[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 143 (Wednesday, October 24, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10971-S10976]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I rise today to clarify a matter that has
been somewhat taken out of context. I know my good friend, the majority
leader, was asked this morning about comments the Senator from Delaware
allegedly made speaking to the New York Council on Foreign Relations,
which surprised me the question was asked.
I was informed that a high-ranking Republican on the House side put
out a statement--and I am sure he did not understand the context--
suggesting I implied Americans were high-tech bullies who were bombing
Afghanis, and we should be fighting on the ground and not bombing.
I want to assure my friend from South Dakota, in his response to the
question, he was correct. I did not say anything like that. I will read
from the transcript from the New York Council on Foreign Relations
speech.
I was asked by a gentleman, whose name I will not put in the--well,
his name is Ron Paul, whom I do not know, who says: I concur with
everybody else in commending you on your comments, and he goes on.
Then he says: With regard to the bombing, every day it goes on the
harder it may be for us to do something next, referring to rebuilding
Afghanistan. He said: What do you see as the situation if we do not
defeat the Taliban in the next 4 weeks and winter sets in in
Afghanistan?
The context of the question was, Is it not a hard decision for the
President to have to choose between bombing, knowing it will be
unfairly used for propaganda purposes by radical Muslims in that area
of the world, and bombing to make the environment more hospitable for
American forces to be able to be successful on the ground?
I said it was a hard decision. The question was repeated, and my
answer was: I am not a military man--I will read this in part.
The part that I think flies in the face of and plays into
every stereotypical criticism of us----
Referring to the radical Muslims, that part of the world that is
radical----
is we're this high-tech bully that thinks from the air we
can do whatever we want to do, and it builds the case for
those who want to make the case against us that all we're
doing is indiscriminately bombing innocents, which is not the
truth.
So I want the majority leader to know, and I am sure when the
gentleman on the House side sees the comments, he will be able to put
it in the proper perspective because the irony is anyone who has been
in the Senate knows I was the first, most consistent, and the last
calling for the United States to bomb in Bosnia, bomb in Kosovo, use
the full force of our air power.
I have been around long enough to know unless someone stands up and
clarifies something, it can get out of hand very quickly.
I thank my colleague for his response this morning to the press and
for his faith in his chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I
assure him, in this case at least, it was well placed.
I ask unanimous consent that my entire speech--which I would not
ordinarily do because it is my own speech--to the Council on Foreign
Relations be printed in the Record, along with the question and answers
that follow.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[Remarks By Joseph R. Biden, Jr., United States Senator--Delaware]
From Tragedy to Opportunity: Acting Wisely in a time of Uncertainty
(Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, October 22, 2001, (As
Prepared))
When I accepted this invitation I expected to be talking
about the ABM treaty, about our military priorities in the
context of an evaporating budget surplus, or about missile
defense versus the more urgent threats we could face--and
now, in fact, do face.
I thought the questions I might be asked would be about
strategic doctrine, about relations with traditional
adversaries like Russia and China, and whether the Yankees
will win another World Series.
I certainly did not, for one instance, think we'd be here
today wondering about our short-and long-term goals in a war
against terrorism: Will we succeed? How long will it take?
What constitutes victory?
But those are, in fact, the questions facing the United
States, and, I confess, they're not easy to answer.
First, our immediate goal is to cut off the head of Al
Qaeda, break up the network, leave them no safe haven. That
means the removal of Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and the
Taliban leadership.
I don't know how long it will be before the regime is
toppled. I wouldn't want to guess. But the handwriting is on
the wall. They've lost the support of their key sponsors and
are essentially isolated. But some of these sponsors may need
reminding that they've got to make a clear break with the
past, and we should not hesitate to spell that out.
After Al Qaeda and the Taliban fall, and--to use the phrase
of the day--we drain the swamp, the medium-term goal is to
roll up all Al Qaeda cells around the world.
Then, with the help of other nations and possibly with the
ultimate sanction of the United Nations, our hope is we'll
see a relatively stable government in Afghanistan--one that
does not harbor terrorists, is acceptable to the major
players in the region, represents the ethnic make up of the
country, and provides a foundation for future reconstruction.
In the long term, our goals are easy to articulate, but
much more difficult to achieve.
We'll need to deter any potential state sponsors of
terrorism from providing support or haven to future bin
Ladens.
We'll work with others and try to help rebuild a
politically and socially stable Afghanistan that does NOT
export terrorism, narcotics, or militancy to its neighbors
and to the wider world--more like it was in the 1950s.
We'll need to stabilize Southwest and Central Asia and
prevent the Taliban-izing, if you will, of Pakistan and other
countries.
And we'll need to address some of the economic and
political forces that can be manipulated by men like bin
Laden. We must do this with the full awareness that attention
to social and political development alone won't prevent
another bin Laden from emerging. But, at least, it will
severely limit the pool from which he can draw recruits and
support.
If we're successful in prosecuting this effort in
Afghanistan, it ups the ante for other nations harboring or
sponsoring--directly or indirectly--other terrorist groups.
The President believes, and I agree, that we must stay
involved in the region, not necessarily with American troops,
but with American leadership, and resources.
The President has repeated many times, and it's important
that we say it over and over again: This is not a war against
the Afghan people or any one faith. This is a war between
nation states and transnational terrorist organizations,
between civilization and chaos.
We need to remind the world's 1.2 billion Muslims--the vast
majority of whom are sickened by the attempted hijacking of
their faith--that our beef is with bin Laden and Al Qaeda,
not with them.
American policy has long been marked by a blend of the
Wilsonian trend and realpolitik, but whatever our motive, it
has not been guided by religious imperatives.
When we sought to bring peace and stability to the Balkans,
the Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo were the primary
beneficiaries.
When we went into Somalia, our aim was to feed starving
people who happen to be Muslims.
