[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 127 (Wednesday, September 26, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9826-S9828]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SPACE WARS
Mr. BYRD. Madam President, during the August recess, The New York
Times Magazine ran a cover story entitled ``The Coming Space War'' The
article caught my interest, as I am sure that it intrigued many other
readers. The author's contention is that the U.S. military is
considering a campaign to achieve military superiority in space similar
to the kind of military superiority that U.S. forces seek in the air,
on land, and from the sky. Military superiority in space is deemed
critical in order to protect our increasing dependence on satellites
for communications, surveillance, commercial and military purposes. On
August 24, President Bush named Air Force General Richard Myers, a
former chief of the U.S. Space Command and of the North American
Aerospace Defense Command, as the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. General Myers' selection as Chairman is in keeping with
President Bush's strong support for building a national missile
defense, NMD, the follow-on to President Reagan's Star Wars Strategic
Defense Initiative, SDI.
It is certainly true that our dependence--and that of other developed
and developing nations--on these winking, blinking objects winging
through the night sky has increased exponentially over the last decade.
It has rapidly become almost impossible to imagine a world without the
Internet, the World Wide Web, electronic mail on handheld computers or
cellular phones, automated teller machines, instantaneous worldwide
credit card use, and other forms of global telecommunications and
electronic commerce. This expansion and its dependence on satellite
links will continue to increase in future decades. We are all
dependent, and, therefore, we are all vulnerable, to the seamless and
uninterrupted access to satellites. Most people, however, do not
understand these technologies. I certainly do not. Like most people, I
can understand that I may be vulnerable in ways that are new to me, a
boy from the Mercer County hills in southern West Virginia. But how
best to address this new vulnerability?
The author of The New York Times Magazine article describes three
fundamentally different philosophical approaches to this brave new
realm of space. The first is a military approach, which opens up a
Pandora's box of weapons in space. The military, it is reported, has
looked into the future and come to the conclusion that space represents
the ``ultimate military `high ground,' '' requiring the military to
develop and deploy whatever technology is necessary to achieve what has
been termed ``Global Battlespace Dominance,'' or ``Full Spectrum
Dominance.'' The tools needed might include everything from National
Missile Defense to antisatellite laser or high-powered microwave
weapons, or clusters of microsatellites to hyperspectral surveillance
satellites and other space sensors--or all of these things. Some of
these systems are under development now or due for testing soon,
according to the article, already undercutting the author's assertion
that the weaponization of space is coming, when, in fact, it may
already be upon us. Already--already--additional funding to the tune of
$190 million is being sought in the defense authorization and
appropriations bills for space weapons.
Now, if I, like most people, do not really understand the
technologies behind satellite communications and cell phones, it is
even harder to understand the technologies behind hyperspectral
surveillance satellites or space-based lasers. And that lack of
technical expertise means, like most Americans, I must depend on the
Pentagon to explain why these new technologies are needed, why no other
alternatives will work, and what new questions and challenges might be
unleashed by these choices. That is not, I suggest, the best way to
perform oversight, but, unfortunately, there are few good alternatives.
The second philosophical approach to space outlined by the author is
that of the purist, seeking to unilaterally ban weapons from space and
seeking to return the heavens to an earlier, unsullied era--an earlier
unsullied era. This is not, in the author's view, a realistic hope. The
final philosophical approach, the one seemingly favored by the author,
is that of the ``pragmatist''--the ``pragmatist.'' This approach
recognizes the inevitable migration of commerce and the military to
space, but hopes to hold the line at surveillance. Weapons for space
would, in this view, remain in the research and test phase, to be
launched only in response to another nation's attempt to put weapons in
space. This launch-on-warning approach would come in conjunction with
further diplomatic efforts to establish operating rules for space
modeled on those in place for blue-water ships on the open ocean.
In the pragmatist's scenario, existing space treaties would be
retained: the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banning nuclear weapons in space
and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which, in addition to
establishing the surveillance system to avoid nuclear conflict, also
forbids most antimissile testing. One way of reducing competition and
tensions in space proposed in the article is by ``mutually assured
awareness'' in space. The U.S. would develop and make globally
available direct video access to space, so that anyone could confirm
any hostile action in space, as opposed to mishaps from natural causes.
I am not sure that this is technologically feasible, but who am I to
question it. The concept of greater openness is the point. It is
interesting, in this light, to note that the 1975 Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, operated by the
United Nations, has not been very successful. In fact, the nation with
the largest number, if not percentage, of unregistered payloads is the
United States. The United States has failed to register 141 of some
2,000 satellite payloads. Only one nation is in full compliance--
Russia. And, of course, it is the Bush Administration advocating the
abrogation of the ABM Treaty in order to commence construction on the
first National Missile Defense ground site in Alaska.
