[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 158 (Thursday, November 15, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11951-S11956]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. FRIST (for himself, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Allen, Mr. Daschle, 
        Mr. Bond, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Bayh, Ms. Collins, Mr. 
        Biden, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Breaux, Mr. DeWine, Mrs. Carnahan, Mr. 
        Hagel, Mr. Cleland, Mr. Hutchinson, Mrs. Clinton, Mrs. 
        Hutchison, Mr. Corzine, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Dodd, Ms. Snowe, Mr. 
        Durbin, Mr. Voinovich, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Warner, Mrs. Feinstein, 
        Mr. Harkin, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Leahy, Mr. 
        Lieberman, Ms. Mikulski, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Nelson of Florida, 
        Mr. Reed, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Sarbanes, and Mr. Torricelli):
  S. 1715. A bill to improve the ability of the United States to 
prepare for and respond to a biological threat or attack; to the 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I am pleased to rise today on behalf of 
myself, Senator Kennedy, and a number of our colleagues to introduce 
vitally important legislation, the ``Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 
2001.'' This bipartisan bill, which represents the very best effort of 
a number of our colleagues in the Senate, responds to the threat of 
bioterrorism by focusing our Nation's efforts to prevent, prepare for 
and respond to any future bioterrorist attacks.
  Events of recent weeks have made clear the danger we currently face. 
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center 
and Pentagon, terrorists have used the mail to deliver anthrax to 
communities across America. In doing so, they have also spread fear 
across our great nation and have underscored the threats that 
bioterrorism poses. If they had employed a more sophisticated delivery 
mechanism, or weaponized smallpox or another communicable virus, our 
health care system may have been overwhelmed.
  Last year, Congress enacted bipartisan legislation to revitalize our 
public health defenses at the local, State and national levels. The 
Frist-Kennedy ``Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000'' 
authorized a series of important initiatives to strengthen the Nation's 
public health system, improve hospital response capabilities, upgrade 
the rapid identification and early warning systems at the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, CDC, improve the training of health 
professionals to diagnose and care for victims of bioterrorism, enhance 
our research and development capabilities, and take additional steps 
necessary to prevent, prepare for and respond to biological attacks.
  Today's legislation, the ``Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001,''

[[Page S11952]]

builds on the foundation laid by the Public Health Threats Act, a 
foundation built on prevention, preparedness, and response.
  The ``Bioterrorism Preparedness Act'' takes a number of steps to 
prepare our Nation for these threats. It includes important measures to 
improve our health system's capacity to respond to bioterrorism, 
protect the Nation's food supply, speed the development and production 
of vaccines and other countermeasures, enhance coordination of 
government agencies responsible for preparing for and responding to 
bioterrorism and increase our investment in fighting bioterrorism at 
the local, State, and national levels.
  The bill authorizes roughly $3.2 billion in fiscal year 2002 
emergency funding toward these critical activities. I believe it is 
important that this funding be considered in the context of the 
existing agreement limiting overall appropriations this year to $686 
billion in addition to the $40 billion emergency supplemental 
appropriations bill. I will work very hard to ensure that 
the priorities outlined in this authorization legislation are included 
within this framework.

  The ``Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001'' is a comprehensive bill 
that takes a major step toward better preparing our nation to respond 
to the special challenges posed by biological weapons. We have worked 
diligently with many of our colleagues and the administration over the 
several weeks, and I believe that the product of those efforts 
represents a strong bill that includes some of the best ideas of both 
Republicans and Democrats.
  I know the bill is stronger due to the input of so many of our 
colleagues and the leadership and guidance of the administration, and I 
would like to thank several of my colleagues for their efforts. 
Specifically, I would like to thank Senator Collins for her 
contributions regarding food safety and the appropriate emphasis on 
children, Senator Hutchinson for his assistance with the provisions 
related to vaccine development and production, Senator Roberts and 
Majority Leader Daschle for their contributions to this bill in the 
area of agricultural safety, and many of our other colleagues who 
contributed in a bipartisan way--Senators Gregg, Hagel, DeWine, Hatch, 
Mikulski, Dodd, and Clinton.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues to see that this 
important legislation becomes law this year.
  I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the bill be printed in the 
Records.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

           Summary--The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001

       The ``Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001'' is designed 
     to address gaps in our nation's biodefense and surveillance 
     system and our public health infrastructure. This new 
     legislation builds on the foundation laid by the ``Public 
     Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000'' by authorizing 
     additional measures to improve our health system's capacity 
     to respond to bioterrorism, protect the nation's food supply, 
     speed the development and production of vaccines and other 
     countermeasures, enhance coordination of federal activities 
     on bioterrorism, and increase our investment in fighting 
     bioterrorism at the local, state, and national levels. The 
     legislation would authorize approximately $3.2 billion in 
     funding for Fiscal Year 2002 (and such sums in years 
     thereafter) toward these activities.


