[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 125 (Monday, September 24, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9694-S9734]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
resume consideration of S. 1438, which the clerk will report by title.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1438) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2002 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed 
     Forces, and for other purposes.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. As I announced for the majority leader this morning, he has 
every intent of finishing this bill by tomorrow. This is one of the 
most important pieces of legislation we have dealt with all year. 
People who have amendments should offer those amendments. I have spoken 
to the two managers. We are in the process of getting ready to offer a 
unanimous consent agreement that we would have a finite list of 
amendments by 4 o'clock today. Everyone who wants to offer an amendment 
must notify their respective manager or aide by 4 o'clock today. I hope 
we can propound that unanimous consent agreement within the next few 
minutes so we will know the status of all the amendments.

  The managers have indicated if we have no amendments, they will move 
to third reading.
  Mr. LEVIN. Could we tell the Senators who have amendments they wish 
to offer, if they could notify our respective Cloakrooms, it would 
facilitate things. We are not ready yet to offer a unanimous consent 
agreement, but we will propound that agreement in the next few minutes 
to set a time for those who want to offer amendments. Is that 
agreeable?
  Mr. WARNER. We are endeavoring to do that on our side. A number of 
Senators have just returned to Washington. They need just a bit of time 
to assess this situation. I know there is a strong spirit of 
cooperation on this side to move forward with the bill and complete it 
by Wednesday afternoon early. In order to do that, we have to have this 
type of working document from which to chart our course, night and day, 
between now and Wednesday afternoon, and recognize that we have to set 
aside time for the CR when it comes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if it is agreeable with my friend from Virginia 
we seek to complete action on this bill by tomorrow night, rather than 
Wednesday. That is the goal. I take it the Senator would agree with 
that goal?
  Mr. WARNER. I agree.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I say to the distinguished chairman, I understand there 
is an amendment that the Senator from Kentucky will offer.
  Mr. LEVIN. Senator Jack Reed has been waiting to make an opening 
statement.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Of course. And I ask it be in order that after the 
first amendment offered by the Senator from Kentucky, I offer an 
amendment on behalf of Senator Bingaman.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we have to clear that. I wonder if we could 
withhold that for a moment.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Sure.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it is hard to hear. I would like to know 
what kind of agreement we are coming to concerning amendments.
  Mr. WARNER. I do not think we have reached any agreement. We have 
just come to the floor for the purpose of starting consideration of the 
bill. I defer to my chairman. As I understand, we have colleagues 
waiting to move ahead. I am prepared to try to do what we can, subject 
to his concurrence.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if we could recognize Senator Reed, who is 
waiting to make an opening statement, and while he is giving that 
statement, we will try to line up the order of amendments. Is that 
agreeable?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I would like to have a chance for opening comments, 
perhaps 10 minutes for that, whenever it is appropriate.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask that the Chair recognize Senator Reed, then Senator 
Sessions, and at that point, after opening statements, we hope to have 
at least one or two amendments lined up in terms of order of 
recognition.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the 
Senator from Michigan regarding the order of speakers?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I thank the Senators from Michigan and 
Virginia not only for their gracious offer of the opportunity to speak 
this afternoon but also for their work as chairman and ranking member 
of this committee. I thank Chairman Levin and Senator Warner for their 
leadership.
  I rise this afternoon in support of this authorization bill for the 
Department of Defense for the year 2002. It comes at a critical time in 
history where we have to prepare for a series of threats, both 
anticipated before September 11 and now understood very well after 
September 11.
  I also speak specifically with respect to my responsibility as 
chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee. 
In that regard, I first thank and commend Senator Wayne Allard of 
Colorado, the ranking member. Senator Allard did a tremendous amount of 
work, and his perseverance, diligence, his good humor, and his 
cooperation were essential to the legislation we are contemplating and 
considering today. He has truly done a remarkable job. It was a 
distinct pleasure and honor working with him. I thank him for his 
activities.
  The jurisdiction of the Strategic Subcommittee has a very wide swath, 
including space and space systems, strategic programs, intelligence, 
reconnaissance and surveillance programs, ballistic missile defense 
programs, and Defense-funded programs at the Department of Energy.
  The Strategic Subcommittee held hearings on all of the matters of 
jurisdiction, including reports of the Space Commission and the 
National Reconnaissance Organization Commission. We had extensive 
hearings, particularly on the ballistic missile defense organization. 
We had at one point a 5-hour hearing on their plans and programs for 
this year. We also had a very useful and instructive hearing on the 
status of our long-range bomber force. Even though we had a compressed 
timeframe to consider these issues because of the late submission of 
the budget, the Strategic Subcommittee conducted extensive hearings.
  The result is the legislation we have before the Senate, a product of 
these hearings, and of hard work, particularly by the staff. I commend 
and compliment the staff for their intense effort and their thorough 
analysis of the requests made to the committee.
  Based upon these hearings and this extensive analysis, we were able 
to increase, in many critical areas, authorization for programs. In 
providing additional funds for these programs, we were guided by the 
recommendations of the military services themselves. We were very 
attentive to the unfunded requests outlined and identified by the 
Departments of the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, their so-
called wish lists. That gave us a sense of where we had to apply 
additional resources. We tried to do that.
  Now, with respect to space and space systems, we understand the 
United States has a continuing and increased reliance on access to 
space. For space programs, we added $53.9 million to improve readiness 
and operations of safety at the east and west coast space launch and 
range facilities. This was the Air Force's No. 1 unfunded priority. We 
were able to fund a significant portion of their request.
  We also added funds to the Air Force to improve its space 
surveillance capabilities and its communications capabilities. With the 
additional funds we have provided in this legislation, the Air Force 
will be able to exercise an option to buy additional wide band gap-
filler satellites to ensure global wide band communications capability. 
Again, as we contemplate and prepare for extensive operations around 
the world directed at those who attacked us, these types of global 
communications become more and more critical to the successful 
operations not only of the Air Force but of our ground elements and all 
of the elements in the Department of Defense.

[[Page S9695]]

  In the area of strategic systems, we have included a provision 
consistent with the requests by the Department of Defense and the 
administration that would repeal section 1302 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998. Section 1302 required the 
Secretary of Defense to stay at the START I nuclear force structure 
level until such time as START II enters into force. This provision, 
the provision we have included, will allow significant immediate 
reduction in the number of strategic nuclear warheads, and will 
continue the transition of our forces away from a cold war structure 
without having to wait for START II to enter into force.

  Also related to the repeal of section 1302 is the inclusion within 
the bill of funds to allow the Air Force to begin to retire the 
Peacekeeper ICBMs beginning next year. This is consistent with the 
overall thrust of the administration to make reductions in our nuclear 
force structure.
  We are awaiting a nuclear posture review, due in the next few weeks. 
But we are giving the administration what they desire and what we think 
is appropriate: the authority to begin to make reductions in our 
nuclear forces and the money to begin immediately to retire the 
Peacekeeper ICBMs.
  Also in the strategic area, we have included a provision that would 
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to keep the full fleet of B-1B 
bombers in place, including those B-1B bombers that are assigned to the 
Air National Guard until both the Quadrennial Defense Review and the 
Nuclear Posture Review are completed and the Secretary has thoroughly 
reviewed the missions of the B-1B bomber fleet. We have included the 
necessary $100 million in operations and maintenance funds to keep the 
B-1B bombers flying in fiscal year 2002.
  I also suggest and point out the B-1B bombers are among those assets 
that have been identified and notified for possible forward deployment 
in support of our antiterrorist operations.
  As we today and in the future place increased reliance on our bomber 
fleet, not only have we dealt with the B-1B bomber force, we have also 
added an additional $125 million for much needed upgrades to the B-2 
bomber and the B-52 bomber. We have all watched recently as those B-52s 
left Barksdale Air Force Base in support, again, of our antiterrorist 
operations, so it is essential to support these Air Force aircraft 
also.
  In the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance area, we have 
continued the emphasis started by Senator Warner on transforming our 
military forces by promoting unmanned aerial vehicles. This bill 
includes an additional $64.2 million for unmanned aerial vehicles. As 
we improve the capability of these vehicles, we will rely on them for a 
growing list of missions. Once again, in any type of counterterrorism 
operation where we need relatively low-level, nonobservable, we hope, 
observation from the sky and where we are unwilling to risk pilots, 
these vehicles are terribly useful.
  Last year we sponsored a demonstration for the Global Hawk system in 
an air surveillance role. This bill includes funding for a signals 
intelligence demonstration project using the Global Hawk UAV. We think 
it is an important addition to our repertoire of overhead 
reconnaissance.
  Another responsibility of the Strategic Subcommittee is the defense-
funded programs at the Department of Energy with the exception of the 
nonproliferation programs. These DOE programs include environmental 
cleanup programs, the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and intelligence 
and counterintelligence programs.
  This bill would add approximately $855 million for these important 
programs. The budget request for these programs was not sufficient to 
cover all the needs for DOE to comply with its cleanup agreements or to 
improve the conditions of the production complex or to complete 
stockpile life extension programs. Additional resources are needed to 
not only maintain weapons reliability and our ability to safeguard the 
stockpile, but also our responsibility to clean up sites that have been 
polluted by nuclear processes in the past.

  We recognize that more money may be needed but this is a substantial 
downpayment on cleanup and stockpile security programs. The additional 
funding included $422 million for the DOE environmental programs and 
$500 million for the National Nuclear Security Administration.
  In addition to the extra funding for DOE programs, we have included 
legislative provisions to streamline the DOE polygraph program and help 
the National Nuclear Security Administration complete its 
reorganization. As we all know, the initial response prompting these 
programs, the polygraph program and the creation of NNSA, was the 
situation of security breaches in our nuclear laboratories. We hope and 
believe that is a thing of the past because of our emphasis on 
streamlined security procedures and a more rational, robust, and 
efficient NNSA.
  One of the most controversial elements of our deliberations involve 
ballistic missile defense. Let me say initially that there is a 
consensus on the committee that we need robust research and development 
of ballistic missile defense and immediate deployment of theater 
missile defenses to counter the threat. But it turns out that when you 
come to national missile defense there are two schools of thought. 
There are those who might say it will never work and those who say we 
don't care if it works, we need it. The reality is somewhere in 
between. We have a strong obligation to test and develop national 
missile defenses so we can bring, we hope, that technology to bear to 
defend the country. But we have to be careful not to deploy something 
that will not work. That is what we have attempted to do in this 
legislation, to provide a counter to immediate threats but also ensure 
that we spend money wisely, with the ultimate goal of producing a 
technology that works, not fielding a technology that doesn't work.
  Let me first discuss the threat that we see before us immediately. It 
is most easily divided, I think, into the theater threats, short-range, 
less than 1,000 kilometers, and medium range, 1,000 to 3,000 
kilometers, and then those national threats, ICBMs that can travel more 
than 5,500 kilometers.
  You can see there is a large number of countries that have theater 
missile capability, and it is growing each and every day. These are the 
threats that immediately challenge our troops in the field, that 
immediately involve American interests through our forces and our 
allies throughout the world.
  When you go to the area of national missile defense, we know the 
Russians have thousands of missiles, the Chinese approximately 20, and 
then it is uncertain, frankly. As we all know, there is a strong 
suspicion that the North Koreans have this capability. There is 
certainly an indication other countries want this capability. But it is 
clear to us, and it should be clear to the American public, that the 
great, immediate threat that should prompt our immediate response is in 
the area of theater missile defense. This authorization responds to 
that grave theater missile defense threat.
  It responds also to the national missile defense threat by continuing 
to support robust funding for research and development.
  Let me give an overview of the funding levels that we have 
recommended for the ballistic missile defense program. It is good, I 
think, to begin with our baseline, which is last year's authorization: 
$5.1 billion overall--national missile defense and theater missile 
defense, as indicated on this bar graph. The ``other'' category simply 
refers to other nonspecific BMDO-wide activities such as program 
operation and other generally supporting programs. The request by the 
administration was $8.3 billion, about a 60-percent increase, the 
largest request for any particular category in this DOD authorization. 
In this chart, you can see roughly the breakout between ``other,'' 
national missile defense, and theater missile defense.
  After very careful consideration of each and every program, after 
hours of hearings and discussions with the officers in charge of BMDO, 
and other officials, we made adjustments unrelated to the debate about 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, related simply to several principles 
that are important.
  Avoid contingency deployments--avoid deploying equipment that has not 
been thoroughly tested and we are not quite sure will work.

