[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 141 (Thursday, October 18, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10836-S10842]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. REID:
S. 1564. A bill to convey land to the University of Nevada at Las
Vegas Research Foundation for a research park and technology center;
read the first time.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the
bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 1564
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, needs land in the
greater Las Vegas area to provide for the future growth of
the university;
(2) the proposal by the University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
for construction of a research park and technology center in
the greater Las Vegas area would enhance the high tech
industry and entrepreneurship in the State of Nevada; and
(3) the land transferred to the Clark County Department of
Aviation under section 4(g) of the Southern Nevada Public
Land Management Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-263; 112 Stat.
2346) is the best location for the research park and
technology center.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are--
(1) to provide a suitable location for the construction of
a research park and technology center in the greater Las
Vegas area;
(2) to provide the public with opportunities for education
and research in the field of high technology; and
(3) to provide the State of Nevada with opportunities for
competition and economic development in the field of high
technology.
SEC. 2. CONVEYANCE TO THE UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA AT LAS VEGAS
RESEARCH FOUNDATION.
(a) Conveyance.--Notwithstanding section 4(g)(4) of the
Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act of 1998 (Public
Law 105-263; 112 Stat. 2347), the Clark County Department of
Aviation may convey, without consideration, all right, title,
and interest in and to the parcel of land described in
subsection (b) to the University of Nevada at Las Vegas
Research Foundation for the development of a technology
research center.
(b) Description of Land.--The parcel of land referred to in
subsection (a) is the parcel of Clark County Department of
Aviation land--
(1) consisting of approximately 115 acres;
(2) located in the SW \1/4\ of section 33, T. 21 S., R. 60
E., Mount Diablo Base and Meridian; and
(3) identified in the agreement entitled ``Interim
Cooperative Management Agreement Between the United States
Department of the Interior--Bureau of Land Management and
Clark County'', dated November 4, 1992.
______
By Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Feingold, Mr.
Corzine, Mr. Harkin, and Mr. Leahy):
S. 1565. A bill relating to United States adherence to the ABM
Treaty; to the Committee on Armed Services.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation
regarding the testing, development, and possible deployment of a
National Missile Defense system. This legislation is cosponsored by
Senators Wyden, Feingold, Corzine, Harkin, and Leahy.
I share the concern of many of my colleagues that, in the aftermath
of the horrific events of September 11, this is not the appropriate
time or place for a divisive debate on the Senate floor on missile
defense.
That is why I did not offer this legislation as an amendment on the
Defense authorization bill, do not intend to offer it as an amendment
on other legislation before the Senate at this time, and do not intend
to push this legislation for a vote at this point in time. This is not
the time for Senate consideration of this legislation or for a divisive
debate on this issue.
But I also believe that it is critical that at the appropriate time,
and in the appropriate way, a full public and congressional debate on
missile defense must occur. It is simply too an important a decision,
and too important an issue, to be treated in any other way.
Indeed, National Missile Defense is one of the most serious foreign
policy and national security issue that we will face in the coming
decades. The administration's decisions on this issue should be made
deliberately, in consultation with our allies, and, most importantly,
in consultation with the United States Congress.
As one Senator, I myself have spent considerable time over the past
several years in meetings, briefings, and discussions on this issue.
Earlier this year I had the opportunity to discuss missile defense
issues at length with former Secretary Perry.
He suggested to me that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons of mass destruction, and the increasing availability
to other nations as well as transnational groups such as terrorist
organizations, of the technology and material necessary to develop and
deliver WMD is perhaps the most serious threat to U.S. national
security today.
Secretary Perry went on to argue, however, that National Missile
Defense is not and should not be seen as a one-size-fits-all substitute
for an effective non-proliferation strategy, and that the United States
must have a balanced program to effectively safeguard our interests.
This includes effective strategies for the prevention of proliferation,
deterrence, homeland defense, and counter-proliferation, and clearly
calibrating and allocating resources to meet the real challenges that
face U.S. national security interests.
I believe that the approach suggested by Secretary Perry makes a good
deal of sense.
Based on this approach, I believe that it is therefore important for
Congress to ask a number of questions with regard to NMD. Questions
such as:
Would missile defense have helped to prevent the events of September
11?
Are there more immediate security needs, such as homeland defense,
which demand priority on our scarce national defense and national
security resources?
Is NMD an appropriate to serve as the central axle around which U.S.
national security rotates, given the nature of the threats we now face?
Would unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty hurt U.S.
efforts to get international cooperation in the battle against
terrorism?
Will acquiring NMD make the United States, and the world, safer and
more secure? Or will unilateral U.S. development and deployment of NMD,
and unilateral violation, abrogation, or withdrawal from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, make us less safe and secure?
I am also concerned that with what appears to be a rush toward
construction at Fort Greely, AK, the administration has already made a
decision on deployment, without having yet answered these bottom line
questions.
The legislation that I and my colleagues introduce today seeks to
address these questions, and to suggest that the balanced approach
suggested by Secretary Perry to safeguarding the United States from the
threat of WMD attack might be a wiser policy for Congress to consider,
rather than merely rubber-stamping the administration's missile defense
policy.