         Title I--National Goals for Bioterrorism Preparedness

       Title I of the ``Bioterrorism Preparedness Act'' states 
     that ``the United States should further develop and implement 
     a coordinated strategy to prevent and, if necessary, to 
     respond to biological threats or attacks.'' It further states 
     that it is the goal of Congress that this strategy should: 
     (1) provide federal assistance to state and local governments 
     in the event of a biological attack; (2) improve public 
     health, hospital, laboratory, communications, and emergency 
     response preparedness and responsiveness at the state and 
     local levels; (3) rapidly develop and manufacture needed 
     therapies, vaccines, and medical supplies; and (4) enhance 
     the safety of the nation's food supply and protect its 
     agriculture from biological threats and attacks.


        Title II--Improving the Federal Response to Bioterrorism

       Title II requires the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services (HHS) to report to Congress within one year of 
     enactment, and biennially thereafter, on progress made toward 
     meeting the objectives of the Act. It provides statutory 
     authorization for the strategic national pharmaceutical 
     stockpile, provides additional resources to the Centers for 
     Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to carry out education 
     and training initiatives and to improve the nation's federal 
     laboratory capacity, and establishes a National Disaster 
     Medical Response System of volunteers to respond, at the 
     Secretary's direction, respond to national public health 
     emergencies (with full liability protection, re-employment 
     rights, and other worker protections for such volunteers 
     similar to those currently provided to those who join the 
     National Guard).
       The bill further amends and clarifies the procedures for 
     declaring a national public health emergency and expands the 
     authority of the Secretary during the emergency period. In 
     declaring such an emergency, the Secretary must notify 
     Congress within 48 hours. Such emergency period may not be 
     longer than 180 days, unless the Secretary determines 
     otherwise and notifies Congress of such determination. During 
     that emergency period, the Secretary may waive certain data 
     submittal and reporting deadlines.
       A recent report by the General Accounting Office raised 
     concerns about the lack of coordination of federal anti-
     bioterrorism efforts. Therefore, the bill contains a number 
     of measures to enhance coordination and cooperation among 
     various federal agencies. Title II establishes an Assistant 
     Secretary for Emergency Preparedness at HHS to coordinate all 
     functions within the Department relating to emergency 
     preparedness, including preparing for and responding to 
     biological threats and attacks.
       Title II also creates an interdepartmental Working Group on 
     Bioterrorism that includes the Secretaries of HHS, Defense, 
     Veteran's Affairs, Labor, and Agriculture, the Director of 
     the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Attorney General 
     of the United States, and other appropriate federal 
     officials. The Working Group consolidates and streamlines the 
     functions of two existing working groups first established 
     under the ``Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 
     2000.'' It is responsible for coordinating the development of 
     bioterrorism countermeasures, research on pathogens likely to 
     be used in a biological attack, shared standards for 
     equipment to detect and protect against from biological 
     pathogens, national preparedness and response for biological 
     threats or attacks, and other matters.
       Title II also establishes two advisory committees to the 
     Secretary. The National Task Force on Children and Terrorism 
     will report on measures necessary to ensure that the health 
     needs of children are met in preparing for and responding to 
     any potential biological attack or event. The Emergency 
     Public Information and Communications Task Force will report 
     on appropriate ways to communicate to the public information 
     regarding bioterrorism. Both of these committees sunset after 
     one year.
       The title also contains a Congressional recommendation that 
     there be established an official federal internet website on 
     bioterrorism to provide information to the public, health 
     professionals, and others on matters relevant to 
     bioterrorism. The title further requires that states have a 
     coordinated plan for providing information relevant to 
     bioterrorism to the public.
       Additionally, Title II helps the federal government better 
     track and control biological agents and toxins. The Secretary 
     of HHS is required to review and update a list of biological 
     agents and toxins that could pose a severe threat to public 
     health and safety and to enhance regulations regarding the 
     possession, use, and transfer of such agents or toxins. 
     Violations of these regulations could trigger civil penalties 
     of up to $500,000, and criminal sanctions may be imposed. 
     Existing law already regulates the transfer of these 
     pathogens.


