations.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States regarding trade in civil 
     aircraft are those set forth in section 135(c) of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3355(c)) and regarding rules 
     of origin are the conclusion of an agreement described in 
     section 132 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 3552).
       (c) Promotion of Certain Priorities.--In order to address 
     and maintain United States competitiveness in the global 
     economy, the President shall--
       (1) seek greater cooperation between the WTO and the ILO;
       (2) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties 
     to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United 
     States trading partners to promote respect for core labor 
     standards (as defined in section 9(2)), and report to the 
     Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives 
     and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on the content and 
     operation of such mechanisms;
       (3) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties 
     to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United 
     States trading partners to develop and implement standards 
     for the protection of the environment and human health based 
     on sound science, and report to the Committee on Ways and 
     Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
     Finance of the Senate on the content and operation of such 
     mechanisms;
       (4) conduct environmental reviews of future trade and 
     investment agreements, consistent with Executive Order 13141 
     of November 16, 1999 and its relevant guidelines, and report 
     to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on 
     such reviews;
       (5) review the impact of future trade agreements on United 
     States employment, modeled after Executive Order 13141, and 
     report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on 
     such review;
       (6) take into account other legitimate United States 
     domestic objectives including, but not limited to, the 
     protection of legitimate health or safety, essential 
     security, and consumer interests and the law and regulations 
     related thereto;
       (7) have the Secretary of Labor consult with any country 
     seeking a trade agreement with the United States concerning 
     that country's labor laws and provide technical assistance to 
     that country if needed;
       (8) with respect to any trade agreement which the President 
     seeks to implement under trade authorities procedures, submit 
     to the Congress a report describing the extent to which the 
     country or countries that are parties to the agreement have 
     in effect laws governing exploitative child labor;
       (9) preserve the ability of the United States to enforce 
     rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping and 
     countervailing duty laws, and avoid agreements which lessen 
     the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines 
     on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, in order 
     to ensure that United States workers, agricultural producers, 
     and firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the 
     benefits of reciprocal trade concessions;
       (10) continue to promote consideration of multilateral 
     environmental agreements and consult with parties to such 
     agreements regarding the consistency of any such agreement 
     that includes trade measures with existing environmental 
     exceptions under Article XX of the GATT 1994; and
       (11) report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 
     of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the 
     Senate, not

[[Page H8984]]

     later than 12 months after the imposition of a penalty or 
     remedy by the United States permitted by a trade agreement to 
     which this Act applies, on the effectiveness of the penalty 
     or remedy applied under United States law in enforcing United 
     States rights under the trade agreement.

     The report under paragraph (11) shall address whether the 
     penalty or remedy was effective in changing the behavior of 
     the targeted party and whether the penalty or remedy had any 
     adverse impact on parties or interests not party to the 
     dispute.
       (d) Consultations.--
       (1) Consultations with congressional advisers.--In the 
     course of negotiations conducted under this Act, the United 
     States Trade Representative shall consult closely and on a 
     timely basis with, and keep fully apprised of the 
     negotiations, the Congressional Oversight Group convened 
     under section 7 and all committees of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate with jurisdiction over laws 
     that would be affected by a trade agreement resulting from 
     the negotiations.
       (2) Consultation before agreement initialed.--In the course 
     of negotiations conducted under this Act, the United States 
     Trade Representative shall--
       (A) consult closely and on a timely basis (including 
     immediately before initialing an agreement) with, and keep 
     fully apprised of the negotiations, the congressional 
     advisers for trade policy and negotiations appointed under 
     section 161 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2211), the 
     Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 
     the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Congressional 
     Oversight Group convened under section 7; and
       (B) with regard to any negotiations and agreement relating 
     to agricultural trade, also consult closely and on a timely 
     basis (including immediately before initialing an agreement) 
     with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the 
     Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the 
     Senate.
       (e) Adherence to Obligations Under Uruguay Round 
     Agreements.--In determining whether to enter into 
     negotiations with a particular country, the President shall 
     take into account the extent to which that country has 
     implemented, or has accelerated the implementation of, its 
     obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.

     SEC. 3. TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY.

       (a) Agreements Regarding Tariff Barriers.--
       (1) In general.--Whenever the President determines that one 
     or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any 
     foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and 
     restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that 
     the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this 
     Act will be promoted thereby, the President--
       (A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries 
     before--
       (i) June 1, 2005; or
       (ii) June 1, 2007, if trade authorities procedures are 
     extended under subsection (c); and
       (B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), proclaim--
       (i) such modification or continuance of any existing duty,
       (ii) such continuance of existing duty-free or excise 
     treatment, or
       (iii) such additional duties,

     as the President determines to be required or appropriate to 
     carry out any such trade agreement.

     The President shall notify the Congress of the President's 
     intention to enter into an agreement under this subsection.
       (2) Limitations.--No proclamation may be made under 
     paragraph (1) that--
       (A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate of duty 
     that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act) to a rate of duty which is less than 
     50 percent of the rate of such duty that applies on such date 
     of enactment; or
       (B) increases any rate of duty above the rate that applied 
     on the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (3) Aggregate reduction; exemption from staging.--
       (A) Aggregate reduction.--Except as provided in 
     subparagraph (B), the aggregate reduction in the rate of duty 
     on any article which is in effect on any day pursuant to a 
     trade agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall not 
     exceed the aggregate reduction which would have been in 
     effect on such day if--
       (i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem or a reduction of 
     one-tenth of the total reduction, whichever is greater, had 
     taken effect on the effective date of the first reduction 
     proclaimed under paragraph (1) to carry out such agreement 
     with respect to such article; and
       (ii) a reduction equal to the amount applicable under 
     clause (i) had taken effect at 1-year intervals after the 
     effective date of such first reduction.
       (B) Exemption from staging.--No staging is required under 
     subparagraph (A) with respect to a duty reduction that is 
     proclaimed under paragraph (1) for an article of a kind that 
     is not produced in the United States. The United States 
     International Trade Commission shall advise the President of 
     the identity of articles that may be exempted from staging 
     under this subparagraph.
       (4) Rounding.--If the President determines that such action 
     will simplify the computation of reductions under paragraph 
     (3), the President may round an annual reduction by an amount 
     equal to the lesser of--
       (A) the difference between the reduction without regard to 
     this paragraph and the next lower whole number; or
       (B) one-half of 1 percent ad valorem.
       (5) Other limitations.--A rate of duty reduction that may 
     not be proclaimed by reason of paragraph (2) may take effect 
     only if a provision authorizing such reduction is included 
     within an implementing bill provided for under section 5 and 
     that bill is enacted into law.
       (6) Other tariff modifications.--Notwithstanding paragraphs 
     (1)(B) and (2) through (5), and subject to the consultation 
     and layover requirements of section 115 of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act, the President may proclaim the modification 
     of any duty or staged rate reduction of any duty set forth in 
     Schedule XX, as defined in section 2(5) of that Act, if the 
     United States agrees to such modification or staged rate 
     reduction in a negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or 
     harmonization of duties under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization.
       (7) Authority under uruguay round agreements act not 
     affected.--Nothing in this subsection shall limit the 
     authority provided to the President under section 111(b) of 
     the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
       (b) Agreements Regarding Tariff and Nontariff Barriers.--
       (1) In general.--(A) Whenever the President determines 
     that--
       (i) one or more existing duties or any other import 
     restriction of any foreign country or the United States or 
     any other barrier to, or other distortion of, international 
     trade unduly burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the 
     United States or adversely affects the United States economy; 
     or
       (ii) the imposition of any such barrier or distortion is 
     likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or effect;
     and that the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives 
     of this Act will be promoted thereby, the President may enter 
     into a trade agreement described in subparagraph (B) during 
     the period described in subparagraph (C).
       (B) The President may enter into a trade agreement under 
     subparagraph (A) with foreign countries providing for--
       (i) the reduction or elimination of a duty, restriction, 
     barrier, or other distortion described in subparagraph (A), 
     or
       (ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on the imposition 
     of, such barrier or other distortion.
       (C) The President may enter into a trade agreement under 
     this paragraph before--
       (i) June 1, 2005; or
       (ii) June 1, 2007, if trade authorities procedures are 
     extended under subsection (c).
       (2) Conditions.--A trade agreement may be entered into 
     under this subsection only if such agreement makes progress 
     in meeting the applicable objectives described in section 
     2(a) and (b) and the President satisfies the conditions set 
     forth in section 4.
       (3) Bills qualifying for trade authorities procedures.--(A) 
     The provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (in 
     this Act referred to as ``trade authorities procedures'') 
     apply to a bill of either House of Congress which contains 
     provisions described in subparagraph (B) to the same extent 
     as such section 151 applies to implementing bills under that 
     section. A bill to which this paragraph applies shall 
     hereafter in this Act be referred to as an ``implementing 
     bill''.
       (B) The provisions referred to in subparagraph (A) are--
       (i) a provision approving a trade agreement entered into 
     under this subsection and approving the statement of 
     administrative action, if any, proposed to implement such 
     trade agreement; and
       (ii) if changes in existing laws or new statutory authority 
     are required to implement such trade agreement or agreements, 
     provisions, necessary or appropriate to implement such trade 
     agreement or agreements, either repealing or amending 
     existing laws or providing new statutory authority.
       (c) Extension Disapproval Process for Congressional Trade 
     Authorities Procedures.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in section 5(b)--
       (A) the trade authorities procedures apply to implementing 
     bills submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into 
     under subsection (b) before July 1, 2005; and
       (B) the trade authorities procedures shall be extended to 
     implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements 
     entered into under subsection (b) after June 30, 2005, and 
     before July 1, 2007, if (and only if)--
       (i) the President requests such extension under paragraph 
     (2); and
       (ii) neither House of the Congress adopts an extension 
     disapproval resolution under paragraph (5) before June 1, 
     2005.
       (2) Report to congress by the president.--If the President 
     is of the opinion that the trade authorities procedures 
     should be extended to implementing bills described in 
     paragraph (1)(B), the President shall submit to the Congress, 
     not later than March 1, 2005, a written report that contains 
     a request for such extension, together with--
       (A) a description of all trade agreements that have been 
     negotiated under subsection (b) and the anticipated schedule 
     for submitting such agreements to the Congress for approval;
       (B) a description of the progress that has been made in 
     negotiations to achieve the

[[Page H8985]]

     purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this Act, 
     and a statement that such progress justifies the continuation 
     of negotiations; and
       (C) a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed 
     to complete the negotiations.
       (3) Report to congress by the advisory committee.--The 
     President shall promptly inform the Advisory Committee for 
     Trade Policy and Negotiations established under section 135 
     of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) of the President's 
     decision to submit a report to the Congress under paragraph 
     (2). The Advisory Committee shall submit to the Congress as 
     soon as practicable, but not later than May 1, 2005, a 
     written report that contains--
       (A) its views regarding the progress that has been made in 
     negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, priorities, 
     and objectives of this Act; and
       (B) a statement of its views, and the reasons therefor, 
     regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2) 
     should be approved or disapproved.
       (4) Status of reports.--The reports submitted to the 
     Congress under paragraphs (2) and (3), or any portion of such 
     reports, may be classified to the extent the President 
     determines appropriate.
       (5) Extension disapproval resolutions.--(A) For purposes of 
     paragraph (1), the term ``extension disapproval resolution'' 
     means a resolution of either House of the Congress, the sole 
     matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 
     ``That the ____ disapproves the request of the President for 
     the extension, under section 3(c)(1)(B)(i) of the Trade 
     Promotion Authority Act of 2001, of the trade authorities 
     procedures under that Act to any implementing bill submitted 
     with respect to any trade agreement entered into under 
     section 3(b) of that Act after June 30, 2005.'', with the 
     blank space being filled with the name of the resolving House 
     of the Congress.
       (B) Extension disapproval resolutions--
       (i) may be introduced in either House of the Congress by 
     any member of such House; and
       (ii) shall be referred, in the House of Representatives, to 
     the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the 
     Committee on Rules.
       (C) The provisions of sections 152(d) and (e) of the Trade 
     Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the 
     floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and 
     Senate) apply to extension disapproval resolutions.
       (D) It is not in order for--
       (i) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval 
     resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance;
       (ii) the House of Representatives to consider any extension 
     disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways 
     and Means and, in addition, by the Committee on Rules; or
       (iii) either House of the Congress to consider an extension 
     disapproval resolution after June 30, 2005.
       (d) Commencement of Negotiations.--In order to contribute 
     to the continued economic expansion of the United States, the 
     President shall commence negotiations covering tariff and 
     nontariff barriers affecting any industry, product, or 
     service sector, and expand existing sectoral agreements to 
     countries that are not parties to those agreements, in cases 
     where the President determines that such negotiations are 
     feasible and timely and would benefit the United States. Such 
     sectors include agriculture, commercial services, 
     intellectual property rights, industrial and capital goods, 
     government procurement, information technology products, 
     environmental technology and services, medical equipment and 
     services, civil aircraft, and infrastructure products. In so 
     doing, the President shall take into account all of the 
     principal negotiating objectives set forth in section 2(b).

     SEC. 4. CONSULTATIONS AND ASSESSMENT.

       (a) Notice and Consultation Before Negotiation.--The 
     President, with respect to any agreement that is subject to 
     the provisions of section 3(b), shall--
       (1) provide, at least 90 calendar days before initiating 
     negotiations, written notice to the Congress of the 
     President's intention to enter into the negotiations and set 
     forth therein the date the President intends to initiate such 
     negotiations, the specific United States objectives for the 
     negotiations, and whether the President intends to seek an 
     agreement, or changes to an existing agreement; and
       (2) before and after submission of the notice, consult 
     regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Finance of 
     the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 
     of Representatives, such other committees of the House and 
     Senate as the President deems appropriate, and the 
     Congressional Oversight group convened under section 7.
       (b) Negotiations Regarding Agriculture.--Before initiating 
     or continuing negotiations the subject matter of which is 
     directly related to the subject matter under section 
     2(b)(9)(A)(i) with any country, the President shall assess 
     whether United States tariffs on agricultural products that 
     were bound under the Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than 
     the tariffs bound by that country. In addition, the President 
     shall consider whether the tariff levels bound and applied 
     throughout the world with respect to imports from the United 
     States are higher than United States tariffs and whether the 
     negotiation provides an opportunity to address any such 
     disparity. The President shall consult with the Committee on 
     Ways and Means and the Committee on Agriculture of the House 
     of Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the 
     Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the 
     Senate concerning the results of the assessment, whether it 
     is appropriate for the United States to agree to further 
     tariff reductions based on the conclusions reached in the 
     assessment, and how all applicable negotiating objectives 
     will be met.
       (c) Consultation With Congress Before Agreements Entered 
     Into.--
       (1) Consultation.--Before entering into any trade agreement 
     under section 3(b), the President shall consult with--
       (A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
       (B) each other committee of the House and the Senate, and 
     each joint committee of the Congress, which has jurisdiction 
     over legislation involving subject matters which would be 
     affected by the trade agreement; and
       (C) the Congressional Oversight Group convened under 
     section 7.
       (2) Scope.--The consultation described in paragraph (1) 
     shall include consultation with respect to--
       (A) the nature of the agreement;
       (B) how and to what extent the agreement will achieve the 
     applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of 
     this Act; and
       (C) the implementation of the agreement under section 5, 
     including the general effect of the agreement on existing 
     laws.
       (d) Advisory Committee Reports.--The report required under 
     section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding any 
     trade agreement entered into under section 3(a) or (b) of 
     this Act shall be provided to the President, the Congress, 
     and the United States Trade Representative not later than 
     30 days after the date on which the President notifies the 
     Congress under section 3(a)(1) or 5(a)(1)(A) of the 
     President's intention to enter into the agreement.
       (e) ITC Assessment.--
       (1) In general.--The President, at least 90 calendar days 
     before the day on which the President enters into a trade 
     agreement under section 3(b), shall provide the International 
     Trade Commission (referred to in this subsection as ``the 
     Commission'') with the details of the agreement as it exists 
     at that time and request the Commission to prepare and submit 
     an assessment of the agreement as described in paragraph (2). 
     Between the time the President makes the request under this 
     paragraph and the time the Commission submits the assessment, 
     the President shall keep the Commission current with respect 
     to the details of the agreement.
       (2) ITC assessment.--Not later than 90 calendar days after 
     the President enters into the agreement, the Commission shall 
     submit to the President and the Congress a report assessing 
     the likely impact of the agreement on the United States 
     economy as a whole and on specific industry sectors, 
     including the impact the agreement will have on the gross 
     domestic product, exports and imports, aggregate employment 
     and employment opportunities, the production, employment, and 
     competitive position of industries likely to be significantly 
     affected by the agreement, and the interests of United States 
     consumers.
       (3) Review of empirical literature.--In preparing the 
     assessment, the Commission shall review available economic 
     assessments regarding the agreement, including literature 
     regarding any substantially equivalent proposed agreement, 
     and shall provide in its assessment a description of the 
     analyses used and conclusions drawn in such literature, and a 
     discussion of areas of consensus and divergence between the 
     various analyses and conclusions, including those of the 
     Commission regarding the agreement.

     SEC. 5. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Notification and submission.--Any agreement entered 
     into under section 3(b) shall enter into force with respect 
     to the United States if (and only if)--
       (A) the President, at least 90 calendar days before the day 
     on which the President enters into the trade agreement, 
     notifies the House of Representatives and the Senate of the 
     President's intention to enter into the agreement, and 
     promptly thereafter publishes notice of such intention in the 
     Federal Register;
       (B) within 60 days after entering into the agreement, the 
     President submits to the Congress a description of those 
     changes to existing laws that the President considers would 
     be required in order to bring the United States into 
     compliance with the agreement;
       (C) after entering into the agreement, the President 
     submits to the Congress a copy of the final legal text of the 
     agreement, together with--
       (i) a draft of an implementing bill described in section 
     3(b)(3);
       (ii) a statement of any administrative action proposed to 
     implement the trade agreement; and
       (iii) the supporting information described in paragraph 
     (2); and
       (D) the implementing bill is enacted into law.
       (2) Supporting information.--The supporting information 
     required under paragraph (1)(C)(iii) consists of--

[[Page H8986]]

       (A) an explanation as to how the implementing bill and 
     proposed administrative action will change or affect existing 
     law; and
       (B) a statement--
       (i) asserting that the agreement makes progress in 
     achieving the applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and 
     objectives of this Act; and
       (ii) setting forth the reasons of the President regarding--

       (I) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in 
     achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives 
     referred to in clause (i);
       (II) whether and how the agreement changes provisions of an 
     agreement previously negotiated;

       (III) how the agreement serves the interests of United 
     States commerce;
       (IV) how the implementing bill meets the standards set 
     forth in section 3(b)(3); and
       (V) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in 
     achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives 
     referred to in section 2(c) regarding the promotion of 
     certain priorities.

       (3) Reciprocal benefits.--In order to ensure that a foreign 
     country that is not a party to a trade agreement entered into 
     under section 3(b) does not receive benefits under the 
     agreement unless the country is also subject to the 
     obligations under the agreement, the implementing bill 
     submitted with respect to the agreement shall provide that 
     the benefits and obligations under the agreement apply only 
     to the parties to the agreement, if such application is 
     consistent with the terms of the agreement. The implementing 
     bill may also provide that the benefits and obligations under 
     the agreement do not apply uniformly to all parties to the 
     agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms 
     of the agreement.
       (b) Limitations on Trade Authorities Procedures.--
       (1) For lack of notice or consultations.--
       (A) In general.--The trade authorities procedures shall not 
     apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a 
     trade agreement entered into under section 3(b) if during the 
     60-day period beginning on the date that one House of 
     Congress agrees to a procedural disapproval resolution for 
     lack of notice or consultations with respect to that trade 
     agreement, the other House separately agrees to a procedural 
     disapproval resolution with respect to that agreement.
       (B) Procedural disapproval resolution.--For purposes of 
     this paragraph, the term ``procedural disapproval 
     resolution'' means a resolution of either House of Congress, 
     the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as 
     follows: ``That the President has failed or refused to notify 
     or consult (as the case may be) with Congress in accordance 
     with section 4 or 5 of the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 
     2001 on negotiations with respect to ____________ and, 
     therefore, the trade authorities procedures under that Act 
     shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with 
     respect to that trade agreement.'', with the blank space 
     being filled with a description of the trade agreement with 
     respect to which the President is considered to have failed 
     or refused to notify or consult.
       (2) Procedures for considering resolutions.--(A) Procedural 
     disapproval resolutions--
       (i) in the House of Representatives--
       (I) shall be introduced by the chairman or ranking minority 
     member of the Committee on Ways and Means or the chairman or 
     ranking minority member of the Committee on Rules;
       (II) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 
     and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules; and
       (III) may not be amended by either Committee; and
       (ii) in the Senate shall be original resolutions of the 
     Committee on Finance.
       (B) The provisions of section 152(d) and (e) of the Trade 
     Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the 
     floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and 
     Senate) apply to procedural disapproval resolutions.
       (C) It is not in order for the House of Representatives to 
     consider any procedural disapproval resolution not reported 
     by the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, by the 
     Committee on Rules.
       (c) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--
     Subsection (b) of this section and section 3(c) are enacted 
     by the Congress--
       (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such are 
     deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and 
     such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that 
     they are inconsistent with such other rules; and
       (2) with the full recognition of the constitutional right 
     of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to 
     the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same 
     manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that 
     House.

     SEC. 6. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR WHICH 
                   NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

       (a) Certain Agreements.--Notwithstanding section 3(b)(2), 
     if an agreement to which section 3(b) applies--
       (1) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization,
       (2) is entered into with Chile,
       (3) is entered into with Singapore, or
       (4) establishes a Free Trade Area for the Americas,
     and results from negotiations that were commenced before the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, subsection (b) shall 
     apply.
       (b) Treatment of Agreements.--In the case of any agreement 
     to which subsection (a) applies--
       (1) the applicability of the trade authorities procedures 
     to implementing bills shall be determined without regard to 
     the requirements of section 4(a) (relating only to 90 days 
     notice prior to initiating negotiations), and any procedural 
     disapproval resolution under section 5(b)(1)(B) shall not be 
     in order on the basis of a failure or refusal to comply with 
     the provisions of section 4(a); and
       (2) the President shall, as soon as feasible after the 
     enactment of this Act--
       (A) notify the Congress of the negotiations described in 
     subsection (a), the specific United States objectives in the 
     negotiations, and whether the President is seeking a new 
     agreement or changes to an existing agreement; and
       (B) before and after submission of the notice, consult 
     regarding the negotiations with the committees referred to in 
     section 4(a)(2) and the Congressional Oversight Group.

     SEC. 7. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT GROUP.

       (a) Members and Functions.--
       (1) In general.--By not later than 60 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, and not later than 30 days 
     after the convening of each Congress, the chairman of the 
     Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives 
     and the chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate 
     shall convene the Congressional Oversight Group.
       (2) Membership from the house.--In each Congress, the 
     Congressional Oversight Group shall be comprised of the 
     following Members of the House of Representatives:
       (A) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on 
     Ways and Means, and 3 additional members of such Committee 
     (not more than 2 of whom are members of the same political 
     party).
       (B) The chairman and ranking member, or their designees, of 
     the committees of the House of Representatives which would 
     have, under the Rules of the House of Representatives, 
     jurisdiction over provisions of law affected by a trade 
     agreement negotiations for which are conducted at any time 
     during that Congress and to which this Act would apply.
       (3) Membership from the senate.--In each Congress, the 
     Congressional Oversight Group shall also be comprised of the 
     following members of the Senate:
       (A) The chairman and ranking Member of the Committee on 
     Finance and 3 additional members of such Committee (not more 
     than 2 of whom are members of the same political party).
       (B) The chairman and ranking member, or their designees, of 
     the committees of the Senate which would have, under the 
     Rules of the Senate, jurisdiction over provisions of law 
     affected by a trade agreement negotiations for which are 
     conducted at any time during that Congress and to which this 
     Act would apply.
       (4) Accreditation.--Each member of the Congressional 
     Oversight Group described in paragraph (2)(A) and (3)(A) 
     shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative 
     on behalf of the President as official advisers to the United 
     States delegation in negotiations for any trade agreement to 
     which this Act applies. Each member of the Congressional 
     Oversight Group described in paragraph (2)(B) and (3)(B) 
     shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative 
     on behalf of the President as official advisers to the United 
     States delegation in the negotiations by reason of which the 
     member is in the Congressional Oversight Group. The 
     Congressional Oversight Group shall consult with and provide 
     advice to the Trade Representative regarding the formulation 
     of specific objectives, negotiating strategies and positions, 
     the development of the applicable trade agreement, and 
     compliance and enforcement of the negotiated commitments 
     under the trade agreement.
       (5) Chair.--The Congressional Oversight Group shall be 
     chaired by the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the 
     Committee on Finance of the Senate.
       (b) Guidelines.--
       (1) Purpose and revision.--The United States Trade 
     Representative, in consultation with the chairmen and ranking 
     minority members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the 
     Senate--
       (A) shall, within 120 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, develop written guidelines to facilitate the 
     useful and timely exchange of information between the Trade 
     Representative and the Congressional Oversight Group 
     established under this section; and
       (B) may make such revisions to the guidelines as may be 
     necessary from time to time.
       (2) Content.--The guidelines developed under paragraph (1) 
     shall provide for, among other things--
       (A) regular, detailed briefings of the Congressional 
     Oversight Group regarding negotiating objectives, including 
     the promotion of certain priorities referred to in section 
     2(c), and positions and the status of the applicable 
     negotiations, beginning as soon as practicable after the 
     Congressional Oversight Group is convened, with more frequent 
     briefings as trade negotiations enter the final stage;

[[Page H8987]]

       (B) access by members of the Congressional Oversight Group, 
     and staff with proper security clearances, to pertinent 
     documents relating to the negotiations, including classified 
     materials;
       (C) the closest practicable coordination between the Trade 
     Representative and the Congressional Oversight Group at all 
     critical periods during the negotiations, including at 
     negotiation sites; and
       (D) after the applicable trade agreement is concluded, 
     consultation regarding ongoing compliance and enforcement of 
     negotiated commitments under the trade agreement.

     SEC. 8. ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
                   REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--At the time the President submits to the 
     Congress the final text of an agreement pursuant to section 
     5(a)(1)(C), the President shall also submit a plan for 
     implementing and enforcing the agreement. The 
     implementation and enforcement plan shall include the 
     following:
       (1) Border personnel requirements.--A description of 
     additional personnel required at border entry points, 
     including a list of additional customs and agricultural 
     inspectors.
       (2) Agency staffing requirements.--A description of 
     additional personnel required by Federal agencies responsible 
     for monitoring and implementing the trade agreement, 
     including personnel required by the Office of the United 
     States Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, the 
     Department of Agriculture (including additional personnel 
     required to implement sanitary and phytosanitary measures in 
     order to obtain market access for United States exports), the 
     Department of the Treasury, and such other agencies as may be 
     necessary.
       (3) Customs infrastructure requirements.--A description of 
     the additional equipment and facilities needed by the United 
     States Customs Service.
       (4) Impact on state and local governments.--A description 
     of the impact the trade agreement will have on State and 
     local governments as a result of increases in trade.
       (5) Cost analysis.--An analysis of the costs associated 
     with each of the items listed in paragraphs (1) through (4).
       (b) Budget Submission.--The President shall include a 
     request for the resources necessary to support the plan 
     described in subsection (a) in the first budget that the 
     President submits to the Congress after the submission of the 
     plan.

     SEC. 9. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Agreement on agriculture.--The term ``Agreement on 
     Agriculture'' means the agreement referred to in section 
     101(d)(2) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 
     3511(d)(2)).
       (2) Core labor standards.--The term ``core labor 
     standards'' means--
       (A) the right of association;
       (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
       (C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or 
     compulsory labor;
       (D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and
       (E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum 
     wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.
       (3) GATT 1994.--The term ``GATT 1994'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
     Act (19 U.S.C. 3501).
       (4) ILO.--The term ``ILO'' means the International Labor 
     Organization.
       (5) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen;
       (B) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity 
     organized under the laws of the United States; and
       (C) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity that 
     is organized under the laws of a foreign country and is 
     controlled by entities described in subparagraph (B) or 
     United States citizens, or both.
       (6) Uruguay round agreements.--The term ``Uruguay Round 
     Agreements'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(7) 
     of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(7)).
       (7) World trade organization; wto.--The terms ``World Trade 
     Organization'' and ``WTO'' mean the organization established 
     pursuant to the WTO Agreement.
       (8) WTO agreement.--The term ``WTO Agreement'' means the 
     Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered 
     into on April 15, 1994.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The amendment printed in the bill, modified 
by the amendment printed in House Report 107-323, is adopted.
  The text of H.R. 3005, as amended, as modified, is as follows:
       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND FINDINGS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Bipartisan 
     Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
       (b) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The expansion of international trade is vital to the 
     national security of the United States. Trade is critical to 
     the economic growth and strength of the United States and to 
     its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships 
     promote security and prosperity. Trade agreements today serve 
     the same purposes that security pacts played during the Cold 
     War, binding nations together through a series of mutual 
     rights and obligations. Leadership by the United States in 
     international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and 
     peace throughout the world.
       (2) The national security of the United States depends on 
     its economic security, which in turn is founded upon a 
     vibrant and growing industrial base. Trade expansion has been 
     the engine of economic growth. Trade agreements maximize 
     opportunities for the critical sectors and building blocks of 
     the economy of the United States, such as information 
     technology, telecommunications and other leading 
     technologies, basic industries, capital equipment, medical 
     equipment, services, agriculture, environmental technology, 
     and intellectual property. Trade will create new 
     opportunities for the United States and preserve the 
     unparalleled strength of the United States in economic, 
     political, and military affairs. The United States, secured 
     by expanding trade and economic opportunities, will meet the 
     challenges of the twenty-first century.

     SEC. 2. TRADE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.

       (a) Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives.--The overall 
     trade negotiating objectives of the United States for 
     agreements subject to the provisions of section 3 are--
       (1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market 
     access;
       (2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers and 
     distortions that are directly related to trade and that 
     decrease market opportunities for United States exports or 
     otherwise distort United States trade;
       (3) to further strengthen the system of international 
     trading disciplines and procedures, including dispute 
     settlement;
       (4) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, and 
     promote full employment in the United States and to enhance 
     the global economy;
       (5) to ensure that trade and environmental policies are 
     mutually supportive and to seek to protect and preserve the 
     environment and enhance the international means of doing so, 
     while optimizing the use of the world's resources;
       (6) to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of 
     children consistent with core labor standards of the 
     International Labor Organization (as defined in section 
     11(2)) and an understanding of the relationship between trade 
     and worker rights;
       (7) to seek provisions in trade agreements under which 
     parties to those agreements strive to ensure that they do not 
     weaken or reduce the protections afforded in domestic 
     environmental and labor laws as an encouragement for trade.
       (b) Principal Trade Negotiating Objectives.--
       (1) Trade barriers and distortions.--The principal 
     negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade 
     barriers and other trade distortions are--
       (A) to expand competitive market opportunities for United 
     States exports and to obtain fairer and more open conditions 
     of trade by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff 
     barriers and policies and practices of foreign governments 
     directly related to trade that decrease market opportunities 
     for United States exports or otherwise distort United States 
     trade; and
       (B) to obtain reciprocal tariff and nontariff barrier 
     elimination agreements, with particular attention to those 
     tariff categories covered in section 111(b) of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
       (2) Trade in services.--The principal negotiating objective 
     of the United States regarding trade in services is to reduce 
     or eliminate barriers to international trade in services, 
     including regulatory and other barriers that deny national 
     treatment and market access or unreasonably restrict the 
     establishment or operations of service suppliers.
       (3) Foreign investment.--The principal negotiating 
     objective of the United States regarding foreign investment 
     is to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting 
     barriers to trade-related foreign investment and, recognizing 
     that United States law on the whole provides a high level of 
     protection for investment, consistent with or greater than 
     the level required by international law, to secure for 
     investors important rights comparable to those that would be 
     available under United States legal principles and practice, 
     by
       (A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of 
     national treatment;
       (B) freeing the transfer of funds relating to investments;
       (C) reducing or eliminating performance requirements, 
     forced technology transfers, and other unreasonable barriers 
     to the establishment and operation of investments;
       (D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and 
     compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States 
     legal principles and practice;
       (E) providing meaningful procedures for resolving 
     investment disputes;
       (F) seeking to improve mechanisms used to resolve disputes 
     between an investor and a government through--
       (i) mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims; and
       (ii) procedures to ensure the efficient selection of 
     arbitrators and the expeditious disposition of claims;
       (G) providing an appellate or similar review mechanism to 
     correct manifestly erroneous interpretations of law; and
       (H) ensuring the fullest measure of transparency in the 
     dispute settlement mechanism, to the extent consistent with 
     the need to protect information that is classified or 
     business confidential, by--
       (i) ensuring that all requests for dispute settlement are 
     promptly made public;

[[Page H8988]]

       (ii) ensuring that--
       (I) all proceedings, submissions, findings, and decisions 
     are promptly made public;
       (II) all hearings are open to the public; and
       (iii) establishing a mechanism for acceptance of amicus 
     curiae submissions from businesses, unions, and 
     nongovernmental organizations.
       (4) Intellectual property.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States regarding trade-related 
     intellectual property are--
       (A) to further promote adequate and effective protection of 
     intellectual property rights, including through--
       (i)(I) ensuring accelerated and full implementation of the 
     Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
     Rights referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)), particularly with 
     respect to meeting enforcement obligations under that 
     agreement; and
       (II) ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or 
     bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual property 
     rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a 
     standard of protection similar to that found in United States 
     law;
       (ii) providing strong protection for new and emerging 
     technologies and new methods of transmitting and distributing 
     products embodying intellectual property;
       (iii) preventing or eliminating discrimination with respect 
     to matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, 
     maintenance, use, and enforcement of intellectual property 
     rights;
       (iv) ensuring that standards of protection and enforcement 
     keep pace with technological developments, and in particular 
     ensuring that rightholders have the legal and technological 
     means to control the use of their works through the Internet 
     and other global communication media, and to prevent the 
     unauthorized use of their works; and
       (v) providing strong enforcement of intellectual property 
     rights, including through accessible, expeditious, and 
     effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement 
     mechanisms; and
       (B) to secure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory market 
     access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon 
     intellectual property protection.
       (5) Transparency.--The principal negotiating objective of 
     the United States with respect to transparency is to obtain 
     wider and broader application of the principle of 
     transparency through--
       (A) increased and more timely public access to information 
     regarding trade issues and the activities of international 
     trade institutions;
       (B) increased openness at the WTO and other international 
     trade fora by increasing public access to appropriate 
     meetings, proceedings, and submissions, including with regard 
     to dispute settlement and investment; and
       (C) increased and more timely public access to all 
     notifications and supporting documentation submitted by 
     parties to the WTO.
       (6) Anti-corruption.--The principal negotiating objectives 
     of the United States with respect to the use of money or 
     other things of value to influence acts, decisions, or 
     omissions of foreign governments or officials or to secure 
     any improper advantage in a manner affecting trade are--
       (A) to obtain high standards and appropriate domestic 
     enforcement mechanisms applicable to persons from all 
     countries participating in the applicable trade agreement 
     that prohibit such attempts to influence acts, decisions, or 
     omissions of foreign governments; and
       (B) to ensure that such standards do not place United 
     States persons at a competitive disadvantage in international 
     trade.
       (7) Improvement of the WTO and multilateral trade 
     agreements.--The principal negotiating objectives of the 
     United States regarding the improvement of the World Trade 
     Organization, the Uruguay Round Agreements, and other 
     multilateral and bilateral trade agreements are--
       (A) to achieve full implementation and extend the coverage 
     of the World Trade Organization and such agreements to 
     products, sectors, and conditions of trade not adequately 
     covered; and
       (B) to expand country participation in and enhancement of 
     the Information Technology Agreement and other trade 
     agreements.
       (8) Regulatory practices.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States regarding the use of 
     government regulation or other practices by foreign 
     governments to provide a competitive advantage to their 
     domestic producers, service providers, or investors and 
     thereby reduce market access for United States goods, 
     services, and investments are--
       (A) to achieve increased transparency and opportunity for 
     the participation of affected parties in the development of 
     regulations;
       (B) to require that proposed regulations be based on sound 
     science, cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, or other 
     objective evidence;
       (C) to establish consultative mechanisms among parties to 
     trade agreements to promote increased transparency in 
     developing guidelines,  rules, regulations, and laws for 
     government procurement and other regulatory regimes; and
       (D) to achieve the elimination of government measures such 
     as price controls and reference pricing which deny full 
     market access for United States products.
       (9) Electronic commerce.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to electronic 
     commerce are--
       (A) to ensure that current obligations, rules, disciplines, 
     and commitments under the World Trade Organization apply to 
     electronic commerce;
       (B) to ensure that--
       (i) electronically delivered goods and services receive no 
     less favorable treatment under trade rules and commitments 
     than like products delivered in physical form; and
       (ii) the classification of such goods and services ensures 
     the most liberal trade treatment possible;
       (C) to ensure that governments refrain from implementing 
     trade-related measures that impede electronic commerce;
       (D) where legitimate policy objectives require domestic 
     regulations that affect electronic commerce, to obtain 
     commitments that any such regulations are the least 
     restrictive on trade, nondiscriminatory, and transparent, and 
     promote an open market environment; and
       (E) to extend the moratorium of the World Trade 
     Organization on duties on electronic transmissions.
       (10) Reciprocal trade in agriculture.--(A) The principal 
     negotiating objective of the United States with respect to 
     agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United 
     States exports of agricultural commodities in foreign markets 
     substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities 
     afforded foreign exports in United States markets and to 
     achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in bulk, 
     specialty crop, and value-added commodities by--
       (i) reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or 
     other charges that decrease market opportunities for United 
     States exports--
       (I) giving priority to those products that are subject to 
     significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of major 
     producing countries; and
       (II) providing reasonable adjustment periods for United 
     States import-sensitive products, in close consultation with 
     the Congress on such products before initiating tariff 
     reduction negotiations;
       (ii) reducing tariffs to levels that are the same as or 
     lower than those in the United States;
       (iii) reducing or eliminating subsidies that decrease 
     market opportunities for United States exports or unfairly 
     distort agriculture markets to the detriment of the United 
     States;
       (iv) allowing the preservation of programs that support 
     family farms and rural communities but do not distort trade;
       (v) developing disciplines for domestic support programs, 
     so that production that is in excess of domestic food 
     security needs is sold at world prices;
       (vi) eliminating Government policies that create price-
     depressing surpluses;
       (vii) eliminating state trading enterprises whenever 
     possible;
       (viii) developing, strengthening, and clarifying rules and 
     effective dispute settlement mechanisms to eliminate 
     practices that unfairly decrease United States market access 
     opportunities or distort agricultural markets to the 
     detriment of the United States, particularly with respect to 
     import-sensitive products, including--
       (I) unfair or trade-distorting activities of state trading 
     enterprises and other administrative mechanisms, with 
     emphasis on requiring price transparency in the operation of 
     state trading enterprises and such other mechanisms in order 
     to end cross subsidization, price discrimination, and price 
     undercutting;
       (II) unjustified trade restrictions or commercial 
     requirements, such as labeling, that affect new technologies, 
     including biotechnology;
       (III) unjustified sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions, 
     including those not based on scientific principles in 
     contravention of the Uruguay Round Agreements;
       (IV) other unjustified technical barriers to trade; and
       (V) restrictive rules in the administration of tariff rate 
     quotas;
       (ix) eliminating practices that adversely affect trade in 
     perishable or cyclical products, while improving import 
     relief mechanisms to recognize the unique characteristics of 
     perishable and cyclical agriculture;
       (x) ensuring that the use of import relief mechanisms for 
     perishable and cyclical agriculture are as accessible and 
     timely to growers in the United States as those mechanisms 
     that are used by other countries;
       (xi) taking into account whether a party to the 
     negotiations has failed to adhere to the provisions of 
     already existing trade agreements with the United States or 
     has circumvented obligations under those agreements;
       (xii) taking into account whether a product is subject to 
     market distortions by reason of a failure of a major 
     producing country to adhere to the provisions of already 
     existing trade agreements with the United States or by the 
     circumvention by that country of its obligations under those 
     agreements;
       (xiii) otherwise ensuring that countries that accede to the 
     World Trade Organization have made meaningful market 
     liberalization commitments in agriculture;
       (xiv) taking into account the impact that agreements 
     covering agriculture to which the United States is a party, 
     including the North American Free Trade Agreement, have on 
     the United States agricultural industry; and
       (xv) maintaining bona fide food assistance programs and 
     preserving United States market development and export credit 
     programs.
       (B)(i) Before commencing negotiations with respect to 
     agriculture, the United States Trade Representative, in 
     consultation with the Congress, shall seek to develop a 
     position on the treatment of seasonal and perishable 
     agricultural products to be employed in the negotiations in 
     order to develop an international consensus on the treatment 
     of seasonal or perishable agricultural products in 
     investigations relating to dumping and safeguards and in any 
     other relevant area.
       (ii) During any negotiations on agricultural subsidies, the 
     United States Trade Representative shall seek to establish 
     the common base year for calculating the Aggregated 
     Measurement of Support (as defined in the Agreement on 
     Agriculture) as the end of each country's Uruguay Round 
     implementation period, as reported in

[[Page H8989]]

     each country's Uruguay Round market access schedule.
       (iii) The negotiating objective provided in subparagraph 
     (A) applies with respect to agricultural matters to be 
     addressed in any trade agreement entered into under section 
     3(a) or (b), including any trade agreement entered into under 
     section 3(a) or (b) that provides for accession to a trade 
     agreement to which the United States is already a party, such 
     as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the United 
     States-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
       (11) Labor and the environment.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to labor and the 
     environment are--
       (A) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the 
     United States does not fail to effectively enforce its 
     environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring 
     course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade 
     between the United States and that party after entry into 
     force of a trade agreement between those countries;
       (B) to recognize that parties to a trade agreement retain 
     the right to exercise discretion with respect to 
     investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance 
     matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of 
     resources to enforcement with respect to other labor or 
     environmental matters determined to have higher priorities, 
     and to recognize that a country is effectively enforcing its 
     laws if a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable 
     exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide 
     decision regarding the allocation of resources; and no 
     retaliation may be authorized based on the exercise of these 
     rights or the right to establish domestic labor standards and 
     levels of environmental protection;
       (C) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading 
     partners to promote respect for core labor standards (as 
     defined in section 11(2));
       (D) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading 
     partners to protect the environment through the promotion of 
     sustainable development;
       (E) to reduce or eliminate government practices or policies 
     that unduly threaten sustainable development;
       (F) to seek market access, through the elimination of 
     tariffs and nontariff barriers, for United States 
     environmental technologies, goods, and services; and
       (G) to ensure that labor, environmental, health, or safety 
     policies and practices of the parties to trade agreements 
     with the United States do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
     discriminate against United States exports or serve as 
     disguised barriers to trade.
       (12) Dispute settlement and enforcement.--The principal 
     negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to 
     dispute settlement and enforcement of trade agreements are--
       (A) to seek provisions in trade agreements providing for 
     resolution of disputes between governments under those trade 
     agreements in an effective, timely, transparent, equitable, 
     and reasoned manner, requiring determinations based on facts 
     and the principles of the agreements, with the goal of 
     increasing compliance with the agreements;
       (B) to seek to strengthen the capacity of the Trade Policy 
     Review Mechanism of the World Trade Organization to review 
     compliance with commitments;
       (C) to seek provisions encouraging the early identification 
     and settlement of disputes through consultation;
       (D) to seek provisions to encourage the provision of trade-
     expanding compensation if a party to a dispute under the 
     agreement does not come into compliance with its obligations 
     under the agreement;
       (E) to seek provisions to impose a penalty upon a party to 
     a dispute under the agreement that--
       (i) encourages compliance with the obligations of the 
     agreement;
       (ii) is appropriate to the parties, nature, subject matter, 
     and scope of the violation; and
       (iii) has the aim of not adversely affecting parties or 
     interests not party to the dispute while maintaining the 
     effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism; and
       (F) to seek provisions that treat United States principal 
     negotiating objectives equally with respect to--
       (i) the ability to resort to dispute settlement under the 
     applicable agreement;
       (ii) the availability of equivalent dispute settlement 
     procedures; and
       (iii) the availability of equivalent remedies.
       (13) WTO extended negotiations.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States regarding trade in civil 
     aircraft are those set forth in section 135(c) of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3355(c)) and regarding rules 
     of origin are the conclusion of an agreement described in 
     section 132 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 3552).
       (c) Promotion of Certain Priorities.--In order to address 
     and maintain United States competitiveness in the global 
     economy, the President shall--
       (1) seek greater cooperation between the WTO and the ILO;
       (2) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties 
     to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United 
     States trading partners to promote respect for core labor 
     standards (as defined in section 11(2)), and report to the 
     Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives 
     and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on the content and 
     operation of such mechanisms;
       (3) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among parties 
     to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United 
     States trading partners to develop and implement standards 
     for the protection of the environment and human health based 
     on sound science, and report to the Committee on Ways and 
     Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
     Finance of the Senate on the content and operation of such 
     mechanisms;
       (4) conduct environmental reviews of future trade and 
     investment agreements, consistent with Executive Order 13141 
     of November 16, 1999 and its relevant guidelines, and report 
     to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on 
     such reviews;
       (5) review the impact of future trade agreements on United 
     States employment, modeled after Executive Order 13141, and 
     report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on 
     such review;
       (6) take into account other legitimate United States 
     domestic objectives including, but not limited to, the 
     protection of legitimate health or safety, essential 
     security, and consumer interests and the law and regulations 
     related thereto;
       (7) have the Secretary of Labor consult with any country 
     seeking a trade agreement with the United States concerning 
     that country's labor laws and provide technical assistance to 
     that country if needed;
       (8) with respect to any trade agreement which the President 
     seeks to implement under trade authorities procedures, submit 
     to the Congress a report describing the extent to which the 
     country or countries that are parties to the agreement have 
     in effect laws governing exploitative child labor;
       (9) preserve the ability of the United States to enforce 
     rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping and 
     countervailing duty laws, and avoid agreements which lessen 
     the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines 
     on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, in order 
     to ensure that United States workers, agricultural producers, 
     and firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the 
     benefits of reciprocal trade concessions;
       (10) continue to promote consideration of multilateral 
     environmental agreements and consult with parties to such 
     agreements regarding the consistency of any such agreement 
     that includes trade measures with existing environmental 
     exceptions under Article XX of the GATT 1994;
       (11) report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 
     of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the 
     Senate, not later than 12 months after the imposition of a 
     penalty or remedy by the United States permitted by a trade 
     agreement to which this Act applies, on the effectiveness of 
     the penalty or remedy applied under United States law in 
     enforcing United States rights under the trade agreement; and
       (12) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among 
     parties to trade agreements to examine the trade consequences 
     of significant and unanticipated currency movements and to 
     scrutinize whether a foreign government is engaged in a 
     pattern of manipulating its currency to promote a competitive 
     advantage in international trade.
     The report under paragraph (11) shall address whether the 
     penalty or remedy was effective in changing the behavior of 
     the targeted party and whether the penalty or remedy had any 
     adverse impact on parties or interests not party to the 
     dispute.
       (d) Consultations.--
       (1) Consultations with congressional advisers.--In the 
     course of negotiations conducted  under this Act, the United 
     States Trade Representative shall consult closely and on a 
     timely basis with, and keep fully apprised of the 
     negotiations, the Congressional Oversight Group convened 
     under section 7 and all committees of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate with jurisdiction over laws 
     that would be affected by a trade agreement resulting from 
     the negotiations.
       (2) Consultation before agreement initialed.--In the course 
     of negotiations conducted under this Act, the United States 
     Trade Representative shall--
       (A) consult closely and on a timely basis (including 
     immediately before initialing an agreement) with, and keep 
     fully apprised of the negotiations, the congressional 
     advisers for trade policy and negotiations appointed under 
     section 161 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2211), the 
     Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 
     the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Congressional 
     Oversight Group convened under section 7; and
       (B) with regard to any negotiations and agreement relating 
     to agricultural trade, also consult closely and on a timely 
     basis (including immediately before initialing an agreement) 
     with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the 
     Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the 
     Senate.
       (e) Adherence to Obligations Under Uruguay Round 
     Agreements.--In determining whether to enter into 
     negotiations with a particular country, the President shall 
     take into account the extent to which that country has 
     implemented, or has accelerated the implementation of, its 
     obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.

     SEC. 3. TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY.

       (a) Agreements Regarding Tariff Barriers.--
       (1) In general.--Whenever the President determines that one 
     or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any 
     foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and 
     restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that 
     the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this 
     Act will be promoted thereby, the President--
       (A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries 
     before--
       (i) June 1, 2005; or
       (ii) June 1, 2007, if trade authorities procedures are 
     extended under subsection (c); and
       (B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), proclaim--

[[Page H8990]]

       (i) such modification or continuance of any existing duty,
       (ii) such continuance of existing duty-free or excise 
     treatment, or
       (iii) such additional duties,
     as the President determines to be required or appropriate to 
     carry out any such trade agreement.
     The President shall notify the Congress of the President's 
     intention to enter into an agreement under this subsection.
       (2) Limitations.--No proclamation may be made under 
     paragraph (1) that--
       (A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate of duty 
     that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act) to a rate of duty which is less than 
     50 percent of the rate of such duty that applies on such date 
     of enactment;
       (B) notwithstanding paragraph (6), reduces the rate of duty 
     below that applicable under the Uruguay Round Agreements, on 
     any agricultural product which was the subject of tariff 
     reductions by the United States as a result of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements, for which the rate of duty, pursuant to 
     such Agreements, was reduced on January 1, 1995, to a rate 
     which was not less than 97.5 percent of the rate of duty that 
     applied to such article on December 31, 1994; or
       (C) increases any rate of duty above the rate that applied 
     on the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (3) Aggregate reduction; exemption from staging.--
       (A) Aggregate reduction.--Except as provided in 
     subparagraph (B), the aggregate reduction in the rate of duty 
     on any article which is in effect on any day pursuant to a 
     trade agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall not 
     exceed the aggregate reduction which would have been in 
     effect on such day if--
       (i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem or a reduction of 
     one-tenth of the total reduction, whichever is greater, had 
     taken effect on the effective date of the first reduction 
     proclaimed under paragraph (1) to carry out such agreement 
     with respect to such article; and
       (ii) a reduction equal to the amount applicable under 
     clause (i) had taken effect at 1-year intervals after the 
     effective date of such first reduction.
       (B) Exemption from staging.--No staging is required under 
     subparagraph (A) with respect to a duty reduction that is 
     proclaimed under paragraph (1) for an article of a kind that 
     is not produced in the United States. The United States 
     International Trade Commission shall advise the President of 
     the identity of articles that may be exempted from staging 
     under this subparagraph.
       (4) Rounding.--If the President determines that such action 
     will simplify the computation of reductions under paragraph 
     (3), the President may round an annual reduction by an amount 
     equal to the lesser of--
       (A) the difference between the reduction without regard to 
     this paragraph and the next lower whole number; or
       (B) one-half of 1 percent ad valorem.
       (5) Other limitations.--A rate of duty reduction that may 
     not be proclaimed by reason of paragraph (2) may take effect 
     only if a provision authorizing such reduction is included 
     within an implementing bill provided for under section 5 and 
     that bill is enacted into law.
       (6) Other tariff modifications.--Notwithstanding paragraphs 
     (1)(B), (2)(A), (2)(C), and (3) through (5), and subject to 
     the consultation and layover requirements of section 115 of 
     the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the President may 
     proclaim the modification of any duty or staged rate 
     reduction of any duty set forth in Schedule XX, as defined 
     in section 2(5) of that Act, if the United States agrees 
     to such modification or staged rate reduction in a 
     negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or 
     harmonization of duties under the auspices of the World 
     Trade Organization.
       (7) Authority under Uruguay round agreements act not 
     affected.--Nothing in this subsection shall limit the 
     authority provided to the President under section 111(b) of 
     the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
       (b) Agreements Regarding Tariff and Nontariff Barriers.--
       (1) In general.--(A) Whenever the President determines 
     that--
       (i) one or more existing duties or any other import 
     restriction of any foreign country or the United States or 
     any other barrier to, or other distortion of, international 
     trade unduly burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the 
     United States or adversely affects the United States economy; 
     or
       (ii) the imposition of any such barrier or distortion is 
     likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or effect;
     and that the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives 
     of this Act will be promoted thereby, the President may enter 
     into a trade agreement described in subparagraph (B) during 
     the period described in subparagraph (C).
       (B) The President may enter into a trade agreement under 
     subparagraph (A) with foreign countries providing for--
       (i) the reduction or elimination of a duty, restriction, 
     barrier, or other distortion described in subparagraph (A), 
     or
       (ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on the imposition 
     of, such barrier or other distortion.
       (C) The President may enter into a trade agreement under 
     this paragraph before--
       (i) June 1, 2005; or
       (ii) June 1, 2007, if trade authorities procedures are 
     extended under subsection (c).
       (2) Conditions.--A trade agreement may be entered into 
     under this subsection only if such agreement makes progress 
     in meeting the applicable objectives described in section 
     2(a) and (b) and the President satisfies the conditions set 
     forth in section 4.
       (3) Bills qualifying for trade authorities procedures.--(A) 
     The provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (in 
     this Act referred to as ``trade authorities procedures'') 
     apply to a bill of either House of Congress which contains 
     provisions described in subparagraph (B) to the same extent 
     as such section 151 applies to implementing bills under that 
     section. A bill to which this paragraph applies shall 
     hereafter in this Act be referred to as an ``implementing 
     bill''.
       (B) The provisions referred to in subparagraph (A) are--
       (i) a provision approving a trade agreement entered into 
     under this subsection and approving the statement of 
     administrative action, if any, proposed to implement such 
     trade agreement; and
       (ii) if changes in existing laws or new statutory authority 
     are required to implement such trade agreement or agreements, 
     provisions, necessary or appropriate to implement such trade 
     agreement or agreements, either repealing or amending 
     existing laws or providing new statutory authority.
       (c) Extension Disapproval Process for Congressional Trade 
     Authorities Procedures.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in section 5(b)--
       (A) the trade authorities procedures apply to implementing 
     bills submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into 
     under subsection (b) before July 1, 2005; and
       (B) the trade authorities procedures shall be extended to 
     implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements 
     entered into under subsection (b) after June 30, 2005, and 
     before July 1, 2007, if (and only if)--
       (i) the President requests such extension under paragraph 
     (2); and
       (ii) neither House of the Congress adopts an extension 
     disapproval resolution under paragraph (5) before June 1, 
     2005.
       (2) Report to congress by the president.--If the President 
     is of the opinion that the trade authorities procedures 
     should be extended to implementing bills described in 
     paragraph (1)(B), the President shall submit to the Congress, 
     not later than March 1, 2005, a written report that contains 
     a request for such extension, together with--
       (A) a description of all trade agreements that have been 
     negotiated under subsection (b) and the anticipated schedule 
     for submitting such agreements to the Congress for approval;
       (B) a description of the progress that has been made in 
     negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, priorities, 
     and objectives of this Act, and a statement that such 
     progress justifies the continuation of negotiations; and
       (C) a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed 
     to complete the negotiations.
       (3) Report to congress by the advisory committee.--The 
     President shall promptly inform the Advisory Committee for 
     Trade Policy and Negotiations established under section 135 
     of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) of the President's 
     decision to submit a report to the Congress under paragraph 
     (2). The Advisory Committee shall submit to the Congress as 
     soon as practicable, but not later than May 1, 2005, a 
     written report that contains--
       (A) its views regarding the progress that has been made in 
     negotiations to achieve the  purposes, policies, priorities, 
     and objectives of this Act; and
       (B) a statement of its views, and the reasons therefore, 
     regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2) 
     should be approved or disapproved.
       (4) Status of reports.--The reports submitted to the 
     Congress under paragraphs (2) and (3), or any portion of such 
     reports, may be classified to the extent the President 
     determines appropriate.
       (5) Extension disapproval resolutions.--(A) For purposes of 
     paragraph (1), the term ``extension disapproval resolution'' 
     means a resolution of either House of the Congress, the sole 
     matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 
     ``That the ____ disapproves the request of the President for 
     the extension, under section 3(c)(1)(B)(i) of the Bipartisan 
     Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, of the trade 
     authorities procedures under that Act to any implementing 
     bill submitted with respect to any trade agreement entered 
     into under section 3(b) of that Act after June 30, 2005.'', 
     with the blank space being filled with the name of the 
     resolving House of the Congress.
       (B) Extension disapproval resolutions--
       (i) may be introduced in either House of the Congress by 
     any member of such House; and
       (ii) shall be referred, in the House of Representatives, to 
     the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the 
     Committee on Rules.
       (C) The provisions of section 152(d) and (e) of the Trade 
     Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the 
     floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and 
     Senate) apply to extension disapproval resolutions.
       (D) It is not in order for--
       (i) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval 
     resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance;
       (ii) the House of Representatives to consider any extension 
     disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways 
     and Means and, in addition, by the Committee on Rules; or
       (iii) either House of the Congress to consider an extension 
     disapproval resolution after June 30, 2005.
       (d) Commencement of Negotiations.--In order to contribute 
     to the continued economic expansion of the United States, the 
     President shall commence negotiations covering tariff and 
     nontariff barriers affecting any industry, product, or 
     service sector, and expand existing sectoral agreements to 
     countries that are not parties to those agreements, in cases 
     where the President determines that such negotiations are 
     feasible and timely and would benefit the

[[Page H8991]]

     United States. Such sectors include agriculture, commercial 
     services, intellectual property rights, industrial and 
     capital goods, government procurement, information technology 
     products, environmental technology and services, medical 
     equipment and services, civil aircraft, and infrastructure 
     products. In so doing, the President shall take into account 
     all of the principal negotiating objectives set forth in 
     section 2(b).

