[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 129 (Monday, October 1, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9943-S9945]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THREAT OF GERM WARFARE AND BIOTERRORISM
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise to discuss an issue based on my
observations over the past week, an issue clearly on the minds of many
people, and that is the potential threat of germ warfare and
bioterrorism. Over the weekend, there was a lot of discussion through
the various media outlets about our broad vulnerability to terrorism in
the United States of America, in part based on intelligence and in part
based on the events of September 11.
Over the last week, many people have rushed to obtain antibiotics and
gas masks to prepare for the threat of bioterrorism or germ warfare--
the threat that is posed by germs, bacteria--if viruses fall into the
wrong hands. Many people are concerned that given the powerful
destructive ability of some of these viruses, they could used in a way
that threatens not only all Americans, but all of civilization.
A lot of people called me over the weekend, recognizing my interest
in this topic and recognizing I had participated in passing a bill
called the Public Health Threats and Emergency Act which was passed in
the year 2000.
People have asked if the threat of bioterrorism is real? The answer
is yes, it is real. In fact, we have already seen the destructive use
of bacteria by people in this country. In 1984, there was an outbreak
in Oregon of salmonella poisoning from which over 700 people suffered
some illness. This outbreak was caused by members of a religious cult
placing living bacteria in the salad bars of 10 different sites across
the State.
The ``bio'' part of biogerm warfare or biochemical warfare is the
living organism, and that is what was inserted in the salad bars that
caused the illness of about 700 people. We know germ warfare has been
used, so the threat is real.
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But before people attempt to respond to this threat by rushing out
and buying items, we need to put the threat of bioterrorism in
perspective. The overall probability of a bioterrorist attack is low. I
do not know exactly what that number is. In fact, we cannot put a
specific number on it, but the overall probability of a terrorist
attack using biology, bacteria, living organisms--is low. However, it
is increasing. It is now our number one or number two threat, and, at
least to me, it is clear that we are highly vulnerable in the event
such an attack takes place.
The consequences of such an attack, whether it is with anthrax,
smallpox, tularemia, pneumonic plague, nerve agents or blister agents,
is huge. Why? Because we are ill equipped. We are unprepared. However,
in saying that, we have to be careful that we do not become alarmists.
People will have nightmares, will not sleep at night, and the response
should be the opposite.
We need to recognize there are things we can do right now, first and
foremost, to develop a comprehensive biodefense plan capable of
preventing a bioterrorist attack. Obviously, prevention should be our
primary goal from the outset. We want to keep biological weapons out of
the hands of people who are intent on destruction. At the same time we
can be prepared--if these germs and agents fall in the hands of a
potential terrorist--by preparing an effective response plan. Third, is
the response, an area called consequence management, crisis management
after such an assault takes place.
Yes, the threat is real, but very low--a tiny probability, but
growing. Why do I say growing? Because on September 11 we witnessed a
calamity the likes of which have never been seen before in the history
of the world. It was unexpected and unfathomable--using planes as
bombs. We know those events were carefully planned out over a period of
years in a very sophisticated way that was obviously well financed.
Therefore, I will say it is growing because we did not expect it, and
because it has occurred several years after Khobar Towers and after the
attack on the USS Cole. So there is an increasing threat of calamity
and destruction.
This threat is rising, secondly, because of scientific advances in
areas such as aerosolization. People talk about anthrax and how you
cannot really aerosolize it--that is, breaking it down into defined
particles so it can be inhaled into the lungs--because 10 years ago we
tried to do it and could not do it. However, over the last 10 years
there have been huge advances in this technology. Today we use
nebulizers in hospitals to aerosolize particles to get medication deep
into the lungs. We did not have that technology 10 to 15 years ago, but
the technology has been developed.
Take perfume, for example. When one goes through a department store,
one can smell the perfume around. The technology of aerosolization has
progressed rapidly over the last 10 to 15 years. What we thought could
not be done 10 or 15 years ago can be done today because of advances in
technology.
Another example is airplanes spraying chemicals. They say: Oh, those
crop dusters cannot do it, but there are some dry chemical crop dusters
that might be able to spray agents.
I have mentioned these examples because science has changed and what
we could not do years ago can be done today.
In addition, the scientific expertise related to biochemical warfare
is there. A lot of people don't realize that during the 1980s, well
after a general pact in 1972 was agreed upon by really the world, the
Soviet Union set out in a very determined and aggressive way to develop
biochemical weapons. The number one goal of this project was the
development of pathogens that could kill. This was not a little, secret
project. This project involved as many as 7,000 scientists whose
professional being, through the 1980s in the Soviet Union, was to
develop these pathogens and effective mechanisms for their delivery.
