[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 163 (Thursday, November 29, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12167-S12169]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. REID (for himself, Mrs. Clinton, Mr. Lieberman and Mr. 
        Jeffords):
  S. 1746. A bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974 to strengthen security at sensitive nuclear 
facilities; to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I would like to discuss an issue of great 
importance to our Nation, the safety of our Nation's nuclear power 
plants.
  The tragedy of September 11 taught us many things: It taught us the 
importance of our first responders. It taught us the vulnerability of 
our Nation's buildings and the strength of our Nation's resolve. 
Finally, it taught us that we must be prepared for today's threats 
because they could become tomorrow's attacks.
  We must not fail to take what we have learned and apply it to the 
vulnerabilities of our Nation's energy and transportation 
infrastructure.
  Less than 1 week ago, the President signed a new law to increase the 
safety at our Nation's airports.
  That act turned the first page in a long struggle to secure our 
Nation's infrastructure.
  Today, I am introducing legislation with Senator Clinton, Senator 
Lieberman, and Senator Jeffords to write the next chapter, which covers 
commercial nuclear facilities.
  I am pleased that Congressman Markey and Congresswoman Lowey will 
introduce a companion bill in the House of Representatives.
  Nuclear facilities provide us with needed electricity, but, in light 
of the events of September 11, they also present a security risk that 
we simply must address.
  When plants are failing nearly half their security evaluations, we 
need to do more than update the curriculum. We need a whole new system.
  There are some plants that do a good job, but it is not enough to 
have peaks of success, we need a new high plateau that secures all 
plants. We can accomplish that by establishing a new nuclear security 
force.
  Our bill also requires the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to take a 
new look at the threats posed by terrorists.
  This is the foundation that will support the efforts of the nuclear 
security force and overall plant security.
  Our bill also establishes a rigorous training and evaluation program 
for the nuclear security force.
  A new office will be established within the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission with a dedicated team of mock terrorists whose only jobs is 
to perfect their skills in challenging the security guards.
  When professional sports teams practice, the don't do it against 
amateur athletes playing in the park. They train against other 
professionals. Nuclear Security personnel should also.
  Our bill will honor the sacrifice of our Nation's emergency 
responders by ensuring that emergency response plans are in place and 
work as we expect them to.
  Finally, we will require stockpiles of medicine to help out in the 
event of a release of radioactive material from a nuclear facility.
  These potassium iodide tablets block the absorption of harmful iodine 
in the thyroid gland.
  The American people told us how they wanted their airlines and 
airports protected. The Congress and the President listened and acted.
  We will work to make sure their questions about the safety of all our 
Nation's nuclear power plants are also answered.
  This bill starts that process.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1746

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Security Act of 
     2001''.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       Section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
     2014) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection jj. as subsection ii.; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``jj. Design Basis Threat.--The term `design basis threat' 
     means the design basis threat established by the Commission 
     under section 73.1 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations 
     (or any successor regulation developed under section 170C).
       ``kk. Sensitive Nuclear Facility.--The term `sensitive 
     nuclear facility' means--
       ``(1) a commercial nuclear power plant and associated spent 
     fuel storage facility;
       ``(2) a decommissioned nuclear power plant and associated 
     spent fuel storage facility;
       ``(3) a category I fuel cycle facility;
       ``(4) a gaseous diffusion plant; and
       ``(5) any other facility licensed by the Commission, or 
     used in the conduct of an activity licensed by the 
     Commission, that the Commission determines should be treated 
     as a sensitive nuclear facility under section 170C.''.

     SEC. 3. NUCLEAR SECURITY.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
     1954 (42 U.S.C. 2201 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

     ``SEC. 170C. PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES 
                   AGAINST THE DESIGN BASIS THREAT.

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Nuclear security force.--The term `nuclear security 
     force' means the nuclear security force established under 
     subsection (b)(1).
       ``(2) Fund.--The term `Fund' means the Nuclear Security 
     Fund established under subsection (f).
       ``(3) Qualification standard.--The term `qualification 
     standard' means a qualification standard established under 
     subsection (e)(2)(A).
       ``(4) Security plan.--The term `security plan' means a 
     security plan developed under subsection (b)(2).
       ``(b) Nuclear Security.--The Commission shall--
       ``(1) establish a nuclear security force, the members of 
     which shall be employees of the Commission, to provide for 
     the security of all sensitive nuclear facilities against the 
     design basis threat; and
       ``(2) develop and implement a security plan for each 
     sensitive nuclear facility to ensure the security of all 
     sensitive nuclear facilities against the design basis threat.
       ``(c) Design Basis Threat.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this section, and at least once every 3 years 
     thereafter, the Commission, in consultation with the 
     Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, the 
     Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and other 
     Federal, State, and local agencies, as appropriate, shall 
     revise the design basis threat to include--