     SEC. 4. CONSULTATIONS AND ASSESSMENT.

       (a) Notice and Consultation Before Negotiation.--The 
     President, with respect to any agreement that is subject to 
     the provisions of section 3(b), shall--
       (1) provide, at least 90 calendar days before initiating 
     negotiations, written notice to the Congress of the 
     President's intention to enter into the negotiations and set 
     forth therein the date the President intends to initiate such 
     negotiations, the specific United States objectives for the 
     negotiations, and whether the President intends to seek an 
     agreement, or changes to an existing agreement;
       (2) before and after submission of the notice, consult 
     regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Finance of 
     the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 
     of Representatives, such other committees of the House and 
     Senate as the President deems appropriate, and the 
     Congressional Oversight Group convened under section 7; and
       (3) upon the request of a majority of the members of the 
     Congressional Oversight Group under section 7(c), meet with 
     the Congressional Oversight Group before initiating the 
     negotiations or at any other time concerning the 
     negotiations.
       (b) Negotiations Regarding Agriculture.--
       (1) In general.--Before initiating or continuing 
     negotiations the subject matter of which is directly related 
     to the subject matter under section 2(b)(10)(A)(i) with any 
     country, the President shall assess whether United States 
     tariffs on agricultural products that were bound under the 
     Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound by 
     that country. In addition, the President shall consider 
     whether the tariff levels bound and applied throughout the 
     world with respect to imports from the United States are 
     higher than United States tariffs and whether the negotiation 
     provides an opportunity to address any such disparity. The 
     President shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means 
     and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance and the 
     Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the 
     Senate concerning the results of the assessment, whether it 
     is appropriate for the United States to agree to further 
     tariff reductions based on the conclusions reached in the 
     assessment, and how all applicable negotiating objectives 
     will be met.
       (2) Special consultations on import sensitive products.--
     (A) Before initiating negotiations with regard to 
     agriculture, and, with respect to the Free Trade Area for the 
     Americas and negotiations with regard to agriculture under 
     the auspices of the World Trade Organization, as soon as 
     practicable after the enactment of this Act, the United 
     States Trade Representative shall--
       (i) identify those agricultural products subject to tariff 
     reductions by the United States as a result of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements, for which the rate of duty was reduced on 
     January 1, 1995, to a rate which was not less than 97.5 
     percent of the rate of duty that applied to such article on 
     December 31, 1994;
       (ii) consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the 
     Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, 
     Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate concerning--
       (I) whether any further tariff reductions on the products 
     identified under clause (i) should be appropriate, taking 
     into account the impact of any such tariff reduction on the 
     United States industry producing the product concerned; and
       (II) whether the products so identified face unjustified 
     sanitary or phytosanitary restrictions, including those not 
     based on scientific principles in contravention of the 
     Uruguay Round Agreements;
       (iii) request that the International Trade Commission 
     prepare an assessment of the probable economic effects of any 
     such tariff reduction on the United States industry producing 
     the product concerned and on the United States economy as a 
     whole; and
       (iv) upon complying with clauses (i), (ii), and (iii), 
     notify the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on 
     Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
     Forestry of the Senate of those products identified under 
     clause (i) for which the Trade Representative intends to seek 
     tariff liberalization in the negotiations and the reasons for 
     seeking such tariff liberalization.
       (B) If, after negotiations described in subparagraph (A) 
     are commenced--
       (i) the United States Trade Representative identifies any 
     additional agricultural product described in subparagraph 
     (A)(i) for tariff reductions which were not the subject of a 
     notification under subparagraph (A)(iv), or
       (ii) any additional agricultural product described in 
     subparagraph (A)(i) is the subject of a request for tariff 
     reductions by a party to the negotiations,

     the Trade Representative shall, as soon as practicable, 
     notify the committees referred to in subparagraph (A)(iv) of 
     those products and the reasons for seeking such tariff 
     reductions.
       (c) Negotiations Regarding Textiles.--Before initiating or 
     continuing negotiations the subject matter of which is 
     directly related to textiles and apparel products with any 
     country, the President shall assess whether United States 
     tariffs on textile and apparel products that were bound under 
     the Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound 
     by that country and whether the negotiation provides an 
     opportunity to address any such disparity. The President 
     shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the 
     Senate concerning the results of the assessment, whether it 
     is appropriate for the United States to agree to further 
     tariff reductions based on the conclusions reached in the 
     assessment, and how all applicable negotiating objectives 
     will be met.
       (d) Consultation With Congress Before Agreements Entered 
     Into.--
       (1) Consultation.--Before entering into any trade agreement 
     under section 3(b), the President shall consult with--
       (A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
       (B) each other committee of the House and the Senate, and 
     each joint committee of the Congress, which has jurisdiction 
     over legislation involving subject matters which would be 
     affected by the trade agreement; and
       (C) the Congressional Oversight Group convened under 
     section 7.
       (2) Scope.--The consultation described in paragraph (1) 
     shall include consultation with respect to--
       (A) the nature of the agreement;
       (B) how and to what extent the agreement will achieve the 
     applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of 
     this Act; and
       (C) the implementation of the agreement under section 5, 
     including the general effect of the agreement on existing 
     laws.
       (e) Advisory Committee Reports.--The report required under 
     section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding any 
     trade agreement entered into under section 3(a) or (b) of 
     this Act shall be provided to the President, the Congress, 
     and the United States Trade Representative not later than 30 
     days after the date on which the President notifies the 
     Congress under section 3(a)(1) or 5(a)(1)(A) of the 
     President's intention to enter into the agreement.
       (f) ITC Assessment.--
       (1) In general.--The President, at least 90 calendar days 
     before the day on which the President enters into a trade 
     agreement under section 3(b), shall provide the International 
     Trade Commission (referred to in this subsection as ``the 
     Commission'') with the details of the agreement as it exists 
     at that time and request the Commission to prepare and submit 
     an assessment of the agreement as described in paragraph (2). 
     Between the time the President makes the request under this 
     paragraph and the time the Commission submits the assessment, 
     the President shall keep the Commission current with respect 
     to the details of the agreement.
       (2) ITC assessment.--Not later than 90 calendar days after 
     the President enters into the agreement, the Commission shall 
     submit to the President and the Congress a report assessing 
     the likely impact of the agreement on the United States 
     economy as a whole and on specific industry sectors, 
     including the impact the agreement will have on the gross 
     domestic product, exports and imports, aggregate employment 
     and employment opportunities, the production, employment, and 
     competitive position of industries likely to be significantly 
     affected by the agreement, and the interests of United States 
     consumers.
       (3) Review of empirical literature.--In preparing the 
     assessment, the Commission shall review available economic 
     assessments regarding the agreement, including literature 
     regarding any substantially equivalent proposed agreement, 
     and shall provide in its assessment a description of the 
     analyses used and conclusions drawn in such literature, and a 
     discussion of areas of consensus and divergence between the 
     various analyses and conclusions, including those of the 
     Commission regarding the agreement.

     SEC. 5. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Notification and submission.--Any agreement entered 
     into under section 3(b) shall enter into force with respect 
     to the United States if (and only if)--
       (A) the President, at least 90 calendar days before the day 
     on which the President enters into the trade agreement, 
     notifies the House of Representatives and the Senate of the 
     President's intention to enter into the agreement, and 
     promptly thereafter publishes notice of such intention in the 
     Federal Register;
       (B) within 60 days after entering into the agreement, the 
     President submits to the Congress a description of those 
     changes to existing laws that the President considers would 
     be required in order to bring the United States into 
     compliance with the agreement;
       (C) after entering into the agreement, the President 
     submits to the Congress, on a day on which both Houses of 
     Congress are in session, a copy of the final legal text of 
     the agreement, together with--
       (i) a draft of an implementing bill described in section 
     3(b)(3);
       (ii) a statement of any administrative action proposed to 
     implement the trade agreement; and
       (iii) the supporting information described in paragraph 
     (2); and
       (D) the implementing bill is enacted into law.
       (2) Supporting information.--The supporting information 
     required under paragraph (1)(C)(iii) consists of--
       (A) an explanation as to how the implementing bill and 
     proposed administrative action will change or affect existing 
     law; and
       (B) a statement--
       (i) asserting that the agreement makes progress in 
     achieving the applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and 
     objectives of this Act; and
       (ii) setting forth the reasons of the President regarding--

[[Page H8992]]

       (I) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in 
     achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives 
     referred to in clause (i);
       (II) whether and how the agreement changes provisions of an 
     agreement previously negotiated;
       (III) how the agreement serves the interests of United 
     States commerce;
       (IV) how the implementing bill meets the standards set 
     forth in section 3(b)(3); and
       (V) how and to what extent the agreement makes progress in 
     achieving the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives 
     referred to in section 2(c) regarding the promotion of 
     certain priorities.

       (3) Reciprocal benefits.--In order to ensure that a foreign 
     country that is not a party to a trade agreement entered into 
     under section 3(b) does not receive benefits under the 
     agreement unless the country is also subject to the 
     obligations under the agreement, the implementing bill 
     submitted with respect to the agreement shall provide that 
     the benefits and obligations under the agreement apply only 
     to the parties to the agreement, if such application is 
     consistent with the terms of the agreement. The implementing 
     bill may also provide that the benefits and obligations under 
     the agreement do not apply uniformly to all parties to the 
     agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms 
     of the agreement.
       (b) Limitations on Trade Authorities Procedures.--
       (1) For lack of notice or consultations.--
       (A) In general.--The trade authorities procedures shall not 
     apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a 
     trade agreement or trade agreements entered into under 
     section 3(b) if during the 60-day period beginning on the 
     date that one House of Congress agrees to a procedural 
     disapproval resolution for lack of notice or consultations 
     with respect to such trade agreement or agreements, the other 
     House separately agrees to a procedural disapproval 
     resolution with respect to such trade agreement or 
     agreements.
         (B) Procedural disapproval resolution.--(i) For purposes 
     of this paragraph, the term ``procedural disapproval 
     resolution'' means a resolution of either House of Congress, 
     the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as 
     follows: ``That the President has failed or refused to notify 
     or consult in accordance with the Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
     Authority Act of 2001 on negotiations with respect to 
     ____________ and, therefore, the trade authorities procedures 
     under that Act shall not apply to any implementing bill 
     submitted with respect to that trade agreement or 
     agreements.'', with the blank space being filled with a 
     description of the trade agreement or agreements with respect 
     to which the President is considered to have failed or 
     refused to notify or consult.
       (ii) For purposes of clause (i), the President has ``failed 
     or refused to notify or consult in accordance with the 
     Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001'' on 
     negotiations with respect to a trade agreement or trade 
     agreements if--
       (I) the President has failed or refused to consult (as the 
     case may be) in accordance with section 4 or 5 with respect 
     to the negotiations, agreement, or agreements;
       (II) guidelines under section 7(b) have not been developed 
     or met with respect to the negotiations, agreement, or 
     agreements;
       (III) the President has not met with the Congressional 
     Oversight Group pursuant to a request made under section 7(c) 
     with respect to the negotiations, agreement, or agreements; 
     or
       (IV) the agreement or agreements fail to make progress in 
     achieving the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives 
     of this Act.
       (2) Procedures for considering resolutions.--(A) Procedural 
     disapproval resolutions--
       (i) in the House of Representatives--
       (I) may be introduced by any Member of the House;
       (II) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 
     and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules; and
       (III) may not be amended by either Committee; and
       (ii) in the Senate may be introduced by any Member of the 
     Senate.
       (B) The provisions of section 152(d) and (e) of the Trade 
     Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(d) and (e)) (relating to the 
     floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and 
     Senate) apply to a procedural disapproval resolution 
     introduced with respect to a trade agreement if no other 
     procedural disapprovement resolution with respect to that 
     trade agreement has previously been considered under such 
     provisions of section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974 in that 
     House of Congress during that Congress''.
       (C) It is not in order for the House of Representatives to 
     consider any procedural disapproval resolution not reported 
     by the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, by the 
     Committee on Rules.
       (c) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--
     Subsection (b) of this section and section 3(c) are enacted 
     by the Congress--
       (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such are 
     deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and 
     such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that 
     they are inconsistent with such other rules; and
       (2) with the full recognition of the constitutional right 
     of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to 
     the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same 
     manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that 
     House.

     SEC. 6. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR WHICH 
                   NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

       (a) Certain Agreements.--Notwithstanding section 3(b)(2), 
     if an agreement to which section 3(b) applies--
       (1) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization,
       (2) is entered into with Chile,
       (3) is entered into with Singapore, or
       (4) establishes a Free Trade Area for the Americas,
     and results from negotiations that were commenced before the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, subsection (b) shall 
     apply.
       (b) Treatment of Agreements.--In the case of any agreement 
     to which subsection (a) applies--
       (1) the applicability of the trade authorities procedures 
     to implementing bills shall be determined without regard to 
     the requirements of section 4(a) (relating only to 90 days 
     notice prior to initiating negotiations), and any procedural 
     disapproval resolution under section 5(b)(1)(B) shall not be 
     in order on the basis of a failure or refusal to comply with 
     the provisions of section 4(a); and
       (2) the President shall, as soon as feasible after the 
     enactment of this Act--
       (A) notify the Congress of the negotiations described in 
     subsection (a), the specific United States objectives in the 
     negotiations, and whether the President is seeking a new 
     agreement or changes to an existing agreement; and
       (B) before and after submission of the notice, consult 
     regarding the negotiations with the committees referred to in 
     section 4(a)(2) and the Congressional Oversight Group.

     SEC. 7. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT GROUP.

       (a) Members and Functions.--
       (1) In general.--By not later than 60 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, and not later than 30 days 
     after the convening of each Congress, the chairman of the 
     Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives 
     and the chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate 
     shall convene the Congressional Oversight Group.
       (2) Membership from the house.--In each Congress, the 
     Congressional Oversight Group shall be comprised of the 
     following Members of the House of Representatives:
       (A) The chairman and ranking member of the Committee on 
     Ways and Means, and 3 additional members of such Committee 
     (not more than 2 of whom are members of the same political 
     party).
       (B) The chairman and ranking member, or their designees, of 
     the committees of the House of Representatives which would 
     have, under the Rules of the House of Representatives, 
     jurisdiction over provisions of law affected by a trade 
     agreement negotiations for which are conducted at any time 
     during that Congress and to which this Act would apply.
       (3) Membership from the senate.--In each Congress, the 
     Congressional Oversight Group shall also be comprised of the 
     following members of the Senate:
       (A) The chairman and ranking Member of the Committee on 
     Finance and 3 additional members of such Committee (not more 
     than 2 of whom are members of the same political party).
       (B) The chairman and ranking member, or their designees, of 
     the committees of the Senate which would have, under the 
     Rules of the Senate, jurisdiction over provisions of law 
     affected by a trade agreement negotiations for which are 
     conducted at any time during that Congress and to which this 
     Act would apply.
       (4) Accreditation.--Each member of the Congressional 
     Oversight Group described in paragraph (2)(A) and (3)(A) 
     shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative 
     on behalf of the President as official advisers to the United 
     States delegation in negotiations for any trade agreement to 
     which this Act applies. Each member of the Congressional 
     Oversight Group described in paragraph (2)(B) and (3)(B) 
     shall be accredited by the United States Trade Representative 
     on behalf of the President as official advisers to the United 
     States delegation in the negotiations by reason of which the 
     member is in the Congressional Oversight Group. The 
     Congressional Oversight Group shall consult with and provide 
     advice to the Trade Representative regarding the formulation 
     of specific objectives, negotiating strategies and positions, 
     the development of the applicable trade agreement, and 
     compliance and enforcement of the negotiated commitments 
     under the trade agreement.
       (5) Chair.--The Congressional Oversight Group shall be 
     chaired by the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the 
     Committee on Finance of the Senate.
       (b) Guidelines.--
       (1) Purpose and revision.--The United States Trade 
     Representative, in consultation with the chairmen and ranking 
     minority members of the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
     House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the 
     Senate--
       (A) shall, within 120 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, develop written guidelines to facilitate the 
     useful and timely exchange of information between the Trade 
     Representative and the Congressional Oversight Group 
     established under this section; and
       (B) may make such revisions to the guidelines as may be 
     necessary from time to time.
       (2) Content.--The guidelines developed under paragraph (1) 
     shall provide for, among other things--
       (A) regular, detailed briefings of the Congressional 
     Oversight Group regarding negotiating objectives, including 
     the promotion of certain priorities referred to in section 
     2(c), and positions and the status of the applicable 
     negotiations, beginning as soon as practicable after the 
     Congressional Oversight Group is convened, with more frequent 
     briefings as trade negotiations enter the final stage;
       (B) access by members of the Congressional Oversight Group, 
     and staff with proper security clearances, to pertinent 
     documents relating to the negotiations, including classified 
     materials;

[[Page H8993]]

       (C) the closest practicable coordination between the Trade 
     Representative and the Congressional Oversight Group at all 
     critical periods during the negotiations, including at 
     negotiation sites; and
       (D) after the applicable trade agreement is concluded, 
     consultation regarding ongoing compliance and enforcement of 
     negotiated commitments under the trade agreement.
       (c) Request for Meeting.--Upon the request of a majority of 
     the Congressional Oversight Group, the President shall meet 
     with the Congressional Oversight Group before initiating 
     negotiations with respect to a trade agreement, or at any 
     other time concerning the negotiations.

     SEC. 8. ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
                   REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) In General.--At the time the President submits to the 
     Congress the final text of an agreement pursuant to section 
     5(a)(1)(C), the President shall also submit a plan for 
     implementing and enforcing the agreement. The implementation 
     and enforcement plan shall include the following:
       (1) Border personnel requirements.--A description of 
     additional personnel required at border entry points, 
     including a list of additional customs and agricultural 
     inspectors.
       (2) Agency staffing requirements.--A description of 
     additional personnel required by Federal agencies responsible 
     for monitoring and implementing the trade agreement, 
     including personnel required by the Office of the United 
     States Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, the 
     Department of Agriculture (including additional personnel 
     required to implement sanitary and phytosanitary measures in 
     order to obtain market access for United States exports), the 
     Department of the Treasury, and such other agencies as may be 
     necessary.
       (3) Customs infrastructure requirements.--A description of 
     the additional equipment and facilities needed by the United 
     States Customs Service.
       (4) Impact on state and local governments.--A description 
     of the impact the trade agreement will have on State and 
     local governments as a result of increases in trade.
       (5) Cost analysis.--An analysis of the costs associated 
     with each of the items listed in paragraphs (1) through (4).
       (b) Budget Submission.--The President shall include a 
     request for the resources necessary to support the plan 
     described in subsection (a) in the first budget that the 
     President submits to the Congress after the submission of the 
     plan.

     SEC. 9. COMMITTEE STAFF.

       The grant of trade promotion authority under this Act is 
     likely to increase the activities of the primary committees 
     of jurisdiction in the area of international trade. In 
     addition, the creation of the Congressional Oversight Group 
     under section 7 will increase the participation of a broader 
     number of Members of Congress in the formulation of United 
     States trade policy and oversight of the international trade 
     agenda for the United States. The primary committees of 
     jurisdiction should have adequate staff to accommodate these 
     increases in activities.

     SEC. 10. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 
     U.S.C. 2111 et seq.) is amended as follows:
       (1) Implementing bill.--
       (A) Section 151(b)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(1)) is amended by 
     striking ``section 1103(a)(1) of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988, or section 282 of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act'' and inserting ``section 282 of the 
     Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or section 5(a)(1) of the 
     Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
       (B) Section 151(c)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(c)(1)) is amended by 
     striking ``or section 282 of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
     Act'' and inserting ``, section 282 of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act, or section 5(a)(1) of the Bipartisan Trade 
     Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
       (2) Advice from international trade commission.--Section 
     131 (19 U.S.C. 2151) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)--
       (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 123 of this Act 
     or section 1102 (a) or (c) of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' and inserting ``section 123 of 
     this Act or section 3(a) or (b) of the Bipartisan Trade 
     Promotion Authority Act of 2001,''; and
       (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``section 1102 (b) or 
     (c) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' 
     and inserting ``section 3(b) of the Bipartisan Trade 
     Promotion Authority Act of 2001'';
       (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``section 
     1102(a)(3)(A)'' and inserting ``section 3(a)(3)(A) of the 
     Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''; and
       (C) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 1102 of the 
     Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' and 
     inserting ``section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
     Authority Act of 2001,''.
       (3) Hearings and advice.--Sections 132, 133(a), and 134(a) 
     (19 U.S.C. 2152, 2153(a), and 2154(a)) are each amended by 
     striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
     Authority Act of 2001,''.
       (4) Prerequisites for offers.--Section 134(b) (19 U.S.C. 
     2154(b)) is amended by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus 
     Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting 
     ``section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act 
     of 2001''.
       (5) Advice from private and public sectors.--Section 135 
     (19 U.S.C. 2155) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(1)(A), by striking ``section 1102 of 
     the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and 
     inserting ``section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
     Authority Act of 2001'';
       (B) in subsection (e)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
     Authority Act of 2001''; and
       (ii) by striking ``section 1103(a)(1)(A) of such Act of 
     1988'' and inserting ``section 5(a)(1)(A) of the Bipartisan 
     Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001''; and
       (C) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 1101 of the 
     Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting 
     ``section 2 of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act 
     of 2001''.
       (6) Transmission of agreements to congress.--Section 162(a) 
     (19 U.S.C. 2212(a)) is amended by striking ``or under section 
     1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' 
     and inserting ``or under section 3 of the Bipartisan Trade 
     Promotion Authority Act of 2001''.
       (b) Application of Certain Provisions.--For purposes of 
     applying sections 125, 126, and 127 of the Trade Act of 1974 
     (19 U.S.C. 2135, 2136(a), and 2137)--
       (1) any trade agreement entered into under section 3 shall 
     be treated as an agreement entered into under section 101 or 
     102, as appropriate, of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111 
     or 2112); and
       (2) any proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to 
     a trade agreement entered into under section 3 shall be 
     treated as a proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant 
     to a trade agreement entered into under section 102 of the 
     Trade Act of 1974.

     SEC. 11. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Agreement on agriculture.--The term ``Agreement on 
     Agriculture'' means the agreement referred to in section 
     101(d)(2) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 
     3511(d)(2)).
       (2) Core labor standards.--The term ``core labor 
     standards'' means--
       (A) the right of association;
       (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
       (C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or 
     compulsory labor;
       (D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and
       (E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum 
     wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.
       (3) GATT 1994.--The term ``GATT 1994'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
     Act (19 U.S.C. 3501).
       (4) ILO.--The term ``ILO'' means the International Labor 
     Organization.
       (5) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen;
       (B) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity 
     organized under the laws of the United States; and
       (C) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity that 
     is organized under the laws of a foreign country and is 
     controlled by entities described in subparagraph (B) or 
     United States citizens, or both.
       (6) Uruguay round agreements.--The term ``Uruguay Round 
     Agreements'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(7) 
     of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(7)).
       (7) World trade organization; wto.--The terms ``World Trade 
     Organization'' and ``WTO'' mean the organization established 
     pursuant to the WTO Agreement.
       (8) WTO agreement.--The term ``WTO Agreement'' means the 
     Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered 
     into on April 15, 1994.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) 
and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) each will control 30 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas).
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Any bill of this magnitude that comes to the floor will always have a 
history of would have, could have, should have; but what is more 
difficult about this bill than most is that my colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle have been forced to diminish the contribution from my 
colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dooley), the very brave 
and knowledgeable members of the Committee on Ways and Means, the 
gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Tanner), and the gentleman from Louisiana 
(Mr. Jefferson).
  Both the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Tanner) and the gentleman from 
Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson) are members of the Subcommittee on Trade of 
the Committee on Ways and Means, that subcommittee that deals on an 
ongoing, everyday basis with this issue. They are among the most 
knowledgeable in the House. But because some of my friends on the other 
side are so driven to deny the President the use of this legislative 
tool, that somehow the fact that the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Levin), working with the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), 
someone who is not on the Committee on Ways and Means, is to be held up 
as

[[Page H8994]]

an example of the way we should operate, but when members of the 
Committee on Ways and Means get together to work on this problem, that 
is a model to blast, to argue it is not bipartisan, to argue the 
product is not any good and whether they mean to or not.
  I took this time at the beginning, regardless of what the vote is at 
the end, to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Dooley), to thank 
the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Jefferson), to thank the gentleman 
from Louisiana (Mr. Tanner), and to thank their staffs. For almost 5 
months we have worked on what was said to be an impossible project, to 
resolve the differences that drove us not to provide this power to the 
President previously. I voted for that. I will vote it for any 
President, but to trash my colleagues who are powerful enough in terms 
of their belief that something needed to be done, for my colleagues to 
carry the day by defeating this is unworthy of any Member.
  Attack me, I understand it. I am one of the targets and the symbols; 
but do not, do not, do not derogate the contribution of those Democrats 
who were strong enough and who believed enough in this to work together 
in an intellectually honest way, to produce a product that ironically 
is better than any product that has ever been brought to this floor in 
a number of ways, which we will talk about.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 4 minutes 
to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson) to allocate as he sees 
fit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Matsui), a senior member, one who has worked so hard on 
the alternative to the majority bill.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Rangel), the ranking Democrat member of the committee, for yielding me 
the time.
  Let me just say this. I am holding in my hands two volumes. These are 
pieces of legislation that was passed in 1994. It was to implement the 
Uruguay Rounds and basically put in place the World Trade Organization. 
I do not say this as somebody who actually produced this legislation 
along with my colleague the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Crane).
  I have been a free trader for the last 23 years, since I have been in 
the United States Congress. I show my colleagues these documents, 
mainly because we took an up or down vote in 1994, after about 5 hours 
of debate, and passed this legislation, 5,000 pages.
  The Uruguay Round, which passed 7 years ago, was basically about 
reducing tariffs and eliminating quotas. We had a little about 
intellectual property, but it was basically about tariffs and quotas.
  This next round, the round that we just witnessed in Doha, the 
beginning of, will be a round in which we not only talk about tariffs 
and quotas, which will be a small part of it, but it will be about 
antitrust laws. It will be about food safety laws. It will be about 
changes in hundreds of government regulations in the United States.
  The United States Trade Representative will be able to go through the 
back door, through the World Trade Organization, and make major changes 
in domestic regulations and domestic laws; and if my colleagues think 
these volumes are big, wait till we see 4 or 5 years from now when 
these negotiations are continued. We will see a volume four or five 
times larger than this, and we will have 4 hours of debate on the floor 
of the House, and we have to vote yes or no; and I will guarantee my 
colleagues they will not know for 2 or 3 years what will be in this 
legislation.
  We might find that there will be a situation where basically we will 
be making major changes in antitrust laws, and we will not even know 
whether the consumer will be protected. This is why the legislation 
should go down, and we should review it again.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  What we will hear from the other side all day is would have, could 
have, should have. Would have, could have, should have; would have, 
could have, should have; would have, could have, should have; would 
have, could have, should have.
  At some point my colleagues have to decide whether or not the 
President needs this power. It is going to have to be done in a 
bipartisan way, and we have a bipartisan product in front of us.
  Mr. Speaker, I place in the Record the ``Statement of Administration 
Policy,'' which begins: ``The Administration strongly supports H.R. 
3005.''
         Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
           and Budget,
                                 Washington, DC, December 5, 2001.

                   Statement of Administration Policy


      H.R. 3005--Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001

                 (Rep. Thomas (R) CA and 5 cosponsors)

       The Administration strongly supports H.R. 3005 and looks 
     forward to working with the Congress to provide the President 
     with the authority and flexibility to secure the greatest 
     possible trade opportunities for America's farmers, workers, 
     producers, and consumers. H.R. 3005 would provide Trade 
     Promotion Authority for the President and would establish 
     special procedures for the consideration of legislation to 
     implement trade agreements.
       Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) is about asserting American 
     leadership, strengthening the American economy, and creating 
     American jobs.
       A congressional grant of TPA takes on renewed importance 
     with the launch of new global trade negotiations. These 
     negotiations can open markets and provide job creating 
     opportunities for every sector of the American economy. But 
     the President can strike the best deal for American workers 
     and families only with approval of TPA. TPA's enactment will 
     send a powerful signal to our trading partners that the 
     United States is committed to free and open trade.
       TPA is also essential to put the United States back at the 
     table to help set the rules of the trading game. Our global 
     influence diminished in recent years as other countries moved 
     ahead while we have been stalled. There are currently more 
     than 130 free trade agreements in the world. The United 
     States is party to only three.
       The Bush Administration is committed to consultations with 
     Congress to help ensure that the Administration's negotiating 
     objectives reflect the views of our elected representatives, 
     and that they will have regular opportunities to provide 
     advice throughout the negotiating process. H.R. 3005 deepens 
     the traditional partnership between the Executive branch and 
     the Congress through the creation of a joint Congressional 
     Oversight Group with broad bipartisan representation from all 
     the Committees that have jurisdiction over a part of a trade 
     negotiation.
       Without TPA, the United States will fall behind in shaping 
     the rules of globalization, our new momentum for trade will 
     be undercut, and the confidence and growth necessary for 
     economic recovery will be weakened.
       Passage of H.R. 3005 will send a strong signal of U.S. 
     leadership in trade liberalization.

  What does this package do? Obviously it creates the power to 
negotiate specific agreements, which will come to us later, without 
ability to equivocate or disagree. This legislation is the best in 
terms of agricultural objectives we have ever seen. It is the best in 
foreign investment we have ever seen. It is the best in electronic 
commerce we have ever seen. It is the best in intellectual property. It 
is the best in foreign relations, and for the first time treated 
equally with trade is labor and the environment. It is the best we have 
ever seen in a dispute resolution, and it is the most comprehensive 
oversight and scrutiny ever presented to the Congress. It is more 
bipartisan, more representative, and more effective in terms of 
expanding the number of Members who are able to deal with these issues.
  In addition to that, after we took the product, put together by my 
friends that I had mentioned earlier, we then went and talked to 
additional Members. Through this process of talking to Members, what do 
they think of this work product, and from their perspective how can it 
be improved, they said we want to make sure there is not a race to the 
bottom on the labor and the environmental standards. We did that.
  They said we want to make sure that no foreign investors when we go 
to court have greater rights than any U.S. citizen. Okay. We did that.
  They said they want to make sure that if there is foreign currency 
changes, that it is not foreign currency manipulation for the purpose 
of getting a trade advantage. We said that is a good idea. It is in the 
bill.
  Members asked for special consideration in terms of import-sensitive 
products. They have gotten it in three

[[Page H8995]]

 different locations because clearly they are threatened if they are 
import sensitive.
  Members asked that the administration not reduce textile tariffs when 
they are negotiating with another country that, as the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Matsui) held up in terms of the Uruguay Round, where 
other countries said they would reduce their tariff and they have not. 
We said they are right. We are going to make sure that our negotiators 
do not lower our tariffs when the other country they are negotiating 
with have higher tariffs.
  Members asked for an improved consultation and opportunity to 
actually withdraw trade promotion authority if the administration 
failed to consult. In a number of ways, we said, they are right; we 
will enhance it.
  Finally, on the oversight, not just the committee's of jurisdiction, 
but every committee whose jurisdiction would be affected by the 
potential legislation, the administration has to come to us at the 
beginning of the process, during the process, and at the end of the 
process. They have to satisfy the Members of Congress on transparency 
and information transfer.
  The administration does not determine when they are through. The 
administration does not determine how much information is to be made 
available. For the first time in any agreement, it is the Congress that 
controls how much information the administration has to provide.
  In every aspect, this is a better negotiating tool than we have ever 
seen in the past. It is bipartisan. It is something that the President 
has said he desperately needs for a number of reasons; and there is no 
solid, substantial reason that this should not pass today.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that we extend the 
time for debate for 1 hour in view of the fact that the Committee on 
Rules did not see fit to give the Democrats a substitute, in view of 
the fact that the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) put this bill 
together in the middle of the night without a hearing, and we are now 
finding sometimes for the first time what is in it.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, and I do plan 
to object, I am very proud of the way the Committee on Rules has put 
together this package, and I do not believe that this was done in the 
middle of the night.
  I believe, as I said in my statement during the debate on the rule, 
we are faced with an up or down vote on whether or not we are going to 
grant the President this very important Trade Promotion Authority, and 
I happen to believe that we have been talking about this for a long 
period of time.
  During debate of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Hall) said let us move ahead and let us vote.
  So, Mr. Speaker, I object.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, with deep disappointment, I yield such time 
as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. George Miller).
  (Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California asked and was given permission to 
revise and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to 
this legislation.
  Ladies and Gentlemen, Trade Promotion Authority is being sold to 
Americans as a few different things. The Bush Administration has called 
today's vote an act of patriotism, now more necessary than ever. House 
Republican leaders, in a suspicious midnight conversion, are now 
feverishly promising gifts to its critics in return for their support. 
Well folks, you can wrap this vote up in red, white and blue. You can 
tie it with a bow and put it under the tree. But either way, this trade 
bill is neither patriotic nor a gift. It is a dagger into our basic 
rights and our standard of living.
  Americans are being asked to make three sacrifices in exchange for 
President Bush's trade policy. They are being asked to give up their 
middle-class lifestyle, their environmental concerns, and their public 
health. For all those Americans who think that sounds like a raw deal--
and they are right--I urge my colleagues to vote a resounding ``no'' on 
this very bad trade deal.
  When NAFTA was passed in 1993, its supporters promised nothing but 
blue skies for hard-working Americans. Using fast-track authority. 
President Clinton hurdled the bill through Congress without a truly 
meaningful debate in Congress on the effects of such a trade agreement. 
Millions of Americans have paid a high price for that lack of candor 
eight years ago. A recent report shows that 3 million actual and 
potential jobs disappeared from the American economy between 1994 and 
2000 due to NAFTA and the accelerated trade deficits it caused. In my 
home State of California, over 300,000 manufacturing jobs--good jobs, 
well-paying jobs--crossed the border during the last 6 years. The 
economic surge and booming stock market of the 1990s masked a harsh 
reality for millions of American workers--for them, NAFTA has meant 
nothing more than a pink slip.
  Despite this, President Bush and others in Congress would expand 
NAFTA further. If this bill passes, it would allow the Administration 
to eventually spread NAFTA's misery to over 30 other nations in our 
hemisphere and further exacerbate job losses in our own country. 
America's workers had hoped for a different kind of generosity from the 
American government. After losing their jobs to NAFTA a few years ago, 
they waited for training programs. In the wake of September 11, they 
waited for help that instead went to corporations. And they are waiting 
still, listening to empty promises that TPA will help bring back their 
jobs.
  In the last day, realizing that they are perilously close to losing 
this vote on fast track, Republican leaders have suddenly become 
concerned about the needs of America's working men and women. They are 
now promising more trade adjustment assistance, for example. That would 
be nice. But their bill does not guarantee more trade adjustment 
assistance, it just authorizes it. We've been there before. Their bill 
continue to fail to address the deeper pitfalls that fast track poses 
for working families.
  Fast Track also poses a serious threat to the environment. Frankly, 
it is insulting to my colleagues and all Americans when fast track 
proponents claim that their bill includes strong language that 
adequately addresses environmental concerns. One look at NAFTA shows 
why we should be terrified at extending current trade rules to future 
agreements.

  Chapter 11, a provision intended to protect multinational 
corporations from their host states, has been abused by corporations 
that refuse to be bound by lawfully decided and publicly supported 
environmental regulations. California was one of the first states to 
run into the chapter 11 problem when it tried to protect its 
environment from the harmful effects of MTBE. When California halted 
the use of the gasoline additive, a Canadian corporation called 
Methanex sued the United States under NAFTA's chapter 11 for almost one 
billion dollars because of lost revenue it said it would incur from 
California's decision to protect its environment. Luckily, however, 
America remains a democracy where important environmental decisions are 
reached in a fair, open manner.
  Consider this frightening, fast track reality: If foreign companies 
operating in the U.S. don't want to play by our rules, they get their 
cases decided before a secret tribunal accountable to no one. This lack 
of democracy doesn't bother the administration. The environment has 
become a defendant without rights. Rights are reserved for multi-
national corporations.
  Like pharmaceutical companies, for example. According to the Bush 
administration, demanding higher labor standards in our trade 
agreements is an imposition of values. On the other hand, when we force 
other countries to rigidly adhere to our own intellectual property 
laws, this is sound policy. A principal negotiating objective in this 
bill is to achieve the elimination of, ``price controls and reference 
pricing which deny full market access for United States products''. I 
don't think such a narrow-minded, market-driven approach is justifiable 
in the face of an HIV/AIDS pandemic that has decimated much of Africa.
  Since the horrible events of September 11, public health experts have 
warned that our country must reduce its vulnerability to potential 
biological and chemical terrorism. The American Public Health 
Association doesn't support this bill because it represents a risk to 
the safety of America's food supply.
  Let me quote Dr. Mohammad Akhter, Executive Director of the American 
Public Health Association:

       With our system of imported food safety so flimsy, the last 
     thing we need is an executive mandate for more porous 
     borders.

  Executive mandate is exactly what this bill is. It stomps on the 
constitutional authority granted to Congress over international 
commerce. On these grounds alone, this bill is unconstitutional. But 
add to that criticism the hostility that this bill shows toward labor 
rights, environmental protection and public health, and you have a bill 
that is indefensible and should be voted down here today. A vote 
against fast track is a vote to defend the rights

[[Page H8996]]

and liberties that we hold so dear. It is a vote to support working men 
and women in America. It is a vote to protect our environment, our 
public health and our values.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. Neal), a member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
  (Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Thomas) said, ``would have, could have and should have.'' Let us 
add another part of that, ``want to,'' because as a free trader here I 
strongly urge my colleagues today to vote against this particular 
version of Fast Track Authority. The bill, put together by the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) and the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Levin) is far superior, and I hope that that version will pass by 
the end of the hour we have to debate.
  While being more modern perhaps than their previous offerings, the 
Republican bill still fails to give adequate voice to the new realities 
of trade negotiations, that decisions made impact our constituents in 
many more ways than they used to, because the negotiations no longer 
simply attempt to lower tariffs or to reduce direct restraints on 
trade.
  Hence, the goals the United States should pursue need to be more 
clearly articulated in any legislation, the issues that we do not 
always see at the surface in Fast Track Authority. The role of Congress 
needs to be far more extensive in order to bring about a successful 
conclusion.
  These new realities are knitted together in a far more comprehensive 
manner by the Rangel-Levin version of Fast Track Authority than the 
Republicans have proposed. We all would be better off in the long run 
by a decision to negotiate, in a meaningful way, bipartisan legislation 
rather than forcing this through this afternoon.

                              {time}  1400

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Crane), the chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means.
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time, and I rise in strong support of H.R. 3005.
  This bill is about arming the President and his team with the 
authority to achieve trade agreements written in the best interest of 
U.S. farmers, companies, and workers. It ensures that the President 
will negotiate according to clearly defined goals and objectives 
written by Congress.
  Trade is fundamental to our relations with other nations. As the 
President strives to neutralize international threats to our security, 
TPA is an essential tool for him to have to use in the campaign to 
build coalitions around the world that work with us to guard freedom.
  H.R. 3005 strikes a two-way partnership between the President and 
Congress on our common objectives for international trade negotiations 
in which the United States participates. Its passage will ensure that 
the world knows that Americans speak with one voice on issues vital to 
our economic security.
  My colleagues know I am not one who is enthusiastic about putting 
labor and environmental matters on the trade agenda, and my original 
TPA bill, H.R. 2149, which had 100 cosponsors, was completely clean in 
this respect. But to protect our country's interests internationally, I 
acknowledged the necessity of forging a meeting of minds on these 
sensitive issues with our colleagues on the other side of the aisle. 
The final result of difficult compromises over 5 months is the bill 
before us today.
  TPA simply offers the opportunity for us to negotiate from a position 
of strength, and does not in any way constitute final approval of any 
trade agreement. Under this bill, Congress and the American people 
retain full authority to approve or disapprove any trade agreement at 
the time the President presents it to Congress.
  While we have delayed these last 7 years to pass TPA, other countries 
have accelerated their claims to new markets. The U.S. is the world's 
greatest exporter, sending almost $1 trillion worth of goods and 
services to foreign consumers. Expanding trade remains the linchpin of 
any successful strategy to increase long-term noninflationary economic 
growth.
  In my home State of Illinois, over 400,000 jobs are tied directly to 
exports. These jobs are more secure and pay over 15 percent more than 
nontrade-related jobs. According to a study by the National Association 
of Manufacturers, companies that manufacture for export are almost 10 
percent less likely to go out of business than others. These firms pay 
better benefits. In Illinois, these good, high paying, trade-related 
jobs are often in the machinery, agriculture, information technology, 
and chemical sectors. These are the types of jobs that will not be 
created if we reject the opportunities of the international marketplace 
by voting no on H.R. 3005.
  In these times of economic dislocation, we cannot afford to deny 
President Bush a primary tool of economic growth. Americans have never 
been reluctant to compete head to head with our trading partners. We 
should not dash the best chance we have of creating a better future of 
dynamic economic growth and success for our workers, businesses, and 
farmers in international markets.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote on H.R. 3005.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Sawyer).
  (Mr. SAWYER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the measure before 
us, confident that we can do better.
  Mr. Speaker, I bring credentials to this discussion.
  I have supported trade initiatives since I came to Congress. And I 
continue to believe that Presidential trade negotiating authority is an 
important tool. But it must be the right kind of authority, suited to 
our time. And the bill before us does not provide that.
  Trade negotiations have moved far beyond the issue of tariffs. These 
negotiations now affect our nation's tax laws, intellectual property 
standards, insurance system, and agricultural programs. These are 
issues that would not have occurred to Congress when we launched GATT 
after World War II. Our trade laws must change with the times. The 
volume and content of international trade has expanded enormously in 
the past decade. And the scope of trade agreements has expanded well 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means in the last 
quarter century. Trade affects all of our constituents on a daily 
basis, and we must strengthen our responsibility to speak for them.
  Congress must now expand its capacity to engage negotiators over the 
often long and complex course of modern trade agreements. We need an 
expanded, independently informed, and active set of Congressional 
advisers. And if the President's negotiators are obviously not 
fulfilling their stated objectives, Members must have an opportunity to 
vote on a resolution of disapproval that does not have to be passed 
first by the Ways and Means Committee. Congress must have an integral 
role, more than just more vague promises from the Administration to 
consult with us. If the consultations, or rather lack of them, that 
bring us to this juncture today are an example of what our colleagues 
have in mind, it is an empty promise indeed. Giving Congress real 
participatory oversight of the negotiations is the best way to build 
Congressional support for the agreements that are ultimately reached.
  It is simply not true to say that opponents of the Thomas bill are 
opponents of free trade. That statement ignores the honest effort led 
by Mr. Rangel to craft a bill that will accomplish the objective of 
promoting trade without sacrificing our capacity to continue to work 
towards basic environmental and labor standards.
  A vote against today's bill is not an attempt to hold free trade 
hostage until the rest of the world matches our labor standards. The 
Rangel alternative expects nothing of the sort. A vote against the bill 
is a vote to go back to work on legislation that will engage our 
partners in a real dialogue. We must ensure, at a minimum, that 
countries do not weaken their labor and environment laws to attract 
investment. It is a vote to go back to work on a bill that will create 
the relationship that should naturally exist between the World Trade 
Organization and the International Labor Organization. It is a vote to 
ensure that the rules we set up do not give foreign investors greater 
rights in America than Americans themselves enjoy.
  I look to the future, and I know we can build a bipartisan consensus 
for trade promotion authority. That is crucial because any trade 
negotiating framework must have the confidence

[[Page H8997]]

of more than a narrow, partisan majority in order to command real 
respect for trade agreements that flow from it. The bill before us 
today, regrettably, does not do that. We can do better.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Cardin), a distinguished member of the Committee on Ways 
and Means.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I support granting the President Trade 
Promotion Authority, but I oppose the bill we are considering today. I 
have supported fast track authority for NAFTA, for GATT, I supported 
PNTR, but I oppose this bill.
  The reason I oppose it is that the landscape for trade legislation 
has changed, yet our delegation of authority to our President has not. 
Let me just cite one example.
  We talk about putting in our authority that we expect to make 
progress on labor standards by enforcing one's own laws. Yet when we 
accomplished that for Jordan, the first thing we did was to weaken our 
ability to enforce those standards.
  Let us take a look at antidumping laws. We passed legislation in this 
body that said we would not weaken our antidumping and countervailing 
duty laws. Yet in Doha we put that on the table for negotiations. So at 
least we would think that this underlying bill would make a principal 
objective of trade that we do not weaken our own laws in this regard. 
But, no, we put it as a third priority. What message is that to our 
trading partners? We can do better.
  Support the motion to recommit with the Rangel bill, then we really 
will give the right authority to the President. I urge rejecting the 
underlying bill and supporting the motion to recommit.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Herger), a member of the Committee on 
Ways and Means.
  Mr. HERGER. Mr. Speaker, this is without a doubt one of the most 
important votes any of us will cast this Congress. Today we are 
deciding whether or not we will give American workers and American 
companies the support they need to open international markets.
  Nowhere is trade more important than on the farm. Last year, more 
than $140 million worth of dried plums, $600 million worth of almonds, 
were exported from the State of California, much of it from my northern 
California district. California exports 80 percent of its cotton, 70 
percent of its almonds, and 40 percent of its rice, yet our farmers 
face an average tariff rate of 62 percent. These barriers will never be 
eliminated until we give the President Trade Promotion Authority.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to support TPA.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield an additional 2 
minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson.)
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Without objection, the 
gentleman from Louisiana will control 2 additional minutes.
  Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Moran).
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Moran).
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I want to address myself 
particularly to the Democratic side of the aisle, not necessarily to 
all of the Democratic Caucus, because I understand that many of us are 
in districts that have high concentrations of organized labor, have 
high concentrations of textiles and other industries that could be 
adversely affected by trade. But I know that there are at least 60 
Members who represent districts that are highly dependent upon trade, 
that in fact represent the highest economic growth sectors of this 
economy; technology, telecommunications, professional services products 
throughout the manufacturing sector benefit from international trade.
  All of our constituents benefit by lower prices in products and 
services as a result of trade. In fact, all of us have constituents 
whose incomes are 15 percent greater because they are in export-related 
jobs.
  The reality is that this bill in fact, is bipartisan, and nobody 
outside the boundaries of the Beltway cares about personalities or 
process. They look at policy. From a policy standpoint, we have 
enforceable standards on labor and the environment. We have the 
availability of the use of sanctions for all such negotiating 
objectives. We have transparency in all commercial transactions.
  This is the most substantial progress in U.S. trade policy with 
respect to labor and the environment that we have ever had the 
opportunity to vote for. This is a good bill. It is one we should all 
support. I urge its approval.
  Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to 
the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks).
  (Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Trade 
Promotion Authority Act of 2001. This is outstanding legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 3005 is legislation that will grant to the 
President Fast Track negotiating authority for certain trade 
agreements. I am convinced, Mr. Speaker, that this authority is 
necessary to ensure that the United States remains a global leader on 
free trade, and to enable this President and future Presidents to 
continue to work to open foreign markets to American goods.
  Clearly in today's global economy, our Nation has a major interest in 
reducing barriers to international trade, with more and more American 
jobs dependent upon our ability to market our goods and services to 
overseas customers. And certainly in my State of Washington, which is 
the most trade-dependent in the Nation, our ability to trade freely 
with foreign nations sustains an enormous portion of our economy. In 
Washington, we exported more than $33 billion in goods each year, 
estimated to sustain more than 1 million jobs. The Puget Sound area of 
our State was recently described as the most export-dependent U.S. 
metropolitan area. So this is an issue that relates very much to the 
creation of new jobs in our region, and certainly it plays a major role 
in the national economy as well, helping to improve our balance of 
trade and provide jobs for American workers in the 21st century.
  And these are good jobs. These are not low wage service jobs that 
have been generated from the growth of international trade in my State. 
They are family-wage jobs that pay substantially greater than the 
national average. We are talking about thousands of union machinists 
making airplanes at the Boeing Company, about software developers at 
Microsoft, mill workers who fabricate aluminum at Kaiser, chipmakers at 
Intel, and workers at Weyerhauser who produce lumber wood products.
  Trade is not just important to large businesses and big corporations. 
In my state, there are many more small businesses than big ones that 
owe their income to international trade.
  There are many small companies that supply machine and airplane parts 
that go into the aircraft that we sell overseas, thousands of farmers 
that grow apples and wheat, and countless small, family-owned mills 
that process timber and sell the products in Asian and other overseas 
markets. And there are jobs that are sustained by these exporters: 
Bankers, teachers, restaurant workers, plumbers, lawyers and countless 
others.
  The economic recession has had a severe impact on the State of 
Washington. The end of the high technology boom and the effect that the 
attacks on September 11 have had on the aircraft industry has been 
devastating. Currently, we are suffering the highest unemployment rate 
in the Nation--6.6 percent.
  My highest priority as a Member of Congress has always been jobs. 
Increasing our trade and exports with other countries means jobs for 
Americans and jobs for people in Washington State. In my judgment, the 
fastest way out of this recession is to tear down the barriers other 
nations have put up against American goods and services, enabling our 
manufacturers and other businesses to access new markets. I believe in 
the ability of our workers and businesses to compete against anybody 
and win.
  Some of my colleagues claim that Trade Promotion Authority is not 
needed; that the President can already conduct trade negotiations 
without expedited authority granted by Congress. This is true, the 
President can negotiate an agreement with other nations. However, what 
we have found since Fast Track authority lapsed in 1994 is that other 
nations are unwilling to negotiate with us knowing that any agreement 
reached with the administration would likely be changed by Congress 
without consultation or consideration of the views of the other party 
to the agreement. This is why President Clinton strongly urged Congress 
to extend Fast Track authority several years ago.

[[Page H8998]]

  We are falling behind. Of the more than 130 free trade agreements in 
the world today, the United States is a party to only three. The 
European Union, by contrast, is a party to more than 27. Because they 
cannot negotiate a fair deal with the United States, other countries 
are choosing to buy European-made manufactured goods and agricultural 
commodities, putting our factory workers and farmers at a distinct 
disadvantage.
  I urge my colleagues to consider very seriously how a vote against 
this bill will affect our nation's ability to compete in the global 
marketplace. I also ask that you think about how important this bill is 
to enable our economic recovery. For both of these reasons, I encourage 
my colleagues to join me in support of H.R. 3005.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Shaw), a member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
  Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, ``Made in the USA'' is a badge of pride. It is a symbol 
of quality. It is a symbol of good workmanship. It is not a symbol of 
protectionism. The greatest, largest economy in the world cannot be 
afraid of free trade. The most free country, the strongest country in 
the world, cannot be afraid to give to their President the same 
authority that every other President and Prime Minister in this world 
has today.
  Let us give this authority to the President. We are not voting on a 
treaty. We are simply voting on the authority of the President to go 
forward. The rest of the world is going towards free trade. We are 
going to lose markets to the countries that have free trade. Let us 
support this bill. It is very important to give the President this 
authority.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Kind).
  Mr. KIND. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding me this 
time, and I rise reluctantly in opposition to H.R. 3005 today.
  I say reluctantly, because I believe in trade, the necessity for it 
to achieve economic growth and expanded opportunities for all of our 
workers, I believe the President needs this authority, and I have 
supported all trade agreements in Congress since I have been here; this 
debate today, however, is not about being for trade or against trade, 
it is about establishing the rules of trade in the 21st century.
  The world is very different than it has been in the past when trade 
negotiations were, by and large, about reducing trade barriers, quotas, 
and tariffs. There are many more complex and evolving issues involving 
trade: labor and environmental standards, antitrust, health and safety 
standards, privacy standards. The major issue for trade in the 21st 
century will be the harmonization of these different standards. And the 
question is do we harmonize upwards or downwards? Do we improve 
standards around the globe or is it a race to the bottom?
  That is why I, along with the gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui), 
believe there needs to be a greater institutional role for Congress to 
have consistent with our Article I, section 8 responsibilities in the 
Constitution. But I resent the fact that many of us have had to come 
begging in the 11th hour to get the majority party and the 
administration to do right by American workers today with an adequate 
worker relief package which is the right thing to do anyway. That 
should not occur. It should have been dealt with months ago, but 
instead it came to this. Trade policy should not be partisan or 
personality driven. Let's instead do it right.
  So unfortunately I rise in opposition and encourage support for the 
motion to recommit.
  As our Nation leads the world into the 21st century, we should not 
shy from opportunities to guide and expand global trade. Opening up 
foreign markets to American goods not only provides economic growth 
potential, but also exposes American ideals to people around the globe. 
I cannot, however, support the majority's trade authority legislation 
because it does little service to real problems facing this Nation, 
refuses to guide trade negotiations in a positive way, and 
unnecessarily maintains a weak constitutional role for Congress in 
regulating international commerce, which is our obligation under 
article 1, section 8 of the Constitution.
  In a world fused by global integration and communication, 
international trade has become a linchpin of not only our national 
economy, but also the economies of most nations. We must remember that 
today's vote, however, is not about promoting or suppressing trade 
between the United States and other nations. This vote is about how our 
Federal Government goes about the process of regulating commerce 
between nations.
  Our Founding Fathers deliberately put Congress in control of 
regulating commerce with foreign nations. With the impact of tariffs 
and duties directly affecting their diverse constituencies, Members 
have a responsibility to weigh in on the regional impacts of these 
mechanisms. Today's trade environment is constantly changing, with 
nontariff trade issues impacting all aspects of our economy and law. 
Issues including antitrust law, intellectual property, and 
pharmaceutical costs, along with concerns over regulatory 
harmonization, require intense negotiations at a new level. 
Nonetheless, the role of Congress should not be ignored as it is in 
H.R. 3005, but reestablished in recognition of these new challenges. To 
this end, I encourage my colleagues to consider the establishment of a 
Congressional Trade Office that could analyze the implications of trade 
negotiations, and address the concerns of Congress. Such an office 
would also be able to provide all Members, not just certain committee 
leaders, with information on the range of issues facing each region in 
a nonpartisan, objective fashion.
  In formulating a trade authority bill that will help establish how 
America engages the rest of the world in the 21st century, I had hoped 
this Congress would seize the opportunity to move toward positive, 
fundamental changes in world trade agreements. Unfortunately, by 
forcing a partisan trade bill, the House leadership dismissed this 
opportunity, effectively limiting our Nation's ability to advance 
international labor, health, safety, and environmental standards, as 
well as improve transparency in international organizations.
  Developing trade relations between the United States and foreign 
nations is often mutually beneficial on economic, societal, and 
political fronts. We cannot, however, ignore that with such engagement, 
competition increases and can result in winners and losers.