     title iii--improving state and local preparedness capabilities

       Numerous reports in recent years have found the nation's 
     public health infrastructure lacking in its ability to 
     respond to biological threats or other emergencies. For 
     example, nearly 20 percent of local public health departments 
     have no e-mail capability, and fewer than half have high-
     speed Internet or broadcast facsimile transmission 
     capabilities. Before September 11, only one in five U.S. 
     hospitals had bioterrorism preparedness plans in place.
       Title III addresses this situation by including several 
     enhanced grant programs to improve state and local public 
     health preparedness. In addition to converting the current 
     public health core capacity grants established under the 
     ``Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000'' to non-
     competitive grants, the bill replaces the current 319F 
     competitive bioterrorism grant with a new state bioterrorism 
     emergency program that provides resources to states based on 
     population and that would guarantee each state a minimum 
     level of funding for preparedness activities. States must 
     develop bioterrorism preparedness plans to be eligible for 
     such funding. Activities funded under this grant include 
     conducting an assessment of core public health capacities, 
     achieving the core public health capacities, and fulfilling 
     the bioterrorism preparedness plan. This program would only 
     be authorized for two years.
       The bill also establishes a new grant program for hospitals 
     that are part of consortia with public health agencies, and 
     counties or cities. To be eligible for the grant, the 
     hospital's grant proposal must be consistent with their 
     state's bioterrorism preparedness plan. Using these grants, 
     hospitals with acquire the capacity to serve as regional 
     resources during a bioterrorist attack. This program is 
     authorized for five years.

[[Page S11953]]

      title iv--developing new countermeasure against bioterrorism

       To better respond to bioterrorism, Title IV expands our 
     nation's stockpile of smallpox vaccine and critical 
     pharmaceuticals and devices. The bill also expands research 
     on biological agents and toxins, as well as new treatments 
     and vaccines for such agents and toxins.
       Since the effectiveness of vaccines, drugs, and 
     therapeutics for many biological agents and toxins often may 
     not ethically be tested in humans, Title IV ensures that the 
     Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will finalize by a date 
     certain its rule regarding the approval of new 
     countermeasures on the basis of animal data. Priority 
     countermeasures will also be given enhanced consideration for 
     expedited review by the FDA.
       Because of the lack of or limitations on a market for 
     vaccines for these agents and toxins, Title IV gives the 
     Secretary of HHS authority to enter into long-term contracts 
     with sponsors to ``guarantee'' that the government will 
     purchase a certain quantity of a vaccine at a certain price. 
     The government has the authority, through an existing 
     Executive Order, to ensure that sponsors through these 
     contracts will be indemnified by the government for the 
     development, manufacture and use of the product as prescribed 
     in the contract.
       Title IV also provides a limited antitrust exemption to 
     allow potential sponsors to discuss and agree upon how to 
     develop, manufacture, and produce new countermeasures, 
     including vaccines, and drugs. Federal Trade Commission and 
     the Department of Justice approval of such agreements is 
     required to ensure such agreements are not anti-competitive.