And, when we provided 170 million dollars in humanitarian
assistance to the Afghan
[[Page S10972]]
people in the last year, it had to do with our principles,
and the people there were Muslim, too.
Unfortunately, we're doing a terrible job of disseminating
information. We have to take a fresh look at public diplomacy
and determine the most effective ways we can get out our
message.
But I'm under no illusions. Winning the hearts and minds of
ordinary citizens in the Islamic world is an uphill battle,
but one we must undertake.
We must enhance the means we use as well as the message--
whether it's people to people visits that explain our
principled respect for the diversity of all faiths and
cultures--or radio and television broadcasts that inform and
ultimately empower moderate Muslim voices.
What we cannot do is let the Taliban wage the same
propaganda war Saddam waged in Iraq, with photographs of
mothers and children scrambling for food and endless footage
of destroyed buildings--all designed to portray America as
anti-Islam. That's a bald-faced lie.
Regardless of whether we succeed in getting our message
out, the truth is, we CANNOT and we certainly WILL not walk
away from seven million displaced and desperate Afghans
surviving on little more than grass and locusts.
We must do more to help the Afghan people, and we must do
FAR more to make our aid visible across the Muslim world.
I'm reluctant to use the word ``nation building'' because
it's such a loaded political term--but, if we leave
Afghanistan in chaos, it'll be another time bomb waiting to
explode. And there's an enormous powder keg right next door
in Pakistan.
If we think we have a problem now, imagine a nation with
six times the population of Afghanistan, a nuclear arsenal,
and a Talibanized government.
To avoid that scenario, we have to work with the World
Bank, the IMF, the U.N., other NGOs and our allies,
especially those in the region, to help build an
infrastructure in Afghanistan that works.
United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan said it will
take nearly $600 million just to get the Afghan refugees
through the winter. But that's only the beginning.
In the long term, Afghanistan will need to find a way to
break the hold that the madrassas have had on a generation of
young men.
They will need to educate a generation of young women, to
give them the tools necessary to seize the rights so cruelly
denied them under Taliban rule.
They'll need to de-mine the most heavily mined nation in
the world.
They'll need crop substitution programs to rid themselves
of the title of the world's foremost producers of heroin and
opium.
They'll need wells, water purification centers, hospitals,
village clinics, even simple roads from one town to the next.
I commend the President for promising $320 million in
Afghan aid. In my opinion, this might be the best investment
we could make. I say this notwithstanding the many obstacles
to achieving these goals that exist in a region that has not
proved fertile for incubating democratic institutions.
Clearly, we can't do it alone.
As demonstrated since September 11th, it's even more
obvious, at least to me, that our national interests can't be
furthered, let alone achieved--in splendid indifference to
the rest of the world.
Our interests are furthered when we meet our international
obligations, keep our treaties, and engage the world.
Far from the black and white of campaigns and up against
the gray of governing, it's much easier to see the virtues of
multi-nationalism and the shortcomings of unilateralism.
The same tools we used to build this coalition may, in the
long term, help change the dynamics of bilateral relations,
and present real and unexpected opportunities to define this
new century.
And by the way, the Administration has figured it out.
Where the Administration may have once been tempted to see
only strategic differences with China over national missile
defense and Taiwan, today there's a growing recognition that
we have common strategic interests as well--like fighting
terrorism and maintaining peace and stability in Central
Asia.
Where the Administration may have once seen relations with
Russia through the prism of the Cold-War, today there's the
promise of entering into a fundamentally different
relationship with the Russian Federation.
Where the Administration may have once viewed relations
with Iran within the confines of a twenty-year time warp,
today Iran has signaled a desire to at least explore a
relationship based on newly defined common interests. They've
even said they would assist in search and rescue operations
of any downed American pilots.
Clearly there's an internal rift in Iran. The reformists
would like to go further. All they could get through the
system was this modest gesture. But because the system
operates on consensus, I'm virtually certain Khamene'i
approves, which is significant in itself.
Let's not be under any illusion that there will be full
blown rapprochement with China, Russia, and Iran. But if we
do this right, if we look at our adversaries in a new light,
there will be much to build off in the future.
This weekend the President was in Shanghai for the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit. He met with China's
leaders, who now see more clearly than ever the threat posed
to them by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
biological, and ballistic missile technology.
I guarantee that Jiang Zemin can imagine a plane crashing
into an 80 story office tower in Shanghai. I expect that
China's leaders will never think of their nuclear and
ballistic missile exports to Pakistan in quite the same way.
Working with China against terrorism, however, does not
mean jettisoning our concerns about China's human rights
record, or overlooking proliferation. In fact, we may need to
remind China's leaders that respect for the human rights and
religious liberty of China's Muslim minorities is not only
morally right, but also essential if we are to deprive the
terrorists of recruits.
In Russia, President Putin has emerged as a strategic
thinker who realizes that, in order for Russia to advance
into the ranks of highly developed nations, he must cast his
lot with the West.
Putin recently said ``Today we must firmly declare: the
Cold War is over.'' And with respect to our efforts in
Afghanistan, he said ``I have no doubt that the U.S.
leadership and President Bush will do their best so that the
peaceful population does not suffer, and they are already
doing their best.''
Putin is willing to confront entrenched, reactionary
domestic opposition when necessary. He overruled his senior
military, and gave the green light for American planes to
overfly Russian territory and to permit troops on former
Soviet territory in Central Asia, actions virtually
unimaginable not long ago.
We have a genuine opportunity to pursue a new relationship
with Russia, and we should. If the news out of Shanghai this
weekend is accurate, it may well be possible to reach
agreement on mutually limiting offensive capabilities and
allowing Tests of missile defense systems. I hope the
President will resist those in his Administration who would
have him risk squandering this opportunity by withdrawing
unilaterally from the ABM treaty.
I've always said: nations, like people, use crises to
resolve differences, or create opportunities.