  In my home town of La Crosse, WI, Isola Laminate Systems recently 
laid off 190 skilled workers due in part to a worsening economy, but 
also due to government trade policies relating to textiles. These laid 
off workers should have every opportunity to receive adequate benefits, 
including health and training, through Trade Adjustment Assistance. 
While the majority has thrown a bone to workers in regard to increased 
TAA assistance, the shortcomings of TAA have not been resolved.
  Moreover, it is important that any real Trade Adjustment Assistance 
reform provide benefits to our Nation's agricultural producers. 
America's family farmers are impacted by our trade agreements through 
markets being both gained and lost. Unfortunately, agricultural 
producers are not currently eligible for trade adjustment assistance 
even though family farms are going out of business at record levels. 
Providing income assistance and job employment skills should be as 
important for America's farmers as it is for our Nation's industrial 
workers.
  As recent reports have indicated, our Nation's economy has been in 
recession since March 2001. In combination with immediate and long-term 
economic losses associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
the economy's downturn has resulted in faltered businesses and laid-off 
workers. In response, Congress has done little to come to the aid of 
displaced workers throughout the country, despite demands by Members 
and promises from the House leadership. In an effort to push 
unemployment legislation I, along with some of my colleagues, sent a 
letter on October 24, 2001 to the majority leadership stating our 
refusal to support Trade Promotion Authority unless displaced worker 
aide is addressed beforehand. The 11th hour promise to recommend action 
on unemployment benefits for our Nation's affected workers is not 
concrete, not encouraging, and not enough.
  As a supporter of increased trade opportunity, I consider this vote 
very important. H.R. 3005 as it currently stands, however, does not 
provide assurances that the concerns of western Wisconsin residents 
will be adequately addressed in future trade negotiations. If Congress 
is going to cede some of its authority over the regulation of commerce 
with foreign nations, such a proposal should be based on deliberate 
policy and not partisan politics. The failure of the House leadership 
to come to the negotiating table and work in a bipartisan manner on 
this important issue is shameful. I strongly encourage my colleagues to 
pass the motion to recommit and include language from the Rangel-Levin-
Matsui Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act, which more 
accurately addresses the issues of international labor and 
environmental concerns, and strengthens the critical role Congress 
should play formulating trade.
  Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from

[[Page H8999]]

Texas (Mr. Stenholm), the ranking member of the Committee on 
Agriculture.
  (Mr. STENHOLM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of Trade Promotion 
Authority and the bill before us today. The truth about trade is that 
there always are both successes and failures, winners and losers. But 
for our Nation as a whole, the indisputable fact is trade is a net 
positive.
  When it comes to agriculture, the successes have outweighed the 
failures. American farmers and ranchers now make a quarter of our sales 
to overseas markets. Next year, agriculture exports are expected to 
exceed $54.5 billion, making a net trade surplus of $14.5 billion. That 
is just a fraction of what could be possible if we had freer and fairer 
markets.
  For workers who have lost in trade in the past, I sincerely believe 
that the best and perhaps only way to fix what has failed is through 
new negotiations that level the playing field. We must speak and act 
with a united voice and a unified voice that is forged through a close 
partnership between Congress and the executive branch. That is the 
vision of the compromise bill before us today.
  There is a dear price to be paid for delay. American farmers and 
ranchers cannot afford for us to stand by and watch the rest of the 
world unite behind trade. We need to participate. Support this bill 
today.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Nussle), a member of the Committee on Ways and 
Means and the chairman of the Committee on the Budget in the House of 
Representatives.
  (Mr. NUSSLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, promoting international trade is essential 
to our economy and to our ability to secure America's future. Granting 
the President authority to improve and expand trade agreements is 
essential to securing America's future. We cannot say that we are for 
trade if we vote against promoting trade authority for the President.
  Let me talk about agriculture. Agriculture would probably be the 
biggest beneficiary under this agreement and under this legislation. 
Thirty-five percent of agricultural goods from my district alone are 
exported. If you walk out into a corn field and count the rows, 1 of 
every 5 corn rows in Iowa is exported.
  But it is not just agriculture. In my district, 217 manufacturers in 
little old Iowa, in the Second District, export on a regular basis. 
John Deere, 1 of every 4 green tractors that come off the line is 
exported overseas. Thirty-five thousand jobs nationwide are export 
dependent.
  Revitalize our economy, create jobs, pass Trade Promotion Authority.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Maine 
(Mr. Allen).
  Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time, and I rise to support the Rangel- Levin bill and oppose the 
Thomas bill, which contains provisions favoring the pharmaceutical 
industry that will make it harder for Americans and our trading 
partners to get access to affordable medicines.
  The Thomas bill will force the Third World's poorest countries to 
move more quickly to pay the First World's high drug prices in order to 
treat diseases like AIDS. Unlike the Rangel-Levin bill, the Thomas bill 
completely ignores the health needs of developing countries.
  The Thomas bill directs the elimination of government measures, such 
as price controls and reference pricing, used by many trading partners, 
to keep prescription drugs affordable. This is not a proper trade 
objective, it is a greed objective for the pharmaceutical industry.

                              {time}  1415

  By forcing higher drug prices in Canada, it could deprive many 
American seniors of an inexpensive source of drugs. In the U.S., it 
could force repeal of the deep discounts available for veterans and 
those on Medicaid. In the name of free trade, the Thomas bill protects 
the monopolies of this country's most profitable industry, and hurts 
the world's poorest disease-ridden countries. Vote down this bill.
  Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma (Mr. Carson).
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma (Mr. Carson).
  (Mr. CARSON of Oklahoma asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. CARSON of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlemen for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today as one of the distressingly few Democrats 
in support of a grant of Trade Promotion Authority to President Bush. 
My support of TPA springs from the recognition that trade is really 
part of a larger debate on the proper role of America in the world 
today. It is a debate that echoes in the halls of the Pentagon and the 
National Security Council, as well as those of our trade 
representatives, and that is waged with arguments in Doha but with arms 
in the Hindu Kush.
  Many of my colleagues in the Democratic Party state their belief in 
free trade, but nonetheless refuse to support TPA unless it includes 
provisions mandating other nations' compliance with our own 
environmental and labor standards. Alas, this notion, if enacted, would 
render TPA a nullity, a mere piece of paper that in the prelude 
expresses support for trade but which, in the details, mocks that 
claim. None of the developing nations with which we aspire to negotiate 
new trade agreements will accept strict labor and environmental 
provisions.
  And equally as important, the best way to improve labor and 
environmental standards, given many nations' social conditions, is to 
increase the wealth of the developing world, which trade will do, while 
also increasing our own wealth. It is a no-lose proposition.
  To reject TPA is, in the end, to reject trade itself, which is a 
disaster for the country and the world, and, for my own party, a 
refusal to live up to its historic obligation to support free trade.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today as one of the distressingly few Democrats 
in support of a grant of Trade Promotion Authority to President Bush. 
My support of TPA springs from the recognition that trade is really 
part of a larger debate on the proper role of America in the world 
today. It is a debate that echoes in the halls of the Pentagon and 
National Security Council, as well as those of our trade 
representatives, and that is waged with arguments in Doha but with arms 
in the Hindu Kush.
  Since Adam Smith first articulated the case for free trade in the 
18th century, economists, no matter whether liberal or conservative, 
have acknowledged with near-unanimity the merits of trade 
liberalization. Trade increases wealth for participating countries, 
ensures access to high-quality products, and guarantees the efficient 
use of resources. As Smith recognized, it pays for a country to 
specialize in what it does best, even if that country can do everything 
better than its trading partners. This is the essence of comparative 
advantage.
  Many of my colleagues in the Democratic Party state their belief in 
free trade, but nonetheless refuse to support TPA unless it includes 
provisions mandating other nation's compliance with our own 
environmental and labor standards. Alas, this notion, if enacted, would 
render TPA a nullity--a mere piece of paper that, in the prelude, 
expresses support for trade but which, in the details, mocks that 
claim. None of the developing nations with which we aspire to negotiate 
new trade agreements will accept strict labor and environmental 
provisions. And, equally as important, the best way to improve labor 
and environmental standards, given many nation's social conditions, is 
to increase the wealth of the developing world, which trade will do, 
while also increasing our own wealth. It's no-lose proposition.
  It is true that, while the nation tremendously benefits from trade, 
certain sectors of our economy can be hurt. That is why, as Democrats, 
we must support and expand Trade Adjustment Assistance, the portability 
of health insurance benefits, more assistance to the International 
Labor Organization and other non-governmental organizations that do the 
heavy lifting on labor and environmental issues, and even wage 
insurance for displaced workers. But at no cost should we scuttle one 
of the great achievements of the post-war era: the liberalization of 
trade. To reject TPA is, in the end, to reject trade itself, which is a 
disaster for the country and the world, and, for my own party, a 
refusal to live up to our historic obligation to reach out to the 
world, bringing prosperity to our own workers and those abroad, too.

[[Page H9000]]

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Washington (Ms. Dunn).
  Ms. DUNN. Mr. Speaker, I represented 700,000 in the suburbs of 
Seattle and Tacoma. One-third of the jobs held by these people are 
related to trade. Reducing trade barriers has never been more important 
in the Puget Sound area. If we do not expand exports and open new 
markets for Boeing jets and Microsoft software, we lose more jobs in 
the Northwest. For Boeing workers, TPA means keeping the aircraft 
industry viable in our community. Over $18 billion worth of aircrafts 
were exported last year. Traditionally, half of Boeing's aircraft sales 
are for overseas customers, a trend that will continue in the future.
  For our farmers, TPA means that more people will have access to the 
finest products in the world; 33 percent of Washington State 
commodities, valued at $1.8 billion go to the international market.
  For our high-tech firms, TPA means strengthening intellectual 
property standards. The software industry loses $12 billion annually 
due to counterfeiting and piracy. Reducing piracy in China alone could 
generate $1 billion of revenue for the Northwest.
  For women entrepreneurs, women-owned businesses involved in 
international trade have higher growth rates, develop more innovations, 
and create more jobs in their communities. Support TPA.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Ohio (Ms. Kaptur).
  Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``no'' vote on the Thomas bill so 
we can ultimately bring up the Rangel-Levin bill which takes an 
important step to restore this body's constitutional mandate in trade 
making so that trade regimes lift all people. Why pass another same-old 
same-old trade bill that will bring us more lost jobs, more bankrupt 
farmers with the lowest prices in history with growing trade deficits 
every single year.
  Fast Track procedures simply do not work. This Congress has the 
ability to write trade agreements that leaves no sector behind, 
recognizes worker rights, and a clean safe environment for each of the 
world's citizens. Put a human face on globalization; vote ``no'' on the 
Thomas bill and let us meet our constitutional obligations in this 
Chamber to write trade bills that work for everyone.
  Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Dooley), who has been a real leader in forging a 
bipartisan effort on this bill.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Dooley).
  (Mr. DOOLEY of California asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. DOOLEY of California. Mr. Speaker, it was a pleasure to work with 
the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson), the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Thomas), the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Tanner), and 
many others in drafting what I believe is a significant step forward in 
developing Trade Promotion Authority.
  Mr. Speaker, why is this important? It is important so the United 
States can maximize its influence and maximize its leadership 
internationally. It is important for the United States to demonstrate 
how we can lead and expand not only economic opportunities for the 
working people and the businesses in our country, but also demonstrate 
through this policy of economic engagement, which is embodied in our 
trade agreements, that we can do more to empower people throughout the 
world.
  When we look at those individuals in the developing world, every 
dollar in their per capita income that they see improved gives them 
greater purchasing power; but also with the improvement in their 
quality of life and their economy, we see the advancement of human 
rights, of civil liberties, and also the advancement of democracy.
  What we are able to do in this Trade Promotion Authority is to ensure 
that we are not only going to make progress in expanding the economic 
opportunities; but also for the first time, we are going to be able to 
provide the ability to see the enhancement of environmental and labor 
standards internationally through our trade agreements.
  What was also important for all of us to realize was that the only 
way we can again provide that leadership is to ensure that we can get 
these countries to the negotiating tables. A lot of the alternative 
proposals that have been offered for Trade Promotion Authority, 
unfortunately, would result in very few countries being interested to 
participate in negotiations with the United States.
  A failure to pass Trade Promotion Authority will have significant 
impacts. In the last few weeks we have heard that Brazil and Bolivia 
would fail to participate in a Free Trade Area to the America agreement 
without the passage of TPA.
  Following the Doha agreement, we have France that made a strong 
statement that they would not be interested in participating in the 
next round of negotiations if the United States President did not have 
TPA. This is important to our economy and workers, and also to the 
developing world.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Doggett), member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, here we have the ``fast'' Fast Track being 
rammed through Congress, with all amendments and alternatives blocked 
and 1 hour for 435 Members to debate this bill. When the House 
Republican leadership acts in such a high-handed manner before the bill 
is even passed it can hardly be expected to cooperate and collaborate 
after Fast-Track authority is granted.
  As a strong advocate for more international commerce, I have 
supported trade agreements with China, the Caribbean Basin, Africa, 
Jordan and most recently, the Andean region. The real issue today is 
not whether to expand trade, but how. In the Ways and Means Committee I 
sought unsuccessfully to obtain one simple guarantee: that foreign 
investors would not be given more rights than American citizens. 
Foreign investors should not be granted the right to eviscerate our 
environmental, health, safety and consumer laws, in secret investor 
tribunals beyond the review of the press, public, and watchdog groups.
  I cannot support unlimited authority to negotiate international 
agreement impacting the environment for an Administration whose 
environmental record has ranged from indifference to outright 
hostility. That is why the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, the 
League of Conservation voters and every major environmental group in 
this country is opposing this legislation. It relegates the role of 
Congress to little more than preparing a Christmas wish list, hoping 
that an Executive Santa Claus will deliver. I am not against taking a 
fast track to more trade; I am against any proposal that does not give 
the Congress a steering wheel and a brake when the administration takes 
the wrong track for the environment.
  Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Tennessee (Mr. Tanner), who has been a real partner in this effort.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Tennessee (Mr. Tanner).
  Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlemen for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, this has been an honest, intellectual exercise in a 
negotiation to try to do something for this country which desperately 
needs to be done. The irony of part of this argument today is the very 
means by which we address child labor, labor and environmental 
standards of all sorts, is through a vehicle just like we have the vote 
on today. It is the only way Congress can participate, and it ought to 
be done. The irony is if we turn it down, what have we done? Nothing. 
Absolutely nothing, and Congress has no voice at all in what goes on 
around the world in the area of the world marketplace. That is really 
pathetic.
  The other thing I would like to say, if Members believe, as I think 
everyone has to, that we can grow more food in this country than we can 
consume, that we can make more products and stuff than we can sell and 
buy from one another, then it is an economic fact of life, not a 
political argument, that those engaged in surplus production are going 
to lose their jobs. That is not

[[Page H9001]]

a political argument; that is an economic fact.
  How do we save those jobs, how do we create new jobs, is by exports 
so that people in this country can work to make, as an earlier speaker 
said, tractors in Iowa to send to the rest of the world. That is what 
this is about: jobs in this country.
  Mr. Speaker, if we turn this down, we are going to wait awhile, 1, 2, 
3 years, I will tell Members what is going to happen. Maybe 4, 5 years 
from now we are going to wake up and the economic partnerships which 
have been created between the Asians, the South Americans and the 
European Union, we are going to be wondering what happened to the 
United States leadership, to the United States jobs and to the United 
States role as a leader in the world.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Becerra), a member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
  Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Speaker, I would support Fast Track legislation that 
meaningfully addresses the areas of labor and the environment, and 
provides an effective mechanism for congressional participation. This 
bill does not. I urge my colleagues to vote against H.R. 3005.
  Mr. Speaker, article 1 of the Constitution empowers this body, 
Congress, to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Over the past 250 
years of our Nation's existence, for only 20 of those years, from 1974 
to 1994, has this body granted the President authority for fast 
tracking any trade agreement. In those 20 years, five agreements were 
signed. In contrast, during the 8 years of the Clinton administration, 
300 agreements were signed with countries from Belarus to Japan to 
Uzbekistan.
  We can do this without Fast Track. We should have Fast Track, but it 
should be a Fast Track that gives us a clear road map of where this 
authority will take us.
  We owe it to the American people not to abandon the American worker 
or consumer. Until we have Fast Track legislation that guarantees where 
we will protect our workers and consumers, we should not support Fast 
Track legislation. Vote ``no'' on H.R. 3005.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, I am someone who has never voted against 
trade legislation on this floor. But unfortunately, the President and 
the Republican leadership have missed an opportunity to move beyond the 
partisan and narrow ideological divide.
  The provisions of the bill of the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Rangel) which dealt with labor standards, multilateral environmental 
agreements and the elimination of the chapter 11 imbalance could have 
produced a bill which would have provided 250 ``yes'' votes on this 
floor.

                              {time}  1430

  But, instead, we are not even allowed to vote on it. We are only 
given 30 minutes to debate it. It is a travesty. Instead, the majority 
will be created by horse trading on citrus, on textiles, and on 
whatever else we will find out when we read the paper over the next 1 
or 2 weeks. It is a terrible way to create trade policy. At a time when 
our Nation expects the best, we are falling short. It is shameful, it 
is unnecessary.
  I urge a ``no'' vote. Come back, do it right. There will be an 
opportunity.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. McDermott), one of the active Members on trade.
  (Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks and include extraneous material.)
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 3005, 
the Trade Promotion Authority Act of ``Fast Track'' as it is commonly 
called.
  Let me first say that there probably isn't a Member in the House that 
has voted in favor of more trade legislation that I have. No part of 
the country is more dependent on trade than the district I represent in 
Congress. Almost one fourth of the jobs in the greater Seattle area are 
generated through trade. Trade fosters peaceful international 
relations, raised the quality of life of working families in our 
country as well as those in our partner nations. I have supported many 
trade agreements--MFN for China, NAFTA, AGOA and the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement Authorities Act of 1998--but like any trader, I try to learn 
from experience, and be careful that I only endorse agreements that 
advance our national goals.
  In the past year, our country lost more than one million 
manufacturing jobs. We have an economy in very deep trouble. Weak prior 
to September 11th, on that terrible day, it began to hemorrhage.
  Mr. Speaker, during the 8 years of prosperity of the Clinton 
administration, the United States negotiated more than 300 treaties. In 
fact, only 4 years ago, there were those who said on this floor that 
without Fast Track, Chile would never negotiate a treaty with us. At 
the end of President Clinton's administration, Chile said they will. 
And several months ago the President of Costa Rica announced his 
country would negotiate with the United States, again without Fast 
Track. Brazil's Minister Councilor stated at a New America Forum that 
the slow pace of current FTAA negotiations, begun without Fast Track, 
has nothing to do with the absence of Fast Track, and everything to do 
with the United States' refusal to negotiate about citrus, meat and 
steel, products with which Brazil feels it has a competitive advantage 
on the table.
  Now, there are a lot of us who have never voted against trade bills. 
Never. Nobody has a district more dependent on trade than me. One out 
of four jobs in my district comes from foreign trade. But when you keep 
Congress out of it, when you do not give us a meaningful role, I cannot 
support it.
  A major problem with Representative Thomas' bill is its failure to 
constrain trade negotiators from repeating the mistakes in NAFTA's 
chapter 11 on investment. Foreign corporations are using NAFTA's 
investment chapter to challenge core governmental functions such as 
California's power to protect groundwater and the application of 
punitive damages by a Mississippi jury to deter corporate fraud. At the 
time of its ratification, few supporters of NAFTA realized that its 
investment chapter opened the door to such challenges. Now we know the 
potential impact of language being considered for inclusion in the FTAA 
and other agreements. H.R. 3005 fails to address the danger that the 
mistakes of NAFTA's chapter 11 will be repeated in negotiations for a 
Free Trade Area for the Americas and other future agreements.
  The Thomas bill would not protect multilateral environmental 
agreements from being challenged as barriers to trade. These critical 
agreements safeguard biodiversity, regulate trade in endangered 
species, protect the ozone layer and control persistent organic 
pollutants. The Thomas bill does nothing to discourage countries from 
lowering or eliminating their environmental standards to gain unfair 
trade advantages. It also fails to promote meaningful improvement in 
environmental protection and cooperation.
  The executive branch--and its Office of U.S. Trade Representative--
must not be given fast track authority that allows it to negotiate more 
agreements that provide sweeping and controversial protections of 
property rights at the expense of traditional government authority to 
protect fair business competition, the environment, public health, 
worker safety and similar public responsibilities. Rather than 
compromising these legitimate governmental regulations, international 
trade and investment agreements should pursue standards of 
nondiscrimination that put U.S. companies and foreign companies on a 
level playing field.
  I urge rejection of the Thomas bill and urge you to vote for the 
Levin-Rangel substitute.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Florida (Mrs. Thurman), a member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
  Mrs. THURMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Thomas bill today. The 
amendment that was approved by the Committee on Rules last night 
recognizes some the issues facing Florida agriculture, but, 
regrettably, this is not the real deal.
  As we have seen in the past, the administration can still trade away 
America's specialty ag products to gain market access for other 
products abroad. This is the same empty promise. It did not work in 
1998 and it will not work now. Florida farmers have a very long memory. 
They are families who have fed this country for generations. They have 
struggled against the tide of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round agreements, 
and many of them have lost.

[[Page H9002]]

  I would like to close with just a letter sent yesterday by the 
Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association. Unlike some others in this who 
continue to talk about it being good for agriculture, this is what 
Florida agriculture says: ``Agriculture provides Florida with a strong 
economic foundation, which is especially important during this economic 
uncertainty. That foundation could be seriously jeopardized as a result 
of trade agreements, most notably the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 
that would be negotiated under TPA.''
  Please vote against this bill.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Sherman).
  (Mr. SHERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Will the gentleman take the 
sticker off his lapel, please, as he addresses the House.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, over the last decades, we have moved from 
the largest creditor Nation to the largest debtor Nation in the world. 
We now run a trade deficit of nearly half a trillion dollars every 
year. The dollar is on the road to crashing sometime in the next decade 
or so, and this bill makes it all more certain and makes it happen 
faster.
  It provides access to the American markets to those with the very 
lowest labor standards and the lowest environmental standards. It will 
pressure us to see our trade deficit even get larger, or to cut our own 
environmental standards, labor standards and wage rates in order to 
compete. It deprives us of the opportunity to demand trade bills that 
are fair and to involve Congress in making sure that the trade bills do 
not simply increase trade, but increase exports more than imports. The 
nonlegal barriers imposed, particularly by China, but other countries 
as well, will ensure large trade deficits if we pass Fast Track now.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. Price).
  (Mr. PRICE of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, during my time in this 
body, I have generally supported trade agreements and the granting of 
so-called Fast Track negotiating authority to the President. The 
vigorous pursuit of bilateral and regional and world trade agreements 
is an essential adaptation to the economic reality our country faces.
  But not just any agreements will suffice. As we consider giving 
negotiating authority to the President, it is important to make certain 
our negotiating framework has kept pace with changes in the scope and 
impact of trade. In my judgment, the bill before us today fails that 
test.
  It is not a totally deficient bill. In fact, it takes some important 
steps towards addressing labor and environmental standards. But the 
bill that the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) and his 
collaborators produced should have been a starting point for wider 
collaboration and negotiation, not a take-it-or-leave-it end point. Had 
that occurred, this bill would give greater weight to basic labor 
standards, would have stronger nonderogation provisions, and would more 
adequately protect our environmental laws from challenges by foreign 
investors.
  We also, Mr. Speaker, need more assertive involvement by the 
President, both in urging all parties on Capitol Hill toward 
accommodation and in making his own negotiating objectives clear. It 
would be easier to vote for this bill, despite its deficiencies, had we 
heard from the President a convincing declaration that he is determined 
not to put our country at a disadvantage by virtue of the labor and 
environmental standards we maintain, and that he will instruct his 
negotiators to give these matters high priority.
  Mr. Speaker, we should defeat this bill and do the job right early 
next year.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise as a supporter of free and fair trade and of an 
expansive American trade policy. Entrepreneurs, corporate leaders, 
workers, and farmers in my North Carolina district have proven their 
ability to compete in the new world marketplace, and although our state 
has also seen more than its share of job losses and industrial decline, 
a great deal of our growth and expanding prosperity have been generated 
by international trade.
  Therefore, during my time in this body, I have generally supported 
trade agreements, the granting of normal trading relationship status to 
China and other countries, and the granting of so-called ``fast track'' 
negotiating authority to the President. My view is and has been that we 
cannot continue to grow and to bring better jobs and expanding 
opportunity to our country by isolating ourselves or protecting 
ourselves from competition. We must confidently and aggressively enter 
the world marketplace, and the vigorous pursuit of bilateral, regional 
and world trade agreements is an essential adaption to the economic 
reality that we face.
  Not just an agreements will suffice, however. As we anticipate the 
challenges we face in the next five years, we must understand that 
trade has greatly increased in volume and in value, that it will 
increasingly involve nations with very different economic and social 
structures from ours, and that the labor, environmental, safety, and 
other policies and standards that we and other countries uphold are 
highly relevant to the advantages or disadvantages we may experience as 
we trade. Moreover, our ability to protect and improve such standards 
in the context of trade agreements will greatly affect the impact of 
trade on our own quality of life and on conditions in the countries 
with which we do business.
  So as we consider critically important legislation to give 
negotiating authority to the President and to specify our negotiating 
objectives, it is important to get it right--to understand these 
changes in the scope and impact of trade and to make certain our 
negotiating framework has kept pace. In my judgment, the bill before us 
today fails that test.
  It is not a totally deficient bill; in fact, it takes important steps 
toward addressing labor and environmental standards and giving them a 
status commensurate with other negotiating objectives. The bill that 
Mr. Thomas and his collaborators produced should have been seen as the 
starting point for wider collaboration and negotiation, not a take-it-
or-leave-it end-point. Had that broader, bipartisan collaboration taken 
place, the bill would have given greater weight to the ILO's core labor 
standards in bilateral and regional negotiations and would have 
mandated the pursuit of a WTO working group on labor. It would have 
more strongly stipulated that agreements should have non-derogation 
clauses--that is, understanding that parties should not relax their 
labor or environmental laws in order to gain a trading advantage. It 
would have reduced barriers to investment while ensuring the integrity 
of our environmental law, by providing that foreign investors would 
have no greater rights in the U.S. than U.S. investors. And it would 
have given Congress a stronger role in overseeing negotiations and 
holding negotiators accountable. In all of these areas, the Rangel-
Levin substitute offers reasonable alternatives that deserve more 
consideration than they got.

  Mr. Speaker, the flawed process and flawed product are intertwined. 
If this bill passes today, it will be by the narrowest of margins on a 
largely partisan basis. That does not bode well for future trade 
agreements or for our country's trading posture. And it did not have to 
be this way. A more inclusive bipartisan process would produce a far 
superior bill that would pass by a large bipartisan majority, and that 
in turn would greatly strengthen the hand of the President and his 
representatives as they enter critical negotiations. That is the kind 
of outcome we can have if we defeat this bill and do it right early 
next year.
  In this endeavor, we need more assertive involvement by the 
President, both in urging all parties on Capitol Hill toward 
accommodation and in making his own negotiating objectives clear. 
Proponents of TPA rightly point out that we are not writing actual 
trade agreements here and that the enabling legislation should not be 
overly prescriptive. Considerable presidential discretion is necessary 
and desirable. But that also places a burden of responsibility and 
accountability on the President to inform Congress and the public as to 
how he intends to use his discretion and what negotiating objectives he 
will vigorously pursue. It would be easier to vote for the bill before 
us today, despite its deficiencies, had we heard from the President a 
convincing declaration that he is determined not to put our country at 
a disadvantage by virtue of the labor and environmental standards we 
maintain, and that he will instruct his negotiators to give these 
matters high priority.
  But we have not heard such a declaration, and so the deficiencies of 
this enabling legislation become all the more troubling. The Rangel-
Levin substitute, while not perfect, is a better alternative. And if 
the motion to recommit fails, I ask my colleagues to vote against this 
version of TPA, so that early next year we can produce legislation that 
more adequately expressed this body's and this country's bipartisan 
support for expanded trade and that puts

[[Page H9003]]

our future trade negotiations on the firmest possible footing.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).
  (Mr. ENGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the bill.
  The TPA bill does not require countries to implement any meaningful 
standards on labor rights. The bill simply requires that a country 
enforce its existing laws--however weak they may be.
  The TPA bill does not contain any meaningful protections for the 
environment. The bill does nothing to prevent countries from lowering 
their environmental standards to gain unfair trade advantages.
  The TPA bill is gross abdication of Congress' power. Congress may 
vote on a disapproval resolution, but only to certify that the 
Administration has ``failed to consult'' with Congress. Furthermore, 
unlike current Jackson-Vanik disapproval resolutions on trade, no floor 
vote is even allowed unless the disapproval resolution is first 
approved by the Ways and Means and Finance Committees--thereby bottling 
up the resolution in committee.
  The U.S. has now officially entered an economic recession, and 
millions of workers are suffering. Neither the Administration nor the 
Republican-controlled House has made any attempt to help unemployed 
workers find new jobs, get unemployment benefits, or maintain health 
coverage. Yet, here we stand again on the floor of the House--presented 
with legislation that helps huge companies at the expense of American 
workers.
  This bill is bad for America. Defeat this bill and let's get to work 
on helping American workers and the American economy.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to my good friend the 
gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Clement).
  Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Rangel), first, for always fighting for the working men 
and women of this great country.
  Mr. Speaker, I am concerned, like a lot of people, about the lack of 
opportunity to debate on this important issue, but I stand here in 
opposition to Fast Track, to H.R. 3005.
  After several years of unprecedented growth, technological 
advancements, medical and scientific innovations, increased 
globalization, our economy is undergoing a dramatic slowdown.
  We know about layoffs, we know about bankruptcies, and people are 
really concerned about their jobs and about their future. And we need 
to be concerned right now about the future of American workers and 
protecting our environment. All must be factored into the TPA vote and 
the long-term equation for the U.S. trade agenda.
  I have always supported trade bills, but I cannot support this. We 
have got this legislation before us now, and I question the 
Constitutional authority concerning this bill because it affects our 
Congress and our involvement in trade issues. Vote no.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield such time as he 
may consume to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Camp), a member of the 
Committee on Ways and Means.
  (Mr. CAMP asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, Michigan ranks fourth in exports. Our family 
farmers export 40 percent of what they produce. I will vote yes on TPA, 
because fair and free trade means a secure economy and better jobs.
  It's official. Our country is in a recession, but Congress is working 
to help turn our economy around. One way we can do that is to expand 
our nation's trading opportunity by giving the president Trade 
Promotion Authority (TPA). This legislation will provide him the 
ability to negotiate sound trade agreements that will give our economy 
the boost it greatly needs.
  Today we will vote on this important trade legislation which will 
open more markets by eliminating and reducing trade barriers, 
benefitting family farmers, employers small businesses, manufacturers, 
working men and women, and consumers. A vote today for fair free trade 
today would be the equivolent of a $1,300 to $2,000 tax cut for the 
average American family. This is good news for local economies in all 
50 states, including Michigan.
  My state has much to gain from free trade. We've already seen that 
with the North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which helped Michigan 
exports grow faster than overall U.S. exports. Michigan ranked the 
fourth highest in exports in 2000 with exports sales of merchandise 
totaling $51.6 billion, up more than 24 percent from 1999. We live in 
an export-dependent state with export sales of $5,193 for every state 
resident. Opening more markets through free trade will only encourage 
more economic growth in Michigan through exporting.
  Economic growth from free trade also translates into more better, 
high-paying jobs. Export-related jobs pay 13 to 18 percent higher than 
the national average. Additionally, workers in exporting plants have 
greater job security because they are 9 percent less likely to shut 
down than those plants that do not export. In Michigan, we have 372,900 
jobs directly dependent upon manufactured exports, in addition to the 
more than 370,000 they support directly and indirectly.
  Michigan farmers, who exported an estimated $868 million in 
agricultural products last year, are also important to the entire 
state's economy. Our state exports about 22 percent to 32 percent of 
what Michigan farmers produce. Already we have seen the benefits of 
free trade on our farmers who sell more soybean oil in South Korean now 
that the country is reducing its tariff by 14.5 percent from 1995 to 
2004. In the Philippines, they too are reducing their tariffs on 
soybean mean from 10 percent to 3 percent.
  While we have made progress in bringing down trade barriers, more 
must be done. Fair, free trade means a secure economy, and more and 
better jobs for Michigan residents as well as all Americans. This week 
I will vote to give the president Trade Promotion Authority because we 
will all win from passing this legislation. This trade bill will 
provide him with the tools he needs to pull us out of this recession 
and put our economy back on the right track.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Collins), an extremely valuable member of 
the committee and one who helped us out in bringing this trade bill to 
where it is today.
  (Mr. COLLINS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, as I have traveled throughout the Third District of 
Georgia, touring textile plants, talking to small business people in 
towns where textile plants have closed, I have repeatedly heard from 
those people that they are tired of trade agreements that have exported 
more jobs in their area than it has exported products. They are tired 
of agreements that have exported plants, seeing those plants relocated 
offshore, outside of the United States, all because of weak trade 
agreements.
  In many ways, we have been our own worst enemy when it comes to the 
textile areas because we have repeatedly said no, no, no. But this time 
we took a different direction, because I have at this point to commend 
the gentleman from California (Chairman Thomas), the President, the 
USTR Representative and Secretary Don Evans of Commerce, because as we 
went to them and expressed our concerns and our problems, they 
listened. Not only did they listen, Mr. Speaker, but they reacted to 
those problems.
  Many of the things that you heard the chairman repeat and talk about 
earlier are provisions that strengthen this bill, provisions in this 
bill that will strengthen not only the bill, but strengthen future 
trade agreements, so that we do promote the exporting of goods.
  This President needs the authority to be able to negotiate, to be at 
the table to sell our products. And that is what it is all about, 
products that are manufactured and produced and services that are 
rendered by people of this country.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues, support the President on this. He 
has a good track record in the few months that he has been in office. 
He has already addressed the dumping of steel in this country that 
hurts steelworkers, the dumping of softwood from Canada that hurt many 
mill workers across this country. In Doha he resisted the pressure from 
those who wanted to accelerate the phaseout of quotas and tariffs on 
textiles. He has a good record. He is our leader. He can be the leader 
and promoter of goods from this country in the international trade 
market.
  I urge support and passage of this Trade Promotion Authority.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to support Trade Promotion Authority to allow the 
President to sell American goods and services. That's right, Mr. 
Speaker. The President is and should be the number one salesperson for 
American goods and services. He must be a leader in International 
trade, promoting America the same

[[Page H9004]]

way he is leading in the international fight against terrorism. 
American workers need a salesperson.
  Now, I say to you, Mr. Speaker and to the leadership in the Congress, 
the American worker has grown tired and weary of trade agreements which 
export American jobs rather than American goods and services. The 
American worker is tired of deep pocket CEO's of major corporations 
sending their Washington lobbyists to urge the passage of trade 
agreements and then within a short time announcing a plant closing in 
the U.S., only to relocate to Mexico or some other country. The 
American worker deserves trade agreements which promote the products 
they produce or services they deliver. To assist and ensure the 
President promotes the American worker, this bill contains legislative 
language and report language requiring the President, when negotiating 
with other nations to do the following:
  First, it requires reciprocating trade agreements. In exchange for 
allowing the selling of international products in our nation, it 
requires the same consideration for American goods.
  Second, it requires the President to negotiate on rules of origin for 
U.S. content in products to be assembled elsewhere and sold back in the 
U.S.
  Third, it requires the President to discuss and monitor the 
difference in value of currency in the negotiating country when 
compared to the strong U.S. Dollar.
  Mr. Speaker, parameters, such as these are instructions to the 
President that American workers want to be engaged in the International 
marketplace. But such engagement must be fair to all, not free to some 
at the expense of American jobs.
  Mr. Speaker, I have full confidence the President will follow these 
and other instructions set forth by Congress. He has already shown 
tremendous support for American jobs by calling the hand of those 
nations which have dumped steel in the United States at the expense of 
the steel worker. He has called Canada's hand for exporting subsidized 
soft wood lumber to the U.S. by proving they were engaged in dumping 
excess lumber at the expense of the American worker. He placed a tariff 
on lumber from Canada rather than negotiating a new agreement at the 
expense of the American worker.
  Yes, Mr. Speaker, American workers standing on the assembly line need 
to and want to trade in an international market. But they want to be 
able to sell their products, not just buy from other countries. This 
bill will give the President the authority to negotiate and provide 
instructions on how to approach those negotiations.
  I urge passage of Trade Promotion Authority so we can assist American 
workers with their jobs, sell their goods and services, and keep our 
economy strong.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Inslee).
  (Mr. INSLEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. INSLEE. Mr. Speaker, consider the tale of two of my constituents. 
Greg is a computer software genius at Microsoft. His intellectual 
property is frequently stolen from him overseas, and he could use a 
President with Trade Promotion Authority to try to prevent that theft.
  And now consider my constituent, John, who came up to me in the lobby 
of a building the other day and said, ``I just got laid off from 
Boeing. I am 56 years old. I am worried. I don't know what I am going 
to do, and I need help.''
  For the last 2 months, while we have passed bailout after bailout, 
this Congress has done nothing for the American worker. Nothing. And we 
have to learn if we are going to advance a trade agenda, we have to 
make sure we respect both the Gregs and the Johns of the world.
  Yes, you can run over the Democrats on the floor of this House, but 
you cannot run over the legitimate needs of working people and the 
environment time after time, and then expect us to develop a trade 
agenda with the support of the American people.
  Vote no on this today. Come back, develop a realistic package of 
worker protection, and we will pass what we need for our international 
agenda.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is a real pleasure for me to yield 1 
minute to my colleague and friend from California (Mr. Hunter) to speak 
on this issue since some of you have known his history.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, in early September, I was gearing up as usual to oppose 
this Fast Track. And then our country was attacked, and today as we all 
know, we have Marine expeditionary forces, American carrier battle 
groups, tactical aircraft, Special Operations forces, in theater, in 
combat in Afghanistan.
  Heading those forces, those American forces, is one man, the American 
President, and for the next couple of months, in my estimation, more 
than ever, his successes are going to be our successes, his losses are 
going to be our losses.
  I, as all my colleagues know, do not like Fast Track, I do not like 
free trade. But I like less the idea of weakening this President in 
this time of great national emergency.
  For that reason, this time, this once, I am voting yes.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), a distinguished leader of Congress.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member for yielding me 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, first, I want to adopt the remarks of the gentleman from 
North Carolina (Mr. Price): One minute is too short a time to 
substantively discuss obviously so important an issue. But I want to 
say that I reject the rationale of the gentleman from California who 
spoke immediately before me. I do not believe that a vote ``no'' will 
weaken the President. What a vote ``no'' will do is strengthen the 
process in this House.

                              {time}  1445

  The American public elected 435, not 221 or 222, but 435 of us; and 
they expected us to come together, to work together, to reason 
together, and to produce a product. I believe had that process been 
followed, this product would be better.
  Like the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price) who spoke before 
me, I have supported Fast Track, PNTR, and NAFTA. Why? Because I 
believe that trade is an important aspect of the economic well-being of 
our country and of our workers. But I believe that this process needs 
to be open; and if so, it will be a better one. Reject this bill.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon) for the purpose of engaging in a 
colloquy.
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the amendments in section 3 
dealing with trade-sensitive commodities would limit the President's 
proclamation authority so that tariff reductions could not be 
implemented without specific congressional approval. It is also my 
understanding that the bill restricts the ability of the administration 
to reduce tariffs on sensitive agricultural industries. Finally, the 
bill requires that import-sensitive agricultural products such as 
citrus be fully evaluated by the ITC prior to tariff negotiations and 
that any probable adverse effects be the subject of remedial proposals 
by the administration. Is that the gentleman's understanding?
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, yes, that is my 
understanding as well.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Brown).
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  In the first year of the Bush Presidency, we have lost 1 million 
manufacturing jobs. We are officially in a recession. The stock market 
has dropped precipitously. This body has done little for the economy, 
and this body has done nothing for laid-off workers. They promised us 
during the airline bailout bill that they would help laid-off workers. 
They promised us during the stimulus package and the tax cuts for the 
richest Americans and the largest corporations in this country that 
they would help laid-off workers. They did not deliver. Now, during 
Trade Promotion Authority, they are promising again to help laid-off 
workers.
  Mr. Speaker, our history of flawed trade agreements has led to a 
trade deficit with the rest of the world that has surged to a record 
$435 billion. The Department of Labor reported that NAFTA alone is 
responsible, and these are conservative estimates, for the loss of 
approximately 300,000 U.S. jobs.
  Our trade agreements go to great lengths to protect investors. Our 
trade agreements go to great lengths to protect property rights. But 
these agreements never include enforceable provisions for public 
health, for the environment, and for laid-off workers.

[[Page H9005]]

  Mr. Speaker, I ask for a ``no'' vote on Fast Track Trade Promotion 
Authority.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Knollenberg).
  Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  Today's vote on Trade Promotion Authority is a critical test of our 
leadership and commitment to creating jobs in this country. Trade 
equals jobs.
  In my home State of Michigan, 372,000 jobs are dependent, dependent 
upon manufactured exports; and those jobs pay upwards of 18 percent 
more than the average job. That is good for America.
  But here is what is bad. We have a serious problem. Look at the 
white; look at the red. This map shows that America is becoming 
isolated, America is isolated, while others expand trade around us.
  There are exactly 133 trade agreements that are in place today, but 
the U.S. is party to only three. That is where we are today. How about 
tomorrow?
  We are leading the world in an effort to eradicate terrorism. We must 
lead the world in expanding free markets and creating new jobs through 
trade. Look at this again. This is the U.S., in case my colleagues 
cannot see. The red is all of those countries, 111 countries that are 
involved with free trade agreements. We must pass TPA. Let us vote for 
TPA.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi), a national leader.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished ranking member for 
yielding me this time and for his initiative that he is presenting here 
today. I, unfortunately, rise in opposition to the legislation before 
us.
  Mr. Speaker, today we have the opportunity to create a new trade 
framework for a new century. I had hoped to be able to support Fast 
Track Authority for President Bush, as I had supported Fast Track 
Authority for his father, President Bush, at an earlier time. I wanted 
to do this, and I had hopes that we could do so with a trade promotion 
act that reflected our Nation's concerns about the importance of the 
environment and workers' rights. If this bill had done so, it would 
have passed this House overwhelmingly. Instead, if it passes at all, it 
will squeak through based on a handful of promises. I wish my 
colleagues to consider the true value of those promises as they cast 
their votes.
  So here we are with an economy in recession and hundreds of thousands 
of American families struggling with the realities of unemployment.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose this legislation. Anyone 
who does not see the connection between the economy and the environment 
is on the wrong side of the future. Vote ``no'' on this trade 
promotion.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
  (Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, there are some in this Chamber who will not 
vote for any kind of trade agreement, and there are others that will 
vote for every kind of trade agreement, thinking it is a panacea. As a 
New Democrat, I believe in incorporating new ideas into our trade 
agreements, especially to help our workers.
  When I voted for the African Trade Agreement, I heard we would help 
workers. When I voted for the Caribbean Basin initiative, I heard, we 
will not forget about the workers. When I voted for the China agreement 
I heard, once again, we will eventually get to the workers.
  Well, it is time now to help American workers and their families. In 
the Tokyo Round we introduced tariff levels as a new idea. In the 
Uruguay Round we introduced intellectual property as a new idea. In the 
Doha rounds we introduced antitrust laws as a new idea, and now we 
should have the new idea of saying there should be a floor of 
protecting against child labor, not mandating a minimum wage, but 
saying, child labor is wrong and it is not going to be in future trade 
agreements between the United States and other countries. Defeat this 
bill.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Weller).
  (Mr. WELLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. WELLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bipartisan effort 
to help Illinois farmers, workers, and small businesses expand their 
business opportunities.
  Mr. Speaker, trade promotion authority or TPA gives the President the 
authority to negotiate and bring back trade agreements to Congress with 
assurances of an up or down vote. Now more than ever, our President 
needs the clout to negotiate trade agreements to protect both the 
economic and national security of our nation.
  America's workers and businesses now export over $1.8 million of 
goods and services per minute, which fuels economic growth, job 
creation, and technological innovation. 12 million Americans owe their 
jobs to foreign exports and more than 25 percent of our $8 trillion 
economy is tied to foreign trade.
  The high tech industry is the largest manufacturing sector in the 
U.S. by employment, sales, and exports. The high tech sector is also 
the largest merchandise exporter in the U.S. In 2000, high tech exports 
accounted for 29 percent of U.S. merchandise exports. TPA allows the 
access to new markets overseas that the high tech industry needs to 
expand and grow.
  Since 1994, the U.S. has failed to implement a single free trade 
agreement with any nation. 130 free trade agreements exist worldwide, 
with the U.S. participating in only two. Open trade will create new 
markets for our workers, including workers in the high tech industry. 
TPA will not only spur economic growth, but it will create new jobs and 
new income.
  Mr. Speaker, TPA is especially important to our friends in the 
agriculture community. My home state of Illinois ranks 5th in 
nationwide exports of agricultural products by exporting $2.7 billion 
in 1999 alone. Income from Illinois exports equates to $110 per acre 
for corn and soybeans.
  Even with its huge output of agricultural products, demand for the 
top five agricultural products from Illinois is growing. NAFTA and GAAT 
trade agreements help prove that TPA will increase this demand further.
  America's farmers export about one-third of their total crop 
production. Future sales and growth are directly tied to whether the 
U.S. can negotiate trade agreements with foreign countries. If we don't 
supply other countries' needs, someone else will!
  The time is now to give the President TPA, which has lapsed since 
1994. TPA is good for small businesses, the high tech sector, 
agriculture, and for the economy in general.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for H.R. 3005 and give the President the 
trade negotiating authority that is needed to help jumpstart our 
economy.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. Watts), the chairman of the Republican 
Conference and someone who understands that this bill is about jobs, 
about helping the unemployed and, for the first time in the history of 
a trade agreement, includes labor and the environment.
  Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, the question before us today is 
the following: Should we vote to stop small businesses and farmers from 
exporting more of their goods, or should we vote to grow America's 
export market? Should we ignore the new economy, or should we look for 
new ways to open new markets?
  My home State of Oklahoma is the third largest producer of wheat in 
the country. We export half of our wheat out of the United States. By 
giving the President Trade Promotion Authority, farmers will have more 
opportunities to export their products to new consumers and new 
markets.
  Mr. Speaker, opponents of giving the President Trade Promotion 
Authority may have had a mainstream argument 50 years ago, but we are 
in a new century. The arguments being made by foes of expanded trade is 
rooted in what was, not what is; and it certainly does not think about 
what can be.
  The choice is simple. We can continue business as usual. Our economy 
is in a recession, corporate profits are down, unemployment is up, and 
the gross domestic product has dropped at the fastest rate in 10 years. 
Companies are even skipping their Christmas party this year, trying to 
save a few bucks.
  Or we can look for new ways to give our economy a boost. Allowing the 
President to have the freedom and flexibility to negotiate down trade 
barriers and tariffs is good for the economy, good for jobs, good for 
farmers,

[[Page H9006]]

good for small businesses, and good for the consumer.
  Mr. Speaker, this is about the old versus the new, yesterday versus 
tomorrow, walls versus bridges, fear versus competence. It is about 
America. Our character, our ingenuity, our employees are the best in 
the world. We can compete with anybody in the world, but we must give 
the President the authority and the flexibility to trade or to 
negotiate these barriers and tariffs down that hurt American products.
  I ask my colleagues to vote for international trade. Vote ``yes.''
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to my dear misguided 
friend, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson).
  Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I think I thank the gentleman for the 
extra 30 seconds.
  I want to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) for his 
efforts to reach a bipartisan consensus on this bill and the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Rangel) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin) 
for the comity that they have shown us in our efforts, along with the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dooley) and the gentleman from Tennessee 
(Mr. Tanner) for the unique partnership that we have been able to forge 
on this bill.
  I rise in strong support of the legislation. Why should Democrats 
support this bill? I think the first reason, Mr. Speaker, is because of 
our legacy. Earlier this week, Jeff Sachs commented in the Wall Street 
Journal that Democrats have a strong legacy of promoting democracy and 
free trade, highlighting the efforts of Woodrow Wilson, F.D.R.'s 
initiation of trade liberalization in the Great Depression, Truman's 
postwar launch of multilateral trade in the GATT, JFK's call for deep 
tariff reductions, and Bill Clinton's completion of the Uruguay Round 
and the leadership in founding of the World Trade Organization.
  Regarding the multilateral trade negotiations, Sachs pointed out that 
while this round is being launched under a Republican administration, 
it might well be completed by a Democratic one. The Dillon Round was 
launched by Eisenhower and finished by Kennedy. The Tokyo Round was 
launched by Nixon, but completed by Carter, and the Uruguay Round was 
launched by Reagan and completed by Clinton.
  History tells us, Mr. Speaker, this issue is about how our Nation 
engages the world over trade issues through the institution of the 
Presidency, not about a particular President. That is why I supported 
Fast Track under former President Bush, former President Clinton; and 
that is why I support granting Trade Promotion Authority now.
  Why should Democrats support this bill? Because it advances 
Democratic trade principles in a meaningful and balanced way. For the 
first time, ILO Core Labor standards will now be considered on par with 
commercial interests in the context of trade agreements and 
negotiations. For the first time, our proposal provides meaningful ways 
for the U.S. to assist countries in improving their labor standards. 
Principal negotiating objectives require the President to assist in 
building the capacities for countries to respect worker rights, the 
right of association, the right to bargain collectively, a prohibition 
on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor, a minimum age for 
employment of children, and acceptable worker conditions. The bill also 
requires countries to enforce the labor and environmental laws. Our 
bill includes substantive and enforceable standards on labor and the 
environment.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Louisiana (Mr. Jefferson).
  Mr. JEFFERSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for the time.
  Why should Democrats support this bill? Because this debate is not 
one of pure philosophy. It has meaningful and powerful implications for 
the United States and the world, and we can be sure that the world is 
watching and waiting for our leadership on this important issue.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Bonior), the minority whip.
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, what are we doing here today? In the midst 
of a recession, we are debating a bill that will cost even more 
American workers their hard-earned paychecks that they pour their 
hearts and their souls into every single day. We have lost over 150,000 
jobs in Michigan, 3 million across the country with these bad trade 
deals over the last decade.
  When a factory closes in Detroit or Saginaw or Flint or Kalamazoo, we 
not only lose those good-paying jobs, we cripple a whole community. We 
take away the tax base so there is no money there for fire and police 
and schools and businesses. No one goes unaffected.
  Our trade agreements should promote human rights and democracy, they 
should improve working conditions across the world, and they should 
protect our environment and the quality of life.