This legislation would: express the Sense of the Senate that U.S.
research and development of missile defense remain consistent with the
ABM treaty, that the U.S. should pursue good faith negotiations with
Russia to make such modifications to the ABM as may be necessary, but
that the U.S. should not unilaterally opt-out of the treaty and not
deploy a missile defense system that has not met the basic research,
testing, and evaluation standards to prove its operational
effectiveness.
Place a limitation on funding available for missile defense testing,
evaluation, or deployment that would unilaterally abrogate or violate
the ABM treaty.
Call on the Secretary of State to report to Congress, if a decision
on deployment is made, regarding the nature of the threat that
triggered the deployment decision and the likely impact that the
deployment decision will have on U.S. national security interests.
Call on the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress, if a decision
on deployment is made, on the operational effectiveness of the missile
defense system.
Call on the President to make an annual report to Congress on the
nature of the WMD threat faced by the U.S. and its allies, evaluate the
threat posed by different means of delivery, ranging from ballistic
missiles to suitcase bombs, provide an estimation for the total cost of
development and deployment of missile defense, and make a determination
whether missile defense spending adversely impacts other priority
national security programs of the Department of Defense.
[[Page S10837]]
I have previously stated that my concerns about NMD revolve largely
around four issues: The nature of the threat; the implications for arms
control and the international security environment; the feasibility of
the technology; and the cost. I would like to address each of these in
turn.
The bottom line of these concerns is simply this: Will a
unilateralist missile defense deployment decision become the basis for
a new arms race, leading to a world with more ballistic missiles and
WMD pointed at the United States, not less? Would the United States be
more secure, or less?
We also must ask where does the long range missile threat to the U.S.
stand?
Russia for all its problems, remains the only nation possessing
enough Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, ICBMs, and submarine
launched ballistic missiles, SLBMs, to overwhelm the proposed U.S.
defensive umbrella. China has only a small number of ICBMs. No other
nation has operational ICBMs and only two, France and the United
Kingdom, have SLBMs.
Other countries, such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, do not today have
ballistic missile capabilities that are a threat to the United States.
We should not act in ways to encourage them to develop these
capabilities or, just as troubling, to develop alternate means to
attack the United States which NMD is powerless to counter.
Looking ahead, however, George Tenet, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, testified before Congress last year that ``over
the next 15 years, our cities will face ballistic missile threats from
a variety of actors.'' He pointed to North Korea which, he said, could
further develop its Taepo Dong 2 missile, noting that it ``might be
capable of delivering a nuclear payload to the United States.''
Other nations which have or are pursuing ballistic missile programs
include Iran and Iraq. Neither of these countries have succeeded in
developing ballistic missile capabilities, however, and unless they
make a concerted effort to do so, neither appears likely to develop
capabilities within the next 10 years.
As we consider U.S. missile defense policy, I believe it is a fair
question to ask what sort of developments in the international security
environment might lead them, or others, to make that sort of concerted
effort?
As the past two weeks have too well illustrated, the world is not a
static place. International security relationships are fluid and
dynamic. The United States today is the world's sole superpower, and
although that gives us great strategic flexibility and maneuverability,
it would be naive for us to believe that other nations and
transnational groups do not and will not react to the strategic choices
the United States makes, and how they perceive those choices affecting
their own interests.
In other words, how might the rest of the world react to a unilateral
U.S. decision to deploy NMD? What would other countries do to protect
what they perceive as their national security interests in the face of
a U.S. NMD?
The National Intelligence Estimate prepared last year, ``Foreign
Responses to U.S. National Missile Deployment,'' suggests that in
reaction to U.S. NMD deployment:
Russia could opt to deploy shorter-range missiles along its borders
and resume adding multiple warheads to its ballistic missiles.
China would most likely seek to deploy additional missiles with
MIRVed warheads if the U.S. went ahead with NMD. This would mean that
China may attempt a strategy of ``breaking out,'' giving them the
capability to ``overwhelm'' a U.S. NMD system.
North Korea could resume its missile flight test program and
cooperate with other countries, such as Iran or Iraq, in helping them
develop missile capabilities.
Iran and Iraq might well redouble their efforts to develop their own
missile programs, including decoys and countermeasures that would allow
them to bypass a U.S. missile shield.
The NIE report also concluded that if China sought to deploy
additional missiles and warheads in response to NMD, this might prompt
India to respond by building up its own nuclear arsenals and missile
arsenal, which would in turn prompt Pakistan to seek to develop
additional nuclear weapons and advanced missiles, unleashing a South
Asian nuclear arms race.
I do not believe I need to comment further, given recent events, just
how dangerous that would be.
Such a destabilized environment, with Russia, China, North Korea,
India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and possibly others adding to their
nuclear arsenals or missile capabilities does not strike me as a more
stable world, or one in which the U.S. is more secure from the threat
of WMD or missile attack.
In addition, many analysts believe that if the United States were to
go ahead with NMD, rogue states and terrorists groups would simply
shift their focus from developing missile technology to delivering
weapons of mass destruction by ship, plane, or cruise missile, methods
that are both more reliable, provide no ``return address,'' and can't
be countered by NMD.
I do not even want to contemplate what September 11 would have been
like had one or more of those hijacked planes contained even a small,
primitive, ``dirty'' nuclear device.