[[Page S9696]]

  Do not fund activities that cannot be executed this year. We have 
scarce resources. We are about to mount a worldwide campaign against 
terror and terrorists who struck us and to fund things this year that 
cannot be performed when we have other glaring needs, to me is not the 
way to spend our money wisely and to support our troops appropriately.
  Also, to avoid excessive nonspecific funding, requests for large 
amounts of money without any real plan to spend it--the sense I got 
from listening to the Administration is that they will figure out what 
they are doing on the run.
  That is not the way to develop a system that is going to protect the 
United States.
  Finally, avoid an undue program growth rate--programs that have been 
moving along with good progress and suddenly are going to be 
accelerated without justification for the acceleration.
  Those are the principles we used to decide program-by-program 
adjustments we would be making.
  The effect was to reduce the overall budget to $7 billion, almost $2 
billion more than last year's authorization; specifically, to increase 
theater missile defense by $600 million, the immediate threat, while 
reducing the administration's request for national missile defense yet 
still increasing that budget by $1.1 billion. This was a robust 
authorization for ballistic missile defense.
  The committee decisions have been impacted, of course, by what we did 
last week. In the manager's amendment, we added back the $1.3 billion 
we had cut. But we have given the President the opportunity to use this 
money for either ballistic missile defense or for antiterrorism 
activity.
  I hope he will look at what we have done, and while looking at the 
ability to deploy systems that aren't ready and activities that can't 
really be executed this year, that he will wisely spend that $1.3 
billion for antiterrorism in the conduct of this campaign that 
threatens America today. If he does that, we will still be on the path 
to a strong theater missile defense and a strong national missile 
defense, but we will be able to affect the immediate crisis we face 
with more resources. I hope he makes that choice. The legislation we 
presented him after last week's amendment will give him that choice.
  Let me try to go into some detail about the recommendations.
  Again, I hope the President and DOD will take our work and use it to 
form their views with respect to the additional $1.3 billion.
  As I mentioned, we have increased theater missile defense by $626 
million. We have tried to identify with surety well-defined programs 
such as the PAC-3 Program, which is just ready for deployment, and the 
THAAD Program, and to fund them robustly. We have also tried to 
increase resources for the Navy Area Defense Program and the Airborne 
Laser to resolve emerging technical problems to keep them on schedule.
  In addition to these programs, we have added $76 million to the 
administration's request for the Arrow Missile System. The Arrow is a 
joint Israeli-United States project. These funds will help make the 
Arrow interoperable with our forces. It is an essential part of the 
development. Today that is one of the few theater missile defense 
systems that is fielded and operational.
  We have also gone ahead and looked at some of these ill-advised 
contingency deployments.
  We save $390 million by not funding untested THAAD missiles, Navy 
Theater-Wide missiles, premature THAAD radar, and Airborne Laser 
components. We save over $200 million by rationalizing the Navy 
Theater-Wide test and radar development programs while funding tests 
for Block 1 missiles and asking the Secretary of Defense for future 
plans on Navy Theater-Wide.
  When it comes to national missile defense, I also pointed out that we 
have increased last year's authorization by a total of $1.1 billion. It 
would fund a new midcourse test bed. It would provide 20 percent more 
for NMD, but it would save over $500 million by moderating growth in 
the NMD system and reducing funding for nonexecutable programs--those 
programs which we think, after careful analysis, cannot be completed in 
this year's authorization.

  We also have saved over $200 million by reducing excessive funding 
for activities not associated with specific programs--essentially large 
categories of money with very little justification. All of this money 
can now be used, pursuant to the amendment of last week, for 
counterterrorism operations, all the things we know we have to do 
today, and I hope we do today.
  We have also funded the request by the administration for a test bed 
in Alaska. Even though there is a great deal of controversy about the 
efficacy of this test bed to test missiles, even though there is a 
suggestion that it could be used for deployment which would raise 
issues under the ABM Treaty, we have tried to give the administration 
the benefit of the doubt by not only significantly increasing resources 
but also assuming that they are working very diligently not to 
arbitrarily move away from the treaty but to comply with it until they 
are forced otherwise.
  This approach of giving the administration not only permission but 
authority to establish their test bed is again another commitment to do 
everything we can to promote research and development of a national 
missile defense system. As we go forward, we hope we can continue 
working closely with the administration.
  Let me also point out that our response to the proposal by the 
administration for missile defense was prompted not by an ideological 
approach to BMD but by a desire to see a program that works. We tried 
to base our judgments on the experience of these programs before.
  One of the most influential aspects of our review was considering the 
report of General Welch, the former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air 
Force, who conducted a thorough study of the THAAD system, the theater 
high-altitude system. A few years ago, this system was going nowhere, 
with test failure after test failure. General Welch was asked to come 
in and look at the program, analyze its faults, and point out whether 
it could be saved and how it could be saved. His conclusions were very 
instructive to our deliberations.
  First of all, the Welch panel, set up by the BMD office to look at 
the failure in this theater high-altitude program, concluded that the 
THAAD program's ``rush-to-failure'' was caused in part by the decision 
to buy operational missiles early. That was the key factor in the 
difficulties of this program. Until they got back to careful, thorough 
development with requirements and objectives, this program was in 
danger of failing. If it failed, it would be a significant loss to the 
Nation.
  The same logic was echoed by GEN Kadish, director of BMDO, when he 
testified that ``emergency deployments are disruptive and can set back 
normal development programs by years.'' That is precisely what the 
administration was urging us to do in this authorization--to accelerate 
deployment before we had done the testing, to buy missiles that were 
untested, to rush to failure.
  I argue very strenuously that if the program adopted by the 
administration is to simply take this $1.3 billion back and plug it 
right back into this program, it will be a rush to failure, and it will 
defeat what we all want to see--the immediate deployment of effective 
theater missile defenses and the deployment, subject to considerations 
of international law and treaties at this point, of an effective 
national missile defense.
  Until we have the testing and the development completed, deployment 
is something that is both premature and ultimately harmful to the 
program development. The program should be careful and deliberate, and 
we hope ultimately successful. As the Welch report concluded, 
attempting to deploy minimal operational capability early ``is unlikely 
to be productive for programs of this complexity. The drive for early 
capability is proving to be counterproductive.''
  I hope the administration takes these words to heart. Much of what we 
suggested in terms of funding reductions was based upon this logic--the 
logic of seasoned professionals who looked closely at this program and 
who want these programs to succeed but understand that they have to be 
done thoroughly and carefully, and not rushed to failure.
  As we go forward, we will, I am sure, continue this debate about 
national

[[Page S9697]]

missile defense and ballistic missile defense, and a host of other 
issues. I hope and I know the full Senate has the same type of very 
constructive and very helpful debate that the members of my 
subcommittee and the members of the full committee had because I think 
it is important to have this type of significant debate as we go 
forward about issues. We have tried to do this, and we have tried to do 
it thoroughly. I believe we have produced, at the subcommittee level, 
and the full committee, a thoughtful and very logical and very 
defensible product.

  Today we are in this Chamber presenting the administration with the 
opportunity to use these resources to counter terrorism or to go back 
and invest in programs of dubious immediate efficacy and efficiency and 
worth for the national defense. Again, I hope that the administration 
does this.
  Let me just make brief comments about the situation with respect to 
the ABM treaty which, I point out, was separated from the logic of this 
discussion.
  Regardless of the existence of an ABM treaty, our responsibility is 
to look closely at every one of these programs and to conclude which 
ones have real value for national defense and which ones are simply not 
worth the effort in terms of the resources committed this year. We did 
that--regardless of the existence of the ABM treaty. But the ABM treaty 
is a factor that has to be considered when you talk about national 
missile defense.
  The point I make is that many things changed on September 11. One 
thing that changed is the appreciation, I believe, by all of us and the 
administration that we need the help and the cooperation of the world 
community to beat our enemy, to beat the terrorists, to root out these 
networks out and destroy them.
  In that context, I suggest and advise that it would be very 
counterproductive for immediate and unilateral departure from the ABM 
treaty, because of the consequences it would produce. That advice, I 
hope, is taken to heart by the President.
  The President clearly has the authority today to withdraw from a 
treaty. We attempted--and we continue to attempt in separate 
legislation--to provide a forum for this Senate at least to consider a 
proposed departure from the ABM treaty. But until that other 
legislation is considered, and perhaps passed, it is clear that the 
President has this right.
  But today, as we assemble a world coalition to fight people who have 
harmed us--grievously--I would think that he would be very careful not 
to withdraw because we need the support of many nations. I think it is 
particularly inappropriate and premature to do that since I believe we 
do not have the technology today that will, in fact, be capable of 
deployment within the next few months, perhaps the next few years.
  While we are developing the technology, we should be very careful 
about undermining the stability of international relations, 
particularly at a time when we are reaching out to nations across the 
globe, including our European allies, including Russia, including 
China, asking them all to stand with us and to trust our judgment and 
our leadership as we go forth to counter and destroy the common enemy, 
the terrorists in the world.
  So I believe among the many things that have changed on September 11 
is the attitude that was demonstrable in the administration that we can 
go it alone, that we don't need many other people; it is our way or the 
highway. We are now on a common path, we hope, to overcome and defeat 
the terrorists. This is not time to debate the language that was 
embodied in the original version of the bill which passed the 
committee. I do hope there is a more appropriate time soon.
  We are in this Chamber today at a momentous time in our history. All 
of us are committed to giving our Department of Defense every resource 
it needs to defend this country and, most specifically, to destroy 
those who attacked us and attempted to destroy us. It is in that spirit 
we continue these deliberations. It is in that spirit we will pass this 
legislation. And it is in that spirit we will triumph and prevail.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Carper). Under the previous order, the 
Senator from Alabama is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. I ask my colleague to defer for a moment so that I can 
recognize the valuable contribution of the Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I defer to the ranking member.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator. We recognize the Senator from 
Alabama is next to be recognized for an opening statement.
  I commend our colleague from Rhode Island first for his hard work 
throughout the years on the committee on which he has served from the 
first day he came to the Senate, and most particularly now in his 
capacity as the chairman of the subcommittee, which is a very important 
subcommittee dealing with many issues. I thank him for his work with 
Senator Levin and myself as we worked our way through the resolution of 
some issues that were very important to him. I thank the Senator very 
much.
  Mr. President, I will keep on my desk, as will the distinguished 
chairman, a list of the amendments which are now coming in. I am 
pleased to say we are down to where there is a single person who is 
examining the possibility of the UC request shortly to be propounded on 
the question of putting in the amendments for consideration by a 
certain time today, so we can hopefully complete this bill tomorrow 
night.
  My understanding is that at the conclusion of the remarks of the 
Senator from Alabama, we will turn to amendments; and in all 
probability, our distinguished colleague from Kentucky will seek 
recognition at that time.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from Alabama yield for just an additional 
minute without losing his order for recognition?
  Mr. SESSIONS. I am pleased to yield.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator from Rhode Island for not just his 
opening statement, which is always extraordinary and thoughtful, but 
also for his magnificent work as the chairman of the Strategic 
Subcommittee. They are both invaluable. I thank him very much for that.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, may I say what a privilege it is working 
with Chairman Levin and the ranking member, Senator Warner. The 
Senators have led this Senate with great distinction.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Alabama is recognized.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I am pleased to express my appreciation 
to Senator Levin and Senator Warner and to all others who have worked 
very hard to make sure we complete our work in this Chamber in a 
bipartisan way. We were very close to doing that on almost every issue 
that has come before us. But one issue did divide us; that was national 
missile defense. And Senator Reed is one of the most knowledgeable and 
articulate spokesmen concerning that issue.
  In my subcommittee, of which I am ranking member, I think Senator 
Kennedy and I were able to reach an agreement on issues pertinent to 
seapower that both of us felt good about. It was not perfect; it was 
not what we would like; but with the money that we were allocated to 
spend on seapower, I think we did a good job. Our problems simply were 
the lack of money and resources. And, indeed, I will mention a few 
things that we were missing as a result of that.
  President Bush campaigned that he would improve the situation for our 
defense people and our defense budget and do some things that needed to 
be done. If you look at his budget, it represents an historic 
improvement and increase in defense. This appropriations bill we are 
voting out today totals $328 billion. Last year, we were at $296 
billion. That is a $30 billion increase, plus a $6 billion supplemental 
we passed. It means a $38 billion increase in defense this year over 
last year.
  That is the biggest increase in probably 15 years in defense. It 
represents a long overdue step. It was done before we had these 
terrorist attacks. And it represented a consensus by the administration 
and their representation to the Congress on the needs of our defense 
budget. So we made a big step forward, and we are happy about that.
  We spent a good deal of that money on a number of things, such as a 
5-percent pay raise for our men and women

[[Page S9698]]

in uniform, which is tacked on to last year's increase--well above the 
inflation rate; 6- to 10-percent pay raises for people in critical 
positions; a $232 million increase in the housing allowance for 
families--increased funding for housing--an increase for national 
missile defense, and a number of other increases.
  So we are proud of those things. We are proud of the overall increase 
in the defense budget. However, our defense budget still, as a 
percentage of our GDP--our total gross domestic product--is far less 
than it was in the 1980s. At a time when we are seeing increased 
threats to our ability to function in the world as a result of 
terrorists and rogue nations, we are going to have to increase the 
budget in the years to come.