                              {time}  1500

  If we give the President Fast Track Authority, we will have no 
opportunity to push for these protections. We will abandon our 
constitutional responsibility. For the American people, Fast Track will 
be a bullet train to the unemployment line.
  Vote ``no'' on the Thomas Fast Track and preserve the voice of the 
people in our trade decisions.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield such time as he 
may consume to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Ramstad), a member of 
the committee.
  (Mr. RAMSTAD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  On behalf of Minnesota jobs, Minnesota businesses, Minnesota farmers, 
and Minnesota's future, I rise in strong support of Trade Promotion 
Authority.
  Mr. Speaker, the vote before us today is absolutely critical to 
America's economic recovery and security. It is no exaggeration to call 
it one of the most important votes we will cast this decade.
  Our President needs Trade Promotion Authority so he can open markets 
for American products, create jobs and get the best deal possible for 
our businesses and workers.
  Every President since President Ford had this important tool in his 
trade arsenal until it expired in 1994.
  Now more than ever, TPA is vital to our economic security. The U.S. 
economy is increasingly international in scope, and it is clear that 
expanding trade is absolutely imperative to spur economic growth.
  Over 25 percent of the growth in our national economy over the last 
decade is tied directly to international trade. Last year alone, my 
home state of Minnesota exported over $17.5 billion in goods and 
services. This is an increase of over $6 billion in the last decade. 
Over 270,000 jobs in Minnesota manufacturing exist because of trade, 
and trade-related jobs pay 13 to 18 percent more than other jobs.
  The U.S. is rapidly falling behind in our efforts to sell our 
products abroad. We are a party to just 3 of the nearly 130 free trade 
agreements currently in force around the world. And while Europe, our 
main competitor, continues to negotiate free trade agreements with the 
rest of the world, the U.S. remains outside the process. Our interests 
are being ignored.
  Mr. Speaker, TPA will help our President negotiate trade agreements 
that open up international markets for U.S. goods and services. Let's 
give the President the tool he needs to create jobs, help workers and 
rescue our ailing economy.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield such time as he 
may consume to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Kolbe), someone who has 
been a stalwart on trade.
  (Mr. KOLBE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of Trade Promotion 
Authority.
  Mr. Speaker, much has been made here today about how trade promotion 
authority can be a real shot in the arm for a struggling economy.
  Other members have pointed out how TPA is a critical tax cut for 
American consumers, workers, and companies. That, too, is true.
  However, I want to talk about 3 other reasons why TPA is so critical 
for America.
  First, TPA strengthens our national security. Capitalism, trade, and 
the rule of law support freedom. Freedom and stable economies support 
the growth of democracies. And democracies conduct peaceful commerce 
among themselves. TPA for President Bush is vital to bolster the global 
trading system. That system is critical to US national security.
  Second, TPA is critical if we are going to do more than spout 
rehtoric about helping the developing world. Each year we pass a 
foreign

[[Page H9007]]

operations bill. While countries appreciate it, it is pennies on the 
dollar compared to the resources they need and compared to the benefits 
that might flow from a new round of trade liberalization. Open markets, 
capitalism, and foreign direct investment are the real tools they 
need--not foreign aid.
  And third, passing TPA is critical to US global leadership. We stand 
at a pivotal moment in world history. Our country fought two world 
wars, defeated the Soviet Empire in the Cold War, and adopted a foreign 
policy to spread democratic values, ideas, and beliefs around the 
world. We achieved much in the 20th century. We must not put that at 
risk in the 21st century.
  Secretary of State Colin Powell says Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
is ``an essential part of our diplomatic tool kit.'' He urges that we 
not allow our ``broader foreign policy agenda to be hijacked by the 
terrorists,'' and points out that ``trade helps create a secure 
international environment within which Americans can prosper.''
  Trade promotion authority is critical for our national security, 
foreign policy, and US leadership abroad. Vote ``yes'' on H.R. 3005.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield such time as she 
may consume to gentlewoman from Connecticut (Mrs. Johnson), a member of 
the Committee on Ways and Means.
  Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, our security interests are 
global. Our economic interests are global.
  As we stand here today, since 1990, the European community has 
negotiated 27 free trade agreements. Do Members understand that every 
one of those free trade agreements socks in European products, European 
standards? Their electrical outlets are different than ours. They get 
into that market, they get their goods in and our goods are out.
  We act here on this more as if there are not negotiations that are 
going to go forward. They are going to go forward. The issue is, will 
America lead or will America follow. Are we going to allow jobs to be 
created in America, or are we going to let them go to Europe?
  Watch this standards issue. Soon to enter the EU is Croatia. They are 
about to pass a bill that bans biotech materials. What will that do to 
agricultural exports from America? Do we not want a President at that 
table demanding science-based standards?
  This is about trade of American products to grow our economy and 
create jobs. I urge support.
  Mr. Speaker, as our security interests are global, so are our 
economic interests. If we want to create new jobs and protect existing 
jobs at home, we must open new markets to American products abroad.
  Since traditional trading authority expired in 1994, we have lost 
customers to other countries because they can now sell their goods 
without high tariffs simply because they have been at the negotiating 
table and have made trade agreements that shut us out.
  Of the 130 existing free trade agreements, America is a party to only 
2--with Israel and the NAFTA countries. Since 1990, the EU has 
completed negotiations on 27 free trade agreements and is currently 
negotiating 15 more.
  The United States has missed out on dozens of opportunities to create 
economic pacts with other nations that want to buy goods made by 
American workers. We are now not only losing markets and customers, one 
by one, but are losing our position as a leader at the table that 
shapes the international trading system.
  By not being there, we allow Europe to set standards that work 
against American products, slowing U.S. economic growth now and for 
decades ahead. According to the USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service, 
Croatia, a country that aspires to future EU membership, currently 
plans to go further than the EU on biotech Croatia has a draft law in 
process that would institute an outright ban on any products containing 
biotech materials. So we simply must have our President at the table to 
insist on science-based standards to protect and open markets to 
American products.
  TPA is essential for our nation to remain prosperous, and passage 
will have a great impact on the workers I represent. Connecticut's 
economy is very export-dependent. Last year, Connecticut's export sales 
of merchandise totaled $13.2 billion, supporting more than 180,000 
jobs. Viewed on a per capita basis, Connecticut ranks 6th nationally, 
with export sales of $3,860 for every state resident. 85 percent of our 
exporters were small and medium-sized businesses.
  Export-related jobs tend to be good, high-paying jobs. Wages of 
workers in jobs supported by exports are 13 to 18 percent higher than 
the national average. Export-related jobs are also more secure, as 
exporting plants are 9 percent less likely to shut down than comparable 
non-exporting plants.
  Trade agreements do work: Total exports from Connecticut to NAFTA 
countries (Mexico and Canada) in 1999 were 44 percent higher than 1993, 
before NAFTA.
  They are also good for consumers and are equivalent to tax cuts, as 
trade agreements reduce tariffs and provide lower-priced goods. The 
average American family of four could see an annual income gain of 
nearly $2500 from a global reduction in tariffs and trade barriers--the 
objective of negotiations.
  TPA is good for workers, and good for consumers alike. Furthermore, 
world trade negotiations are going to proceed. The only issue is will 
America lead--or follow. At the very moment when our President has 
provided strong and able leadership, diplomatic skill and sound 
judgement to unite the world against terrorism and create a more 
peaceful future, why would we not empower him to provide the same 
leadership to the economic discussions on which our prosperity and the 
economic growth of the nation depends?
  I urge my colleagues to support passage of this needed legislation.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Eshoo), a gentlewoman who has worked hard over the 
years on trade issues.
  Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished ranking member of 
the committee, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel), for yielding 
time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I have but a few brief moments to come to the microphone 
today, not to urge Members one way or the other on the issue that is 
before us, but to state why, with really a heavy heart, why I am not 
supporting the first trade issue since I have come to the Congress 
since 1992.
  In my congressional district, which is the home to Silicon Valley, we 
have scores of unemployed workers. They are part of that two-thirds of 
the American work force that are not eligible for unemployment benefits 
because they are contract workers.
  I know what the new economy produced. I have faith in the industrial 
leaders in my congressional district and other places. I believe they 
will help restore the economic well-being of our country.
  But we in the Congress have an obligation to stand next to those 
workers in my district and across the country that are part of the 
economic collateral of 9-11 and before that. That is why I rise. I 
asked for a vote on an economic package that would deal with them 
first, and on the heels of that, support trade assistance.
  So it is with a great deal of regret that I state that I cannot and 
will not vote for the bill because of it.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Combest), the chairman of the Committee on 
Agriculture.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 3005. Trade 
Promotion Authority is a win for American agriculture. It is a vital 
tool that the Bush administration must have in order to fight for the 
American farmers and ranchers in the global marketplace.
  In all of my 17 years in Congress, I have never seen a President more 
committed and focused on American agriculture. President Bush has 
stated that it is his intention that agriculture remains at the 
cornerstone of his administration's trade program, that his commitment 
to the American farmers and ranchers in all aspects is constant and 
strong.
  The President has firmly stated to me that the American farmer and 
rancher will be the beneficiaries of Trade Promotion Authority, and I 
intend to work with the administration and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture to ensure that the best interests of our farmers and 
ranchers are kept in the minds of American trade negotiators.
  H.R. 3005 clearly provides that the Committee on Agriculture must be 
involved in all discussions and consultations during negotiations and 
immediately prior to signing any agreement. As chairman of that 
committee, I intend to make sure that that happens. I will continue to 
work with the administration to make sure that American agriculture 
uses all the tools necessary to compete on the global stage.
  I rise today in support of H.R. 3005. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
is a win for American agriculture and is a vital tool that the

[[Page H9008]]

Bush administration must have in order to fight for the American 
farmers and ranchers in the global marketplace. In all of my 17 years 
of Congress, I have never seen a President more committed to and 
focused on American agriculture. President Bush has stated that it is 
his intention that agriculture remains the cornerstone of his 
administration's trade program and that his commitment to American 
farmers and ranchers in all aspects is strong and constant. Therefore I 
support granting the President trade negotiating authority and urge my 
colleagues to do the same.
  The President has firmly stated to me that America's farmers and 
ranchers will be the beneficiaries of trade promotion authority. I 
intend to work with the administration and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture to ensure that the best interests of our farmers and 
ranchers are kept in mind as agricultural trade negotiations proceed. 
Since U.S. farmers and ranchers produce much more than is consumed in 
the United States, exports are vital to the prosperity and success of 
U.S. farmers and ranchers. TPA will give the President the flexibility 
to take advantage of market-opening opportunities, while maintaining 
the closest possible consultation with Congress. It is important that 
American farmers and ranchers see agriculture trade and new trade 
agreements as a positive force. Officials administering trade issues 
must both understand production agriculture here at home and the fierce 
competition in worldwide agricultural trade.
  H.R. 3005 clearly provides that the Committee on Agriculture must be 
involved in all discussions and consultations during trade negotiations 
and immediately prior to signing any trade agreement. As chairman of 
the committee I intend to make sure that happens. I will continue to 
work with the administration to make sure that American agriculture 
uses all the tools necessary to compete on the global stage, while 
maintaining our international obligations.
  As President Bush has said, the success of agriculture contributes to 
the strength of this Nation. Our President recognizes that the 
worldwide agricultural market has been rigged against farmers who play 
fair. Through trade negotiations we can achieve a more level playing 
field . . . and, as President Bush says, that is good news for the 
world's most productive food producers--the American farmers. I urge my 
colleagues to support H.R. 3005 and grant the President trade promotion 
authority.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio).
  (Mr. DeFAZIO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, there are so many problems with the fast-track trade 
negotiating authority legislation under consideration today that it's 
hard to know where to begin. In short, H.R. 3005 will cede blanket 
authority to the President to negotiate future trade agreements that 
perpetuate and expand the failed U.S. trade policies of the most recent 
administrations with no meaningful checks and balances from Congress.
  These failed trade policies, including the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and most-favored 
nation status for China, all of which I opposed, have, to varying 
degrees, contributed to massive job loss and job dislocation, soaring 
trade deficits, eroding U.S. sovereignty, plummeting farm commodity 
prices, and degraded environmental conditions. I will speak more about 
these issues in a minute. But first, I'd like to address the more 
fundamental question of whether fast-track is an appropriate or 
necessary delegation of constitutional authority. Proponents of fast-
track and H.R. 3005 would have you believe that if Congress fails to 
grant this special negotiating authority to the President that the U.S. 
economy and the global economy will come to a screeching halt and 
allies will refuse to negotiate new trade agreements with us. That is 
sheer nonsense.
  Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the 
exclusive authority ``to regulate commerce with foreign nations.'' 
Fast-track negotiating authority, which allows the President to 
negotiate trade agreements with virtually no input from Congress and 
forces Congress to vote yes or no on the agreement without the 
opportunity for amendments, destroys the checks and balances built into 
the Constitution. This is not a partisan issue for me. I helped defeat 
legislation twice to grant former President Clinton fast-track trade 
negotiating authority. My opposition to fast-track is due to my desire 
to protect the constitutional prerogatives of Congress, as well as my 
belief that American workers and the U.S. economy have not been well-
served by current U.S. trade policies. In essence, in one 62 page bill 
and one single vote, fast-track delegates four critical constitutional 
powers of Congress regarding trade. Under the fast-track process 
envisioned in H.R. 3005, Congress gives up:
  The authority to decide the terms for trade--any negotiating 
objectives set by Congress are not binding on the Administration or 
enforceable by Congress in any practical way; the ability to enter into 
trade pacts of its own design--the Administration will sign an 
agreement, thus locking in commitments, before Congress votes up or 
down, leaving no opportunity for amendment; the authority to draft 
laws--the administration will have the authority to write implementing 
legislation for trade agreements that can change federal laws to 
conform to the agreement without any additional congressional checks; 
and, the ability to set the congressional schedule--H.R. 3005 per-sets 
the floor procedures for final consideration of any trade agreements 
negotiated with fast-track.

  Given this wholesale delegation of our constitutional 
responsibilities, it stands to reason that fast-track proponents must 
be under the assumption that all wisdom on trade matters rests with 
those at the White House, the U.S. Trade Representative's office, and 
the Department of Commerce. I find that insulting, and given the 
pathetic record of previous trade agreements, absolutely incorrect.
  Mr. Speaker, it is useful to step back and look at the historical 
basis for fast-track. Fast-track was a Nixon-era presidential power 
grab. While proponents say that every president since Gerald Ford has 
had fast-track negotiating authority, what they don't say is that it 
has only been used a handful of times--to negotiate the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Tokyo Round and Uruguay Round, 
the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the U.S.-Canada FTA, and 
the NAFTA. The Clinton administration alone claimed to have negotiated 
nearly 300 separate trade agreements. Of these, only the GATT Uruguay 
Round and NAFTA were done using fast-track. Further, it is not just 
minor trade agreements that have been negotiated without fast-track. 
Major agreements like the Jordan FTA, our bilateral agreement on 
China's accession to the WTO, the Information Technology Agreement, the 
Financial Services Agreement, and the Basic Telecommunications 
Agreement were all negotiated without fast-track.
  Rather than granting the executive branch carte blanche negotiating 
authority, it seems that Congress would be well-advised to reassert its 
constitutional prerogatives and rein in the freelance negotiating done 
by successive administrations without clear authorization from 
Congress. This is particularly true since trade agreements now deal 
with far more than just setting tariff and quota levels, which were 
primarily of interest to industry. Today's international commercial 
agreements impact much broader areas of public policy, including the 
environment, consumer and worker safety, and a vast array of domestic 
regulatory standards. The public and America's congressional 
representatives have a greater need to monitor negotiations and have 
meaningful input into the outcome. That is impossible under the 
legislation on the floor today.
  H.R. 3005 eviscerates Congress' constitutional role on trade. It 
includes essentially worthless provisions requiring ``consultation'' 
with Congress by the executive branch. This type of requirement has 
been routively ignored in recent trade negotiative, and no doubt will 
be disregarded under the current administration. Proponents of fast-
track also claim that the President needs this authority to negotiate 
trade agreements that will be good for the U.S. economy. If that's what 
the President was actually going to do, it might make some sense to 
provide him some leeway. Unfortunately, the record of U.S. trade policy 
shows otherwise. For example, consider our runaway trade deficit. Last 
year, the U.S. trade deficit reached a record $435 billion, up from 
$271 billion in 1999. The trade deficit currently stands at an 
unprecedented 4.5 percent of the overall U.S. economy. Including 
interest payments, our net foreign debt is 22 percent of GDP and is on 
a trajectory to reach 40 percent of GDP in 5 years. Argentina's 
experience should serve as a warning. Argentina, whose economy is 
suffering a total collapse with the government threatening to default 
on its debt, has a net foreign debt of 50 percent of GDP.

  Why does the trade deficit matter? The U.S. trade deficit is financed 
by borrowing, often from foreign investors and foreign countries. This 
is money that future generations of people living in the U.S. will have 
to pay back to people living elsewhere, with interest. And when foreign 
creditors begin to call in their loans, it will be the American worker 
and the American family who pay the price caused by the indifference of 
policymakers in Washington. Just ask workers in Argentina.
  Is this really a problem? Yes. In December of 1999, well-known 
market-watcher Standard & Poor's put the U.S. financial system on its 
watch list of 20 countries that are ``vulnerable to a credit bust.'' 
Surprisingly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is generally 
recognized as a tool of the U.S. Treasury Department, has acknowledged 
the teetering nature

[[Page H9009]]

of the present U.S. financial condition. In a recent consultation with 
the U.S., the IMF noted, ``The sustainability of the large U.S. current 
account deficit hinges on the ability of the United States to continue 
to attract sizable capital inflows. Up to now, these inflows in large 
part have reflected the perceived attractiveness of the U.S. investment 
environment, but such perceptions are subject to continuous 
reappraisal.'' In other words, foreign investors could wake up 
tomorrow, look at the large U.S. current accounts deficit, question 
whether we'll be able to pay our bills, change their minds about the 
attractiveness of the U.S. investment environment, and plunge the U.S. 
into a financial and economic crisis.
  As an article in the Wall Street Journal on August 14, 2000, pointed 
out, ``Although he's often credited with omniscience, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan admitted his uncertainty about the trade 
deficit in testimony before the House of Representatives last month.'' 
Greenspan testified ``At some point, something has got to give, and we 
don't know what it's going to be.''
  The Chief Economist at Deutsche Bank Research was quoted in the Wall 
Street Journal saying, ``Confidence in the U.S.A. could abruptly 
collapse before the rest of the world is firmly back on its feet.'' Mr. 
Walter went on to say, ``It is, at any rate, not out of the question 
that capital flows into the U.S.A. will dry up, and that the dollar 
will take a rapid dive . . .''
  Paul Krugman, a mainstream, establishment economist wrote in his 
column in the New York Times on March 26, 2000, that ``. . . even the 
most successful economy must sooner or later export enough to pay for 
its imports. Our current position, where we pay for many of our imports 
by attracting inflows of capital--in effect by selling the rest of the 
world claims on our future exports--cannot go on forever.'' Krugman 
went on to write something that could turn out to be prophetic, ``The 
trouble, you see, is that in economics, as in life, what you don't pay 
attention to can hurt you.''
  It may not be so far in the future that foreign investors lose 
confidence in the U.S. economy and the dollar and flee to other 
currencies as has happened in England, Mexico, Southeast Asia, Brazil, 
and Russia in the past few years. Of course, then the IMF can come to 
the rescue, force a structural adjustment program on us, and demand 
export-led economic growth. Maybe then we can reduce our trade deficit.
  Catherine Mann of the Institute for International Economics (IIE) has 
done research to try to determine at what point deficits become 
unsustainable. The IIE is a respected, non-partisan research 
organization that generally supports unfettered globalization. Ms. Mann 
examined Canada, Australia, and Finland and seven other economically 
advanced nations with big trade deficits during the past 20 years. What 
she found should be a wake-up call to American policymakers. According 
to her research, 4.2 percent of GDP is the limit a current accounts 
deficit can research before the economy begins to implode. The U.S. 
deficit has already reached and surpassed this benchmark.
  It is also worth providing a bit of historical perspective. It the 
early 1970s, the deteriorating trade balance was considered so severe 
that in August 1971, the Nixon administration made the historic 
decision to abandon the dollar's gold convertibility and allowed it to 
float other currencies. What were these shockingly high deficits that 
led to this decision? A mere 0.1 percent and 0.5 percent of GDP in 1971 
and 1972, respectively, minuscule compared to today's deficits. Even 
the widely heralded ``new economy'', which sacrifices manufacturing in 
favor of high-technology products and the service sector, is unlikely 
to improve the trade deficit. So-called post-industrial businesses earn 
very little from exports and therefore will contribute little to 
improving our balance of payments problem. Microsoft's exports 
typically only account for one-quarter of its total sales revenue.
  Merrill Lynch is a classic service business. While the firm generates 
about one-quarter of its revenue outside the U.S., most of it doesn't 
count as U.S. exports since it generally serves foreign customers from 
offices in the markets concerned. According to an article in the 
American Prospect on August 14, 2000, `` . . . it is apparent, that 
even in a good year, less than 5 percent of the firm's revenues 
contribute to the American balance of payments.''
  Ignoring U.S. trade deficits and continuing to pursue the same-old 
failed trade policies is not sound policy, and could lead to an 
economic catastrophe. For this reason, Congress must maintain its 
constitutional prerogatives on trade, and oppose fast track. Failed 
U.S. trade policies and subsequent trade deficits have also cost 
millions of high-paying jobs across the country. H.R. 3005 will help 
accelerate this job loss by continuing to force U.S. workers--who are 
the highest educated, best trained, most productive workers in the 
world--to compete with exploited workers in developing countries who 
often make only a few dollars a day in dangerous work environments.
  Various analysts have identified many negative consequences of 
massive, persistent trade deficits: a sharp rise in income inequality 
and stagnation of incomes for average workers; the shifting composition 
of employment away from high-paying manufacturing jobs with benefits to 
lower-wage service sector jobs; and decreased research and development 
spending, which hurts our long-term economic competitiveness; among 
other problems. According to the Economic Policy Institute, the U.S. 
has lost 3 million jobs from 1994-2000 due to the U.S. trade deficit. 
Job-loss associated with the trade deficit increased six times more 
rapidly between 1994-2000 than between 1989-1994. Every state and the 
District of Columbia has suffered significant losses. Ten states, led 
by California, lost over 100,000 jobs each. My home State of Oregon has 
lost more than 41,000 jobs.
  There are many parts of my district in Southwest Oregon that never 
benefitted from the so-called economic boom of the 1990's. So, while 
proponents of fast-track will argue that trade has led to a net 
increase in jobs that proclamation rings hollow to many communities in 
Southwest Oregon. We've seen our friends and neighbors lose high-
paying, family-wage jobs with health care benefits. If they've been 
able to find work at all after being laid-off, it's for less pay, more 
hours, and fewer benefits.
  In addition to these sometimes abstract, macro-level impacts, U.S. 
trade policies that sacrifice U.S. jobs and industrial capacity have 
main street impacts. The micro-level impact of factories leaving small, 
often single company towns is devastating on families and communities. 
The domino effect of plant closures has been linked to: increased 
domestic violence and substance abuse, reduced purchasing power for 
other businesses in the area that used to depend on higher wage factory 
workers as their customer base, a reduced tax base that decreases the 
ability of the local government to provide necessary services, and 
eventually, population flight that exacerbates the latter two problems.
  Of course, it's not just workers who have lost as Congress delegated 
complete authority to negotiate trade agreements to the executive 
branch. Farmers and rural communities have been utterly devastated. 
NAFTA and other trade agreements were held out as a beacon of hope for 
America's farmers. New market openings were promised in which farmers 
could sell their surplus crops. All would become rich. This never 
happened.

  While giant agribusinesses exporters have certainly benefitted, the 
vast majority of family farmers have struggled against a flood of cheap 
imports from developing nations. In addition, U.S. farmers have, 
despite commitments to the contrary, been unable to open new markets 
for their products as other nations stubbornly maintain both tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to U.S. agriculture products. In addition, trade 
rules discourage country-of-origin labeling, which could allow 
consumers to pick U.S. grown produce, beef, or other commodities.
  The statistics pointing to the failure of U.S. trade policy for 
farmers are clear: The U.S. balance of trade in farm products has 
fallen 57 percent since 1996. Prices for major commodities have fallen 
nearly 50 percent. 72,000 family farms disappeared in the mid to late 
1990s. U.S. farm income is projected to decline nine percent in the 
next year.
  Farmers should be wary of predictions that granting fast track will 
lead to new export markets. We've heard this all before, and farmers 
are falling further and further behind. Various forecasts by government 
agencies, private researchers, and lobbyists predicted steady growth in 
exports through the 1990s. These forecasts all proved to be backwards. 
U.S. farm exports dropped 22 percent between 1996-2000. At the same 
time, farm imports rose by nearly 10 percent.
  A series of articles in The Oregonian highlighted the plight of 
farmers in my state. One article detailed the unfair trade practices by 
Chilean fruit growers that is causing Oregon farmers to go out of 
business. U.S. imports of Chilean red raspberries more than doubled 
between 1998 and 2000. That increased Chile's share of the U.S. market 
to 36 percent, up from 27 percent in 1998. The U.S. International Trade 
Commission issued a preliminary ruling in favor of U.S. growers on the 
allegation of illegal dumping, but the ruling came too late for many 
family farmers. On the whole, Chile exports $900 million worth of 
agriculture products to the U.S. every year, around six times as much 
as it imports.
  The story is the same for many other commodities and many other 
trading partners. Oregon wheat farmers had asked me to support 
permanent most-favored-nation status for China because of the supposed 
huge market opportunities. However, China has a massive surplus of 
wheat and no need to buy U.S. wheat. Shipments by Oregon wheat growers 
have sat and rotted in Chinese ports.
  It is worth quoting Dr. Willard Cochrane, former chief economist at 
the Department of

[[Page H9010]]

Agriculture, at length on the folly of U.S. trade policy as it relates 
to agriculture. He recently wrote:

       It does not make sense to pursue a strategy of pushing 
     exports when the global demand is weak. To sell more of our 
     farm commodities in that situation requires us to price them 
     below the going market price, and thereby pull sales away 
     from our competitors. This would, of course, invite 
     retaliation in which those competitors (like Brazil and 
     Argentina) came back at us by cutting their prices still 
     further. This is not the way to profit from the export 
     market--it is the formula for an expensive price war.
       For the U.S., this is a terrible solution. The world prices 
     for products like soybeans and corn are already below the 
     costs of production for most U.S. producers. To expand your 
     sales by selling more at still lower price is no way to get 
     well financially and to stay in business. This practice can 
     only transfer the costs to the U.S. taxpayer, as we are 
     continually forced to provide emergency payments to farmers 
     because of extremely low prices.
       The global demand for American farm products cannot be 
     manipulated at the beck and call of American policy makers. 
     Foreign importers are not going to increase their purchase of 
     American food products because U.S. policymakers want them to 
     do so. Imports of American farm products will increase again 
     only as those importing countries pull out of their economic 
     slump and consumer incomes begin to rise.
       Fantisizing about solving the price and income problems of 
     American farmers through instantaneous global demand 
     expansion is life fantasizing over winning the Power-ball 
     Lottery. The chances of success are about the same. Farmers 
     generally, and family farmers in particular, would be better 
     served by forgetting about fixing the broken export market 
     for farm commodities, and concentrating their energies on 
     enacting legislation designed to strengthen rural 
     communities, reduce the pollution of America's farmland and 
     rivers, and increase competition among suppliers of non-farm 
     produced inputs on the production side, and among handlers 
     and processors on the marketing side.

  I am also opposed to the fast-track legislation drafted by Chairman 
Thomas because it will help accelerate the destruction of the 
environment both here at home and around the world. Further, it will do 
nothing to ensure basic labor rights for workers around the world. 
Proponents of fast-track would have us believe that incorporating labor 
rights and environmental protections that are enforceable in the exact 
same manner as the commercial provisions in trade agreements is an 
inappropriate mixture of economic issues with so-called ``social'' 
issues. That is, at best, a shallow and disingenuous analysis.
  Representative Sander Levin, one of the leading Democratic supporters 
of previous trade agreements, put it best when he said labor and 
environmental issues ``are fundamentally economic issues that are 
directly relevant to the structure of international competition. In the 
domestic context, we don't hesitate to say that `right to work' laws or 
emissions standard, to pick two examples, are issues that affect 
economic competition. Indeed, it was the economic relevance of the 
right of workers to associate, organize and bargain that made it so 
central in early, decades-long struggles in our nation. Accordingly, it 
is illogical and inconsistent to suggest these issues are irrelevant 
with respect to international commerce and competition. Certainly, 
labor or environmental issues can have `social' aspects that may 
involve humanitarian or human rights considerations, or considerations 
about conservation of natural resources. But it is unrealistic to 
suggest that as the issues operate among nations, they are not in 
substantial measure economic in their nature. Indeed, the intensity of 
the controversy over them, especially between nations, is in good part 
because they are economic, and not just `social.' ''

  The Economic Strategy Institute (ESI), a pro-trade think-tank that 
includes former officials of the Reagan administration has also 
concluded that these are economic issues and that labor standards are 
appropriate. ESI economist Peter Morici wrote in his book Labor 
Standards and the Global System that, ``An international regime that 
permitted importing countries to embargo or impose tariffs on goods 
made with exploited labor would increase wages, speed development and 
increase growth in countries where labor is exploited if these measures 
caused governments or producers to take corrective actions. . . . 
Better enforcement of [core worker] rights would likely promote trade 
that increases incomes and growth, both in industrialized and 
developing countries.'' He went on to write, ``Permitting workers to 
bargain collectively reduces distortions in the economy and results in 
a more efficient allocation of resources, more exports, and higher GDP. 
In contrast, denying workers the right to bargain collectively 
perpetuates distortions in the labor market, and results in an inferior 
allocation of resources.''
  That being the case, why do fast-track proponents who oppose 
guaranteed workers rights favor a lower GDP for developing countries, a 
distorted labor market, and an inferior allocation of resources? Free 
traders pride themselves on promoting economic efficiency. Yet, 
economic efficiency depends on workers having rights. The Thomas bill, 
H.R. 3005, does not even guarantee that trade agreements will recognize 
the five core International Labor Organization standards: the right to 
freely associate, the right to bargain collectively, and bans on child 
labor, compulsory labor, and discrimination.
  Environmental protection receives similarly shabby treatment under 
H.R. 3005. The bill includes no provisions that prevent countries from 
lowering their environmental standards to produce an economic 
advantage. The bill does not require the negotiation of trade 
agreements that improve environmental standards. Environmental 
protections negotiated via multilateral environmental agreements (MEA) 
are put at-risk. Citizens have few, if any, rights to protest when 
governments fail to enforce environmental laws, or labor laws for that 
matter. Even the language in H.R. 3005 that supposedly promotes 
environmental consideration is meaningless since it is non-binding on 
the administration's trade negotiators.
  I have visited the U.S.-Mexico border since the enactment of NAFTA. 
It is a virtual wasteland. Environmental protection is not a natural 
result of so-called free trade agreements. Environmental protection 
must be a mandatory objective, enforceable through the same dispute 
resolution process as commercial provision in trade agreements. H.R. 
3005 falls far short of that standard.

  Finally, as if destroying American jobs, rural communities, and the 
environment weren't enough, the misguided U.S. trade policies that 
would be perpetuated by the fast-track bill before us today represent a 
frontal assault on U.S. sovereignty.
  H.R. 3005 proposes to expand NAFTA's notorious chapter 11 provision, 
for the first time, allows a private company to sue a sovereign foreign 
government in the event a country takes an action that is ``tantamount 
to expropriation.'' Unfortunately, the definition of ``tantamount to 
expropriation'' turned out to be extraordinarily broad. In other words, 
if federal, state, or local elected officials take action, such as 
through passing a law or regulation, that a company believes unfairly 
limits their ability to make a profit, that company can sue to get the 
law or regulation overturned or to get monetary compensation for ``lost 
profits'' resulting from the action.
  We have over seven years of experience with the radical investment 
deregulation included in chapter 11 of NAFTA. During the NAFTA debate, 
critics of the treaty, like myself, were told that fears about the 
forced overturning of consumer safety, health, or environmental laws or 
regulations were unfounded. Unfortunately, events have proven those 
fears to have been quite prophetic. A string of chapter 11 cases has 
forced the repeal of public health and environmental laws in Canada and 
Mexico, and, at least two cases have been filed against the United 
States. There may be more, but because of the secrecy surrounding these 
proceedings, it is hard to know.
  In Methanex v. U.S., a Canadian corporation is suing to overturn a 
California law enacted to protect its clean water supply, and thus the 
health of its citizens. In Loewen v. U.S., another Canadian company is 
essentially arguing that the U.S. tort system--whereby juries are able 
to send strong messages via large damage awards to businesses who 
abuse, defraud, or endanger their customers--is illegal. In other 
cases, Canada has been forced to overturn a ban on a suspected toxin, 
the United Parcel Service has sued challenging the existence of the 
Canadian postal service, and a Canadian steel company has sued over 
``Buy American'' laws for highway construction projects in the United 
States.
  The investor protections included in NAFTA, and those envisioned by 
H.R. 3005, are much broader than previous investment provisions in 
international agreements. These investor rights are exercised in 
secretive tribunals that issue binding decisions without regard to 
consumer health and safety or the environment. And, these investor 
protections are increasingly being used by businesses as a first resort 
to influence the sovereign lawmaking and regulatory processes of 
individual countries rather than as a last resort for egregious conduct 
by governments. The end-result forces taxpayers to fork over their 
hard-earned dollars to compensate corporations for our sovereign right 
as citizens to protect our health and safety. I believe that federal, 
state, and local governments should be able to act to protect the 
public interest without being unnecessarily restrained by trade 
agreements. Unfortunately, H.R. 3005 says otherwise.

  Mr. Speaker, the American people are far ahead of their elected 
officials in understanding the need to halt and reverse the race to the 
bottom in labor, human rights, and environmental standards around the 
world.
  A recent study by the School of Public Affairs at the University of 
Maryland found 93

[[Page H9011]]

percent of Americans agree that ``countries that are part of 
international trade agreements should be required to maintain minimum 
standards for working conditions.'' Further, over 80 percent wanted to 
bar products made by children under the age of 15. Seventy-eight 
percent said the WTO should consider labor standards and the 
environment when it makes decisions on trade. Seventy-four percent said 
countries should be able to restrict the imports of products if they 
are produced in a way that damages the environment. Seventy-four 
percent also said we have a moral obligation to ensure foreign workers 
do not have to work in harsh or unsafe working conditions. Polls by 
other independent organizations have drawn similar conclusions.
  Our current trade policies allow multinational corporations to 
receive all the benefits of expanded trade with no corresponding 
obligations to workers, public health, or the environment. We must 
reject the claims of proponents of H.R. 3005 that the choice is between 
unfettered ``free'' trade or no trade at all.
  Let's be clear. Fast-track, and the agreements that would be 
negotiated with it, are not about ``free'' trade. No one will be 
arguing for the complete removal of tariffs, quotas, or other barriers 
to trade. No one will be arguing for the uninhibited movement of 
citizens. And, no one will propose doing away with patents, copyrights 
or other intellectual property protections which, while they have an 
economic rationale, are protectionist and violate the dictates of 
``free'' trade. Rather, the debate today is about who will write the 
rules for trade and who those rules will benefit. I believe Congress 
must not abdicate our constitutional duty to write the rules, and to do 
so in a way that benefits average working families, public health and 
safety, the environment, and the U.S. economy.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose H.R. 3005.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott), a member of the Committee on 
Ways and Means and an active member on trade.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, the last round of negotiations came down 
with 5,000 pages of rules and regulations. We have today out here in 1 
hour set up the process by which we are going to do this all over 
again.
  The majority would have us believe that it is not even worth taking 
the time to look at any alternative. They say, well, you can have a 
motion to recommit. We can have 5 minutes to talk about the process by 
which we arrive at 5,000 pages of trade legislation.
  If Members think that is fair, if Members think that is what people 
sent the 435 of us here to do, they ought to vote for this. But if 
Members think we need a little more time, and we have been here for 
almost 11 months, and we come down here at the last minute and we have 
less than an hour for 5,000 pages.
  It does not work. They are going to have to come back again.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Dreier), the chairman of the Committee 
on Rules, which shares jurisdiction over trade packages, including this 
one.
  (Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, on this, the 60th birthday of our friend, 
the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, it is important to 
note that we are on the verge of casting the single most important vote 
of the 107th Congress. Why? Because it deals with the two very 
important issues of our economy and the U.S. role in the world, our 
leadership role.
  We know that the attack that was launched on the United States first 
hit the World Trade Center, where people from 80 nations around the 
world were killed, and it was the worst attack on our civilian 
population ever. They knew exactly what they were doing. They were 
trying to undermine the leadership role we are playing.
  The fact is, the world is moving dramatically towards free trade. The 
President of Brazil said in a speech just a couple of months ago in 
Portuguese, ``Exportamos o moremos,'' export or die. He understands 
that very well.
  We as a Congress need to give this authority to the President so that 
he can pry open new markets for U.S. workers, producers, farmers, and 
businesses.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I hope the worst thing that happens today on the 
birthday of the gentleman from California (Mr. Thomas) is defeat of 
this bill and that the rest of the day goes well for him.
  But the best thing that could happen for the country is that we 
defeat the bill and try to do it the right way.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from 
Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), the minority leader.
  (Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, first I want to recognize the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Rangel), the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Bonior), 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Matsui), and the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Levin) for a tremendous job in putting together the 
motion to recommit that we will be talking about in a few moments. They 
are truly hard workers, and they truly care about a good trade policy 
for our country. I thank them for the hard work that they did to put 
this together.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to ask Members to vote yes on the motion to 
recommit; and if it does not prevail, I ask Members to vote no on the 
underlying bill that has been presented here by the Committee on Ways 
and Means.
  Let me first say that I would have hoped that we could have been on 
the floor today with worker relief. We are 11-plus weeks since 
September 11. We have thousands of workers who have lost their jobs.
  While we seem to find time for insurance company relief and airline 
company relief, and now a big trade bill, and lots of appropriation 
bills, all of which are important and all of which have great support, 
we cannot seem to find time to take care of the most important thing in 
front of us.
  I said last week, I guess it is because we are not unemployed. If one 
is unemployed, unemployment is the biggest problem. They cannot get 
health insurance today. They cannot support their families. I talk to 
unemployed workers every day. Their problems are right now, this week, 
today. I would hope that we would get relief for them soon. They need 
it. We have to do it. They deserve it. Rather than taking up every 
other manner of bill, I hope we would take that up.
  But let me direct my remarks to the bill from the Committee on Ways 
and Means and why I think it is ill-advised and why the kind of bill 
that will be presented on the motion to recommit I think is the right 
way to go.
  Let me say that over 20 years now, we have made great progress, in my 
view, on trade policy in America. Trade policy today is not what it was 
20 years ago. There is a good reason for that. In trade negotiations, 
20 years ago the only thing that was ever really considered were 
tariffs. It was a matter of trying to get down high protective tariffs 
all over the world so that trade would take place between countries.
  Today, we have moved way down the road and the issues are not just 
tariffs, the issues are really about compatibility: how do we get 
intellectual property laws in countries to be properly enforced; how do 
we get capital laws to be enforced.
  What we have brought to the table and tried to get on the table is 
the question of whether or not labor laws, human rights laws, 
environmental laws, health and safety laws, should be just as much a 
part of trade negotiations as intellectual property laws and capital 
laws.
  Now, we have made a lot of progress. We had a treaty with Jordan that 
was recently brought to the Congress that dealt with those matters, to 
the satisfaction of the Government of Jordan and to the satisfaction of 
the United States.
  We now go to another WTO Round. There are lots of other free trade 
treaties that we want to negotiate, that we should negotiate; but it is 
vital and important that the full range of issues that should be in 
those negotiations are on the table in the core text of the treaties.
  I was at Microsoft last week, and one of the executives at Microsoft 
said to me, our intellectual property is still being pirated in China. 
We are not being paid for our Windows software in China. They can buy 
it on the street corner, pirated copies. You need to do more, he said, 
to enforce the intellectual property agreements that are in the 
treaties with the WTO and now China.
  Labor unions, workers, people concerned about the environment, people

[[Page H9012]]

worried about health and safety laws have the same feeling about things 
they care about. At the end of the day, I think what this comes down to 
is what one worries about.
  What do Members care about? If they care about getting wages up in 
countries abroad, if they think trade is a long march to bring about 
compatibility across the world so that we have real compatibility in 
countries, if we really worry about having consumption as well as 
production, if Members believe we have to build economies all over the 
world from the bottom up so people have enough money in their pocket to 
really buy things, then they would agree with me that we need to have a 
little bit different trade policy that I think is suggested in the 
motion to recommit, and not suggested in the bill the Committee on Ways 
and Means brought forward.

                              {time}  1515

  Now, let me end with this. I was in Pueblo, Mexico recently and I met 
with people in a factory there that went on strike, put together an 
independent union, something that has not often happened. And they won 
their strike because the leader of the new independent union, a woman, 
went to each house of every worker in that plant and got them to 
support the strike. And they said to me, when I met with them, how 
great it would have been had we had a provision in a trade treaty with 
Mexico that they could have used to try to get labor laws in Mexico to 
be properly enforced so it would have been easier for them to succeed 
in what they finally succeeded in. One of the first times that it has 
happened.
  I think we need to help people like that in our own self-interest and 
in the interest of our economy. Trade is a critical issue going forward 
for this country.
  I agree with a lot of the statements that have been made on the other 
side of the aisle. We are the leader, we are the one that needs to 
bring trade policies to the world. But in order to do it correctly we 
have to insist that all the right issues be on the table. And that is 
what this debate is about.
  I urge Members to vote yes on the motion to recommit. I urge Members 
to vote no if that motion to recommit does not succeed. We can come 
back here, I am confident if we turn down this ill-advised bill, and we 
can reach a bipartisan consensus on a trade bill that should get 400 
votes on the floor of this House of Representatives. Let us do that and 
do it very soon.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hastert), the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives.
  Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me time.
  Mr. Speaker, it is always an honor to take this floor. It is an honor 
to have these debates because, let no one be fooled, this is one of the 
defining debates of this Congress. The gentleman who stood up and spoke 
before, just prior to my taking the floor, is a person who leads the 
other side of the aisle, a person who I have a great deal of respect 
for. We do not always agree. As a matter of fact, there are a lot of 
times we do not agree. But some of the things he talked about today I 
do agree with.
  We talked about unemployed workers. We have seen 700,000 workers in 
this country lose their jobs since September 11. We need to stimulate 
our economy. We need to support those things that make this economy 
work. And one of the ways to do that is to be aggressive, something 
that we have not been able to do for a number of years; go overseas, 
make the agreements, make the deals that we have to, sell our products, 
put our people to work, create jobs in this country, and stimulate and 
pass legislation that gives the President of the United States the 
abilities to go out and make those agreements.
  We have talked about maybe this bill does not have all of the good 
things in it maybe other bills did. We have talked about the Jordan 
trade agreement we just passed a short time ago. But I can tell you, 
this bill has those agreements in it that were in the Jordan trade 
agreement. The issues of workers, the issues of environment are put 
into this agreement, put in this bill.
  They talk about being able to negotiate on the international property 
rights. I understand the problems of trading with China and trading 
with other places that do not quite have the laws that we have. But 
unless you have the structure so that our administration and others can 
go forward and negotiate and lay down the agreements so that we can 
protect ourselves with international property rights and others, we 
will never get them, because you cannot do it by waving a wand and you 
cannot do it by coercion. You have to do it by negotiation, and you 
have to have the ability to do that.
  I stood on this floor 5 years ago to give then President Clinton the 
ability for Fast Track authority. I did that because I thought it was 
the right thing to do. I did it because I thought the President of the 
United States, regardless of party, ought to be able to go out to make 
agreements and negotiations and then bring them back to this Congress 
for us to agree with or to disagree with.
  Today I rise in support of this legislation giving a new President 
Trade Promotion Authority. And I urge all of my colleagues to do it. As 
I said, this is a defining vote for this Congress. This Congress will 
either support our President, who is fighting a courageous war on 
terrorism and redefining American world leadership, or it will undercut 
the President at the worst possible time.
  David McCurdy, a former member of this body, now head of a high-tech 
trade group, said, this vote is every bit as important as our vote to 
give the President the authority to fight the war on terrorism; this 
vote is being watched today closely by our allies and by our 
adversaries.
  Ironically, there is more at stake here if we fail than if we 
succeed. If this vote prevails, the President has the authority to 
negotiate further trade agreements. That is it. The President still has 
to bring those agreements back to Congress for approval. If we do not 
like those deals we can still reject them. But if we vote down this 
legislation, we send a terrible signal to the rest of the world. We say 
to the world that the Congress will not trust the President to lead on 
trade. We say to the world that Congress is not interested in promoting 
trade. We say to the world that we fight a war around this world on 
terrorism, that we would rather retreat to splendid isolationism than 
engage in the world economy.
  That is the wrong choice. The world keeps spinning without us. There 
are 170 free trade agreements around the world that have been 
negotiated in the last several years. We have been party to two, two, 
T-W-O, two, one, two, of those agreements out of 170. That means that 
we have not engaged. We are not there.
  We can either watch from the sidelines or we can get in the game. Our 
high-tech communities, our farmers, our manufacturing sectors, our 
sectors, they all want us to be in the game. They understand that 
American leadership on trade means more than American jobs and a better 
standard of living for our workers.
  Many of you are concerned about your constituents. You have a right 
to be concerned about your constituents. But the constituents in this 
Nation want us to take steps now to promote long-term economic security 
now and for the future. American leadership on trade means better 
economic security for our workers.
  Let me conclude by simply saying, reject isolationism, reject 
protectionism. Vote instead for the American leadership. Vote for 
American jobs. Vote for better economic growth. Vote to support the 
President this time, especially in a time of war. Vote for Trade 
Promotion Authority.
  Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant support of this 
legislation, which would provide trade promotion authority to the 
President. Every President since 1974 has had expanded trade authority, 
but Congress allowed the provision to expire in 1994, and our 
subsequent efforts to pass TPA have been unsuccessful.
  As someone who has supported free and fair trade throughout my 
Congressional career, the vote on this issue has been particularly 
difficult because of the process the House Leadership utilized to draft 
this legislation. More specifically, I believe while real progress was 
made, more could have been done to address the Democratic concerns in 
trade negotiations.
  I also object to the timing of this measure, which is being 
considered prior to enactment

[[Page H9013]]

of unemployment insurance legislation for those affected by the 
recession and the September 11 terrorist attacks. I also wish this 
legislation had incorporated more meaningful language on reform of the 
trade adjustment assistance program. Only after intense pressure and 
the prospect of failure did the House Leadership and the White House 
concede that more must be done meet the needs of American workers 
suffering from the recession and those who lose their job as a direct 
result of trade. With my colleague, Anna Eshoo, I have offered 
legislation that presents a real reform of the TAA program, and I am 
hopeful that the Senate companion to this bill--S. 1209--is considered 
in short order by the full Senate, and serves as the primary vehicle 
for conference consideration.
  Despite these concerns, I believe passage of this legislation is 
needed to produce strong trade agreements that open and expand markets 
for U.S. goods and service. To create new opportunities for American 
workers and their families, Congress must support policies that 
encourage growth and increased living standards in the U.S. Passage of 
this legislation will send a strong signal to the rest of the world 
that the President and Congress are prepared to work together to 
reaffirm U.S. leadership on global trade, and provides much needed 
momentum to advance new and existing trade negotiations around the 
world.
  While I do not believe the underlying bill went far enough in 
creating Congressional consultation, I was pleased with the inclusion 
of language creating a Congressional Oversight Group, comprised of 
members from all relevant committees, who are the briefed regularly, 
have access to negotiating documents and become accredited members to 
the U.S. delegation to ongoing trade negation. This measure also allows 
Congress to limit the ability of TPA procedures as a result of an 
Administration's failure to consult. And at the end of every 
negotiation, Congress retains the most important protection against an 
agreement that is not in our nation's interest--the right to approve or 
disapprove the final agreement.
  I also believe passage of this legislation is needed to continue to 
foster economic growth worldwide. Indeed, trade and economic growth 
provides the mechanism to help our developing countries expand their 
middle class and improve their standard of living. Since the end of 
World War II, the liberalization of trade has helped to produce a six-
fold increase in growth in the world economy and a tripling of per 
capita income that has enable hundreds of million of families escape 
from poverty and establish a higher standard of living. I believe 
passage of this bill helps us to continue to advance those goals which 
support not only our economic growth potential, but also helps preserve 
our national security.
  This bill does provide for issue related to enforcement of labor and 
environmental laws to be principal objectives in any trade agreement 
negotiated under TPA and that there can be no backsliding on current 
law. This is a strong achievement when compared to earlier versions 
including the original Crane bill. This measure requires the President 
to determine a remedy to meet any non-enforcement, and I believe such a 
provision provides an Administration with the latitude necessary to 
negotiate reasonable enforcement provision, without mandating specific 
penalties--an action that would keep many of our prospective trading 
partners away from the negotiating table.
  It would be wrong to ignore the public ambivalence regarding 
globalization, and we must recognize that while trade provides an 
overall benefit, there are those who lose, and the result can be 
devastating to working families and entire committees. It is important 
that as the bill works it way through the legislative process, that 
there is clear followthrough on commitments to provide enhanced 
unemployment assistance and health benefits. Further, I strongly urge 
that any final package include an enhanced and expanded TAA provision 
like that proposed in H.R. 3359. Lacking that, I and others, I believe, 
will find it hard to support a conference report.
  Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, as we debate trade authority, let's not 
forget the fastest growing and most exciting segment of American 
exporters--our small business exporters. Trade Promotion Authority 
surely will assist our negotiators in lowering barriers for this most 
promising engine of our exporting industries. Small businesses and 
family farmers in America will especially benefit from new trade 
agreements because exporting is the only sure way they can do business 
overseas. With Trade Promotion Authority, the President can more 
quickly ink foreign trade deals that will give our small businesses new 
markets to sell their goods and services.
  The role of small business in our domestic economy is well 
documented. America's 25 million-plus small companies are the backbone 
of our economy. They create three of every four new jobs, produce most 
innovations, and generate over half of the nation's private gross 
domestic product.
  The role of small business in international trade is less well known. 
In fact, small businesses account for nearly 97 percent of the total 
number of all U.S. exporters. The number of small business exporters 
has tripled over the past decade or so, increasing to over 224,000 
small businesses directly involved in exporting. Small businesses now 
account for 29 percent of total merchandise export sales spread 
throughout every industrial classification. What is more surprising is 
that the fastest growth among small business exporters has been with 
companies employing fewer than 20 employees. These very small 
businesses represented 69 percent of all exporting companies in 1999. 
Obviously, trade is essential to their future and to all they employ--
particularly at a time when our economy is facing difficulties. That's 
why groups like the Small Business Exporters Association has strongly 
endorsed H.R. 3005. Please find enclosed a copy of their letter to me.
  Our nation also is poised to expand its exports in services, which is 
the fastest growing sector of our economy and one in which small firms 
thrive. In fact, the service sector accounts for 80 percent of U.S. 
Gross Domestic Product and U.S. employment--83 million jobs. These 
service jobs are good paying jobs--their average annual income of 
$32,865 a year slightly exceeds the average annual income of 
manufacturing jobs. Although we in Congress tend to think of trade 
primarily in terms of goods, our services trade is where we have our 
competitive edge. The U.S. is the world's largest exporter of 
services--services such as telecommunications and information 
technology, insurance, securities, banking and funds management, 
energy, legal and educational services, accounting, express delivery, 
travel and tourism. This sector has created more than 20 million new 
jobs since 1998, generates a $76.5 billion annual trade surplus, and 
provides the greatest opportunity to increase American prosperity 
through international trade. To capitalize on our competitive edge and 
gain the benefits in economic prosperity and jobs, we need to remove 
the many kinds of complex barriers that now block our trade.
  In my own district in northern Illinois, small manufacturers are 
learning that if they want to remain in business they must begin 
tapping new markets in Canada, Mexico, and overseas. In 1999, the 
Rockford metropolitan area exported $857.2 million worth of goods and 
services, an increase of 64 percent since 1993, to practically every 
area of the world. As exporting opportunities become known, northern 
Illinois small and family owned businesses are taking advantage of 
them. For example, a tool and die business with 40 employees attended a 
successful trade mission to Mexico with the Administrator of the U.S. 
Small Business Administration.

  Despite these encouraging statistics and trends, there is much more 
work to do. While small business exporters have more than tripled in 
number, they still form less than one percent of all small businesses 
in the United States. Even among these cutting-edge small firms, nearly 
two-thirds sold to just one foreign market in 1999. In fact, 76 percent 
of small business exporters sold less than $250,000 worth of goods 
abroad. In other words, many of these small firms are ``casual'' 
exporters.
  The key is to encourage more small businesses to enter the trade 
arena and then to prod the ``casual'' small business exporters into 
becoming more active. If we were able to move in this direction, it 
could boost our exports by several billion dollars. We need to get 
these engines of our domestic economic growth fully engaged in the 
global marketplace. Hopefully, when Trade Promotion Authority is 
returned from the other chamber, it will contain a provision to create 
an Assistant United States Trade Representative for Small Business.
  Trade barriers are insurmountable for small business. While most 
large companies can either export or set up a factory overseas, most 
small business exporters have only one choice--that is to export from 
America. In addition, there are many complicated issues that face small 
business exporters, such as streamlining foreign customs practices. 
Trade Promotion Authority will give the President the tools he needs to 
negotiate away these unfair trade barriers.
  Trade Promotion Authority has been granted to the last six American 
Presidents. It simply gives the President the ability to negotiate 
trade agreements in a timely fashion. Once a trade deal is inked, the 
House and Senate have 90 days to approve it on an up or down vote. 
Under the version considered today, Congress will be more involved than 
ever in foreign trade deals because the bill creates a Congressional 
Oversight Group to oversee negotiations and consult with the 
Administration throughout the process.
  Currently, more than 134 trade agreements exist in the world and the 
United States is party to only two of them. Trade Promotion Authority 
would help the President open new markets to American products, 
knocking down unfair tariffs and foreign trade practices and preserving 
and creating more high-paying jobs

[[Page H9014]]

in the United States. American jobs that involve exporting pay 13 to 18 
percent more than other jobs.
  Expanded trade is needed now more than ever. In these tough economic 
times, American workers need work. This legislation will not only 
preserve jobs, but it will give our employers new markets to increase 
their business so they can put unemployed Americans back to work where 
they belong.
  Economic studies show that a new World Trade Organization (WTO) round 
would produce enormous benefits for the United States. If the round 
reduced existing tariffs and all service barriers by one-third, it has 
the potential to add $177 billion to the U.S. economy. Removal of all 
trade barriers would add $537 billion to the U.S. economy, $450 billion 
of which would be from services.
  Services and agricultural negotiations need to be re-energized by a 
successful new trade round. Nothing would assist American success in 
these talks, and continuing bilateral and multilateral negotiations, 
than the passage of Trade Promotion Authority. Without a new round, 
these negotiations will run out of steam, and our companies, economy, 
and job-creation potential will suffer.
  Renewing TPA will show our trading partners that we have the 
political will to start and conclude serious negotiations. I urge my 
colleagues' support of H.R. 3005.
         Small Business Exporters Association,
                                 Washington, DC, December 5, 2001.
     Rep. Don Manzullo,
     House Small Business Committee, 2361 Rayburn House Office 
         Building, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Rep. Manzullo: As the Chairman of the House Small 
     Business Committee, you are one of Congress, most committed 
     advocates of small business growth and prosperty. The Small 
     Business Exporters Association urges you to act on that 
     commitment tomorrow--by voting for Trade Promotion Authority 
     for this and future Presidents.
       This issue is sometimes seen as a struggle between the 
     priorities of big business and big labor. It is anything but. 
     As the nation's oldest and largest association dedicated 
     exclusively to small and mid-size US exporters, SBEA is 
     hearing loud and clear from its members that TPA may well 
     make or break their ability to compete globally.
       Though the number of small business exporters in the US has 
     tripled, reaching more than 200,000, smaller exporters face 
     huge new challenges, and our progress is at risk. The high 
     cost of the dollar in foreign currencies and the worldwide 
     economic softening have dealt serious blows to our ability to 
     sell abroad.
       We're also losing customers as free trade agreements spread 
     around the world--without the US--and our products grow more 
     expensive as a result.
       Big businesses can deal with the high dollar and the free 
     trade agreements by shifting production overseas. Small 
     business can't. Price us out of a market and we're out. 
     America loses the sales, jobs and economic growth.
       The vote on TPA tomorrow will send a powerful signal--
     whether Congress intends to strengthen a strategic growth 
     area of the American economy, or accentuate a downward 
     economic spiral.
       SBEA understands that compromises will be necessary in the 
     months ahead. There are many interests affected by US trade 
     agreements. We support those compromises. But a vote against 
     TPA is not a vote for compromise. It is a vote to end the 
     discussion.
       We hope that you will stand with small business tomorrow.
           Regards,
     James Morrison.
                                  ____

  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise not in opposition to 
free trade, or trade promotion authority. I come to the floor today to 
register my opposition to the form Chairman Thomas and the Republican 
leadership have chosen H.R. 3005. For the ``Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
Authority Act of 2001'' is anything but, simply does not fully address 
the well founded concerns many Americans have about international trade 
policy.
  Let me begin by stating that I am in favor of sensible, sustainable 
international trade. The United States is a major part of the global 
economy, and the health of this nation and its workers depends upon the 
ability of American producers and service providers to have access to 
markets to conduct business. It was Democratic President John F. 
Kennedy who stated, ``A rising tide lifts all boats.'' I firmly believe 
that in the case of international trade, this sentiment rings true, and 
that an economically stable world where every nation can aspire to a 
standard of living that reflects the elbow grease and ingenuity of its 
people is within our reach.
  Mr. Speaker, I have genuine concerns about the current state of the 
global economy. Over the last two years economic slowdown has impacted 
the entire world. The Bush administration has finally acknowledged that 
not only are we in a recession, but that we have been a recession since 
March. The recent tragedies associated with September 11 and the U.S. 
Postal Service have shaken the confidence of this nation's workforce 
even more, and despite the thousands of jobs that have been lost, the 
families who have suffered the most from the sum total of events have 
been least on the agenda of the Republican Majority in this Congress.
  My own district, Texas' 18th is a glaring example of the competition 
that exists between ensuring the stability of working families and 
adapting to the realities of the new global economy. Recently, the 
economic tide caught up with Enron, a major global employer in my 
district. Though I have every confidence in Houston to set the ship 
back on course, thousands of families will be the losers in the 
interim, and that weighs heavily on my mind.
  International trade is vital to the health of my district. The 
Business Roundtable estimates that exports directly support 10,000 jobs 
in my district. Another 55,000 jobs with wholesalers and service 
providers either wholly or partially depend upon export sales. By the 
same token, though NAFTA has lead to a 100 percent increase in Texas 
exports to Canada and Mexico, this trade agreement has resulted in 
severe distress to America's steel industry. It has cost literally 
thousands of U.S. jobs and forced district manufacturers like Maas 
Flange to seek and obtain a remedy from the International Trade 
Commission.
  Every Member here today can outline a similar set of tensions when 
determining the best course of action for their district. In the years 
since Trade Promotion Authority, or Fast Track, expired in 1994, we 
have had the opportunity to witness the need for free trade. We have 
also learned the reality that the trade rules can have a profound 
impact on labor forces as well as the local and global environments. As 
a legislator, I take seriously my constitutional obligations to balance 
these competing interests. Thus, I believe that any system of trade 
guidelines dispensed to the President should fully discharge our 
constitutional obligations and responsibilities to our respective 
districts.
  H.R. 3005--railroaded through committee by Chairman Thomas--does not 
strike this balance. At best, the legislation pays lip service to the 
concerns of the labor and environmental communities, and fails to 
substantively address the concerns of the American people that our 
trade policy be constitutionally sound.
  To begin, H.R. 3005 does not require countries to implement any of 
the five core ILO standards; the right of association; the right to 
collective bargaining; bans on child labor; compulsory labor; or 
discrimination. H.R. 3005 requires only that a country enforce its 
existing law--whatever law that happens to be. Through proponents of 
the legislation claim that H.R. 3005 does require countries to consider 
labor standards, the bill constructs these core standards as mere 
``general negotiating objectives.''
  Thus, negotiation on, or implementation of, labor considerations in 
trade agreements enacted under this formula would not be subject to the 
economic realities of a global trade regime. Instead, they would be 
subject to the whims of the negotiators and their political agenda. The 
bill also requires countries to continue to enforce whichever labor 
standards they have, rather than recognizing the ILO conventions. 
Consequently, rather than ensuring that we foster positive labor 
standards with our trading partners in order to keep multinational 
corporations from exploiting foreign workforces to the detriment of 
their domestic workers, this bill would encourage it. No greater 
incentive to stabilize worker conditions around the world is contained 
in this bill, than in previous versions of Trade Promotion Authority 
that were voted down by this Body. Yet this bill is supposed to help 
create and keep American Jobs.
  H.R. 3005 also falls severely short of incorporating the 
environmental externalities associated with international trade as a 
component part of the trade regime. This bill considers environmental 
objectives to be ``general negotiating objectives as well.
  However, H.R. 3005 does not require any concrete action from U.S. 
negotiators. The bill requires only that the President ``consult'' with 
other countries and ``promote consideration'' of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements. Thus, the bill contains no real assurances 
that the environment will be respected. H.R. 3005 would also allow 
greater rights for foreign investors in U.S. than U.S. firms due to its 
mimicry of NAFTA's chapter 11 rules regarding expropriation and 
takings, and it does not address key concerns raised under NAFTA 
investment rules that allow for the challenge of laws which are 
``tantamount to expropriation.'' Last Minute changes to H.R. 3005 in 
this area are an indication of the flawed philosophy behind the Thomas 
legislation; the Leadership has paid too little attention too late in 
this process to convince this Body that labor and the environment are 
legislative priorities of U.S. international trade, and they should be.
  Finally, this bill does not fully discharge Congress' Constitutional 
obligations regarding U.S. trade. Simply put, H.R. 3005 includes no 
effective mechanism for congressional participation in developing 
international trade. The

[[Page H9015]]

bill includes only more consultations and a recycled oversight 
mechanism from the 1988 law that was never used, which requires the 
Ways and Means and Finance Committees to act as gatekeepers. This 
function has never previously been utilized effectively, and there is 
no reason to assume this will change.
  The Leadership of this House has made a mistake with this 
legislation. Recent trade agreements with Jordan and the Andean 
countries prove that Congressional priorities and international trade 
can be reconciled. Thus, to send a bill to the floor which does not 
ensure that the recent trends in U.S. Law are respected is an 
irresponsible way to conduct trade policy. As such, despite my support 
of free trade, I cannot support the trade regime fostered by this 
legislation.
  Only H.R. 3019 fosters trade in a manner that considers its effects 
on workforces, the environment, our national sovereignty, and our 
constitutional obligations as members of Congress. The bill makes 
international labor standards a specific negotiating objective of the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas, and it requires the creation of a 
Working Group on Trade and Labor within the WTO. H.R. 3019 also 
provides a real mechanism for members of Congress to play an ongoing 
role in this increasingly important sector by structuring a review 
process of ongoing negotiations and increasing congressional oversight 
of negotiating objectives.
  International trade is vital to the people of the 18th district of 
Texas. So too are their jobs, the environment, and the freedom of our 
nation. It is our mandate as legislators to balance these interests for 
the good of our nation. The H.R. 3005 version of trade promotion 
authority does not do this, and I therefore cannot support it. By 
putting politics before policy, the Republican leadership has ruined an 
opportunity to ``lift all boats,'' for only the H.R. 3019 version of 
Trade Promotion Authority has the opportunity to ride a ``rising tide'' 
of support to passage.
  Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 3005, 
the ``Fast Track'' Trade Promotion Authority bill and in support of the 
Rangel substitute in the motion to recommit.
  As a member of this House and as a member of the California Assembly 
prior to my election to the House, I have been a long-time supporter of 
free trade policies. As a Californian, I understand very well the many 
advantages that come from open markets, the lowering of tariffs, and 
the elimination of other trade barriers that prevent American products 
from competing on a level playing field in overseas markets.
  American workers are the most productive workers in the world, and 
consumers around the world desire quality American products. I strongly 
believe that given a level playing field, American companies will 
thrive in overseas markets.
  I am also well aware of the value of open markets to American 
consumers. Americans are shrewd consumers. Their open-minded attitude 
in considering and purchasing quality goods produced in other countries 
instills competition in both American and foreign companies which, in 
turn, lowers prices for American families and increases their real 
income.
  Knowing the many benefits of increased trade between the U.S. and 
other countries, I voted for the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and for many years, I have supported legislation to increase 
trade, such as ``most favored nation'' status for China. I did so 
because of promises made to address the negative impacts of free trade 
agreements on U.S. workers and industries. However, once the trade 
agreement passed these promises were ignored and forgotten.
  Since the passage of NAFTA, on numerous occasions, I have loudly 
voiced my concerns to Cabinet officials and trade negotiators about the 
necessity to live up to the promises to help displaced workers.
  One such promise was the establishment of the Community Adjustment 
and Investment Program--CAIP--which was intended to provide financial 
assistance for American companies located in NAFTA trade-affected 
areas. In practice however, CAIP did little to help these companies. In 
fact, CAIP was never of any assistance to the garment industry located 
in my district, which experienced enormous job losses after the passage 
of NAFTA. CAIP's overly stringent eligibility requirements completely 
overlooked textile manufacturing companies too small to qualify or who 
did not meet the job loss threshold requirements. This essentially 
makes the CAIP program meaningless and ineffective.
  Meanwhile, last year the Los Angeles Times reported that employment 
in the Los Angeles garment trade dipped below 100,000 for the first 
time since NAFTA was enacted in 1994, with nearly 13,000 jobs lost 
since 1997 alone. The jobs lost have almost exclusively been blue-
collar sewing jobs.
  Knowing that adequate and appropriate safeguards are not currently in 
place to help our nation's displaced workers, I cannot support 
extending Trade Promotion Authority to the President. I also cannot 
support this bill, because it does not sufficiently address my growing 
concerns regarding issues of labor standards, environmental 
protections, and congressional oversight on trade negotiations.
  I regret that the Rules Committee has recommended a closed rule on 
this bill specifically blocking Democrats from offering amendments to 
address the concerns regarding this bill.
  However, while I will oppose the Thomas bill, I will support the 
Rangel substitute in the motion to recommit. The Rangel bill includes 
provisions that address many of my concerns about labor rights, 
environmental protections, and congressional review. First, the Rangel 
substitute sets out clear negotiating objectives for labor standards. 
The Rangel substitute forbids slave labor, and outlines strict rules on 
the use of child labor, and on the freedom of workers to associate and 
bargain collectively. The Thomas bill, in contrast, has no requirement 
that a country's laws include any of the five core International Labor 
Organization standards.