              Title V--PROTECTING OUR NATION'S FOOD SUPPLY

       With 57,000 establishments under its jurisdiction and only 
     700-800 food inspectors, including 175 import inspectors for 
     more than 300 ports of entry, FDA needs increased resources 
     for inspections of imported food. The President's emergency 
     relief budget included a request for $61 million to enable 
     FDA to hire 410 new inspectors, lab specialists and other 
     experts, as well as invest in new technology and equipment to 
     monitor food imports.
       Title V grants FDA needed authorities to ensure the safety 
     of domestic and imported food. It allows FDA to use qualified 
     employees from other agencies and departments to help conduct 
     food inspections. Any domestic or foreign facility that 
     manufacturers or processes food for use in the U.S. must 
     register with FDA. Importers must provide at least four hours 
     notice of the food, the country of origin, and the amount of 
     food to be imported. FDA also receives authority to prevent 
     ``port-shopping'' by making food shipments denied entry at 
     one U.S. port to ensure such shipments to do reappear at 
     another U.S. port.
       The bill gives additional tools to FDA to ensure proper 
     records are maintained by those who manufacture, process, 
     pack, transport, distribute, receive, hold or import food. 
     The FDA's ability to inspect such records will strengthen 
     their ability to trace the source and chain of distribution 
     of food and to determine the scope and cause of the 
     adulteration or misbranding that presents a threat of serious 
     adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals. 
     Importantly, the bill also enables FDA to detain food after 
     an inspection for a limited period of time if such food is 
     believed to present a threat of serious adverse health 
     consequences or death to humans or animals. The FDA may also 
     debar imports from a person who engages in a pattern of 
     seeking to import such food.
       Title V also includes several measures to help safeguard 
     the nation's agriculture industry from the threats of 
     bioterrorism. Toward this end, it contains a series of grants 
     and incentives to help encourage the development of vaccines 
     and antidotes to protect the nation's food supply, livestock, 
     or crops, as well as preventing crop and livestock diseases 
     from finding their way to our fields and feedlots.
       It also authorizes emergency funding to update and 
     modernize USDA research facilities at the Plum Island Animal 
     Disease Laboratory in New York, the National Animal Disease 
     Center in Iowa, the Southwest Poultry Research Laboratory in 
     Georgia, and the Animal Disease Research Laboratory in 
     Wyoming. Also, it funds training and implements a rapid 
     response strategy through a consortium of universities, the 
     USDA, and agricultural industry groups.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it is a privilege to join my 
distinguished colleague, Senator Frist, to introduce this bipartisan 
legislation to respond to one of the most severe dangers of terrorism, 
the grave threat of bioterrorist attacks. I commend Senator Frist for 
his impressive continuing leadership on this vital issue.
  We are all well aware of the emergency we face. In recent weeks, 15 
anthrax cases stretched our health care system to the breaking point. A 
larger attack could be a disaster for whole communities of Americans. 
The anthrax attack of the past weeks has sounded the alarm. The clock 
is ticking on America's preparedness for a future attack. We've had the 
clearest possible warning, and we can't afford to ignore it. We know 
that hundreds, even millions, of lives may be at stake--and we're not 
ready yet.
  The needs are great. A summit meeting of experts in bioterrorism and 
public health concluded that $835 million was needed just to address 
the most pressing needs for public health at the State and local 
levels.
  The National Governor's Association has said that states need $2 
billion to improve readiness for bioterrorism. John Hopkins is spending 
$7.5 million to improve its ability to serve as a regional bioterrorism 
resource for Baltimore. Equipping just one hospital to this level in 
each of 100 cities across America would cost $750 million.
  Clearly, our legislation is an important downpayment on preparedness. 
But we must make sure that our commitment to achieving full readiness 
is sustained in the weeks and months to come.
  Since September 11, the American people have supported our commitment 
of billions of dollars and thousands of troops to battle terrorism 
abroad. But Americans also want to be safe at home. We have an 
obligation to every American that we will do no less to protect them 
against terrorism at home than we do to fight terrorism abroad.
  The need for help at the State and local level is especially urgent. 
In the first 3 weeks of October alone, State health departments spent a 
quarter billion dollars responding to the anthrax attack. Many 
departments were forced to put aside other major public health 
responsibilities.
  Hospitals across the country have immediate needs. According to the 
American Public Health Association, hospitals are hard-pressed even 
during a heavy flu season, and could not cope with a lethal contagious 
disease like smallpox.
  The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act we are proposing will address these 
deficiencies. It provides new resources for bioterrorism preparedness 
to the States under a formula that guarantees help to each State. These 
resources will be available to improve hospital readiness, equip 
emergency personnel, enhance State planning, and strengthen the ability 
of public health agencies to detect and contain dangerous disease 
outbreaks.
  Federal stockpiles of antibiotics, vaccines, and other medical 
supplies are an essential part of the national response. We have a 
strategic petroleum reserve to safeguard our energy supply in times of 
crisis. We need a strategic pharmaceutical reserve as well, to ensure 
that we have the medicines and vaccines stockpiled to respond to 
bioterrorist attacks. Our legislation establishes this reserve, and 
authorizes the development of sufficient smallpox and other vaccines to 
meet the needs of the entire U.S. population.
  The legislation will also help protect the safety of the food supply, 
through increased research and survelliance of dangerous agricultural 
pathogens.
  Every day we delay means that States can't buy the equipment to 
improve their labs and hire the personnel they need. It means another 
day in which hospitals can't purchase stocks of antibiotics or add 
emergency room capacity. It means further delay in building up 
pharmaceutical stockpiles and producing essential vaccines. We face an 
extraordinary threat, and we must take immediate action to combat it.
  Our legislation draws on the work and suggestions of numerous 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle. One of the important areas 
addressed in the legislation is the threat of agricultural 
bioterrorism. Deliberate introduction of animal diseases could pose 
grave dangers to the safety of the food supply. Such acts of 
agricultural bioterrorism would also be economically devastating. The 
outbreaks of ``mad cow'' disease in Europe cost over $10 billion, and 
the foot and mouth outbreak cost billions more. We must guard against 
this danger.

  Protecting the safety of the food supply is a central concern in 
addressing the problem of bioterrorism. Senator Clinton, Senator 
Mikulski, Senator Harkin, Senator Collins and Senator Durbin have all 
contributed thoughtful proposals about food safety. Our bill will 
enable FDA and USDA to protect the Nation's food supply more 
effectively.

