[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 148 (Wednesday, October 31, 2001)]
[House]
[Pages H7580-H7585]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           AVIATION SECURITY

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mica) is recognized 
for 60 minutes.
  Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to come to the floor tonight on 
the eve of consideration by the House of Representatives of the 
Aviation and Transportation Security bill, which is scheduled for 
debate and consideration tomorrow before the House.
  Tonight is Halloween. It is a time when sometimes people are 
frightened. It is a time when goblins and ghosts and images are raised. 
Unfortunately, in some of this debate about aviation and airline 
security there has been some scaring on this Halloween eve.
  I happened to hear some of my previous colleagues who spoke about the 
aviation security measure. And I want to say from the Republican side 
of the aisle, from the majority side, that each and every one of us 
want to pass legislation that will ensure the safety, the security of 
every member of the traveling public. We think it is absolutely 
essential that we pass the best possible legislation.
  Part of being an American is being able to go anywhere you want at 
any time without any restrictions. And we want people to feel safe, to 
be able to take to the air if they choose and feel secure anywhere they 
have takeoff, whether it is a small airport in a rural area, in a small 
state or one of the metropolitan areas or one of the major hubs.
  As chairman of the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, I have tried to work in a bipartisan 
manner. I have only had this responsibility for some 8 or 9 months and, 
of course, was thrust into the limelight by the events of September 11.
  I have tried to approach my responsibility in a business-like 
fashion. Particularly since I took office, one of my concerns has been 
aviation security. I have gone around and around about issues of 
aviation security with FAA from, I believe, February, when I first took 
on this position, and from the beginning I have been concerned that we 
have not properly prioritized the risk that the travelling public has 
taken. In fact, I have had communications back and forth to the 
Security Director of FAA, who has now been replaced and removed, but we 
went back and forth in regard to the deployment of equipment that sat 
idle in regard to setting priorities, in regard to instituting on a 
more expedited basis security measures.
  Unfortunately, some of that was not done as of September 11. Now it 
is very important that this Congress act in a responsible fashion and 
craft legislation that deals with not just the political questions that 
have made the headlines and have been the center of some of the debate, 
screeners and their role as in any new proposed structure as either 
Federal employees or private sector employees, but looking at the 
larger picture of aviation security.
  Even going beyond that, one of the things we have done is sat down, 
and it is amazing. When I sat down and looked at who is responsible for 
transportation security, under the current structure it is almost 
impossible to pinpoint who has that responsibility in the Department of 
Transportation.

                              {time}  2045

  Then we look at the other modes of transportation. Of course everyone 
is now focused on aviation, but when we look at highways and hazardous 
materials and trucking, we look at pipelines, we look at our ports, we 
look at any type of transportation security and we see that there is no 
one, if we look at a chart of organization, in charge with the specific 
responsibility and also the authority to move on issues of security. So 
that is one of the glaring examples that we all found lacking.
  We find actually in the Senate proposed bill that they do create a 
new Deputy Under Secretary of Transportation Security in a measure that 
will be before the House tomorrow, and the House Republican majority 
proposal also has that provision. To start out, when we look at the 
problems of transportation security and see no one in

[[Page H7581]]

