[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 158 (Thursday, November 15, 2001)]
[House]
[Pages H8217-H8219]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SUDAN PEACE ACT
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
the Committee on International Relations be discharged from further
consideration of the Senate bill (S. 180) to facilitate famine relief
efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan, and ask for
its immediate consideration in the House.
The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from New Jersey?
There was no objection.
The Clerk read the Senate bill, as follows:
S. 180
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecution
of the war against areas outside of its control, which has
already cost more than 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more
than 4,000,000.
(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored
peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best
chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of
human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
(3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian
relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the
effort to bring an end to the war.
(4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
(5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas
of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan,
the absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a
major impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese
people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace
process.
(6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among
peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government
of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques
to subjugate their population, and internationally sponsored
reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in
reducing the tactic's effectiveness and human suffering.
(7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and organizing
militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units
for raiding and slaving parties in areas outside of the
control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to severely
disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain
themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of
bans on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war
through selective starvation and to minimize the Government
of Sudan's accountability internationally.
(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it
intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to
increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas
outside its control.
(9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport
flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation
Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able
to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people
from the United States and other donor countries as a
devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the
Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the
Government's control.
(10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in
delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS
have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in
OLS and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food
donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
(11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan
facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the
population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the
Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption
of their ability to sustain themselves.
(12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal,
Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded
completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently
placing their populations at increased risk of famine.
(13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000 per
day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the
immediate food needs of the recipients, the current
international relief operations are neither sustainable nor
desirable in the long term.
(14) The ability of populations to defend themselves
against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan's
control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of
the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within
officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the
battlefield can be achieved.
(15) The United States should use all means of pressure
available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war
in Sudan, including--
[[Page H8218]]
(A) the multilateralization of economic and diplomatic
tools to compel the Government of Sudan to enter into a good
faith peace process;
(B) the support or creation of viable democratic civil
authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside
government control;
(C) continued active support of people-to-people
reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside of
government control;
(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide
humanitarian relief to those areas; and
(E) cooperation among the trading partners of the United
States and within multilateral institutions toward those
ends.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan''
means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum,
Sudan.
(2) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief
operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and
participating relief organizations known as ``Operation
Lifeline Sudan''.
SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES,
AND TACTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.
Congress hereby--
(1) condemns--
(A) violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict
in Sudan;
(B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights record,
with regard to both the prosecution of the war and the denial
of basic human and political rights to all Sudanese;
(C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role of the
Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating the practice;
and
(D) the Government of Sudan's use and organization of
``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'', Popular Defense Forces
(PDF), and regular Sudanese Army units into organized and
coordinated raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal,
the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and
(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air
transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use
of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food
shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the
societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and
Nuba peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.
SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED PEACE
PROCESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress hereby recognizes that--
(1) a single viable, internationally and regionally
sanctioned peace process holds the greatest opportunity to
promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in
Sudan; and
(2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best made
through a peace process based on the Declaration of
Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994.
(b) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of
State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the
Department of State for the support of--
(1) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of
Sudan and opposition forces;
(2) any necessary peace settlement planning or
implementation; and
(3) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a
peace process in Sudan.
SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United Nations should be used as a tool to
facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and
(2) the President, acting through the United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should seek
to--
(A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline Sudan to end the
veto power of the Government of Sudan over the plans by
Operation Lifeline Sudan for air transport of relief flights
and, by doing so, to end the manipulation of the delivery of
those relief supplies to the advantage of the Government of
Sudan on the battlefield;
(B) investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan and
provide mechanisms for its elimination; and
(C) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of Sudan each
time it subjects civilians to aerial bombardment.
SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections (d)
and (f), the report required by subsection (d) shall
include--
``(1) a description of the sources and current status of
Sudan's financing and construction of oil exploitation
infrastructure and pipelines, the effects on the inhabitants
of the oil fields regions of such financing and construction,
and the Government of Sudan's ability to finance the war in
Sudan;
``(2) a description of the extent to which that financing
was secured in the United States or with involvement of
United States citizens;
``(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial
bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in areas
outside its control, including targets, frequency, and best
estimates of damage; and
``(4) a description of the extent to which humanitarian
relief has been obstructed or manipulated by the Government
of Sudan or other forces for the purposes of the war in
Sudan.''.