In the case of Russia, we have a momentous opportunity. It
may well be possible to deal not only with strategic forces,
but also with NATO enlargement and our non-proliferation
concerns.
That new relationship could shape this half-century as the
Cold-War shaped the last.
Three days ago, Secretary Powell said in Shanghai, ``Not
only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold War period is also
over.''
If the Administration proceeds pragmatically, rather than
ideologically, the new era could be good, indeed.
But let's remember that Russia is not the only country that
matters in developing a new strategic doctrine. We must take
care not to provoke a major Chinese arms build-up, which
could lead to more nuclear arms in India and Pakistan. We
need the help of both in the war on terrorism. And nobody
needs more nuclear weapons along a border that is already
getting too hot for comfort.
The time is right to consider joint efforts to reduce
strategic arms; commit to a joint program to combat
terrorism; develop a bilateral plan to prevent other
countries or terrorists from gaining weapons of mass
destruction; find ways to counter infectious disease
epidemics and clean up the residue left by our weapons
programs. And we should do everything we can to help Russia
stay on a path of economic and political growth and
stability.
Once the foundation of cooperation is firmly established,
we can pursue missile defense--if that's what we want--
without rocking the boat of strategic stability.
Look, in the long-term--even if the coalition breaks down--
we'll have the potential opportunity to create a new day of
enhanced bilateral relations with China, Russia, and maybe
even with Iran.
So, in the short term we want to eliminate bin Laden and
his top aides and remove Mullah Omar and the Taliban
leadership.
In the medium term, we'll need to establish a relatively
stable regime in Afghanistan and roll up Al Qaeda cells
around the world.
And in the long-term, we have to deter state sponsorship of
future bin Ladens, help rebuild Afghanistan, and stabilize
Southwest and Central Asia.
What will be much more difficult, will be to clearly
identify and address some of the root causes of this hard-
core, hate-driven zealotry so we can limit the pool from
which another bin Laden can draw recruits.
The list of root causes is long--from the lack of
legitimate channels of dissent in the Arab world, to
desperation, resentment at American material success, a
perception that our actions don't match our ideals.
All of these issues are worthy of our attention, but they
can never be excuses for terrorism.
Which brings us to Israel. Let me just say, Israel did not
produce bin Laden, and we can't let Israel be the scapegoat.
We are in a tough stage right now, and there are many
cross-winds buffeting our relationship, but our friendship
with Israel is not a transitory event, a marriage of
convenience, or a short-term alliance.
Differences are normal even among friends, but airing them
in public is never useful. Surely there are sufficient
channels to communicate our views. Let us not create any
[[Page S10973]]
false impressions about the fundamental, long-term basis upon
which the U.S.-Israel relationship rests: we continue to be
bound by unshakable, shared democratic values.
After all this, the question remains--what constitutes
victory in the war on terrorism?
If we cut off the head of Al Qaeda, help to rebuild a
stable Afghanistan, and if, in the process, we find a way to
stabilize the relationship between Pakistan and India, and
enhance bilateral relations with China, Russia, and Iran,
then we have achieved a victory that may well define the 21st
century.
In sum, just as we could not have put together a viable
coalition if President Bush had already walked away from the
ABM treaty, so too will we have trouble nurturing future
bilateral relations if we decide, when the crisis is over, to
go it alone, again.
We should be figuring out right now how we revive the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Biological Weapons
Treaty, move on arms control proposals that go to Start III,
environmental treaties, and how to amend--and not jettison--
the ABM Treaty.
Before I take some questions let me leave you with these
final thoughts. On September 11th the world changed for the
terrorists. It was, I believe the beginning of the end of a
way of life, not for America, but for international
terrorism.
Out of our dark grief our nation is newly united and abroad
we have new opportunities.
As my mother says, ``Out of every tragedy, if you look hard
enough, you can find one good thing.''
Or, in the words of another great Irish poet, Seamus
Heaney:
``History says, don't hope
On this side of the grave.
But then, once in a lifetime
The longed-for tidal wave
Of justice can rise up,
And hope and history rhyme.''
I truly believe, notwithstanding incredible difficulties we
face in doing even half the things I mentioned here, that
we're on the verge, if we do it right, of making hope and
history rhyme. But we cannot squander this opportunity. I
believe the President has made a genuine transition in his
thinking on foreign policy. I hope I am not kidding myself.
If he has, I think not only will he go down as a great
President, I think we will have marked the beginning of a new
era in international relations.
____
The following transcript of the Question and Answer period
has been provided by the Council on Foreign Relations. The
moderator is former Congressman Vin Weber.
VW: Thank you. It's my job to screen questions for the
Senator without trying to get too much between the questioner
and the answer. Under the rules of these engagements, when I
call on you will you please stand up and state your
affiliation, and try to state your question as concisely as
possible. To get things going, though, I'm going to take the
prerogative of the Chair and ask the first question.
Senator, you talked at some length about some possibilities
in terms of relationships around Russia and other places.
Talk about a place where there might be some strains, the
American people at least are being fed a significant diet of
negative information about our relationship with the Saudi's
and their relationship to terrorism over these past many
years. Is there a deeper problem there than we thought, and
how should the American people and the government think about
that relationship?
JB: I've been admonished to make the answers very, very
brief, so I will make them brief, if you want me to expand I
will attempt to do that. Number one, I do not doubt the
pressure that the Saudis are under, like other Arab states in
the region, having to essentially buy off their extreme
groups in order to maintain themselves. But the Saudis have
gone above and beyond the call in destabilizing the region,
in my view, in terms of essentially funding a significant
portion of what we are now dealing with in the extreme
example of Islam gone awry. It's one thing to decide you're
going to export Wahhabi Sunnism, by setting up Madrassas
around the region. Okay, I get that. But what I don't get is
setting them up where they have a third feature: that they're
a hate-filled, anti-American breeding ground.
