[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 161 (Tuesday, November 27, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S12034-S12036]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              BIOTERRORISM

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise to speak regarding a topic that has 
emerged dramatically over the past 7 weeks, a topic that everybody in 
the United States of America has thought about, a topic that many of us 
in the Senate have been thinking about over the last 3 years. That 
topic is the use of viruses, bacteria, and other germs as bioterrorist 
weapons.
  Going back 3 years when the Senate Public Health Subcommittee began 
to look at the issue of bioterrorism, we had a series of hearings to 
study in depth the ability of our Nation's public health 
infrastructure. Those three words--``public health infrastructure''--
are words about which we hear a lot. People ask me: What is the public 
health infrastructure? I will address that question in a few minutes.
  The public health infrastructure is the basis of our preparedness and 
response to such bioterrorist attacks--who we call if something 
happens, what they do, who does the test, how they communicate with 
each other, and how quickly they respond. When we began addressing the 
issue of bioterrorism, we wanted to look at the local, State, and 
national level. We wanted to examine how those systems respond to 
public health threats.
  We had a series of hearings beginning 3 years ago focused 
specifically on our preparedness to respond to a bioterrorist attack--
the use of viruses, bacteria, and germs with the intent to create 
terror or to kill. The testimony of

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the witnesses fascinated me because few people were talking about 
bioterrorism. Our intelligence community was looking at it 
internationally, but people on the street corners, on Main Street, or 
in town squares were not thinking about bioterrorism 3 years ago.
  After listening to these witnesses, it was very clear that it was no 
longer a question of ``if'' there would be a bioterrorist attack, but 
``when, where, and how.'' When it did occur, we knew that a 
bioterrorist attack would not only occur on foreign soil but also on 
the soil of the United States.
  These hearings also made equally clear to those of us on the 
subcommittee that the threat, the risk, was increasing and that our 
Nation was not fully prepared to meet the potential risk that could 
present.
  As legislators do, we listened intently. We talked to the American 
people. We collected more information, and then we wrote a bill called 
the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act. That bill had as its 
main goal two things--coordination of response and improvement of 
public health infrastructure. The coordination was two-fold horizontal, 
or coordination of all the different local organizations, entities, 
agencies at the point of the attack; and vertical, or coordination of 
the Federal, State, and local agencies that would all have a 
responsibility to respond.
  The second goal of this crucial legislation was to improve the 
resources to support the public health infrastructure, principally at 
the State and local level. I encourage my colleagues to consider what 
they would do if there was a bioterrorist attack at their home or at 
their work. Given what occurred in the Hart Building just last month, 
that consideration should not be too difficult.
  We passed that bill, and that bill was actually signed into law about 
a year ago, long before September 11. It was referred to the floor by 
the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee through the 
Subcommittee on Public Health. At the time, I chaired that 
subcommittee, and Senator Kennedy was the ranking member. Both Senator 
Kennedy and I have continued our interest in this topic over the last 3 
years.
  In terms of bioterrorism, what did September 11 and the ensuing 
events around the country do? It took what we thought was low risk and 
high vulnerability to a bioterrorist attack and made us realize that 
there was high risk and high vulnerability. As things appeared in the 
news and we learned about new inhalation anthrax cases, we realized our 
risks had increased markedly after September 11, and that our 
vulnerabilities, which we knew were high, were more clearly defined.
  We know where the gaps are today because we have learned from the 
events of the past 3 months. We knew that some gaps existed, but the 
public health infrastructure is so large that it was difficult to 
determine exactly where those gaps were without having a specific 
challenge to the system. I mention that because now is the time to act. 
We did not have all of the information when we passed the Public Health 
Threats and Emergencies Act, but we had the foundation a framework that 
focused on prevention, preparedness, and consequence management. That 
same framework is still valid, and we now know where those defined gaps 
in the public health infrastructure are.
  We are now aware of our increased risks and defined vulnerabilities 
or gaps in the system. Now is the time to address those gaps before we 
have another challenge to our system. We have a responsibility to the 
American people, to the people on Main Street, to the people in Alamo, 
TN--people who might not be thinking about what our government should 
be doing. It is our responsibility as government officials in the 
Federal, State, and local level to fill those gaps.
  Eighteen people have already been infected with anthrax. Another five 
or so suspicious cases are currently being examined. Five have already 
died. I have had the opportunity to see firsthand how these few cases 
have stretched our public health infrastructure, have stressed the 
people who respond--the medical and laboratory personnel. The number of 
anthrax diagnostic tests have overwhelmed the system for these 18 
cases.
  It could have been worse. If the same amount of anthrax had been 
delivered by aerosolization, it would affected not 10, 15, 20, 30 
people but clearly hundreds, indeed, thousands of people.
  We have to act. We have 2 or 3 weeks before we leave. If we do not 
act, if we do not pass comprehensive legislation that looks at 
preparedness, prevention, and consequence management as well as filling 
the newly identified gaps, we have not fulfilled our responsibility to 
the American people.
  We are learning more about anthrax and bioterrorism every day, and we 
need to continue to learn from these recent events. We do not know when 
and if there will be any future biological attacks, but we are on an 
alert now.
  We know terrorists are around the world. We know what terrorists have 
said--Osama bin Laden has said that it is his religious duty to obtain 
biological weapons of mass destruction. We know that the same 
motivation that sent those airplanes into the World Trade Center and 2 
miles from the Capitol at the Pentagon still exists. When that 
motivation for mass destruction is coupled with the hard evidence that 
Osama bin Laden and other terrorists intend to gain access to bacteria, 
to viruses, to germs, then we must conclude that the risk for 
bioterrorist attacks, whatever it was on September 9 or 10, is larger 
now and growing.
  Again, we need to respond. We have already identified some 
vulnerabilities. Now is the time to respond. Because the risk is 
increasing, we must have a real response.
  What is our next step? I mentioned that the Public Health Threats and 
Emergencies Act of 2000 passed a year ago. It has the basic framework 
of prevention, preparedness, and consequence management. Now is the 
time to build on that framework. Now is the time to appropriate the 
funds for that act. We have not yet put significant money into 
supporting that public health infrastructure, that crucial link in 
protecting us from and responding to any future biological attacks. The 
Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act was never fully funded. I am 
not pointing the finger at anybody, but now is the time to fund those 
issues.
  More resources for that infrastructure are needed. I would ask that 
you call your local public health official and ask that person: How 
stretched are you? How prepared are you if there is an outbreak of 
Salmonella, botulinum toxin, tularemia, smallpox, or anthrax in your 
community? Call them on the phone and see what they say. I know what 
they will say because I have talked to many of them lately. They will 
tell you that they have a few people working to address the issue, but 
they do not have the ability to communication with local hospitals, 
clinics, or other health care delivery systems. Your local public 
health official will tell you that they cannot rapidly identify those 
germs.
  If one thinks of things such as smallpox--and this is not to be 
alarmist because I think the risk of smallpox is tiny--we need people 
to diagnosis it quickly, communicate rapidly, and make sure the 
vaccines get there on time. If the system operates properly, then we 
would be okay.
  I mention all this because a week ago Thursday, I, along with Senator 
Kennedy and 40 of our colleagues, introduced a bill called the 
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001. We entered statements into the 
Record but did not have time to actually speak on the particular bill. 
I encourage my colleagues to read the bill and its summary. You can 
find two summaries--a one-page summary and a six-page summary--120-page 
bill on my website.
  The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001 incorporates the 
recommendations by President Bush to improve the national 
pharmaceutical stockpile. It includes authorized funding for the 
development of additional doses of the smallpox vaccine. It includes 
the funding to help encourage the development of additional vaccines 
and other bioterrorism countermeasures.