The second issue I would like to address today is the implication of
a rush to deploy NMD for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Today the ABM Treaty is the keystone of a number of interlinked
nuclear arms control agreements, including the START I and START II
treaties with Russia. Although the ABM Treaty may require some
modifications to take into account the realities of the new security
environment, and this legislation urges the Administration to pursue
such negotiations, to just cast it aside risks undermining the very
foundations of strategic stability and U.S. national security.
The United States has long been at the forefront of the international
community in trying to inculcate respect for international law and
treaty obligations.
In fact, one of the ways in which the United States identifies so-
called rogue states is that these are states that do not respect their
obligations to other members of the international community; states who
walk away from, ignore, or cheat on their treaty obligations.
And so it is deeply troubling to me that the United States may now be
telling the rest of the world, through its own actions, that it is
accepted behavior to break your treaty obligations.
Indeed, with this approach I am particularly concerned that the
United States may, in fact, be sending precisely the wrong message on
international arms control to China: That only the weak must respect
other nations and international law. If you are strong enough, you can
do as you please.
If the United States seeks to unilaterally abrogate the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, and in general treat international treaty
commitments as mere pieces of paper to be disregarded if they prove
inconvenient, how can we expect to hold China accountable to live up to
its international agreements, or to the commitment it has made to the
Missile Technology Control Regime?
As reported in the press accounts earlier this summer, the Department
of Defense ABM Compliance Review Group, the Pentagon lawyers tasked to
identify potential ABM Treaty issues raised by the testing schedule,
have determined that some elements of the administration's plan for
developing missile defenses may conflict with the ABM Treaty by 2002.
Indeed, a July 30, 2001 letter from Undersecretary Paul Wolfowitz to
me stated that the ``Department has neither designed the missile
defense program to intentionally impact the ABM treaty sooner rather
than later, nor have we designed it to avoid the treaty.'' That is good
as far as it goes. But is also avoids the real question:
Has the Department of Defense made an effort to develop a missile
defense testing program which is, by intent, consistent with the ABM?
So long as the treaty is in force and is the supreme law of the land
that seems to me to be a reasonable requirement.
Moreover, as Philip Coyle, the former director of Operational Test
and Evaluation at the Pentagon, wrote in a recent issue of The Defense
Monitor, the ABM treaty ``is not holding back the design and
development of the technology needed for National Missile Defense, NMD,
nor is the treaty slowing the tests of an NMD system. Development of
NMD will take a decade or
[[Page S10838]]
more for technical and budgetary reasons, but not due to the
impediments caused by the ABM treaty.''
In other words, the United States can continue with an aggressive NMD
development and testing program for the foreseeable future, should the
Administration and Congress choose to, without the need to abandon the
ABM.
I do not believe that arms control treaties and agreements are a
panacea that, by themselves, secure U.S. national security interests or
those of our friends and allies.
But surely the constraints that these treaties and agreements impose
can play a valuable role in constricting the development of weapons of
mass destruction and their proliferation around the globe.
They are a useful tool in a fully articulated foreign policy and
national security toolbox, and it is short-sighted, to say the least,
to throw the tool out. Especially if one does not replace it with
something of equal or greater value.
Although the technical challenges of developing missile defense
technology are great, I believe that the United States, if we choose to
pursue it, is equal to the task.
But that we can develop a missile defense system should not be
confused by anyone to mean that we have the capabilities now, or will
possess them, even with an aggressive testing and development program,
anytime soon.
Effective missile defense is an enormous technical challenge.
Commonly compared to ``hitting a bullet with a bullet,'' missile
defense requires interceptors to find and hit the warheads of long-
range missiles traveling at speeds of 15,000 mph or more. Although two
of the four tests thus far have failed, and serious questions have been
raised about the degree of success of the other two, these tests have
indicated that it may indeed be possible to ``hit a bullet with a
bullet.''
But it is still far from clear if it can be done reliably in a real-
world setting, where decoys and countermeasures will complicate the
system's ability to determine what targets need to be hit. A global
system of satellites, radars, communications relays, booster rockets
and interceptors all must work with each other almost perfectly for the
defense to have a chance of success.
There are also concerns, first raised by the November 1999 Welch
Report, that political pressure to deploy a system regardless of
whether the science works or not may lead to a ``rush to failure.''
However, it must be a scientific determination, not a political
determination, that decides how far and how fast we go forward with
missile defense.
If the United States goes forward with development and deployment of
a missile defense system, it must be one that is fully tested and
deemed operationally effective in a real world setting. Anything less
would be an invitation to disaster.
My final concern about missile defense relates to the potential costs
of development and deployment.
As Congress considers this issue it is critical that it is able to
clearly prioritize missile defense programs and spending, within the
context of our larger national security needs. Funds that are spent on
national missile defense are, in effect, funds that can not be spent on
other priority programs, such as homeland defense. I do not propose
that the United States spends all on one or the other. Rather, Congress
must play a responsible role in making sure that sufficient funds are
available to meet the threats to national security that exist today,
while planning prudently for threats that will emerge tomorrow.
To allocate a disproportionate share of defense spending on a threat
that does not exist at all, or which will not be real until much
further off in the future creates a very real risk to those programs
that need to be funded today. This means that immediate and concrete
threats we face today may not be addressed with potentially disastrous
results.