I think we should have a very simple, straightforward
discussion with the Saudis and they should understand that
they have a hell of a lot more to lose in the break up of the
relationship than we do. That is taking a great risk. I am
not sanguine about the fact that we get 1.6 million barrels
of oil a day from there, but I would be prepared, were I the
Secretary of State, or I was in another position, to tell the
Saudis: Don't push it. Don't push it. Cease and desist on
this activity. There will be consequences. At any rate,
that's my view.
SR: I'm Steve Robert of Robert Capital Management. As I
listened carefully to your address, which I thought was very
good, it seems the center of gravity in the debate over
missile defense has changed. Because while the opponents of
missile defense prior to September 11th would have just
probably said it's a foolish idea and the wrong priority,
what you seem to be saying is that, it's almost inevitable if
we also cut nuclear arms stockpiles, renegotiate the arms
control treaty and the strategic arms treaty and so forth. So
is this in fact what you mean to communicate, that we're now
just talking about how we get to missile defense, as opposed
to whether we should have missile defense at all?
JB: What I'm suggesting is, and it's a very good question,
what I'm suggesting is, we should be prepared to explore,
assuming we can amend the ABM Treaty to do the exploration,
whether or not a viable missile defense system is feasible
without starting a new arms race, and without producing an
economic hemorrhage of a half a trillion dollars with little
return on our investment.
Right now we're caught between the rock and the hard place.
In order to go forward, according to this administration--and
I think they're inaccurate--but the gentleman sitting behind
you has forgotten more about this issue than I am going to
know. But in order for them to go forward with the testing
program they have in mind, they can do it without having to
violate the ABM Treaty. But it has become sort of religious
doctrine on the right that the ABM Treaty is, per se, bad.
I'm hopeful that we're at a place now, where the President,
if we in fact--and I happen to support significant further
reductions in all offensive capability--if we get the Joint
chiefs to agree upon a number significantly below where we
are, I'm willing to go along with an amendment of the ABM
Treaty, assuming that we have scrubbed this in a way that we
understand what the likely response in China will be to such
a system.
If in fact, notwithstanding the fact that the Russians
would agree, this will start a significant--and our
intelligence agencies publish widely, and I can only tell you
what was in the paper, only confirm . . . I won't confirm,
I'll state what's in the paper--that they will do ten times
as much as they would have otherwise done in offensive
capability if we build such a system. If we cannot get
through that wicket, then it seems to me it is not worth a
candle. The cost is not worth it, and the consequence of
going forward with the limited benefit that would flow from
it may very well start that arms race which I worry most
about in the most dangeorus part of the world. It was
dangerous before, and it's considerably more dangerous now.
So I cannot fathom India sitting by if China rapidly racks
up their nuclear capability, and I cannot figure Pakistan
doing the same, and so I see it as a disaster. But this is a
beginning step, and I guess the polite way of saying this,
I'm happy the President seems to be moving in the direction
where he may not unilaterally walk away from the ABM Treaty.
That's a big deal.
VW: I want to go to Rita next, but if there are other
questions on either strategic defense or the ABM Treaty, I'll
take them now, before we leave that topic. If not, we'll go
to Rita.
RH: Rita Hauser. You didn't mention Iraq. Do you see Iraq
in the second stage as a target for the terrorists counter-
offensive, and what is your view on the continuation of our
policy of sanctions?
JB: I happen to think that the sanctions policy needs to be
changed. The Secretary of State has discussed a smarter
sanctions policy. I thought he was going in the right
direction, I was hoping that it would be embraced, although I
now think there's an opportunity to embrace it because the
dynamics have changed in Moscow, and the dynamics have
changed in France, and the dynamics have changed in China
somewhat, and I would further explore going back to that
approach, that is, a smart sanctions policy.
I'm of a view that what has changed has all been bad from a
Iraq standpoint, for the Iraqis. The idea now that we are
going to just disregard what Saddam has done, walk away and
just seek economic opportuinty, as some of our friends and
allies have done, I think is being reconsidered in those very
capitols. Rather than have a second phase, the way in which
the press uses it, and I assume you're talking about, that
is, after we finish with Afghanistan, do we invade Iraq? I
think that is not the prudent approach. I think what we
attempt to do is to build a coalition, reconstruct a
coalition that is tighter and stronger and with more demands
placed upon the behavior of Iraq.
My view is, if we're able to do that, and the behavior is
still as bad as it has been in the past, you will be able to
much more likely generate a consensus on at least standing by
as we took action, or having multilateral action. But to just
go from here to there I think would be a disastrous mistaken
in the near term.
VW: Go back to that table. I'm going to try to move the
audience as best I can.
FW: Frank Wisner from the American International Group. The
current crisis . . . (Overlap)
JB: Why are you taking folks out of Delaware? We want to
talk about that . . . (Laughter) . . . I want to know this,
Mr. Ambassasdor, this a parochial, this a serious stuff.
(Laugher) I'm only joking . . . (Overlap)
FW: . . . we have commitment . . . (Overlap)
JB: . . . I just want to kind of throw you off. (Laughter)
VW: . . . He's not really joking. (Laughter)
JB: . . . Former Congressman, I can tell you, I'm worried
about it, but . . .
FW: Senator, coming back to the subject of your terrific
speech today, (Laughter) . . .
JB: It went from good to terrific. (Laughter)
FW: This crisis has brought to light other tensions, and
among them has been the sparking of tension between India and
Pakistan, with very heavy Indian shelling, acts of
[[Page S10974]]
terror in Kashmir. As you look at that aspect of the
challenge to American diplomacy, what message do you have to
the parties in the region, how they can get on top of the
problem they have and the role the United States can play?
