[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 144 (Thursday, October 25, 2001)]
[House]
[Pages H7329-H7331]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
LONG-TERM TERRORIST STRATEGY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED WITH HIGH-LEVEL
STATEMENT OF NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Culberson). Under the Speaker's
announced policy of January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Connecticut
(Mr. Shays) is recognized for 60 minutes.
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, on September 11 we were brutally awakened to
the harsh realities we dreamed might never reach our shores. With the
thousands of dead, we buried forever any illusion the scourge of
transnational terrorism could not strike here.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called it our
``wake-up call from hell.'' We have awakened to a recurring nightmare
of escalating brutality and carnage unfettered by moral or political
constraints.
Each attack is practice and prelude for the next. Global terrorism
turns our strengths against us, exploiting the freedom, pluralism and
openness we cherish to spread hate, fear and death.
On that day, our world changed in ways we are still struggling to
understand, our vision still blurred by disbelief and tears of grief.
Since then, there have been times I find myself longing for a return
to the Cold War. The numbing calm of mutually assured destruction seems
in retrospect more tolerable than the unnerving wait for the next
random act of barbaric terrorist mayhem.
But if the global upheavals of the last century yield one lesson, it
is this: the dynamic triumphs over the static, and we dare not indulge
the urge to pause and reminisce.
To be sure, the post-Soviet Pax Americana is not quite what we
expected. The Cold War is over, yet the world is a more dangerous
place. Hard on the heels of hope, we are entering a new world order of
growth and cooperation, intractable regional conflicts and the rise of
radical Islamic militancy
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bringing, instead, the prospect of chronic, even cataclysmic disorder.
On the 50th anniversary of Winston Churchill's ``Iron Curtain''
speech at Westminster College, former British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher described these ``other, less appealing consequences'' of the
global situation.
She said, ``Like a giant refrigerator that had finally broken down
after years of poor maintenance, the Soviet empire in its collapse
released all the ills of ethnic, social and political backwardness
which it had frozen in suspended animation for so long.''
In 1996, she was prescient enough to warn of the threat posed by
radical Islamic movements and the middle-income countries, Iraq, Iran,
Syria and others, shopping for chemical and biological weapons in the
post-Soviet toxic bazaar.
The Iron Curtain has been replaced by a poison veil that shrouds the
world in dread and terror. We also find our economic, military and
cultural dominance fostering vocal, sometimes violent resentment to
which we seem unaccustomed and unprepared to rebut. Former Senator
Warren Rudman, who served as the co-chairman of the U.S. Commission on
National Security 21st Century, recently said acknowledging and
managing that resentment would have to become a central element of U.S.
public diplomacy in the years and decades ahead.
That is not all that will have to change. The Nation's fight against
terrorism will remain fragmented and unfocused until there is a
thorough assessment of the threats we face and overarching national
strategy articulated to guide planning, direct spending and discipline
bureaucratic balkanization.
President Bush instructed the Director of the White House Office of
Homeland Security, former Governor Tom Ridge, to formulate that
strategy based on the most current threat intelligence.
When pressed for a national strategy, the previous administration
pointed to a pastiche of event-driven Presidential decision directives
and the Department of Justice's 5-year spending plan.
Reactive in vision and scope, that strategy changed only as we
lurched from crisis to crisis, from Khobar Towers to the Cole, from
Oklahoma City to Dar es Salaam.
President Clinton's National Security Council Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, Richard Clarke, scoffed at our committee's request
for a comprehensive threat assessment. He told us the threat came from
the groups on the State Department's list of designated terrorists and
the strategy was to hunt them down like criminals.
As recently as a month ago, threat assessment and security strategy
were still viewed in some quarters as academic or bureaucratic
exercises.
Today, as we worry about access to crop dusters and anthrax exposures
by mail, a clear-eyed, fully informed view of the threat, particularly
the threat posed by chemical agents and weaponized pathogens, is a
national security imperative.
Assessing the threat of bioterrorism requires a sober judgment about
the motives, intentions and capabilities of people so intoxicated with
hate and evil they would kill themselves in the act of killing others.
These are the questions that confound the assessment process: When
and where will terrorists use biological weapons against us? How will
the agent be dispersed? For what type and magnitude of attack should we
be prepared?
Available answers offer little comfort and less certainty in
assessing the threat. Some conclude the technical difficulties of large
scale production and efficient dissemination reduce the likelihood
terrorists will use lethal agents to inflict mass casualties any time
soon. Others think those barriers have been or will soon be overcome.
Stills others believe neither large quantities nor wide dispersion are
required to inflict biological terror.
From this cacophony of plausible opinions, those charged with
formulating a national counterterrorism strategy must glean a rational
estimate about the irrational possibility of biological attack.
Perhaps the most difficult dimension of the threat to assess is the
deep-seated, almost primal fear engendered by the prospect of
maliciously induced disease. For the terrorist, that fear is a potent
force multiplier, capable of magnifying a minor, manageable outbreak
into a major public health crisis. Failure to account for this unique
aspect of biological terrorism understates the threat, increasing our
vulnerability. Overstating the threat based on fear alone invites
overreaction, in which we waste scarce resources and terrorize
ourselves with Draconian security restrictions.