With the fall of the Soviet Union 13 years ago, those scientists all
of a sudden became unemployed. With no employment available in the
former Soviet Union, those scientists have gone elsewhere in the world.
We do not know where they all are, but we do know that they spent their
entire professional life studying how to develop the boichemical
weapons that threaten us today.
I say that because it is not beyond the realm of possibility that
those scientists can be either hired or bought. All of this is in the
public record, and, again, I want to be very careful because I do not
want to be an alarmist. On the other hand, people need to realize that
from the technology and the scientific standpoint, the expertise is out
there.
The third area, and the reason why I say the risk is rising compared
to 10 years ago, is that the United States today has emerged as the
sole superpower of the world. Without the cold war and the sort of
balances and the trade-offs and the push and the pull, the United
States has become the target of many people who resent us, who do not
like us, who are jealous of us, and a lot of that fervor today will hit
the surface, or was hitting the surface more than 10 or 15 years ago in
the middle of the cold war.
So, the threat is real: low probability but rising.
Let me just close on an issue that has to be addressed, and that is
this whole field of vulnerability. Why are we so vulnerable today? We
have heard recently that the Federal Government has worked aggressively
and compared to 4 years ago, there has been enormous improvement at the
Federal level. We are investing money that was not being invested 4
years ago. We are organized. We have 12-hour push products that allow
us to very quickly could get antibiotics and vaccine, although not
enough vaccine. We have a delivery system that could be mobilized very
quickly. All of this is good.
We also know that at the Federal level we are not nearly as
coordinated as we should be. Treasury, Defense, Energy, and Health and
Human Services are all doing something, but according to the GAO report
that came out last week, we need better organization and better
coordination to eliminate the duplication and to eliminate the possible
conflicting messages that are sent from the Federal level. So, we can
coordinate better.
I am delighted that Governor Ridge has taken on this overall
responsibility because that is the first step toward better
coordination.
What really bothers me, when I say the vulnerability is high in spite
of low probability, is that our public health infrastructure has been
woefully and inadequately underfunded over the last really 15 years to
two decades.
If there were a bioterrorist attack using germ warfare, what would
happen? Basically, you have to diagnosis, you have to have good medical
surveillance, you have to be able to assimilate a response team, and
you have to do in it a rapid fashion. That is done through our public
health system. The difference between conventional weaponry and
bioweaponry is that bioweaponry requires first responders that are not
just the firemen and the policemen, which are so critical and whose
courage was so well demonstrated 2\1/2\ weeks ago, but in addition the
first responders have to be the physicians, nurses, and the people who
are managing the public health systems today.
Most physicians have never been trained to recognize smallpox or to
recognize the pneumonic plague that affects the lungs or to recognize
tularemia or the various types of food poisoning. They have not been
trained. When you see 100 cases of flu, you do not even think about
pneumonic anthrax. So we need better training.
We have underfunded the public health infrastructure. Communities of
fewer than 25,000 people are being served by public health units of
which fewer than two-thirds have fax machines or an Internet
connection. The ability to communicate between public health units once
something is suspected or identified between the public health entities
is absolutely critical. This communication infrastructure, at least
from my standpoint, as a physician, as someone who has dealt in
treating the immuno-compromised host through the field of
transplantation for 20 years before coming to the Senate, is totally
inadequate today.
There are four other things that we can do. The bill that we passed
in this body last year, the Public Health Threats and Emergency Act, is
a good first step. It addressed this prevention, it addressed this
preparedness, and it
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addressed this third category of consequence management.
Unless we support our public health infrastructure, we cannot
minimize the vulnerability that is out there today by training those
first responders, by making sure that coordination at the local level
among various entities is intact. This coordination is not there today
because we have underinvested. Finally we must make sure that there is
coordination at the State level and then at the Federal level and then
across the Federal level, and that there is appropriate coordination
without duplication.
I will simply close by saying that now is not the time for
individuals to go out and hoard antibiotics or to buy gas masks. Now is
the time for us to come together and develop a comprehensive biodefense
plan that looks first at prevention to make sure we have the adequate
intelligence, the appropriate research in terms of viruses, in terms of
vaccines, and in terms of methods of early detection; second to look at
preparedness, to make sure we are stockpiling the appropriate
antibiotics, that we have a sufficient number of vaccines, which we
simply do not have today but we are working very hard to get; and third
that our consequence management and crisis management could handle what
is called the surge product, the rush of people to emergency rooms, in
a straightforward way.
I am very optimistic. We are working very hard over the course of
this week on how much money should be put into this effort. We had a
good first step last year in the Public Health Threats and Emergency
Act. I am very confident that the American public will be very well
served by this body and by the administration as we look at this
critical area of biodefense.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, we are in morning business, is that
correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are in morning business.
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