[[Page S12168]]

       ``(A) threats equivalent to--
       ``(i) the events of September 11, 2001;
       ``(ii) a physical, cyber, biochemical, or other terrorist 
     threat;
       ``(iii) an attack on a facility by multiple coordinated 
     teams of a large number of individuals;
       ``(iv) assistance in an attack from several persons 
     employed at the facility;
       ``(v) a suicide attack;
       ``(vi) a water-based or air-based threat;
       ``(vii) the use of explosive devices of considerable size 
     and other modern weaponry;
       ``(viii) an attack by persons with a sophisticated 
     knowledge of the operations of a sensitive nuclear facility; 
     and
       ``(ix) fire, especially a fire of long duration; and
       ``(B) any other threat that the Commission determines 
     should be included as an element of the design basis threat.
       ``(2) Reports.--The Commission shall submit to Congress a 
     report on each revision made under paragraph (1).
       ``(d) Security Plans.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of enactment of this section, the Commission shall develop a 
     security plan for each sensitive nuclear facility to ensure 
     the protection of each sensitive nuclear facility against the 
     design basis threat.
       ``(2) Elements of the plan.--A security plan shall 
     prescribe--
       ``(A) the deployment of the nuclear security force, 
     including--
       ``(i) numbers of the members of the nuclear security force 
     at each sensitive nuclear facility;
       ``(ii) tactics of the members of the nuclear security force 
     at each sensitive nuclear facility; and
       ``(iii) capabilities of the members of the nuclear security 
     force at each sensitive nuclear facility;
       ``(B) other protective measures, including--
       ``(i) designs of critical control systems at each sensitive 
     nuclear facility;
       ``(ii) restricted personnel access to each sensitive 
     nuclear facility;
       ``(iii) perimeter site security, internal site security, 
     and fire protection barriers;
       ``(iv) increases in protection for spent fuel storage 
     areas;
       ``(v) placement of spent fuel in dry cask storage; and
       ``(vi) background security checks for employees and 
     prospective employees; and
       ``(C) a schedule for completing the requirements of the 
     security plan not later than 18 months after the date of 
     enactment of this section.
       ``(3) Additional requirements.--A holder of a license for a 
     sensitive nuclear facility under section 103 or 104 or the 
     State or local government in which a sensitive nuclear 
     facility is located may petition the Commission for 
     additional requirements in the security plan for the 
     sensitive nuclear facility.
       ``(4) Implementation of security plan.--Not later than 270 
     days after the date of enactment of this section, the 
     Commission, in consultation with a holder of a license for a 
     sensitive nuclear facility under section 103 or 104, shall, 
     by direct action of the Commission or by order requiring 
     action by the licensee, implement the security plan for the 
     sensitive nuclear facility in accordance with the schedule 
     under paragraph (2)(C).
       ``(5) Sufficiency of security plan.--If at any time the 
     Commission determines that the implementation of the 
     requirements of the security plan for a sensitive nuclear 
     facility is insufficient to ensure the security of the 
     sensitive nuclear facility against the design basis threat, 
     the Commission shall immediately submit to Congress and the 
     President a classified report that--
       ``(A) identifies the vulnerability of the sensitive nuclear 
     facility; and
       ``(B) recommends actions by Federal, State, or local 
     agencies to eliminate the vulnerability.
       ``(e) Nuclear Security Force.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this section, the Commission, in consultation 
     with other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall establish 
     a program for the hiring and training of the nuclear security 
     force.
       ``(2) Hiring.--
       ``(A) Qualification standards.--Not later than 30 days 
     after the date of enactment of this section, the Commission 
     shall establish qualification standards that individuals 
     shall be required to meet to be hired by the Commission as 
     members of the nuclear security force.
       ``(B) Examination.--The Commission shall develop and 
     administer a nuclear security force personnel examination for 
     use in determining the qualification of individuals seeking 
     employment as members of the nuclear security force.
       ``(C) Criminal and security background checks.--The 
     Commission shall require that an individual to be hired as a 