charge, we know that someone specifically must be in charge of all 
modes of transportation security.
  We have done that in the House majority bill. What is better than the 
Senate proposal, which was somewhat hastily crafted and put together, 
is, we have given some specific authority. If we look at the provisions 
of the Senate proposal, they create the position of a Deputy Under 
Secretary for Transportation Security, but that individual can only act 
when a national emergency is declared.
  What is even more lacking in the Senate proposal, again that was 
hastily put together, is there is no ability for that individual who is 
charged with transportation and aviation security to put in place 
security rules on an immediate basis. In fact, that is the biggest flaw 
of the bill. That is why if that measure should pass, I would urge the 
President to veto the Senate bill.
  It was hastily crafted. It is a nice cosmetic proposal that says we 
are going to make baggage screeners Federal employees and that is going 
to solve the problems. But I say to my colleagues, that is merely a 
cosmetic proposal. Whether those employees were under Federal 
supervision or all Federal employees or all private employees, it does 
not matter a bit. What matters is the standards that are put in place.
  Most people, if we stop and just take a minute and look at what 
happened on September 11, baggage screeners were not at fault. Baggage 
screeners did not fail. Baggage screeners actually did their job 
according to the rules and regulations established by Federal employees 
and the Federal Government. The Federal Government was not able, even 
after two directives by Congress, to put in place standards for 
improving the quality, the qualifications, the background checks, and 
again, generally improving all of the requirements for being a baggage 
handler for more than 6 years. And, as of tonight, on Halloween night, 
we still do not have in place strong provisions for qualifications for 
baggage handlers.
  That is for a very simple reason. That is because it takes, on 
average, in the Department of Transportation 3.8 years to pass a rule; 
in other words, to get a regulation to put in place newer standards. So 
today, some 6 years after Congress first directed FAA to get a rule 
into place, higher standards and regulations for baggage screeners and 
background checks, those qualifications are still not in place.
  What is absolutely astounding is the Senate proposal does not even 
have a single provision giving the new Deputy Under Secretary any 
authority to put in place rules on an expedited basis, so that 
actually, if we pass the Senate provision, it puts us in a worse 
position than we were on September 10. And we have not learned very 
much by the experience, the horrible experience, that we never want 
repeated of September 11.
  So, first, the Senate bill creates a position with really no 
authority, some limited responsibility, mainly to report to Congress, 
but the whole crux, the whole solution to the problem we face is 
getting rules into place on an expedited basis. So, on September 11, 
there were no high standards for baggage screeners. On September 11, 
there was no requirement, there was no regulation put in place to put 
in place the very best equipment we could, the very best technology. In 
fact, getting a rule in place was thwarted.
  We have technology, and this will not show up to all of my colleagues 
who are watching, Mr. Speaker. I do not think my colleagues can see 
this, but this is technology that is electromagnetic technology. It is 
not x-ray technology. X-ray technology and the machines we see at most 
airports, that happens to be equipment from the 1970s and 1980s; it 
will detect metal.
  On September 11 we believe that hijackers took plastic weapons, 
possibly plastic knives, they could have been ceramic knives, but the 
x-ray technology of the 1970s will not detect that. This shows a body 
outline and it shows plastic weapons, plastic guns, plastic knives and 
others that we are able to detect with this latest equipment. This 
technology has been tested, but not deployed, because we cannot get a 
rule passed to get the latest technology into place.
  We can have a Federal employee, we can have a Federal employee as we 
require who is an American citizen, we can have a Federal employee 
supervised by a Federal employee, we can have a Federal employee with a 
college degree, we can have a Federal employee as a screener who has a 
Ph.D.; but he or she is only as good as the equipment that is issued. 
The Senate bill has not one word, again, or one ability for the new 
Deputy Under Secretary to get this equipment, this new technology in 
place on an immediate basis. So basically, if we pass the Senate bill, 
we would be just as bad off as we were on September 10, the day before 
the tragedy; and it will not make any improvement in the ability of the 
screener, be he or she a Federal employee, a contract employee or 
whoever.
  So the Senate bill does not address the basic problems with the 
deployment of technology.
  I heard the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Inslee) and some others 
who were discussing some of the problems with getting legislation 
passed, and let me say again tonight there were some scary things said, 
and the American people should not be frightened to fly. The American 
people should understand, first of all, that the President of the 
United States acted immediately, and under his order, within just a 
matter of days now, every large commercial aircraft flying in the 
United States will have secure cockpit doors. The President acted, 
Secretary Mineta has informed me by, I believe it is November 5 or 7, 
but within a few days, every commercial airline or large aircraft, not 
all of the smaller aircraft, but the large ones, will have secure 
cockpit doors. That is one of the provisions of both the Senate bill 
and the House bill. That is a moot point. That has been done. It is in 
place and it is ongoing.
  A second provision that is very similar, and the American people 
again should not be scared on Halloween or any other time, because the 
President of the United States has acted with due speed and he has 
required that air marshals be on flights.
  I can tell my colleagues, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Aviation 
and former chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil Service, and we will 
get into that in just a second, but I can tell my colleagues as 
chairman with, again, the responsibility in the House on the aviation 
side, that air marshals are being trained every day, they are being 
deployed, they are on most of our flights, that hijackers will not know 
which ones; and whether the bill passes or not, they will be on almost 
every domestic and international flight. So that has been done.
  I can tell my colleagues that Secretary Mineta acted yesterday, 
issuing additional orders for higher security and improvements and 
higher standards. So the administration has acted. The President has 
acted. It has never been safer to fly.
  Now, is it impossible, or is it possible, I should say, to have some 
other incident? When we have people who are willing to give up their 
lives to destroy an aircraft, to go into a marketplace and blow 
themselves up as they have done in Israel, there is no place that can 
be totally secure. So we put in place the best provisions humanly 
possible.
  What is important now is not for the Congress to rush and act, and 
everyone says, oh, the Senate passed this in a few weeks; and, yes, 
they did, and the product shows that it is a product of haste, it is a 
product of lack of consideration.
  We, on the House side, held 4 weeks of public hearings, numerous 
public hearings. We held several closed hearings. We brought in experts 
from around the world and around the United States to hear what was 
going on. I do want to say that there has been a scare again by some of 
the previous speakers about baggage checking, and I can tell my 
colleagues that tomorrow, when the House votes on the package, the 
final package that the House majority has put together, it has the very 
best provisions for checking baggage.