[[Page S11954]]

  We're grateful for the leadership of other Senators who have made 
significant contributions to this legislation. Senator Bayh and Senator 
Edwards contributed important proposals on providing block grants to 
states, so that each State will be able to increase its preparedness. 
Their proposal ensures that each state will receive at least a minimum 
level of funding.
  We're also grateful for the contributions that many of our 
distinguished colleagues have made to address the special needs of 
children. Senator Dodd, Senator Collins, Senator Clinton, Senator 
DeWine and Senator Murray have emphasized the crucial needs of children 
relating to bioterrorism. The legislation includes important 
initiatives to provide for the special needs of children and other 
vulnerable populations.
  The events of recent weeks have shown the importance of effective 
communication with the public. Our legislation incorporates proposals 
on improving communication offered by several of our colleagues. 
Senator Carnahan has recognized the importance of the internet in 
providing information to the public. The legislation includes the 
provisions of her legislation to establish the official Federal 
internet site on bioterrorism, to help inform the public.
  Senator Mikulski also contributed provisions on improving 
communication with the public. The high level, blue ribbon task force 
can provide vitally needed insights on how best to provide information 
to the public. Senator Mikulski also recommended ways to ensure that 
states have coordinated plans for communicating information about 
bioterrorism and other emergencies to the public.
  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have a leading role in 
responding to bioterrorism. Senator Cleland has been an effective and 
skillful advocate for the needs of the CDC. Our legislation today 
incorporates many of the proposals introduced by Senator Cleland in his 
legislation on public health authorities.
  Hospitals are also one of the keys to an effective response to 
bioterrorism. We must do more to strengthen the ability of the nation's 
hospitals to cope with bioterrorism. Senator Corzine has proposed to 
strengthen designated hospitals to serve as regional resources for 
bioterrorism preparedness, I commend him for his thoughtful proposal, 
which we have incorporated into the legislation.
  We must also ensure that we monitor dangerous biological agents that 
might be used for bioterrorism. There is a serious loophole in current 
regulations, and we are grateful for the proposals offered by Senator 
Durbin and Senator Feinstein to achieve more effective control of these 
pathogens.
  In a biological threat or attack, mental health care will be 
extremely important. We are indebted to Senator Wellstone for his 
skillful and compassionate advocacy for the needs of those with mental 
illnesses. In the event of a terrorist attack, thousands of persons 
would have mental health needs, and our legislation includes key 
proposals by Senator Wellstone to address these needs.
  Mobilizing the nation's pharmaceutical and biotech companies so that 
they can fully contribute to this effort is critical. Senators Leahy, 
Hatch, DeWine, and Kohl made thoughtful contributions to the antitrust 
provisions of the bill, which will help encourage a helpful public-
private partnership to combat bioterrorism.
  This legislation is urgent because the need to prepare for a 
bioterrorist attack is urgent. I look forward to its prompt passage so 
that the American people can have the protection they need.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I am proud to be an original cosponsor of 
the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, a comprehensive package of measures 
to improve our Nation's capability to respond to a future biological 
weapons attack against the United States. This bill, introduced by 
Senators Kennedy and Frist, would authorize $3.25 billion in funding 
for fiscal year 2002, a substantial boost in resources for the measures 
outlined in the bill. I applaud Senators Kennedy and Frist for coming 
together in a bipartisan spirit and putting forth a bill that takes the 
first important step towards truly protecting our Nation against future 
acts of bioterrorism. When Sam Nunn testified in early September before 
the Foreign Relations Committee on the threat posed by biological 
weapons, he was very clear, bioterrorism is a direct threat to the 
national security of the United States and we need to invest the 
necessary resources to counter this threat accordingly.
  As troubling as the recent spate of anthrax by mail attacks was, we 
were very fortunate that this was a comparatively small-scale attack. 
Seventeen Americans contracted inhalation or cutaneous anthrax; 
unfortunately, four individuals died. The next time a biological 
weapons attack occurs, we may not be so fortunate in dealing with a 
small number of victims who emerge over a period of weeks. Instead, we 
may face thousands of victims flooding local emergency rooms and 
overwhelming our hospitals in a matter of hours. Let's be real here, 
the anthrax attacks, as small-scale as they have been, have greatly 
stressed our national public health infrastructure. One out of every 
eight Centers for Disease Control employees at their headquarters in 
Atlanta is working on the current anthrax outbreak, forcing the CDC to 
sideline other essential core activities for the time being. Folks, 
what we have just been through is small potatoes compared to what we 
potentially will face. Plain and simple, we can't afford to be so 
underprepared in the future.
  Among Sam Nunn's recommendations for countering biological terrorism, 
he declared, ``We need to recognize the central role of public health 
and medicine in this effort and engage these professionals fully as 
partners on the national security team.'' There are many good things in 
this bill, ranging from the expansion of the National Pharmaceutical 
Stockpile to efforts to enhance food safety, but I am especially please 
that the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act provides direct grants to 
improve the public health infrastructure at the State and local level. 
Our doctors, nurses, emergency medical technicians, and other public 
health personnel are our eyes and ears on the ground for detecting a 
biological weapons attack. We can't afford not to do everything we can 
to make sure they have the necessary tools and resources in containing 
any BW attack. This bill goes a long way towards fulfilling that core 
commitment.