There has never been a consensus cost figure for deploying an NMD
system. For several years, the Clinton administration estimated that a
limited NMD system would cost $9 to $11 billion to develop, test, and
deploy. In January 1999, the administration estimated that an initial
system of 20 interceptors would cost about $10.6 billion. In February
2000, the administration provided a ``life-cycle'' cost estimate of
$26.6 billion for an initial system of 100 ground-based interceptors in
Alaska.
An April 2000 study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
however, estimated that it would cost about $29.5 billion to develop,
build, and operate an initial NMD system through 2015. CBO estimates it
will cost another $19 billion through 2015 to expand the initial system
of 100 interceptors and build what was called a Capability 2 and
Capability 3 system designed for greater numbers of more sophisticated
potential missile threats. According to CBO, additional space-based
sensors would bring the total costs for NMD to around $60 billion
through 2015.
Several reports issued by outside groups, however, suggest that the
real costs of missile defense deployment could be much higher, perhaps
as $300 billion if such elements as space-based and naval-based NMD
interceptors are included.
Trying to put a price tag on missile defense costs is all the more
difficult at present because the current administration has not yet
determined what sort of missile defense architecture they want to
develop. Put simply, they have asked for the credit card to go to the
store, but have not told us if they will be buying jeans or a tuxedo,
or anything in between.
The question of cost should not be a determining factor in and of
itself. If the international security environment demands development
and deployment of missile defenses, the U.S. must go forward regardless
of the cost.
But as Congress considers the elements of U.S. national security
strategy in the years ahead, it must do so mindful that devoting
resources to one area likely means depriving them from another. We must
be careful, therefore, to make sure that our national security needs
are properly prioritized. To move forward with missile defense, if it
is not at the top of the list or immediately needed, and in so doing
place in jeopardy other higher and more immediate needs and priorities,
such as homeland defense, risks creating an unbalanced and ineffective
national security strategy.
The administration's current plans, of what we know about them, seem
to suggest that the United States will abandon the Anti-Ballistic
Missile treaty before we even know if the deployment of NMD is even
feasible. And that it would abandon the ABM in pursuit of what can only
be considered ``unbalanced'' national security strategy, one that
places too much weight on the development of missile defense, and too
little on the other areas, such as prevention, intelligence, rollback,
and management, that are equally, or more, important.
The United States must respond to new threats, and defenses can play
an important role. But the question is not whether we deploy defenses,
as missile defense advocates like to paint it, but what, when, and,
most importantly, how.
As I stated earlier, the threat of the proliferation of WMD is real
and growing, and how the United States manages this threat should be an
overriding security priority. Management requires a comprehensive
approach that strikes the right balance between prevention, deterrence,
and defense, and the emphasis placed on missile defense must be
balanced against other national security priorities. An effective WMD
national security strategy must emphasize:
Prevention, through preventive defense and preventive diplomacy,
including export controls, regional security commitments, on-going
threat reduction programs, and arms control regimes;
Intelligence, including those efforts that show promise for
penetrating transnational and terrorist groups that may be planning
attacks against the United States or our allies and that illuminate the
nature of the proliferation threat;
Rollback of WMD and missile programs that have been developed by
other countries, such as the intense diplomacy such as has met with
some success on the Korean Peninsula, and a mixture of economic and
political incentives; and,
Management of the consequences of proliferation by better protecting
our forces, holding open the possibility of pre-emption, and active
defenses.
[[Page S10839]]
And our defensive programs must also recognize that as the horrific
events of September 11 too well illustrated, missile defense is a
response to but one of the WMD threats that the United States faces in
today's world--and perhaps the least of these threats at that.
Indeed, a breakdown of the ``threat spectrum'' produced by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff earlier this year lists a missile attack as having the
lowest ``probability of occurrence'' in the threat spectrum.
In fact, as a member of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, I have
had an opportunity to discuss WMD threat assessments with members of
our intelligence community. Although the threat of a ballistic missile
attack from a rogue nation is certainly a concern, they are far more
concerned about the threat that a ``suitcase'' bomb or a bomb hidden on
a ship may pose. Needless to say, NMD does nothing to address these
threats.
A balanced approach to national security therefore suggests that it
is only prudent for the United States to conduct a limited testing
program to develop missile defense technology so that if, at some point
in the future, it is necessary we will have appropriate options. And
yes, the ABM Treaty may need to be modified or amended to enable us to
respond to new threats.
But it would be folly to place too much of an emphasis on missile
defense, to simply and unilaterally develop and deploy NMD, and to
abandon the treaty, before we even know what defensive systems are
feasible, which systems best meet our needs, and well before any
sensible development or testing program needs to bump up to treaty
limits.
The unilateral U.S. pursuit of NMD is likely to create a less stable
world, with more nations pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and
without the constraints of international arms control agreement.
It strikes me as a big gamble to develop a national security strategy
on one hand which seems intent on cultivating a missile defense system
of unknown effectiveness, and a less stable and less secure world on
the other.
I look forward to the opportunity to debate these issues on the floor
with my colleagues at an appropriate time.