  Now, as the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Inslee) has said, 95 
percent of the checked baggage is not screened. He was correct in 
saying that. The problem we had, and he did attend, I will give him 
credit for attending one of our hearings, which is more than the 
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Ganske),

[[Page H7582]]

who is the prime sponsor, has ever done. One of the prime sponsors of 
the Senate measure and a member of the majority never bothered to 
discuss with me or anyone else any of the provisions of our 
legislation, but at least the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Inslee) 
did take the time to come to the hearing. I do not know if he heard 
everything that was said at the hearing about checked baggage; and he 
did repeat tonight on the floor some information about explosive 
detection devices.
  What the House of Representatives cannot do is repeat the mistake 
they made in 1996 after the TWA 800 crash, after Oklahoma City, when 
all the attention became glued on explosive devices. We went out and we 
spent $443 million, almost a half a billion dollars, on buying 
explosive detection devices. Some of that sat in warehouses, some of it 
is not used. We had testimony to that effect in the hearings that we 
had. Why? Because some of it does not work, and Congress required the 
purchase of that.
  We also heard from experts, technology individuals from a broad range 
of the sciences, who told us that the explosive devices, the actual 
materials, explosive materials are changing every 3 or 4 years. There 
are new products that can be used as explosive devices. So the last 
thing we need to do is put a provision in a law that requires us to go 
out, put in place in 3 years, or some specified time, equipment that 
will be outdated by the time that it all gets deployed.