  Second, the Rangel substitute sets out clear negotiating objectives 
for environmental standards. The Rangel substitute would commit 
countries to enforcing their own national environmental laws and 
prevent them from waiving existing standards for the purpose of gaining 
a competitive advantage. The Thomas bill does little to ensure that 
environmental rules established by Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements have equal status to other provisions of trade agreements.
  Third, the Rangel bill ensures a continuing and active role for 
Congress in setting U.S. trade policy. It does this by replacing the 
ineffective mechanisms included in the 1988 ``fast track'' law with a 
procedure for structured biennial review of ongoing trade negotiations 
subject to fast track. It also gives Congress an opportunity to pass a 
resolution of disapproval if the U.S. decides to inaugurate a new 
regional or multilateral trade negotiation. The Rangel bill helps to 
ensure that Congress is an active participant in important 
negotiations. The Thomas bill's approach is to view Congress as an 
occasional consultant.
  In short, although it is not perfect, I believe the Rangel substitute 
addresses most of the legitimate concerns that have been raised about 
the negotiation of free-trade agreements.
  Free trade agreements and free trade policies are desirable goals, 
but we should never forget that they also impact many Americans 
adversely. By requiring implementation of labor and environmental 
standards, together with the active involvement of Members of Congress 
both Republican and Democratic administrations are likely to construct 
trade policies consistent with our principles as a society.
  The Rangel substitute is the best vehicle for achieving this goal. I 
urge my colleagues to support the motion to recommit and oppose the 
Thomas bill.
  Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Speaker, trade is clearly an important component of 
our national economy. Accordingly, I strongly support fair trade laws 
that ensure a competitive foundation for American exports by promoting 
American values. Fair trade laws ensure that workers and the 
environment do not get exploited for shortsighted profits; free and 
unfettered trade agreements trade away American jobs. The language in 
H.R. 3005 provides hollow promises to the environment and American 
workers. For years, supporters of these agreements have argued that 
trade is the cure-all for the American economy. To the contrary, the 
U.S. economy has been struggling for some time now, and we have empty 
trade accords to thank for it. We simply cannot have free trade at any 
cost.
  Clearly, now is not the time to pass fast-track authority. In the 
third quarter of this year, economic activity fell 1.1%; there is 
virtual agreement that the United States economy is in recession. Last 
year, the U.S. trade deficit reached a record $435 billion. Including 
interest payments, the United State's net foreign debt is 22% of the 
gross domestic product.
  Not surprisingly, personal bankruptcies hit an all-time high of 1.4 
million this year. The unemployment rate has been rising steadily, and 
the number of laid-off workers receiving unemployment benefits rose to 
3.8 million last month, the highest level since I came to Congress. But 
there's more: Industrial construction is at its lowest level in 7 
years. Since last July, 1.5 million U.S. manufacturing jobs have been 
lost, and 26 steel companies have gone bankrupt.
  These conditions hit too close to home for my constituents. In my 
home state of Illinois, the fourth-largest economy in the union, 
economic activity has fallen for seven straight months. Output at 
factories in the Chicago area has contracted for 14 straight months. 
Last month, a Clorox plant in my district closed and laid off 95 
workers. Furthermore, a 3M tape production facility announced it would 
be shutting down as well, displacing 270 hard-

[[Page H9016]]

working Chicagoans. Both companies cited the global economic downturn 
as the reason for these closures.
  Mr. Speaker, given a fair environment, our workers will out-perform 
any competitors. But we cannot compete with countries that subjugate 
their environment and pay their workers 90 cents per day. Now, in the 
midst of a recession, we are asked to vote to further these problems. I 
urge a ``no'' vote on H.R. 3005. Now is definitely not the time for 
fast track authority.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice strong support for 
free and fair trade but also my opposition to the Representative 
Thomas' Fast-Track bill. As a cofounder and a current leader of the New 
Democrats, I am dedicated to finding new and innovative approaches to 
expanding our trade opportunities. Over the course of my six terms in 
Congress, I have demonstrated a strong record on free trade by voting 
for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (BCI), 
Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China (PNTR), and most recently 
the Andean Trade Promotion Act.
  The global landscape for trade among nations continues to grow in 
complexity, however, as more nations enter the international market to 
trade goods and services. Just as we advocate more efficient, fiscally 
responsible government that encourages economic growth, so must we 
support free and fair trade agreements that recognize the challenges 
faced by American workers in the age of globalization. The opportunity 
exists for the United States to act as a world leader by enacting 
strong trade provisions that protect the American worker and the 
environment. The Thomas bill missed this opportunity by failing to 
enact meaningful labor and environmental standards.
  If you look at past free trade negotiations leading up to the Doha 
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization last month, the 
incremental increase in complexity and detail involved in trade 
negotiations is striking. In 1979, the Tokyo Round Agreement included 
only six areas for negotiation. Some of these issued areas included 
tariff levels, government procurement, and technical product standards. 
In 1994, the Uruguay Round negotiations integrated upwards of sixteen 
areas for trade negotiation including new issues such as intellectual 
property rights and trade in agriculture. In November 2001, the Doha 
Ministerial WTO Negotiations included upwards of 26 areas for debate. 
Among the issues open for negotiation were anti-trust laws, electronic 
commerce, and product labeling to name a few.
  As trade negotiations between nations involve more issues, there is 
absolutely no excuse to exclude new compliance standards regarding 
labor and the environment. This is the time for the United States to 
take the lead to ensure that American jobs are protected at home and 
that human rights laws are enforced by our trading partners.
  The Thomas bill falls well short of a guarantee for strong labor 
standards. By merely requiring a country to enforce its own existing 
labor laws, the Thomas bill provides no U.S. leadership on the 
treatment of the world's laborers. In fact, the five core International 
Labor Organization (ILO) standards are not even enforced. A commitment 
to principles like opposition to forced labor and child labor should be 
non-negotiable priorities of any future trade deals. The Fast-Track 
proposal does not require that our trade partners agree to these basic 
standards. Furthermore, an incentive must be in place for our trading 
partners to achieve fair and responsible labor standards and under the 
Thomas bill this will not happen.
  The Thomas bill falls short of any meaningful protections for the 
environment, as well. Because only voluntary negotiating objectives are 
in place, trading partners can lower their environmental standards to 
gain unfair trade advantages. Furthermore, the Thomas bill does not 
block foreign investors lawsuits from challenging domestice 
environmental laws.
  In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, during these times of uncertainty brought 
about by the war on terrorism and an apparent economic slowdown, we 
must heed the challenge to think anew when it comes to U.S. Trade 
Policy. We must balance our commitment to trading our goods and 
services abroad while also ensuring the protection and well-being of 
our workers. The Thomas bill is unbalanced and would represent a step 
backwards in our pursuit for free and fair trade.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I commend the diligent efforts of the 
distinguished chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, the gentleman 
from California, Mr. Thomas, my colleagues and their staff members in 
drafting and sponsoring H.R. 3005, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
Authority Act of 2001.
  This measure has been referred to as the most environmentally and 
labor responsive legislation regarding Trade Promotion Authority (i.e. 
Fast Track) to be sponsored by the Congress. However, I share the 
concerns raised by my constituents in that H.R. 3005's labor and 
environmental standards do not go far enough to ensure a level playing 
field in trade agreements. H.R. 3005 refers to environmental and labor 
provisions as negotiating objectives. Nevertheless, our trade history 
reveals that during the past 25 years including labor rights, and now 
environmental rights, as ``negotiating objectives'' do not guarantee 
that these provisions will actually be included in trade agreements. 
The geopolitical and trade landscape has changed. Of the 142 members 
comprising the World Trade Organization (WTO), 100 are classified as 
developing nations and 30 are referred to as lesser-developed nations. 
Why is this important? It is important because with China's accession 
into the WTO, those 130 nations will then become more forceful in 
promoting their own trade agendas. What H.R. 3005 does is create an 
incentive for a nation to create a more favorable trade agreement for 
itself by lowering its environmental and labor standards. At best, many 
of these nations' labor and environmental standards are substandard.
  As drafted, the overall negotiating objective of H.R. 3005 is to 
promote respect for worker rights. My constituents are concerned that 
the worker rights provisions do not guarantee that ``core'' labor 
standards are included in the corpus of prospective trade agreements. 
By core labor standards, I refer to the International Labor 
Organization's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work: freedom of association, the right to organize and for collective 
bargaining, and the rights to be free from child labor, forced labor 
and employment discrimination, which many people throughout the world 
are confronted with.
  My constituents are troubled that H.R. 3005 does not require any 
signatory to an agreement to improve or even to maintain that its 
domestic laws comply with the standards of the International Labor 
Organization. Among H.R. 3005's principal objectives is a provision 
entitled labor and the environment, which calls for the signatories to 
trade agreements to enforce their own environment and labor laws. Our 
nation as a leader in the global trade community must set the example 
by encouraging our prospective trading partners to raise their labor 
and environmental standards before we enter into any trade agreements 
with them. In the end, it will be the United States which is called 
upon to provide the resources to clean up environmental disasters and 
to bail out collapsed economies that failed as a result of substandard 
labor conditions.
  Through their first-hand accounts, my constituents report that 
workers in many nations in which we seek to enter into bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements are subjected to exploitation, harassment 
and worse for exercising their rights to collective bargaining, and are 
forced to work under harsh conditions. For example, in our own 
hemisphere more than 33 percent of the complaints filed with the 
International Labor Organization's Committee on Free Association 
originate in the Andean region. I understand that new labor laws in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru undermine the right to collective 
bargaining, and there are scores of reports from NGO's regarding 
unconscionable violations of the most fundamental rights for workers 
and their union representatives. The AFL-CIO reports that since January 
2001, more than 93 union members in Colombia have been murdered, while 
the perpetrators have gone unpunished.
  How the United States engages in trade negotiations and its practices 
are crucial not only for our future, but for our democratic process. 
Since our Nation's conduct is scrutinized worldwide we should set the 
right example. Events during the recent World Trade Organization 
negotiations in Doha, Qatar have made this fact even more apparent. 
That organization is seeking to adopt a worldwide ``Investor-State 
Clause'' during its next round of discussions. This clause was written 
into Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for 
the purpose of protecting businesses from expropriation by foreign 
governments. However, its application deviates from its original 
purpose of protecting signatories from expropriations.
  NAFTA Chapter 11 cases such as Methanex v. United States, allow a 
foreign investor to sue a signatory government if their company's 
assets, including lost profits and other intangibles are damaged by our 
laws or regulations. The provisions of Chapter 11 call for an 
arbitration panel, which meets in secret, and its findings are not 
subject to public disclosure.
  NAFTA's Chapter 11 standard of proof is much lower than what our own 
courts would require in a commercial case. The standard is whether the 
regulation illegitimately injured a company's investments and can be 
construed as an expropriation, which generally requires a physical 
taking of property or assets, even though in Chapter 11 cases no assets 
were physically taken. By virtue of this provision, our laws may be 
challenged in ways not foreseen by our Congress and in ways that are 
inconsistent with our own court's judicial interpretation, which are 
rendered irrelevant by

[[Page H9017]]

NAFTA's Chapter 11 provision. Methanex is seeking 970 million dollars.
  Mr. Speaker, we must seek out ways to make trade compatible with 
conservation of the environment and by adhering to core labor and 
environmental standards that are both incorporated into the body of a 
trade agreement and enforceable.
  Accordingly, I am not able to support H.R. 3005.
  Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Trade 
Promotion Authority Act of 2001. This important legislation will allow 
the United States to negotiate trade agreements in order to increase 
exports and stimulate our economic recovery here at home. It will also 
enable the President and Congress to work together to advance our 
interests around the world by guaranteeing Congress substantial 
participation in trade negotiations and allowing the President the 
authority to sign meaningful agreements.
  Today's economy is dependent on global trade. Therefore, American 
businesses must have access to foreign markets. There must be a level 
playing field. Farmers throughout my state of Kansas depend on foreign 
markets to purchase significant portions of their crops and livestock. 
And in a time where productivity exceeds the ability of the domestic 
market to absorb current production levels, the need to create overseas 
customers is more important than ever. In fact, Agriculture must export 
one-third of its production because it is nearly three times more 
dependent on exports than other sectors.
  Mr. Speaker, it's not just agriculture which benefits from free 
trade. Boeing, the largest exporter in the United States, sells more 
than half of its commercial planes to overseas customers. Last year, 
the company, which employs nearly 200,000 Americans, reported that one-
third of its sales were to international customers.
  Expanded trade has never been more important. Economists agree that 
America is in a recession and we must work to get our economy moving 
again, This is an opportunity to boost the economy by opening new 
markets.
  This bill ultimately saves American consumers money, it increases 
American exports, it creates American jobs, and it guarantees that the 
United States will remain the world's economic leader.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the Bipartisan Trade 
Promotion Authority Act.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, this has been a long day in a needlessly 
partisan fight.
  I support Trade Promotion Authority and have voted for it in the 
past. The bill I voted for in 1998 is not as good as the text before us 
today.
  I represent a trade-dependent district, and understand very well why 
trade helps our economy.
  But context matters. Our country was in a serious economic recession 
before September 11, and now faces enormous hardships just as the 
holiday season arrives. Forty-one thousand workers are out of jobs in 
the communities surrounding Los Angeles International Airport. Their 
airline and airport-affiliated jobs evaporated in the aftermath of 9-
11.
  Workers first, Mr. Chairman. Those workers and those negatively 
impacted by September 11 and trade must be helped first before we pass 
TPA.
  I support the package of worker benefits that the House leadership 
supports: $20 billion for unemployment, health insurance and worker 
training. The President has told me he supports it too.
  My wish was that working together we could vote and pass it first as 
evidence that we would keep our promises to workers.
  Sadly we didn't. Sadly I can't support TPA today until we do.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of Trade Promotion 
Authority. As a lifelong supporter of improved trade opportunities for 
American producers, my inclination always is to begin with a favorable 
disposition toward trade bills which come before Congress. I am 
convinced that American producers can, and do, win with freer and 
fairer trade. Certainly, not every conceivable trade bill deserves 
support but, in general, I am strongly persuaded that increased trade 
opportunities improve the lives and pocketbooks of American workers. I 
also believe that enhanced trade is a potent mechanism for America to 
export our values, practices and democracy along with our products.
  Unfortunately, early messages from the current administration forced 
me to question whether enhanced trade authority would be prudently used 
if granted this year. In particular, I was sorely disappointed by 
statements by the current Administration which made me doubt their 
understanding of both domestic and international farm policies and, 
particularly, the impact of those policies on the producers of our 
Nation's food and fiber. I am not going to be party to a unilateral 
disarmament of our farmers and ranchers for someone else's partisan 
philosophical reasons.
  Furthermore, the early handling of this issue by both the 
Administration and the House leadership confirmed what has appeared to 
me throughout the year as legislative arrogance. While it may be 
numerically possible to pass bills with Republican-only votes, 
ultimately there is a price to be paid for this sort of shortsighted 
partisanship by either party. Successful trade legislation always has 
required bipartisan support; when the well of good will has been 
drained by earlier legislative battles fought entirely on partisan 
grounds, issues like trade arrive with inadequate troops supporting the 
effort.
  All of that being said, I am reassured both by several conversations 
I personally have had and by those which have been reported to me from 
colleagues who share some of my concerns. As a naturally optimistic 
person, I am willing to hope that this experience might signal an 
awakening to political and legislative realities by some important 
players in both the executive and legislative branches.
  With my chairman on the Agriculture Committee, I am supporting the 
trade promotion authority legislation before us today. I do believe 
that the enhanced congressional consultation and oversight in the 
current bill are vital for ensuring that our constituents' views and 
needs are respected by our trade negotiators. I highly commend this and 
other improvements made by my colleagues John Tanner, Bill Jefferson, 
and Carl Dooley.
  The truth about trade is that there always are both successes and 
failures, winners and losers. But for the Nation as a whole, trade is a 
net positive.
  When it comes to agriculture, the successes have outweighed the 
failures. American farmers and ranchers now make a quarter of their 
sales to overseas markets; U.S. agriculture consistently enjoys a trade 
surplus; and next year agricultural exports are expected to reach $54.5 
billion, producing a trade surplus of $14.5 billion. But that is just a 
fraction of what could be possible with freer and fairer markets.
  According to the U.S. Trade Representative, NAFTA, and the Uruguay 
Round have resulted in higher incomes and lower prices for goods, with 
benefits amounting to $1,300 to $2,000 a year for an average American 
family of four, NAFTA has also produced a dramatic increase in trade 
between the United States and Mexico. In 1993, United States-Mexico 
trade totaled $81 billion. Last year, our trade hit $247 billion--
nearly half a million dollars per minute.
  U.S. exports to our NAFTA partners increased 104 percent between 1993 
and 2000; U.S. trade with the rest of the world grew only half as fast.
  Increased trade supports good jobs. In the five years following the 
implementation of NAFTA, employment grew 22 percent in Mexico, and 
generated 2.2 million jobs. In Canada, employment grew 10 percent, and 
generated 1.3 million jobs. And in the United States, employment grew 
more than 7 percent, and generated about 13 million jobs.
  But as I said before, I acknowledge that there are those who do not 
win in the short run under certain trade situations. For workers who 
have lost in trade in the past, I also believe that the best--and 
perhaps only--way to fix what has failed is through new negotiations, 
which level the playing field. We must speak with a unified voice that 
is forged through a close partnership between Congress and the 
executive branches. That is envisioned in the compromise bill.
  We in agriculture have only begun to reap the benefits of a half 
century of trade negotiations under GAIT and the WTO, which have 
reduced the average tariff on industrial goods to about 4 percent. That 
is a fraction if the 62 percent tariff that is imposed on our exports 
of agricultural products.
  Indeed, reform of agricultural trade policies begun in the Uruguay 
Round provided not only additional market access for agriculture but, 
perhaps more importantly, it provided the necessary framework to 
improve market access in future negotiations.
  Now is the time to press forward with additional trade reforms that 
will improve market access for our agricultural products.
  In addition to tariff barriers, U.S. agricultural exports must 
compete with subsidies from foreign governments. Europe alone spends 75 
times more in agricultural export subsidies than does the United 
States. In fact, Europe spent $91 billion last year to support 
agriculture, almost twice the $49 billion spent by the United States.
  Europe is aggressively pursuing trade agreements with other 
countries, already securing free-trade or special customs agreements 
with 27 countries, 20 of which it completed in the last 10 years. And 
the EU is negotiating another 15 accords right now. Last year, the 
European Union and Mexico--the second-largest market for American 
exports--entered into a free trade agreement. Japan is negotiating a 
free-trade agreement with Singapore, and is exploring free trade 
agreements with Mexico, Korea, and Chile.
  There is a price to pay for our delay in negotiating new trade 
agreements. For example,

[[Page H9018]]

U.S. exports to Chile face an 8-percent tariff, but Canada exports to 
Chile without the tariff because of the Canada-Chile trade agreement. 
As a result, United States wheat and potato farmers are now losing 
market share in Chile to Canadian exports.
  American farmers and ranchers can't afford for us to stand by and 
watch the world write new trade rules. The United States needs to lead 
a new round of negotiations, and we need trade promotion authority to 
do it.
  I encourage my colleague to support the compromise bill today and you 
will be supporting American farmers and ranchers as well as other 
business men and women who have the capacity to strengthen our economy 
as well as their own livelihoods if they are just given the chance.
  With millions of jobs and billions of dollars at stake, we cannot 
afford to be partisan or cavalier with this vote. My hope is that this 
week we will produce not only a legislative victory on Trade Promotion 
Authority but also a blueprint for greater respect and improved working 
relations between the parties on substantive national policy.
  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I cannot vote for this bill.
  I believe in free trade and am philosophically opposed to 
protectionism. I am particularly sensitive to the economic challenges 
faced by the ``high technology'' sector of our economy, and believe 
that there was an opportunity to craft a bill that would have secured 
broad bipartisan support on trade. Unfortunately, this bill falls short 
of that bipartisan promise.
  The stakes on trade promotion authority--or ``fast track''--have 
changed, along with the global trade landscape. Easing barriers to 
trade no longer simply involves tariffs or quotas. In our increasingly 
globalized world, trade negotiations involve areas that used to be 
considered U.S. domestic law--from regulatory standards and antitrust 
laws to food safety and prescription drug patents, to name just a few.
  And because the trade landscape has changed, I--along with many of my 
colleagues--believe that the way in which we go about negotiating those 
trade agreements should be different than it has been in the past, when 
Congress agreed to limit its role in this important aspect of national 
policy.
  Now, even more than before, broad support is needed for any bill that 
would relinquish the authority of Congress to represent the nation by 
reviewing agreements or decisions reached by the Executive. If we are 
going to vote to reduce congressional review and give favorable 
treatment to trade agreements, we should at least provide that these 
agreements meet certain minimum standards. The stakes--for American 
workers and for the environment--are too high for us to do otherwise.
  In June of this year, the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Crane 
introduced a fast-track bill that was roundly criticized as not 
providing a strong enough role for Congress and not addressing concerns 
about labor or environmental standards. As Ways and Means Chairman 
Thomas prepared his revised legislation, many of my colleagues and I 
had hoped that he might have better understood that building a 
bipartisan consensus requires consultation of Members on both sides of 
the aisle. Only then could Chairman Thomas's bill have correctly been 
named the ``Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act.''
  So I was disappointed when H.R. 3005 was introduced, as it was clear 
that Chairman Thomas wasn't willing to work to gain broad support for 
his bill. In contrast, in my view, the version of the legislation 
introduced by Ways and Means Ranking Member Rangel and Trade 
Subcommittee Ranking Member Levin would take important steps in the 
right direction and would provide a better foundation for developing 
sound legislation.
  But the rule under which this bill is being debated does not even 
provide for consideration of the Rangel-Levin bill as an alternative. 
Although the rule does make some slight improvements to the Thomas 
bill, the changes are too little and too late.
  It is incumbent on us in Congress to continue to work to update our 
trade policy to take account of this changed landscape. That means we 
need a trade promotion bill that includes a stronger role for Congress, 
and stronger environmental and labor provisions. The Thomas bill before 
us does not measure up, and I cannot support it.
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, I urge the House of Representatives to 
reject this ``fast-track'' trade legislation--this bill will not meet 
our trade goals, and will hurt rather than help our needed economic 
recovery.
  Many industries, such as the U.S. steel industry, are being hard-hit 
by subsidized foreign imports, yet this bill does not require U.S. 
negotiators to seek wide protections such as the United States needs 
from such dumping by foreign countries in key areas such as steel, 
lumber, cement, and agriculture products.
  Moreover, this bill will not attack the key trade steps we need to 
take--rather, we need a revised U.S. trade policy that will eliminate 
the record-level trade deficit, protect U.S. jobs and the U.S. economy, 
and promote U.S. exports. This bill before the House of Representatives 
will only mean more U.S. jobs lost to overseas, subsidized 
manufacturers.
  The U.S. can compete with any nation in the world as long as the 
competition is fair, but this legislation will actually encourage other 
countries to avoid U.S. anti-dumping laws, and worsen rather than 
strengthen our economy. It also fails to strengthen overseas worker 
rights and require environmental progress.
  Yes, we need a revised U.S. trade policy, but we need one that 
protects U.S. jobs and stimulates economic growth. This bill does not 
reach that goal at all, and it should be rejected by the House of 
Representatives as a statement that we will stand-up for the U.S. 
economy and protect U.S. jobs rather than sending business and jobs 
overseas.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to H.R. 
3005, a bill to grant the President fast track trade negotiating 
authority. The bill before us today is weaker on labor and 
environmental language than the 1988 fast track bill used to negotiate 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As witnessed by the 
surge of imports and loss of millions of jobs since NAFTA's enactment, 
Congress must hold the President accountable for negotiating trade 
agreements that are stronger than that of NAFTA--not weaker.
  While gross U.S. exports rose 61.5% between 1994 and 2000, presumably 
as a result of NAFTA, imports rose by 80.5% over the same period 
resulting in over 3 million trade-related job losses. California led 
the states in job losses with over 300,000 jobs lost to NAFTA's 
explosion in imports. Proponents of the last fast track bill assured us 
that more jobs would be created than would be lost. Clearly, this is 
not the case. Now, Mr. Thomas is asking Congress to support a bill that 
is weaker than the fast track language used to negotiate NAFTA. I warn 
my colleagues not to be fooled into believing that promises made to 
provide benefits in an economic stimulus package to workers who have 
recently lost their jobs, will come close to justly compensating the 
millions of workers who have already lost their high-paying 
manufacturing jobs. Nor will it suffice in protecting those who have 
yet to see unemployment from the trade negotiations that have yet to be 
signed.
  I want to make one thing clear: H.R. 3005 does not help U.S. workers. 
This bill is intended to protect and promote multinational investments. 
The bill neglects to provide any enforceable requirements that the U.S. 
Trade Representative (USTR) negotiate any of the five core 
International Labour Organization standards. We need USTR to negotiate 
an agreement that commits countries to implement and enforce in their 
domestic laws both the right to associate and bargain collectively, and 
prohibitions on child labor, compulsory labor and discrimination in 
hiring. When workers are not given these basic rights, they are 
exploited. This is what has happened with NAFTA. Workers in the U.S. 
are given these rights but this is not the case in Mexico. So rather 
than continue to pay a decent wage to a U.S. union worker, a factory 
owner can move the business to a country where there are no labor laws 
and labor costs are lower than in the U.S. Although Mexico has seen a 
significant increase in manufacturing with NAFTA, Mexican manufacturing 
workers have seen a 21% decrease in their wages. Mexico's burgeoning 
middle class has yet to materialize and the working poor have spiraled 
deeper into poverty. Clearly, the 1988 fast track negotiating authority 
hurt U.S. workers as much as it hurt Mexican workers. Congress must 
insist on stronger trade negotiating objectives to protect U.S. workers 
as well as the exploited workers around the globe. The Thomas proposal 
fails to do so.
  Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, corporations have been given unprecedented 
immunity from domestic statute through global trade agreements. H.R. 
3005 embraces NAFTA's Chapter 11 provisions, which vitiate U.S. statute 
in deference to foreign corporations. This has the consequences of 
hurting the environment as well as public safety. Intended as an 
investor protection measure, Chapter 11 allows foreign-based 
corporations to seek damages from governments that engage in 
protectionist behavior and interfere with corporations' abilities to 
fully realize anticipated profits.
  Californians have confronted the ludicrous protections Chapter 11 
provides for investors while consumer safety and the environment are 
made to suffer. The Canadian-based Methanex Corporation has sued the 
U.S. under NAFTA's Chapter 11 provisions, because California's phase-
out of the harmful gasoline additive, MTBE, has hurt the price of 
Methanex stock. MTBE contaminated California's drinking water due to 
underground gasoline storage tank leaks. Logically, California 
lawmakers have ordered the additive out of their gasoline, even if it 
means slightly higher gas prices at the pump. However, if the

[[Page H9019]]

closed-door NAFTA dispute panel decides in favor of Methanex, taxpayers 
could be slapped with a billion dollar fine. The Thomas proposal before 
us does nothing to address this egregious flaw in the NAFTA agreement. 
In fact, it encourages similar provisions in future trade agreements.
  The current fast track bill being considered does nothing to protect 
U.S. jobs, does nothing to protect the environment and does nothing to 
protect U.S. consumers. Until such issues are addressed in binding 
legislative language. I cannot support fast track trade negotiating 
authority. I encourage my colleagues to do join me and vote no on H.R. 
3005.
  Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, we are asked today to grant the President so-
called trade promotion authority, authority that has nothing to do with 
free trade. Proponents of this legislation claim to support free trade, 
but really they support government-managed trade that serves certain 
interests at the expense of others. True free trade occurs only in the 
absence of interference by government, that's why it's called 
``free''--it's free of government taxes, quotas, or embargoes. The term 
``free-trade agreement'' is an oxymoron. We don't need government 
agreements to have free trade; but we do need to get the federal 
government out of the way and unleash the tremendous energy of the 
American economy.
  Our founders understood the folly of trade agreements between 
nations; that is why they expressly granted the authority to regulate 
trade to Congress alone, separating it from the treaty-making power 
given to the President and Senate. This legislation clearly represents 
an unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority to the 
President. Simply put, the Constitution does not permit international 
trade agreements. Neither Congress nor the President can set trade 
policies in concert with foreign governments or international bodies.
  The loss of national sovereignty inherent in government-managed trade 
cannot be overstated. If you don't like GATT, NAFTA, and the WTO, get 
ready for even more globalist intervention in our domestic affairs. As 
we enter into new international agreements, be prepared to have our 
labor, environmental, and tax laws increasingly dictated or at least 
influenced by international bodies. We've already seen this with our 
foreign sales corporation tax laws, which we changed solely to comply 
with a WTO ruling. Rest assured that TPA will accelerate the trend 
toward global government, with our Constitution fading into history.
  Congress can promote true free trade without violating the 
Constitution. We can lift the trade embargo against Cuba, end Jackson-
Vanik restrictions on Kazakhstan, and repeal sanctions on Iran. These 
markets should be opened to American exporters, especially farmers. We 
can reduce our tariffs unilaterally--taxing American consumers hardly 
punishes foreign governments. We can unilaterally end the subsidies 
that international agreements purportedly seek to reduce. We can simply 
repeal protectionist barriers to trade, so-called NTB's, that stifle 
economic growth.
  Mr. Speaker, we are not promoting free trade today, but we are 
undermining our sovereignty and the constitutional separation of 
powers. We are avoiding the responsibilities with which our 
constituents have entrusted us. Remember, congressional authority we 
give up today will not be restored when less popular Presidents take 
office in the future. I strongly urge all of my colleagues to vote NO 
on TPA.
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Speaker, a vote in favor of Trade Promotion Authority 
today will be a vote in favor of U.S. workers, it will be a vote in 
favor of increased exports, and it will be a vote in favor of economic 
growth.
  This bill will have a positive effect on all aspects of the U.S. 
economy, not the least of which will be the services sector.
  Last year the U.S. exported $295 billion in services, compared to 
imports of $215 billion, leading to an $80 billion surplus in services 
trade.
  Between 1989 and 1999, 20.6 million new U.S. jobs were added to the 
economy in service related industries. These knowledge-based jobs 
account for 80% of the total private sector employment in the U.S.
  Today we have the opportunity to either expand this number by voting 
in favor of H.R. 3005, or to begin to erode these impressive figures by 
denying the President the tools he needs to negotiate strong free trade 
agreements.
  As Chairman of the Financial Services Committee I understand how 
important this bill is to maintain our competitiveness in the 
international arena. Earlier this year, the Committee held hearings in 
which representatives from the insurance, banking and securities 
industries testified that barriers to overseas markets will severely 
affect their ability to compete with foreign based financial service 
providers.
  Financial services firms contributed more than $750 billion to U.S. 
Gross domestic Product in 1999, nearly 8% of total GDP. Over 6 million 
employees support the products and services these firms offer. TPA will 
eliminate impediments to foreign markets and enable financial service 
providers to continue to act as the engine that drives economic growth.
  Approximately 80 percent of the world's GDP and half of the world's 
equity and debt markets are located outside the U.S. More than 96% of 
the world's population resides overseas, with India and China alone 
accounting for 2.3 billion people. Many of the best future growth 
opportunities lie in ``non-U.S.'' markets.
  If U.S. service providers cannot access these markets or operate on a 
level playing field overseas we will be left behind by foreign 
financial service providers.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 3005. Our 
workers need it, our exporters need it and our economy needs it.
  Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, trade promotion authority enhances the United 
States' ability to negotiate agreements that help American workers and 
businesses. Just as we can't repeal the laws of gravity, we can't 
ignore the fact that we live in a world with a global economy.
  It is estimated if global trade barriers could be cut by just one-
third, the world economy would grow more than $600 billion each year. 
Talk about economic stimulus--this is it!
  Trade promotion authority will open new markets. Without this 
authority, trading partners will not put forth meaningful offers. 
Tariffs on American products won't be reduced, and our economy will 
grow at a much slower rate.
  Passing this bill signals to the world we are committed to global 
trade and free markets. It allows the United States to take a 
leadership role in building international trading systems based on 
American principles of market-based economics and fair play.
  Giving the President the authority to negotiate trade agreements is 
good for Connecticut, the United States and every country involved.
  Exports accounted for almost one quarter of all U.S. economic growth 
in the last 10 years. Trade promotion authority should pass without 
delay.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, this debate on ``Fast Track'' is not about 
whether or not the U.S. should be participating in the global economy--
we all agree on that. This debate is about HOW we are going to 
participate in that economy.
  In this time of economic recession, I feel that we have 
responsibility to the American worker and the workers around the globe 
to ensure that American labor standards are enforced globally. It is 
unacceptable that American jobs are being shipped overseas to countries 
that refuse to pass or enforce minimal labor protections.
  As many of us can remember all too well, Fast Track Trade Authority 
was last used to pass the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
in 1993. While the Administration claims that NAFTA is a resounding 
success, I contend that this is far from the truth.
  It is estimated that NAFTA has cost nearly 1 million U.S. 
manufacturing jobs and tens of thousands of family owned farms to go 
out of business. In my home state of New Jersey, alone, it is estimated 
by the U.S. Department of Labor that more than 20,000 jobs were 
directly lost due to NAFTA's scope.
  NAFTA has also been a disaster in the area of environment protection 
and public health. Since passage, pollution also in the U.S. Mexico 
border has created worsening environmental and public health threats in 
the area. Along the border, the occurrence of some environmental 
diseases, including hepatitis, is two or three times the national 
average, due to lack of sewage treatment and safe drinking water.
  This is unacceptable. In my mind, no matter what this Administration 
promises, Fast Track only causes the quality of life in America to be 
compromised.
  My friends--I say, fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame 
on me. I urge my colleagues--don't be fooled again. We have already 
allowed the word of past Administrations cost thousands of American 
jobs and further destroy our environment. Let's not make the same 
mistake again.
  Vote ``no'' on Fast Track.
  Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3005, 
the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act (``TPA''), which will open 
up new markets for our businesses here in the United States. This bill 
is about breaking down trade barriers abroad and expanding 
opportunities for American workers. This legislation recognizes the 
reality of today's global economy and equips our country with the tools 
necessary to maintain America's leadership throughout the world.
  I would be remiss if I did not voice my concern about the timing of 
today's debate. At times like this, we must work together. Yet for a 
number of understandable reasons, this bill is far from enjoying bi-
partisan support. Nevertheless, I do not control the agenda; thus, here 
we are debating the bill without the fullest support it could enjoy.

[[Page H9020]]

  The evolving nature of the trade debate is evident. Instead of 
discussing whether to address labor and environmental issues in the 
text of TPA and future trade agreements, Congress is discussing how to 
address these concerns. I believe this bill has taken a giant step 
forward since the last floor vote in 1998. While not perfect, for the 
first time ever in a TPA bill labor and environmental standards will 
receive parity in enforcement alongside subjects covered in trade 
agreements such as foreign investment and intellectual property. This 
is in stark contrast to the Archer TPA bill which called for preventing 
countries from weakening labor and environmental standards to attract 
investment but was silent on enforcement. Clearly, H.R. 3005 moves the 
trade debate forward.
  Mr. Speaker, the simple fact that 96 percent of the world's consumers 
live outside of our borders is irrefutable evidence that in order to 
grow our economy, we must grow our exports. Hence, international trade 
is critical to our nation's continued economic expansion.
  An estimated 12 million jobs in the United States depend on exports 
of goods and services. Furthermore, opening markets has created more 
than 20 million new jobs in the US since 1992. Jobs related to exports 
generally pay as much as 18 percent more than the national average. 
Consumers also benefit in the form of affordable prices for many 
products. In fact, our existing trade agreements provide annual 
benefits of $1,300 to $2,000 for the average American family of four 
from the combined effects of lower prices and increased income.
  Free trade is not exclusively for the giant business conglomerates. 
Our trade agreements enable small (less than 100 employees) and medium 
size businesses (less than 500 employees) to compete in international 
markets. According to the Department of Commerce, in 1998, more than 92 
percent of Florida's 22,295 exporting companies were small and medium 
sized businesses. In the district I represent, 85 percent of exporters 
are small businesses that employ fewer than 100 employees.
  Mr. Speaker, international markets are vital to my state's economic 
well-being. Florida's economy is export-dependent, with export sales of 
$1,515.00 for every state resident. Florida merchandise and 
agricultural exports support an estimated 183,700 jobs, while service 
industry exports support an estimated 364,000 jobs. Last year, in the 
Tampa Bay area alone, nearly 500 local companies and independent 
business people profited from approximately $2.6 billion in exports to 
international markets.

  My fellow colleagues, we need to pass TPA as soon as possible. Unless 
we pass TPA, our businesses and workers will be forced to sit on the 
sideline and watch our global competitors take advantage of free trade 
agreements. Of the more than 130 free trade agreements (FTAs) in force 
worldwide, only 3 include our country. One of our main trade 
competitors, the European Union, has free trade agreements with 27 
countries.
  Mr. Speaker, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) will be 
virtually impossible to negotiate by 2005 without TPA. The FTAA is 
setting the stage for significant trade opportunities--particularly, 
the opportunity to assure that the rules of trade that will be 
developed are fair and sufficiently advantageous to our country. It is 
an agreement that will benefit 34 countries, consisting of 800 million 
people with a combined GDP of $13 trillion. The potential benefits of 
increased trade with Latin America for our nation and the State of 
Florida are tremendous. In Florida, Latin America and the Caribbean are 
our most important markets, accounting for about 80 percent of all 
exports from the state. Furthermore, over the past three years, eight 
of the top 10 Florida-origin export destinations were FTAA countries. 
As for Brazil, one of Florida's largest export destinations, the 
average Brazilian tariff on U.S. goods is almost 14 percent, compared 
with under 3 percent for Brazilian products entering the U.S.
  Mr. Speaker, as I have said in the past, I recognize that increased 
global competition will put some industries at risk and that with the 
overwhelming number of winners there will be some losers. We will have 
to work harder to ensure every American worker can participate in our 
global economy, and the government has an important role to play in 
educating, training and retraining today's and tomorrow's workers with 
the skills they need not just to survive but to prosper in an 
increasingly global economy.
  By passing TPA, the Congress is delegating a significant amount of 
authority to the executive branch. Thus, it is essential that the 
Congress have a meaningful role during the trade negotiating process, 
while recognizing the importance of providing flexibility necessary to 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to negotiate the best 
deal possible for America. In the future, I expect the executive branch 
to work closely with the Congress throughout any trade negotiations as 
required by this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, in conclusion, this legislation is critical for the 
United States. TPA will empower the President to negotiate trade 
agreements that will open more markets for American goods and services, 
create jobs, and reduce costs for farmers, workers, consumers, and 
entrepreneurs. Refusal to pass TPA would put American workers at a 
disadvantage.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 3005.
  Mr. EVANS. Mr. Speaker, my district is composed of hard working 
Americans who build tractors, refrigerators, and furnaces. Blood, sweat 
and tears are what brings home the bacon in my district. But their way 
of life is endangered by both this bill and our flawed trade policy.
  This year, two steel mills in my district closed their doors forever. 
I have witnesses numerous other manufacturing plants close because they 
are not allowed to compete fairly against foreign imports. Some of 
these very companies have reopened facilities overseas only to export 
their products back into the U.S.
  In the past few months, I have assisted hundreds of my layed-off 
constituents in filing for unemployment and TAA benefits. These hard 
working folks have lost their jobs because we have set course on a 
flawed trade policy that puts cheap imports ahead of their good paying 
jobs. Trade Promotion Authority is a dangerous leap of faith for an 
administration that has pursed a unsound trade policy.
  Our flawed trade policy has most recently led to the demise of our 
nation's steel industry. The inaction of Congress and the willingness 
of the President's chief trade negotiator to eliminate anti-dumping 
regulations has driven US steel into the ground. And we want to give 
them even more authority to negotiate trade agreements?
  Mr. Speaker, my district is blessed with thousands of acres of the 
most fertile farmland in the country where John Deere revolutionized 
agriculture with the invention of the steel plow. The farmers in my 
district have struggled as corn and soybean prices have dropped in half 
over the last five years. In these times of rock bottom crop prices, 
they depend more than ever on farm subsidies. But, in the infinite 
wisdom of our trade policy we have offered to eliminate these 
indispensable price supports. I cannot in good faith support a fast 
track bill at the same time the administration tries to kill the price 
supports that my farmers depend on.
  I am further ashamed our flawed trade policy does little to further 
human rights. We blindly turn our heads when countries use children, 
prisoners, and slave labor to undercut American workers. This does not 
represent the values of the people I represent, but it represents the 
trade policy of an administration that now wants even more latitude in 
trade negotiations.
  Mr. Speaker, I am proud to represent a working class district, where 
folks still make a living by the sweat of their brow. I made a promise 
to protect their jobs and support their economic security. This 
administration has instead pursued a flawed trade policy and has let 
them down at every major trade negotiation. They now want even more 
latitude in negotiating trade agreements. My Colleagues, I cannot and 
will not support this administration's request for fast track authority 
and urge you to vote against this bill.
  Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 3005, a bill 
to provide the President with the authority to negotiate international 
agreements and submit them to Congress for and up-or-down vote, without 
amendment.
  Last month, the United States and other members of the World Trade 
Organizations launched a new round of trade negotiations. The members 
agreed to a far-reaching agenda, covering topics from e-commerce to 
manufactured goods to financial services and, most importantly to North 
Dakota, agriculture. With such an ambitious agenda to tackle, an 
agreement is not expected for at least four years.
  For agriculture, the new agenda gives us cause for both hope and 
concern. On the positive side, the agenda calls for the eventual 
elimination of export subsidies, which the Europeans have used to rob 
market share from U.S. farmers. In addition, the efforts of some 
countries to reopen prior agreements in order to erect scientifically 
unjustified barriers to U.S. commodities were rejected. The agenda's 
commitment to achieve substantial new market opening measures also 
stands to benefit U.S. farmers, who earn $1 out of very $3 from export 
sales.
  On the hand, I am troubled that U.S. trade officials have so freely 
offered to negotiate our export credit guarantee program, which is not 
an export subsidy but a program to help finance U.S agriculture exports 
at commercial rates. I am concerned that the new round of negotiations 
could expose our sugar beet industry--worth $1 billion annually to the 
Red River Valley--to unlimited imports of subsidized product sold dump 
market prices.

[[Page H9021]]

What's worse, even as our government was putting the export credit and 
sugar programs squarely on the table, the Europeans were staunchly 
defending their own subsidies and the Canadian government was declaring 
the Wheat Board to be off-limits. Although U.S. attempts to ``lead by 
example'' in trade negotiations may win points with free-trade 
theorists, it will not in win trade agreements. We should vigorously 
defend our programs and yield concessions only when we receive 
concessions in exchange.
  The farm bill debate has also reflected what I believe to be the 
Administration's flawed approach to trade policy. Among its reasons for 
opposing the House farm bill, the Administration said that restoring a 
price safety net for family farmers would undermine our trade 
negotiating position. I believe, quite the contrary, that a renewed 
commitment to our farmers in the form of strong farm bill improves our 
negotiating position. If the U.S. withdraws support for our farmers 
unilaterally, what incentive do the Europeans have to negotiate away 
their tremendous subsidy advantage?
  The negotiations launched earlier this month have a long way to go. 
Only time will tell whether our hopes for American agriculture will be 
realized or our concerns will prove well founded. Before these 
negotiations have even begun, however, Congress is being asked to 
approve fast track, a bill authorizing the President to negotiate trade 
agreements and submit them to Congress for an up-or-down vote, without 
amendment.
  I believe it would be unwise to approve fast track before we know 
whether these negotiations are headed in a positive direction for 
American agriculture. Let's make sure that the Europeans will not be 
allowed to maintain their overwhelming subsidy advantage and that the 
Canadian Wheat Board won't be able to continue to exploit its monopoly 
position to the detriment of our farmers. Let's make sure that our 
sugar industry won't be hung out to dry and that the Administration 
won't try to undo our domestic farm program in trade negotiations.
  Once we have greater confidence that these trade negotiations are 
serving the interests of our farmers, we can move forward with fast 
track authority. Until our concerns have been addressed, however, we 
should not give our trade negotiators the blank-check they are seeking. 
For now, there are too many open questions for us to give up our right 
to amend future trade agreements.
  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, this country is in a new era. We have not 
faced such times of trepidation since the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is 
well established that countries who trade, who are engaged in business 
with one another, are less inclined to fight, and more willing to 
cooperate among mutual beneficial matters. Ultimately, trade is about 
freedom and economic prosperity. And in some cases, prosperity has been 
the case for certain sectors of the American economy.
  Unfortunately, such has not been the case in my district in Florida. 
There are number of small farmers and businesses who were decimated by 
NAFTA and imports from Mexico. Promises made by our government were 
promises un-kept. The specific provisional relief promised to the 
tomato growers, for instance, was applied for after implementation of 
NAFTA, and subsequently these farmers were denied that relief.
  Under NAFTA, Florida exports in total agriculture products dropped 
from $6.1 million to 1.9 million between 1993 and 1996. Only in the 
year 2000, did exports climb above the 1993 level--but the damage was 
done.
  Earlier today, the House voted to reauthorize the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance program, a program designed to aid workers and firms who 
have been affected by the impact of foreign trade. This program alone 
serves as a reminder that not everyone in our country benefits from 
free trade . . . including small farmers and businesses in my district.
  Now I understand the need to engage in free trade and I support free 
trade. However, I also support fair trade. Additional provisions have 
been included in HR 3005 that allows for greater consultation among 
Congressional committees regarding import sensitive commodities. The 
language also recognizes the need to treat such products in a different 
manner during trade negotiations than other products. Though I am 
grateful for the attempt at addressing these issues, I believe it does 
not go far enough.
  Without adequate protection and enforcement of our trade laws, and 
the ability to provide sufficient relief for affected markets--such 
provisions are less than meaningful.
  I have had the opportunity to speak with the President regarding my 
concerns and those of my constituents. I understand the need to use 
Trade Promotion Authority as a tool in the war against terrorism and to 
address our faltering economy. We are at war. And for that reason these 
are special circumstances. The President needs to be supported and he 
can use this agreement to help America in its fight against terrorism. 
For this reason I am voting for Trade Promotion Authority.
  Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr.. Speaker, I rise today to speak about H.R. 3005, 
the Trade Promotion Authority Act.
  The vote on this bill has been a very difficult decision for me. My 
home county and my hometown have been hit hard in recent months by 
layoffs and closures of textile manufacturing plants. In many of these 
towns, several generations of families have worked at these textile 
plants, and when the plants closed our way of life was shaken and our 
hometown identities were forever changed.
  I hurt for each and every worker who has lost a textile job and for 
each and every family that faces economic uncertainty as a result of 
these layoffs. We must provide them generous assistance to meet their 
short-term needs. We must provide them the education and training to 
equip them with the skills to fill 21st century jobs. And we must pass 
policies for economic growth that will create those employment 
opportunities.
  But, Mr. Speaker, the fact is that defeating Trade Promotion 
authority will not bring back a single textile job that we've lost. 
Defeating Trade Promotion Authority instead will wave a white flag of 
surrender to our economic competitors around the world and will mean 
fewer jobs to replace the ones we've lost.
  The workers in my home state have proven that we can compete and win 
in the world economic arena. Last year, my state's export sales totaled 
$15 billion, a 10.3 percent increase in one year. In the seven-year 
period between 1993 and 2000, North Carolina's exports grew by 88 
percent. Those exports fueled tremendous economic growth, created 
unprecedented employment opportunities and placed North Carolina at the 
forefront of America's global economic leadership.
  In the latest available data, North Carolina depends on manufactured 
exports for 285,600 jobs. That is the seventh highest total in the 
United States. 6,869 companies--including 5,609 small and medium-sized 
businesses--export from North Carolina. The number of companies 
exporting from North Carolina rose 79 percent between 1992 and 1998. 
Our state is truly export-dependent, and we need Trade Promotion 
Authority to break down barriers to overseas markets so that our 
technology, agriculture, manufacturing and other sectors can expand on 
our progress in international competition. If we fail to gain access to 
these markets, it is a guaranteed fact that our overseas economic 
competitors will exploit that opportunity and deal a huge blow to our 
global economic leadership. Every $1 billion in exports creates 20,000 
jobs here in America, and a successful multilateral trade agreement 
could reasonably result in expanding exports by $200 billion a year 
producing 4 million new jobs here in America. And jobs supported by 
exports pay significantly higher wages than jobs that only support 
domestic markets. Clearly, expanding exports is the key to expanding 
prosperity for American workers, and Trade Promotion Authority is the 
key to expanding exports.
  It is important to note that this bill is not itself a trade 
agreement. It simply provides the President the authority past 
Presidents, both Democrats and Republicans, have traditionally enjoyed 
to negotiate with our trading partners to obtain the best deal possible 
for America's economy. I want the President to know that I intend to 
hold his feet to the fire to make sure he looks out for the best 
interests of my constituents in those negotiations. And I want the 
committees of jurisdiction to exercise their Congressional oversight 
role vigilantly. I certainly reserve the right to oppose any trade deal 
that is not in the best interests of North Carolina, and I will not 
hesitate to exercise that right. I have voted against trade deals in 
the past. In short, I'm going to be watching these negotiations like a 
hawk.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, I am compelled by the fact that we are a nation 
at war. All Americans are united behind the President as he and our 
nation's military seek to rid the world of the terrorist threat. 
Although I may disagree with the President on some of his domestic 
policies, this is a matter of major international importance.
  In conclusion, I will vote ``yes'' on H.R. 3005, and I urge my 
colleagues to join me in doing so.
  Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my support for H.R. 
3005, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001.
  I have the honor to represent Montgomery County, Maryland, a county 
rich in high technology such as communications technology and 
biotechnology. Trade is important to our economy.
  I believe Trade Promotion Authority will be good for the economy of 
Montgomery County and the State of Maryland as well as our country. 
Trade is important to our economy; last year Maryland sold more than $5 
billion worth of exports to nearly 200 foreign markets.
  Trade is also good for Maryland's entrepreneurs and small businesses. 
The number of Maryland companies exporting increased 51 percent from 
1992 to 1998. This is significant;

[[Page H9022]]

more than 81 percent of Maryland's 3,472 companies that export are 
small- and medium-sized businesses. Trade data also shows that an 
estimated 58,900 Maryland jobs depend on manufactured exports. One in 
every seven manufacturing jobs in Maryland--24,700 jobs--is tied to 
exports. Wages of workers in jobs supported by exports are 13 to 18 
percent higher than the national average. Maryland exported an 
estimated $200 million in agricultural products in 1999.
  Indeed, Maryland has benefited from previous trade agreements. For 
example, total exports from Maryland to NAFTA countries (Mexico and 
Canada) in 1999 were 56 percent higher than 1993, before NAFTA.
  This negotiating authority expired in 1994, and during that time 
other countries have been moving forward with trade agreements while 
the United States has been stalled. There are more than 130 
preferential trade and investments agreements in the world today, and 
the United States is a party to only two.
  The European Union has free trade or special customs agreements with 
27 countries, 20 of which it completed in the last 10 years. And the EU 
is negotiating another 15 accords right now. Our inaction hurts 
American businesses, farmers, ranchers, and workers as they find 
themselves shut out of the many preferential trade and investment 
opportunities.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe in free and fair trade and a strong economy. 
In times of growth our Nation has been able to move forward on 
important social issues and make the world a better place for all.
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss the trade policy 
of the United States. We are scheduled to vote in the House of 
Representatives this week on approving Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), 
what used to be called ``Fast Track'' Authority. I will vote against 
it, as I did in 1998. I will do so for several reasons, but primarily 
because the United States has signed few effective trade pacts in 
recent memory. Since the early 1980s the United States has become the 
greatest debtor nation in the world, and that trade deficit continues 
to grow, with devastating impacts for the working men and women of this 
country. While corporate CEOs continue to earn record-breaking 
salaries, their employees face reduced wages and benefits or worse--
they are laid off while their jobs are moved abroad. We continue to 
export good, high-paying American manufacturing jobs to places like 
Mexico and China, where workers are paid little and enjoy few 
protections from abuse.
  I agree that we need to create export markets for our goods, 
especially our agricultural products. To that end, I have voted to end 
the trade embargo against Cuba. However, this must be done on terms 
that are fair to the United States. The list of unfair reciprocal trade 
agreements we currently have with other countries boggles the mind. Our 
products are taxed at extremely high rates in those countries, while 
their products enter our markets virtually tax-free.
  The supporters of TPA will tell you that the President needs this 
authority to negotiate trade pacts, such as the next round of world 
trade talks that has been put in motion by the recently concluded 
conference in Doha, Qatar. But TPA is not necessary to negotiate trade 
pacts. In fact, TPA expired in 1994, and we have reached several bad 
agreements since then, notably terms to allow China to enter the World 
Trade Organization, a deal I also did not support. The only thing TPA 
guarantees is that Congress is shut out of the negotiating process, 
left to ratify whatever agreement the President negotiates. And when 
the time comes to vote, Congress is told that while this might not be 
the best deal, it is the only one on the table and that we cannot waste 
the years it took to reach it by it voting down. It is a vicious cycle 
that imprisons American workers, and I will not vote to revive it.
  The North American Free Trade Agreement is a good example of this 
process. Eight years ago, the passage of NAFTA brought many promises: 
200,000 new jobs annually in the United States; higher wages for 
Mexican workers; an increased trade surplus with Mexico and a cleaner 
environment and improved health in the boarder regions. In fact, the 
opposite has happened--none of these promises have materialized.
  Supporters of NAFTA promised great things for America's trade surplus 
with Mexico and Canada. These, too, have failed to materialize. While 
gross exports to NAFTA countries have increase dramatically--147 
percent to Mexico and 66 percent to Canada--imports from these 
countries have increased more dramatically. U.S. imports have increased 
248 percent from Mexico and 79 percent from Canada. The trade deficit 
with Mexico and Canada was nine billion dollars in 1993; by 2000, it 
had ballooned to $60 billion. NAFTA was supposed to reduce these 
numbers. Instead, the trade deficit has increased.
  Instead of creating 1.6 million jobs over eight years, NAFTA has 
eliminated 766,000 jobs. In my home state of Illinois, over 37,000 
people have lost their jobs as a result of NAFTA. These were the good 
paying manufacturing jobs I referenced above. Most of these jobs have 
been relocated to Mexico, where the labor and environmental standards 
are lower than in America.
  Even if American jobs were not relocated to Mexico and elsewhere, 
many companies have leveled this threat at their employees. Workers are 
told if they do not agree to the company's terms, their jobs will go to 
Mexico. As a result, workers settle for contracts with lower wages and 
fewer benefits in collective bargaining. This occurred recently with 
the Tower Automotive plant in my congressional district. A recent 
newspaper article described it this way, ``Earlier this month, Tower 
Automotive has said in order to save money, it was subcontracting the 
Lincoln Aviator program to Metalsa, a company in Monterey, Mexico.'' 
Fortunately, Tower Automotive decided to stay in the U.S., but the 
threat to move remains as an option for Tower and other businesses.