I cannot say at this point what philosophical camp that I might find
myself. The author, Jack Hitt, closes his article by pointing out that
if the United States is not successful at holding the line at
surveillance, if we ``plan, test, and deploy aggressively as the lone
superpower, we make certain that after a brief respite from the cold
war's nuclear competition, we will once again embark on a fresh and
costly arms race. And with it, assume the dark burden of policing a
rapid evolution in battlespace.'' This specter rings true. It should
concern us, and it should be debated by the people and the people's
representatives. As it stands now, the U.S. military is moving ahead on
a trajectory that is both costly and one that
[[Page S9827]]
carries with it a kind of philosophical imperialism with dangerous
ramifications.
Now, what do I mean by philosophical imperialism? The military's
plans for ``full spectrum dominance,'' and space superiority, if fully
realized, would mean that in some not-so-distant future, the United
States would be in a position to (in the words of the Air Force
Strategic Master Plan) ``operate freely in space, deny the use of space
to our adversaries, protect ourselves from an attack in and through
space and develop and deploy a N[ational] M[issile] D[efense]
capability.'' The U.S. would presumably, then, have information
dominance in this arena as well. Thus, the U.S. would be in a position
to know if a conflict between two nations, say India and Pakistan, was
about to explode into open, even nuclear, warfare. The U.S. would also
be in a position to act, but how? Would we shoot down the missiles from
one side or the other, or both? If we shot down the missiles that each
nation was firing at the other, what would happen if we missed one and
it destroyed a city? What is our responsibility? What if we chose not
to act because the conflict did not involve us, and tens of thousands
or millions of innocent people died? What is our responsibility?
If the United States achieves, at enormous expense, space
superiority, how could we avoid becoming the space marshal on this
dangerous new frontier? If we detect a threat against a third party, do
we warn the third party? If we provide a warning, and are asked to
interdict the attack because only we can, how do we say no? How do we
avoid making our military personnel and our commercial enterprises
overseas the targets of reprisals from those whose attacks we thwart?
It is difficult for me to envision a future in which we could avoid
such an imperialist, if benevolent, dictatorship in space.
The role of global policeman and space marshal would not come
cheaply, either, and in this period of shrinking or perhaps vanishing
surpluses, we cannot ignore those costs. Space dominance would not
replace air, land, or sea dominance, but would be additive. In fact,
dominance in space might conceivably add to the cost of protecting
forces on ground by making them targets for the kind of retaliation I
mentioned previously. Gaining and maintaining a robust presence in
space is technologically challenging. An airborne laser, reportedly
operational sometime around 2010, is budgeted at $11 billion. It will
cost still more to build and deploy a space-based laser. The estimated
cost for a working space laser test is about $4 billion--that is $4
billion merely to get to a test of a laser in space. A test is expected
as early as 2010.
The defense budget already consumes a bit over half of the domestic
discretionary budget that Congress must allocate among programs ranging
from health research to agriculture, education to highway and air
traffic safety, environmental protection to diplomacy. How much more
are we willing to trade between guns and butter? How much must we
trade, or might alternatives be found in the course of free and open
debate?
As most people are now well aware, those large budget surpluses so
optimistically predicted just a few weeks ago--it is not funny--while
the economy was booming--and so irresponsibly paid out in the form of
vote-buying ``tax refunds'' before the actual surpluses materialized--
are now gone, gone. Indeed, the Administration has had to employ a few
green-eyeshade accounting tricks just to find a few dollars beyond the
Social Security surplus to spend on other priorities. And the
administration's No. 1 priority seems to be the defense budget--well,
that might be all right--but more particularly, the defense budget for
National Missile Defense and space weapons. The President wants an
additional $39 billion for defense--more, perhaps, now--including more
than $8 billion to research and test his missile defense plan.
I am troubled that this Administration's number one priority is a
project whose scientific feasibility is in doubt. That is the problem.
We could very well be rushing down a path that leads to spiraling
costs and lengthy delays. In the 1960s, Congress was told that research
of a Super Sonic Transport plane was essential to U.S. competitiveness
in future decades. I was here. We spent nearly a billion dollars
developing this aircraft before cancelling it in 1973, a billion
dollars then would be much larger now. I do not think we have lost one
whit of competitiveness because of the cancellation of that program.
We traveled down the same path again when we considered funding the
Superconducting Super Collider. The $8 billion program was supposed to
fulfill a supposedly vital role in basic scientific research, but we
learned that the true cost was nearly fifty percent greater than
expected, and we were not even sure it could ever work. Congress had to
step in to end this program in 1993. Again, I do not think that we have
lost any crucial advantage by not going forward with that project.
I can think of no one who believes that a national missile defense
system will be deployed on-time and under budget.
I am troubled, not because such weapons might be needed, but because
we are spending huge sums on them without being sure in our own minds
that the weaponization of space is the best course of action to ensure
our security.