                              {time}  2100

  It does not matter how we deploy that equipment, it still will take a 
number of years to get it deployed everywhere.
  So in the House measure we have the tightest and the best provision. 
We do not repeat the mistake when we spend a lot of money, when the 
equipment is not used, when new technology is being developed, and we 
have spent the money on old technology, and we get this in place on an 
expedited basis.
  The other thing that the Democrat side has lost is that we cannot get 
that technology in place without a rule-making expeditious provision in 
the law. The Senate bill has no provision. If we go through the normal 
rule-making to require this type of equipment, it could be some 5 to 7 
years, as we have seen in the past, so the public is left in the lurch. 
Baggage checking at the level that should be done is not complete.
  So we do not want to make the mistakes of 1996. Everyone says we must 
hurry, that this legislation should be rushed through. It passed the 
Senate 100 to nothing. The worst thing we could do is make a mistake 
tomorrow and pass bad legislation.
  I do not want to be rough on the Senators, Mr. Speaker, but the 
Senate passed legislation, the other body passed legislation that 
primarily deals with the airline screening process. It is only a small 
piece of the total transportation security network, a small piece of 
the total aviation security network that we should be dealing with.
  When they passed their legislation in haste, they moved it to the 
Department of Justice. The Department of Justice, let me read what the 
Department of Justice has said about the Senate provision.
  It says: ``We also feel that attempting to divide the responsibility 
for aviation security between two separate agencies is not the most 
effective way to enhance aviation security.''
  They also go on to say that right now, ``In light of DOT's strong 
capabilities and the Department of Justice's many responsibilities in 
fighting the war on terrorism, we feel that the resources would be 
better spent carrying out our current mission than developing a new 
transportation expertise.''
  Again, that is in opposition to what the Senate passed. Their focus 
is on going after terrorism. Actually, the most important function, if 
we wanted to increase the number of Federal employees, we only have 
11,000 Federal FBI investigative agents. This bill creates 28,000, now 
get this, baggage screeners, Federal baggage screeners. Would we not be 
much better off getting investigative personnel for the FBI?
  If we look at the events of September 11, again, it was not the 
baggage screeners that failed. It is nice to make them the scapegoat, 
but to tell the American public everything will be fine if we just make 
them Federal employees, that in fact will not solve the problem. The 
problem is that we cannot get security in place with, again, a 
disjointed organization that is created by the Senate bill.
  We have a plea from the Department of Justice not to send and create 
a two-tiered system. What is strange in the Senate bill, and I went 
through the Senate bill, the Senate bill in fact creates several layers 
of aviation security.
  Now, if the traveling public and Members of Congress are concerned 
about a good aviation security system, they should read this bill. I 
would venture to say that 95 percent of the Senators did not read this 
legislation. This legislation by the Senate was put together so hastily 
they left the actual law enforcement functions, law enforcement 
functions, under the Department of Transportation, while transferring 
baggage screening to the Department of Justice.
  Not only did they leave the Department of Transportation with the law 
enforcement responsibility, and it is hard to believe, but that is 
exactly how it reads. I went back and had the staff attorneys check 
this to see if in fact that is what they did, and it appears they did 
it by error.
  However, what they did was they also created several levels of law 
enforcement. They only require one law enforcement officer at each 
airport screening location at the 100 largest airports. There are 
another 270 airports for which they exempt security at small community 
airports, and they go on and say that at smaller airports with 
scheduled passenger operations, they should enter into agreements under 
which screening of passengers and property will be carried out by 
qualified, trained State or local law enforcement personnel.
  So we might get in in Portland, Maine, as some of the hijackers did, 
and there would be one level of security. Someone might come to Boston 
and have a different level of security. Again, this is a fractured 
system that is far worse than what we have now.
  Now, trying to make 28,000 baggage handlers Federal employees in even 
the most expedited fashion might take some 3 years. In the meantime, we 
would have created a disaster with some of the current services that 
have already been considered by private vendors.

  I am not here to defend any of the private vendors who have not put 
in place already standards. Of course, FAA, a Federal agency and 
Federal employees, did not require the higher standards. We had no rule 
in place and could not get a rule for 6 years, and do not have a rule 
tonight. With the Senate bill, we have no hope of getting a rule 
because there is not an expedited rule-making process.
  So again, the bill was hastily crafted by the Senate, sent over to 
the House, and I think that their intent was that we work on this 
measure as they have sent it to us. We have conducted, again, a much 
more comprehensive series of hearings, bringing experts in and trying 
to see how this would function best. A split system between the 
Department of Justice for baggage screeners, for some law enforcement 
to be under the Department of Transportation and for some screening to 
be done by State and local officials, is not the way to go. It is a 
fractured, disjointed security system.
  The bill which we have proposed in the House is well thought out. It 
has one level of responsibility first of all for transportation and 
aviation security. That is an undersecretary of transportation level. 
That Secretary is responsible for all security measures in 
transportation and all in aviation; all elements, not just a few, not 
just the baggage issue.
  There are also issues of airport perimeter security; there are issues 
of cargo security; there are issues of ramp personnel, those who have 
access to the airplane; there are issues of those who maintain the 
airplane and clean the airplane; there are issues of the FAA towers at 
each of these airports, and we have heard reports some of those may be 
at risk.
  The Senate bill does not touch any of those issues. They only deal 
with the most visible, doing a cosmetic job on the public and 
convincing people that