  So I strongly support the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act and I look 
forward to its early passage and entry into law before the Congress 
adjourns for the year. But I am deeply concerned that the bill ignores 
the international aspects to any effective response to potential 
bioterrorism. As chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, I know 
that we cannot address the threat of bioterrorism within the borders of 
the United States alone.
  Let me be clear, a biological weapons attack need not originate in 
the United States to pose a threat to our Nation. A dangerous pathogen 
deliberately released anywhere in the world can quickly spread to the 
United States in a matter of days, if not hours. The scope and 
frequency of international trade, travel, and migration patterns offer 
unlimited opportunities for pathogens to spread across national borders 
and even to move from one continent to another. Therefore, we need to 
view all infectious disease epidemics, wherever they occur, as a 
potential threat to all nations.
  It is for this reason that Senator Helms, the distinguished ranking 
member on the Foreign Relations Committee, and I worked together in 
seeking to insert provisions in this bill to enhance global disease 
monitoring and surveillance. With Senator Kennedy's strong backing, we 
wanted to ensure the full availability of information, i.e. disease 
characteristics, pathogen strains, transmission patterns, on infectious 
epidemics overseas that may provide clues indicating possible illegal 
biological weapons use or research. Even if an infectious disease 
outbreak occurs naturally, improved monitoring and surveillance can 
help contain the epidemic and tip off scientists and public health 
professionals to new diseases that may be used as biological weapons in 
the future.
  The World Health Organization, WHO, established a formal worldwide 
network last year, called the Global Alert and Response Network, to 
monitor and track infectious disease outbreaks in every region of the 
world.

[[Page S11955]]

The WHO has done an impressive job so far working on a shoestring 
budget. But this global network is only as good as its components, 
individual nations. Many developing nations simply do not possess the 
personnel, laboratory equipment or public health infrastructure to 
track disease patterns and detect traditional and emerging pathogens. 
In fact, these nations often just seek to keep up in treating those who 
have already fallen ill.

  Doctors and nurses in many developing countries only treat a small 
fraction of the patients who may be ill with a specific infectious 
disease--in effect, they are only witnessing the tip of a potentially 
much larger iceberg. According to the National Intelligence Council, 
governments in developing countries in Africa and Asia have established 
rudimentary or no systems at all for disease surveillance, response or 
prevention. For example, in 1994, an outbreak of plague occurred in 
India, resulting in 56 deaths and billions of dollars of economic 
damage as trade and travel with India ground to a halt. The plague 
outbreak was so severe because Indian authorities did not catch the 
epidemic in its early stages. Authorities had ignored or failed to 
respond to routine complaints of flea infestation, a sure warning 
signal for plague.
  Owing to the lack of resources, developing nations are the weak spots 
in global disease monitoring and surveillance. Without shoring up these 
nations' capabilities to detect and contain disease outbreaks, we are 
leaving the entire world vulnerable to either a deliberate biological 
weapons attack or an especially virulent naturally occurring epidemic.
  Therefore, Senator Helms and I worked together in proposing language 
for this bill to authorize $150 million in fiscal year 02 and fiscal 
year 03 to strengthen the capabilities of individual nations in the 
developing world to detect, diagnose, and contain infectious disease 
epidemics. The proposed title would have helped train entry-level 
public health professionals from developing countries and provide 
grants for the acquisition of modern laboratory and communications 
equipment essential to any effective disease surveillance network. Upon 
first glance, $150 million is chump change in a bill that authorizes 
more than $3 billion. But I have been assured by public health experts 
that $150 million alone can go a long ways in making sure that 
developing countries acquire the basic disease surveillance and 
monitoring capabilities to effectively contribute to the WHO's global 
network. The bottom line is that these provisions would have offered an 
inexpensive, commonsense solution to a problem of global proportions.
  I was greatly disappointed, therefore, when the White House weighed 
in late in the negotiations and expressed its strong insistence that 
the language Senator Helms and I worked out should be dropped from this 
bill. While administration officials assured me that they liked our 
ideas, they asserted any bioterrorism bill passed this year should only 
include those provisions that carry a domestic focus and meet the test 
of urgency.