  The biggest thing we were not able to do in this budget--and the 
American people need to understand it--we did not make enough progress 
in recapitalization, replacing old and worn-out equipment such as 
tanks, aircraft, and ships; nor did we do enough in research and 
development of new equipment for the future. We did not make enough 
progress despite a very significant increase in defense spending this 
year.
  We are going to have--we approved the other day--an additional $20 
billion for defense, most of which--virtually all of which will be 
spent for the terrorist problem we are now facing. With some of that, 
we will be able to strengthen our Defense Department for other issues, 
but most of it, indeed, will go to a terrorist response. That is not 
going to leave us in a significantly stronger position.
  If you count that, we are looking at a $58 billion increase over last 
year. From a financial point of view, we did pretty well. From a 
procurement point of view, most of us are somewhat concerned.
  For example, in the Seapower Subcommittee, of which I am ranking 
member, we were wrestling with a Navy that now has about 315 ships 
afloat out there. At one point in this country not too long ago, we 
were talking about a 600-ship Navy. Along with everything else, we have 
had a steady reduction in funding for ships. In this budget, we are 
going to have six new ships approved, which is good--they are 
expensive, every one of them--but that will not stop the decline. Our 
estimates from our Navy people are it takes eight to ten ships a year 
to maintain the current level of 315 ships. So we are still on a 
downward slope for ships.
  At some point, you just have to have a ship on the sea to be able to 
project American power in areas around the globe. You have to have a 
certain number. Many of them have to be in home port to be repaired. 
The sailors need to be home at various times. They need to respond to 
various crises in different places. It does not leave you that many 
ships to actually send to a given place at a given time when they are 
needed. Seapower is a good example of our inability to be as effective 
in procuring capital assets for our defense as we would like to be. I 
wish I had a more positive story to tell there, but I don't.
  One defense official recently said that it was like a bow wave in 
front of a ship, this procurement need. We are just pushing it in front 
of us. Sooner or later, we will have to confront it. Another defense 
official in the Clinton administration said we are in a death spiral. 
What he meant by that was, we are trying to keep afloat and keep 
operating equipment and airplanes and ships that need constant repair, 
and they are getting older and older. We would do better to purchase 
new, modern, more effective equipment that would not, perhaps, have as 
many personnel needed to operate it and could actually save us money in 
operation to a significant degree. Those are the issues with which we 
need to wrestle.
  Senator Reed is very knowledgeable and makes a number of points about 
national missile defense. It would be appropriate for me to respond to 
some degree on that. I will make a few points the items that concern 
me. We are not in perfect agreement on it.
  However, I do want to say how much I appreciate Senator Reed and 
Chairman Levin and Senator Warner, the ranking member, and Senator 
Allard, ranking member of the subcommittee, for their determination at 
this time of national crisis to reach an agreement on this issue and 
not to have us be in disagreement. They have accomplished that. They 
have done so in a way I can support. I believe it moves us in a 
direction that we needed to move. I am very proud we were able to have 
that occur.

  As it came out of committee, we split 13-12 on the budget for 
national missile defense. Let me relate a few things about it.
  President Clinton's budget for national missile defense this year, as 
he projected it, was approximately $5 billion. As President Bush 
campaigned, he told America he believed we needed to do more on 
national missile defense. Two and a half years ago, this Congress voted 
97-3, I believe, to deploy a national missile defense system. As soon 
as technologically feasible, we would deploy a national missile defense 
system.
  Secretary Rumsfeld, when he was in the private sector, chaired a 
bipartisan commission, the Rumsfeld commission. They did a study to 
determine what kind of threat we faced from incoming missiles. The 
report was unanimous, the bipartisan commission was unanimous, that by 
2005, this Nation could be subject to missile attack for which we have 
absolutely no defense at this time. The President recognized that. 
Later he chose Mr. Rumsfeld to be Secretary of Defense. When he came 
in, he proposed a $38 billion increase in the defense budget. He asked 
for $3 billion more for national missile defense, to go from $5 to $8 
billion. We think that is a reasonable increase. It is a significant 
increase, but I believe--and I know Senator Warner and others believe--
this is the right thing for us to do.
  People say: Well, they may not have this missile that can reach us 
now. The commission said, by 2005, they could. If we are going to have 
a defense against it when they do have the capability of reaching us 
with missiles, we have to start today. This is not something about 
which we can do at a snap of our fingers.
  Of course, this administration will not, this Congress will not 
tolerate the deployment of a system that is not feasible, that won't 
work. We have to get started on building it. A $3 billion increase in 
national missile defense spending is a reasonable increase when that is 
the one gap we saw in our defense.
  Indeed, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, in his 
testimony, talked about the Gulf War. He said: If you look at the Gulf 
War, you could see that in many ways we overestimated our enemy's 
capability. And, in fact, we overestimated his capability in virtually 
every area except one. The one we did not consider enough was his 
ability to launch missiles, Scud missiles, if you remember, into our 
military bases and troops out in the field and into Israel and perhaps 
even destabilizing our relationship with Israel and causing 
consternation in our defense effort. So we rushed in the Patriot 
missile. It actually succeeded in knocking some of those Scuds down, 
but it was not designed for that and had not been ready to be deployed 
for that. It was rushed out as an emergency, and it worked to a degree.
  Since then, we realize we do have the capability to knock down an 
incoming missile. Some people almost think it is Star Wars and it can't 
be done, but we have had hearing after hearing after hearing on that 
subject. Both sides of the aisle agree it is technologically something 
that can be done. We have the ability to do it. It is just the question 
of when it ought to be deployed, I suppose; that is our disagreement.
  The American people need to realize that if, by 2005, Iran or 
Pakistan, any nation, Iraq, or North Korea continues their development 
or their purchase of missiles, they could have the ability to reach us 
with a missile, and we have no defense to that whatsoever.
  You say we have theater missile defense, but it cannot be deployed 
around this country in a way that would protect us as a national 
missile defense. Why is that, under present circumstances? The reason 
for that is, in 1972 we entered into an ABM treaty, Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty, with the Soviets.
  At that time, we both had the capability to destroy each other many 
times over with our missiles. Both of us, in the 1970s, were thinking 
about a national missile defense program. So somebody finally, I guess, 
got our nations to start thinking that this is

[[Page S9699]]

really not good for either one of us. Why should we invest billions of 
dollars in a system that will not really protect us from the 
overwhelming force of the other. So we signed the treaty. It, flat out, 
said that we will not deploy a national missile defense. The treaty is 
not but two or three pages.
  The first article says: We will not build a national missile defense. 
People have said we don't need to get out of this treaty. Well, if we 
are going to build a national missile defense, we do have to get out of 
it. What if the Russians don't agree? We are threatened now from a 
multitude of nations. We want to have a friendly relationship with 
Russia. I pray we don't have a threat from Russia. I hope that our 
relationship will get even better with Russia. But we have a bunch of 
nations out there--and if anybody had any doubts about it, they didn't 
after September 11--who wish us ill. If they had the capability of 
launching missiles and hitting Los Angeles, New York, Miami, or some 
other American city and can kill millions of American people, then we 
are not safe in this world.
  We have the ability to do this, and it is time for us to get busy 
about it. No great nation ought to leave itself vulnerable. Indeed, 
Henry Kissinger, an architect of the ABM Treaty, was quoted. He talked 
about the new circumstances we are in. He said:

       I have never heard of a nation whose policy it is to keep 
     itself vulnerable to attack.

  That is what we are basically talking about. We are having a policy 
by trying to adhere to a treaty with a dead empire, the Soviet Union--
it wasn't even with the Russia of today. Many legal scholars say we are 
not even required to abide by it because it is not with a legal entity 
that exists today. So we need to get out of that treaty.
  The Russians want to extract compromises from us, and we all 
understand that. So the President deals with them and works and 
increases our relationship with Russia, and the mutual interests get 
furthered. I thought we were on the road to making an agreement with 
the Russians. They have said some things that indicate they would 
agree. The Europeans, after initially being opposed, have warmed up to 
the idea quite considerably. About the only place left that we are 
having problems with is the U.S. Senate. The House is on board with 
this, but we are still having some problems here. So there was language 
in this bill--and the reason I and others voted against it when it came 
out of committee--which said that if the Russians didn't agree to allow 
us to build a national missile defense, the President could not go 
forward, but had to come back to Congress and ask for a vote.
  Whereas, under the ABM treaty, the President has personal unilateral 
power to wipe out the treaty. But if they did agree, the President 
could go forward. To me, that is an odd thing for the Congress to do--
to cede our power to build a national missile defense system to the 
Russians, to have them have a veto over whether or not we have a 
missile system deployed. I don't think that was good.
  I am glad that this compromise language came out. I am very, very 
happy that it came out. It is something I don't think we should have 
done.
  As a former Federal lawyer, I think about the legal situation here. 
The treaty prohibits us from deploying a national missile defense 
system, which would include deploying the radar systems, perhaps, out 
there that support one. It prohibits us from developing or testing a 
sea-based or mobile system of any kind, which is precisely what we need 
to be doing now. As a lawyer, it seems to me that when the Senate votes 
97-3 to deploy a national missile defense system, the President of the 
United States at that time, President Clinton, signed that legislation, 
and the President of the United States today, President Bush, campaigns 
on developing and deploying one, and we are funding the money to carry 
one out, we ought to be honest enough to say we are moving to 
contradiction of the treaty, if we have not already.
  We have the intent to deploy a national missile defense system, which 
is contrary to the treaty. So the President either has to get out of 
it, or the Russians need to agree to that. Hopefully, they will agree. 
If not, we need to move on because we have to protect ourselves. We 
can't let a 1972 treaty with an empire that no longer exists prohibit 
us from protecting ourselves from other nations around this world who 
have the ability to launch missiles that could hit us. It is just that 
simple. I hope and believe I can support the language that is in the 
bill. I salute those who worked hard to make it acceptable.
  I will just mention a couple of things in general about this 
legislation. Secretary Rumsfeld is committed to transforming our 
military. Certainly, the events of September 11 should make us doubly 
committed to that goal. The old system of defending against a Soviet 
attack on the planes of Europe is not what our threat is today. We need 
a transformation that has more mobility, the ability to move our 
equipment, to disembark it around the globe. This is what the 
transformation plan was about that he has pushed, which was in 
discussion and agreement, really, by all of us before September 11. It 
was that we be more mobile, have more agility, that the weapons systems 
and equipment we use have more abilities to perform different 
functions. It would be more lethal with the smart bombs and those kinds 
of things. A single round, a single bomb, could be much more directed 
and effective in its attack.
  We needed better surveillance and reconnaissance and intelligence 
information, and we need a modernized command and control system. Those 
were the goals of transformation. I believe this legislation supports 
that, although perhaps not as much as I would like. I would like to 
believe that the quadrennial defense review coming out of the 
Department of Defense within a few weeks, and Secretary Rumsfeld's own 
internal review, will further push our services to go forward to a 
transformation to a world that is quite different than the one we have 
had--particularly against asymmetric threats.
  I am concerned that we may not have enough money in this budget for 
smart weapons of all kinds--the kinds we saw in Kosovo that could go in 
the window of a building. We need an adequate supply of those weapons, 
but the new funding--the $20 billion we approved--should be able to 
fill those needs. But we have to watch to make sure we have a 
sufficient supply of those. I don't think we have been operating at the 
level we should. We are closer to minimum sustaining rates for 
production of those kinds of weapons; whereas, we could get the weapons 
cheaper if we increase the production level.
  I thank Chairman Levin for his leadership and dedication, and I 
particularly thank Senator Warner, the ranking member, whose advice and 
wisdom I have called on frequently and value highly.

  I believe we have a bill here that is good. But we remain challenged 
as a nation. Our challenge remains that we have to consider how much 
more we are going to need for defense, because this remains a dangerous 
world.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to commend our distinguished 
colleague from Alabama. He is a tireless worker on our committee and a 
great watchdog of the taxpayers' dollars. I especially thank him for 
his reference to the work done by the full committee, and indeed others 
subsequent thereto, to resolve such issues as we had during the course 
of the markup on the missile defense system. He has been a keen 
observer and a strong contributor to America's ability to prepare 
itself against a limited attack. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 1622

  Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Bunning] for himself, Mr. 
     Lott, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Craig, Mr. Burns, Mr. 
     Hutchinson, Ms. Collins, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Smith of New 
     Hampshire, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Conrad, 
     Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Stevens, and Mrs. Clinton, proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1622.