[[Page H7583]]

they acted in a hurry and they got the job done and sent it to the 
House and we did not act.
  I can tell the Members that nothing is further from the truth. We 
acted in a very reasoned manner. We held hearings. We heard testimony 
from dozens and dozens of witnesses, the best experts. We looked at 
what was successful in Europe.
  Today, there is an article from the former head of El Al Airlines. We 
had that individual come and testify before us. We said, ``What worked 
well?'' Do Members know, in Israel and Europe they tried federalization 
in the 1970s and 1980s and it did not work. They went to Federal 
supervision, Federal management, Federal oversight, Federal background 
checks, and Federal testing. That has worked. That is the best model. 
That is the model that we bring before the House tomorrow.
  We also again go back to the individual responsible for all of these 
elements of transportation and aviation security, not only responsible, 
but with the authority to put in place security regulations on an 
immediate basis.
  That is the biggest problem with the Senate bill. The Senate bill is 
a terrible measure, again taking us back to September 10. Have we 
learned nothing from the events of September 11?
  So while screeners are the most visible, while we want them under 
Federal supervision, now the airlines have that responsibility. The 
airlines now are charged with that responsibility, and are also paid 
for airline and airport security.
  The Republican measure, the House majority measure, takes that 
responsibility away from the airlines. It makes it a Federal process. 
We have made the Federal Government responsible for aviation security 
and transportation security, but not just making someone responsible, 
because we have done that in government before.
  We have passed two measures, one in 1996 on aviation security, in a 
reaction to TWA 800, which incidentally turned out to be a technical 
malfunction in the gas tank, the fuel tank of the airplane. But we 
passed that legislation in 1996. We passed legislation a year ago, in 
2000, directing that we have higher standards for baggage screeners, 
and it still is not, as of tonight, in place. So Members can have 
someone with the responsibility, but they must have the authority.
  It is absolutely unbelievable. We have to take their bill and look at 
the bill. The bill has no provision for an expedited rulemaking, so we 
cannot get the rules in place, we cannot get the new technology in 
place. The mistakes of September 11 can be repeated. It would be years 
if we could ever get in place this latest technology that can scan the 
body.
  Incidentally, we had this tested. We asked why we would not get this 
in place. Basically, they cannot pass a rule, so they might have the 
responsibility to get the latest technology in place, government, but 
they do not have the ability through the rule-making process, which is 
delayed or which people go into court and try to kill or stymie, to get 
this technology.

  This technology can detect plastics, ceramics or other materials, and 
there will be even a later technology coming on board. Of course, this 
technology also has upset some of the civil liberties union. It is very 
invasive. It shows body parts in great detail, but it will detect 
materials. It would have, if it had been in place in Boston Logan, 
detected if in fact a plastic weapon was used on one of those flights.
  The Senate bill does nothing to address the rule-making process. It 
again divides responsibility in an unclear split between the Department 
of Justice and the Department of Transportation. It leaves law 
enforcement in charge, actually under the direction of the Department 
of Transportation. Now, get this: They move baggage screening to the 
Department of Justice, but they leave law enforcement under the 
Department of Transportation.
  Mr. Speaker, I said that we must have rules in place in an expedited 
fashion. We do not have the rules for high standards for baggage 
screeners in place. We do not have the technology in place because we 
have not had the ability to put a rule in place. No one has expedited 
rule-making ability under the Senate provision.
  I have to repeat that, Mr. Speaker, because no one seems to hear it. 
It is nice to come here and pass legislation, but legislation that does 
nothing is a fraud on the American public. Legislation that does not 
enhance security or put in place security measures on an expedited 
basis is a fraud.
  At this time it would be an abdication of our responsibility as 
Members of Congress not to put it in place, and if it takes another 
day, if it takes another week, if we have to go to conference, but this 
time to do it right so that we have a comprehensive transportation and 
aviation security measure.
  This is not a bipartisan issue. Actually, we worked very closely the 
last 4 or 5 weeks with members of both sides of the aisle. The 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar) worked with us. We crafted most 
of this legislation with the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Oberstar), 
the ranking member of the Committee on Transportation and 
infrastructure. We crafted this legislation with the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Lipinski), my counterpart, the ranking Democrat member on 
the Subcommittee on Aviation. We did this in a bipartisan fashion, and 
this is a good bill.