JB: Let me answer it in reverse order. The role of the
United States. The United States should stay engaged the way
the Secretary has gotten engaged in the last week. It's made
a difference already. I think there has to be a clear
understanding, both in Delhi and Islamabad that we are
interested, we are looking and we are watching.
Secondly, I think a message should be delivered very
strongly to the Indians, do not attempt to take advantage of
the circumstances this moment, it's against your interests
across the board. And thirdly, we have to make clear to the
Pakistanis that, notwithstanding the fact we need you very
much right now, you are in a position where if you are going
to continue to foment the terror that does exist in Kashmir,
then you are operating against your own near term interests,
because that very viper can turn on you. And I think we have
to talk and talk and talk and talk, and engage and engage and
engage. Because as you well know, part of the cry on the part
of India has been, just somebody pay attention . . . or
excuse me, in Pakistan, someone pay attention.
And on India, we don't want any part of anybody being
involved and looking at any of this problem. The truth of the
matter is, the whole world is looking at their problem now in
Kashmir, not just us, the spotlight is on and the
consequences for how they will be treated relative to all
other nations in the world is very much up in the air right
now, and they should be made constantly aware of how tenuous
the circumstance is for both of them. In this case,
particularly India . . . in my view, particularly India.
VW: Can I follow up on that myself? Because at the
beginning of this administration, the administration seemed
to be tilting, to use a term, toward India, the Indian
Foreign Minister was given a meeting with the President, and
it seemed as if the administration was going to try to, as
one of the cornerstones of their foreign policy, build a much
better relationship with India than we've had in the past. In
view of what you just said, do you think that that was then,
and this is now, or is there still an opportunity going
forward to forge a much closer relationship with the Indians?
JB: I think that was then, and it's almost still that way
now. (Scattered Laughter) And let me explain what I mean by
that. I may be mistaken, and I may be a bit cynical, but I
think the initial, quote, tilt toward India was related to
Beijing more than it was to Pakistan or anything else. And I
think that the relationship with Beijing was going south very
rapidly. And continued to move south in a precipitous way
until Powell made his visit.
I coincidentally happened to take a small delegation of
Senators to some very high level meetings for six days in
China, just on the heels of that visit, and you could
literally see, maybe a mild exaggeration, a sigh of relief on
the part of the Chinese, that maybe this collision is not
inevitable, it is not inevitable. I think it chastened the
Chinese a little bit, I think it made them focus on the
precipice, as well as us.
Now what's happened is, I think, you have, and it's a . . .
I cannot prove this, I think what you have in India now is a
look north and saying, whoa, it looks like these guys are
talking again. We may have moved past our opportunity to make
a substantial change in the relationship. That would be a
mistake on their part, to think that. Because I think that
there is a desire in the administration to actually,
genuinely better relations with India. I think it is an
absolute essential element of American foreign policy that
that be done. And part of that is simply engaging . . .
engaging them and treating them like what they are. They
will, in not too long, be the largest, most populous nation
in the world. They are a democracy, as flawed as you may
think it is. They are someone with whom we should and must
have a much, much, much better relationship and
understanding.
And the whole world has changed for India. It has changed
not only when the Wall came down, and when their protector
evaporated, it changed now as the relationship with China
begins to mature, and they're going to have some great
difficulty internally figuring out how to deal with that. But
we should be engaged at the highest level on a daily basis,
literally with India. So I don't think the administration is
jettisoning India, but I think they're beginning to look at
India in a different way, not as cynically as just a card to
have been played against Beijing.
VW: Questioner behind Frank, then I'm going to try to go
the back of the room for a question.
ME: Monsoor Ejaz. Senator, it's always good to hear you
speak so frankly, so I'm going to try and get you on the
record on another sensitive issue. Does the United States
need a military policy to deal with an eventuality in which a
Taliban-like force would hold control over Pakistan's nuclear
weapons? And if it does, what should that policy look like?
JB: Well, I think we're engaged in that policy right now.
And I have every reason to believe from my conversations with
the President, and I don't pretend to be his confidant, I
don't want anyone . . . I know you all know that, but the CNN
audience might think I'm trying to foist myself off as the
President's close advisor. I've been flattered the President
has engaged me as the opposition and as Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, and we've had, as they say, full
and frank discussion, probably five, six hours worth in the
last several months, and . . . but my impression and my
understanding is, coming from both the Secretary of State as
well as the Secretary of Defense and as well as the President
of the United States personally, that that is the essence of
their policy at the moment.
It is reflected in certain ways. You see, and I'll be very
parochial, and I'm going to give you a specific example.
Right now there has been, and continues to exist, a real
dissatisfaction on the part of the Northern Alliance that we
have not done, which is fully without our capability to do
now, and that is with air power, essentially provide air
cover that could decimate the Taliban capability of holding
them back, not only from Mazar i Sharif, but also holding
them back from the capitol.
And the President has not been as blunt as I'm going to be,
because I don't speak for him, so I can say it, I believe the
President's actions have been somewhat circumspect for very
good reasons. He understands that if in fact the Northern
Alliance marches into Kabul and sets up a government, that we
will have the potential for a disintegration in Islamabad,
and that Pakistan may very well, and Musharraf may in fact
collapse, it may be gone.
And so I think that . . . I'll give you that as one example
of my view of the President's understanding of how difficult
this is. We have also done things which were not particularly
comfortable for me to do, quite frankly. I'm the guy, as
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that was
responsible for either facilitating and/or proposing the
lifting of all the sanctions, of which I have supported
relative proliferation, not to proliferation questions, as
well as democratization. And we've even looked at Section
508, and so my point is that we have taken extraordinary
actions, which is sort of against our instincts, with only
the promise, only the promise of elections a year from
now, with the commitment to be kept, and only the hope,
the hope that we will be able to stabilize, that the
region will, with our help and others, be stabilized in
such a way that we don't have to face that God awful
specter of radical Islamic groups taking over a country
that is multiple sizes larger than Afghanistan, with
nuclear weapons.