The changes wrought by the events of September 11 have also brought
into sharper focus just how much of our national security apparatus is
now irrelevant or ineffective.
Last week, Ambassador Paul Bremer, our Nation's first diplomat in
1986 to combat the spread of global terrorism, and chairman of the
National Commission on Terrorism, noted that two of the four pillars of
U.S. counterterrorism policy were already obsolete.
The first, to make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals,
has been made irrelevant by the rise of radical Islamic groups. Their
only demand being the demise of the West, there can be no deal to
strike.
The second pillar of our policy, bring terrorists to justice for
their crimes, has been rendered ineffective by perpetrators willing to
die with their victims. We can no longer indulge the tidy, familiar
mechanics of solving the crime and punishing individuals when the crime
offends humanity and the individuals are eager to be martyred.
That approach has been compared to battling malaria by swatting
mosquitoes. To stop the disease of modern terrorism, the swamp of
explicit and tacit state sponsorship must be drained and disinfected.
That leaves the final two precepts of current policy, isolate state
sponsors of terrorism and enlist other Nations in that effort.
Like its totalitarian forebears, terrorism is not incorporal. Its
practitioners must make anchor and draw sustenance through contact with
the people, places and institutions susceptible to the pressures of
military and political statecraft.
So building a coalition to punish state sponsors is now being pursued
in earnest. But that was not always the case, and it is by no means
clear what longer-term strategy should be pursued in this regard beyond
Afghanistan.
That long-term strategy should be developed with a high-level
statement of national objectives. It should be coupled logically to a
statement of the means that will be used to achieve those objectives.
Only then can we hope to resist the drift of the events thrust upon us
by others and be prepared to confront terrorism in our time and on our
terms.
It will not be easy. David Abshire, from the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, CSIS, recently noted this critical strategic
discussion occurs in the context of a greatly weakened State
Department, a traumatized intelligence community, a disorganized NSC,
and a reactive national security posture left over from the Cold War.
With regard to our intelligence capabilities, I would add the
observation their trauma is in part self-induced. Self-satisfied and
for the most part self-policed, intelligence agencies tend to see
information as an end, not a means. We are partially blinded by the
lack of human intelligence in key parts of the world. Classification
standards and jurisdictional stovepipes all but guarantee critical
observations, and analysis will not reach those who need them.
Ironically, a community so heavily dependent on technical means of
intelligence-gathering has not been able to embrace the data mining and
threat profiling tools others are using to glean important knowledge
from open-source material.
Increasingly sophisticated terrorists are becoming adept at hiding
their secrets in plain view. Our intelligence agencies are too busy
protecting Cold War sources and methods to find them.
Similar institutional dynamics were present the last time the United
States was coming to grips with a profound strategic paradigm shift:
the emergence of the Cold War and the nuclear threat. President
Eisenhower wisely tasked the bureaucracies to do what they often do
best, compete with each
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other. Strategic options were identified, studied and urged on the
President. Conceived in the White House sunroom, the Solarium Exercise,
as it came to be known, produced the long-range strategy that guided
U.S. national security policy for the next 5 decades.
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To meet the current threat, our strategy must be more dynamic and
more open. Security is not a sedative, not a state of rest, but the
level of vigilance required to protect, and advance, what we hold
essential to life and liberty. Advocating for human rights and human
freedoms is not cultural hegemony; it is our God-given right and duty.
Nor can we afford to be squeamish or patronizing in public discourse
about the zealots who target us, or the weapons they wield. A naive or
blurred perception of the threat fragments our defenses and leaves us
avoidably vulnerable.
The inconveniences and sacrifices required to protect national
security and maintain public safety will be more readily accepted if we
are brutally honest about the true nature of our peril. The threat must
be confronted with the same clear-eyed focus, steely intensity and
unflagging vigilance with which the terrorists pursue their malignant
cause.
Since September 11, we have shown we are up to the task.
In another age, another generation faced the prospect of another
evil. Winston Churchill, addressing his besieged nation over the BBC in
1940, spoke to the timeless challenge of defending freedom. This is
what Churchill said:
``And now it has come to us to stand alone in the breach, and face
the worst that the tyrant's might and enmity can do. Bearing ourselves
humbly before God, but conscious that we serve an unfolding purpose, we
are ready to defend our native land against the invasion by which it is
threatened.
``We are fighting by ourselves alone; but we are not fighting for
ourselves alone. Here in this strong city of refuge which enshrines the
title-deeds of human progress and is of deep consequence to Christian
civilization; here, girt about by the seas and oceans where the Navy
reigns; shielded from above by the prowess and devotion of our airmen,
we await undismayed the impending assault.
``Perhaps it will come tonight. Perhaps it will come next week.
Perhaps it will never come.
``We must show ourselves equally capable of meeting a sudden violent
shock, or what is perhaps a harder test, a prolonged vigil. But be the
ordeal sharp or long, or both, we shall seek no terms, we shall
tolerate no parley; we may show mercy, we shall ask for none.''
Mr. Speaker, I appreciate your willingness to take the dais and give
me this opportunity.
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