                              {time}  2115

  One issue deep-sixed the bill that the Democrats were going to 
introduce which was exactly the same as ours and one word. They said 
all screeners shall be Federal employees. We said all screeners may be 
Federal employees. We gave the option because again we think a public-
private partnership can serve us best.
  Let me say, I have no problem with having Federal employees handling 
the supervision. I have no problem with Federal employees handling the 
oversight. I have no problem with Federal employees doing the 
background checks, the testing, all of the other management 
responsibilities of the screening process, and that is what our bill 
proposes. It makes this a Federal process and then gives the President 
and also the DOT security administrator the option, and we think that 
is the best way to go.
  One of the problems that has already arisen with the Senate bill is 
the language, when they passed this bill in haste, in trying to make it 
appear that they were doing something, they passed this bill in haste, 
and unfortunately, it has raised some questions about unionization of 
the potential Federal employees. Part of this was done by some of those 
who would like to represent the new Federal employee group of some 
28,000.
  A quote taken just the other day from AFGE, the American Federation 
of Government Employees, Legislative Director Beth Moten said the union 
could live with the measure; that is, the Senate measure, but 
litigation may be required to ensure most of the civil service 
obligations remain in place.
  We were told that this would be a different brand of Federal 
employee, but it appears the way the language is written that every one 
of the constraints now and every one of the obligations that are now 
provided by law for a Federal civil servant will be imposed on those 
that may be employed of this force of 28,000.
  My colleagues have to understand the size of 28,000 Federal 
employees. There are five agencies in the Federal Government, five 
Cabinet departments, that do not have 28,000 Federal employees. This 
will be larger than the State Department. It will be larger than the 
Department of Labor. It will be larger than HUD. It will have more 
employees than the Department of Energy, more employees than the 
Department of Education, and they will all be baggage screeners. So we 
will have a department basically of baggage screeners, taken away from 
the Department of Transportation and put into the Department of Justice 
with the Department of Justice saying today that they have no ability 
to handle them.
  The Department of Justice only has 11,000 FBI agents in the entire 
agency and only has between 4- and 5,000 Federal marshals, but we are 
going to put them in charge of baggage screening. It just is a 
ludicrous idea. It may sound good.
  What does it do? Here we create Federal employment with the 
possibility of getting into a brawl over the status of these 
individuals the way the language is poorly written on the Senate side.

[[Page H7584]]

  I implore my colleagues, look at this. We cannot create a huge 
bureaucracy, and having been chairman for 4 years in the House of the 
Subcommittee on Civil Service, I tried on this floor on numerous 
occasions over my 4-year tenure to bring to the floor measures that 
would require performance standards for Federal employees, a 
performance-based management system, and I actually passed it in the 
House several times, and it was defeated in the Senate, and we still 
have nothing in place.
  Let me say out of the 1.9 million Federal employees, and there are 8- 
or 900,000 postal employees, there are some dedicated employees. There 
are some great employees who go to work every day and do an incredible 
job in the country, serving their agency.
  When I was chairman of Civil Service, I met so many of these 
dedicated individuals, but if you get these people aside and you talk 
to them about what would improve their agency, they will tell you what 
improved their agency is getting rid of the deadwood, and it is part of 
the problem we have with our Federal bureaucracy and sometimes 
government at every level is that we create an insular system, a system 
in which you cannot, as you do in the private sector, get rid of the 
deadwood.
  We tried everything, including giving the employees the right to set 
up a performance-based system: Reward good employees and get rid of the 
bad employees, but it is almost impossible to do. In fact, it takes 
years to get rid of a Federal employee, and if they want to fight the 
system, it takes on average 38 months just to go through the normal 
complaint process. That is on average.
  If we want responsiveness in those screeners that are out there doing 
a job, if we want the ability to fire somebody and get rid of the poor 
performers, then certainly the Federal model is not the way to go. I 
might say that there are Federal employees that try to do the best job, 
and even if they attempt to do the best job, they make mistakes, too.
  Let me cite an example of a Federal prison in one of our States. A 
recent report said that in a maximum Federal prison facility, with 
Federal guards, Federal employees, Federal oversight, with strip 
searches, with body cavity searches, with searches of the personnel 
coming in, with detection screening equipment, still more than a 
hundred weapons entered the Federal security prison. So it can happen. 
We have the possibility of a weapon getting on to a plane, but we also 
have the possibility of weapons going into a Federal maximum secure 
facility.
  What is important here, again, is when we create this position that 
we have someone responsible, who can act on an immediate basis, not 
just giving someone the responsibility but without the authority, and 
that is what happens if tomorrow they pass the other body's provision, 
the Senate's provision. They have the responsibility as they may define 
a partial responsibility in a new individual but no authority to move 
forward.
  The other thing that we tried to do in this legislation is find a 
responsible manner to pay for aviation security. I have Republicans who 
do not like to impose any taxes. I have Democrats who can never find a 
tax high enough and they are trying to find a compromise. It has been a 
challenge but we did put a provision that allows up to a maximum of 
$2.50 per one-way trip in our legislation, and this money can only be 
used to pay for aviation airline security. It cannot be used for ads. 
It cannot be used for anything else.
  We also do not let the airlines off the hook. Interestingly enough, 
the airlines have been anxious to get rid of this screening 
responsibility. They do not want this. This is a hot potato, but they 
also now pay for it, and they pay about a billion dollars out of their 
revenues, and heaven knows, we have tried to help the airlines get back 
on their feet. We may even have to do more because we are so dependent 
on aviation as a transportation system in this country. We felt that it 
was important and we asked questions to these airline representatives: 
Would you be willing to pay? They said they would pay.
  Of course, they would like to get off the hook for aviation security 
responsibility because of the costs, but they have agreed, and under 
our legislation, the airlines can also be assessed part of the cost. 
The passenger can be assessed part of the cost. We tried to do a very 
fair measure.