  Since the enactment of NAFTA, wages for industrial workers in the 
United States have decreased. These workers comprise 73% of our 
nation's industrial workforce and account for most of our middle- and 
low-wage workers. When manufacturing jobs leave the country, displaced 
workers who can find work generally receive pay that is 13% less than 
they received in their previous job. These jobs are primarily in the 
service industry, where wages pay only 77% of those in the 
manufacturing sector. The jobs lost as a result of NAFTA were good 
paying jobs held by individuals who most likely do not have a college 
education. These workers have a harder time finding re-employment and 
need these jobs the most.
  The trade deficit is not only a problem of the rich getting richer 
and the poor poorer--it is a national security issue. Our nation is 
currently at war. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th, the U.S. military is engaged in military actions 
against the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden. Young Americans are putting 
their lives on the line every day to defend the values of this great 
nation. Does it make sense that while American troops are in harm's 
way, the U.S. is rapidly losing its ability to produce steel due to the 
flood of illegally imported steel? If the current trend continues, we 
will not have a steel industry in the U.S., leaving our national 
defense vulnerable.
  In September, I testified before the International Trade Commission 
regarding the Section 201 investigation into U.S. steel imports. I 
represent the 12th Congressional District of Illinois, which includes 
Alton, Granite City, and other areas with great steel traditions. 
Sadly, Alton is no longer a steel town. Laclede Steel announced in July 
that it will shut its doors permanently, ending an 86-year history in 
Alton and throwing 550 employees out of work. The impact on the local 
economy has been severe. Of course, Laclede is not alone. Since 1997, 
26 domestic mills have filed for bankruptcy. This trend must not be 
allowed to continue. The hardworking men and women of the United States 
and their families cannot bear the price of misguided foreign 
industrial policies any longer.
  However, the U.S. representatives at the Doha conference did not see 
it that way. Even after the House of Representatives passed a 
resolution requesting that the president preserve the ability of the 
U.S. to rigorously enforce its trade laws, particularly anti-dumping 
laws, the American representatives at Doha permitted the anti-dumping 
regulations to be re-examined. If allowed to happen, this will further 
damage American steel producers.
  So where does U.S. trade policy stand on the week of the vote to 
grant the president TPA? A record of unfair trade agreements that 
ignore worker rights and environmental protections, hundreds of 
thousands of good, high paying manufacturing jobs continuing to leave 
the country, and vital American interest left close to extinction. Not 
a pleasant picture.
  Mr. Speaker, given this bleak backdrop, I will not vote for TPA. It 
will minimize the role that Congress plays in trade agreements at a 
time when congressional oversight is needed most. The Bush 
administration has demonstrated by its action in Doha that it does not 
have the best interests of American workers in mind. Congress must work 
to ensure that more damage is not done. I urge my colleagues to join me 
in fighting for the American worker by opposing Trade Promotion 
Authority.
  Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant 
opposition to H.R. 3005, the Trade Promotion Authority Act.
  Words probably cannot fully convey how disappointed I am in being 
forced to vote ``No'' on H.R. 3005. Up to now, since coming to Congress 
in 1993, I have compiled a pro-trade voting record that is second to 
none. I have supported NAFTA, U.S. entry into the WTO, normalizing 
trading relations with China and Vietnam, expanding trading relations 
with the countries of sub-Sahara Africa and the Carribean, and most 
recently to establish free trade with Jordan. I strongly believe that, 
our nation has the most to gain from opening new

[[Page H9023]]

markets and improving upon a rules-based trading system.
  I am also disappointed because I fully appreciate the extraordinary 
effort put forth by my friends, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Tanner, and Mr. 
Dooley, in helping to craft this bill. Throughout this process, they 
were willing to listen to concerns that I and other members expressed. 
They performed admirably in pushing forward Democratic principles in 
negotiating this bill with the majority. Their steadfastness produced a 
great deal of progress in addressing concerns on how trade impacts 
labor and the environment and in addressing the plight of recently 
displaced workers.
  The majority has represented enactment of trade promotion authority 
as economic stimulus that will help pull the nation out of the current 
recession. I also recall the Administration representing this bill as 
something we must pass in the context of our war against terrorism. I 
don't doubt that expanding trade is in the national interest, but both 
of those arguments are exaggerated and misplaced. Trade does create 
better jobs for American workers that pay higher wages and add more to 
the economy. However, trade's benefits manifest themselves over the 
long-term; passing this bill will have very little effect on pulling 
the economy out of the current recession.
  It is in the context of this recession and the September 11 tragedy 
that I have weighed my vote on trade promotion authority. Passing trade 
authority may well be in our national interest, but over the short 
term, it will not do anything except add to the anxiety that workers 
who have been or are on the verge of being laid off are experiencing 
now. Conscience dictates that before I support granting trade 
promotion, I must ensure that their immediate needs and concerns are 
addressed. I have concluded that Congress and the Administration has 
fallen well short of what we must do in this area, and for this 
reasons, I must vote against H.R. 3005.
  On September 21, we passed a bill to provide immediate financial 
assistance to the airline industry in the wake of the September 11 
tragedy. Some of my colleagues objected on the grounds that we should 
provide assistance contemporaneously to the workers laid off by the 
airlines. I supported that bill because I understood that maintaining 
the viability of the airline industry was necessary to preserve the 
jobs of those who were not laid off. I was also assuaged by assurances 
that we would have a bill on the floor the following week to provide 
assistance to airline workers. That promise was not kept.
  September 11 also exacerbated the recession that the country has 
apparently been experiencing since Spring. Following the tragedy, there 
was bipartisan agreement that Congress should pass an economic stimulus 
package to speed recovery and to provide broad safety net assistance to 
workers affected by the recession. Instead, the majority rammed through 
the House a tax package providing tax breaks on offshore profits, 
accelerated capital gains, and retroactively repealing a provision in 
the tax code that ensures that corporations are not able to wholly 
avoid paying taxes. At the same time, the bill provided a minimal level 
of unemployment and health care assistance to laid off workers. Besides 
not bringing our country out of recession, the bill was essentially a 
slap in the fact to working class Americans.
  Now, we are on the verge of voting on H.R. 3005. Several weeks ago, I 
indicated to its principal supporters that in order to attract my 
support, I would have to witness real progress on helping displaced 
workers, and not just vague promises and commitments. In response, 
Chairman Thomas unveiled several new items. Principal among them is a 
provision in the TAA bill to provide $2 billion over 2 years for 
workers affected by the September 11 attacks. The Chairman also 
signaled his intention to offer proposals relating to health insurance 
and extension of unemployment benefits in the context of the ongoing 
negotiations with the Senate over the stimulus package. I appreciate 
Chairman Thomas' good faith efforts, particularly his willingness to 
include a provision to suspend federal income taxes on unemployment 
benefits. This is actually a bill that I personally introduced earlier 
this Congress.
  These proposals fall short of what I would like but they do appear to 
be substantial progress. Unfortunately, since they do come at the last 
minute, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding whether this is 
enough. Furthermore, the bulk of these proposals would need to be 
included in a final stimulus package, in which negotiations are ongoing 
over contentious issues. I am basically being asked to trust that these 
proposals will be improved upon where necessary and enacted into law, 
in spite of the fact that we have had months to do complete work on 
these items.
  I have concluded that I owe it to working class Americans that I 
should not simply take a leap of faith. For too long, they have been 
suffering while Congress has sat on its hands. I do not think it is 
unreasonable for us to wait on passing TPA legislation until we have 
passed legislation to help the unemployed.
  I am fully willing to revisit this issue if, later in this Congress, 
we do in fact provide the relief that displaced workers deserve. Today, 
however, my vote is ``no.''
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to H.R. 
3005, the Fast Track Trade Authority bill.
  The President has requested Fast Track Trade Authority whereby 
Congress agrees to consider trade agreements without amendment and with 
limited debate. The administration says that unless we pass this bill, 
it will not be able to finalize a new round of worldwide trade talks or 
complete smaller trade deals.
  This is simply not true. Without Fast Track Trade Authority, the 
Clinton administration negotiated more than 300 trade agreements. 
President Bush has finalized the Vietnam-U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement 
and begun work on the Free Trade Agreement of the Americaas.
  Denying Fast Track Trade Authority at this time will not hinder the 
president's ability to negotiate large multi-national trade agreements. 
The World Trade Organization will not finalize the next round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for at least another five 
years.
  Fast Track Trade Authority is actually a tool to aid powerful 
corporations searching the globe for cheap labor by ignoring basic 
workers' rights, environmental safeguards, enforceable sanctions, and 
Congressional input.
  H.R. 3005 includes negotiating objectives promoting worker rights, 
yet these objectives are hollow. The bill relies on the self-
enforcement of a country's worker rights laws.
  This bill does not require trade agreements with clear provisions to 
protect workers' rights. It does not require countries to agree to 
adhere to the International Labor Organization's core labor standards, 
including bans on child and slave labor.
  American needs trade agreements that instantly go before a dispute 
settlement panel if a country violates internationally recognized labor 
standards, such as the right to collective bargaining. All trade 
agreements need enforcement provisions which allow for prompt and full 
compliance with a dispute settlement panel's decisions.
  Proponents of Fast Track Trade Authority believe that the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance program we reauthorized today will assist 
individuals who will lose their jobs to future trade agreements. 
Workers who lost their jobs to NAFTA will vouch that this program 
cannot replace their jobs and does not provide the health benefits that 
they desperately need while looking for new jobs. All of us want to 
help workers and should support this program, but the reauthorization 
does not overcome the weaknesses of Fast Track Trade Authority.
  H.R. 3005 states that environmental concerns are a negotiating 
objective of trade agreements, but it only requires consultative 
mechanisms for strengthening trading partner's environmental and human 
health standards.
  The Thomas fast-track bill will expand controversial ``investor'' 
rules that empower foreign corporations to sue over environmental laws 
if laws, regulations, or court orders interfere in any way with a 
company's ability to do business.
  H.R. 3005 requires the president to consult with Congressional 
committees and prepare reports about child labor and the effectiveness 
of enforcing workers rights. These provisions do not give Congress the 
power to ensure that trade agreements conform to basic international 
labor provisions and environmental policies.
  With the economy in a recession and 7.7 million unemployed Americans 
looking for work, we cannot expose working families to unfair trade 
agreements that allow corporations to move into countries with weak 
labor standards.
  We cannot expose workers to flawed trade agreements such as NAFTA 
that cost American workers 766,030 jobs in the steel textile, apparel, 
manufacturing, and other sectors of our economy.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against H.R. 3005 and protect our 
environment and American workers from unfair trade agreements.
  Ms. SOLIS. Mr. Speaker, For my colleagues pondering their vote on 
Fast Track Trade Negotiating Authority. And for the American public. I 
ask you to envision this scene. It was August, 1995. In my district--El 
Monte, California.
  Not two years after the North American Free Trade Agreement narrowly 
passed this House.
  During a pre-dawn raid, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
comes to the rescue, literally, of seventy-two Thai immigrants working 
in a garment factory.
  I say ``working,'' but what I really mean is involuntary servitude. 
These women, forced into slave labor, worked eighteen hours a day in a 
seven-unit apartment building that served as a sweatshop. Actually, a 
prison. Some of the women had not been let out of the filthy factory 
surrounded by razor wire for seven years.

[[Page H9024]]

  Now, many of you find it hard to believe this kind of horrific scene 
could take place in the United States. Well, it did happen. And not 
only did it happen in my community, it happens in communities 
throughout the world.
  The United States should not reinforce the existence of such horrific 
practices. And yet, we do--at the behest of a global economy. The 
presence of sweatshops here and abroad corresponds directly with trade 
levels.
  The number of workers employed by maquiladoras in Mexico has tripled 
since the passage of NAFTA. Now, that may sound good to some. But, you 
must look close at the picture.
  Workers caught in maquiladoras on our Southern border are faced daily 
with extremely low wages and unsafe labor practices. Take the Han Young 
factory in Tijuana, Mexico for instance. The Han Young factory 
manufactures parts for Hyundai trucks. This factory has repeatedly 
failed to provide a safe working environment for its employees. The 
company refused to provide safety shoes and glasses, chemical resistant 
gloves, respirators, and face shields. There are even puddles of water 
beneath high-powered cables--and faulty cranes that repeatedly dropped 
tractor trailer chassis while they were being worked on. And when the 
workers tried to band together to create a bargaining unit in order to 
remedy these serious health risks--the company engaged in a campaign of 
intimidation in order to stop unionization.
  Our unbridled pursuit of trade is leading to the further exploitation 
of the poor throughout the world. I agree that we must engage in trade. 
However, the most powerful country in the world should be committed to 
engaging only in fair trade. Our trade agreements must include labor 
and environmental protections. For, if we do not take the lead on these 
issues, who will? And, if the plight of the working poor is not enough 
to persuade you to support a fair trade agreement, please consider the 
harm that will come to our environment. Many of my Republican 
colleagues understand the importance of protecting our global 
environment.

  And we need only look to the Qatar World Trade Organization 
negotiations to understand that our U.S. Trade Representative does not 
consider the environment to be priority. In fact, while in Qatar, the 
USTR agreed to revisit the status of international environmental 
treaties already in effect. These negotiations could lead to further 
destruction of our environment by enabling the WTO to review these 
agreements. Environmental agreements should not be subject to review by 
an organization whose sole purpose is to promote business and trade. As 
we have learned from our environmental movement here, business 
interests many times conflict with environmental interests. Trade 
agreements and environmental agreements should remain independent of 
each other in order to maintain the integrity of both.
  Join me in opposing H.R. 3005. This version of Fast Track does not 
ensure safety to workers nor safety to our environment. The world looks 
to us as leaders in trade. Therefore, we should fulfill that role 
responsibly and include enforceable labor and environmental protections 
in all of our trade deals.
  Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, From the debate thus far on Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA), it is clear to me that the legislative process works 
best when Democrats and Republicans move forward together. 
Unfortunately, the effort to pass TPS this Congress is a poor 
demonstration of Congress' ability to cooperate and compromise. At this 
particular moment in American history, I find that troubling.
  I would like nothing better than to vote for the passage of TPA. Over 
the past several years, I have supported almost every free trade 
measure to come before the House of Representatives because I believe 
that the health of the American economy is dependent on new and more 
open markets. I believe that the future wages of the American worker 
are dependent on our ability to do two things: secure new markets for 
American goods and services and enhance the education and skills of our 
current workforce.
  But markets do not open overnight. Negotiating new and more open 
markets is a complicated process made even more complicated by the 
procedural process in Congress. Without a straight up or down vote on a 
trade agreement, Congress could be bogged down forever in amendments 
and in congressional politics. If the congressional amendment process 
came into play, our President would no longer have the credibility to 
negotiate agreements. All 435 Members of the House cannot be the 
American trade negotiators.
  I understand this. I believe that the President, Democrat or 
Republican, should have the flexibility that TPA affords to negotiate 
and pass trade agreements.
  But the details of TPA do matter. The USTR has moved from negotiating 
tariffs to non-tariff barriers to trade. What this means is that 
instead of just negotiating reductions in tariffs, our trade 
negotiators will be negotiating substantive changes in American law.
  In the next round, the plan is to make changes in antitrust laws. The 
protections currently provided by the American patent system may also 
be amended through trade. Copyright protection is up for discussion. 
These laws, antitrust and intellectual property, are enormously 
important to the economic viability of the United States. Just as 
American laws are harmonized in trade negotiations, the role of 
Congress's Congressional Committees must evolve from procedural 
consultations to ones that are substantively consultative.
  While I have raised this issue again and again over the past several 
months, the Thomas bill has left this issue unaddressed. Interestingly, 
a role is provided for review of agricultural policy as well as for 
financial services. But are potatoes and rice more important that 
patents and antitrust laws? I think not.
  The USTR must submit to the relevant Congressional Committees, 
including the Judiciary Committee, and not just to the Ways and Means 
Committee, information that informs Members which provisions of 
existing US law are being changed.
  Just a few years ago, I was surprised as a Member of the Judiciary 
Committee to find that I could not insert a salary floor amendment into 
a bill pertaining to H-1B nonimmigrants because we had made a trade 
commitment in the General Agreement on Trade in Services not to put in 
such a condition. An alternative system that was negotiated, but not 
approved by Congress, was inserted by GATT. This made it impossible for 
Members of Congress to make changes to domestic law without violating 
US trade obligations. When I asked my colleagues on the Committee if 
they had heard of such a change in the law, I got a lot of blank looks. 
They were as surprised as I was.
  And I'm not surprised that they didn't know because the implementing 
legislation of the Uruguay Round Agreements was hundreds of pages long.
  Such changes are not limited to immigration law. The same thing could 
happen in a area like antitrust if an agreement on competition policy 
is reached. Professor Daniel Tarullo, a Professor of Law at Georgetown 
University wrote in a letter to Senator Leahy that a ``competition 
agreement in the WTO could seriously compromise the integrity of US 
antitrust policy and for that matter the competition policies of other 
nations.''
  We know that antitrust law is explicitly ``on the table'' for the 
next round. While I don't disagree that this is an appropriate topic 
for discussion, I cannot agree that US antitrust laws should be changed 
without the review and involvement of the Judiciary Committee.
  The Judiciary Committee should have the same access to these issues 
as the Agriculture Committee has relative to agricultural issues in the 
Thomas bill. While I do not support a unduly burdensome process, I 
believe there must be a happy medium between the Rangel and Thomas 
approaches. That is why I believe we should wait to vote on TPA.
  Again, I would like nothing more than to vote for a Trade Promotion 
Authority measure that takes into consideration the proper role of 
Congress and its Committees. I appreciate the ways & Means Committee's 
work on this bill, but we are not there yet.
  Mrs. McCARTHY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 
3005, which is similar to a bill that failed two years ago, that 
establishes expedited procedures for congressional consideration of 
trade agreements negotiated by the President. Under H.R. 3005, the 
Trade Promotion Authority Act (TPA), the Administration would be 
required to consult with Congress before signing a trade agreement, but 
once the agreement is formally submitted to Congress, both houses must 
consider the agreement within 90 days without amending the tentative 
agreement.
  As a New Democrat, I believe in the fundamental concept of free 
trade. Eliminating unfair foreign trade barriers leads to greater 
exports by the United States and potential increases in production. It 
is important that America not be left on the sidelines as trade 
agreements are negotiated without our participation. However, free 
trade must occur on an equal playing field.
  Unfortunately, this particular, H.R. 3005, does not sufficiently 
address important concerns that were expressed two years ago. For 
example, this legislation does not require countries to implement any 
meaningful standards on labor rights. These include the five core 
International Labor Organization (ILO) standards: the rights of 
association and collective bargaining, bans against child labor, 
compulsory labor, and discrimination.
  The bill simply details negotiating objectives on labor rights, but 
does nothing to ensure that any final trade agreement will actually 
include those provisions. In addition, this legislation simply requires 
a country to enforce its existing law--however weak that law may be.
  Furthermore, this bill contains only voluntary negotiating objectives 
on the environment. It

[[Page H9025]]

does nothing to prevent countries from lowering their environmental 
standards to gain unfair trade advantages, and would do nothing to 
protect multilateral environmental agreements from trade challenges. 
Moreover, it does nothing to block foreign investor lawsuits from 
challenging domestic environmental laws. Future trade agreements could 
include provisions like Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) which allow foreign investors to undermine U.S. 
environmental, safety, and health law on the basis of unfair trade.
  Lastly, I am concerned over the lack of congressional action prior to 
the signing of any trade agreement; only consultations. Congress may 
vote on a disapproval resolution, but only to certify that the 
Administration has ``failed to consult'' with Congress. Moreover, under 
this bill Congress would give up the right to amend trade agreements--
even those that are controversial and which dramatically alter domestic 
law--in exchange for optional negotiating objectives. Any trade 
agreement should be under the purview of the House of Representatives, 
not the House of Consultants.
  I am disappointed that these issues were not resolved prior to floor 
consideration. The trade policy of the United States must benefit the 
entire country, not simply select interest groups. We must strive and 
enter into trade agreements that are not only free, but fair. 
Unfortunately, H.R. 3005, like its predecessor, fails to remedy the 
concerns associated with expedited trade agreements.
  Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this bill. 
And let me say right up front: I stand here before you today as a free 
trader.
  Those of you who know me know that I believe in the principles of 
free trade and global commerce. I have fought to open and expand 
markets for US goods and services time and time again, right here in 
this chamber.
  Those who know me know that I believe that the freedom to trade 
across borders, if handled responsibly, is a wonderful way to raise 
living standards, create jobs, and protect the environment around the 
world--particularly in those countries that need help the most.
  But this vote is about much more than that. It's about the fact that 
the very nature of international trade has changed radically.
  Trade is no longer primarily about tariffs and quotas. It's about 
changing domestic laws. The constitutional authority to make law is at 
the heart of our role as a Congress and of our sovereignty as a nation.
  When international trade negotiators sit down to hammer out 
agreements, they are talking about harmonizing `non-tariff barriers to 
trade' that may include everything from antitrust laws to food safety.
  Now, I believe the President and the USTR should be able to negotiate 
trade deals as efficiently as possible. There's no questions about 
that.
  But that does not mean that Congress must concede to the Executive 
Branch its constitutional authority over foreign commerce and domestic 
law without adequate assurances that Congress will be an active 
participant in the process.
  Congress should be a partner, not a mere spectator or occasional 
consultant to the process. The Thomas bill does not ensure that.
  Think about what may be bargained away at the negotiating table: our 
own domestic environmental protections . . . food safety laws . . . 
competition policies.
  That's the air we breathe, the food our children eat, and the way 
Americans do business.
  With all due respect to Robert Zoellick, I want George Miller, John 
Conyers, and John Dingell in on those discussions.
  Now, Chairman Thomas says that he has fixed the problem of 
Congressional participation by adding a bit of technical language here 
and there.
  Of course, these changes do nothing to affect the labor and 
environmental provisions in this bill, which we all know are sorely 
lacking.
  But let me be clear: these amendments are pure window-dressing.
  Beneath the jargon, all he's done is give himself, as Chairman of the 
Ways and Means Committee, the ability to bottle up any attempt to 
revoke fast track authority, no matter how far the negotiators have 
strayed from Congressional trade objectives.
  With all due respect to the Chairman, I cannot cede my constitutional 
responsibility to his stewardship.
  Mr. Speaker, the nature of trade has changed, and fast track 
authority must change with it. I ardently believe in the principles of 
free trade. But I will not put my constitutional authority over 
domestic law and my responsibility to my own constituents on a fast 
track to the executive branch.
  I urge my colleagues to vote no on this legislation. Thank you.
  Beneath the jargon, all he's done is give himself, as Chairman of the 
Ways and Means Committee, the ability to bottle up any attempt to 
revoke fast track authority, no matter how far the negotiators have 
strayed from Congressional trade objectives.
  With all due respect to the Chairman, I cannot cede my constitutional 
responsibility to his stewardship.
  Mr. Speaker, the nature of trade has changed, and fast track 
authority must change with it. I ardently believe in the principles of 
free trade. But I will not put my constitutional authority over 
domestic law and my responsibility to my own constituents on a fast 
track to the executive branch.
  I urge my colleagues to vote no on this legislation.
  Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, as I have conveyed to you, my 
concern is that as we pursue international trade agreements, we must 
enter those negotiations recognizing the special needs of our fruit and 
vegetable sector, and Florida citrus in particular. While many of our 
commodities enjoy significant federal subsidies, fruit and vegetable 
producers do not have these same subsidies. Florida's $9 billion citrus 
industry potentially faces significant competition from Brazil. Brazil 
enjoys a cost-of-production far below that of U.S. agricultural 
producer. Today's tariffs on Brazilian orange juice account for the 
wide difference in cost-of-production between the U.S. and Brazil. 
Also, Brazilian fruit can be treated with pesticides that are banned in 
the U.S. This raises issues of safety, double standards, and 
competitive advantages. Any further reduction in the tariff schedule 
for Brazilian orange juice under FTAA could cause significant harm to 
Florida's citrus industry.
  Mr. Speaker, we had requested the inclusion of language in the bill 
specifically excluding export sensitive products such as perishable 
fruits and vegetables, and related products such as frozen orange 
juice. That specific language is not in your bill.
  Mr. Speaker, it is my understanding that the amendments in section 
three dealing with trade sensitive commodities, would limit the 
President's proclamation authority so that tariff reductions could not 
be implemented without specific Congressional approval.
  It is also my understanding that these special provisions provide a 
strong indication that these sensitive agriculture industries, such as 
citrus, should not be the subject of further tariff reductions in 
negotiations covered under this act?
  Finally, it is my understanding that these provisions require that 
the Administration identify that the import sensitive agriculture 
products, such as citrus, be fully evaluated by the ITC prior to any 
tariff negotiations and that any probable adverse effects be the 
subject of remedial proposals by the Administration.
  As this bill moves from the House to the other body and to 
conference, there will be additional opportunity to address the 
concerns of this industry. I am pleased that the Chairman has indicated 
he is willing to work with me and other members of the Florida 
Congressional delegation to address any additional concerns.
  Mr. CROWLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to the 
Trade Promotion Authority bill offered by Chairman Thomas.
  My problem here is not with the concept of giving the President trade 
promotion authority, my problem is with passing a TPA bill that fails 
to address basic labor and congressional oversight requirements.
  The labor provisions in this bill are a sham.
  This legislation calls only for the non-degradation of a potential 
trading partner's labor laws.
  Under this bill, Malaysian companies could continue to pay a ten year 
old child, five cents for a day's work.
  In this example, the Malaysian firm would only be in violation if it 
paid the same child four cents for a day's work.
  The Thomas labor requirements run counter to common sense.
  There is a reason that the International Labor Organization 
established the five core labor standards.
  The rights of association and collective bargaining, and bans on 
child labor, compulsory labor and discrimination are essential 
components to all trade agreements.
  We must insist that our trade partners respect and abide by these 
standards without exception.
  The notion of Congressional oversight has fallen short in this bill, 
as well.
  H.R. 3005 provides no effective mechanism for Congressional 
participation. It only includes an element of the 1988 law that was 
never implemented.
  Congress must have the authority to oversee these agreements on a 
periodic basis, and have the ability to present resolutions of 
disapproval should the need arise.
  The bottom line is that this bill is totally deficient on many 
levels.
  The Ranking Member, Mr. Rangel, had a substitute that would have met 
the requirements necessary to negotiate trade agreements in good faith.
  Unfortunately, the Republicans would not allow the Democratic bill to 
see the light of day.

[[Page H9026]]

  Let's pass a TPA bill that makes sense.
  This bill certainly does not.
  Therefore, I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill.
  Mr. KLECZKA. Mr. Speaker, almost 11 weeks have passed since the 
Speaker indicated that the House would take up legislation to help 
those who were unemployed due to the September 11th attacks and the 
slowing economy. To date we have not completed action on proposals to 
extend unemployment compensation, to address health insurance for 
people who lost coverage through their former employer, or to provide 
health insurance coverage for those who did not have health benefits 
through their employer.
  Today we are asked to consider another bill that would benefit large 
businesses at the expense of the American worker. The legislation 
before us would grant the President the ability to negotiate trade 
agreements with other countries and then send them to the Congress for 
it's up or down vote.
  Congress should be part of careful and deliberate negotiations on all 
trade agreements. They should not be put on the fast-track. Such a 
take-it-or-leave-it approach strongly favors any agreement submitted by 
the Administration, regardless of its flaws or impact on our workers 
and the environment. A recent trade agreement between the United States 
and Jordan was not subject to fast-track procedures, but was approved 
by Congress nevertheless. This measure required labor and environmental 
issues to be part of the core negotiating objectives. If Congress has 
not been a part of constructing that agreement, those objectives would 
surely have been left out of the accord.
  The most appalling aspect of this bill is the fact that it fails to 
address the continuing problem of varying labor and environmental 
standards throughout the world. The bill requires only that a country 
enforce its own laws--however bad they may be in terms of worker rights 
and working conditions. There is no real requirement that a country's 
law include any of the five core labor standards--bans on child labor, 
discrimination, slave labor and the rights to associate and to bargain 
collectively.
  Therefore, this bill would allow countries that do not provide basic 
protections to children under 14 who work in factories, that allow the 
use of slave labor, or that deny workers the basic right to associate 
and bargain collectively, to continue to do so. It is nearly impossible 
for American companies and their employees to compete against foreign 
businesses that pay poverty wages.
  Nor does the bill direct that concrete steps be taken to integrate 
existing or future multilateral environmental agreements with trade 
agreements. Instead, the bill says we do not care whether your 
companies pollute the water or poison the air. This bill says we do not 
care how safe your products are and it allows foreign investors in the 
U.S. to challenge our own right to enact environmental and other public 
interest laws within our borders.
  Our trade agreements should not forsake the interests of U.S. workers 
and industries, for the option of foreign companies flooding our 
markets with cheap products, forcing American businesses to close there 
doors and send their workers to the unemployment line.
  Trade agreements have far-reaching effects on the U.S. economy, 
workers and the environment and at a time when the economy is in a 
recession and America is waging a war overseas, the jobs of American 
workers should not be put at additional risk by this legislation.
  This bill differs little from the fast track bill voted down by the 
House in 1998 and it should be voted down today as well.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, One of my priorities in Congress is the 
support of trade policies that require environmental protections, 
support human rights and fair labor conditions while strengthening the 
economies of my community and of nations around the world.
  Trade has tremendous potential for achieving these objectives, but 
only if our trade policy is carefully crafted. We must ensure that we 
are using our maximum leverage to achieve the above goals. We need to 
appreciate how the world is chaning--in regards to the positive 
transformative powers trade can have for societies around the world as 
well as the potential negative impact trade can have here at home. 
International trade provisions can now undermine other U.S. provisions 
of law ranging from immigration to anti-trust. One example is the 
provisions in NAFTA that appear to place foreign investors in a 
position superior to their American counterparts, potentially enabling 
them to evade our environmental protections.
  I believe these problems are not insurmountable or even all that 
difficult to tackle. The provisions of HR 3019, authored by Ranking 
Member Rangel, would establish core labor standards as the point of 
departure for any new free trade agreement in the Americas. In HR 3019 
foreign investors would not be given greater rights than domestic 
investors, and the United States would be empowered to enforce 
multilateral environmental agreements where both parties have accepted 
their obligations.
  With a determined expression of outreach and commitment on the part 
of the President and the Speaker of the House, we can and should have a 
trade bill that garners at least 250 votes, helping lift trade above 
today's fiercely ideological partisan contention. Instead, if this bill 
passes, it will win a narrow majority over bitter opposition from many 
people who are actually leaders for international trade. Bringing this 
legislation to the House floor in this form, under these conditions, 
borders on the irresponsible. There is no reason to play ``Russian 
roulette'' with our national trade policy in order to accentuate 
partisan differences. Securing votes with incremental concessions on 
items like citrus and steel, and backing away form agricultural reform 
is a poor way to pass legislation and is no way to form an enduring 
coalition in support of trade promotion. I have implored the President 
to defuse the situation. I fear it will come back to haunt him and his 
Administration and make progress in the trade arena needlessly 
difficult for years to come.
  The decision to attempt a narrow partisan victory continues a 
troubling trend in the House of Representatives. Legislation dealing 
with terrorism, airline security, insurance protection and economic 
stimulus did not need to be partisan and indeed there were strong 
bipartisan bills available. The decision by the House Republican 
leadership to push for narrow partisan victories at the expense of 
sound bipartisan policy, with the acquiescence or in some cases the 
outright support of the Administration, is not just bad policy, it's 
the wrong thing to do, when the country desperately wants to be united 
solving our problems.
  I sadly but resolutely vote against this legislation. I will continue 
to speak out in support of the importance of Trade Promotion Authority. 
I will work with people on both sides of the aisle and our talented 
Trade Representative Robert Zoellick to secure a true bipartisan 
solution to other trade related issues.
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my strong opposition to 
H.R. 3005, the Thomas Fast Track bill.
  I strongly support free trade, but it must be fair and not at the 
expense of American jobs, workers' rights, the environment, or our 
Constitution.
  We cannot sacrifice jobs in the pursuit of imaginary profits, 
especially now with our economy stumbling.
  We are losing jobs every day, while our trade deficits get larger and 
larger. And those deficits have expanded since NAFTA was passed.
  The Economic Policy Institute reports that Americans have lost 3 
million actual and potential jobs since NAFTA.
  California alone has suffered over 300,000 jobs in trade-related 
losses.
  We must stem this tide and signing over Congress' trade authority is 
not the way to do that.
  Nor should we sacrifice our environment or the public health.
  Under the terms of Chapter 11 of NAFTA, California is currently being 
sued by a Canadian corporation because our state's efforts to phase out 
MTBE from our gasoline and eliminate that potential carcinogen from our 
water supply have cut into their profits.
  Fast track would open up our environmental laws to foreign lawsuits.
  It would undermine efforts to let consumers know if they are eating 
genetically modified foods.
  It would threaten international environmental protections.
  Finally, fast track undercuts the authority of this very Congress to 
protect our constituents.
  The Constitution specifically grants Congress ``the power to regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations.''
  We should not vote to give that power away.
  I urge you to oppose this bill. We don't have to jump on to a fast 
track that will lead to a train wreck.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member rises today to express his 
very strong support for H.R. 3005, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion 
Authority Act of 2001. This Member would like to thank the 
distinguished Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee from 
California (Mr. Thomas) for both introducing this legislation and for 
his efforts in moving this legislation forward to today's House Floor 
debate. Additional appreciation is expressed to the distinguished 
Chairman of the House Rules Committee from California (Mr. Dreier) for 
his efforts in expediting the consideration of this legislation.
  Under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, Congress 
would agree to vote ``yeas'' or ``no'' on any trade agreement in its 
entirety, without amendments. This Member in the past has always 
supported Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), or ``Fast-Track Authority'' 
as it was previously called, because

[[Page H9027]]

this Member is fully convinced it is required for the President, acting 
through the United States Trade Representative, to conclude trade 
agreements with foreign nations. Certainly, TPA is necessary to give 
our trading partners confidence that the agreements which the U.S. 
negotiates will not be changed by Congress. Without the enactment of 
TPA, the United States will continue to fall further behind in 
expanding its export base and that will cost America thousands of 
potential jobs. Granting TPA to the President is absolutely essential 
for America to reach towards its export potential.
  TPA will enhance Nebraska's agricultural exports. According to 
estimates from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Nebraska ranked 
fourth among all states with agricultural exports of $3.1 billion in 
2000. These exports represented about 35 percent of the state's total 
farm income of $8.9 billion in 2000. In addition to increasing farm 
prices and income, agricultural exports support about 44,800 jobs both 
on and off the farm. The top three agricultural exports in 2000 were 
live animals and red meats ($1 billion), feed grains and products ($769 
million) and soybeans and products ($454 million). However, Nebraska 
agricultural exports still encounter high tariff and a whole range of 
significant nontariff barriers worldwide.
  At the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial in Doha, 
Qatar, trade ministers representing over 140 countries agreed to a 
Declaration which launched a comprehensive multilateral trade 
negotiation that covered a variety of areas including agriculture. The 
trade objectives in this Declaration called for a reduction of foreign 
agriculture export subsidies, as well as improvements in agriculture 
market access. In order to help meet these trade negotiation 
objectives, TPA would give the President through the United States 
Trade Representative the authority to conclude trade agreements which 
are in the best interest of American farmers and ranchers.

  This legislation is very important for Nebraska because our states 
economy is very export-dependent. According to the U.S. Department of 
Commerce International Trade Administration, Nebraska has export sales 
of $1,835 for every state resident. Moreover, 1,367 companies, 
including 998 small and medium-sized businesses with under 500 
employees, exported from Nebraska in 1998. Therefore, TPA is critical 
to help remove existing trade barriers to exports of Nebraska goods and 
services.
  To illustrate the urgency for TPA, it must be noted that the U.S. is 
only party to free trade agreements with Mexico and Canada through 
NAFTA and with Israel and Jordan. However, Europe currently has entered 
27 free trade agreements and it is currently negotiating 15 more such 
agreements. In addition, there are currently over 130 preferential 
trade agreements in the world today. Without TPA, many American 
exporters will continue to lose important sales to countries which have 
implemented preferential trade agreements. For example, many American 
exporters are currently losing export sales to Chile because Canadian 
exporters face lower tariffs there under a Canada-Chile trade 
agreement.
  This Member would like to focus on the following five subjects are 
they relate to the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001: 
financial services; labor and the environment; congressional 
consultation; the constitutionality of TPA; and the foreign policy and 
national security implications of TPA.
  First, as the Chairman of the House Financial Services Subcommittee 
on International Monetary Policy and Trade, this Member has focused on 
the importance of financial services trade, which includes banking, 
insurance, and securities. This Subcommittee was told in a June 2001 
hearing that U.S. trade in financial services equaled $20.5 billion in 
2000. This is a 26.7 percent increase from the U.S.'s 1999 financial 
services trade data. Unlike the current overall U.S. trade deficit, 
U.S. financial services trade had a positive balance of $8.8 billion in 
2000.
  The numbers for U.S. financial services trade have the potential to 
significantly increase if TPA is enacted into law. The U.S. is the 
preeminent world leader in financial services. TPA would further 
empower the United States Trade Representative to negotiate with 
foreign nations to open these insurance, banking, and securities 
markets and to expand access to these diverse financial service 
products.
  Certainly, TPA would particularly benefit U.S. financial services 
trade as it relates to the Free Trade Area of the Americas since many 
of the involved countries are emerging markets where there will be an 
increasing demand for sophisticated financial services. Furthermore, 
TPA would also benefit financial services trade as it is part of the 
larger framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In 2000, GATS members began a 
new round of service negotiations.

  Second, the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001 includes 
important labor and environmental provisions. For example, among other 
provisions, TPA adds a principal U.S. negotiating objective to ensure 
that a party to a trade agreement does not fail to effectively enforce 
its own labor or environmental laws. This type of provision was also 
included in the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement which was signed into 
law on September 28, 2001 (Public Law No. 107-43).
  Third, it is important to note that this legislation has strong 
congressional consultation provisions for before, during, and after the 
negotiations of trade agreements. For example, the President is 
required, before initiating negotiations, to provide written notice and 
to consult with the relevant House and Senate committees of 
jurisdiction and a Congressional Oversight Group at least 90 calendar 
days prior to entering into trade negotiations. This Congressional 
Oversight Group, who would be accredited as official advisers to the 
United States Trade Representative, would provide advice regarding 
formulation of specific objectives, negotiating strategies and 
positions, and development of the trade agreement. In addition, TPA 
would not apply to an agreement if both Houses separately agree to a 
procedural disapproval resolution within any 60-day period stating that 
the Administration has failed to consult Congress.
  Fourth, enactment of TPA is required to secure a constitutionally 
sound basis for American trade policy in the globalized economic 
environment focusing our country today. Under Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution, the President is given the authority to negotiate 
treaties and international agreements. However, under Article I of the 
U.S. Constitution, Congress is given the power to regulate foreign 
commerce. In this TPA legislation, any trade agreement still has to be 
approved by Congress by a ``yes'' or ``no'' vote, without any 
amendments, by both the House and the Senate before it can be signed 
into law. As a result, TPA does not impinge upon the exclusive power of 
Congress to regulate foreign commerce. Furthermore, the U.S. 
Constitution does not ban the adoption of a Senate or House rule which 
prohibits amendments from being offered to a bill during Floor 
consideration. In fact, the House considers bills almost every 
legislative week which cannot be amended on the Suspension Calendar.
  Fifth, extending TPA to the President has critical national security 
implications. Indeed, the terrorist attacks of September 11th highlight 
the extend to which American security is placed at risk when the U.S. 
fails to remain engaged in areas around the world. Many countries of 
Central America, South America, Asia, and Africa have fragile 
democratic institutions and market economies. They remain in peril of 
falling into the hands of unfriendly regimes unless the U.S. helps to 
develop the kind of economic stability underpinning democratic 
societies that enhanced trading opportunities can provide.
  In conclusion, for the above stated reasons and many others, this 
Member strongly supports TPA because it is absolutely critically 
important to the health and the future growth of the U.S. economy. 
Therefore, this Member very strongly urges his colleagues to support 
H.R. 3005. This is probably the most important vote of the 107th 
Congress.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Bipartisan 
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, H.R. 3005, a measure granting 
Trade Promotion Authority, TPA, to President Bush, an authority which 
lapsed in 1994. One of the most important votes we will be asked to 
cast in this Congress, the enactment of this measure is essential to 
our national interest and our long-term economic growth and prosperity.
  Without this authority, U.S. negotiators will continue to find 
themselves outside looking in on trade competitors concluding one trade 
agreement after another that protects their interests and ignores ours. 
There are over 130 such preferential agreements in place today and the 
U.S. is a party to only three.
  Our trade competitors have clearly taken advantage of our inability 
to negotiate without this authority. Our NAFTA trade partners, Canada 
and Mexico, have, for example, signed preferential trade agreements 
with other countries of South and Central America ensuring that our 
exporters are at a competitive disadvantage.
  Our hopes for this hemisphere rest upon the economic advancement of 
all. And during the past decade there were many positive signs as 
almost every country in the region embraced the free market and 
implemented a far-reaching series of economic reforms, thereby laying 
the foundation for sustained growth. We are only at the beginning of 
this process, however.
  Too many in this rich hemisphere remain poor; too many countries 
remain underdeveloped; and too many workers are denied access to 
increased economic opportunities. There are many obstacles that need to 
be overcome in this effort, but one easy way to

[[Page H9028]]

expand economic opportunity for every country in this hemisphere is to 
remove its outdated and self-limiting barriers to trade. This is what 
the Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) represents: the recognition that 
protectionism is a dead end street and that the economic interests of 
each country are best advanced through cooperation and an openness to 
the world.
  President Bush has rightly made the FTAA the centerpiece of U.S. 
policy towards the hemisphere, but we cannot succeed in this effort 
without trade promotion authority.
  We now find ourselves in the ironic situation that the greatest 
advocates of this agreement are the countries of Central and South 
America which formerly blockaded themselves virtually every U.S. 
proposal for expanded cooperation. Now it is they who are knocking on 
our door, preaching the benefits of cooperation.
  A ``no'' voted today will only ties the hands of our trade 
negotiators who are trying to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers, to 
increase economic opportunity here and abroad, and to jump-start the 
global economy.
  NAFTA and the most recent global trade agreement (the ``Uruguay 
Round'') have saved the average American family $1,300 to $2,000 each 
year from the combined effect of income increases and lower prices for 
imports. These two agreements are estimated to have increased overall 
U.S. national income by approximately $50 billion a year.
  Many Members, on the Republican as well as Democratic side of the 
aisle, are concerned, however, that granting the President ``a blank 
check'' to negotiate trade agreements could compromise our values and 
set back efforts to reform the World Trade Organization.
  But the text of the proposed trade legislation clearly spells out our 
commitment to democracy, improved trade and environmental policies, 
respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent with 
the core labor standards of the International Labor Organization.
  It also includes our commitment to greater openness and transparency 
inside the global rule-making body, the World Trade Organization and to 
much greater public access to its dispute settlement proceedings.
  For those members who remain unconvinced that the President would put 
his TPA authority to good use, I emphasize that Congress retains the 
right to approve or disapprove any trade agreement negotiated under the 
TPA authority. Any Member can vote down any future trade agreement if 
he or she feels that it doesn't promote our economic security.
  Our failure to grant the President this vitally needed authority will 
lead to the continuing loss of American influence in global trade 
debates and a continuation of the global economic recession. The U.S. 
has long been the engine of the global economy and without this key 
trade authority we will be hard pressed to lead Europe and Asia back 
onto the growth path of the 1990s.
  At this critical point in our global anti-terrorism battle, it is 
also essential, in my view, that we enable the President to build 
stable trade relationships with our key coalition partners.
  We can--and should--esnure that the views of our committee are fully 
taken into account in the drafting of any future trade negotiations, 
and I will help to ensure that this takes place.
  Without TPA, we won't have the tools needed to jump start the global 
economy to help lift us out of economic recession.
  With TPA, they can finish the task of building a Free Trade Area of 
the Americas and negotiating a new trade round. With TPA, our President 
can once again exercise leadership to foster open markets, democracy 
and economic development.
  Security and trade issues are increasingly linked. Bringing China, 
and eventually Russia, into the world trading system will help to 
ensure that these and other countries will strengthen the rule of law 
and promote more open economic systems.
  NATO's role in the world is only as strong as the economies of its 
members and without TPA and a new round of trade negotiations the 
global recession is likely to be that much longer and deeper.
  Support the President and pass H.R. 3005.
  Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support H.R. 3005, 
the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001.
  I believe passage of this important legislation is crucial to 
America's economic interest, especially in light of the recession. H.R. 
3005 is significant because it seeks to renew the President's fast 
track or trade promotion authority (TPA) to negotiate trade agreements 
with other nations. This legislation would ensure that the United 
States can effectively negotiate away foreign tariff barriers as well 
as non-tariff barriers that now exclude U.S. products. It gives the 
U.S. credibility to negotiate tough trade deals while preserving 
Congress' right to approve or disapprove them. More importantly, if the 
U.S. fails to be a leading participant in future negotiations on 
multilateral, bilateral and sectoral agreements, we will see a negative 
effect on our competitive ability to sell our goods in overseas 
markets. Our global economy demands that the President have TPA to open 
up foreign markets to United States products and ensure continued 
economic prosperity for American consumers and workers. For this 
reason, I fully support giving the President this important tool that 
every President, except for President Bill Clinton, has had since 1974.
  TPA allows the President to enter into trade agreements reducing, 
eliminating, or otherwise affecting U.S. tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. It essentially commits the Congress to vote on those 
agreements (without amendments or revisions) within a limited period of 
time. Under H.R. 3005, the President must also consult and coordinate 
with Congress throughout the negotiating process. In any event, if 
Congress does not like the end result, members can simply vote against 
the total package.
  Mr. Speaker, 95 percent of the world's consumers living outside of 
the United States. Let me repeat: 95 percent of the world's consumers 
live outside the U.S. That means quite simply, that the continued 
growth of the U.S. economy depends upon our success in eliminating 
trade barriers around the globe. Since 1993, U.S. exports have 
contributed to nearly one-third of the nation's economic growth and 
have increased three times faster than overall income. Moreover, 
between 1986 and 1994, jobs supported by exports rose 63 percent more 
than four times faster than overall private industry job growth.
  Free trade is especially important to the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
In 1996, Virginia exported goods worth $10.9 billion, 4.8 percent 
higher than in 1995. As the 16th largest exporter among the 50 states, 
Virginia industries have benefitted tremendously from international 
trade, particularly in the high-tech, industrial machinery, 
transportation equipment, and chemical and fabricated metal products 
exporting sectors.
  U.S. technology companies are the single largest merchandise 
exporters in the United States, accounting for 20 percent of all 
merchandise exports. Exports from the U.S. have more than doubled 
during the last decade. In particular, high-tech services such as 
computer, data processing and other information services are booming. 
While these exports are vital, imports are also important. They help 
keep inflation in check, give consumers greater choice, create jobs, 
and allow U.S. companies to use the best technology available so they 
can increase their productivity and competitiveness.
  Since TPA lapsed in 1993, the U.S. has been forced to sit on the 
sidelines while our foreign competitors aggressively pursued their own 
economic interests through trade agreements. For example: both Canada 
and Mexico now have free trade agreements with Chile; the Latin 
American Southern Cone Common Market (``Mercosur''), which consists of 
Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, has agreements with Chile and 
Bolivia and is negotiating trade arrangements with other countries in 
Latin America; Japan and the European Union are working toward trade 
arrangements with countries in Latin America and Asia; and Members of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are implementing a 
free trade area.

  The President must have the authority to begin hammering out fair and 
balanced trade agreements that will clinch America's leadership role in 
the world market and improve the standard of living for American 
families. H.R. 3005 is a reasonable compromise that will enable the 
United States to stimulate economic growth, exercise leadership, and 
provide new opportunities for American companies, workers and their 
families. The U.S. is not keeping pace with our foreign competitors in 
opening up markets. We are party to only two of the more than 130 free 
trade agreements, and 43 of the 1,800 bilateral investment agreements 
in force today. The impact of U.S. inaction cannot be overstated: we 
face discriminatory tariffs; our service sectors are often at a 
competitive disadvantage against their foreign rivals; product 
standards are established that favor our foreign competitors; and 
foreign companies are often granted more favorable investment terms.
  By granting the President this authority we will guarantee that the 
U.S. remains both the political and economic world leader. Right now, 
while the U.S. stands on the sidelines, other nations have gotten the 
jump on negotiating trade agreements that benefit their domestic 
interest.
  U.S. exporters lose out on investment opportunities while the 
Congress debates whether we as a nation should be engaged in serious 
world trade. The time for debate is over; the time for action is now.
  Without the authority provided by this legislation, U.S. negotiators 
will not be able to sit across the table from our largest trading 
partners and reach agreements that lower tariffs, increase transparency 
and lessen onerous regulations in prospective markets. Instead, it

[[Page H9029]]

will be our trading partners who negotiate free trade pacts among 
themselves, excluding U.S. workers and businesses from the benefits of 
open markets. We cannot afford to sit idly by while other nations seize 
the mantle of leadership on trade matters from the United States.
  The September 11th attacks on America and the ensuing sluggish 
economy make it more important than ever for Congress to give the 
President unfettered authority to tear down barriers to trade and 
investment, expand markets for U.S. farmers and businesses, and create 
higher-skilled, higher-paying jobs for American workers. Because TPA is 
crucial to these objectives, I urge all of my colleagues to vote in 
favor of H.R. 3005
  Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3005, the 
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority and encourage its overwhelming 
passage.
  Mr. Speaker, my colleagues on the other side of the aisle claim that 
trade promotion authority will result in a diminished quality of life 
while creating low paying jobs in countries around the world.
  This could not be further from the truth and our trade with Mexico is 
the perfect example to illustrate this point.
  Since NAFTA, wages in Mexico increased at an average annual rate of 
10.3 percent from 1995-2000.
  The standard of living in Mexico between 1993-1999 increased at an 
average annual rate of 8 percent.
  Approximately 1.7 million jobs have been created in Mexico since mid-
1995, according to Mexican government figures.
  Moreover unemployment in Mexico fell from nearly 6.3 percent in 1995 
to just over 2.5 percent in 1999.
  In the year 2000, U.S. companies have had direct investment worth $35 
million in Mexico, up from $17 billion in 1994.
  Not only is NAFTA raising the standard of living and creating jobs in 
Mexico, but it is doing so in the United States as well.
  NAFTA allowed U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico to rise by $149 
billion, leading to new sales that helped create nearly three million 
jobs.
  Export-related jobs pay on average 13-16 percent more than comparable 
domestic jobs.
  United States trade interests will continue to suffer if we do not 
grant the President trade promotion authority.
  In an editorial that appeared in the Wall Street Journal, European 
Union commissioner for trade, Pascal Lamy, was quoted as saying that, 
``If the United States does not get this mandate quickly, then no one 
will negotiate.''
  Brazilian Ambassador Rubens Barbosa has warned that a TPA failure 
would all but sink talks for a new 34-country Free Trade Area of the 
Americas.
  In Chile, United States exports are being displaced as Chilean buyers 
switch away from United States made products and increasingly buy goods 
from suppliers in countries with which Chile has a free trade 
agreement.
  The United States has lost 6 percentage points of the Chilean import 
market since 1997, resulting in the loss of more than $800 million 
annually in exports to Chile.
  This represents a loss of more than 10,000 American Jobs. The point 
is clear.
  Increased international trade and investments will create 
opportunities for American companies and American workers, lifting the 
world's standard of living and creating even more demand for American 
goods and services.
  I urge passage of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). All time for debate has 
expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 306, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill, as amended.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Rangel

  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. RANGEL. I am, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Rangel moves to recommit the bill H.R. 3005 to the 
     Committee on Ways and Means with instructions that the 
     Committee report back to the House forthwith with the 
     following amendment:

       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is the following:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Negotiating objectives.
Sec. 3. Congressional trade advisers.
Sec. 4. Trade agreements authority.
Sec. 5. Commencement of negotiations.
Sec. 6. Congressional participation during negotiations.
Sec. 7. Implementation of trade agreements.
Sec. 8. Treatment of certain trade agreements.
Sec. 9. Additional report and studies.
Sec. 10. Additional implementation and enforcement requirements.
Sec. 11. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 12. Definitions.

     SEC. 2. NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.

