[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 138 (Monday, October 15, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10701-S10702]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. ROBERTS:
  S. 1546. A bill to provide additional funding to combat bioterrorism; 
to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Bio-
Security in Agriculture Act of 2001. I refer to the security of 
agriculture, our crops, our livestock production.
  In the wake of September 11, we increased security of the Capitol, 
our government buildings, airports, sports venues, and businesses.
  We should do the same for our agriculture and our nation's food 
supply.
  I served 2 years as chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats, and now as ranking member of the subcommittee. I'm 
also on the Intelligence Committee and a member of the Agriculture 
Committee.
  In numerous hearings on terrorism, we repeatedly asked top scientists 
and biowarfare experts to assess the greatest threats to our nation. 
One of their greatest concerns has been the susceptibility of U.S. 
agriculture and the impact an attack on it could have on the 
agriculture economy and the Nation's food supply.
  It would not be difficult to take a disease such as foot-and-mouth so 
prevalent in Europe and introduce it into the U.S. livestock herd. With 
the large number of cattle and livestock operations in close proximity 
to each other in our feedlots and hog facilities it could quickly 
become an epidemic.
  I consider this threat to be real. I know of no specific threat, but 
I can tell you 2 years ago, when we asked the FBI where is the 
probability and where is the risk, the probability was rather low. 
Since the foot-and-mouth disease epidemic overseas and since the events 
of September 11, I can assure my colleagues the probability is rated 
much higher. I am not going to get into classified information, but the 
risk would cause utter chaos in our country.
  Such an attack would be devastating. One estimate for California is a 
loss of $14 billion should foot and mouth disease break out in that 
state.
  We know that the former Soviet Union developed ``tons'' of biowarfare 
agents aimed at North American agriculture. These include FMD, 
glanders, rust diseases for wheat and rice, and Karnal Bunt in wheat. 
There are other diseases that could be introduced as well.
  The threat is real. Yet, our federal facilities to test and do 
research on

[[Page S10702]]

both containment and prevention of these diseases are outdated and in 
need of repair. We have approximately $700 million in the pipeline to 
upgrade these facilities over the next 6 to 10 years. But we cannot 
wait for 6 to 10 years. We need to make the investment in these 
facilities and the research dollars now.
  Why is protecting agriculture from terrorist attack important? There 
are several reasons: Agriculture is one of the few sectors of the 
economy with a trade surplus; using numbers from 1999; agriculture and 
agribusiness related industries accounted for approximately 22 million 
jobs and 16.4 percent of GDP; The overall contribution to the Nation's 
GDP in 1999 was $1.5 trillion; and the cheap U.S. food supply kept the 
total portion of individual income spent on food to 10.4 percent, or 10 
and one half cents of every dollar, on food in 1999. The lowest percent 
of income spent on food of any country in the world.
  The loss of export markets resulting from the intentional 
introduction of these pathogens would be dramatic. The introduction of 
FMD or Karmal Bunt on a widespread basis could mean the total collapse 
of U.S. export markets.
  This would be devastating for a commodity such as wheat where 32 
percent of total production was exported in 1999 and to agriculture in 
general which is one of the few sectors of the economy that operates in 
a trade surplus. Also, when an outbreak of FMD occurs, many of the 
animals are often killed to control the spread of the disease.
  If a massive herd reduction occurred, it could take several years to 
replace the lost numbers. Again the ripple effects are enormous. 
Individual producers will be impacted, feedlots and hog operations 
could be devastated, meat packers and their employees could be put out 
of business due to reduced slaughter numbers, and the grain markets 
would take enormous hits as there would be no where for the excess feed 
usage to go.
  The impact on our Nation of a widespread attack on agriculture could 
dwarf the airline and travel industry's loss from September 11.
  To keep this nightmare scenario from occurring, legislation is 
necessary to complete the facility upgrades needed to deal with this 
threat and to provide funding for the additional research to develop 
risk control methods, first responder response mechanisms, and 
development of vaccines and plant resistant varieties that are immune 
to these threats. The need is real, the timing is crucial, and it needs 
to be done now.
  The legislation I am introducing today will provide approximately 
$3.5 billion to improve and invest on a ``crash course'' to do the 
building upgrades and research we should have been doing for years.
  In fiscal year 2002, the bill calls for $1.1 billion, including: $101 
million to allow USDA to meet the security levels required under 
Presidential Decision Directive, PDD-67, for the animal and plant 
disease facilities at: Plum Island, NY; the National Animal Disease 
Center, Ames, IA; the Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory, Athens, 
GA; the Arthropod-Borne Animal Disease Research Laboratory, Laramie, 
WY; and the Foreign Disease Weed Science Laboratory, Fort Detrick, MD.

  We also provide $722.8 million in fiscal year 2002 to accelerate the 
planning, upgrading, and construction of four of the above named 
facilities, including: $234 million for the Plum Island facility; $129 
million to renovate the existing Biolevel 3 facilities and $105 million 
for planning and construction of a Biosafety level 4 facility; $381 
million for modernization of the facilities in Ames, IA; $78 million 
for the planning and design of the biocontainment laboratory for 
poultry research in Athens, GA; and $29.8 million for the Arthropod-
Born Animal Disease Laboratory, Laramie, WY.
  The bill provides $10 million in fiscal year 2002 for USDA to 
purchase, and distribute to each of the states, rapid diagnostic field 
tests that can give a definitive answer on suspected cases of FMD, 
Karnal bunt, anthrax, etc., in only 45 minutes.
  These test would represent a strengthened line of security replacing 
the current process where the sample is trucked to an airport, flown to 
one of the disease labs, tested, and then results are released anywhere 
from a day to 4 or 5 days later.
  We also make a significant investment in research with $2.71 billion 
provided over the next 10 years to continue work ARS is already doing 
with state universities and private industry, provide competitive 
grants for USDA to award to qualified universities and private 
organizations, and general funding for USDA to use in those areas where 
it determines we have the most pressing need.
  We have worked to keep from tying USDA's hands on this in order to 
allow them to respond to future needs or threats that may arise, but 
generally the research could include: Expanding on-the-spot diagnostic 
capabilities; conducting mapping of microorganisms and pests to 
pinpoint their geographical origins; genetically engineer diseases that 
will be effective against agents of bioterrorism concerns; improve 
plant resistance to potential introduced pathogens; create mass vaccine 
delivery systems for animals, poultry, and fish; conduct research with 
foreign countries to help reduce disease threats at the source and 
remove the natural sources of infectious agents and pests that 
terrorists or nations might easily access to threaten the United 
States; develop counter toxins; and develop economic models to assist 
in risk assessment and prioritization of efforts. Currently, it is 
difficult to determine the exact economic effect of an attack on the 
United States because the proper economic models do not exist.
  Finally, the bill provides $12 million each year for USDA to work in 
collaboration with the Oklahoma City counter-terrorism Institute.
  This is a significant amount of money. But it is an investment that 
requires our immediate attention. I do not want us to ignore this issue 
until it is too late.
  Nearly 2\1/2\ years ago, as chairman of the Emerging Threats 
Subcommittee, I warned at our first hearing that the World Trade Center 
was at risk of terrorist attack because of its symbolism of U.S. 
economic strength and indulgence. At the time, no one wanted to listen 
to the warning.
  I take no please in my prediction and the events of September 11. But 
I do not want us to ignore similar warnings and threats on 
agroterrorism until it is too late. If we do our 10.5 percent of 
disposable income spent on food in this country could well be a thing 
of the past.
  I urge my colleagues to support me in enacting the Biosecurity for 
Agriculture Act of 2001.
                                 ______