[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 151 (Monday, November 5, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S11428-S11429]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[[Page S11428]]
                             THE ABM TREATY

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, until recently, the Bush administration 
appeared to be engaged in a headlong rush to unilaterally withdraw from 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty--the ABM Treaty--and deploy a 
national missile defense system. That headlong rush had some serious 
negative implications for the security of the United States and for our 
relations with other nations.
  If the United States decided to unilaterally withdraw from the ABM 
Treaty, it could:
  First, lead Russia to stop dismantling nuclear weapons, and to retain 
or eventually increase its multiple warheads on long-range missiles;
  Second, lead other nations, such as China, to speed the deployment, 
or increase the number, of their long-range nuclear missiles; and
  Third, strain our relations with allies and friends in Europe and 
Asia who recognize that the ABM Treaty has allowed nuclear arms 
reductions and has promoted stability for many decades.
  Those reactions to a unilateral withdrawal from the treaty on our 
part would be serious because they could result in more nuclear 
warheads on the territory of other nations and could lead to an 
increased risk of the theft or proliferation of such warheads or their 
materials to rogue states or terrorists.
  In addition, Russia and China could respond to unilateral United 
States withdrawal from the ABM Treaty by producing, deploying, and 
possibly even selling missile defense countermeasures and decoys to our 
potential adversaries. A spiraling competition of countermeasures and 
counter-countermeasures could then ensue.
  I have believed for some time that these serious negative 
consequences for our national security argued against our unilateral 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and I have long been concerned by the 
Bush administration's unilateralist approach to this question.
  As recently as August 23 of this year, for instance, President Bush 
declared, ``We will withdraw from the ABM Treaty on our timetable, at a 
time convenient to America.''
  Then came the horrific attacks of September 11. To its credit, the 
administration then set out to build and sustain a broad international 
coalition, which includes Russia, to fight terrorism. Despite its 
unilateralist go-it-alone approach so prevalent before those September 
11 attacks, the administration appears to have recognized that in a 
world of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the United States 
is more secure when we work cooperatively with allies and with nations 
with whom we have common interests than we are if we go it alone.
  We have already witnessed that welcome new approach to foreign policy 
in areas as diverse as the newfound support for South Korea's effort to 
improve relations with North Korea, and in the administration's recent 
reversal and decision to join the international effort to improve the 
worldwide Biological Weapons Convention. This new approach has already 
influenced the administration's approach to national missile defense, 
the ABM Treaty, and our relationship with Russia, with whom the 
President seeks a ``new strategic framework.''
  At his October 11 press conference, the President twice avoided 
giving direct answers to questions about whether he would unilaterally 
withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The discussions between Presidents Bush 
and Putin in Shanghai gave some hope that the United States and Russia 
can reach agreement on missile defense and reductions in offensive 
nuclear weapons.
  Then, on October 25, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced 
that the administration had ``decided not to go forward'' with missile 
defense tests in late October and early November that might have 
violated the ABM Treaty. That is a significant change because the 
administration had said previously that we would not be constrained by 
the ABM Treaty but, rather, we would withdraw from it.
  Last week, we read in the newspapers that the United States and 
Russia are near agreement on an interim arrangement that would achieve 
three things: No. 1, allow the administration to continue with its 
robust program of missile defense research, development, and testing; 
No. 2, preserve the ABM Treaty; and, No. 3, set goals for reducing by 
some two-thirds the number of each nation's strategic nuclear warheads. 
The story quoted one unnamed official as saying: ``Testing will go on, 
but there will be no announcement of a U.S. withdrawal from the ABM 
Treaty.''
  If the administration has, in fact, now decided not to unilaterally 
dismantle a mutual security structure before a new structure is put in 
place, it would represent a wise shift in U.S. policy.
  Presidents Bush and Putin would then have a genuine opportunity at 
their summit next week to make real progress towards a new security 
arrangement that permits both missile defense testing and significant 
nuclear arms reductions, and that would have strong bipartisan support 
in Congress.
  As I mentioned, on October 25, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
announced that the Pentagon had decided not to proceed with four 
planned missile defense test activities because they might conflict 
with the ABM Treaty. But, in fact, prior to Secretary Rumsfeld's 
announcement, the Pentagon had already decided to delay three of the 
test activities for technical reasons wholly unrelated to the ABM 
Treaty. In addition, the fourth test planned for November 14 was not a 
missile defense test, but a Navy radar tracking of a satellite launch 
vehicle, which is not covered by the ABM Treaty.
  Confusing this history even further, back on June 13, LTG Ronald 
Kadish, the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, 
briefed the Armed Services Committee on the Defense Department's 
missile defense plans and informed the committee that, to the best of 
his knowledge, there were no ballistic missile defense activities 
planned for fiscal year 2002 that would be in conflict with the ABM 
Treaty.
  Then, on July 17, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, 
testified before our Armed Services Committee that three missile 
defense activities could ``bump up'' against the ABM Treaty, in his 
words, ``in months rather than in years.'' One of the examples was the 
use of a Navy Aegis SPY-1 radar to track a strategic ballistic missile. 
However, his written explanation of that possibility said plainly:

       Plans to use an Aegis SPY-1 radar to track long-range 
     ballistic missiles are currently under development and are 
     only at a preliminary stage.