  With the Senate provision it basically lets the airlines off the 
hook. They get a billion dollar free ride, and the taxpayer is going to 
pay because it is going to come out of the national Treasury and the 
passenger will pay for the balance.
  I think people are willing to pay. I have never voted for a tax. I do 
not consider this a tax. I consider it a user fee, and we do have 
specific provisions in our legislation that says the actual cost of the 
screening, passenger screening must be passed on, and we give an amount 
up to, but we also make the airlines partially responsible, which we 
think is very important.
  What concerns me is not only the disjointed approach to aviation 
security proposed by my colleagues from the other side of the aisle and 
rapidly put together and sent to the House by the Senate. What concerns 
me is that we have this disjointed part of the functions now in the 
Department of Justice, who has said publicly today they have no way of 
handling 28,000 more employees. They are not geared to that. They think 
it is best in the Department of Transportation.
  It also takes out part of the Transportation function, one part of 
it, and leaves all the rest sort of to hang by itself, again leaving 
the public at risk. Who knows what is going on in the airport 
perimeter? Who knows what is going on with ramp personnel? Who knows 
what is going on with maintenance people? Who knows what is going on 
with the mechanics? Who is protecting the FAA tower?
  So they do sort of a half-baked job with a split, undefined 
responsibility, having screeners in the Department of Justice, 28,000 
of them, leave law enforcement under the Department of Transportation, 
which is just beyond me, having a different level of law enforcement 
for the hundred top airports. The smaller airports, well, they sort of 
fend for themselves, and we will take State or local offerings, and 
again, we do not believe that that is the way to go.
  We need Federal standards across the board. We need someone with 
responsibility and someone with authority, which again is lacking in 
the measure that will be presented by the other side tomorrow.
  The worst thing that we could do is have several levels of security 
at our airports. We have another measure in the bill for screening. 
Some of the screening at the smaller airports may or may not be done 
according to having Federal standards and Federal regulations in place 
that are even and across the board for small airports and for larger 
airports, and that is important. There must be a seamless security and 
comprehensive security plan or we are just fooling the American public 
and that would be a shame.
  Most of what is being done by the Senate bill is cosmetic. Most of it 
was done in haste. There was a hundred to nothing vote on it to get it 
over here. The Senate has voted a hundred to nothing before. They voted 
unanimously, after the British burnt the Capitol in history, if you 
look this up, to move from Washington, and it was saved by a few votes 
in the House of Representatives. The House votes unanimously every day 
on issues. We had several votes today. I think that we were unanimous. 
Everything is done by unanimous consent and they unanimously tossed the 
ball into our court, and we tried to be responsible.
  We held continuous hearings, both open and closed. We brought in the 
best experts, and we tried to put together the very best provisions 
possible.
  One of the other provisions of the legislation that sort of surprised 
me, and I have the Senate bill here, and again I would venture to say 
very few Members have taken the opportunity to read this legislation, 
and that is the frightening part because they will wake up if they pass 
the wrong measure and see that we do not have in place the very best 
provisions for airline security, but one of the interesting things is 
that the Senate bill brings together all of the different intelligence 
agencies' and enforcement agencies' information, but the Senate measure 
does not have any way to distribute information about the bad guys. We 
do provide that that information be available to the airlines.