 (Purpose: To strike title XXIX, relating to defense base closure and 
                              realignment)

       Strike title XXIX, relating to defense base closure and 
     realignment.

  Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I thank the chairman and ranking member 
of the full committee for giving me

[[Page S9700]]

an opportunity to offer this amendment on behalf of 20 cosponsors. This 
amendment is a straightforward amendment.
  The underlying bill authorizes a base closure realignment in the year 
2003. This amendment simply strikes that language, that provision.
  There are a number of good reasons why we should not move ahead with 
another BRAC at this time. Most important, there has always been the 
uncertainty as to whether or not previous rounds of BRAC have actually 
saved the military and the taxpayers any money. This has always been my 
main concern with proposals for future BRACs.
  I will go further into this aspect in a moment, but right now I, and 
many others, have a bigger concern with future BRAC rounds, and it 
unfortunately stems from the awful terrorist attacks on September 11. 
Now more than ever, we should hold off further downsizing of our 
military infrastructure as we analyze how to fight the first war of the 
21st century.
  Last week, President Bush laid it all out for us. We are gearing up 
for war. It will be a different kind of war and different from any 
battles this Nation has ever fought. Its future is unknown. The course 
of the conflict is uncharted. The strengths we will use and need are 
unforeseen.
  The President has warned us that victory is not going to come quickly 
and it is not going to come without pain. There will be casualties, and 
our will and resources will be tested, probably for many years to come.
  The fight will require force. It may require more and a different 
kind of training at our military posts and bases. This war may change 
from the United States battling only terrorist organizations to the 
United States battling armies of nations harboring terrorists.
  Because of this uncertainty, it is unwise to begin hacking away at 
our military infrastructure. I am not here to chant gloom and doom. I 
know in the end we are going to triumph over evil, but at this point in 
time, we have to ask a fundamental question: Is now the time to cut 
bases and to reduce our military infrastructure? The answer is a clear 
and resounding no.
  President Bush said recently the course of this conflict is unknown. 
If this course is unknown, then it must be unwise to move ahead with 
another BRAC round until we have a clearer picture of where we are 
going and how we are going to get there. Now is not the time to further 
authorize the reduction of our military infrastructure.
  More than ever, we must focus on security and how to maximize our 
resources. We should not leap before we are even able to look. We are 
venturing into the unknown and attempting to survey the landscape of 
21st century warfare. We should not go blindly or with one hand tied 
behind our back in the name of so-called efficiency and cost savings.
  During markup of this bill, the Readiness Subcommittee heard from our 
professional staff on the BRAC issue. They were unable to pinpoint any 
definitive cost savings from the prior BRAC rounds. In fact, they could 
not provide any firm details because DOD could not provide them 
definitive numbers from previous BRAC rounds.
  We have heard talk about so-called savings numbers from DOD here and 
there, but when the rubber hits the road, DOD is unable to provide 
these savings with cold, hard numbers.
  I and many others have asked the Department of Defense many times to 
provide detailed data showing savings from previous BRAC rounds. If it 
is there, we should definitely take a look at it, but until we see real 
numbers, supporting another BRAC is only a shot in the dark.

  CRS, CBO, and GAO have all been asked to find real savings, and they 
also have had a tough time finding consistent and detailed savings 
numbers. They quote DOD projections and predictions as their source, 
but they admit that DOD has been unable to document any detailed 
underlying savings.
  We all support efficiency in not only our military but throughout the 
Federal Government. But after the attacks of September 11, the 
landscape for me and others has changed from one of efficiency to one 
of security. In these turbulent times, we need serious numbers before 
we can even contemplate another BRAC, let alone approve it.
  In conclusion, it seems to me at this point that it would be foolish 
and dangerous to go ahead with another BRAC. When you boil it down, it 
is pretty simple: We are entering a new type of conflict in which we 
are not sure what resources are going to be needed. So how can we take 
a chance on eliminating resources that may be vital to our struggle 
against terrorism? In fact, last week, the House of Representatives 
withdrew a BRAC amendment to their fiscal year DOD authorization bill. 
It is clear that support in the House for another BRAC round evaporated 
after the attacks of September 11.
  If the Senate bill includes another BRAC round, this could make for a 
contentious issue in conference, and now is not the time for prolonged 
contentious debate.
  I ask my colleagues' support for this amendment. In light of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, we need to act prudently and carefully. 
Authorizing another BRAC round is neither. I urge my colleagues to 
support this amendment.
  I want to read from Secretary Rumsfeld's letter of September 21. I 
want to read a portion of it because it says in the third paragraph: 
``While our further future needs as to base closure are uncertain and 
are strategically dependent,'' he says we must simply go ahead and do 
it. I firmly and strongly disagree with Secretary Rumsfeld. If base 
closures are uncertain and strategically dependent, then now is not the 
time when we are planning for a full, all-out war against terrorism.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our distinguished colleague from 
Kentucky for his remarks. He is a very valuable member of our 
committee, and he straightforwardly told us from the very first he 
would be in opposition to the BRAC procedure. The opposition he 
indicated preceded indeed the crisis we now face as a consequence of 
the tragedies of September 11.
  I nevertheless have decided to continue to support the action of the 
committee, and I will recite my reasons for doing so in the course of 
the next few minutes. I will address one point my colleague made so it 
is fresh in the minds of those Senators and others following this 
important debate. He read from a letter, and I shall put the letter in 
the Record. It is addressed to me from the Secretary of Defense and I 
will read it in its entirety momentarily. But he quoted:

       While our future needs as to base structure are uncertain 
     and are strategy dependent, we must simply have the freedom 
     to maximize the efficient use of our resources.

  Freedom, in a sense, goes directly to what the bill says. The bill 
very carefully and simply puts in place, in the hands of the Secretary 
of Defense, the authority to go forward with such legislation if he 
deems it necessary at some future date. So the Senate will be asked to 
make a decision of deleting this provision or sustaining the committee 
report and bill and thereby just putting in place the authority for the 
Secretary to do the following: If the President does not transmit to 
Congress the nomination for appointment to the commission on or before 
the date specified for 1993 in clause 2 of subparagraph B, for 1995 in 
clause 3 of that paragraph, or for 2003 in section 4, the process by 
which the military installations may be selected for closure 
realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be 
terminated.
  So what we are doing, in a sense, putting aside all of that technical 
language, is simply giving the Secretary of Defense the authority to 
proceed. I supported it in the committee, and I support it now.
  I say to my good friend, after discussion with him and others, I 
thought as to whether or not we should proceed to put in place on a 
standby basis the authority. I reflected on the many rounds of base 
closures in which I have had personal experience. As a matter of fact, 
I was the author of the legislation involving several previous BRAC 
rounds. Going as far back as when I was privileged to serve in the 
Department of Defense, in those days a service secretary could initiate 
the BRAC procedures and did so and closed such

[[Page S9701]]

major installations as the Boston naval shipyard. That was, I believe, 
in the 1971-1972 timeframe. So I have had a long familiarity with the 
BRAC procedures, the goals of BRAC, and I reflected on whether or not I 
would support the BRAC when this bill came to the floor, and I do so.
  My concern was much along the lines of our distinguished colleague 
from Kentucky. America is experiencing a callup of the Reserve and 
Guard units. America sees our Nation faced with a great many 
uncertainties and challenges never before faced, the complexity of the 
foreign policy considerations and the security considerations flowing 
from the tragic events of September 11, without parallel in our 
history. So why should we at this point in time critical to our 
national defense and that to help our allies and friends be faced with 
a BRAC round?
  I long ago made the decision, before we took it up in committee, we 
would not have 2 years; we would only have the one, and I told that to 
the Secretary of Defense, and indeed when they came before the Congress 
they had selected the single year because BRAC brings upon a community 
a tremendous amount of unsettling factors, particularly in the towns 
and cities where we have the military bases. It is home for so many of 
the men and women of the Armed Forces and civilian workers. It is an 
unsettling thing from their economic standpoint. They are planning for 
the future and for business, and to have this hanging over their head 
is a difficult situation.

  Most communities will go out and expend a considerable sum of money 
to hire experts who have been through the complicated procedures that 
BRAC thrusts upon the communities to assist them in stating their 
claim, as they have a right under the law for continuing to have those 
military facilities open and not have them the subject of a possible 
future closure by a base closure commission.
  Having thought all through that, I personally talked to the Secretary 
of Defense and I reiterated these arguments to him. I think it was not 
more than a day or two after September 11, because I have had an 
opportunity to visit with him on a number of occasions--and Deputy 
Secretary Wolfowitz--and I laid before them the fact we are calling up 
people, we are augmenting our forces, there is uncertainty, and the 
last thing we need is instability in those communities which provide a 
home for the men and women of the military.
  So I said I would like to have you send a letter to me, if it is your 
desire that the Senate proceed to ask for a vote in favor of the bill 
as now written, and he wrote me on September 21.
  I will read it because it is very important.

       Dear Senator Warner: I write to underscore the importance 
     we place on the Senate's approval of authority for a single 
     round of base closures and realignments. Indeed, in the wake 
     of the terrible events of September 11, the imperative to 
     convert excess capacity into warfighting ability is enhanced, 
     not diminished. Since that fateful day, the Congress has 
     provided additional billions of taxpayers' funds to the 
     department. We owe it to all Americans, particularly those 
     service members on whom much of our responsibility depends, 
     to seek every efficiency in the application of those funds on 
     behalf of our warfighters.
       Our installations are the platform from which we will 
     deploy the forces needed for the sustained campaign the 
     President outlined last night. While our future needs as to 
     the base structures are uncertain and are strategy dependent, 
     we simply must have the freedom to maximize the efficient use 
     of our resources. The authority to realign and close bases 
     and facilities will be a critical element of ensuring the 
     right mix of bases and forces within our warfighting 
     strategy. No one relishes the prospect of closing a military 
     facility or even seeking the authority to do so, but as the 
     President said last evening, `We face new and sudden national 
     challenges,' and those challenges will force us to confront 
     many difficult choices. In that spirit, I am hopeful that 
     Congress will approve our request for authority to close and 
     realign our military base facilities. Thank you for the 
     opportunity to provide our views in this important matter.

  Other Senators are anxious to address this matter, and I may reenter 
the debate subsequently before we proceed to a vote, but I assure the 
Senate this Senator deliberated long and carefully as to whether or not 
I would continue my support. I have given the request by the Secretary 
simply to put in place the necessary authorization to proceed. If it is 
his judgment and that of the President to do so some months ahead, then 
I think it is important we do proceed because we have an obligation to 
the American taxpayers that those dollars that are authorized and 
appropriated for the Department of Defense be spent very wisely.

  Subsequently, I or others will address the question of savings, but 
my calculation is, the 152 major closures and realignments resulting 
from the BRAC procedures of 1988 through 1995 will save the Department 
$14.5 billion by 2001--that fiscal year is about to end--and $5.7 
billion every year thereafter. There is additional information on the 
savings which will be placed into the Record.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, before I speak to the pending amendment, 
I want to commend the two leaders of our committee. I joined this 
committee in January, and they have worked very hard in the last week 
to come up with a bill that would unify this body. So I want to commend 
both Senator Levin and Senator Warner for their tremendous efforts in 
producing a bill that will help bring us together and ensure we are 
providing the resources and the authority for the important task before 
us. I praise them and thank them for their efforts.