       (a) Overall Trade Negotiating Objectives.--The overall 
     trade negotiating objectives of the United States for 
     agreements subject to the provisions of section 4 are the 
     following:
       (1) To obtain clear and specific commitments from trading 
     partners of the United States to fulfill existing 
     international trade obligations according to existing 
     schedules.
       (2) To obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market 
     access for United States agricultural products, manufactured 
     and other nonagricultural products, and services.
       (3) To obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers to 
     trade, including barriers that result from failure of 
     governments to publish laws, rules, policies, practices, and 
     administrative and judicial decisions.
       (4) To ensure effective implementation of trade commitments 
     and obligations by strengthening the effective operation of 
     the rule of law by trading partners of the United States.
       (5) To oppose any attempts to weaken in any respect the 
     trade remedy laws of the United States.
       (6) To increase public access to international, regional, 
     and bilateral trade organizations in which the United States 
     is a member by developing such organizations and their 
     underlying agreements in ways that make the resources of such 
     organizations more accessible to, and their decisionmaking 
     processes more open to participation by, workers, farmers, 
     businesses, and nongovernmental organizations.
       (7) To ensure that the dispute settlement mechanisms in 
     multilateral, regional, and bilateral agreements lead to 
     prompt and full compliance.
       (8) To ensure that the benefits of trade extend broadly and 
     fully to all segments of society.
       (9) To pursue market access initiatives that benefit the 
     world's least-developed countries.
       (10) To ensure that trade rules take into account the 
     special needs of least-developed countries.
       (11) To promote enforcement of internationally recognized 
     core labor standards by trading partners of the United 
     States.
       (12) To promote the ongoing improvement of environmental 
     protections.
       (13) To promote the compatibility of trade rules with 
     national environmental, health, and safety standards and with 
     multilateral environmental agreements.
       (14) To identify and pursue those areas of trade 
     liberalization, such as trade in environmental technologies, 
     that also promote protection of the environment.
       (15) To ensure that existing and new rules of the WTO and 
     of regional and bilateral trade agreements support 
     sustainable development, protection of endangered species, 
     and reduction of air and water pollution.
       (16) To ensure that existing and new rules of the WTO and 
     of regional and bilateral agreements are written, 
     interpreted, and applied in such a way as to facilitate the 
     growth of electronic commerce.
       (b) Principal Negotiating Objectives Under the WTO.--The 
     principal negotiating objectives of the United States under 
     the auspices of the WTO are the following:
       (1) Reciprocal trade in agriculture.--The principal 
     negotiating objective of the United States with respect to 
     agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United 
     States exports of agricultural commodities in foreign markets 
     equal to the competitive opportunities afforded foreign 
     exports in United States markets and to achieve fairer and 
     more open conditions of trade in bulk, specialty crop, and 
     value-added commodities by doing the following:
       (A) Reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or 
     other charges that decrease market opportunities for United 
     States exports, giving priority to those products that are 
     subject to significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of 
     major producing countries and providing reasonable adjustment 
     periods for import sensitive products of the United States, 
     in close consultation with the Congress.
       (B) Eliminating disparities between applied and bound 
     tariffs by reducing bound tariff levels.
       (C) Enhancing the transparency of tariff regimes.
       (D) Tightening disciplines governing the administration of 
     tariff rate quotas.
       (E) Eliminating export subsidies.
       (F) Eliminating or reducing trade distorting domestic 
     subsidies.
       (G) When negotiating reduction or elimination of export 
     subsidies or trade distorting domestic subsidies with 
     countries that maintain higher levels of such subsidies than 
     the United States, obtaining reductions from other countries 
     to United States subsidy levels before agreeing to reduce or 
     eliminate United States subsidies.

[[Page H9030]]

       (H) Preserving United States market development programs, 
     including agriculture export credit programs that allow the 
     United States to compete with other foreign export promotion 
     efforts.
       (I) Maintaining bona fide food aid programs.
       (J) Allowing the preservation of programs that support 
     family farms and rural communities but do not distort trade.
       (K) Eliminating state trading enterprises, or, at a 
     minimum, adopting rigorous disciplines that ensure 
     transparency in the operations of such enterprises, including 
     price transparency, competition, and the end of 
     discriminatory policies and practices, including policies and 
     practices supporting cross-subsidization, price 
     discrimination, and price undercutting in export markets.
       (L) Eliminating practices that adversely affect trade in 
     perishable or seasonal products, while improving import 
     relief mechanisms to recognize the unique characteristics of 
     perishable and seasonal agriculture. Before commencing 
     negotiations with respect to agriculture, the Trade 
     Representative, in consultation with the Congress, shall seek 
     to develop a position on the treatment of perishable and 
     seasonal food products to be employed in the negotiations in 
     order to develop an international consensus on the treatment 
     of such products in antidumping, countervailing duty, and 
     safeguard actions and in any other relevant area.
       (M) Taking into account whether a party to the negotiations 
     has failed to adhere to the provisions of already existing 
     trade agreements with the United States or has circumvented 
     obligations under those agreements.
       (N) Taking into account whether a product is subject to 
     market distortions by reason of a failure of a major 
     producing country to adhere to the provisions of already 
     existing trade agreements with the United States or by the 
     circumvention by that country of its obligations under those 
     agreements.
       (O) Taking into account the impact that agreements covering 
     agriculture to which the United States is a party, including 
     NAFTA, have had on the agricultural sector in the United 
     States.
       (P) Ensuring that countries that accede to the WTO have 
     made meaningful market liberalization commitments in 
     agriculture.
       (Q) Treating the negotiation of all issues as a single 
     undertaking, with implementation of early agreements in 
     particular sectors contingent on an acceptable final package 
     of agreements on all issues.
       (2) Trade in services.--The principal negotiating objective 
     of the United States with respect to trade in services is to 
     further reduce or eliminate barriers to, or other distortions 
     of, international trade in services by doing the following:
       (A) Pursuing agreement by WTO members to extend their 
     commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
     (in this section also referred to as ``GATS'') to--
       (i) achieve maximum liberalization of market access in all 
     modes of supply, including by removing restrictions on the 
     legal form of an investment or on the right to own all or a 
     majority share of a service supplier, subject to national 
     security exceptions;
       (ii) remove regulatory and other barriers that deny 
     national treatment, or unreasonably restrict the 
     establishment or operations of service suppliers in foreign 
     markets;
       (iii) reduce or eliminate any adverse effects of existing 
     government measures on trade in services;
       (iv) eliminate additional barriers to trade in services, 
     including restrictions on access to services distribution 
     networks and information systems, unreasonable or 
     discriminatory licensing requirements, the administration 
     of cartels or toleration of anticompetitive activity, 
     unreasonable delegation of regulatory powers to private 
     entities, and similar government acts, measures, or 
     policies affecting the sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
     distribution, or use of services that have the effect of 
     restricting access of services and service suppliers to a 
     foreign market; and
       (v) grandfather existing concessions and liberalization 
     commitments.
       (B) Strengthening requirements under GATS to ensure that 
     regulation of services and service suppliers in all respects, 
     including by rulemaking, license-granting, standards-setting, 
     and through judicial, administrative, and arbitral 
     proceedings, is conducted in a transparent, reasonable, 
     objective, and impartial manner and is otherwise consistent 
     with principles of due process.
       (C) Continuing to oppose strongly cultural exceptions to 
     obligations under GATS, especially relating to audiovisual 
     services and service providers.
       (D) Preventing discrimination against a like service when 
     delivered through electronic means.
       (E) Pursuing full market access and national treatment 
     commitments for services sectors essential to supporting 
     electronic commerce.
       (F) Broadening and deepening commitments of other countries 
     relating to basic and value added telecommunications, 
     including by--
       (i) strengthening obligations and the implementation of 
     obligations to ensure competitive, nondiscriminatory access 
     to public telecommunication networks and services for 
     Internet service providers and other value-added service 
     providers; and
       (ii) preventing anticompetitive behavior by major 
     suppliers, including service suppliers that are either 
     government owned or controlled or recently government owned 
     or controlled.
       (G) Broadening and deepening commitments of other countries 
     relating to financial services.
       (3) Trade in manufactured and nonagricultural goods.--The 
     principal negotiating objectives of the United States with 
     respect to trade in manufactured and nonagricultural goods 
     are the following:
       (A) To eliminate disparities between applied and bound 
     tariffs by reducing bound tariff levels.
       (B) To negotiate an agreement that includes reciprocal 
     commitments to eliminate duties in sectors in which tariffs 
     are currently approaching zero.
       (C) To eliminate tariff and nontariff disparities remaining 
     from previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations that 
     have put United States exports at a competitive disadvantage 
     in world markets, especially tariff and nontariff barriers in 
     foreign countries in those sectors where the United States 
     imposes no significant barriers to imports and where foreign 
     tariff and nontariff barriers are substantial.
       (D) To obtain the reduction or elimination of tariffs on 
     value-added products that provide a disproportionate level of 
     protection compared to that provided to raw materials.
       (E) To eliminate additional nontariff barriers to trade, 
     including--
       (i) anticompetitive restrictions on access to product 
     distribution networks and information systems;
       (ii) unreasonable or discriminatory inspection processes;
       (iii) the administration of cartels, or the promotion, 
     enabling, or toleration of anticompetitive activity;
       (iv) unreasonable delegation of regulatory powers to 
     private entities;
       (v) unreasonable or discriminatory licensing requirements; 
     and
       (vi) similar government acts, measures, or policies 
     affecting the sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
     transportation, distribution, or use of goods that have the 
     effect of restricting access of goods to a foreign market.
       (4) Trade in civil aircraft.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to civil 
     aircraft are those contained section 135(c) of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3555(c)).
       (5) Rules of origin.--The principal negotiating objective 
     of the United States with respect to rules of origin is to 
     conclude the work program on rules of origin described in 
     Article 9 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin.
       (6) Dispute settlement.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to dispute 
     settlement are the following:
       (A) To improve enforcement of decisions of dispute 
     settlement panels to ensure prompt compliance by foreign 
     governments with their obligations under the WTO.
       (B) To strengthen rules that promote cooperation by the 
     governments of WTO members in producing evidence in 
     connection with dispute settlement proceedings, including 
     copies of laws, regulations, and other measures that are the 
     subject of or are directly relevant to the dispute, other 
     than evidence that is classified on the basis of national 
     security, and evidence that is business confidential.
       (C) To pursue rules for the management of translation-
     related issues.
       (D) To require that all submissions by governments to 
     dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body be made 
     available to the public upon submission, providing 
     appropriate exceptions for only that information included in 
     a submission that is classified on the basis of national 
     security or that is business confidential.
       (E) To require that meetings of dispute settlement panels 
     and the Appellate Body with parties to a dispute are open to 
     other WTO members and the public and provide for in camera 
     treatment of only those portions of a proceeding dealing with 
     evidence that is classified on the basis of national security 
     or that is business confidential.
       (F) To require that transcripts of proceedings of dispute 
     settlement panels and the Appellate Body be made available to 
     the public promptly, providing appropriate exceptions for 
     only that information included in the transcripts that is 
     classified on the basis of national security or that is 
     business confidential.
       (G) To establish rules allowing for the submission of 
     amicus curiae briefs to dispute settlement panels and the 
     Appellate Body, and to require that such briefs be made 
     available to the public, providing appropriate exceptions for 
     only that information included in the briefs which is 
     classified on the basis of national security or that is 
     business confidential.
       (H) To strengthen rules protecting against conflicts of 
     interest by members of dispute settlement panels and the 
     Appellate Body, and promoting the selection of such members 
     with the skills and time necessary to decide increasingly 
     complex cases.
       (I) To pursue the establishment of formal procedures under 
     which dispute settlement panels, the Appellate Body, and the 
     Dispute Settlement Body seek advice from other fora of 
     competent jurisdiction, such as the International Court of 
     Justice, the ILO, representative bodies established under 
     international environmental agreements, and scientific 
     experts.
       (J) To ensure application of the requirement that dispute 
     settlement panels and the Appellate Body apply the standard 
     of review

[[Page H9031]]

     established in Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement and 
     clarify that this standard of review should apply to cases 
     under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
     and the Agreement on Safeguards.
       (7) Sanitary and phytosanitary measures.--The principal 
     negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to 
     sanitary and phytosanitary measures are the following:
       (A) To oppose reopening of the Agreement on the Application 
     of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
       (B) To affirm the compatibility of trade rules with 
     measures to protect human health, animal health, and the 
     phytosanitary situation of each WTO member by doing the 
     following:
       (i) Reaffirming that a decision of a WTO member not to 
     adopt an international standard for the basis of a sanitary 
     or phytosanitary measure does not in itself create a 
     presumption of inconsistency with the Agreement on the 
     Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and that 
     the initial burden of proof rests with the complaining party, 
     as set forth in the determination of the Appellate Body in
     EC Measures Concerning Meat and
     Meat Products (Hormones), AB-1997-4,
     WT/DS26/AB/R, January 16, 1998.
       (ii) Reaffirming that WTO members may take provisional 
     sanitary or phytosanitary measures where the relevant 
     scientific evidence is insufficient, so long as such measures 
     are based on available pertinent information, and members 
     taking such provisional measures seek to obtain the 
     additional information necessary to complete a risk 
     assessment within a reasonable period of time. For purposes 
     of this clause, a reasonable period of time includes 
     sufficient time to evaluate the potential for adverse effects 
     on human or animal health arising from the presence of 
     additives, contaminants, toxins, or disease-causing organisms 
     in food, beverages, or feedstuffs.
       (8) Technical barriers to trade.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to technical 
     barriers to trade are the following:
       (A) To oppose reopening of the Agreement on Technical 
     Barriers to Trade.
       (B) Recognizing the legitimate role of labeling that 
     provides relevant information to consumers, to ensure that 
     labeling regulations and standards do not have the effect of 
     creating an unnecessary obstacle to trade or are used as a 
     disguised barrier to trade by increasing transparency in the 
     preparation, adoption, and application of labeling 
     regulations and standards.
       (9) Trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
     rights.--The principal negotiating objectives of the United 
     States with respect to trade-related aspects of intellectual 
     property rights are the following:
       (A) To oppose extension of the date by which WTO members 
     that are developing countries must implement their 
     obligations under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
     Intellectual Property Rights (in this section also referred 
     to as the ``TRIPs Agreement''), pursuant to paragraph 2 of 
     Article 65 of that agreement.
       (B) To oppose extension of the moratorium on the 
     application of subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII 
     of the GATT 1994 to the settlement of disputes under the 
     TRIPs Agreement, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 64 of the 
     TRIPs Agreement.
       (C) To oppose any weakening of existing obligations of WTO 
     members under the TRIPs Agreement.
       (D) To ensure that standards of protection and enforcement 
     keep pace with technological developments, including ensuring 
     that rightholders have the legal and technological means to 
     control the use of their works through the Internet and other 
     global communication media, and to prevent the unauthorized 
     use of their works.
       (E) To prevent misuse of reference pricing classification 
     systems by developed countries as a way to discriminate 
     against innovative pharmaceutical products and innovative 
     medical devices, without challenging legitimate reference 
     pricing systems not used as a disguised restriction on trade.
       (F)(i) To clarify that under Article 31 of the TRIPs 
     Agreement WTO members are able to adopt measures necessary to 
     protect the public health and to respond to situations of 
     national emergency or extreme urgency, including by taking 
     actions that have the effect of increasing access to 
     essential medicines and medical technologies.
       (ii) In situations involving infectious diseases, to 
     encourage WTO members that take actions described under 
     clause (i) to also implement policies--
       (I) to address the underlying causes necessitating the 
     actions, including, in the case of infectious diseases, 
     encouraging practices that will prevent further transmission 
     and infection;
       (II) to take steps to stimulate the development of the 
     infrastructure necessary to deliver adequate health care 
     services, including the essential medicines and medical 
     technologies at issue;
       (III) to ensure the safety and efficacy of the essential 
     medicines and medical technologies involved; and
       (IV) to make reasonable efforts to address the problems of 
     supply of the essential medicines and medical technologies 
     involved (other than by compulsory licensing), consistent 
     with the obligation set forth in Article 31 of the TRIPs 
     Agreement.
       (iii) To encourage members of the Organization for Economic 
     Cooperation and Development and the private sectors in their 
     countries to work with the United Nations, the World Health 
     Organization, and other relevant international organizations, 
     including humanitarian relief organizations, to assist least-
     developed and developing countries, in all possible ways, in 
     increasing access to essential medicines and medical 
     technologies including through donations, sales at cost, 
     funding of global medicines trust funds, and developing and 
     implementing prevention efforts and health care 
     infrastructure projects.
       (10) Transparency.--The principal negotiating objectives of 
     the United States with respect to transparency are the 
     following:
       (A) To pursue the negotiation of an agreement--
       (i) requiring that government laws, rules, and 
     administrative and judicial decisions be published and made 
     available to the public so that governments, businesses, and 
     the public have adequate notice of them;
       (ii) requiring adequate notice before new rules are 
     promulgated or existing rules amended;
       (iii) encouraging governments to open rulemaking to public 
     comment;
       (iv) establishing that any administrative proceeding 
     conducted by the government of any WTO member relating to any 
     of the WTO Agreements and applied to the persons, goods, or 
     services of any other WTO member shall be conducted in a 
     manner that--

       (I) gives persons of any other WTO member affected by the 
     proceeding reasonable notice, in accordance with domestic 
     procedures, of when the proceeding is initiated, including a 
     description of the nature of the proceeding, a statement of 
     the legal authority under which the proceeding is initiated, 
     and a general description of any issues in controversy;
       (II) gives such persons a reasonable opportunity to present 
     facts and arguments in support of their positions prior to 
     any final administrative action, when time, the nature of the 
     proceeding, and the public interest permit; and
       (III) is in accordance with domestic law; and

       (v) requiring each WTO member--

       (I) to establish or maintain judicial, quasi-judicial, or 
     administrative tribunals (impartial and independent of the 
     office or authority entrusted with administrative 
     enforcement) or procedures for the purpose of the prompt 
     review and, where warranted, correction of final 
     administrative actions regarding matters covered by any of 
     the WTO Agreements;
       (II) to ensure that, in such tribunals or procedures, 
     parties to the proceeding are afforded a reasonable 
     opportunity to support or defend their respective positions; 
     and
       (III) to ensure that such tribunals or procedures issue 
     decisions based on the evidence and submissions of record or, 
     where required by domestic law, the record compiled by the 
     office or authority entrusted with administrative 
     enforcement.

       (B) To pursue a commitment by all WTO members to improve 
     the public's understanding of and access to the WTO and its 
     related agreements by--
       (i) encouraging the Secretariat of the WTO to enhance the 
     WTO website by providing improved access to a wider array of 
     WTO documents and information on the trade regimes of, and 
     other relevant information on, WTO members;
       (ii) promoting public access to council and committee 
     meetings by ensuring that agendas and meeting minutes 
     continue to be made available to the public;
       (iii) ensuring that WTO documents that are most informative 
     of WTO activities are circulated on an unrestricted basis or, 
     if classified, are made available to the public more quickly;
       (iv) seeking the institution of regular meetings between 
     WTO officials and representatives of nongovernmental 
     organizations, businesses and business groups, labor unions, 
     consumer groups, and other representatives of civil society; 
     and
       (v) supporting the creation of a committee within the WTO 
     to oversee implementation of the agreement reached under this 
     paragraph.
       (11) Government procurement.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to government 
     procurement are the following:
       (A) To seek to expand the membership of the Agreement on 
     Government Procurement.
       (B) To seek conclusion of a WTO agreement on transparency 
     in government procurement.
       (C) To promote global use of electronic publication of 
     procurement information, including notices of procurement 
     opportunities.
       (12) Trade remedy laws.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to trade remedy 
     laws are the following:
       (A) To preserve the ability of the United States to enforce 
     vigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping, 
     countervailing duty, and safeguard laws, and not enter into 
     agreements that lessen in any respect the effectiveness of 
     domestic and international disciplines--
       (i) on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, or
       (ii) that address import increases or surges, such as under 
     the safeguard remedy,

      in order to ensure that United States workers, farmers and 
     agricultural producers, and

[[Page H9032]]

     firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the benefits 
     of reciprocal trade concessions.
       (B) To eliminate the underlying causes of unfair trade 
     practices and import surges, including closed markets, 
     subsidization, government practices promoting, enabling, or 
     tolerating anticompetitive practices, and other forms of 
     government intervention that generate or sustain excess, 
     uneconomic capacity.
       (13) Trade and labor market standards.--The principal 
     negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to 
     trade and labor market standards are the following:
       (A) To achieve a framework of enforceable multilateral 
     rules as soon as practicable that leads to the adoption and 
     enforcement of core, internationally recognized labor 
     standards, including in the WTO and, as appropriate, other 
     international organizations, including the ILO.
       (B) To update Article XX of the GATT 1994, and Article XIV 
     of the GATS in relation to core internationally recognized 
     worker rights, including in regard to actions of WTO members 
     taken consistent with and in furtherance of recommendations 
     made by the ILO under Article 33 of the Constitution of the 
     ILO.
       (C) To establish promptly a working group on trade and 
     labor issues--
       (i) to explore the linkage between international trade and 
     investment and internationally recognized worker rights (as 
     defined in section 502(a)(4) of the Trade Act of 1974), 
     taking into account differences in the level of development 
     among countries;
       (ii) to examine the effects on international trade and 
     investment of the systematic denial of those worker rights;
       (iii) to consider ways to address such effects; and
       (iv) to develop methods to coordinate the work program of 
     the working group with the ILO.
       (D) To provide for regular review of adherence to core 
     labor standards in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
     established in Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement.
       (E) To establish a working relationship between the WTO and 
     the ILO--
       (i) to identify opportunities in trade-affected sectors of 
     the economies of WTO members to improve enforcement of 
     internationally recognized core labor standards;
       (ii) to provide WTO members with technical and legal 
     assistance in developing and enforcing internationally 
     recognized core labor standards; and
       (iii) to provide technical assistance to the WTO to assist 
     with the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.
       (14) Trade and the environment.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to trade and the 
     environment are the following:
       (A) To strengthen the role of the Committee on Trade and 
     Environment of the WTO, including providing that the 
     Committee would--
       (i) review and comment on negotiations; and
       (ii) review potential effects on the environment of WTO 
     Agreements and future agreements of the WTO on liberalizing 
     trade in natural resource products.
       (B) To provide for regular review of adherence to 
     environmental standards in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
     of the WTO.
       (C) To clarify exceptions under Article XX(b) and (g) of 
     the GATT 1994 to ensure effective protection of human, 
     animal, or plant life or health, and conservation of 
     exhaustible natural resources.
       (D) To amend Article XX of the GATT 1994 and Article XIV of 
     the GATS to include an explicit exception for actions taken 
     that are in accordance with those obligations under any 
     multilateral environmental agreement accepted by both parties 
     to a dispute.
       (E) To amend Article XIV of the GATS to include an 
     exception for measures relating to the conservation of 
     exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
     effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
     production or consumption.
       (F) To give priority to trade liberalization measures that 
     promote sustainable development, including eliminating duties 
     on environmental goods, and obtaining commitments on 
     environmental services.
       (G) To reduce subsidies in natural resource sectors 
     (including fisheries and forest products) and export 
     subsidies in agriculture.
       (H) To improve coordination between the WTO and relevant 
     international environmental organizations in the development 
     of multilaterally accepted principles for sustainable 
     development, including sustainable forestry and fishery 
     practices.
       (15) Institution building.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to institution 
     building are the following:
       (A) To strengthen institutional mechanisms within the WTO 
     that facilitate dialogue and coordinate activities between 
     nongovernmental organizations and the WTO.
       (B) To seek greater transparency of WTO processes and 
     procedures for all WTO members by--
       (i) promoting the improvement of internal communication 
     between the Secretariat and all WTO members; and
       (ii) establishing points of contact to facilitate 
     communication between WTO members on any matter covered by 
     the WTO Agreements.
       (C) To improve coordination between the WTO and other 
     international organizations such as the International Bank 
     for Reconstruction and Development, the International 
     Monetary Fund, the ILO, the Organization for Economic 
     Cooperation and Development, the United Nations Conference on 
     Trade and Development, and the United Nations Environment 
     Program to increase the effectiveness of technical assistance 
     programs.
       (D) To increase the efforts of the WTO, both on its own and 
     through partnerships with other institutions, to provide 
     technical assistance to developing countries, particularly 
     least-developed countries, to promote the rule of law, to 
     assist those countries in complying with their obligations 
     under the World Trade Organization agreements, and to address 
     the full range of challenges arising from implementation of 
     such obligations.
       (E) To improve the Trade Policy Review Mechanism of the WTO 
     to cover a wider array of trade-related issues.
       (16) Trade and investment.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to trade and 
     investment are the following:
       (A) To pursue further reduction of trade-distorting 
     investment measures, including--
       (i) by pursuing agreement to ensure the free transfer of 
     funds related to investments;
       (ii) by pursuing reduction or elimination of the exceptions 
     to the principle of national treatment; and
       (iii) by pursuing amendment of the illustrative list 
     annexed to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
     Measures (in this section also referred to as the ``TRIMs 
     Agreement'') to include forced technology transfers, 
     performance requirements, minimum investment levels, forced 
     licensing of intellectual property, or other unreasonable 
     barriers to the establishment or operation of investments as 
     measures that are inconsistent with the obligation of 
     national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III 
     of the GATT 1994 or the obligation of general elimination of 
     quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of 
     Article XI of the GATT 1994.
       (B) To seek to strengthen the enforceability of and 
     compliance with the TRIMs Agreement.
       (17) Electronic commerce.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to electronic 
     commerce are the following:
       (A) Make permanent and binding the moratorium on customs 
     duties on electronic transmissions declared in the WTO 
     Ministerial Declaration of May 20, 1998.
       (B) Ensure that current obligations, rules, disciplines, 
     and commitments under the WTO apply to electronically 
     delivered goods and services.
       (C) Ensure that the classification of electronically 
     delivered goods and services ensures the most liberal trade 
     treatment possible.
       (D) Ensure that electronically delivered goods and services 
     receive no less favorable treatment under WTO trade rules and 
     commitments than like products delivered in physical form.
       (E) Ensure that governments refrain from implementing 
     trade-related measures that impede electronic commerce.
       (F) Where legitimate policy objectives require domestic 
     regulations that affect electronic commerce, to obtain 
     commitments that any such regulations are nondiscriminatory, 
     transparent, and promote an open market environment.
       (G) Pursue a procompetitive regulatory environment for 
     basic and value-added telecommunications services abroad, so 
     as to facilitate the conduct of electronic commerce.
       (H) Focus any future WTO work program on electronic 
     commerce on educating WTO members regarding the benefits of 
     electronic commerce and on facilitating the liberalization of 
     trade barriers in areas that directly impede the conduct of 
     electronic commerce.
       (18) Developing countries.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to developing 
     countries are the following:
       (A) To enter into trade agreements that promote the 
     economic growth of both developing countries and the United 
     States and the mutual expansion of market opportunities.
       (B) To ensure appropriate phase-in periods with respect to 
     the obligations of least-developed countries.
       (C) To coordinate with the World Bank, the International 
     Monetary Fund, and other international institutions to 
     provide debt relief and other assistance to promote the rule 
     of law and sound and sustainable development.
       (D) To accelerate tariff reductions that benefit least-
     developed countries.
       (19) Current account surpluses.--The principal negotiating 
     objective of the United States with respect to current 
     account surpluses is to develop rules to address large and 
     persistent global current account imbalances of countries, 
     including imbalances that threaten the stability of the 
     international trading system, by imposing greater 
     responsibility on such countries to undertake policy changes 
     aimed at restoring current account equilibrium, including 
     expedited implementation of trade agreements where feasible 
     and appropriate or by offering debt repayment on concessional 
     terms.
       (20) Trade and monetary coordination.--The principal 
     negotiating objective of the United States with respect to 
     trade and monetary coordination is to foster stability in 
     international currency markets and develop

[[Page H9033]]

     mechanisms to assure greater coordination, consistency, and 
     cooperation between international trade and monetary systems 
     and institutions in order to protect against the trade 
     consequences of significant and unanticipated currency 
     movements.
       (21) Access to high technology.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to access to 
     high technology are the following:
       (A) To obtain the elimination or reduction of foreign 
     barriers to, and of acts, policies, or practices by foreign 
     governments which limit, equitable access by United States 
     persons to foreign-developed technology.
       (B) To seek the elimination of tariffs on all information 
     technology products, infrastructure equipment, scientific 
     instruments, and medical equipment.
       (C) To pursue the reduction of foreign barriers to high 
     technology products of the United States.
       (D) To enforce and promote the Agreement on Technical 
     Barriers to Trade, and ensure that standards, conformity 
     assessments, and technical regulations are not used as 
     obstacles to trade in information technology and 
     communications products.
       (E) To require all WTO members to sign the Information 
     Technology Agreement of the WTO, and to expand and update 
     product coverage under that agreement.
       (22) Corruption.--The principal negotiating objectives of 
     the United States with respect to the use of money or other 
     things of value to influence acts, decisions, or omissions of 
     foreign governments or officials or to secure any improper 
     advantage in a manner affecting trade are the following:
       (A) To obtain standards applicable to persons from all 
     countries participating in the applicable trade agreement 
     that are equivalent to, or more restrictive than, the 
     prohibitions applicable to issuers, domestic concerns, and 
     other persons under section 30A of the Securities and 
     Exchange Act of 1934 and sections 104 and 104A of the Foreign 
     Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
       (B) To implement mechanisms to ensure effective enforcement 
     of the standards described in subparagraph (A).
       (23) Implementation of existing commitments and improvement 
     of the wto and the wto agreements.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to 
     implementation of existing commitments under the WTO are the 
     following:
       (A) To ensure that all WTO members comply fully with 
     existing obligations under the WTO according to existing 
     commitments and timetables.
       (B) To strengthen the ability of the Trade Policy Review 
     Mechanism within the WTO to review implementation by WTO 
     members of commitments under the WTO.
       (C) To undertake diplomatic and, as appropriate, dispute 
     settlement efforts to promote compliance with commitments 
     under the WTO.
       (D) To extend the coverage of the WTO Agreements to 
     products, sectors, and conditions of trade not adequately 
     covered.
       (c) Negotiating Objectives for the FTAA.--The principal 
     negotiating objectives of the United States in seeking a 
     trade agreement establishing a Free Trade Area for the 
     Americas are the following:
       (1) Reciprocal trade in agriculture.--The principal 
     negotiating objective of the United States with respect to 
     agriculture is to obtain competitive opportunities for United 
     States exports of agricultural commodities in foreign markets 
     equal to the competitive opportunities afforded foreign 
     exports in United States markets and to achieve fairer and 
     more open conditions of trade in bulk, specialty crop, and 
     value-added commodities by doing the following:
       (A) Reducing or eliminating, by a date certain, tariffs or 
     other charges that decrease market opportunities for United 
     States exports, giving priority to those products that are 
     subject to significantly higher tariffs or subsidy regimes of 
     major producing countries and providing reasonable adjustment 
     periods for import sensitive products of the United States, 
     in close consultation with Congress.
       (B) Eliminating disparities between applied and bound 
     tariffs by reducing bound tariff levels.
       (C) Enhancing the transparency of tariff regimes.
       (D) Tightening disciplines governing the administration of 
     tariff rate quotas.
       (E) Establishing mechanisms to prevent agricultural 
     products from being exported to FTAA members by countries 
     that are not FTAA members with the aid of export subsidies.
       (F) Maintaining bona fide food aid programs.
       (G) Allowing the preservation of programs that support 
     family farms and rural communities but do not distort trade.
       (H) Eliminating state trading enterprises or, at a minimum, 
     adopting rigorous disciplines that ensure transparency in the 
     operations of such enterprises, including price transparency, 
     competition, and the end of discriminatory practices, 
     including policies supporting cross-subsidization, price 
     discrimination, and price undercutting in export markets.
       (I) Eliminating technology-based discrimination against 
     agricultural commodities, and ensuring that the rules 
     negotiated do not weaken rights and obligations under the 
     Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
     Measures.
       (J) Eliminating practices that adversely affect trade in 
     perishable or seasonal products, while improving import 
     relief mechanisms to recognize the unique characteristics of 
     perishable and seasonal agriculture. Before proceeding with 
     negotiations with respect to agriculture, the Trade 
     Representative, in consultation with the Congress, shall seek 
     to develop a position on the treatment of perishable and 
     seasonal food products to be employed in the negotiations in 
     order to develop a consensus on the treatment of such 
     products in dumping or safeguard actions and in any other 
     relevant area.
       (K) Taking into account whether a party to the negotiations 
     has failed to adhere to the provisions of already existing 
     trade agreements with the United States or has circumvented 
     obligations under those agreements.
       (L) Taking into account whether a product is subject to 
     market distortions by reason of a failure of a major 
     producing country to adhere to the provisions of already 
     existing trade agreements with the United States or by the 
     circumvention by that country of its obligations under those 
     agreements.
       (M) Taking into account the impact that agreements covering 
     agriculture to which the United States is a party, including 
     NAFTA, have on the United States agricultural industry.
       (2) Trade in services.--The principal negotiating objective 
     of the United States with respect to trade in services is to 
     achieve, to the maximum extent possible, the elimination of 
     barriers to, or other distortions of, trade in services in 
     all modes of supply and across the broadest range of service 
     sectors by doing the following:
       (A) Pursuing agreement to treat negotiation of trade in 
     services in a negative list manner whereby commitments will 
     cover all services and all modes of supply unless particular 
     services or modes of supply are expressly excluded.
       (B) Achieving maximum liberalization of market access in 
     all modes of supply, including by removing restrictions on 
     the legal form of an investment or on the right to own all or 
     a majority share of a service supplier, subject to national 
     security exceptions.
       (C) Removing regulatory and other barriers that deny 
     national treatment, or unreasonably restrict the 
     establishment or operations of service suppliers in foreign 
     markets.
       (D) Eliminating additional barriers to trade in services, 
     including restrictions on access to services distribution 
     networks and information systems, unreasonable or 
     discriminatory licensing requirements, administration of 
     cartels or toleration of anticompetitive activity, 
     unreasonable delegation of regulatory powers to private 
     entities, and similar government acts, measures, or policies 
     affecting the sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
     distribution, or use of services that have the effect of 
     restricting access of services and service suppliers to a 
     foreign market.
       (E) Grandfathering existing concessions and liberalization 
     commitments.
       (F) Pursuing the strongest possible obligations to ensure 
     that regulation of services and service suppliers in all 
     respects, including by rulemaking, license-granting, 
     standards-setting, and through judicial, administrative, and 
     arbitral proceedings, is conducted in a transparent, 
     reasonable, objective, and impartial manner and is otherwise 
     consistent with principles of due process.
       (G) Strongly opposing cultural exceptions to services 
     obligations, especially relating to audiovisual services and 
     service providers.
       (H) Preventing discrimination against a like service when 
     delivered through electronic means.
       (I) Pursuing full market access and national treatment 
     commitments for services sectors essential to supporting 
     electronic commerce.
       (J) Broadening and deepening existing commitments by other 
     countries relating to basic and value-added 
     telecommunications, including by--
       (i) strengthening obligations and the implementation of 
     obligations to ensure competitive, nondiscriminatory access 
     to public telecommunication networks and services for 
     Internet service providers and other value-added service 
     providers; and
       (ii) preventing anticompetitive behavior by major 
     suppliers, including service suppliers that are either 
     government owned or controlled or recently government owned 
     or controlled.
       (K) Broadening and deepening existing commitments of other 
     countries relating to financial services.
       (3) Trade in manufactured and nonagricultural goods.--The 
     principal negotiating objectives of the United States with 
     respect to trade in manufactured and nonagricultural goods 
     are the following:
       (A) To eliminate disparities between applied and bound 
     tariffs by reducing bound tariff levels.
       (B) To negotiate an agreement that includes reciprocal 
     commitments to eliminate duties in sectors in which tariffs 
     are currently approaching zero.
       (C) To eliminate tariff and nontariff disparities remaining 
     from previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations that 
     have put United States exports at a competitive disadvantage 
     in world markets, especially tariff and nontariff barriers in 
     foreign countries in those sectors where the United States 
     imposes no significant barriers to imports and where foreign 
     tariff and nontariff barriers are substantial.

[[Page H9034]]

       (D) To obtain the reduction or elimination of tariffs on 
     value-added products that provide a disproportionate level of 
     protection compared to that provided to raw materials.
       (E) To eliminate additional nontariff barriers to trade, 
     including--
       (i) anticompetitive restrictions on access to product 
     distribution networks and information systems;
       (ii) unreasonable or discriminatory inspection processes;
       (iii) the administration of cartels, or the promotion, 
     enabling, or toleration of anticompetitive activity;
       (iv) unreasonable delegation of regulatory powers to 
     private entities;
       (v) unreasonable or discriminatory licensing requirements; 
     and
       (vi) similar government acts, measures, or policies 
     affecting the sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
     transportation, distribution, or use of goods that have the 
     effect of restricting access of goods to a foreign market.
       (4) Dispute settlement.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to dispute 
     settlement are the following:
       (A) To provide for a single effective and expeditious 
     dispute settlement mechanism and set of procedures that 
     applies to all FTAA agreements.
       (B) To ensure that dispute settlement mechanisms enable 
     effective enforcement of the rights of the United States, 
     including by providing, in all contexts, for the use of all 
     remedies that are demonstrably effective to promote prompt 
     and full compliance with the decision of a dispute settlement 
     panel.
       (C) To provide rules that promote cooperation by the 
     governments of FTAA members in producing evidence in 
     connection with dispute settlement proceedings, including 
     copies of laws, regulations, and other measures that are the 
     subject of or are directly relevant to the dispute, other 
     than evidence that is classified on the basis of national 
     security, and evidence that is business confidential.
       (D) To require that all submissions by governments to FTAA 
     dispute panels and any appellate body be made available to 
     the public upon submission, providing appropriate exceptions 
     for only that information included in a submission that is 
     classified on the basis of national security or that is 
     business confidential.
       (E) To require that meetings of FTAA dispute panels and any 
     appellate body with the parties to a dispute are open to 
     other FTAA members and the public and provide for in camera 
     treatment of only those portions of a proceeding dealing with 
     evidence that is classified on the basis of national security 
     or that is business confidential.
       (F) To require that transcripts of proceedings of FTAA 
     dispute panels and any appellate body be made available to 
     the public promptly, providing appropriate exceptions for 
     only that information included in the transcripts that is 
     classified on the basis of national security or that is 
     business confidential.
       (G) To establish rules allowing for the submission of 
     amicus curiae briefs to FTAA dispute panels and any appellate 
     body, and to require that such briefs be made available to 
     the public, providing appropriate exceptions for only that 
     information included in the briefs that is classified on the 
     basis of national security or that is business confidential.
       (H) To pursue rules protecting against conflicts of 
     interest by members of FTAA dispute panels and any appellate 
     body, and promoting the selection of members for such panels 
     and appellate body with the skills and time necessary to 
     decide increasingly complex cases.
       (I) To pursue the establishment of formal procedures under 
     which the FTAA dispute panels and any appellate body seek 
     advice from other fora of competent jurisdiction, such as 
     the International Court of Justice, ILO, representative 
     bodies established under international environmental 
     agreements, and scientific experts.
       (5) Trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
     rights.--The principal negotiating objectives of the United 
     States with respect to trade-related aspects of intellectual 
     property rights are the following:
       (A) To ensure that the provisions of a regional trade 
     agreement governing intellectual property rights that is 
     entered into by the United States reflects a standard of 
     protection similar to that found in United States law.
       (B) To provide strong protection for new and emerging 
     technologies and new methods of transmitting and distributing 
     products embodying intellectual property.
       (C) To prevent or eliminate discrimination with respect to 
     matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, 
     maintenance, use, and enforcement of intellectual property 
     rights.
       (D) To ensure that standards of protection and enforcement 
     keep pace with technological developments, including ensuring 
     that rightholders have the legal and technological means to 
     control the use of their works through the Internet and other 
     global communication media, and to prevent the unauthorized 
     use of their works.
       (E) To provide strong enforcement of intellectual property 
     rights, including through accessible, expeditious, and 
     effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement 
     mechanisms.
       (F) To secure fair, equitable and nondiscriminatory market 
     access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon 
     intellectual property protection.
       (G) To prevent misuse of reference pricing classification 
     systems by developed countries as a way to discriminate 
     against innovative pharmaceutical products and innovative 
     medical devices, without challenging valid reference pricing 
     systems not used as a disguised restriction on trade.
       (H)(i) To ensure that FTAA members are able to adopt 
     measures necessary to protect the public health and to 
     respond to situations of national emergency or extreme 
     urgency, including taking actions that have the effect of 
     increasing access to essential medicines and medical 
     technologies, where such actions are consistent with 
     obligations set forth in Article 31 of the TRIPs Agreement.
       (ii) In situations involving infectious diseases, to 
     encourage FTAA members that take actions described under 
     clause (i) to also implement policies--
       (I) to address the underlying causes necessitating the 
     actions, including, in the case of infectious diseases, 
     encouraging practices that will prevent further transmission 
     and infection;
       (II) to take steps to stimulate the development of the 
     infrastructure necessary to deliver adequate health care 
     services, including the essential medicines and medical 
     technologies at issue;
       (III) to ensure the safety and efficacy of the essential 
     medicines and medical technologies involved; and
       (IV) to make reasonable efforts to address the problems of 
     supply of the essential medicines and medical technologies 
     involved (other than by compulsory licensing).
       (iii) To encourage FTAA members and the private sectors in 
     their countries to work with the United Nations, the World 
     Health Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
     Organization of American States, and other relevant 
     international organizations, including humanitarian relief 
     organizations, to assist least-developed and developing 
     countries in the region in increasing access to essential 
     medicines and medical technologies through donations, sales 
     at cost, funding or global medicines trust funds, and 
     developing and implementing prevention efforts and health 
     care infrastructure projects.
       (6) Transparency.--The principal negotiating objectives of 
     the United States with respect to transparency are the 
     following:
       (A) To pursue the negotiation of an agreement--
       (i) requiring that government laws, rules, and 
     administrative and judicial decisions be published and made 
     available to the public so that governments, businesses and 
     the public have adequate notice of them;
       (ii) requiring adequate notice before new rules are 
     promulgated or existing rules amended;
       (iii) encouraging governments to open rulemaking to public 
     comment;
       (iv) establishing that any administrative proceeding by any 
     FTAA member relating to any of the FTAA agreements and 
     applied to the persons, goods, or services of any other FTAA 
     member shall be conducted in a manner that--

       (I) gives persons of any other FTAA member affected by the 
     proceeding reasonable notice, in accordance with domestic 
     procedures, of when the proceeding is initiated, including a 
     description of the nature of the proceeding, a statement of 
     the legal authority under which the proceeding is initiated, 
     and a general description of any issues in controversy;
       (II) gives such persons a reasonable opportunity to present 
     facts and arguments in support of their positions prior to 
     any final administrative action, when time, the nature of the 
     proceeding, and the public interest permit; and

       (III) is in accordance with domestic law; and

       (v) requiring each FTAA member--

       (I) to establish or maintain judicial, quasi-judicial, or 
     administrative tribunals (impartial and independent of the 
     office or authority entrusted with administrative 
     enforcement) or procedures for the purpose of the prompt 
     review and, where warranted, correction of final 
     administrative actions regarding matters covered by any of 
     the FTAA agreements;
       (II) to ensure that, in such tribunals or procedures, 
     parties to the proceeding are afforded a reasonable 
     opportunity to support or defend their respective positions; 
     and
       (III) to ensure that such tribunals or procedures issue 
     decisions based on the evidence and submissions of record or, 
     where required by domestic law, the record compiled by the 
     office or authority entrusted with administrative 
     enforcement.

       (B) To require the institution of regular meetings between 
     officials of an FTAA secretariat, if established, and 
     representatives of nongovernmental organizations, businesses 
     and business groups, labor unions, consumer groups, and other 
     representatives of civil society.
       (C) To continue to maintain, expand, and update an official 
     FTAA website in order to disseminate a wide range of 
     information on the FTAA, including the draft texts of the 
     agreements negotiated pursuant to the FTAA, the final text of 
     such agreements, tariff information, regional trade 
     statistics, and links to websites of FTAA member countries 
     that provide further information on government regulations, 
     procedures, and related matters.
       (7) Government procurement.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives for the United

[[Page H9035]]

     States with respect to government procurement are the 
     following:
       (A) To seek the acceptance by all FTAA members of the 
     Agreement on Government Procurement.
       (B) To seek conclusion of an agreement on transparency in 
     government procurement.
       (C) To promote global use of electronic publication of 
     procurement information, including notices of procurement 
     opportunities.
       (8) Trade remedy laws.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives for the United States with respect to trade remedy 
     laws are the following:
       (A) To preserve the ability of the United States to enforce 
     vigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping, 
     countervailing duty, and safeguard laws, and not enter into 
     agreements that lessen in any respect the effectiveness of 
     domestic and international disciplines--
       (i) on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, or
       (ii) that address import increases or surges, such as under 
     the safeguard remedy,
      in order to ensure that United States workers, farmers and 
     agricultural producers, and firms can compete fully on fair 
     terms and enjoy the benefits of reciprocal trade concessions.
       (B) To eliminate the underlying causes of unfair trade 
     practices and import surges, including closed markets, 
     subsidization, promoting, enabling, or tolerating 
     anticompetitive practices, and other forms of government 
     intervention that generate or sustain excess, uneconomic 
     capacity.
       (9) Trade and labor market standards.--The principal 
     negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to 
     trade and labor market standards are the following:
       (A) To include enforceable rules that provide for the 
     adoption and enforcement of the following core labor 
     standards: the right of association, the right to bargain 
     collectively, and prohibitions on employment discrimination, 
     child labor, and slave labor.
       (B) To establish as the trigger for invoking the dispute 
     settlement process with respect to the obligations under 
     subparagraph (A)--
       (i) an FTAA member's failure to effectively enforce its 
     domestic labor standards through a sustained or recurring 
     course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade or 
     investment; or
       (ii) an FTAA member's waiver or other derogation from its 
     domestic labor standards for the purpose of attracting 
     investment, inhibiting exports by other FTAA members, or 
     otherwise gaining a competitive advantage,
     recognizing that--
       (I) FTAA members retain the right to exercise discretion 
     with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and 
     compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the 
     allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other 
     labor matters determined to have higher priorities; and
       (II) FTAA members retain the right to establish their own 
     domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly 
     labor policies, laws, and regulations, in a manner consistent 
     with the core labor standards identified in subparagraph (A).
       (C) To provide for phased-in compliance for least-developed 
     countries comparable to mechanisms utilized in other FTAA 
     agreements.
       (D) To create an FTAA work program that--
       (i) will provide guidance and technical assistance to FTAA 
     members in supplementing and strengthening their labor laws 
     and regulations, including, in particular, laws and 
     regulations relating to the core labor standards identified 
     in subparagraph (A); and
       (ii) includes commitments by FTAA members to provide market 
     access incentives for the least-developed FTAA members to 
     improve adherence to and enforcement of the core labor 
     standards identified in subparagraph (A), and to meet their 
     schedule for phased-in compliance on or ahead of schedule.
       (E) To provide for regular review of adherence to core 
     labor standards.
       (F) To create exceptions from the obligations under the 
     FTAA agreements for--
       (i) products produced by prison labor or slave labor, and 
     products produced by child labor proscribed by Convention 182 
     of the ILO; and
       (ii) actions taken consistent with, and in furtherance of, 
     recommendations made by the ILO.
       (10) Trade and the environment.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to trade and the 
     environment are the following:
       (A) To obtain rules that provide for the enforcement of 
     environmental laws and regulations relating to--
       (i) the prevention, abatement, or control of the release, 
     discharge, or emission of pollutants or environmental 
     contaminants;
       (ii) the control of environmentally hazardous or toxic 
     chemicals, substances, materials and wastes, and the 
     dissemination of information related thereto; and
       (iii) the protection of wild flora or fauna, including 
     endangered species, their habitats, and specially protected 
     natural areas, in the territory of FTAA member countries.
       (B) To establish as the trigger for invoking the dispute 
     settlement process--
       (i) an FTAA member's failure to effectively enforce such 
     laws and regulations through a sustained or recurring course 
     of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade or 
     investment, or
       (ii) an FTAA member's waiver or other derogation from its 
     domestic environmental laws and regulations, for the purpose 
     of attracting investment, inhibiting exports by other FTAA 
     members, or otherwise gaining a competitive advantage,
     recognizing that--
       (I) FTAA members retain the right to exercise discretion 
     with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and 
     compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the 
     allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other 
     environmental matters determined to have higher priorities; 
     and
       (II) FTAA members retain the right to establish their own 
     levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental 
     development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify 
     accordingly environmental policies, laws, and regulations.
       (C) To provide for phased-in compliance for least-developed 
     countries, comparable to mechanisms utilized in other FTAA 
     agreements.
       (D) To create an FTAA work program that--
       (i) will provide guidance and technical assistance to FTAA 
     members in supplementing and strengthening their 
     environmental laws and regulations based on--

       (I) the standards in existing international agreements that 
     provide adequate protection; or
       (II) the standards in the laws of other FTAA members if the 
     standards in international agreements standards are 
     inadequate or do not exist; and

       (ii) includes commitments by FTAA members to provide market 
     access incentives for the least-developed FTAA members to 
     strengthen environmental laws and regulations.
       (E) To provide for regular review of adherence to 
     environmental laws and regulations.
       (F) To create exceptions from obligations under the FTAA 
     agreements for--
       (i) measures taken to provide effective protection of 
     human, animal, or plant life or health;
       (ii) measures taken to conserve exhaustible natural 
     resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction 
     with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; and
       (iii) measures taken that are in accordance with 
     obligations under any multilateral environmental agreement 
     accepted by both parties to a dispute.
       (G) To give priority to trade liberalization measures that 
     promote sustainable development, including eliminating duties 
     on environmental goods, and obtaining commitments on 
     environmental services.
       (11) Institution building.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to institution 
     building are the following:
       (A) To improve coordination between the FTAA and other 
     international organizations such as the Organization of 
     American States, the ILO, the United Nations Environment 
     Program, and the Inter-American Development Bank to increase 
     the effectiveness of technical assistance programs.
       (B) To ensure that the agreements entered into under the 
     FTAA provide for technical assistance to developing and, in 
     particular, least-developed countries that are members of the 
     FTAA to promote the rule of law, enable them to comply with 
     their obligations under the FTAA agreements, and minimize 
     disruptions associated with trade liberalization.
       (12) Trade and investment.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to trade and 
     investment are the following:
       (A) To reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting 
     barriers to foreign investment by United States persons and, 
     recognizing that United States law on the whole provides a 
     high level of protection for investments, consistent with or 
     greater than the level required by international law, to 
     secure for investors the rights that would be available under 
     United States law, but no greater rights, by--
       (i) ensuring national and most-favored nation treatment for 
     United States investors and investments;
       (ii) freeing the transfer of funds relating to investments;
       (iii) reducing or eliminating performance requirements, 
     forced technology transfers, and other unreasonable barriers 
     to the establishment and operation of investments;
       (iv) establishing standards for expropriation and 
     compensation for expropriation, consistent with United States 
     legal principles and practice, including by clarifying that 
     expropriation does not arise in cases of mere diminution in 
     value;
       (v) codifying the clarifications made on July 31, 2001, by 
     the Free Trade Commission established under Article 2001 of 
     the NAFTA with respect to the minimum standard of treatment 
     under Article 1105 of the NAFTA such that--

       (I) any provisions included in an investment agreement 
     setting forth a minimum standard of treatment prescribe only 
     that level of treatment required by customary international 
     law; and
       (II) a determination that there has been a breach of 
     another provision of the FTAA, or of a separate international 
     agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of 
     the minimum standard of treatment;

       (vi) ensuring, through clarifications, presumptions, 
     exceptions, or other means in the text of the agreement, that 
     the investor protections do not interfere with an FTAA

[[Page H9036]]

     member's exercise of its police powers under its local, 
     State, and national laws (for example legitimate health, 
     safety, environmental, consumer, and employment opportunity 
     laws and regulations), including by a clarification that the 
     standards in an agreement do not require use of the least 
     trade restrictive regulatory alternative;
       (vii) providing an exception for actions taken in 
     accordance with obligations under a multilateral 
     environmental agreement agreed to by both countries involved 
     in the dispute;
       (viii) providing meaningful procedures for resolving 
     investment disputes;
       (ix) ensuring that--

       (I) no claim by an investor directly against a state may be 
     brought unless the investor first submits the claim for 
     approval to the home government of the investor;
       (II) such approval is granted for each claim which the 
     investor demonstrates is meritorious;
       (III) such approval is considered granted if the investor's 
     home government has not acted upon the submission within a 
     defined reasonable period of time; and
       (IV) each FTAA member establishes or designates an 
     independent decisionmaker to determine whether the standard 
     for approval has been satisfied; and

       (x) providing a standing appellate mechanism to correct 
     erroneous interpretations of law.
       (B) To ensure the fullest measure of transparency in the 
     dispute settlement mechanism established, by--
       (i) ensuring that all requests for dispute settlement are 
     promptly made public, to the extent consistent with the need 
     to protect information that is classified or business 
     confidential;
       (ii) ensuring that--

       (I) all proceedings, submissions, findings, and decisions, 
     are promptly made public; and
       (II) all hearings are open to the public, to the extent 
     consistent with need to protect information that is 
     classified or business confidential; and

       (iii) establishing a mechanism for acceptance of amicus 
     curiae submissions from businesses, unions, and 
     nongovernmental organizations.
       (13) Electronic commerce.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to electronic 
     commerce are the following:
       (A) To make permanent and binding on FTAA members the 
     moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions 
     declared in the WTO Ministerial Declaration of May 20, 1998.
       (B) To ensure that governments refrain from implementing 
     trade-related measures that impede electronic commerce.
       (C) To ensure that electronically delivered goods and 
     services receive no less favorable treatment under trade 
     rules and commitments than like products delivered in 
     physical form.
       (D) To ensure that the classification of electronically 
     delivered goods and services ensures the most liberal trade 
     treatment possible.
       (E) Where legitimate policy objectives require domestic 
     regulations that affect electronic commerce, to obtain 
     commitments that any such regulations are nondiscriminatory, 
     transparent, and promote an open market environment.
       (F) To pursue a regulatory environment that encourages 
     competition in basic telecommunications services abroad, so 
     as to facilitate the conduct of electronic commerce.
       (14) Developing countries.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to developing 
     countries are the following:
       (A) To enter into trade agreements that promote the 
     economic growth of both developing countries and the United 
     States and the mutual expansion of market opportunities.
       (B) To ensure appropriate phase-in periods with respect to 
     the obligations of least-developed countries.
       (C) To coordinate with the Organization of American States, 
     the Inter-American Development Bank, and other regional and 
     international institutions to provide debt relief and other 
     assistance to promote the rule of law and sound and 
     sustainable development.
       (D) To accelerate tariff reductions that benefit least-
     developed countries.
       (15) Trade and monetary coordination.--The principal 
     negotiating objective of the United States with respect to 
     trade and monetary coordination is to foster stability in 
     international currency markets and develop mechanisms to 
     assure greater coordination, consistency, and cooperation 
     between international trade and monetary systems and 
     institutions in order to protect against the trade 
     consequences of significant and unanticipated currency 
     movements.
       (16) Access to high technology.--The principal negotiating 
     objectives of the United States with respect to access to 
     high technology are the following:
       (A) To obtain the elimination or reduction of foreign 
     barriers to, and of acts, policies, or practices by foreign 
     governments that limit, equitable access by United States 
     persons to foreign-developed technology.
       (B) To seek the elimination of tariffs on all information 
     technology products, infrastructure equipment, scientific 
     instruments, and medical equipment.
       (C) To pursue the reduction of foreign barriers to high 
     technology products of the United States.
       (D) To enforce and promote the Agreement on Technical 
     Barriers to Trade, and ensure that standards, conformity 
     assessment, and technical regulations are not used as 
     obstacles to trade in information technology and 
     communications products.
       (E) To require all parties to sign the Information 
     Technology Agreement of the WTO and to expand and update 
     product coverage under such agreement.
       (17) Corruption.--The principal negotiating objectives of 
     the United States with respect to the use of money or other 
     things of value to influence acts, decisions, or omissions of 
     foreign governments or officials or to secure any improper 
     advantage are--
       (A) to obtain standards applicable to persons from all FTAA 
     member countries that are equivalent to, or more restrictive 
     than, the prohibitions applicable to issuers, domestic 
     concerns, and other persons under section 30A of the 
     Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and sections 104 and 104A 
     of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977; and
       (B) to implement mechanisms to ensure effective enforcement 
     of the standards described in subparagraph (A).
       (d) Bilateral Agreements.--
       (1) Principal negotiating objectives.--The principal 
     negotiating objectives of the United States in seeking 
     bilateral trade agreements are those objectives set forth in 
     subsection (c), except that in applying such subsection, any 
     references to the FTAA or FTAA member countries shall be 
     deemed to refer to the bilateral agreement, or party to the 
     bilateral agreement, respectively.
       (2) Adherence to obligations under uruguay round 
     agreements.--In determining whether to enter into 
     negotiations with a particular country, the President shall 
     take into account the extent to which that country has 
     implemented, or has accelerated the implementation of, its 
     obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements.
       (e) Domestic Objectives.--In pursuing the negotiating 
     objectives under subsections (a) through (d), United States 
     negotiators shall take into account legitimate United States 
     domestic (including State and local) objectives, including, 
     but not limited to, the protection of health and safety, 
     essential security, environmental, consumer, and employment 
     opportunity interests and the laws and regulations related 
     thereto.

     SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL TRADE ADVISERS.