So I think the administration is fully appraised, fully
understands, and is doing everything within its power,
understanding, and I don't . . . in defense of the
administration, no one has a hole card here. No one that I
know, maybe some of you do, and if you do, let me know
because I want to nominate you for the Nobel Peace Prize in
advance. No one I know has a surefire way to assure that
stability in this part of the world will result from the
actions undertaken. Conversely, I don't know of anyone who .
. . I do know of some, I don't know anyone in this room would
like to suggest we should not and need not have taken the
action we are taking. We're not going to get into the weeds
here. It's going to start to get . . . we talked, and I hope
I don't offend anybody saying this, at our table here, we
talked about how long the honymoon, how long the
unquestioning period of unabashed support for the President's
policy will continue. I think everyone . . . I shouldn't say
everyone . . . I mean the vast majority of the foreign policy
establishment, of the Democratic and Republican sides of the
aisle, in fact share the view that up to now the President's
done a pretty darn good job of assembling this multilateral
force, resisting what were very strong entree's from parts of
the administration to bypass Afghanistan and go straight to
Iraq, et cetera. I think he's done well. But now we're going
to get into the tough calls.
Case in point, and I'll stop with this. How much longer
does the bombing continue? Because we're going to pay every
single hour, every single day it continues, we're going to
pay an escalating price in the Muslim world. We're going to
pay an escalating price in the region. And that in fact is
going to make the aftermath of our, quote, victory more
difficult to reconstruct the region. Conversely, the
President's in a very difficult spot. How much does he have
to do to make the environment in which we are going to send,
and we will, American forces, hospitable to the extent . . .)
(Council on Foreign Relations tape turned to side B . . .
several seconds missing . . .)
. . . tell you, though, I hope to God it ends sooner rather
than later, becasue every moment it goes on, it makes the
aftermath problem more severe than it is . . . was an hour
ago. And so that's what I mean when I say they're fully
appraised of their problem. They are going to engage in
activities that we may . . . I may be able to Monday morning
quarterback and second guess, but I know of no clear path
that suggests how they secure the notion that there is no
possibility of Pakistan degenerating into chaos, and us
dealing with a problem there. The ultimate answer would be,
if that were the case, we would find ourselves with a whole
hell of a lot more forces in that region than we have now,
which would be a very bad idea.
VW: Going to go right straight to the back of the room, and
then I have a question at the middle table up front.
[[Page S10975]]
DG: I'm Davey Gaw(?), with the conference board. Senator,
you gave us a picture that was historic, and it raised the
question in my mind, to this effect. Is there an advertising
problem, is there a genuine insoluble intellectual issue, or
simply have we not solved the following? It seems to me that
for the past 50 years or so, the U.S. has always been stuck
in a corner, on the one hand we launch into the world with
noble causes, and then we tie ourselves to ignoble regimes so
that we have (Inaudible) for purposes, but people think that
we're married to these regimes, and the same thing is
occuring now in the Middle East. What's wrong? Why can't we
do a dual track strategy? Why can't we send a message that's
credible, that we do serve double purposes on the one end,
but we also do not want to marry ignoble regimes on the
other? Why can't we solve that issue?
JB: Because life's tough (Scattered Laughter) There are
hard choices. I don't know. I don't want to get him
in trouble, but I suspect Les Gelb may remember, about a
dozen years ago, my proposing we start to distance
ourselves from some of those various regimes, and for
example, during the Gulf War, one of the reasons I voted
against the resolution that was put forward was, I did not
get any commitment from the administration personally that
they would in fact make sure that when we freed Kuwait,
the circumstance in Kuwait would change. I did not see
merely putting the Emir back in power as anything that
inured to our great benefit. The territorial principle of
not crossing a border was a big deal, and important and
oil mattered, but it seemed to me we should have extracted
in return for that some commitment toward the movement
toward, some movement toward, not outright democracy, but
some movement toward a liberalization of the system.
I have been the odd man out on that for a long time with
regard to Saudi Arabia as well, and other countries in the
region. But I acknowledge to you, it is incredibly difficult
to do. And you got to be prepared to take a risk, and the
risk is serious. The down side is high. The costs
economically are severe. But I think we're at the point now
where we have to take those risks. But it's not easy. It is
not easy because the truth of the matter is, we inherited
what was there, we helped make and sustained what was there,
but we did it for reasons relating to our immediate self
interests that were of consequence to us, enabling us to do
other things in other parts of the world that were necessary
to be done.
So, it's, yes, as a former President once said, life ain't
fair. Well, the world ain't fair, and we're left with a lot
of Hobson's Choices. If I can elaborate on one piece. This
dissemination of information, I put together a proposal that
I've been discussing with the administration. I've been sort
of the guy who has, and a lot of you have as well, but I mean
in the Senate, in the House, I've been sort of the godfather
of the radios lately, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, the
Voice of America, et cetera. It's woefully underfunded. For
example, in the largest Muslim state in the world, where they
have 220 million people, we spend two million dollars on the
radio, for example. So I put together a proposal at the
President's urging, quite frankly, because one of the things
I discussed with him, that I'm going to present to him when
he gets back, is over a half a billion dollar initial
investment, 250 million dollars a year, for public diplomacy,
and fundamentally altering the way in which we're able to
broadcast to that part of the world. As part of this, I asked
my staff, and I have some very talented staff people who know
the region well, have worked in the region, and are very
academically qualified as well as practically qualified, if
they would get together some two or three or four of the most
knowledgeable folks on Islam in the world, so that we in
fact, when I propose this, I was doing something that was
counterproductive. So that we wouldn't find we were causing
more problems than there were solutions. And I sat with these
four folks, I'll tell you what they said to me. Now, they're
not the end of the day, but they said to me, they said, look,
the idea of winning the hearts and minds of the Islamic
world, and the Arab Islamic world is not likely. The best you
can do is give some reasons for the moderates within that
regime to have a reason to sustain their position against the
extremists in . . . did I say regime? I meant to say region,
against extremists in the region. And they went on to say,
the problem isn't with the American people, it's with
American foreign policies, and then they ticked off the
foreign policy. Being part of propping up regimes that in
fact are anti-democratic and are part of the problem, because
again, Osama Bin Laden is after Riyadh, not after Jerusalem.