SEC. 8. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF
EFFORTS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS
agencies in the distribution of relief supplies in southern
Sudan.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a detailed
report to Congress describing the progress made toward
carrying out subsection (a).
SEC. 9. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF
FLIGHTS.
(a) Plan.--The President shall develop a contingency plan
to provide, outside United Nations auspices if necessary, the
greatest possible amount of United States Government and
privately donated relief to all affected areas in Sudan,
including the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in
the event the Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial,
or incremental ban on OLS air transport relief flights.
(b) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, in carrying out the plan developed under
subsection (a), the President may reprogram up to 100 percent
of the funds available for support of OLS operations (but for
this subsection) for the purposes of the plan.
SEC. 10. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR EXCLUSIONARY ``NO GO''
AREAS OF SUDAN.
(a) Pilot Project Activities.--The President, acting
through the United States Agency for International
Development, is authorized and requested to undertake,
immediately, pilot project activities to provide food and
other humanitarian assistance, as appropriate, to vulnerable
populations in Sudan that are residing in exclusionary ``no
go'' areas of Sudan.
(b) Study.--The President, acting through the United States
Agency for International Development, shall conduct a study
examining the adverse impact upon indigenous Sudan
communities by OLS policies that curtail direct humanitarian
assistance to exclusionary ``no go'' areas of Sudan.
(c) Exclusionary ``No Go'' Areas of Sudan Defined.--In this
section, the term ``exclusionary `no go' areas of Sudan''
means areas of Sudan designated by OLS for curtailment of
direct humanitarian assistance, including, but not limited
to, the Nuba Mountains, the Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile
Motion Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I offer a motion.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Smith of New Jersey moved to strike out all after the
enacting clause of the bill S. 180 and insert in lieu thereof
the text of H.R. 2052 as passed by the House.
Mr. TOWNS. Madam Speaker, I rise today to express my concern over
proposals that would deny investors and issuers access to the U.S.
capital markets. As the House prepares to go to conference with the
Senate on the Sudan Peace Act (S. 180/H.R. 2052), I would like to urge
my colleagues to take a close look at the provisions of the bill that
would impose such sanctions.
I am fully aware of the human rights atrocities that are going on in
Sudan. As Congress works to develop policies to end the violence is
important that we be careful and prudent and not act in ways that
damage our economy, the free flow of capital, or create greater
uncertainty in our capital markets.
Closing the U.S. capital markets in order to influence the behavior
of foreign countries sets a poor policy precedent that might easily
provoke other countries to pursue their own foreign policy objectives
through similar sanctions. The continued health of our capital markets
is dependent on economic and political certainty and predictability.
The historic U.S. commitment to open and fair markets has been
fundamental to the U.S. financial service sector's ability to nurture
and establish a substantial foreign client base.
The imposition of capital markets sanctions could have the unintended
effects of redirecting business out of the United States and eroding
the certainty and predictability that have been fundamental to the
preeminence of the U.S. capital markets. Moreover, capital markets
sanctions would seriously disrupt investor confidence--both domestic
and foreign--in the U.S. markets, thereby jeopardizing their continued
vibrancy. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said ``the motive of
the legislation, I think, obviously commendable, but I think it's not
been thoroughly thought through and I don't think that the implications
of this particular type of statute is useful to the United States and,
indeed, I think it is downright harmful.''
Capital markets sanctions have never been imposed by the U.S. These
types of sanctions would seriously disrupt investor confidence--both
domestic and foreign--in the U.S. markets, thereby jeopardizing their
continued vibrancy. The imposition of capital markets sanctions could
also have the unintended effects of redirecting business out of the
United States and eroding the certainty and predictability that have
been fundamental to the preeminence of the U.S. capital markets. U.S.
investors--pension funds, other institutional investors, and
individuals--would see the liquidity, and the value, of substantial
amounts of
[[Page H8219]]
their holdings drop precipitately even at the suggestion that companies
in which they are invested would be forced to delist from U.S.
exchanges.