  Let me respond to those arguments. It is extremely short-sighted to 
draw artificial boundaries between ``domestic'' and ``international'' 
responses to bioterrorism. I have already pointed out that pathogens 
deliberately released in an attack anywhere in the world can quickly 
spread to the United States if we are unable to contain the epidemic at 
its source. The National Intelligence Council has concluded that 
infectious diseases are a real threat to U.S. national security. To 
ignore the international arena in favor of domestic solutions alone is 
profoundly misguided. As for urgency, I can think of few things more 
urgent than taking the necessary steps to respond to bioterrorism in a 
global context. Americans have been repeatedly warned by their 
government leaders to expect other terrorist attacks in the near 
future; we cannot limit ourselves to thinking these attacks will occur 
in a conventional form or location. Just this fall, the WHO has had to 
respond to natural outbreaks of hemorrhagic fever in Pakistan and 
yellow fever in the Ivory Coast. An effective global disease 
surveillance network cannot come into existence soon enough.
  I therefore intend to offer an amendment, when this bill comes to the 
floor later this year, to re-insert the provisions to enhance the 
capabilities of developing nations to track, diagnose, and contain 
disease outbreaks resulting from both BW attacks and naturally 
occurring epidemics. It is not my intention to slow down this overall 
bill or raise any obstacles; on the contrary, I want to see 
comprehensive bioterrorism legislation reach the President's desk this 
year. But we cannot address the full scope of the threat posed by 
biological weapons without including the international component of the 
solution.
  Let me close with an excerpt of testimony from the Foreign Relations 
Committee hearing on bioterrorism in September from Dr. D.A. Henderson, 
the man who spearheaded the international campaign to eradicate 
smallpox in the 1970s. Today, he is the director of the newly-formed 
Office of Emergency Preparedness in the Department of Health and Human 
Services, which has the mandate to help organize the Federal 
Government's response to future bioterrorist attacks. Dr. Henderson was 
very clear on the value of global disease surveillance: ``In 
cooperation with the WHO and other countries, we need to strengthen 
greatly our intelligence gathering capability. A focus on international 
surveillance and on scientist-to-scientist communication will be 
necessary if we are to have an early warning about the possible 
development and production of biological weapons by rogue nations or 
groups.'' I am hopeful that a majority of my colleagues will recognize 
we cannot leave the rest of the world to fend for itself in combating 
biological weapons and infectious diseases in general if we are to 
ensure America's security as well.
  Mrs. CARNAHAN. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the 
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act. I am proud to join Senator Kennedy, 
Senator Frist, and Senator Gregg as an original cosponsor of this 
timely bipartisan legislation. Senator Kennedy and Senator Frist have 
been leaders on this issue even before the events of September 11. In 
June of 2000, they introduced the Public Health Threats and Emergencies 
Act, which was enacted into law last year.
  The recent anthrax attacks have shown that Congress must do much more 
to prepare our country for possible future bioterrorist attacks. We 
need to e4nsure that all of our communities across the country, both 
rural and urban, are equipped to respond to a bioterrorism attack in 
the event that such an unfortunate act should occur.
  The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act would put in place a comprehensive 
national strategy to combat bioterrorism. This legislation would 
improve preparedness at the Federal, State, and local levels. It would 
increase investments in public health surveillance systems and public 
health laboratories to improve our ability to detect an attack. 
Moreover, the Act would strengthen our ability to contain the spread of 
a bioterrorism attack by increasing the Nation's stockpile of vaccines 
and treatments.
  One critical component of a national strategy on bioterrorism is 
communication between the government and the public. Americans have 
many questions about what bioterrorism is and how they can protect 
their families. They need a reliable source of information where they 
can go to get accurate answers to their questions, thereby alleviating 
some of their anxiety and fears. Several weeks ago, I introduced the 
Bioterrorism Awareness Act, S. 1548, to address this need. S. 1548 
calls for the creation of a single website containing information on 
bioterrorism that would serve as the official federal government source 
of information for the public. This website will provide ``one-stop 
shopping'' for people who need to find answers to questions about 
bioterrorism. For so many of us, the fear of bioterrorism is a fear of 
the unknown. Knowledge is power, and the more knowledge we have about 
terrorism, the more power we have to overcome our fears.
  I am pleased that my proposal has been included as a key part of the 
national communications strategy in the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act. 
This legislation calls for the creation of a new official Federal 
website to serve as the definitive source of bioterrorism for the 
public and other targeted populations. For example, farmers and others 
individuals involved in the Nation's