  I commend the Senator from Kentucky for his amendment. I rise in 
strong opposition to the provisions in our bill known as the base 
realignment and closure, or BRAC, proposal. I opposed this proposal in 
committee, and I continue to oppose it today. In fact, I think the 
reasons for opposition are even more compelling than they were at the 
time of our committee markup. After the September 11 attacks on 
America, I question, with even more certainty, the decision to proceed 
with additional cuts in our base infrastructure.
  As the result of the first 4 BRAC rounds, 97 military bases in the 
United States have been or are in the process of being closed, 
degrading our defense readiness according to some military experts.
  In light of the recent terrorist attacks on our homeland, and based 
on the testimony provided by the Chief of Naval Operations before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee when Admiral Clark recently cautioned 
that the Navy's infrastructure is already at barebones, now is simply 
not the time, it is simply not in our country's best interests, to 
initiate yet another round of base closures.
  At a time when our Commander in Chief has warned of a long and 
sustained military operation, we should be preserving, not eroding, our 
facilities and infrastructure, so that they are fully available for our 
Armed Forces both at home and abroad. It is the responsibility of this 
Congress to ensure that these installations are not placed at risk 
without careful, prudent consideration of the additional military 
requirements, particularly with regard to homeland defense, that are 
evolving as a result of the recent horrific attacks on our Nation. It 
is also clear that our ongoing peacekeeping and humanitarian missions 
require a greater force structure than had been expected. Our war on 
terrorism will most likely require a greater one still. In short, it is 
difficult to conceive of a worse time for the Pentagon to divert its 
energies to another round of base closures.
  Before we legislate a defense-wide policy that will reduce the size 
and number of training areas critical to our force readiness, the 
Department of Defense needs time to complete its comprehensive plan 
identifying the operational and maintenance infrastructure required to 
support national security requirements, particularly in light of the 
challenge to come. Before we know what to cut, we need to know what to 
keep. It is that simple. I fear we are approaching the issue of excess 
capacity exactly backwards. As Secretary Rumsfeld acknowledged in his 
recent letter to the committee, our future needs as to base structure 
are uncertain and our strategy dependent.
  I make it clear I understand the Secretary still wants to proceed 
with base closures, but his own letter says very clearly that our 
future needs as to base structure are uncertain. Shouldn't we determine 
what our infrastructure needs are before embarking on a whole

[[Page S9702]]

new round of closing bases? Wouldn't that be the better, more logical 
way to proceed?
  Further, while those who support BRAC hope for substantial savings 
from base closures, the one consequence you can count on when a base is 
closed is the need for a significant upfront investment.
  A recent GAO report released in July of this year underscores how 
costly base closures can be and how ephemeral the savings estimates may 
be. The loose estimates of supposed savings, for example, exclude over 
$1.2 billion in costs of Federal assistance provided to affected 
communities. These are costs paid by the Federal Government but not out 
of the BRAC budget accounts. Some $10.4 billion in environmental 
cleanup costs were the direct result of the first four BRAC rounds. We 
ought to be doing a better job of environmental cleanup at our bases, 
whether they are open or closed. However, we can't ignore these 
significant costs. These are considerable costs which only continue to 
grow, often not counted, as costs associated with closing bases.

  There is another more fundamental reason I oppose the BRAC language 
in this bill. Simply stated, BRAC is the wrong process for identifying 
bases for closure. If the Pentagon believes certain bases are no longer 
needed, those installations should be identified and included in DOD's 
budget submission. There is no need to cast a cloud of uncertainty over 
every base in virtually every community hosting a base all across this 
great Nation.
  Senator Snowe and I can testify personally that BRAC is not the 
clinical, impartial process it is often made out to be. Rather, the 
BRAC process in the past has been highly politicized and it remains 
susceptible to political pressure in its current form in this bill. 
While I recognize the need to reduce proven excess capacity, the BRAC 
procedure has been unfair in the past. It has not produced the savings 
anticipated by past rounds of closures, and it could at a critical time 
result in degraded readiness for our Armed Forces.
  I will continue, therefore, to voice my strong opposition to another 
round of base closures. I will continue to work to ensure that critical 
assets and training capacities provided by our existing force structure 
and infrastructure are not lost.
  Now is certainly not the time to create chaos, concern, in every 
community that has proudly hosted a military installation. Now is 
certainly not the time to embark on another round of base closures, 
when all of the energies of our civilian and military leaders must be 
focused on the overriding goal of crushing the global network of 
terrorists intent on harming our great Nation and its citizens.
  I urge support for the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Durbin). The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. I intend to speak at greater length later on on this 
issue. It is very clear, the opinion of Members of this body, including 
those just articulated by the Senator from Maine who, among other 
things, said there has been no savings, when we have ample 
documentation that they have achieved net savings of $15 billion by the 
end of this fiscal year from the previous base closure rounds, with 
another $6 billion in savings each and every year thereafter.
  What we are really talking about is an opinion held in the Senate, 
which I respect, for which I have admiration, and I have great respect 
for the individuals who are opposing the base closing round. The fact 
is, at a time when we rally around the President of the United States 
and the Secretary of Defense and the men and women in the armed 
services, we are going in direct contravention to the views of the 
President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and our 
military and civilian leadership. It is that clear.
  That is really what this debate is all about.
  As the Secretary of Defense wrote on September 21, to Senator Carl 
Levin and Senator John Warner: 

       We owe it to all Americans--particularly those service 
     members on whom much of our response will depend--to seek 
     every efficiency in the application of those funds on behalf 
     of our warfighters.
       Our installations are the platforms from which we will 
     deploy the forces needed for the sustained campaign the 
     President outlined last night. While our future needs as to 
     base structure are uncertain and are strategy dependent, we 
     simply must have the freedom to maximize the efficient use of 
     our resources.

  Why is that? Earlier this year there was testimony before the Armed 
Services Committee by the people who are responsible for our 
installations. Do you know what they are saying?
  ``We are in a slow death spiral,'' said Air Force MG Earnest Robbins 
II, the civil engineer for his service, who predicted the 2002 defense 
budget will include enough money only to handle the most pressing 
priorities.
  The services have argued that the poor conditions of many facilities 
and the shortage of money to fix them are proof they must close 
unneeded bases.
  What is going on here is, because we have so many bases, we don't 
have the funds to maintain not only their capabilities but the quality 
of life. The quality of life deteriorates when we do not maintain these 
facilities. Therefore, there is a requirement to close the unnecessary 
ones.
  By the way, we will get into this argument about how you do it and 
whether it is politicized. I will submit for the Record and discuss, 
over time, clearly the fact that there is no other way to close bases. 
We went for many years until we came up with the Base Closing 
Commission.
  But if you go out to any military facility, you will see that people 
have aging, not only installations at which they work but aging 
installations in which they live. It is because we simply have not 
enough money to go around to maintain all of these facilities.
  So what does that translate into? Difficulties in recruiting, 
difficulties in retention. According to a study last year, the U.S. 
Army has had the greatest exodus of captains they have had in their 
history. What do they say? They say they do not put us in conditions in 
which we can live. We have men and women in the military living in 
barracks that were constructed in World War II and Korea.
  An example of the problems, Robbins said, is at Travis Air Force 
Base, where routine operations on one runway had to be suspended 
because a 90-foot-long, 4- to 6-inch-wide crack has appeared.
  The Navy has a $2.6 billion backlog in critically needed repairs, 
about the same as a year ago, because the budget did not include enough 
money to make up any ground, officials said. Navy people ``are so used 
to operating and living in inadequate facilities that many accept this 
as the norm.''
  Should we be asking men and women in the military to be living in 
inadequate facilities and accepting it as the norm?
  The carrier berth at Norfolk Naval Air Station is a prime example. 
Structural deterioration of the berth has forced access restrictions 
that allow only emergency vehicles to park near the ships.
  Marine COL Michael Lehnert, assistant deputy commandant 
for installations and logistics, says his service does not even have 
enough money to assess problems at its bases.

  Assess problems at its bases?

       We are doing the right thing; we just aren't doing it fast 
     enough.

  At Camp Pendleton, the base sewer system, which spilled 3 million 
gallons of sewage into the Santa Margarita River last year, needs to be 
replaced. But that would cost $179 million--more than the entire $173 
million construction budget proposed by the Marine Corps for 2002.
  ``The effects of underfunding only get worse as our facilities age,'' 
Army MG Robert Van Antwerp, Jr. said. He noted that the backlog has 
grown to $18.4 billion, a $600 million increase in 1 year.
  We are asking these men and women to live and work in facilities that 
are, at best, substandard, in some cases absolutely abysmal, because we 
have too many of them. We have too many of them.
  I will challenge the proponents of this amendment to find one 
military expert, active-duty or retired, who would not say we need to 
close unnecessary bases. I would like for the Senator from Maine to 
talk to GEN Schwarzkopf. He is a fairly well respected individual. I 
would like for her to hear all the former Chairmen of the Joints Chiefs 
of Staff. I would like for her to hear from all the experts on

[[Page S9703]]

military readiness. All these people unanimously, without exception, 
will say we have too many bases and we need to reduce those numbers of 
bases so we can be more efficient, but also we can take the limited 
assets that we have and put them into the bases that remain so the 
people there would have a lifestyle, both operationally and 
recreationally, and living-wise, that would give them the standard of 
living of most Americans outside the military.
  That is all we are asking. The President of the United States needs 
the flexibility to be able to do that. I know the President feels 
strongly about this. I know the Secretary of Defense feels strongly 
about it. I know how the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff feels 
about it. But do you know who feels most strongly about it? The 
squadron commanders and base commanders at these installations where 
they see their men and women subjected to a lifestyle that is not 
satisfactory. It is not satisfactory. They know it, I know it, and 
everybody else knows it.
  I believe if we take this base closing amendment out of this bill, we 
will send a signal, my friends, and the signal is: It is business as 
usual in the U.S. Congress. It is business as usual. We are not 
prepared to make the necessary sacrifices--even if it affects our 
State; a base closing commission can clearly affect my State--that are 
necessary to fight this war on terrorism.
  The opening signal is business as usual, my friends. We will not even 
approve giving the Secretary of Defense the authority, through a base 
closing commission which, with one exception, has been an apolitical 
process.
  I admit there were some politics around the base closing. We have 
fixed this. Senator Levin and I have fixed this with this amendment so 
that is not possible again. If anybody believes there can be any other 
process to eliminate these bases, then obviously the history of how we 
tried to do this in the past shows it doesn't work.
  So I say this is a very important vote. It is even more important 
than whether we are going to have a base closing commission. This vote 
is really all about whether we are going to do business as usual and 
preserve our bases in our States, whether they are necessary or not, or 
whether we are going to have another commission so we can have the most 
efficient military machine to fight this long, protracted struggle, the 
opening salvo of which was fired on Tuesday, September 11. This is a 
very important vote.
  I am glad to see the Secretary of Defense has made such a very strong 
statement, a very strong statement in support of this base closing 
commission. I hope the Members of this body will pay close attention to 
the views of the uniformed and civilian leadership of the U.S. 
military, including the President of the United States of America.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode island.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to support the language in this 
legislation that would authorize another round of base closings. I do 
so, as we all do, knowing full well there are perhaps facilities in my 
home State that might be considered. I am confident and hopeful that, 
because of their critical role, they will continue to be vital parts of 
the Department of Defense. But every Senator is a bit nervous when we 
authorize a round of base closings.
  Simply stated, we have too many facilities. We have a cold-war base 
structure. We have a post-cold-war Department of Defense. We have to 
reconcile the two.
  I associate myself with the comments of the Senator from Arizona. The 
bottom line here, the effect that is most obvious from too many bases, 
is the deteriorating quality of life of the troops who serve in our 
Armed Forces.
  I spent 12 years in the U.S. Army, from 1967 to 1979. There were 
facilities back then, in the 1970s, which the Army desired to close. 
Some are still open. There were facilities back then that were 
inadequate or barely adequate. They remain on the books of the 
Army. Troops are using them for their barracks. Family housing is being 
used.

  Base closure is just common sense. When you have the demands of 
training, operational readiness, integrating new equipment, and then 
family housing, troop housing, and community facilities on Army posts 
and Navy bases or an Air Force base, something has to give. What 
typically gives are those quality-of-life items: The community center, 
the child care center, the library, family housing, and troop housing.
  That is multiplied and amplified when you have just too many bases.
  About 3 weeks ago, I traveled to Fort Bragg, NC, to watch the 82nd 
Airborne Division conduct live fire exercise for their division 
readiness brigade. Those soldiers are today on orders and on alert to 
go out and be the tip of the spear. I talked to the brigade commander, 
the division commander, the battalion commander, and the troops. The 
one thing they said is they are proud to be in this division, and that 
one of the reasons they are is because the commanding officer, the 
division commander, and battalion commander--all the way down--put the 
money and emphasis on training. They are ready to go. They are well 
trained. But what they can't do is put sufficient resources to all the 
needs they have on the post.
  I must say that Bragg is one of the primary posts in the Army it does 
quite well. They are getting ready to conduct massive reconstruction of 
family housing. They are reconstructing barracks. But they cannot do as 
much as they want.
  When you go away from those major division posts, such as Fort Bragg, 
Fort Campbell, and other posts around the country and go out to other 
posts that do not have quite that high of a priority, the crisis is 
even more severe. It is then manifested, as Senator McCain indicated, 
in retention problems and in recruiting problems. It is manifested in 
quality of life which is not commensurate with the sacrifices these 
young men and women make for their country and will make even more 
dramatically in the days ahead.
  This base closing round is supported by the President, the Secretary 
of Defense, by the Joint Chiefs, and by service chiefs because they 
know they can't continue to operate efficiently and effectively if they 
have facilities they do not need but have to keep barely open. It 
drains resources from the quality-of-life of troops, and also from the 
ability of this military force, which is the best in the world, to 
maintain its razor edge of readiness, training, and operational 
capability.
  The DOD estimates that we are maintaining 23-percent excess capacity 
of infrastructure. That is obvious because after the end of the cold 
war we reduced our force structure 36 percent.
  There are those arguing based upon the tragic and horrific events of 
September 11 that we need to keep these bases open. Some of those bases 
were built at the beginning of the First World War. But substantially 
the infrastructure was built in the Second World War when we were 
fighting huge national armies in two theaters. We were drafting 
hundreds of thousands of men. We were training them. We were preparing 
to conduct operations with armies and corps.
  The operation we face going forward will involve our military forces 
but most likely special operations troops--specially tailored brigades 
of Army and Marines. We will not be engaged, mercifully, thankfully in 
a tank-to-tank army battle with hundreds of thousands of troops on each 
side. We don't have that force structure today. But we have 
that infrastructure today.