______
By Mr. ENZI (for himself, Mr. Dorgan, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Kerry,
Mr. Thomas, Mr. Graham, Mr. Voinovich, and Mr. Hutchinson):
S. 1567. A bill to foster innovation and technological advancement in
the development of the Internet and electronic commerce, and to assist
the States in simplifying their sales and use taxes; to the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the
bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 1567
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Internet Tax Moratorium and
Equity Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The moratorium of the Internet Tax Freedom Act on new
taxes on Internet access and on multiple and discriminatory
taxes on electronic commerce should be extended.
(2) States should be encouraged to simplify their sales and
use tax systems.
(3) As a matter of economic policy and basic fairness,
similar sales transactions should be treated equally, without
regard to the manner in which sales are transacted, whether
in person, through the mails, over the telephone, on the
Internet, or by other means.
(4) Congress may facilitate such equal taxation consistent
with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota.
(5) States that adequately simplify their tax systems
should be authorized to correct the present inequities in
taxation through requiring sellers to collect taxes on sales
of goods or services delivered in-state, without regard to
the location of the seller.
(6) The States have experience, expertise, and a vital
interest in the collection of sales and use taxes, and thus
should take the lead in developing and implementing sales and
use tax collection systems that are fair, efficient, and non-
discriminatory in their application and that will simplify
the process for both sellers and buyers.
(7) Online consumer privacy is of paramount importance to
the growth of electronic commerce and must be protected.
SEC. 3. EXTENSION OF INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT MORATORIUM.
Section 1101(a) of the Internet Tax Freedom Act (47 U.S.C.
151 note) is amended to read as follows:
``(a) Moratorium.--No State or political subdivision
thereof shall impose--
``(1) any taxes on Internet access during the period
beginning after September 30, 1998, unless such a tax was
generally imposed and actually enforced prior to October 1,
1998; and
``(2) multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic
commerce during the period beginning on October 1, 1998, and
ending on December 31, 2005.''.
SEC. 4. INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT DEFINITIONS.
(a) Internet Access Services.--Section 1104 of the Internet
Tax Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 151 note) is amended by adding at
the end the following new paragraph:
``(11) Internet access services.--The term `Internet access
services' means services that combine computer processing,
information storage, protocol conversion, and routing with
transmission to enable users to access Internet content and
services. Such term does not include receipt of such content
or services.''.
(b) Internet Access.--Section 1104(5) of the Internet Tax
Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 151 note) is amended by striking
``telecommunications services.' and inserting
``telecommunications services generally, but does include
wireless web access services used to enable users to access
content, information, electronic mail, or other services
offered over the Internet, including any comparable package
of services offered to users.''.
(c) Telecommunications Services.--Section 1104(9) of the
Internet Tax Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 151 note) is amended by
striking ``and includes communications services (as defined
in section 4251 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986)''.
(d) Wireless Web Access Services.--Section 1104 of the
Internet Tax Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 151 note), as amended by
subsection (a), is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(12) Wireless web access services.--The term `wireless
web access services' means commercial mobile services (as
defined in section 332(d)(1) of Communications Act of 1934
(47 U.S.C. 332(d)(1)), multi-channel, multi-point
distribution services, or any wireless telecommunications
services used to access the Internet.''.
SEC. 5. STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX SYSTEM.
(a) Development of Streamlined System.--It is the sense of
Congress that States and localities should work together to
develop a streamlined sales and use tax system that addresses
the following in the context of remote sales:
(1) A centralized, one-stop, multi-state reporting,
submission, and payment system for sellers.
(2) Uniform definitions for goods or services, the sale of
which may, by State action, be included in the tax base.
(3) Uniform rules for attributing transactions to
particular taxing jurisdictions.
(4) Uniform procedures for--
(A) the treatment of purchasers exempt from sales and use
taxes; and
(B) relief from liability for sellers that rely on such
State procedures.
(5) Uniform procedures for the certification of software
that sellers rely on to determine sales and use tax rates and
taxability.
(6) A uniform format for tax returns and remittance forms.
(7) Consistent electronic filing and remittance methods.
(8) State administration of all State and local sales and
use taxes.
(9) Uniform audit procedures, including a provision giving
a seller the option to be subject to no more than a single
audit per year using those procedures; except that if the
seller does not comply with the procedures to elect a single
audit, any State can conduct an audit using those procedures.
(10) Reasonable compensation for tax collection by sellers.
(11) Exemption from use tax collection requirements for
remote sellers falling below a de minimis threshold of
$5,000,000 in gross annual sales.
(12) Appropriate protections for consumer privacy.
(13) Such other features that the States deem warranted to
promote simplicity, uniformity, neutrality, efficiency, and
fairness.
(b) Study.--It is the sense of Congress that a joint,
comprehensive study should be commissioned by State and local
governments and the business community to determine the cost
to all sellers of collecting and remitting State and local
sales and use taxes on sales made by sellers under the law as
in effect on the date of enactment of this Act and under the
system described in subsection (a) to assist in determining
what constitutes reasonable compensation.
SEC. 6. INTERSTATE SALES AND USE TAX COMPACT.
(a) Authorization.--In general, the States are authorized
to enter into an Interstate Sales and Use Tax Compact. The
Compact shall describe a uniform, streamlined sales and use
tax system consistent with section 5(a), and shall provide
that States joining the Compact must adopt that system.