[[Page S11956]]

food supply need accurate information on bioterrorism. This website 
would include information geared specifically towards the needs of 
agricultural workers and the unique challenges they might encounter in 
the event of a bioterrorism attack on our food supply. I encourage the 
development of this website as soon as possible.
  The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act also contains other provisions 
aimed at protecting our food supply. It recognizes that our Nation's 
food supply cannot be left vulnerable to a terrorist attack. The bill 
would authorize funds to increase the Food and Drug Administration's 
authority to perform food inspections. It would also authorize funds to 
improve security at facilities belonging to the Department of 
Agriculture, the Department of Health and Human Services, and 
universities across the country, where potential animal and plant 
pathogens are housed or researched.
  I know that farmers in Missouri, as well as across the country, are 
concerned about protecting their crops and livestock. A terrorist 
attack on these targets has the potential to not only disrupt the food 
supply in the U.S., but throughout the world. The potential economic 
impact on farmers' livelihood would be devastating to them and their 
families. The food safety provisions in this bill go far in protecting 
this essential national resource.
  Another key component in dealing with bioterrorism is providing 
states with the resources to be equipped to respond. The bill would 
award block grants to states for improving preparedness and 
coordination in the event of an attack. These grants would allow States 
to improve their surveillance and detection capabilities. Further, they 
would allow states to bolster their public health infrastructure to 
best protect the public from an attack.
  These block grants are especially important because when it comes to 
protecting our nation from terrorism, the Federal Government cannot do 
it alone. We need the cooperation and support of State and local 
governments to protect the citizens at all levels. These funds will 
help ensure that State governments have the resources they need to 
prevent and respond to a bioterrorism attack.
  This bipartisan legislation would allow our Nation to improve its 
ability to prevent, detect, contain, and respond to a possible 
bioterrorist attack. In this time of uncertainty, preparation is our 
best defense. This bill provides the necessary resources to strengthen 
that defense throughout all levels of government--Federal, State, and 
local. I urge my colleagues to support the ``Bioterrorism Preparedness 
Act'' and to act on it expeditiously.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, along with Senators Frist, Roberts, 
Collins, Bond, Hagel, Snowe, DeWine, and other colleagues, I rise today 
in support of the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001.
  As the fight against terrorism heats up, it is critical that we 
dedicate sufficient resources to the growing threat of bioterrorism. 
This legislation will enhance the capabilities of Federal, State, and 
local governments to coordinate emergency preparedness efforts, 
stockpile vaccines and medical supplies, link channels of 
communication, modernize biosecurity facilities, and ensure the safety 
of America's health and food supply. In other words, it will help the 
U.S. protect its citizens.
  I am proud to have worked with my colleague, Senator Roberts, to 
address the concerns about our food supply and vital agricultural 
economies. The agricultural bioterrorism provisions in this legislation 
will authorize the U.S. Department of Agriculture, USDA, to strengthen 
its capacities to identify, prepare for, and respond to such 
bioterrorism threats to our farms, ranches, livestock, poultry, crops, 
and food processing, packaging, and distribution facilities and 
systems.
  We have a clear priority to ensure the safety of our food, and to 
maintain the public's confidence regarding this. To do so, we must 
identify and quickly control the threats to our food supply, currently 
the world's safest and most abundant and affordable.
  Bioterrorism has always been a question of when it would strike, not 
could it occur, especially since the cold war. During the cold war, it 
was known that the former Soviet Union had a bio-weapons program that 
included bio-agents aimed at agriculture, while during the gulf war our 
own soldiers have shown evidence of possible use of biological weapons. 
From the terrorist attacks on Japan's subway system to the foot-and-
mouth and ``mad-cow'' disease outbreaks in Europe to the recent anthrax 
attacks here, even the public is now acutely aware of this threat.
  For this reason, this bill is critical, both for the results it will 
achieve and the reassurance it will provide. USDA will be expanded to 
enhance inspection capability, implement new information technology, 
and develop methods for rapid detection and identification of plant and 
animal disease. USDA's Veterinary Services will be authorized to 
establish cooperative agreements with state animal health commissions 
and regulatory agencies for livestock and poultry health, and private 
veterinary practitioners to enhance its ability to respond to outbreaks 
of animal disease.
  We must emphasize and promote collaboration to strengthen America's 
research and development capacity. Therefore, USDA is instructed to 
establish a Consortium for Countermeasures Against Agricultural 
Bioterrorism to form long-term programs of research and development to 
enhance the biosecurity of U.S. Agriculture. America's institutes of 
higher education that have a demonstrated expertise in animal and plant 
disease research, strong linkages with diagnostic laboratories, and 
strong coordination with state cooperative extension programs will 
provide the resources and expertise that will prove invaluable in the 
war on agricultural bioterrorism.
  This is the first modern war where the front lines lie on our own 
shores, farms and fields, but I know we are up to the challenge, 
especially as Texas will proudly serve as one of the States on the 
first lines of defense for our entire country. States where agriculture 
is critical are vulnerable to a bioterrorism attack, but they will also 
prove invaluable in the war on bioterrorism when they provide the first 
evidence of an attack.
  To protect our citizens, our economy and our food supply, I urge my 
colleagues to support the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001.
                                 ______