  So after saying there were no tests planned that would violate the 
ABM Treaty, the administration then planned a series of tests that 
might violate the treaty. Then they changed direction for a second time 
on October 25 and said they would not proceed with tests that would 
violate the ABM Treaty. So why did the administration first strain to 
put these tests on the calendar and then strain to remove them from the 
calendar?
  My analysis is shaped by my firm belief that the administration has 
decided it would be unwise to withdraw from the ABM Treaty anytime 
soon. In a number of ways, this double reversal in its course may help 
the President at the upcoming summit, while simultaneously avoiding 
criticism from those who have forcefully pressed for withdrawal from 
the ABM Treaty.
  First, the administration looks more reasonable to the American 
people, the Russians, and the rest of the world, compared to their 
numerous declarations that they plan to unilaterally withdraw from the 
ABM Treaty. When the Secretary of Defense announced unilateral 
restraint on October 25--that is, announcing that we would forego 
missile defense testing in order to avoid violating the ABM Treaty--he 
made us look more reasonable and that may help pave the way to reach an 
agreement with Russia on missile defense issues.
  Second, the administration has simultaneously made the case that the 
U.S. missile defense testing program is already now being constrained 
by the ABM Treaty. This could make it easier to justify a decision to 
withdraw from the treaty at a later time; in effect, to serve as a 
prelude to withdrawal in case there is no agreement with Russia.
  Third, if, as expected, the administration reaches an agreement with 
Russia at the Crawford Summit that will permit its missile defense 
testing program to proceed, the Rumsfeld announcement would allow the 
administration to argue that the Crawford

[[Page S11429]]

agreement removed the ABM obstacle to the administration's missile 
defense testing plans. That would appear to be a victory, showing the 
critics of the treaty that the administration succeeded in clearing 
away the testing constraints in the ABM Treaty. That, in turn, would 
make it easier politically for the administration to agree with Russia 
to maintain a treaty so loathed by those same critics and from which 
those critics are pressing the President to withdraw.
  If this tactic of straining to create premature conflict with the ABM 
Treaty and then straining to remove the conflict by deferring the tests 
helps the administration reach an agreement with Russia and helps 
assure them of political support for the agreement from the critics of 
the ABM Treaty, more power to them. If that is what it takes to do the 
right thing, so be it.
  The important point is to work cooperatively with Russia to seek an 
agreement that will enhance our mutual security. It looks as if that is 
the path we are on. I hope so, and I hope we can stay on it.
  Also hopefully, any new arrangement that emerges from the upcoming 
summit will be based on more than just the handshake of a gentleman's 
agreement. I hope the two leaders can agree on a new strategic 
framework that will include the following specific elements.
  First, any agreement should include a reduction of strategic nuclear 
weapons--as the President has said--``to the lowest possible number 
consistent with our national security.'' I agree with his assessment 
that ``the premises of Cold War nuclear targeting should no longer 
dictate the size of our arsenals.''
  I would also hope that any agreement on nuclear reductions would be 
transparent, predictable and difficult to reverse. There is no benefit 
in creating a situation where we worry that it would be easy and quick 
for either nation to increase its nuclear forces significantly. We 
would be better served with an agreement that gives each side 
confidence that its terms are being met by the other side, and cannot 
easily be reversed.
  Congress should permit the President the flexibility to make these 
reductions. Current law prevents any reductions in our nuclear delivery 
systems below the needlessly high START I level. President Bush and 
President Putin are essentially moving toward a START IV, but Congress 
is keeping us at a START I, Cold War level of nuclear forces. Our 
senior uniformed military and civilian defense leaders have wanted 
Congress to remove these unnecessary restrictions for years. The Senate 
has already acted in this year's Defense Authorization bill to remove 
these restrictions, and I hope the House will accept the Senate 
position in the conference now underway.
  Second, the framework for a new security arrangement set forth by 
President Bush included the issue of reducing the risk of accidental or 
unauthorized launch of nuclear missiles. I would hope the two nations 
will explore a variety of steps that can move us in a more stable 
direction. There has already been good United States-Russian 
cooperation on data exchanges on missile launches, and we are improving 
our work on exchanging early warning data to reduce the risk of a false 
alert leading to a military crisis or a missile launch. We need to 
expand our cooperation and make sure that neither side maintains 
unnecessary and potentially destabilizing nuclear postures or 
practices. For example, both sides could agree to deactivate nuclear 
weapon systems that are awaiting dismantlement. As President Bush 
stated, ``the United States should remove as many weapons as possible 
from high alert, hair-trigger status.''
  Third, there is also a great need for enhanced and expanded 
cooperation on reducing the threats of proliferation. There is perhaps 
no more operationally effective and cost-effective means of reducing 
proliferation threats than assisting Russia in eliminating its nuclear 
and chemical weapons. Earlier this year, a task force led by former 
Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and former White House Counsel 
Lloyd Cutler concluded that ``the most urgent unmet national security 
threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass 
destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and 
sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American 
troops abroad or citizens at home.'' I hope the two nations can 
continue to make great progress in this area, since much remains to be 
done.
  Finally, given the current anthrax attacks in the United States and 
our concerns about other potential biological terrorist attacks, we 
should be working much more closely with Russian scientists who have 
great expertise in biological warfare defense. They may be able to help 
us develop better defenses and vaccines, and also help us with the 
analysis of current biological threats. There is a unique and timely 
opportunity for major United States-Russian cooperation in this effort.
  In short, I hope that President Bush and President Putin will be bold 
in their effort not just to bury the Cold War, but to forge a new 
alliance or a mutual security agreement against the terrorist menace 
that threatens both our nations and the world.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Stabenow). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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