And it's a different problem. And also they then point out
Israel, and they say part of the problem relates to our
policy relative to Israel. Well, there are certain things
we're not going to change. There are certain things we're not
going to change, so the question is, what utility would a
significant investment in our public diplomacy have? And it
seems to me the minimum what it would have, it would give a
context in which we were able to . . . they were able to make
judgments about the totality of our action, and would not in
fact change the attitude in that part of the world toward us,
but would moderate it. And so these are very difficult
questions, though, but I am going to propose we make this
major investment, and I think it will fall on, quite frankly,
friendly ears in the administration, based on my
conversations with the President.
VW: Is there an opportunity to take that a step further to
the whole foreign policy budget of the government, the United
Nations that you've been involved in, support for our
embassies abroad that's been underfunded for some time,
foreign aid budget, is that a part of the whole response?
JB: No, because . . . and I'm not being . . . I didn't mean
to be so sure. (Laughs) I don't mean . . . (Overlap)
VW: . . . short answer (?) . . .
JB: . . . that's right. (Scattered Laughter) Now, well . .
. the answer is no for the following reasons. For the federal
government to engage in public diplomacy at home is a very
dangerous thing, in my view. For us to fund news
organizations that promote a governmental position, it seems
to me is not what we need, domestically in the United States.
But we do need it abroad. What will change, and has changed
that, as Ambassador Negroponte knows, he not only . . . I
mean, I love the guy. We held him up for God knows how long
before we approved him, so everybody made sure any accusation
ever against wouldn't rub off on them, and they all turned
out to be false, and we approved unanimously, wasn't it? I
don't think anybody voted against it. And he went up there
and did something no one's been able to do, including Prince
Holbrooke, no one's been able to do this. (Laughter) And you
know what he did? He went up and there and got immediately
the right wing Republicans to free up the money in the House.
You know what did that? The world changed. They did not want
to have to, as former Senator Carol Moseley Braun would say,
wear the jacket of us not being able to put together a
coalition because he was unable to do his job in the United
Nations because he had to face the constant charge that we
weren't meeting our end of the deal.
So I think events alter those kinds of things and I think
you're going to see foreign policy much more on the front
burner of American domestic politics for the reasons that
were stated at the outset, that we'll, in fact, up those
budgets and people are beginning to understand the
complexity. It's not all military, it's diplomacy. We have to
lead in other ways, and I think that will be helped by this
terrible circumstance.
VW: Senator Biden, thank you for . . . (Overlap)
DG: I'm Dick Garwin, Council on Foreign Relations. Thank
you for an insightful and constructive presentation. Now, on
the ABM Treaty and missile defense, I can just say Amen, but
the rest of the topics you mentioned, we need to have not
only some priorities, but more than that. That administration
and the Congress are going to have to do a number of things
together. First, it seems to me that we have to have refugee
camps, and the refugee camps have to be training grounds for
democracy. So, we need to work with the United Nations to do
this, and to accomplish that. We need to provide security,
but we need to provide more than security.
The next priority I think has to be the chemical and
biological weapons conventions, especially the BWC . . .
essentially all the nations of the world have signed up, but
they're not all obeying it. They're not all doing what they
said. Before we have any compliance, we've got to have them
say, we're going to do this, we're passing a law, everybody
has to stop affiliating with biological weapons and we're
going to destroy our stocks. Seems to me that's the next. And
finally, in my talk, is the Pakistani nuclear weapons. You
read in the New York Times Bruce Wehr(?), saying we ought to
provide means of going in, and capturing them in case
Pakistan regime falls. Well, we'll get a lot more cooperation
if we fund Pakistani regime in order to destroy their own, or
render them ineffective if the regime falls, and with uranium
weapons that can be done in reasonably expeditious fashion.
But how do you solve the problem of priorities, and doing a
number of things at the same time which neither
administrations nor Congress are good at?
JB: Let me tell you, I fully agree with your list, I
shortened my speech on the fly here, I'll give you a copy of
it, it mentions all three of those things, particularly the
biological and chemical weapons treaty and the
implementation. And I think you do just what you said. Those
discussions are underway with the Democratic Congress and the
Republican members of Congress and the President on setting
those priorities. The question is, the President has an
internal dilemma he has to overcome first. He is focusing on
first things first, but then he has to deal with . . . and
I'm going to get in trouble for saying this . . . but he has
to deal with what has not gone away. There is, for lack of a
better phrase, still a Rumsfeld-Powell split on how they
look at the world, and how they look at these very issues
that you've stated here. I was discussing here at my
table, my perception, and maybe, what's that old
expression, the father is . . . the wish is the father of
the thought, or whatever it is, that maybe I'm just sort
of making this up as I go along because I want to feel it.
But my impression is, this President is arriving at his
own foreign policy. He is arriving at his own foreign
policy. I think he accepted wholesale sort of the movement
right position on foreign policy issues, because as a
Governor he hadn't paid much attention to those. And I
think he's finding that those as a prescription don't fit
the modern day world as easily as he thought they may.