  If we want to be efficient and effective, we have to reconcile our 
infrastructure with our force structure. We are not going to fight 
World War II again--I hope. We are not going to fight the cold war 
again--I hope. But we have serious threats before us. Those threats 
require a faster, leaner military. Part of that efficient, leaner 
military is allowing the services to make judicial judgments about what 
real estate they need.
  Yes, we have an imperfect structure in terms of base closing 
conditions. Nothing is perfect. But there are closed bases that some 
people thought would never be closed in our lifetime, or several 
lifetimes. So it has worked.
  There are other arguments that no savings have been realized. As the 
Senator from Arizona pointed out, between $15 billion and $16 billion 
will have been realized by the end of fiscal year

[[Page S9704]]

2001 on these base closures. It is projected going forward that we will 
accrue an annual savings of approximately $6.2 billion. That is real 
money that goes back into the bottom line of the Department of Defense 
for improved barracks, improved family housing, improved readiness, 
improved technology, a better fighting force.
  There are some who argue that we can't do this because there is just 
too many environmental flaws; that it turns out to be just a big 
environmental remediation project. Those environmental costs are not 
avoidable. It is mandated by law that the DOD, like everyone else, is 
responsible for serious environmental degradation. They have to pay for 
it. They are doing it right now on posts that are open and operating. 
It is not something you can throw into the mix and say don't close the 
base because of environmental costs. You have environmental costs for 
open bases. They have to be faced, addressed, and paid for.
  For many reasons, I believe we have to follow through on the base 
closing language in this legislation. I think it is time to give the 
Department of Defense the flexibility to tailor their resources, to 
tailor their infrastructure, and to fit the mission that faces us 
today.
  We have the best military force in the world. We will see them in 
action shortly. I think we owe them our vote to sustain their base 
closing round as we go forward.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, I am compelled to rise today in opposition 
to the amendment offered by the Senator from Kentucky and to join with 
the Senator from Rhode Island and the Senator from Arizona and others 
who have spoken eloquently and effectively on this point.
  For 23 years of my life, I was not a Senator but was a naval flight 
officer, and I served as commission commander of Navy aircraft.
  We saw a lot in the news earlier this year about this. I have been 
stationed on bases that did not get much support. As the Senator from 
Rhode Island suggested, it is not an enviable position to be in--either 
professionally in terms of supporting your mission, your aircraft, or 
whatever weapons systems with which you operate. And it is not an 
especially satisfying position to be in for the families of those who 
are assigned to those bases because you don't get the kind of support 
for your child care development centers, and you don't get the kind of 
support for your family-related activities on those bases.
  Several people rose today to say there are cost savings that flow out 
of base realignment and closures. Just take the figures that were 
estimated by the previous two speakers: Savings of $15 billion to $16 
billion by 2001, and annual savings going forward of about $6 billion 
per year. Let's say those figures are not right. Let's say they 
overstate by half the amount of money that has been saved and will be 
saved. It was suggested that we have already saved anywhere between 
$7.5 billion to $8 billion, and that going forward we might expect to 
save another $3 billion each year.
  What would we do with that money? There are plenty of things to spend 
it on in this Defense authorization bill. I will just mention a few of 
them: Fighter aircraft that we are anxious to build; military airlift 
capability; cargo aircraft--either anxious to build or upgrade and 
improve--helicopters that need to be replaced, and ships.
  Earlier we heard from the Senator from Alabama that 315 Navy ships 
continue to diminish. We need to build ships to replace those that are 
being decommissioned. We need to build submarines as well.
  The President and others support the idea of developing and deploying 
a national missile defense system which will cost tens of billions of 
dollars. But even if we set aside those weapons systems and simply 
consider the aircraft and the ships that stay on the ground, with the 
helicopters that stay on the ground that are used just for 
cannibalization--we steal their spare parts to keep other ships and 
other aircraft and other helicopters flying, the ships that aren't 
going to sea simply because they lack the spare parts that enable them 
to carry out their missions.
  It has been suggested that in the wake of the tragedies in the last 2 
weeks--the terrorist attacks in New York and Virginia--somehow keeping 
military bases that are unutilized or underutilized open will enable us 
to be more vigilant against our enemies. I just do not see it. I just 
do not see it that way.
  The language in the legislation before us today does not mandate the 
establishment of a base realignment commission. It provides the 
discretion to the President and to our Secretary of Defense, if they 
see fit, to appoint the members to serve on a commission. As Senator 
McCain has suggested, the language in this legislation is crafted in a 
way to take the politics out of whatever might be done with respect to 
base realignment.
  If the President and if the Secretary of Defense elected to use the 
discretion provided for them in this legislation, they would ultimately 
establish the commission, and that commission would ultimately come 
back to us in this body and in the House of Representatives in order to 
have the final say, the final word, as to whether or not the bases 
recommended for closure be closed. We have the final word.
  I believe it is prudent for us, in a day and age when we do have 
substantial needs for additional weapons systems--upgraded weapons 
systems, and to make the ones we already have workable--to look for 
some opportunities to save not just a few dollars but a substantial 
number of dollars. The potential in this bill, with this approach, is 
very real.
  With that, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the 
language the committee has reported out, and also to support our 
President and our Secretary of Defense, as well as our military 
leaders, who have sought just this kind of authorization.
  I yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. REID. Will the Senator from North Carolina allow me to propound a 
unanimous consent request without you losing your right to the floor?
  Mr. DORGAN. I have no idea what the Senator from North Carolina would 
say, but the Senator from North Dakota would be happy to yield.
  Mr. REID. I am so sorry.
  Mr. DORGAN. They both start with ``North.''
  Mr. REID. That is why they should change the name to ``Dakota.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, first of all, I am going to propound a 
unanimous consent request. We have been talking now for a couple days 
about having a final cutoff time for amendments, telling Senators that 
they have to give both Cloakrooms amendments so we know how many. We 
need a finite list of amendments. We have been going back and forth on 
this. We want to move this along. This is the country's bill. The 
President is very interested in getting this passed as quickly as 
possible. Unless we work out something on these amendments, we will 
never finish this bill. So this is the purpose of this unanimous 
consent request.
  I ask unanimous consent that the list I will send to the desk be the 
only first-degree amendments remaining in order to S. 1438, the 
Department of Defense authorization bill; that these amendments be 
subject to relevant second-degree amendments; that upon disposition of 
all amendments the bill be read a third time and the Senate vote on 
passage of the bill, with no intervening action or debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. ALLARD. I object, Mr. President. I might explain.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. ALLARD. I understand there are a couple Members yet on our side 
who are still working on it. I am not sure whether we have those issues 
resolved or not. As soon as Senator Warner returns to this Chamber, we 
might be able to get a final agreement on that.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I would say we are losing ground. A little 
while ago we only had one Member who was concerned; now we have two. 
This has been going on literally all this day. I repeat, I certainly 
understand the point by my friend from Colorado, but the fact is, we 
need to move this legislation. This does not prevent anyone from 
offering an amendment. They can offer amendments to their heart's 
content. But we

[[Page S9705]]

need a list of finite amendments so the managers can work on these 
amendments to move this legislation forward.
  I think it is really too bad that we can't get a final list of these 
amendments. Senator Warner and Senator Levin have worked very hard on 
this legislation. It is important--I repeat--to this institution and to 
the country to get this legislation passed.
  So I am very disappointed we were not able to do this. I hope we can 
do it at some subsequent time. And I hope that subsequent time is not 
far in the future.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 9:30 a.m. tomorrow, 
Tuesday, September 25, following the usual opening activities, the 
Senate resume consideration of S. 1438, the Department of Defense 
authorization bill; that there be 15 minutes remaining for debate prior 
to a motion to table the Bunning amendment, with the time equally 
divided and controlled in the usual form, provided no second-degree 
amendments be in order prior to the vote.
  I would say, before I put this to the Chair in final form, that the 
managers of the bill are being very gracious in doing this. People 
tonight can debate this amendment as long as they wish. Either manager, 
or any anyone else, of course, could move to table at any time. So I 
think this is certainly generous on behalf of the two managers. People 
would have all night tonight to debate. We would come in tomorrow 
morning and have a vote on a motion to table. So I propound this 
request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. BUNNING. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I again----
  Mr. BUNNING. May I state my objection?
  Mr. REID. Of course.
  Mr. BUNNING. I really have not had a chance to talk to the minority 
leader.
  Mr. REID. OK.
  Mr. BUNNING. As soon as I speak with him, I will get back to you.
  Mr. REID. I express my appreciation to the Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. BUNNING. Thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this amendment deals with an issue that is 
not new to any of us. We have long debated the issue of base closures 
and the establishment of a BRAC commission for the purpose of base 
closures. In fact, we have had previous base closure rounds in 1988, 
1991, 1993, and 1995. In those rounds, 451 installations, including 97 
major installations, were ordered closed or realigned by the year 2001. 
And the last two big installations, Kelly and McClellan Air Force 
Bases, were closed this past summer.
  Now even though most of those installations have been closed or 
realigned, only 41 percent of the unneeded base property has, in fact, 
been transferred. From all of those base closures, over all of that 
period of time, only 41 percent of the unneeded base property has been 
transferred.
  It takes years to dispose of this property. And, principally, the 
reason for that is the strict environmental cleanup standards which are 
very costly and very expensive. In fact, I find it interesting, 
according to pages 118 and 119 of the Department of Defense's 1998 
Report on Base Realignment and Closure, the first several years after a 
base closure incur additional costs to the government, not savings.
  For the 1993 BRAC round, a net cost to the Federal Government--not a 
net savings--a net cost was incurred for the first 3 years beginning in 
the year 1994.
  If you take a look at the 1995 BRAC round, you find exactly the same 
thing. The BRAC-related costs exceeded savings by $1.5 billion for five 
years from fiscal year 1996 to 2000.
  One might make the case, if you skip over the next 3-5 years you will 
find some savings from a new round of base closures. Maybe so, although 
lying out there is the disposal of almost 40 percent of all the 
property that has not yet been disposed of because of the environmental 
cleanup costs. So one wonders exactly what these savings are. They are 
certainly not in the next 3-5 years.
  Those who make the point that there is an urgency to close these 
bases, at a time when we desperately need investment in the Department 
of Defense, are probably going to end up costing the Department of 
Defense additional money through base closures if we, in fact, decide 
to approve another round.
  I support this amendment to strike the base closure provisions from 
the underlying bill for two reasons. One is military, and the other is 
economic. First, the military side of things.
  We do not know what the force structure is going to be of the 
Department of Defense. There is a quadrennial review that is going on, 
but at this point no one in this Chamber knows what the force structure 
is going to be. If you do not know what the force structure is going to 
be, how do you know what the base structure should be? How do you know 
what kind of facilities for military operations you need if you do not 
know what kind of military force you are going to have?
  Will this military force change as a result of the tragedies that 
occurred on September 11? Probably. Will we--when we see now a renewed 
attention to homeland security and homeland defense--will we be more 
concerned about the issue of bases in this country? Where they are 
located? Whether they are strategic in location? Whether they are 
needed or not needed? Will all that change? I think it will.
  But the main point is this: If you do not know what your force 
structure is, how can you be talking about your base structure? Yet the 
Department of Defense is already saying our base structure is way out 
of line, even though they don't know their force structure.