  Given the whole host of germs available for use--tularemia, anthrax, 
smallpox, botulinum toxins--we cannot concentrate on one virus or 
bacteria or other germ because the terrorists, if they want to, will 
simply move to another germ once we have developed an appropriate 
response. Therefore, a vaccine, although an important part of the

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comprehensive policy, is not the complete answer to the risk of germ 
biowarfare.
  In our bill, we also provide substantial additional funds, over $1 
billion to the States and local communities, to improve the public 
health infrastructure. If something happens to someone's daughter and/
or son and they suspect bioterrorism, we call on the public health 
infrastructure. What we need to do is have them prepared to receive 
that phone call and to respond in an effective way, and we provide the 
funds to make sure they are prepared to receive that phone call.
  In our bill, we look at revitalizing the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention's training initiatives. We look at response 
capabilities. We look at epidemiologic capacity.
  We do not disturb the Federal funding established under the Public 
Health Threats and Emergencies Act that goes into the core facility 
laboratories, the public health capacities. In fact, we broaden the 
funding streams and increase the authorization for these capacity-
building activities.
  Not only will these additional funds assist us in the event of 
another biological attack, but the strengthening of the public health 
infrastructure means that we will also be able to respond to other 
infectious diseases as well. No matter what infectious disease it is, 
whether it is a result of a terrorist attack or a natural-occurring 
disease, we need the same response--quick diagnosis, high surveillance, 
good communication, and quick treatment.
  In our bill, there is also a section on food safety protections, 
which I hope my colleagues will examine. My number one priority is to 
ensure that we address all of the issues laid out in the bill because 
the bill focuses on the entire system required to respond to any future 
bioterrorist attack--a system dependent upon the public health 
infrastructure.
  I close simply by saying we have made tremendous progress. Our 
colleagues have spent a lot of time looking at the issues in putting 
together this bill. I encourage them, once again, to look at what is in 
this bill and understand the comprehensive framework of prevention, 
preparedness, and consequence management as we move forward. The gaps 
have been defined in the public health infrastructure. Now is the time 
to respond. The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act gives that framework. I 
encourage my colleagues to support it when it comes to the floor.

  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum 
call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING Officer. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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