     member of the nuclear security force undergo a criminal and 
     security background check.
       ``(D) Disqualification of individuals who present national 
     security risks.--The Commission, in consultation with the 
     heads of other Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall 
     establish procedures, in addition to any background check 
     conducted under subparagraph (B), to ensure that no 
     individual who presents a threat to national security is 
     employed as a member of the nuclear security force.
       ``(3) Annual proficiency review.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Commission shall provide that an 
     annual evaluation of each member of the nuclear security 
     force is conducted and documented.
       ``(B) Requirements for continuation.--An individual 
     employed as a member of the nuclear security force may not 
     continue to be employed in that capacity unless the 
     evaluation under subparagraph (A) demonstrates that the 
     individual--
       ``(i) continues to meet all qualification standards;
       ``(ii) has a satisfactory record of performance and 
     attention to duty; and
       ``(iii) has the knowledge and skills necessary to 
     vigilantly and effectively provide for the security of a 
     sensitive nuclear facility against the design basis threat.
       ``(4) Training.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Commission shall provide for the 
     training of each member of the nuclear security force to 
     ensure each member has the knowledge and skills necessary to 
     provide for the security of a sensitive nuclear facility 
     against the design basis threat.
       ``(B) Training plan.--Not later than 60 days after the date 
     of enactment of this section, the Commission shall develop a 
     plan for the training of members of the nuclear security 
     force.
       ``(C) Use of other agencies.--The Commission may enter into 
     a memorandum of understanding or other arrangement with any 
     other Federal agency with appropriate law enforcement 
     responsibilities, to provide personnel, resources, or other 
     forms of assistance in the training of members of the nuclear 
     security force.
       ``(f) Nuclear Security Fund.--
       ``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the Treasury 
     of the United States a fund to be known as the `Nuclear 
     Security Fund', which shall be used by the Commission to 
     administer programs under this section to provide for the 
     security of sensitive nuclear facilities.
       ``(2) Deposits in the fund.--The Commission shall deposit 
     in the Fund--
       ``(A) the amount of fees collected under paragraph (5); and
       ``(B) amounts appropriated under subsection (g).
       ``(3) Investment of amounts.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     invest such portion of the Fund as is not, in the judgment of 
     the Secretary of the Treasury, required to meet current 
     withdrawals. Investments may be made only in interest-bearing 
     obligations of the United States.
       ``(B) Acquisition of obligations.--For the purpose of 
     investments under subparagraph (A), obligations may be 
     acquired--
       ``(i) on original issue at the issue price; or
       ``(ii) by purchase of outstanding obligations at the market 
     price.
       ``(C) Sale of obligations.--Any obligation acquired by the 
     Fund may be sold by the Secretary of the Treasury at the 
     market price.
       ``(D) Credits to fund.--The interest on, and the proceeds 
     from the sale or redemption of, any obligations held in the 
     Fund shall be credited to and form a part of the Fund.
       ``(4) Use of amounts in the fund.--The Commission shall use 
     amounts in the Fund to pay the costs of--
       ``(A) salaries, training, and other expenses of the nuclear 
     security force; and
       ``(B) developing and implementing security plans.
       ``(5) Fee.--To ensure that adequate amounts are available 
     to provide assistance under paragraph (4), the Commission 
     shall assess licensees a fee in an amount determined by the 
     Commission, not to exceed 1 mill per kilowatt-hour of 
     electricity generated by a sensitive nuclear facility.
       ``(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are 
     authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to 
     carry out this section.''.
       (b) Implementation.--The Commission shall complete the full 
     implementation of the amendment made by subsection (a) as 
     soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this Act, 
     but in no event later than 270 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.
       (c) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     contents for chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. prec. 2011) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