In sum Madam Speaker, I believe it is a mistake to unilaterally try
to resolve complex foreign policy issues through an untested formula
that would greatly impair the U.S. capital markets. The goals of the
Sudan Peace Act are laudable, but I object to capital markets sanctions
that are included in the bill. As the House prepares to consider the
Sudan Peace Act, I urge my colleagues to continue pursuing open and
fair financial markets and reject these types of sanctions.
Mr. NEY. Madam Speaker, due to the recent tragedies on U.S. soil we
are in the position to find ways to stop terrorist attacks. As Congress
works to develop these policies it is important that we be careful to
not accidentally damage legitimate American jobs. We must act in ways
that do not damage our economy, the free flow of capital, or create
greater uncertainty in our capital markets.
I am extremely concerned over proposals that would deny legitimate
investors and issuers access to the U.S. capital markets. As this body
moves to go to conference with the Senate on the Sudan Peace Act (S.
180), I urge my colleagues to take a close look at the provisions of
the bill that would impose such sanctions. The imposition of capital
markets sanctions could have the unintended effects of redirecting
business out of the United States and eroding the certainty and
predictability that have been fundamental to the success of the U.S.
Capital markets. Moreover, capital markets sanctions would seriously
disrupt investor confidence--both domestic and foreign--in the US.
Markets, thereby jeopardizing their continued vibrancy.
The safety and certainty of U.S. capital markets attracted record
numbers of foreign issuers and investors in the 1990s. In the
competitive, global environment, however, there are few products and
services for which U.S. companies are the sole suppliers. If issuers
are denied access to the U.S. capital markets through unilaterally
imposed sanctions, they will simply turn to other countries. Indeed,
since the House of Representatives approved the Sudan Peace Act (H.R.
2052)--with a provision restricting capital market access--in June, at
lease one foreign company cited the uncertain environment created by
the legislation in deciding to list on the London Stock Exchange over a
U.S. exchange. H.R. 2052 would have little--if any--impact on the
ability of sanctioned companies to raise financing, but it would
strengthen the position of foreign competitors. U.S. investors--pension
funds, other institutional investors, and individuals--would see the
liquidity, and the value, of substantial amounts of their holdings drop
precipitately even at the suggestion that companies in which they are
invested would be forced to delist from U.S. exchanges.
Closing the U.S. capital markets in order to influence the behavior
of foreign countries also sets a poor policy precedent that might
easily provoke other countries to pursue their own foreign policy
objectives through similar sanctions. The continued health of our
capital markets is dependent on economic and political certainty and
predictability. The historic U.S. commitment to open and fair markets
has been fundamental to the U.S. financial service sector's ability to
nurture and establish a substantial foreign client base.
In sum, Madam Speaker, I believe it is a mistake to unilaterally try
to resolve complex foreign policy issues through an untested formula
that would greatly impair the U.S. capital markets. The goals of the
Sudan Peace Act are laudable, however, I am deeply troubled by the
capital markets sanctions that are included in the bill. As the House
requests a conference on the Sudan Peace Act, I urge my colleagues to
continue pursuing open and fair financial markets and reject these
types of sanctions.
The motion was agreed to.
The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the
third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.
A similar House bill (H.R. 2052) was laid on the table.
Appointment of Conferees on S. 180, Sudan Peace Act
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to
insist on the House amendment and request a conference with the Senate
thereon.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New Jersey? The Chair hears none, and, without
objection, appoints the following conferees:
For modification of the Senate bill and the House amendment and
modifications committed to conference: Messrs. Hyde, Gilman, and Smith
of New Jersey, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, and Messrs. Royce, Tancredo, Lantos,
Berman, and Payne, and Ms. McKinney.
For consideration of sections 8 and 9 of the House amendment and
modifications committed to conference: Messrs. Oxley, Baker, Bachus,
LaFalce, and Frank.
There was no objection.
____________________