(b) Expiration.--The authorization in subsection (a) shall
expire if the Compact has not been formed before January 1,
2005.
(c) Congressional Approval of Compact.--
[[Page S10840]]
(1) Adopting states to transmit.--Upon the 20th State
becoming a signatory to the Compact, the adopting States
shall transmit a copy of the Compact to Congress.
(2) Congressional action.--
(A) In general.--If a joint resolution described in
subparagraph (B) is enacted into law within 120 calendar
days, excluding congressional recess period days, of Congress
receiving the Compact under paragraph (1), then sections 7
and 8 shall apply to the adopting States, and any other State
that subsequently adopts the Compact.
(B) Joint resolution.--A joint resolution described in this
subparagraph is a joint resolution of the two Houses of
Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is
as follows: ``That Congress--
``(1) agrees that the uniform, streamlined sales and use
tax system described in the Compact transmitted to Congress
by the States pursuant to section 6(c)(1) of the Internet Tax
Moratorium and Equity Act does not create an undue burden on
interstate commerce; and
``(2) authorizes any State that adopts such Compact to
require remote sellers to collect and remit sales and use
taxes in accordance with such system .''
(C) Expedited procedure for approval.--
(i) Rules of house and senate.--This paragraph is enacted--
(I) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such is
deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but
applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed
in that House in the case of the joint resolution described
in subparagraph (B), and they supersede other rules only to
the extent that they are inconsistent therewith, and
(II) with full recognition of the constitutional right of
either House to change the rules (so far as they relate to
the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner
and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of
that House.
(ii) Applicable procedural provisions.--Except as otherwise
provided in this paragraph, the procedures set forth in
section 152 (other than subsection (a) thereof) of the Trade
Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192) shall apply to the joint
resolution described in subparagraph (B) by substituting the
``Committee on the Judiciary'' for the ``Committee on Ways
and Means'' and the ``Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation'' for the ``Committee on Finance'' in
subsection (b) thereof.
(iii) Introduction of joint resolution after compact
received.--Until Congress receives the Compact described in
paragraph (1), it shall not be in order in either House to
introduce the joint resolution described in subparagraph (B).
(iv) Consideration of joint resolution.--No amendment to
the joint resolution described in subparagraph (B) shall be
in order in either the House of Representatives or the
Senate, and no motion to suspend the application of this
clause shall be in order in either House. Within 120 calendar
days, excluding congressional recess period days, after the
date on which a joint resolution described in subparagraph
(B) is introduced in either House, that House shall proceed
to a final vote on the joint resolution without intervening
action. If either House approves the resolution, it shall be
placed on the calendar in the other House, which shall
proceed immediately to a final vote on the joint resolution
without intervening action.
SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION TO SIMPLIFY STATE USE-TAX RATES THROUGH
AVERAGING.
(a) In General.--Subject to the exception in subsection
(c), a State that adopts the Compact authorized and approved
under section 6 and that levies a use tax shall impose a
single, uniform State-wide use-tax rate on all remote sales
on which it assesses a use tax for any calendar year for
which the State meets the requirements of subsection (b).
(b) Averaging Requirement.--A State meets the requirements
of this subsection for any calendar year in which the single,
uniform State-wide use-tax rate is in effect if such rate is
no greater than the weighted average of the sales tax rates
actually imposed by the State and its local jurisdictions
during the 12-month period ending on June 30 prior to such
calendar year.
(c) Annual Option To Collect Actual Tax.--Notwithstanding
subsection (a), a remote seller may elect annually to collect
the actual applicable State and local use taxes on each sale
made in the State.
(d) Alternative System.--A State that adopts the uniform,
streamlined sales and use tax system described in the Compact
authorized and approved under section 6 so that remote
sellers can use information provided by the State to identify
the single applicable rate for each sale, may require a
remote seller to collect the actual applicable State and
local sales or use tax due on each sale made in the State if
the State provides such seller relief from liability to the
State for relying on such information provided by the State.
SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION TO REQUIRE COLLECTION OF USE TAXES.
(a) Grant of Authority.--
(1) States that adopt the system may require collection.--
Any State that has adopted the system described in the
Compact authorized and approved under section 6 is
authorized, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to
require all sellers not qualifying for the de minimis
exception to collect and remit sales and use taxes on remote
sales to purchasers located in such State.
(2) States that do not adopt the system may not require
collection.--Paragraph (1) does not extend to any State that
does not adopt the system described in the Compact.
(b) No Effect on Nexus, Etc.--No obligation imposed by
virtue of authority granted by subsection (a)(1) or denied by
subsection (a)(2) shall be considered in determining whether
a seller has a nexus with any State for any other tax
purpose. Except as provided in subsection (a), nothing in
this Act permits or prohibits a State--
(1) to license or regulate any person;
(2) to require any person to qualify to transact intrastate
business; or
(3) to subject any person to State taxes not related to the
sale of goods or services.
SEC. 9. NEXUS FOR STATE BUSINESS ACTIVITY TAXES.
It is the sense of Congress that before the conclusion of
the 107th Congress, legislation should be enacted to
determine the appropriate factors to be considered in
establishing whether nexus exists for State business activity
tax purposes.
SEC. 10. LIMITATION.