``Sec. 170B. Uranium supply.
``Sec. 170C. Protection of sensitive nuclear facilities against the 
              design basis threat.''.

     SEC. 4. OPERATION SAFEGUARDS AND RESPONSE UNIT.

       Section 204 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 
     U.S.C. 5844) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) Operation Safeguards and Response Unit.--
       ``(1) Definitions.--In this subsection:
       ``(A) Assistant director.--The term `Assistant Director' 
     means the Assistant Director for Operation Safeguards and 
     Response.
       ``(B) Design basis threat.--The term `design basis threat' 
     has the meaning given the term in section 11 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014).
       ``(C) Sensitive nuclear facility.--The term `sensitive 
     nuclear facility' has the meaning given the term in section 
     11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014).
       ``(D) Unit.--The term `Unit' means the Operation Safeguards 
     and Response Unit established under paragraph (2)(A).
       ``(2) Establishment of unit.--

[[Page S12169]]

       ``(A) In general.--There is established within the Office 
     of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards the Operation 
     Safeguards and Response Unit.
       ``(B) Head of unit.--The Unit shall be headed by the 
     Assistant Director for Operation Safeguards and Response.
       ``(C) Duties.--The Assistant Director shall--
       ``(i) establish a program for the conduct of operation 
     safeguards and response evaluations under paragraph (3); and
       ``(ii) establish a program for the conduct of emergency 
     response exercises under paragraph (4).
       ``(D) Mock terrorist team.--The personnel of the Unit shall 
     include a Mock Terrorist Team comprised of--
       ``(i) not fewer than 20 individuals with advanced knowledge 
     of special weapons and tactics comparable to special 
     operations forces of the Armed Forces;
       ``(ii) at least 1 nuclear engineer;
       ``(iii) for each evaluation at a sensitive nuclear facility 
     under paragraph (3), at least 1 individual with knowledge of 
     the operations of the sensitive nuclear facility who is 
     capable of actively disrupting the normal operations of the 
     sensitive nuclear facility; and
       ``(iv) any other individual that the Assistant Director 
     determines should be a member of the Mock Terrorist Team.
       ``(3) Operation safeguards and response evaluations.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this subsection, the Assistant Director shall 
     establish an operation safeguards and response evaluation 
     program to assess the ability of each sensitive nuclear 
     facility to defend against the design basis threat.
       ``(B) Frequency of evaluations.--Not less often than once 
     every 2 years, the Assistant Director shall conduct and 
     document operation safeguards and response evaluations at 
     each sensitive nuclear facility to assess the ability of the 
     members of the nuclear security force at the sensitive 
     nuclear facility to defend against the design basis threat.
       ``(C) Activities.--The evaluation shall include 2 or more 
     force-on-force exercises by the Mock Terrorist Team against 
     the sensitive nuclear facility that simulate air, water, and 
     land assaults (as appropriate).
       ``(D) Criteria.--The Assistant Director shall establish 
     criteria for judging the success of the evaluations.
       ``(E) Corrective action.--If a sensitive nuclear facility 
     fails to complete successfully an operation safeguards and 
     response evaluation, the Commission shall require additional 
     operation safeguards and response evaluations not less often 
     than once every 6 months until the sensitive nuclear facility 
     successfully completes an operation safeguards and response 
     evaluation.
       ``(F) Reports.--Not less often than once every year, the 
     Commission shall submit to Congress and the President a 
     report that describes the results of each operation 
     safeguards and response evaluation under this paragraph for 
     the previous year.
       ``(4) Emergency response exercises.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this subsection, the Assistant Director, in 
     consultation with the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
     Security, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management 
     Agency, the Attorney General, and other Federal, State, and 
     local agencies, as appropriate, shall establish an emergency 
     response program to evaluate the ability of Federal, State, 
     and local emergency response personnel within a 50-mile 
     radius of a sensitive nuclear facility to respond to a 
     radiological emergency at the sensitive nuclear facility.
       ``(B) Frequency.--Not less often than once every 3 years, 
     the Assistant Director shall conduct emergency response 
     exercises to evaluate the ability of Federal, State, and 
     local emergency response personnel within a 50-mile radius of 
     a sensitive nuclear facility to respond to a radiological 
     emergency at the sensitive nuclear facility.
       ``(C) Activities.--The response exercises shall evaluate--
       ``(i) the response capabilities, response times, and 
     coordination and communication capabilities of the response 
     personnel;
       ``(ii) the effectiveness and adequacy of emergency response 
     plans, including evacuation plans; and
       ``(iii) the ability of response personnel to distribute 
     potassium iodide or other prophylactic medicines in an 
     expeditious manner.
       ``(D) Revision of emergency response plans.--The Commission 
     shall revise the emergency response plan for a sensitive 
     nuclear facility to correct for any deficiencies identified 
     by an evaluation under this paragraph.
       ``(E) Reports.--Not less often than once every year, the 
     Commission shall submit to Congress and the President a 
     report that describes--
       ``(i) the results of each emergency response exercise under 
     this paragraph conducted in the previous year; and
       ``(ii) each revision of an emergency response plan made 
     under subparagraph (D) for the previous year.''.

     SEC. 5. POTASSIUM IODIDE STOCKPILES.

       Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
     2210) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``u. Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of 
     this subsection, the Commission, in consultation with the 
     Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services, and other Federal, 
     State, and local agencies, as appropriate, shall--
       ``(1) ensure that sufficient stockpiles of potassium iodide 
     tablets have been established at public facilities (such as 
     schools and hospitals) within at least a 50-mile radius of 
     all sensitive nuclear facilities;
       ``(2) develop plans for the prompt distribution of the 
     stockpiles described in paragraph (1) to all individuals 
     located within at least a 50-mile radius of a sensitive 
     nuclear facility in the event of a release of radionuclides; 
     and
       ``(3) submit to Congress a report--
       ``(A) certifying that stockpiles have been established as 
     described in paragraph (1); and
       ``(B) including the plans described in paragraph (2).''.

     SEC. 6. DEFENSE OF FACILITIES.

       (a) In General.--In a case in which a state of war or 
     national emergency exists, the Commission shall--
       (1) request the Governor of each State in which a sensitive 
     nuclear facility is located to deploy the National Guard to 
     each sensitive nuclear facility in that State; and
       (2) request the President to--
       (A) deploy the Coast Guard to sensitive nuclear facilities 
     on the coastline of the United States; and
       (B) restrict air space in the vicinity of sensitive nuclear 
     facilities in the United States.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out 
     this section.

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