If the United States builds a missile shield to shoot down enemy
missiles as soon after they launch as possible, a smart adversary would
attempt to shorten the amount of time that our defenses have to react,
in addition to taking measures to fool our defenses. One way to shorten
the time between launch and impact is to launch closer to the target--
either from a submarine offshore, or, as the seas become more
transparent to new technologies, from space. Another alternative for a
wily adversary would be to switch gears entirely and employ other forms
of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical or biological weapons,
that could be dispersed without using long range or intercontinental
missiles whose launch points make determining the adversary a simple
exercise in geometry. We must be aware that our actions produce
reactions.
We can assume that if the United States deploys weapons in space,
even in a purely defensive posture, even in a global policeman role,
not all of our friends, allies, and competitors will see this as
benign. We have only to consider the reaction of the world to the
recent statements by the Administration concerning National Missile
Defense and the potential abrogation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. Just what would we do when some other nation--friend or
competitor--threatens our space superiority by deploying their own
weapons there, even if for avowedly defensive purposes? Again the
vision of a space marshal comes to mind, this time facing off another
gunman down the dusty main street of space. Does the U.S. Marshal fire
first, second, or is it a long, tense stand-off with weapons cocked?
None of the alternatives sounds particularly promising.
Though it is difficult to conceive, would a military competition in
space weaponry deter commercial satellite growth or the growth of e-
business that depends on global satellite networked communications?
Once weapons are in space, does the cost of doing business in space go
up to the point that global commerce is stifled? That would be very bad
news for business, for consumers, and for the prospects of returning
our national budget to surplus or even to balance.
These are all ramifications of our current course of action that
merit discussion--broad, open, public discussion and debate. I do not
wish for the United States to be left undefended--far from it--but
neither do I wish for the military to be left, in the face of public
silence, to make decisions that spend our treasure and which may create
new problems for us in arenas yet unconsidered.
In his farewell address on January 17, 1961, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower looked upon the rising power and influence of armament
producers and at the increasing share of technological research that is
performed for the federal government. He warned the councils of
government to ``guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence,
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex . . .,''
and to ``be alert to the . . . danger that public policy could itself
become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.''
[[Page S9828]]
Mr. Eisenhower was concerned that, among other things, ``democracy . .
. survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent
phantom of tomorrow.'' He urged that ``[O]nly an alert and
knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge
industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods
and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.''
Coming from a former supreme commander of the Allied military forces
during World War II, President Eisenhower's words carry the weight of
his experience. They are also uncomfortably prophetic. Just forty years
after President Eisenhower gave his warning, President Bush proposes to
invest many billions of dollars to achieve military superiority in a
new realm, where there currently is no threat, jeopardizing the
economic health of the nation and creating instability and mistrust in
the hearts of other nations. This will occur unless the citizenry--and
its elected representatives--we members of the House and U.S. Senate--
especially us--consider and agree upon this course of action. Silence
does not equal assent. We must talk, and learn, and consider.
Again, I am admittedly a layman when it comes to high-tech gadgetry
on earth, let alone in space. But it seems to me that we must set aside
the whizbang and drama of lasers and satellites to consider the real,
age-old questions--those that have plagued the great generals
throughout time. We should be taking stock of what we have to gain and
what we have to lose by moving the lines of battle. We must consider
whether or not we have the necessary weapons to protect ourselves and
our land before we send our military into new and vastly different
frontiers. We should assess the real, known threats to our Nation, and
gauge whether we have the weapons and the resources to remain secure,
and whether our time, talent, and treasure would be better spent
fending off those most likely threats or devising new unproven plans of
attack and fabulously expensive means of battle. And we should ponder
the awesome responsibility of militarizing space and then being the
world's space cop before we rush headlong into the twilight zone called
national missile defense.
Madam President, I believe that it would be both wise and prudent to
back off just a little bit on the accelerator that is driving us in a
headlong and fiscally spendthrift rush to deploy a national missile
defense and to invest billions into putting weapons in space and
building weapons designed to act in space. That heavy foot on the
accelerator is merely the stamp and roar of rhetoric. The threat does
not justify the pace. Our budget projections cannot support the pace.
Let us continue to study the matter. Let us continue to conduct
research. But the threat, as I say, does not justify the pace at which
we are traveling.
Our budget projections cannot support the pace, so let us slow down a
bit, look at the map, and consider just where this path is taking us.
Madam President, I thank the distinguished Senator from California
who is here prepared to manage the appropriations bill. She is waiting
patiently.
I take this opportunity to congratulate her also for the excellent
work she has done in preparing this legislation. It was moved through
the full Committee on Appropriations yesterday. She is here today
prepared to guide its way through this Senate. I thank her on behalf of
the Senate and on behalf of the Nation for the service she has rendered
and is rendering and will continue to give us.
I yield the floor.
Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Carper). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
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