In general, nothing in this Act shall be construed as
subjecting sellers to franchise taxes, income taxes, or
licensing requirements of a State or political subdivision
thereof, nor shall anything in this Act be construed as
affecting the application of such taxes or requirements or
enlarging or reducing the authority of any State or political
subdivision to impose such taxes or requirements.
SEC. 11. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) State.--The term ``State'' means any State of the
United States of America and includes the District of
Columbia.
(2) Goods or services.--The term ``goods or services''
includes tangible and intangible personal property and
services.
(3) Remote sale.--The term ``remote sale'' means a sale in
interstate commerce of goods or services attributed, under
the rules established pursuant to section 5(a)(3), to a
particular taxing jurisdiction that could not, except for the
authority granted by this Act, require that the seller of
such goods or services collect and remit sales or use taxes
on such sale.
(4) Locus of remote sale.--The term ``particular taxing
jurisdiction'', when used with respect to the location of a
remote sale, means a remote sale of goods or services
attributed, under the rules established pursuant to section
5(a)(3), to a particular taxing jurisdiction.
______
By Mr. REID (for himself and Mr. Smith of Oregon):
S. 1566. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify
and expand the credit for electricity produced from renewable resources
and waste products, and for other purposes; to the Committee on
Finance.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, perhaps at no other time in our history is
the energy security of the United States more vital to this nation's
well being.
We all agree that the United States needs to reduce its dependence on
fossil fuels that pollute the environment and undermine our national
security interests and balance of trade. Nevadans understand that any
responsible energy strategy must encompass conservation, efficiency,
and an expanded generating capacity. Developing renewable energy
resources represents a responsible way to expand our power capacity
without compromising air or water quality. These renewable energy
sources can enhance America's energy supply on a time scale of 1-3
years, considerably shorter than times required for fossil-fuel power
plants.
I rise today to introduce a bill that expands the existing production
tax credit for renewable energy technologies to cover all renewable
energy technologies. I want to thank Senator Gordon Smith for joining
me in the introduction of this bill, which sets America on a steady
path toward energy independence.
Our legislation will renew the wind power production tax credit and
expand the credit to additional renewable resources, including solar
power, open-loop biomass, poultry and animal waste, landfill gas,
geothermal, incremental geothermal, and incremental hydropower
facilities.
The proposed production tax credit for all these renewable energy
sources would be made permanent to signal America's long-term
commitment to renewable energy resources.
One example that illustrates the need for a permanent tax credit is
what I recently learned about a major wind farm project at the Nevada
Test Site. It is experiencing delays. The production of electricity in
rapidly growing Nevada and the whole western part of the country is
important. We need to do something to develop new sources of
electricity.
But I found that this project, which is set to go on line, is having
difficulty
[[Page S10841]]
because in the law we have an expiring tax credit for wind. Not only
that, but to do it for 1 year really doesn't help that much. People are
unwilling to lend money on a 1-year tax credit. It is possible this
project may be canceled due to the uncertain nature of the production
tax credit for wind energy. This would be a terrible disappointment.
Within 3 to 5 years they can produce enough electricity by wind to
supply energy to 260,000 people. That is a lot of people. That would be
that much less coal we would have to burn, or natural gas, or fuel oil.
The Department of Energy estimates that we could increase our
geothermal energy production almost ten fold, supplying ten percent of
the energy needs of the West, and expand wind energy production to
serve the electricity needs of ten million homes.
The Nevada Public Utilities Commission estimates 500 megawatts of
wind energy and 500 megawatts of geothermal should be online in the
state by 2013, supplying the energy needs of one million Nevadans. That
is 1,000 megawatts.
But we need a permanent production tax credit to make these estimates
a reality.
The bill Senator Smith and I have introduced this afternoon allows
for co-production credits to encourage blending of renewable energy
with traditional fuels and provides a credit for renewable facilities
on native American and native Alaskan lands.
It also provides production incentives to not-for-profit public power
utilities and rural electric cooperatives, which serve 25 percent of
the nation's power customers, by allowing them to transfer of their
credits to taxable entities.
Fossil fuel plants pump over 11 million tons of pollutants into our
air each year. Eleven million tons--it is hard to comprehend that--
every year. What we are doing is building more powerplants to pump more
pollution into the air. By including landfill gas in this legislation,
we systematically reduce the largest single human source of methane
emissions in the United States, effectively eliminating the greenhouse
gas equivalent of 233 million tons of carbon dioxide. These figures are
staggering, but they are realistic.
There is a compelling need for our legislation because the existing
production tax credit for electricity produced from wind energy and
closed-loop biomass renewable resources expires at the end of this
year.
In the past year alone, $1.3 billion in capital investment in wind
energy projects has been made in the U.S.
As I indicated, at the Nevada Test Site, a new wind farm will provide
260 megawatts to meet the needs of 260,000 people.
Growing renewable energy industries in the U.S. will also help
provide growing employment opportunities in the U.S., and help U.S.
renewable technologies compete in world markets.
In States like Nevada, expanded renewable energy production will
provide jobs in rural areas--areas that have been largely left out of
America's recent economic boom during the past several years. Rural
Nevada hasn't done well at all. Renewable energy is poised to make
major contributions to our Nation's energy needs over the next decade.