       Section 161(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 
     2211(a)(1)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(1) At the beginning of each regular session of 
     Congress--
       ``(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall--
       ``(i) upon the recommendation of the chairman and ranking 
     member of the Committee on Ways and Means, select 5 members 
     (not more than 3 of whom are members of the same political 
     party) of such committee,
       ``(ii) upon the recommendation of the chairman and ranking 
     member of the Committee on Agriculture, select 2 members 
     (from different political parties) of such committee, and
       ``(iii) upon the recommendation of the majority leader and 
     minority leader of the House of Representatives, select 2 
     members of the House of Representatives (from different 
     political parties), and
       ``(B) the President pro tempore of the Senate shall--
       ``(i) upon the recommendation of the chairman and ranking 
     member of the Committee on Finance, select 5 members (not 
     more than 3 of whom are members of the same political party) 
     of such committee,
       ``(ii) upon the recommendation of the chairman and ranking 
     member of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
     Forestry, select 2 members (from different political parties) 
     of such committee, and
       ``(iii) upon the recommendation of the majority leader and 
     minority leader of the Senate, select 2 members of the Senate 
     (from different political parties),

     who shall be designated congressional advisers on trade 
     policy and negotiations. They shall provide advice on the 
     development of trade policy and priorities for the 
     implementation thereof. They shall also be accredited by the 
     United States Trade Representative on behalf of the President 
     as official advisers to the United States delegations to 
     international conferences, meetings, dispute settlement 
     proceedings, and negotiating sessions relating to trade 
     agreements.''.

     SEC. 4. TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY.

       (a) Agreements Regarding Tariff Barriers.--
       (1) In general.--Whenever the President determines that one 
     or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any 
     foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and 
     restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that 
     the purposes, policies, and objectives of this Act will be 
     promoted thereby, the President--
       (A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries 
     before--
       (i) the date that is 5 years after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, or
       (ii) the date that is 7 years after such date of enactment, 
     if fast track procedures are extended under subsection (c), 
     and
       (B) may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), proclaim--
       (i) such modification or continuance of any existing duty,
       (ii) such continuance of existing duty-free or excise 
     treatment, or
       (iii) such additional duties,


[[Page H9037]]


     as the President determines to be required or appropriate to 
     carry out any such trade agreement.

     The President shall notify the Congress of the President's 
     intention to enter into an agreement under this subsection.
       (2) Limitations.--No proclamation may be made under 
     paragraph (1) that--
       (A) reduces any rate of duty (other than a rate of duty 
     that does not exceed 5 percent ad valorem on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act) to a rate of duty which is less than 
     50 percent of the rate of such duty that applies on such date 
     of enactment; or
       (B) increases any rate of duty above the rate that applied 
     on such date of enactment.
       (3) Aggregate reduction; exemption from staging.--
       (A) Aggregate reduction.--Except as provided in 
     subparagraph (B), the aggregate reduction in the rate of duty 
     on any article which is in effect on any day pursuant to a 
     trade agreement entered into under paragraph (1) shall not 
     exceed the aggregate reduction which would have been in 
     effect on such day if--
       (i) a reduction of 3 percent ad valorem or a reduction of 
     one-tenth of the total reduction, whichever is greater, had 
     taken effect on the effective date of the first reduction 
     proclaimed under paragraph (1) to carry out such agreement 
     with respect to such article; and
       (ii) a reduction equal to the amount applicable under 
     clause (i) had taken effect at 1-year intervals after the 
     effective date of such first reduction.
       (B) Exemption from staging.--No staging is required under 
     subparagraph (A) with respect to a duty reduction that is 
     proclaimed under paragraph (1) for an article of a kind that 
     is not produced in the United States. The United States 
     International Trade Commission shall advise the President of 
     the identity of articles that may be exempted from staging 
     under this subparagraph.
       (4) Rounding.--If the President determines that such action 
     will simplify the computation of reductions under paragraph 
     (3), the President may round an annual reduction by an amount 
     equal to the lesser of--
       (A) the difference between the reduction without regard to 
     this paragraph and the next lower whole number; or
       (B) one-half of 1 percent ad valorem.
       (5) Other limitations.--A rate of duty reduction that may 
     not be proclaimed by reason of paragraph (2) may take effect 
     only if a provision authorizing such reduction is included 
     within an implementing bill provided for under section 7 and 
     that bill is enacted into law.
       (6) Other tariff modifications.--Notwithstanding paragraphs 
     (1)(B) and (2) through (5), and subject to the consultation 
     and layover requirements of section 115 of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act, the President may proclaim the modification 
     of any duty or staged rate reduction of any duty set forth in 
     Schedule XX, as defined in section 2(5) of that Act, if the 
     United States agrees to such modification or staged rate 
     reduction in a negotiation for the reciprocal elimination or 
     harmonization of duties under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization or as part of an interim agreement leading to 
     the formation of a regional free-trade area.
       (7) Authority under uruguay round agreements act not 
     affected.--Nothing in this subsection shall limit the 
     authority provided to the President under section 111(b) of 
     the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3521(b)).
       (b) Agreements Regarding Tariff and Nontariff Barriers.--
       (1) In general.--(A) Whenever the President determines 
     that--
       (i) one or more existing duties or any other import 
     restriction of any foreign country or the United States or 
     any other barrier to, or other distortion of, international 
     trade unduly burdens or restricts the foreign trade of the 
     United States or adversely affects the United States economy, 
     or
       (ii) the imposition of any such barrier or distortion is 
     likely to result in such a burden, restriction, or effect,

     and that the purposes, policies, and objectives of this Act 
     will be promoted thereby, the President may enter into a 
     trade agreement described in subparagraph (B) during the 
     period described in subparagraph (C).
       (B) The President may enter into a trade agreement under 
     subparagraph (A) with foreign countries providing for--
       (i) the reduction or elimination of a duty, restriction, 
     barrier, or other distortion described in subparagraph (A), 
     or
       (ii) the prohibition of, or limitation on the imposition 
     of, such barrier or other distortion.
       (C) The President may enter into a trade agreement under 
     this paragraph before--
       (i) the date that is 5 years after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, or
       (ii) the date that is 7 years after such date of enactment, 
     if fast track procedures are extended under subsection (c).
       (2) Conditions.--A trade agreement may be entered into 
     under this subsection only if such agreement substantially 
     achieves the applicable objectives described in section 2 and 
     the conditions set forth in sections 5, 6, and 7 are met.
       (3) Bills qualifying for fast track procedures.--(A) The 
     provisions of section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (in this 
     Act referred to as ``fast track procedures'') apply to a bill 
     of either House of Congress which contains provisions 
     described in subparagraph (B) to the same extent as such 
     section 151 applies to implementing bills under that section. 
     A bill to which this paragraph applies shall hereafter in 
     this Act be referred to as an ``implementing bill''.
       (B) The provisions referred to in subparagraph (A) are--
       (i) a provision approving a trade agreement entered into 
     under this subsection and approving the statement of 
     administrative action, if any, proposed to implement such 
     trade agreement;
       (ii) if changes in existing laws or new statutory authority 
     are required to implement such trade agreement, provisions, 
     necessary or appropriate to implement such trade agreement or 
     agreements, either repealing or amending existing laws or 
     providing new statutory authority; and
       (iii) provisions to provide trade adjustment assistance to 
     workers, firms, and communities.
       (c) Extension Disapproval Process for Congressional Fast 
     Track Procedures.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in section 5(c), 6(c), 
     and 7(b)--
       (A) the fast track procedures apply to implementing bills 
     submitted with respect to trade agreements entered into under 
     subsection (b) before the date that is 5 years after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act; and
       (B) the fast track procedures shall be extended to 
     implementing bills submitted with respect to trade agreements 
     entered into under subsection (b) on or after the date 
     specified in subparagraph (A) and before the date that is 7 
     years after the date of such enactment if (and only if)--
       (i) the President requests such extension under paragraph 
     (2); and
       (ii) neither House of the Congress adopts an extension 
     disapproval resolution under paragraph (6) before the date 
     specified in subparagraph (A).
       (2) Report to congress by the president.--If the President 
     is of the opinion that the fast track procedures should be 
     extended to implementing bills to carry out trade agreements 
     under subsection (b), the President shall submit to the 
     Congress, not later than 3 months before the expiration of 
     the 5-year period specified in paragraph (1)(A), a written 
     report that contains a request for such extension, together 
     with--
       (A) a description of all trade agreements that have been 
     negotiated under subsection (b) and the anticipated schedule 
     for submitting such agreements to the Congress for approval;
       (B) a description of the progress that has been made in 
     negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and 
     objectives of this Act, and a statement that such progress 
     justifies the continuation of negotiations; and
       (C) a statement of the reasons why the extension is needed 
     to complete the negotiations.
       (3) Report to congress by the advisory committee.--The 
     President shall promptly inform the Advisory Committee for 
     Trade Policy and Negotiations established under section 135 
     of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155) of the President's 
     decision to submit a report to the Congress under paragraph 
     (2). The Advisory Committee shall submit to the Congress as 
     soon as practicable, but not later than 2 months before the 
     expiration of the 5-year period specified in paragraph 
     (1)(A), a written report that contains--
       (A) its views regarding the progress that has been made in 
     negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and 
     objectives of this Act; and
       (B) a statement of its views, and the reasons therefor, 
     regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2) 
     should be approved or disapproved.
       (4) Report to congress by congressional trade advisers.--
     The President shall promptly inform the congressional trade 
     advisers of the President's decision to submit a report to 
     the Congress under paragraph (2). The congressional trade 
     advisers shall submit to the Congress as soon as practicable, 
     but not later than 2 months before the expiration of the 5-
     year period specified in paragraph (1)(A), a written report 
     that contains--
       (A) its views regarding the progress that has been made in 
     negotiations to achieve the purposes, policies, and 
     objectives of this Act; and
       (B) a statement of their views, and the reasons therefor, 
     regarding whether the extension requested under paragraph (2) 
     should be approved or disapproved.
       (5) Reports may be classified.--The reports under 
     paragraphs (2) and (3), or any portion of such reports, may 
     be classified to the extent the President determines 
     appropriate, and the report under paragraph (4), or any 
     portion thereof, may be classified.
       (6) Extension disapproval resolutions.--(A) For purposes of 
     paragraph (1), the term ``extension disapproval resolution'' 
     means a resolution of either House of the Congress, the sole 
     matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 
     ``That the ____ disapproves the request of the President for 
     the extension, under section 4(c)(1)(B)(i) of the 
     Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001, of the 
     fast track procedures under that Act to any implementing bill 
     submitted with respect to any trade agreement entered into 
     under section 4(b) of that Act after the date that is 5 years 
     after the date of the enactment of that Act.'', with the 
     blank space being filled with the name of the resolving House 
     of the Congress.
       (B) Extension disapproval resolutions--
       (i) may be introduced in either House of the Congress by 
     any member of such House; and

[[Page H9038]]

       (ii) shall be referred, in the House of Representatives, to 
     the Committee on Ways and Means and, in addition, to the 
     Committee on Rules.
       (C) The provisions of section 152 (d) and (e) of the Trade 
     Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (d) and (e)) (relating to the 
     floor consideration of certain resolutions in the House and 
     Senate) apply to extension disapproval resolutions.
       (D) It is not in order for--
       (i) the Senate to consider any extension disapproval 
     resolution not reported by the Committee on Finance;
       (ii) the House of Representatives to consider any extension 
     disapproval resolution not reported by the Committee on Ways 
     and Means and, in addition, by the Committee on Rules; or
       (iii) either House of the Congress to consider an extension 
     disapproval resolution after the date that is 5 years after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 5. COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS.

       (a) In General.--In order to contribute to the continued 
     economic expansion of the United States and to benefit United 
     States workers, farmers, and businesses, the President shall 
     commence negotiations covering tariff and nontariff barriers 
     affecting any industry, product, or service sector, in cases 
     where the President determines that such negotiations are 
     feasible and timely and would benefit the United States. The 
     President shall commence negotiations--
       (1) to expand existing sectoral agreements to countries 
     that are not parties to those agreements; and
       (2) to promote growth, open global markets, and raise 
     standards of living in the United States and other countries 
     and promote sustainable development.

     Such sectors include agriculture, commercial services, 
     intellectual property rights, industrial and capital goods, 
     government procurement, information technology products, 
     environmental technology and services, medical equipment and 
     services, civil aircraft, and infrastructure products.
       (b) Consultation Regarding Negotiating Objectives.--With 
     respect to any negotiations for a trade agreement under 
     section 4(b), the following shall apply:
       (1) The President shall, in developing strategies for 
     pursuing negotiating objectives set forth in section 2 and 
     other relevant negotiating objectives to be pursued in 
     negotiations, consult with--
       (A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
       (B) the congressional trade advisers; and
       (C) other appropriate committees of Congress.
       (2) The President shall assess whether United States 
     tariffs on agricultural products that were bound under the 
     Uruguay Round Agreements are lower than the tariffs bound by 
     the country or countries with which the negotiations will be 
     conducted. In addition, the President shall consider whether 
     the tariff levels bound and applied throughout the world with 
     respect to imports from the United States are higher than 
     United States tariffs and whether the negotiation provides an 
     opportunity to address any such disparity. The President 
     shall consult with the Committee on Ways and Means and the 
     Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Agriculture, 
     Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate concerning the results 
     of the assessment, whether it is appropriate for the United 
     States to agree to further tariff reductions based on the 
     conclusions reached in the assessment, and how all applicable 
     negotiating objectives will be met.
       (c) Notice of Initiation; Disapproval Resolutions.--
       (1) Notice.--The President shall--
       (A) provide, at least 90 calendar days before initiating 
     the proposed negotiations, written notice to the Congress of 
     the President's intention to enter into the negotiations and 
     set forth therein the date the President intends to initiate 
     such negotiations, the specific negotiating objectives to be 
     pursued in the negotiations, and whether the President 
     intends to seek an agreement or changes to an existing 
     agreement; and
       (B) before and after submission of the notice, consult 
     regarding the negotiations with the Committee on Finance of 
     the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 
     of Representatives, the congressional trade advisers, and 
     such other committees of the House of Representatives and the 
     Senate as the President deems appropriate.
       (2) Resolutions disapproving initiation of negotiations.--
       (A) Inapplicability of fast track procedures to agreements 
     of which certain notice given.--Fast track procedures shall 
     not apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to 
     a trade agreement entered into under section 4(b) pursuant to 
     negotiations with 2 or more countries of which notice is 
     given under paragraph (1)(A) if, during the 90-day period 
     referred to in that subsection, each House of Congress agrees 
     to a disapproval resolution described in subparagraph (B) 
     with respect to the negotiations.
       (B) Disapproval resolutions.--For purposes of this 
     paragraph, the term ``disapproval resolution'' means a 
     resolution of either House of Congress, the sole matter after 
     the resolving clause of which is as follows: ``That the ____ 
     disapproves the negotiations of which the President notified 
     the Congress on ____, under section 5(c)(1) of the 
     Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001 and, 
     therefore, the fast track procedures under that Act shall not 
     apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to any 
     trade agreement entered into pursuant to those 
     negotiations.'', with the first blank space being filled with 
     the name of the resolving House of Congress, and the second 
     blank space being filled with the appropriate date.
       (3) Procedures for considering resolutions.--(A) 
     Disapproval resolutions to which paragraph (2) applies--
       (i) in the House of Representatives--
       (I) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 
     and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules; and
       (II) may not be amended by either Committee; and
       (ii) in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on 
     Finance.
       (B) The provisions of section 152 (c), (d), and (e) of the 
     Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (c), (d), and (e)) 
     (relating to the consideration of certain resolutions in the 
     House and Senate) apply to any disapproval resolution to 
     which paragraph (2) applies. In applying section 152(c)(1) of 
     the Trade Act of 1974, all calendar days shall be counted.
       (C) It is not in order for--
       (i) the Senate to consider any joint resolution unless it 
     has been reported by the Committee on Finance or the 
     committee has been discharged pursuant to subparagraph (B); 
     or
       (ii) the House of Representatives to consider any joint 
     resolution unless it has been reported by the Committee on 
     Ways and Means or the committee has been discharged pursuant 
     to subparagraph (B).

     SEC. 6. CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION DURING NEGOTIATIONS.

       (a) Consultations With Congressional Trade Advisers and 
     Committees of Jurisdiction.--In the course of negotiations 
     conducted under this Act, the Trade Representative shall--
       (1) consult closely and on a timely basis with, and keep 
     fully apprised of the negotiations, the congressional trade 
     advisers, the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
       (2) with respect to any negotiations and agreement relating 
     to agriculture, also consult closely and on a timely basis 
     with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations, the 
     Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the 
     Senate; and
       (3) consult closely and on a timely basis with other 
     appropriate committees of Congress.
       (b) Guidelines for Consultations.--
       (1) Guidelines.--The Trade Representative, in consultation 
     with the chairmen and ranking minority members of the 
     Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 
     the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the congressional 
     trade advisers--
       (A) shall, within 120 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, develop written guidelines to facilitate the 
     useful and timely exchange of information between the Trade 
     Representative, the committees referred to in subsection (a), 
     and the congressional trade advisers; and
       (B) may make such revisions to the guidelines as may be 
     necessary from time to time.
       (2) Content.--The guidelines developed under paragraph (1) 
     shall provide for, among other things--
       (A) regular, detailed briefings of each committee referred 
     to in subsection (a) and the congressional trade advisers 
     regarding negotiating objectives and positions and the status 
     of negotiations, with more frequent briefings as trade 
     negotiations enter the final stages;
       (B) access by members of each such committee, the 
     congressional trade advisers, and staff with proper security 
     clearances, to pertinent documents relating to negotiations, 
     including classified materials; and
       (C) the closest practicable coordination between the Trade 
     Representative, each such committee, and the congressional 
     trade advisers at all critical periods during negotiations, 
     including at negotiation sites.
       (c) Disapproval Resolutions With Respect to Ongoing 
     Negotiations.--
       (1) Negotiations of which notice given.--Fast track 
     procedures shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted 
     with respect to a trade agreement entered into under section 
     4(b) pursuant to negotiations of which notice is given under 
     section 5(c)(1) if, at any time after the end of the 90-day 
     period referred to in section 5(c)((1), during the 120-day 
     period beginning on the date that one House of Congress 
     agrees to a disapproval resolution described in paragraph 
     (3)(A) disapproving the negotiations, the other House 
     separately agrees to a disapproval resolution described in 
     paragraph (3)(A) disapproving those negotiations. The 
     disapproval resolutions of the two Houses need not be in 
     agreement with respect to disapproving any other 
     negotiations.
       (2) Prior negotiations.--Fast track procedures shall not 
     apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to a 
     trade agreement to which section 8(a) applies if, during the 
     120-day period beginning on the date that one House of 
     Congress agrees to a disapproval resolution described in 
     paragraph (3)(B) disapproving the negotiations for that 
     agreement, the other House separately agrees to a disapproval 
     resolution described in paragraph (3)(B) disapproving those 
     negotiations. The disapproval resolutions of the

[[Page H9039]]

     two Houses need not be in agreement with respect to 
     disapproving any other negotiations.
       (3) Disapproval resolutions.--(A) For purposes of paragraph 
     (1), the term ``disapproval resolution'' means a resolution 
     of either House of Congress, the sole matter after the 
     resolving clause of which is as follows: ``That the ____ 
     disapproves the negotiations of which the President notified 
     the Congress on ____, under section 5(c)(1) of the 
     Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001 and, 
     therefore, the fast track procedures under that Act shall not 
     apply to any implementing bill submitted with respect to any 
     trade agreement entered into pursuant to those 
     negotiations.'', with the first blank space being filled with 
     the name of the resolving House of Congress, and the second 
     blank space being filled with the appropriate date or dates 
     (in the case of more than 1 set of negotiations being 
     conducted).
       (B) For purposes of paragraph (2), the term ``disapproval 
     resolution'' means a resolution of either House of Congress, 
     the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is as 
     follows: ``That the ____ disapproves the negotiations with 
     respect to ____, and, therefore, the fast track procedures 
     under the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 
     2001 shall not apply to any implementing bill submitted with 
     respect to any trade agreement entered into pursuant to those 
     negotiations.'', with the first blank space being filled with 
     the name of the resolving House of Congress, and the second 
     blank space being filled with a description of the applicable 
     trade agreement or agreements.
       (4) Procedures for considering resolutions.--(A) Any 
     disapproval resolution to which paragraph (1) or (2) 
     applies--
       (i) in the House of Representatives--
       (I) shall be referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 
     and, in addition, to the Committee on Rules; and
       (II) may not be amended by either Committee; and
       (ii) in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on 
     Finance.
       (B) The provisions of section 152 (c), (d), and (e) of the 
     Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (c), (d), and (e)) 
     (relating to the consideration of certain resolutions in the 
     House and Senate) apply to any disapproval resolution to 
     which paragraph (1) or (2) applies if--
       (i) there are at least 145 cosponsors of the resolution, in 
     the case of a resolution of the House of Representatives, and 
     at least 34 cosponsors of the resolution, in the case of a 
     resolution of the Senate; and
       (ii) no resolution that meets the requirements of clause 
     (i) has previously been considered under such provisions of 
     section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974 in that House of 
     Congress during that Congress.

     In applying section 152(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, all 
     calendar days shall be counted.
       (C) It is not in order for--
       (i) the Senate to consider any joint resolution unless it 
     has been reported by the Committee on Finance or the 
     committee has been discharged pursuant to subparagraph (B); 
     or
       (ii) the House of Representatives to consider any joint 
     resolution unless it has been reported by the Committee on 
     Ways and Means or the committee has been discharged pursuant 
     to subparagraph (B).
       (5) Computation of certain time periods.--Each period of 
     time referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be computed 
     without regard to--
       (A) the days on which either House of Congress is not in 
     session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a 
     day certain or an adjournment of the Congress sine die; and
       (B) any Saturday and Sunday, not excluded under 
     subparagraph (A), when either House of Congress is not in 
     session.
       (d) Environmental Assessment.--
       (1) Initiation of assessment.--Upon the commencement of 
     negotiations for a trade agreement under section 4(b), the 
     Trade Representative, jointly with the Chair of the Council 
     on Environmental Quality, and in consultation with other 
     appropriate Federal agencies, shall commence an assessment of 
     the effects on the environment of the proposed trade 
     agreement.
       (2) Content.--The assessment under paragraph (1) shall 
     include an examination of--
       (A) the potential effects of the proposed trade agreement 
     on the environment, natural resources, and public health;
       (B) the extent to which the proposed trade agreement may 
     affect the laws, regulations, policies, and international 
     agreements of the United States, including State and local 
     laws, regulations, and policies, relating to the environment, 
     natural resources, and public health;
       (C) measures to implement, and alternative approaches to, 
     the proposed trade agreement that would minimize adverse 
     effects and maximize benefits identified under subparagraph 
     (A); and
       (D) a detailed summary of the manner in which the results 
     of the assessment were taken into consideration in 
     negotiation of the proposed trade agreement, and in 
     development of measures and alternative means identified 
     under subparagraph (C).
       (3) Procedures.--The Trade Representative shall commence 
     the assessment under paragraph (1) by publishing notice 
     thereof, and a request for comments thereon, in the Federal 
     Register and transmitting notice thereof to the Congress. The 
     notice shall be given as soon as possible after sufficient 
     information exists concerning the scope of the proposed trade 
     agreement, but in no case later than 30 calendar days before 
     the applicable negotiations begin. The notice shall contain--
       (A) the principal negotiating objectives of the United 
     States to be pursued in the negotiations;
       (B) the elements and topics expected to be under 
     consideration for coverage by the proposed trade agreement;
       (C) the countries expected to participate in the agreement; 
     and
       (D) the sectors of the United States economy likely to be 
     affected by the agreement.
       (4) Consultations with congress.--The Trade Representative 
     shall submit to the Congress--
       (A) within 6 months after the onset of negotiations, a 
     preliminary draft of the environmental assessment conducted 
     under this subsection; and
       (B) not later than 90 calendar days before the agreement is 
     signed by the President, the final version of the 
     environmental assessment.
       (5) Participation of other federal agencies and 
     departments.--(A) In conducting the assessment required under 
     paragraph (1), the Trade Representative and the Chair of the 
     Council on Environmental Quality shall draw upon the 
     knowledge of the departments and agencies with relevant 
     expertise in the subject matter under consideration, 
     including, but not limited to, the Environmental Protection 
     Agency, the Departments of the Interior, Agriculture, 
     Commerce, Energy, State, the Treasury, and Justice, the 
     Agency for International Development, the Council of Economic 
     Advisors, and the International Trade Commission.
       (B) The heads of the departments and agencies identified in 
     subparagraph (A), and the heads of other departments and 
     agencies with relevant expertise shall provide such resources 
     as are necessary to conduct the assessment required under 
     this subsection.
       (6) Consultations with the advisory committee.--(A) Section 
     135(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155(c)(1)) is 
     amended in the first sentence--
       (i) by striking ``may establish'' and inserting ``shall 
     establish''; and
       (ii) by inserting ``environmental issues,'' after 
     ``defense''.
       (B) In developing measures and alternatives means 
     identified under paragraph (2)(C), the Trade Representative 
     and the Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality shall 
     consult with the environmental general policy advisory 
     committee established pursuant to section 135(c)(1) of the 
     Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2155(c)(1)), as amended by 
     subparagraph (A) of this paragraph.
       (7) Public participation.--The Trade Representative shall 
     publish the preliminary and final environmental assessments 
     in the Federal Register. The Trade Representative shall take 
     into account comments received from the public pursuant to 
     notices published under this subsection and shall include in 
     the final assessment a discussion of the public comments 
     reflected in the assessment.
       (e) Labor Review.--
       (1) Initiation of review.--Upon the commencement of 
     negotiations for a trade agreement under section 4(b), the 
     Trade Representative, jointly with the Secretary of Labor and 
     the Commissioners of the International Trade Commission, and 
     in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies, 
     shall commence a review of the effects on workers in the 
     United States of the proposed trade agreement.
       (2) Content.--The review under paragraph (1) shall include 
     an examination of--
       (A) the extent to which the proposed trade agreement may 
     affect job creation, worker displacement, wages, and the 
     standard of living for workers in the United States;
       (B) the scope and magnitude of the effect of the proposed 
     trade agreement on the flow of workers to and from the United 
     States;
       (C) the extent to which the proposed agreement may affect 
     the laws, regulations, policies, and international agreements 
     of the United States relating to labor; and
       (D) proposals to mitigate any negative effects of the 
     proposed trade agreement on workers, firms, and communities 
     in the United States, including proposals relating to trade 
     adjustment assistance.
       (3) Procedures.--The Trade Representative shall commence 
     the review under paragraph (1) by publishing notice thereof, 
     and a request for comments thereon, in the Federal Register 
     and transmitting notice thereof to the Congress. The notice 
     shall be given not later than 30 calendar days before the 
     applicable negotiations begin. The notice shall contain--
       (A) the principal negotiating objectives of the United 
     States to be pursued in the negotiations;
       (B) the elements and topics expected to be under 
     consideration for coverage by the proposed trade agreement;
       (C) the countries expected to participate in the agreement; 
     and
       (D) the sectors of the United States economy likely to be 
     affected by the agreement.
       (4) Consultations with congress.--The Trade Representative 
     shall submit to the Congress--
       (A) within 6 months after the onset of negotiations, a 
     preliminary draft of the labor review conducted under this 
     subsection; and
       (B) not later than 90 calendar days before the agreement is 
     signed by the President, the final version of the labor 
     review.

[[Page H9040]]

       (5) Participation of other departments and agencies.--(A) 
     In conducting the review required under paragraph (1), the 
     Trade Representative, the Secretary of Labor, and the 
     International Trade Commission shall draw upon the knowledge 
     of the departments and agencies with relevant expertise in 
     the subject matter under consideration.
       (B) The heads of the departments and agencies referred to 
     in subparagraph (A) shall provide such resources as are 
     necessary to conduct the review required under this 
     subsection.
       (6) Consultation with the advisory committee.--In 
     developing proposals under paragraph (2)(D), the Trade 
     Representative and the Secretary of Labor shall consult with 
     the labor general policy advisory committee established 
     pursuant to section 135(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 
     U.S.C. 2155(c)(1)), as amended by subsection (d)(6)(A) of 
     this section.
       (7) Public participation.--The Trade Representative shall 
     publish the preliminary and final labor reviews in the 
     Federal Register. The Trade Representative shall take into 
     account comments received from the public pursuant to notices 
     published under this subsection and shall include in the 
     final review a discussion of the public comments reflected in 
     the review.
       (f) Notice of Effect on United States Trade Remedies.--
       (1) Notice.--In any case in which negotiations being 
     conducted to conclude a trade agreement under section 4(b) 
     could affect the trade remedy laws of the United States or 
     the rights or obligations of the United States under the 
     Antidumping Agreement, the Agreement on Subsidies and 
     Countervailing Measures, or the Agreement on Safeguards, 
     except insofar as such negotiations are directly and 
     exclusively related to perishable and seasonal agricultural 
     products, the Trade Representative shall, at least 90 
     calendar days before the President signs the agreement, 
     notify the Congress of the specific language that is the 
     subject of the negotiations and the specific possible impact 
     on existing United States laws and existing United States 
     rights and obligations under those WTO Agreements.
       (2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``trade 
     remedy laws of the United States'' means section 337 of the 
     Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1337), title VII of the Tariff 
     Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.), chapter 1 of title II 
     of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.), title III 
     of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411 et seq.), section 
     406 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2436), and chapter 2 
     of title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2451 et 
     seq.).
       (g) Report on Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanism.--If 
     any agreement concluded under section 4(b) with respect to 
     trade and investment includes a dispute settlement mechanism 
     allowing an investor to bring a claim directly against a 
     country, the President shall submit a report to the Congress, 
     not later than 90 calendar days before the President signs 
     the agreement, explaining in detail the meaning of each 
     standard included in the dispute settlement mechanism, and 
     explaining how the agreement does not interfere with the 
     exercise by a signatory to the agreement of its police powers 
     under its national (including State and local) laws, 
     including legitimate health, safety, environmental, consumer, 
     and employment opportunity laws and regulations.
       (h) Consultation With Congress Before Agreements Entered 
     Into.--
       (1) Consultation.--Before entering into any trade agreement 
     under section 4(b), the President shall consult with--
       (A) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
       (B) the congressional trade advisers; and
       (C) each other committee of the House and the Senate, and 
     each joint committee of the Congress, which has jurisdiction 
     over legislation involving subject matters which would be 
     affected by the trade agreement.
       (2) Scope.--The consultation described in paragraph (1) 
     shall include consultation with respect to--
       (A) the nature of the agreement;
       (B) how and to what extent the agreement will achieve the 
     applicable purposes, policies, and objectives of this Act; 
     and
       (C) the implementation of the agreement under section 7, 
     including the general effect of the agreement on existing 
     laws.
       (i) Advisory Committee Reports.--The report required under 
     section 135(e)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 regarding any 
     trade agreement entered into under section 4(a) or (b) of 
     this Act shall be provided to the President, the Congress, 
     and the Trade Representative not later than 30 calendar days 
     after the date on which the President notifies the Congress 
     under section 7(a)(1)(A) of the President's intention to 
     enter into the agreement.
       (j) ITC Assessment.--
       (1) In general.--The President, at least 90 calendar days 
     before the day on which the President enters into a trade 
     agreement under section 4(b), shall provide the International 
     Trade Commission (referred to in this subsection as ``the 
     Commission'') with the details of the agreement as it exists 
     at that time and request the Commission to prepare and submit 
     an assessment of the agreement as described in paragraph (2). 
     Between the time the President makes the request under this 
     paragraph and the time the Commission submits the assessment, 
     the President shall keep the Commission current with respect 
     to the details of the agreement.
       (2) ITC assessment.--Not later than 90 calendar days after 
     the President enters into the agreement, the Commission shall 
     submit to the President and the Congress a report assessing 
     the likely impact of the agreement on the United States 
     economy as a whole and on specific industry sectors, 
     including the impact the agreement will have on the gross 
     domestic product, exports and imports, aggregate employment 
     and employment opportunities, the production, employment, and 
     competitive position of industries likely to be significantly 
     affected by the agreement, and the interests of United States 
     consumers.
       (3) Review of empirical literature.--In preparing the 
     assessment, the Commission shall review available economic 
     assessments regarding the agreement, including literature 
     regarding any substantially equivalent proposed agreement, 
     and shall provide in its assessment a description of the 
     analyses used and conclusions drawn in such literature, and a 
     discussion of areas of consensus and divergence between the 
     various analyses and conclusions, including those of the 
     Commission regarding the agreement.
       (k) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--Section 
     4(c), section 5(c), and subsection (c) of this section are 
     enacted by the Congress--
       (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such are 
     deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and 
     such procedures supersede other rules only to the extent that 
     they are inconsistent with such other rules; and
       (2) with the full recognition of the constitutional right 
     of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to 
     the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same 
     manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that 
     House.

     SEC. 7. IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Notification, submission, and enactment.--Any agreement 
     entered into under section 4(b) shall enter into force with 
     respect to the United States if (and only if)--
       (A) the President, at least 120 calendar days before the 
     day on which the President enters into the trade agreement, 
     notifies the House of Representatives and the Senate of the 
     President's intention to enter into the agreement, and 
     promptly thereafter publishes notice of such intention in the 
     Federal Register;
       (B) the President, at least 90 calendar days before the day 
     on which the President enters into the trade agreement, 
     certifies to the Congress the trade agreement substantially 
     achieves the principal negotiating objectives set forth in 
     section 2 and those developed under section 5(b)(1);
       (C) within 60 calendar days after entering into the 
     agreement, the President submits to the Congress a 
     description of those changes to existing laws that the 
     President considers would be required in order to bring the 
     United States into compliance with the agreement;
       (D) after entering into the agreement, the President 
     submits to the Congress a copy of the final legal text of the 
     agreement, together with--
       (i) a draft of an implementing bill;
       (ii) a statement of any administrative action proposed to 
     implement the trade agreement; and
       (iii) the supporting information described in paragraph 
     (2); and
       (E) the implementing bill is enacted into law.
       (2) Supporting information.--The supporting information 
     required under paragraph (1)(D)(iii) consists of--
       (A) an explanation as to how the implementing bill and 
     proposed administrative action will change or affect existing 
     law; and
       (B) a statement--
       (i) asserting that the agreement substantially achieves the 
     applicable purposes, policies, and objectives of this Act; 
     and
       (ii) setting forth the reasons of the President regarding--

       (I) how and to what extent the agreement substantially 
     achieves the applicable purposes, policies, and objectives 
     referred to in clause (i), and why and to what extent the 
     agreement does not achieve other applicable purposes, 
     policies, and objectives;
       (II) how the agreement serves the interests of United 
     States commerce; and
       (III) why the implementing bill and proposed administrative 
     action is required or appropriate to carry out the agreement;

       (iii) describing the efforts made by the President to 
     obtain international exchange rate equilibrium and any effect 
     the agreement may have regarding increased international 
     monetary stability; and
       (iv) describing the extent, if any, to which--

       (I) each foreign country that is a party to the agreement 
     maintains non-commercial state trading enterprises that may 
     adversely affect, nullify, or impair the benefits to the 
     United States under the agreement; and
       (II) the agreement applies to or affects purchases and 
     sales by such enterprises.

       (3) Reciprocal benefits.--In order to ensure that a foreign 
     country that is not a party to a trade agreement entered into 
     under section 4(b) does not receive benefits under the 
     agreement unless the country is also subject to the 
     obligations under the agreement, the implementing bill 
     submitted with respect to the agreement shall provide

[[Page H9041]]

     that the benefits and obligations under the agreement apply 
     only to the parties to the agreement, if such application is 
     consistent with the terms of the agreement. The implementing 
     bill may also provide that the benefits and obligations under 
     the agreement do not apply uniformly to all parties to the 
     agreement, if such application is consistent with the terms 
     of the agreement.
       (b) Limitations on Fast Track Procedures; Concurrence by 
     Congressional Trade Advisers in President's Certification.--
       (1) Concurrence by congressional trade advisers.--The fast 
     track procedures shall not apply to any implementing bill 
     submitted with respect to a trade agreement of which notice 
     was provided under subsection (a)(1)(A) unless a majority of 
     the congressional trade advisers, by a vote held not later 
     than 30 days after the President submits the certification to 
     Congress under subsection (a)(1)(B) with respect to the trade 
     agreement, concur in the President's certification. The 
     failure of the congressional trade advisers to hold a vote 
     within that 30-day period shall be considered to be 
     concurrence in the President's certification.
       (2) Computation of time period.--The 30-day period referred 
     to in paragraph (1) shall be computed without regard to--
       (A) the days on which either House of Congress is not in 
     session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a 
     day certain or an adjournment of the Congress sine die; and
       (B) any Saturday and Sunday, not excluded under 
     subparagraph (A), when either House of Congress is not in 
     session.

     SEC. 8. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS.

       (a) Certain Agreements.--Notwithstanding section 4(b)(2), 
     if an agreement to which section 4(b) applies--
       (1) is entered into under the auspices of the World Trade 
     Organization regarding the rules of origin work program 
     described in article 9 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin,
       (2) is entered into otherwise under the auspices of the 
     World Trade Organization,
       (3) is entered into with Chile,
       (4) is entered into with Singapore, or
       (5) establishes a Free Trade Area for the Americas,

     and results from negotiations that were commenced before the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, subsection (b) shall 
     apply.
       (b) Treatment of Agreements.--In the case of any agreement 
     to which subsection (a) applies--
       (1) the applicability of the fast track procedures to 
     implementing bills shall be determined without regard to the 
     requirements of section 5; and
       (2) the President shall consult regarding the negotiations 
     described in subsection (a) with the committees described in 
     section 5(b)(1) and the congressional trade advisers as soon 
     as feasible after the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Applicability of Environmental Assessment.--
       (1) Uruguay round agreements and ftaa.--With respect to 
     agreements identified in paragraphs (2) and (5) of subsection 
     (a)--
       (A) the notice required under section 6(d)(3) shall be 
     given not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act; and
       (B) the preliminary draft of the environmental assessment 
     required under section 6(d)(4) shall be submitted to the 
     Congress not later than 18 months after such date of 
     enactment.
       (2) Chile and singapore.--With respect to agreements 
     identified in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), the 
     Trade Representative shall consult with the Committee on Ways 
     and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Finance of the Senate to determine the appropriate time 
     frame for submission to the Congress of an environmental 
     assessment meeting the requirements of section 6(d)(2).
       (3) Rules of origin.--The requirements of section 6(d)(1) 
     shall not apply to an agreement identified in subsection 
     (a)(1).
       (d) Applicability of Labor Review.--
       (1) Uruguay round agreements and ftaa.--With respect to 
     agreements identified in paragraphs (2) and (5) of subsection 
     (a)--
       (A) the notice required under section 6(e)(3) shall be 
     given not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act; and
       (B) the preliminary draft of the labor review required 
     under section 6(e)(4) shall be submitted to the Congress not 
     later than 18 months after such date of enactment.
       (2) Chile and singapore.--With respect to agreements 
     identified in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), the 
     Trade Representative shall consult with the Committee on Ways 
     and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Finance of the Senate to determine the appropriate time 
     frame for submission to the Congress of an environmental 
     assessment meeting the requirements of section 6(e)(2).
       (3) Rules of origin.--The requirements of section 6(e)(1) 
     shall not apply to an agreement identified in subsection 
     (a)(1).

     SEC. 9. ADDITIONAL REPORT AND STUDIES.

       (a) Report on Trade-Restrictive Practices.--Not later than 
     1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     President shall transmit to the Congress a report on trade-
     restrictive practices of foreign countries that are promoted, 
     enabled, or facilitated by governmental or private entities 
     in those countries, or that involve the delegation of 
     regulatory powers to private entities.
       (b) Annual Study on Fluctuations in Exchange Rate.--The 
     Trade Representative shall prepare and submit to the 
     Congress, not later than ____ of each year, a study of how 
     fluctuations in the exchange rate caused by the monetary 
     policies of the trading partners of the United States affect 
     trade.

     SEC. 10. ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
                   REQUIREMENTS.

       At the time the President submits to the Congress the final 
     text of an agreement pursuant to section 7(a)(1)(C), the 
     President shall also submit a plan for implementing and 
     enforcing the agreement. The implementation and enforcement 
     plan shall include the following:
       (1) Border personnel requirements.--A description of 
     additional personnel required at border entry points, 
     including a list of additional customs and agricultural 
     inspectors.
       (2) Agency staffing requirements.--A description of 
     additional personnel required by Federal agencies responsible 
     for monitoring, implementing, and enforcing the trade 
     agreement, including personnel required by the Office of the 
     United States Trade Representative, the Department of 
     Commerce, the Department of Agriculture (including additional 
     personnel required to evaluate sanitary and phytosanitary 
     measures in order to obtain market access for United States 
     exports), the Department of the Treasury, the Environmental 
     Protection Agency, the Department of the Interior, the 
     Department of Labor, and such other departments and agencies 
     as may be necessary.
       (3) Customs infrastructure requirements.--A description of 
     the additional equipment and facilities needed by the United 
     States Customs Service.
       (4) Impact on state and local governments.--A description 
     of the impact the trade agreement will have on State and 
     local governments as a result of increases in trade.
       (5) Cost analysis.--An analysis of the costs associated 
     with each of the items listed in paragraphs (1) through (4).

     SEC. 11. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 
     U.S.C. 2111 et seq.) is amended as follows:
       (1) Implementing bill.--
       (A) Section 151(b)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(1)) is amended by 
     striking ``section 1103(a)(1) of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988, or section 282 of the Uruguay 
     Round Agreements Act'' and inserting ``section 282 of the 
     Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or section 7(a)(1) of the 
     Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001''.
       (B) Section 151(c)(1) (19 U.S.C. 2191(c)(1)) is amended by 
     striking ``or section 282 of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
     Act'' and inserting ``, section 282 of the Uruguay Round 
     Agreements Act, or section 7(a)(1) of the Comprehensive Trade 
     Negotiating Authority Act of 2001''.
       (2) Advice from international trade commission.--Section 
     131 (19 U.S.C. 2151) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)--
       (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 123 of this Act 
     or section 1102 (a) or (c) of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' and inserting ``section 123 of 
     this Act or section 4(a) or (b) of the Comprehensive Trade 
     Negotiating Authority Act of 2001,''; and
       (ii) in paragraph (2), by striking ``section 1102 (b) or 
     (c) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' 
     and inserting ``section 4(b) of the Comprehensive Trade 
     Negotiating Authority Act of 2001'';
       (B) in subsection (b), by striking ``section 
     1102(a)(3)(A)'' and inserting ``section 4(a)(3)(A) of the 
     Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001'' 
     before the end period; and
       (C) in subsection (c), by striking ``section 1102 of the 
     Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' and 
     inserting ``section 4 of the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating 
     Authority Act of 2001,''.
       (3) Hearings and advice.--Sections 132, 133(a), and 134(a) 
     (19 U.S.C. 2152, 2153(a), and 2154(a)) are each amended by 
     striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988,'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``section 4 of the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating 
     Authority Act of 2001,''.
       (4) Prerequisites for offers.--Section 134(b) (19 U.S.C. 
     2154(b)) is amended by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus 
     Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting 
     ``section 4 of the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority 
     Act of 2001''.
       (5) Advice from private and public sectors.--Section 135 
     (19 U.S.C. 2155) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(1)(A), by striking ``section 1102 of 
     the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and 
     inserting ``section 4 of the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating 
     Authority Act of 2001'';
       (B) in subsection (e)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``section 1102 of the Omnibus Trade and 
     Competitiveness Act of 1988'' each place it appears and 
     inserting ``section 4 of the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating 
     Authority Act of 2001''; and
       (ii) by striking ``section 1103(a)(1)(A) of such Act of 
     1988'' and inserting ``section 7(a)(1)(A) of the 
     Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001''; and
       (C) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 1101 of the 
     Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' and inserting 
     ``section 2 of the Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority 
     Act of 2001''.

[[Page H9042]]

       (6) Transmission of agreements to congress.--Section 162(a) 
     (19 U.S.C. 2212(a)) is amended by striking ``or under section 
     1102 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988'' 
     and inserting ``or under section 4 of the Comprehensive Trade 
     Negotiating Authority Act of 2001''.
       (b) Application of Certain Provisions.--For purposes of 
     applying sections 125, 126, and 127 of the Trade Act of 1974 
     (19 U.S.C. 2135, 2136(a), and 2137)--
       (1) any trade agreement entered into under section 4 shall 
     be treated as an agreement entered into under section 101 or 
     102, as appropriate, of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2111 
     or 2112); and
       (2) any proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant to 
     a trade agreement entered into under section 4 shall be 
     treated as a proclamation or Executive order issued pursuant 
     to a trade agreement entered into under section 102 of the 
     Trade Act of 1974.

     SEC. 12. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Agreements.--Any reference to any of the following 
     agreements is a reference to that same agreement referred to 
     in section 101(d) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 
     U.S.C. 3511(d)):
       (A) The Agreement on Agriculture.
       (B) The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
     Phytosanitary Measures.
       (C) The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.
       (D) The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures.
       (E) The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
     General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
       (F) The Agreement on Rules of Origin.
       (G) The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
       (H) The Agreement on Safeguards.
       (I) The General Agreement on Trade in Services.
       (J) The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
     Property Rights.
       (K) The Agreement on Government Procurement.
       (2) Antidumping agreement.--The term ``Antidumping 
     Agreement'' means the Agreement on Implementation of Article 
     VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
       (3) Appellate body; dispute settlement body; dispute 
     settlement panel; dispute settlement understanding.--The 
     terms ``Appellate Body'', ``Dispute Settlement Body'', 
     ``dispute settlement panel'', and ``Dispute Settlement 
     Understanding'' have the meanings given those terms in 
     section 121 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (35 U.S.C. 
     3531).
       (4) Business confidential.--Information or evidence is 
     ``business confidential'' if disclosure of the information or 
     evidence is likely to cause substantial harm to the 
     competitive position of the entity from which the information 
     or evidence would be obtained.
       (5) Congressional trade advisers.--The term ``congressional 
     trade advisers means the congressional advisers for trade 
     policy and negotiations designated under section 161(a)(1) of 
     the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2211(a)(1)).
       (6) FTAA.--The term ``FTAA'' means the Free Trade Area of 
     the Americas or comparable agreement reached between the 
     United States and the countries in the Western Hemisphere.
       (7) FTAA agreement.--The term ``FTAA agreements'' means any 
     agreements entered into to establish or carry out the FTAA.
       (8) FTAA member; ftaa member country.--The terms ``FTAA 
     member'' and ``FTAA member country'' mean a country that is a 
     member of the FTAA.
       (9) GATT 1994.--The term ``GATT 1994'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
     Act (19 U.S.C. 3501).
       (10) ILO.--The term ``ILO'' means the International Labor 
     Organization.
       (11) Implementing bill.--The term ``implementing bill'' has 
     the meaning given that term in section 151(b)(1) of the Trade 
     Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2191(b)(1)).
       (12) NAFTA.--The term ``NAFTA'' means the North American 
     Free Trade Agreement.
       (13) Trade representative.--The term ``Trade 
     Representative'' means the United States Trade 
     Representative.
       (14) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen;
       (B) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity 
     organized under the laws of the United States; and
       (C) a partnership, corporation, or other legal entity that 
     is organized under the laws of a foreign country and is 
     controlled by entities described in subparagraph (B) or 
     United States citizens, or both.
       (15) Uruguay round agreements.--The term ``Uruguay Round 
     Agreements'' has the meaning given that term in section 2(7) 
     of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501(7)).
       (16) WTO.--The term ``WTO'' means the organization 
     established pursuant to the WTO Agreement.
       (17) WTO agreement.--The term ``WTO Agreement'' means the 
     Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization entered 
     into on April 15, 1994.

  Mr. RANGEL (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that the motion to recommit be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Rangel) is recognized for 5 minutes on his motion to 
recommit.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a very emotional time for me, because our 
Speaker said that this bill is just as important as fighting the war 
against terrorism. I think that is a big stretch, to compare the loss 
of American lives at Ground Zero to the passage of this bill as being 
on the same level. We cannot bring back those lives at Ground Zero, but 
we can get another chance to give the President the authority that so 
many of us believe that he wants and he deserves in order to have an 
effective trade policy.
  We do not believe that under our government and the democratic way 
that we expect to legislate, that what we are doing is undercutting the 
President of the United States. We believe in our democratic world that 
the majority and the minority should have an opportunity to express 
themselves, and the fact that someone can pick up some Democratic 
friends in the middle of the night does not mean that the process of 
having bills and having hearings on bills and amendments on bills and 
having the people on the Committee on Ways and Means have an 
opportunity to discuss these things means to take away these rights, 
and for us to stand up for what we know is morally and legislatively 
right, that we are undercutting the President of the United States.
  If the Committee on Rules says that we cannot express ourselves, we 
will fight on this. But we will salute that flag just as high as 
anybody else. And to infer that to vote against this piece of 
legislation, which we have no idea where it is going in the Senate, 
that it is the end of the day and that we are not fighting, that we are 
not as patriotic as the next American, wrong.
  I will tell you this: This is just the beginning of our fight against 
terrorism, and this should be the beginning of us continuing to fight 
hard to maintain bipartisanship in this House and on the other side. We 
should not use our fight against terrorism loosely, and we should not 
compare the bill before us as the same thing in fighting the war 
against terrorism.
  I just hope we recognize that we can defeat this bill before us. We 
can vote on the motion to recommit. We can make certain that we are 
concerned about the rights of kids, that they do not have to be 
involved in working in foreign governments and labor and be abused; 
protecting the environment; make certain we protect the constitutional 
rights of the Members of the House.
  We can do all of those things. We can be patriots. We can be 
Americans and we can do these things.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Levin).
  (Mr. LEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, this debate is about trade and not about 
terrorism. It is not about American leadership. America must lead in 
trade in the right direction. Trade must expand, and it has to be 
shaped as that happens, and that is what we have been doing these last 
years. We have voted on these bills. Do not pretend they do not exist.
  The Thomas bill would turn back the clock in key areas including 
those relating to labor.

                              {time}  1530

  I am an internationalist. This is not about isolationism. It is about 
how we shape our role as internationalists. It is not about 
protectionism. We are beyond that. Trade is so important that the role 
of Congress has to change. We cannot be rubber stamps or silent 
partners or consultants. We must be participants.
  The Thomas bill falls so far short in that way. Vote, vote for the 
motion to recommit; and if that fails, vote against Thomas; and then if 
Thomas goes down and the recommittal motion goes down, we will come 
back and do it the right way.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
minority leader.

[[Page H9043]]

  Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, as I said previously, I want to commend 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) and the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Matsui) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin) for 
their hard work on this alternative. They have worked endlessly to put 
together what they believe to be the right trade policy for our 
country.
  I agree with it entirely. I think it is the kind of vision that we 
need in trade. I think it is the kind of vision that we will ultimately 
come to in trade, and I urge Members to seriously consider voting for 
it.
  The only way we will get these changes made in trade policy is if we 
have the votes to pass this kind of a motion. So I strongly recommend 
it to Members.
  I honor their hard work and scholarship, their seriousness of 
purpose. It is a remarkable job that they have done, and I urge Members 
to vote for what I believe to be the right vision on trade for America 
now and in the future.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to 
recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). The gentleman from California 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, most others would oppose this if they had 
told us what was in it during their 5 minutes; but that usually is my 
job, to tell people what is in the motion to recommit.
  First of all, that is the motion to recommit, and I do have to 
compliment the gentleman from New York (Mr. Rangel) in which he 
utilized patriotism by condemning others using patriotism to urge that 
my colleagues support his motion to recommit. Nicely done.
  What the minority leader said was that this position contains all the 
right issues.
  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Levin), who is the author of this, 
says that it moves in the right direction; and in fact, the key phrase 
from the gentleman from Michigan is it says it is how we should shape 
our world.
  I want my colleagues to think about a document which the minority 
asks us to vote for, which more than 75 pages consists of mandates, of 
requirements that others must meet. To give my colleagues the flavor of 
the 75 pages of mandates, we only have to get to page 6 when it says 
any agreement that comes back must maintain bona fide food aid 
programs. Now, what is a bona fide food aid program? Whatever it is, 
the agreement between whoever country works with us must maintain a 
bona fide food aid program.
  My colleagues can imagine 75 pages of maintaining, to preserve, to 
promote, to eliminate, to achieve, to explore, to develop, to identify, 
to clarify and on and on, that an agreement has to meet these because 
they are mandates, and if they do not meet them, guess what? There is a 
structure that will judge whether or not those mandates have been met.
  First of all, to get an agreement through Congress in this package, 
requires that my colleagues vote not once, remember, normally, this is 
called Fast Track, that we do not vote once, that we do not have to 
vote twice, but we have to vote three times; and every time we have to 
achieve a majority.
  On those 75 pages of mandates, this is the structure to determine 
whether or not the agreement has met the particular mandate. It takes 
nine Members of the House and nine Members of the Senate, and it 
constructs them so that the nine and the nine just happen to be nine 
Democrats and nine Republicans, and if they hold their party line, if 
the AFL-CIO is able to hold the party line, any agreement goes down 
because to get an agreement not only requires us to go through those 
three separate votes, but we then have to on any one of these 75 pages 
of mandates, have to get a majority of that structure to go forward.
  I know that sometimes bringing countries together over the 
negotiating table is difficult to do; and that is why, in committee, 
when this was offered as a substitute, with 17 Democrats on the 
committee, the leadership of the Committee on Ways and Means, laying 
this in front of their Democratic colleagues, did not get 17 vote, did 
not get 16 votes, did not get 14 vote, did not get 13 votes. They were 
able to muster 12 of the 17 in support of this; and once my colleagues 
know what is inside of it, we begin to wonder about the 12 that voted 
for it.
  That is why they would not spend one minute of their time telling us 
what is in this document; but if my colleagues examine it, what it is 
is a guarantee that unless and until one or two people's vision over 
there of how we shape our world is in each and every document, we will 
not have a trade agreement. That is not the way a trade agreement 
arrangement should work.
  I want to compliment the Democrats that voted against it in Ways and 
Means. I want to compliment the Democrats who will vote down the motion 
to recommit, and I want to compliment all of those who will support 
Trade Promotion Authority for the President.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair 
announces that he will reduce to 5 minutes the period of time within 
which a vote by electronic device will be taken on the question of the 
passage of the bill.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 162, 
noes 267, not voting 5, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 480]

                               AYES--162

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Brown (FL)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     Deutsch
     Doggett
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Frank
     Frost
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (OH)
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larson (CT)
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lowey
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Phelps
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                               NOES--267

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Armey
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baker
     Baldwin
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Boozman
     Borski
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (OH)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carson (OK)
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Coble
     Collins
     Combest
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis (FL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hart
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes

[[Page H9044]]


     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kanjorski
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kerns
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Larsen (WA)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lee
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Mascara
     Matheson
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, Jeff
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Paul
     Pence
     Peterson (MN)
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rivers
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Stupak
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Wu
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Hostettler
     Meek (FL)
     Quinn
     Roukema
     Young (AK)

                              {time}  1559

  Mr. GREENWOOD, Mr. WALSH, Mrs. CUBIN, Messrs. BROWN of South 
Carolina, COX, STRICKLAND, HERGER, BORSKI, MURTHA, Ms. VELAZQUEZ, 
Messrs. DOYLE, MASCARA, BRADY of Pennsylvania, RAHALL, HOLDEN, and 
KANJORSKI changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. MEEHAN changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

                              {time}  1600


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Notwithstanding the Chair's 
earlier announcement, the time for electronic vote on passage, if 
ordered, will be 15 minutes.
  The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 215, 
noes 214, not voting 5, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 481]

                               AYES--215

     Akin
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barton
     Bass
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boozman
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Carson (OK)
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Collins
     Combest
     Cooksey
     Cox
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Davis, Tom
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hart
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Issa
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kerns
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     Matheson
     McCrery
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, Jeff
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Osborne
     Ose
     Otter
     Oxley
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Rehberg
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tancredo
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Wamp
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (FL)

                               NOES--214

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett
     Bartlett
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Foley
     Ford
     Frank
     Frost
     Gephardt
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Gordon
     Graham
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     LaTourette
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McHugh
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Norwood
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Phelps
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Putnam
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Regula
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogers (KY)
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Simmons
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Hostettler
     Meek (FL)
     Quinn
     Roukema
     Young (AK)

                              {time}  1637

  Mr. DeMINT changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________