  I deeply respect the men and women in uniform. God bless them. I want 
to give them everything they need to do their job in preserving liberty 
and fighting for freedom. But we don't need a new BRAC round to find 
savings in the Pentagon. We all know there are areas of inefficiency in 
the Pentagon. I won't go through them. But let me give you one instance 
I have dealt with in the last 6 months, just as an example. I say this 
only to say that if there are worries about efficiency, let's go find 
where money is being wasted hand over foot.
  We have 5,700 trailers that were manufactured for the U.S. Army. They 
had a problem with the brake actuator. The result is, they put 5,700 
trailers in storage facilities, and they were there for years. It turns 
out in fact, in addition to a brake actuator that didn't work on the 
hitch, the bumpers on the Humvees that were supposed to pull the 
trailers weren't strong enough. They hooked these things up to the 
Humvee, and it broke the Humvee. You talk about waste. There is a lot 
of waste, a lot of inefficiency. I think we ought to go at that. I 
don't think it ought to be business as usual with respect to the waste 
of the taxpayers' money.
  With respect to the question of which bases are important in the 
future of this country, which bases might be important with respect to 
homeland security, I don't think we know the answer to that at this 
point. We certainly don't know what the force structure is, so how on 
Earth would we know what the base structure should be?
  Economic circumstances have really changed with respect to this 
country's economy. We had a very soft economy prior to the tragedy on 
September 11. That economy has turned more than soft, I am afraid. All 
of us are struggling to try to find ways to see if we can't give some 
lift to the economy.
  I will tell you how you put a lodestone on the economy, how you put 
an anvil on the economies of literally dozens and dozens of 
communities, all across America: Tell the communities tomorrow that we 
are going to have a base closing commission and that every single base 
is at risk, and, therefore, if you are thinking of making an investment 
in a community that has a sizable base, don't do it because it might be 
this base that will get caught in the next BRAC round and be closed. 
That message in this particular piece of legislation will say to 
potential investors in literally hundreds of communities across this 
country that you ought not make investments in those communities now, 
you ought to wait.
  I can't think of a more destructive thing to do to the economy at 
this point than to send that message to all of those communities and 
all the folks who might invest in them.
  When you have a wide open BRAC commission like the Administration

[[Page S9706]]

proposes, every single military installation is at risk. It is as if 
you are painting a bull's eye on the front gate of every base that 
says: This might be the one that is selected; this might be the one 
that is closed. The result is, people will stunt the economic growth of 
those communities because they feel they must, in order to make good 
prudent investment decisions, they must wait until that BRAC round is 
complete.
  Investors will say: I can't build a 12-plex apartment in this 
community because I don't know whether there will be 20- or 30-percent 
unemployment 2 years from now if that base is ordered closed. From a 
military standpoint and economic standpoint, I think this is a very 
inappropriate and unwise judgment. That is what will happen if we 
approve the base closure provision in this bill.

  The amendment I support simply says, let's strip that provision out.
  My point remains: How can you realign and create a base structure 
before you know what your force structure is? And we don't know that. 
No one in the Senate, no one in the Congress and, for that matter, no 
one in the Pentagon yet understands what our force structure is going 
to be.
  It might very well be the case--I suspect it will--that following the 
tragedy of September 11, we might have a very different view of the 
base structure in this country relating to homeland security and 
homeland defense. If that is the case, it will change the views of 
Congress and the Pentagon about what our missions ought to be and where 
they ought to be placed. At this point I believe strongly that we ought 
to do the right thing, and the right thing is to take this out of the 
bill. Pass this amendment.
  My colleague, for whom I have great affection, said that, if we strip 
this out of the bill, we will be sending a signal that it is business 
as usual in the Congress. It is not that, with due respect. It just is 
not that. Business as usual is gone, as far as I am concerned. Business 
as usual is thinking the way we used to think. Everyone in this Chamber 
and in the Congress ought to be prepared to think differently about 
these issues. We have a quadrennial review commission that will 
evaluate force structure. We don't have the foggiest idea what that is 
going to be or how that will change as a result of what has happened in 
the last couple weeks. Yet we are going to go right back to the same 
old cry on the floor of the Senate that we need to unleash a base 
closing commission that will evaluate whether any and every base in 
this country shall be a candidate for closure. That makes no sense to 
me.
  Let me make a couple of additional points. The term they are now 
using to create a BRAC is ``efficient facilities initiative,'' which as 
an acronym is pronounced ``iffy.'' I really don't like acronyms very 
much. This particular one I don't like a lot. ``Iffy'' probably 
describes the difficulty, the serious difficulty, virtually every 
community in this country that hosts a military installation will have 
with respect to its future and the consequences of this Congress 
unleashing another round of base closures.
  One of my colleagues said: This doesn't really create a round, it 
just authorizes a round. Of course it creates a round. There is no 
difference between authorization and creating one. If we don't pass 
this amendment and it strip out the base closure provision, we will 
have a new round of base closures. And if we have a base closing round, 
I am certain it will have significant consequences on this country's 
economy, beginning immediately. The minute the Congress enacts 
legislation and it is signed, every single community in this country 
that hosts a military installation is going to see its investment 
deteriorate. It is the worst possible result for this country's 
economy.
  Aside from that, as I said, the issue is not just economics, and 
should not be. The issue is also military. Given the circumstances with 
our new needs in homeland defense and given the fact that we don't know 
what the military force structure is going to be, this Congress should 
not at this point anticipate that the base structure ought to be cut by 
creating a new BRAC commission. If the new force structure 
justifies cutting base structure, we can consider that again next year, 
since the base closure round the Administration wants is not applicable 
until the year 2003. There would be nothing that would prevent it from 
being included in the next year's authorization bill.

  This proposal for a new round of base closures is a terrible idea. I 
hope very much my colleagues will join me in supporting the amendment 
offered by the Senator from Kentucky.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I yield to my colleague from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I renew now the unanimous consent request 
the Senator from Nevada had made before. I understand it has now been 
cleared.
  I ask unanimous consent that at 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, September 25, 
following the usual opening activities, the Senate resume consideration 
of S. 1438, the Department of Defense authorization bill; that there be 
15 minutes remaining for debate prior to a motion to table the Bunning 
amendment, with the time equally divided and controlled in the usual 
form, provided no second-degree amendments be in order prior to the 
vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. ALLARD. Reserving the right to object, and I don't plan to 
object, does that mean there will not be any more votes tonight so 
Members can clear their schedules?
  Mr. REID. May I respond to that on behalf of the manager of the bill? 
Senator Daschle has not made a decision on whether or not there will be 
more votes tonight. We hope there will be the opportunity to offer 
other amendments tonight. If people want to debate this base closing 
issue until the wee hours of the morning, the two managers have no 
concern about that. But if people have completed their debate tonight 
on this issue, we hope that others will offer amendments on other 
matters. There could be votes. The leader has not made an announcement 
on that.

  I think the Senator from Colorado makes a good point, that the leader 
needs to make a decision on that, and he will in the near future.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. ALLARD. I withdraw my reservation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I join Senator Lott, Senator Bunning, my colleague who 
just spoke, and others, in supporting the amendment to strike section 
29 of the bill. That is the provision in the bill that comes to the 
Senate floor to authorize the Base Realignment and Closure Commission 
that would be convened 2 years from now.
  Simply stated, I believe this is the wrong time for us to be 
committing our country to this course. It adds greatly to the 
uncertainty that already is substantial in the country. In the context 
of this new threat that we have all come to recognize in stark terms in 
recent weeks, it strikes me as inconsistent for us to agree to close 
more military facilities, not knowing precisely what our military needs 
are going to be as we move ahead. We may decide we need to resize the 
military and we may need to reconfigure it in a great many ways.
  Let me make one other point that I believe is accurate, which I have 
always thought got too little attention in this discussion; that is, 
the point that the administration has authority to realign and, in 
fact, even to close bases--or essentially do that--if it determines 
that is an appropriate course to follow. When they send us their budget 
each year, they can send us proposals to move people from here to there 
and, in fact, they don't need to wait for the next budget cycle or for 
the next fiscal year to take those actions.
  I think the reality is that this whole concept of setting up a 
commission to make these determinations is a way for the administration 
to not have to specify what bases it believes ought to be realigned or 
what bases it believes ought to be closed.
  We had a base closed in my State back in the 1960s. Lyndon Johnson 
was the President at the time that happened. We didn't have a law on 
the books that authorized that in this

[[Page S9707]]

same way. It was the decision of the President to support the 
recommendations made to him by the people he chose to review this 
matter.
  So I don't really think anyone in this Senate should be under the 
illusion that if we don't pass this provision, the administration is 
totally hamstrung; they are not. If they feel strongly about this, they 
should come to the Congress and make their recommendation or take their 
action. If the Department of Defense decides to reduce the number of 
vulnerable overseas bases and facilities--which they may well do in 
light of this new terrorist threat of which we have all become aware--
then that would require that personnel and equipment and their families 
be brought home, and we may well need the various facilities in this 
country to accommodate them at that time. It is another aspect of the 
uncertainty that we face in going forward. Clearly, there are other 
aspects of that uncertainty that we also need to take into account.
  Let me also raise the obvious issue about the impact that closing 
bases and realigning bases has on morale and quality of life for the 
people in uniform and their families. There is a lot of relocating that 
goes on when you are in the military. I think we have all observed 
that, and we see that in our own States. But that relocating is added 
to very substantially when you go through this process of doing a major 
realignment and closure of a whole raft of bases. So that needs to be 
taken into account in determining whether this is the right time to be 
pursuing this course of action.

  Among those who support setting up a new commission on realignment 
and closure, we hear a lot about savings. They say the reason we are 
doing this is that this will give us extra money in the defense budget 
to meet these urgent needs. Several Senators have already spoken about 
how those savings are fairly illusory when you get down to looking at 
them. The costs of closing bases and realigning bases can be very 
substantial. When the Department of Defense was closing bases in the 
1990s, there were expenditures--identifiable expenditures--of over $3 
billion during 1994, 1995, and 1996. The Congressional Budget Office 
cited the Department of Defense estimates that an average round of base 
realignment and closure could average costing more than $2 billion each 
year during the first 3 years after that process begins.
  I think what people are not focusing on is that these extra costs--if 
we approve this provision as it comes to the Senate floor, these extra 
costs that can be incurred in going forward with this issue are not in 
the budgets we have been given by the Department of Defense so far. If 
the Congress approves another round of base realignment and closure, 
those upfront costs have to come out of some other portion of funds 
that are identified for the Department of Defense. It could be 
procurement of weaponry, it could be readiness, and it could be 
research and development for improvements in our force structure in the 
future. Those choices, which are already hard to make, become even 
harder if we lay these additional billions of dollars of expense on the 
defense budget. So the upfront cost problem is a very real problem and 
needs to be taken into account.
  Supporters of BRAC, as I mentioned before, refer to the billion 
dollars in savings; there will be savings and I recognize that. But 
they will be a long time in the future. According to the Department of 
Defense estimates, the Department did not begin to show overall net 
savings for the first four rounds of base realignment and closure until 
at least 10 years after the first round of the base realignment and 
closure was approved in 1988. So there may be savings, but we need to 
recognize that those are far in the future, and that for the next 
several years there will be additional costs laid on top of the 
military, which they will have to take out of some other activity in 
which they are engaged. I believe the timing is wrong for this issue.
  From a national security standpoint, it does not make sense to me to 
commit ourselves to reducing our base infrastructure, with all of the 
uncertainty we have about what that base infrastructure ought to be as 
we move forward. It also doesn't make sense to undertake significant 
new spending that is not currently in the Department of Defense budget 
when future budgets promise to be tighter and our economy clearly is 
more fragile than we thought it was several months ago. All of this we 
are doing, or proposing to do, in the hope we will have some savings in 
the far distant future.
  In my view, that is not an adequate justification for going forward 
with another base realignment and closure commission. I hope my 
colleagues will support the amendment Senator Lott and Senator Bunning 
have put forward on this issue. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment 
and to support our chairman, Senator Levin, and our ranking member, 
Senator Warner, and to support our Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld, who has written a very clear letter to all of us, which 
Senator Warner has already read into the Record, setting forth his 
reasons why we need to consider realignment and closure of some bases.
  We have close to 400 bases in the United States. With a 
reorganization of the force structure, it is very clearly stated by the 
Secretary of Defense that we don't need all of those bases, and that 
there would be substantial savings from closing some of them.
  Now, is any Senator up here going to want any base closed in his or 
her particular State? Of course not.
  Are all of us, with such a recommendation for closure, going to fight 
like the dickens to keep that base open in our particular States? Of 
course we are. But we are judging a question not within the myopic lens 
of just the interest of our own States but, rather, from the view as 
Senators looking at protection and providing for the common defense of 
the country.
  I have heard a number of our colleagues talk about this very sad 
tragedy of September 11 as a justification for not closing bases. It 
seems to me it is a justification for exactly the opposite; that it is 
a justification for recognizing that we need to be smart in how we are 
going to allocate the funds that are clearly going to be needed for the 
defense of this country, and that we best utilize and direct those 
funds in combating this terrible plague that has now beset not only us 
but the entire world, and that is this plague of terrorism.
  I wanted to add my voice to perhaps what is an unpopular point of 
view. Indeed, if one of our bases ends up on the closure list, I will 
be making the pitch, but that is not the question. The question is what 
is in the best interest of the country in the allocation of the dollars 
that are appropriated for the Department of Defense. If we can save 
some that can be allocated more to the prosecution of this war against 
terrorism, then, in this Senator's judgment, that is in the best 
interest of our country.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Florida. He is a 
man who has served his country in a variety of capacities and 
understands the military, the men and women in the military, and the 
need for this provision.
  None of us who have a significant number of bases--such as is the 
case in the State of Florida, as is the case in the State of Arizona--
that are very important to the economy of our States enjoy this 
exercise. I respect the views of those who are supporters of the 
amendment, including the sponsor himself, who is an experienced 
individual having served in the House and now in the Senate and has 
been involved in these issues of national security.
  We have an honest difference of opinion. I believe this is a good 
debate to have. I respect--I repeat, I respect--the views articulated 
by those who are supporters of the amendment. But I do think, as I said 
before, this will be a defining vote. The President of the United 
States has clearly asked for the authority to close unnecessary bases. 
The Secretary of Defense has spoken in the strongest terms. Our 
civilian and military leaders of the services have spoken in the 
strongest terms. Every objective observer recognizes that we need to 
have a base closing process.
  There are several arguments that are being made in behalf of the 
amendment of the Senator from Kentucky. One is we need more studies 
before we act.