As fantastic as it sounds, enough sunlight falls on a 100-mile-by-
100-mile area of southern Nevada that, if covered with solar panels,
could power the entire Nation.
I am proud to say that Nevada has adopted the most aggressive
Renewable Portfolio Standard in the nation, requiring that 5 percent of
the state's electricity needs be met by renewable energy resources in
2003, which then grows to 15 percent by 2013.
We are mandating in the State of Nevada that 15 percent of the energy
resources must be produced by alternative energy. That is really a step
forward, and I applaud the Nevada State Legislature.
The citizens of Nevada deserve a national energy strategy that
ensures their economic well being and security, and provides for a
secure quality of life. That should also apply to the whole United
States.
Our legislation encourages the use of renewable energy and signals
America's long-term commitment to clean energy, a healthy environment,
and energy independence.
Renewable energy--as an alternative and successor to traditional
energy sources--is a common sense way to ensure the American people
have a reliable source of power at an affordable price.
The United States needs to move away from its dependence on fossil
fuels that pollute the environment and undermine our national security
interests and balance of trade.
We must accept this commitment for the energy security of the U.S.,
for the protection of our environment, and for the health and security
of the American people.
I hope this legislation is allowed to move forward as quickly as
possible.
______
By Mr. HATCH:
S. 1568. A bill to prevent cyberterrorism; to the Committee on the
Judiciary.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the
Cyberterrorism Prevention Act of 2001, an important piece of
legislation to prevent terrorists from hijacking our computer system to
wreak havoc with our essential infrastructure.
This bill provides law enforcement with critical tools to combat
cyberterrorism. I urge my colleagues to support this important piece of
legislation.
______
By Ms. COLLINS (for herself, Mr. Gregg, Mr. Reed, Mr. Johnson,
Mr. Sessions, and Mr. Warner):
S. 1570. A bill to provide the Secretary of Education with specific
waiver authority to respond to conditions in the national emergency
declared by the President on September 14, 2001; to the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, every American is struggling to cope with
the terrorist attacks of September 11 and subsequent events. Among
those on the front lines in addressing these disasters are our military
Reservists and members of our National Guard. Not only are these men
and women grappling with the consequences of the catastrophe and the
rigors of being mobilized for active duty, but many of them are also
forced to worry about leaving college in the middle of their courses
and making continued payments on their student loans. Will their
tuition be reimbursed for courses that are interrupted? How will they
keep up with their student loan payments while they are on active duty?
In my State of Maine, more than 10 percent of our National Guard
members are making payments on their student loans and are faced with
these very questions. As these Guard members and Reservists prepare to
serve their country, the least we can do is alleviate their concerns
about making payments on their student loans while they are on active
duty.
Some of the families directly affected by the tragedies of September
11 are facing similar dilemmas. The dislocation in New York City and
elsewhere caused by the terrorist attacks has jeopardized the ability
of some individuals to meet their payment schedules on their student
loans.
Lending institutions located in New York City are encountering yet
another set of difficulties. A number of lenders are headquartered
within a few blocks of ground zero. They, understandably, have been
unable to meet the due diligence requirements set forth by the
Department of Education. Several firms, in fact, were not even able to
access their office buildings for many days after the attacks, let
alone meet filing deadlines.
With those Guard members, Reservists, affected families, and lending
institutions in mind, I am pleased today to introduce the Higher
Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2001. My colleagues,
Senators Gregg, Reed, Warner, and Sessions, as well as the Presiding
Officer, Senator Johnson, whose support and leadership I value greatly,
have signed on as original cosponsors. The HEROS Act grants the
Secretary of Education specific waiver authority under the Higher
Education Act to provide relief to those affected by the recent attacks
on America. The Secretary would be empowered to assist Reservists and
Guard members who are being called up for active duty as well as others
directly affected by the attacks.
The Secretary's new authority would be limited to ensuring that
military
[[Page S10842]]
personnel and civilians are in the same financial position as they were
prior to the terrorist attacks with respect to their student loans. And
it has been drafted so as to not impair the integrity of the student
loan programs.
The Secretary of Education is given some discretion under the Higher
Education Act to defer payments on student loans. But this authority
does not go far enough. The HEROS Act would empower the Secretary to
take several additional steps to provide needed relief to help those
directly affected by the terrorist attacks.
Specifically, the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students
Act authorizes the Secretary of Education to relax repayment
obligations for Guard members and Reservists called up to active duty,
to provide a period of time during which the victims and their families
may reduce or delay monthly student loan payments, and to assist
educational institutions and lenders with reporting requirements.
All of these steps can be taken while still ensuring the integrity of
our student loan programs.
This legislation is modeled on a previous law that was enacted during
the Gulf War to provide relief for our men and women in the military.
In short, there is precedent for authorizing the Secretary of Education
to provide these kinds of relief.
I am pleased to be joined by five of my colleagues in introducing
this bill, and I thank them all for their support. I also commend
Representative McKeon for his leadership on the House version of the
HEROS Act. His initiative will help ensure that we provide adequate
student loan relief to Reservists, Guard members, and victims'
families.
I look forward to the swift passage of this legislation.
Mr. President, I send the bill to the desk and ask it be
appropriately referred at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately
referred.
____________________