And so I see the first thing that has to happen is the
President himself has to decide
[[Page S10976]]
what he thinks about these issues. And I hope we throw in
CTBT here, because I think to me that is one of the . . .
that is the single most important thing we could do at the
front end. But . . . Vin is looking at his watch,
understandably, I happen to agree with you. With regard to
priorities, Dick Lugar and I are going to be introducing this
week after call for a commission that is, I know we got a lot
of commissions, but a commission made up, appointed by the
President, the House and the Senate, made up of the leading
people in America that we could find with the greatest
stature, to come forward with us with a threat assessment, a
threat assessment that in fact reflects, for purposes of
deciding what priorities we should be focusing on. And so I
can talk to you more about that later, but my time is . . .
(Overlap)
VW: I don't know if we have time for one or two more, but
one there, and if there's time for two, it's over there. Les
is telling me only one, I'm sorry to say, (inaudible).
M: (inaudible) Talbot(?). Senator, thank you for this broad
guarded approach to the problems we face. My question is
this, do you foresee the need or the expectation of a
Congressional declaration of war, which the Constitution
calls for, and if so, against whom? (Scattered Laughter)
JB: The answer is yes, and we did it. I happen to be a
professor of Constitutional law. I'm the guy that drafted the
Use of Force proposal that we passed. It was in conflict
between the President and the House. I was the guy who
finally drafted what we did pass. Under the Constitution,
there is simply no distinction . . . Louis Fisher(?) and
others can tell you, there is no distinction between a formal
declaration of war, and an authorization of use of force.
There is none for Constitutional purposes. None whatsoever.
And we defined in that Use of Force Act that we passed, what
. . . against whom we were moving, and what authority was
granted to the President.
And why don't you take that question, it's not two o'clock,
I'll give a yes or no. He may be from Delaware. (Laughter)
RP: Roland Paul, Senator, I concur with everybody else in
commending you on your comments, and anyone who's heard you
before would certainly not be surprised at how good they
were. I would return to a question you answered earlier, and
you said as long . . . the bombing, every day it goes on, the
harder it may be for us to do something in the past(?). What
do you see as the situation if we don't defeat the Taliban in
the next four weeks, and winter sets in in Afghanistan?
JB: Again, I'm not a military man. I think the American
public and the Islamic world is fully prepared for us to take
as long as we need to take, if it is action that is mano-a-
mano. If it's us on the ground going against other forces on
the ground. The part that I think flies in the face of and
plays into every stereotypical criticism of us is we're this
high tech bully that thinks from the air we can do whatever
we want to do, and it builds the case for those who want to
make the cause against us that all we're doing is
indiscriminately bombing innocents, which is not the truth.
Some innocents are (indiscriminately) bombed, but that is not
the truth. I think the American public is prepared for a long
siege. I think the American public is prepared for American
losses. I think the American public is prepared, and the
President must continue to remind them to be prepared, for
American body bags coming home.
There is no way that you can in fact go after and root out
al-Qaeda and/or Bid Laden without folks on the ground, in
caves, risking and losing their lives. And I believe that the
tolerance for that in the Islamic world is significant . . .
exponentially higher than it is for us bombing. That's a
generic point I wish to make. I am not qualified enough to
tell you, although I can tell you what the military guys have
said to me, this is not 1948. This is 2001, I'm not at all
they're correct, and our ability to wage conflict in the
winter, in parts of this region, is within our control, I
don't know enough to vouch for that or not, but I do think it
clearly makes it more difficulty, and the weather window is
closing, as opposed to the tolerance window for a behavior,
in my view. Thank you all very, very much. (Applause)
Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Miller). The majority leader.
Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Senator from Delaware for his clarification,
although there was none required on my part.
Mr. BIDEN. I knew it would not be required on the Senator's part.
Mr. DASCHLE. I have the greatest admiration for the extraordinary
experience and leadership provided by the Senator from Delaware. I am
not surprised he was misquoted, and I think he is wise. He speaks from
experience in coming to the floor to ensure if there is any
misunderstanding it has now been clarified.
He did it in a way I would expect. He has come to the Chamber with a
complete explanation. I have read some of the remarks because after
being asked the question, I was informed of the Senator's comments. I
applaud him for the way in which he handled the questions and applaud
him as well for his speech. I appreciate his willingness to come to the
Chamber, and I thank him for the extraordinary job he does every day as
chairman of our Foreign Relations Committee.
Mr. BIDEN. Very briefly in response, I thank the Senator. I know the
public listening to this would say they expect two guys who are friends
and in the same party to say the same thing, but the truth is we are
all going to be tested over the next several months. The President of
the United States, who we all think is doing a very fine job, is going
to have to make some very tough decisions.
I, for one, and I know my two leaders and the Senator from Oregon as
well are not into Monday morning quarterbacking. Some of the decisions
we are going to make are going to turn out to be brilliant. Some we are
going to make are not going to be so good.
I would say this: This President, in my view, so far has made the
right choices. He has done the right thing. He is pursuing the right
way. This notion of how long we bomb versus how long before we put
forces on the ground is an incredibly difficult decision. You can be
assured every single mistake we accidentally make--and by the way, to
our credit the Defense Department acknowledged today, like no other
Defense Department would, I think, that, yes, there was an errant bomb,
and it did take out some innocent people. What other great nation would
acknowledge that?
That is going to happen. It is horrible that it will, but the
President has a series of very tough choices. I want him to know that
not only I, but we all wish him well, and as long as he is trying, as
he is, to keep this coalition together, to keep it moving, I am willing
to yield to his judgment in the prosecution of this war.
So I thank my friend for his kind comments, and I hope this puts it
to rest. I am sure the gentleman on the House side who made the
comments was probably told by staff, and I think it was kind of like a
drive-by shooting because I have never had a cross word with this
particular House Member, but I understand things got pretty hot in the
House today. I think I was the first Democrat who came across his
radar, and I think this would be called a political drive-by shooting--
accidental, I hope--and it will get straightened out.
I am not criticizing or making light of what was said. I want the
Record to be straight because it is important the world knows and the
Nation knows we are behind the President and we are not at this point
second-guessing his judgment, particularly about bombing.
____________________