[[Page H7585]]

                              {time}  2130

  The airlines are the only ones that have the passenger lists. We have 
a requirement that every airline that flies into the United States must 
provide us with a passenger list.
  If we want to avoid the mistakes of September 11, we need to at least 
allow the airlines to have some information about who the suspected 
terrorists are. The Senate bill puts together a committee, but has no 
requirement. It does not require that every airline coming into the 
United States provide us with a list.
  So the very least we can do is learn by the mistakes of September 11, 
see that they are not repeated. The very least we can do is not make 
the same mistakes we made in 1996, when we passed knee-jerk 
legislation, and we bought billions of dollars' worth of equipment, 
made all kinds of changes, and addressed explosive devices. We acquired 
explosive devices, and we have unused explosive devices because we do 
not have rules to get in place the proper explosive devices.
  The worst thing we can do is repeat the mistakes of 1996, so we do 
not want to do that.
  Then again in 2000, when we saw we still did not have in place rules 
for baggage handlers, we passed another law directing the agency to do 
it. As of tonight, they still have not done this. So while the Senate 
bill, I think, was well-intended, they tried to pass something in a 
hurry and get it to us, but it was done in haste.
  We need to proceed with caution. We need to proceed in an expeditious 
fashion, but also take the very best from others who have put into 
place the tightest possible security systems, to put people in place 
who have both the responsibility and, most importantly, the authority.
  If there is no other reason to defeat the Senate proposal, it is 
because it lacks the ability to put rules in place relating to security 
on an expedited basis, and this brings us back to September 10, not 
learning one single thing, using airline screening employees as the 
scapegoats. Airline screening employees on September 11 did not fail; 
it was the lack of Federal standards put in place to check even their 
background. It was the lack of Federal agencies to do their jobs.
  If we want to put more personnel someplace, we should put them in our 
visa department. I checked to see how many people work issuing visas 
around the entire world, and it is somewhere in the neighborhood of 
5,000. Here we are creating a bureaucracy of 28,000 baggage screeners 
and what we may need are people who can identify a potential terrorist, 
a hijacker, a potential murderer who may be let legally into the United 
States.
  Most of the terrorists used our border as a swinging door with a 
visa, with a permit. We can do all the checks, we can send the National 
Guard to do a check at the screening area, we can have a Federal 
employee or a contract employee, we can have the airline employees all 
become Federal employees and they can check the IDs. But if Mr. Adda 
comes to the counter, and they check him, and he has an ID and a visa, 
they let him go; and he goes next to the airport screener or to a 
National Guard person, whoever is checking the IDs there now, and that 
person checks it and say, oh, this is Mr. Adda, go forth Mr. Adda, you 
have a visa. A Federal Government employee has given him that visa; 
therefore he goes to the next stage and he gets on the airplane. 
Congratulations, Mr. Adda; welcome, get on the plane.
  So if we are going to put Federal employees someplace where we need 
them, we need to put them at the visa locations. There are less than 
500 INS inspectors and inspectors along our Canadian border, and that 
is where we understand the terrorists came in. We have 6,000 or 7,000 
down in Mexico, but these terrorists picked our weakest point. If we 
are going to put employees there at the airports, 28,000, why not put a 
few in place to protect our borders to catch these people as they come 
in?
  So we need the intelligence, first of all, about these individuals. 
We need someone checking the visas. All the protections in the world 
can be put in place, but they will be useless if we do not do this.
  Again, look at the September 11 events. Plastic weapons were not in 
place because we did not have the most modern equipment in place. We 
cannot make the mistakes we have made in the past.
  Tomorrow my colleagues will have an opportunity to debate this and, 
hopefully, we will do the right thing to ensure a comprehensive 
transportation and aviation security plan for the country. We must do 
it right. We must do it in a comprehensive fashion. I plead with my 
colleagues not to make this a partisan issue, but to make it a public 
interest issue and pass the very best legislation. The American people 
deserve no less.

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