[[Page S9708]]

  Here are some things we already know. We know we have excess 
infrastructure. An April 1998 report from the Department of Defense on 
base closure required by the Congress found that the Department still 
maintains excess capacity that should be eliminated.
  We know having more facilities to run costs more money, and having 
fewer facilities to run costs less. Excess infrastructure is a drain on 
resources and the military services are struggling. I quoted earlier 
from testimony given to the House Armed Services Committee by the 
people who are responsible for these installations.
  Some of the conditions at these bases are deplorable. None of us 
would want to live and work under the conditions which they presently 
have, and this does have an effect on morale, which then does have an 
effect on retention of good men and women in the military. God knows, 
we need them now more than any time perhaps since December 7, 1941.
  We know the Base Closure Commission used to reduce that excess in an 
impartial way not only works well but is considered a model for others 
to follow. Many times I hear we ought to have a commission on Social 
Security along the lines of the Base Closure Commission so Congress can 
vote up or down. It has been a model.
  We know the military has unmet needs that have higher priority than 
preserving our current base structure. The fact is DOD has excess 
facilities; that closing bases saves money; that the military has other 
pressing needs for those savings, and BRAC is the fairest way we know 
to reduce the excess.
  I point out, I do not think it is totally fair. As long as you have 
human beings making these decisions, it will not be a totally fair 
process. There will be some subjectivity, but for me, someone has to 
come up with a more objective way. The only way I know is crank all the 
information into a computer, and I do not think we are quite ready for 
that process.
  People keep saying: We don't know if closing bases really saves 
money. The Defense Department says they will have achieved a net 
savings of $15 billion by the end of this fiscal year from the previous 
base closure rounds, with another $6 billion in savings each and every 
year thereafter.
  One of the things that costs money that was not anticipated was the 
environmental cleanup costs. We found out that on these bases, 
particularly those that were built during World War II and before, in 
some cases there were enormous environmental problems. Those were 
additional costs associated with closing those facilities.
  My response to that is, no, we did not anticipate that, but should we 
have left these environmental problems alone? Shouldn't we have cleaned 
them up anyway? Were we asking our active duty military men and women 
to work in places that were environmental hazards, perhaps even to 
their health? These measures should have been taken while the bases 
were still open.
  We do know it saves money. We do know there are environmental costs, 
but I would argue those environmental steps should be taken on every 
base in America whether they are open or closed. Why should we expect a 
military base to put up with an environmental situation which is not 
acceptable off the military base? Some people say DOD has not proved 
that is the right number. This is because the BRAC savings costs you 
avoid does not mean the savings are not real. The more bases you have, 
the more you have to spend. We know that.
  We have to wait for Secretary Rumsfeld to finish all his strategy 
reviews before we authorize any new base closures. The fact is, we are 
now undertaking several strategy reviews that may revise DOD's force 
structure plans and their estimates of what facilities are in excess. 
Authorizing new base closure rounds now does not preempt these reviews. 
Just the opposite: It will allow Congress to act on them.
  We are in the process right now and already have spent more money on 
defense. There will be additional costs for defense because, as the 
President so eloquently stated to Congress and the American people, we 
are in a long twilight struggle. But I know of no one who believes we 
will have to expand the size of the military establishment to fit in 
these excess costs. I think all of us envision a military that is not 
necessarily expanded in size but restructured; something we should have 
done beginning in 1991 at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
  This military structure will not necessarily be a larger one. This 
military structure will be one that is equipped to respond to 
emergencies throughout the world, deploy in force, be on the 
battlefield, effect the outcome, and leave. That is basically the kind 
of military we need to meet the challenges and win the first war of the 
21st century.
  So, yes, there is restructure in the military; yes, we need more 
high-tech equipment; yes, we need more of some kinds of equipment. We 
need less of others. But no one believes we will go back to a military 
of the size that would require the use of the number of bases we have 
today.
  I do not believe the Secretary of Defense would have written the 
letter he did yesterday that says I want to underscore the importance 
we place on the Senate's approval of authority for a single round of 
base closures and alignments. Indeed, in the wake of the terrible 
events of September 11, the imperative to convert excess capacity and 
warfighting ability is enhanced, not diminished.
  I repeat, the imperative to convert excess capacity into warfighting 
ability is enhanced, not diminished.
  I want to talk about another issue that is kind of important, 
although perhaps from a national security standpoint it is not too 
important, but that is the economic impact it has on the local 
communities. There is the belief it devastates the local community. If 
a base is closed, it can go well, and it can go badly. There are many 
cases where the local communities put together a good reuse plan and 
they are as well off or even better off after the closure of an 
installation.
  The Congress and the Defense Department have taken steps, since the 
last base closure round, to speed up the disposal of property for any 
future rounds.
  In the majority of bases that were closed, there has been an increase 
both of employment as well as revenues into the local communities. Why 
is that? One reason is that in a lot of cases you have a nice runway, 
and an air facility is readily available then for usage; in the case of 
Williams Air Force Base, in the case of many others. Another reason is, 
you have recreational facilities, such as a golf course. You have 
buildings. You have an infrastructure there that businesses, education, 
and others have chosen to move into.
  There is another argument that it is not fair to put every community 
with a base through all the anxiety of BRAC when we only need to close 
some of them, so we ought to change the process and take some bases we 
know we will not want to close off the list, certain bases that will 
not be closed under any circumstances.
  On the surface it sounds like a good idea. I think anybody could name 
20 bases we would not want to see closed. But who decides which 20 
bases cannot even be looked at, what criteria would be used, and how do 
you put 20 bases on the list and say no to the 21st or the 40th or the 
100th?
  I have every confidence the Norfolk naval base will not be closed. I 
do not see how the Navy could exist without it. Could Luke Air Force 
Base be closed? It is the only place where F-16 pilots are trained 
today. I am not so sure. Should Luke Air Force Base be in the top 20? I 
hope so. But maybe not. Maybe this BRAC could figure they could 
consolidate F-16 and F-15 training together in one base. So that is 
not, I believe, a procedure that could lead us to any meaningful 
result.
  There is another issue that is important: Closing bases will deprive 
military retirees of access to health care, and that happens. Not only 
health care but commissary facilities and others. That is one of the 
reasons we induce people to join the military--because they will 
receive benefits and have access to military bases after they are 
retired. They have reduced retiree health care options, but the TRICARE 
For Life Program enacted in the fiscal year 2001 Defense authorization 
bill addresses this issue by providing a quality benefit package that 
allows military retirees to get care from civilian doctors. This was a 
big step forward. It also allows the services in the Base

[[Page S9709]]

Closure Commission to focus fully on the military value of each base.

  I know if Luke Air Force Base were closed, a lot of retirees who use 
the commissary, use the other facilities, would be deprived. I feel 
very bad about that, but at least we have taken care, to some degree, 
of their most important needs, and that is health care they would 
otherwise get at these installations.
  So we have been through this debate for years. We have been through 
this debate since I came to the Congress in 1983. We had a series of 
base closures, and unneeded and unwanted and unnecessary bases were 
closed. If we had not gone through that process and left a number of 
bases open that had been closed through previous BRAC processes, I 
cannot imagine the costs that would be entailed today.
  I note with some interest the Secretary of Defense is asking for one 
more round. Perhaps we are getting close to the point where we will not 
need any more rounds of base closings, but every study, every objective 
observer, every person I know of--and there may be some who do not, but 
I do not know of any who are military experts who are admired and 
respected by the people of this country who think we need another round 
of BRAC.
  Again, I want to point out--and this is a very important point--it is 
very difficult for us to recruit and maintain a quality military force 
if they are living and working in facilities that are inadequate and 
sometimes unsatisfactory. I mentioned the issue of environmental 
cleanup. It is obvious now, because of the base closure process, that 
many of the men and women in the military were working and living in 
areas that were environmentally unsafe, if not hazardous. So the 
quality of life does have a significant impact on the efficiency of our 
military.
  We will be asking men and women in the military to go out and fight 
and perhaps sacrifice their lives. It seems to me the least we can do 
is make sure their quality of life, both at home and overseas, is at a 
level we would want for all of us, our families and our friends and 
particularly those brave young Americans whom we are going to ask to 
serve and sacrifice in the future.
  Is this a life-or-death issue? No, it is not a life-or-death issue. 
We will muddle through if the Bunning amendment is passed. As I said 
earlier, I think this sends a signal that could be very wrong, and that 
is that on a major issue, according to the Secretary of Defense and our 
uniformed and civilian leaders, we do need a base closing commission, 
we are not prepared to do that. I think that would be a very serious 
error on our part.
  So I hope we will defeat the Bunning amendment.
  I want to thank Senator Levin, the distinguished chairman of the 
committee, for his unstinting and unrelenting support of this issue. He 
and I have tried to get this done for a number of years now, and our 
track record, like mine on several other issues, has not been 
exemplary, but I think we now have an opportunity.
  I thank Senator Levin again for his leadership and his willingness to 
be involved in this issue. I am aware in the State of Michigan there 
are bases that could be closed, as there are in any State.
  I thank all of those who support this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I hope I did not cause the Senator from 
Arizona to wrap up his argument prior to when he planned to. I did not 
mean to do that.
  Senator Daschle has asked me to announce there will be no more 
rollcall votes tonight. We also hope, if there is a lull in the debate 
regarding this base closing issue, that Senators offer amendments on 
other matters, and we would arrange a time to vote on those tomorrow.
  We are going to renew our request for a finite list of amendments. We 
had great difficulty getting that. We are sorry the minority has 
objected to that. This is a bill that is of the utmost importance, and 
it appears now there are people who do not want this legislation to go 
forward, which I think sends a terrible message to the American people.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from Nevada yield for a question?
  Mr. REID. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. If Senators come forward tonight with other amendments, if 
the BRAC debate ends at a reasonable hour, would it be possible for 
those amendments not agreed to, to have votes on those amendments, 
stacked immediately after the BRAC motion to table tomorrow morning?
  Mr. REID. It may be difficult because the Attorney General is coming 
before the Judiciary Committee at 10 o'clock. It is a very important 
meeting. With all he has on his plate, we should not keep him waiting. 
We will work to arrange the votes as quickly as possible.
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. REID. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. McCAIN. I was prepared and I think Senator Levin was prepared to 
offer a motion to table very shortly. Is that out of the question at 
this time?
  Mr. REID. I say to my friend from Arizona, we have a vote scheduled 
at 9:45 in the morning. People said they wanted more time to debate 
this. Although, as I announced prior to entering into that consent 
agreement, anyone at any time can move to table, but in consideration 
of the importance of this issue, we thought it would be best that 
everyone have everything they have to say tonight.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rockefeller). The Senator from New York.
  Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, I, too, thank the chairman and ranking 
member and a number of our distinguished colleagues who have risen to 
support and oppose the Bunning amendment. I believe many Members in 
this Chamber either had no well-informed or formed opinion prior to 
September 11, or, perhaps, were inclined to support a new round of base 
realignment closings. It is with some regret that I rise in support of 
the amendment from the Senator from Kentucky. I believe after September 
11, it is imperative we have more information available than we 
currently have.
  There are many arguments that have already been made on the floor, 
very good ones, from our colleagues from Arizona, Rhode Island, 
Delaware, and Florida, as to what efficiency issues should take 
precedence. I agree we need to constantly be evaluating our defense 
budget and expenditures, to become as efficient as possible. Yet I also 
believe there are serious security concerns we are only beginning to 
address. I take very seriously the Secretary's letter which has been 
referred to and which has been read into the Record.
  I believe my colleague from New Mexico, Senator Bingaman, is correct 
in saying the President and the Secretary have inherent power to 
realign, depending upon the needs we face in any kind of strategic or 
emergency situation.
  We are about to engage in a broad-scale reevaluation of our homeland 
defense and security. We are going to be asking ourselves some very 
tough questions about our readiness, about the proper intersection 
between our domestic policing agencies and functions and our military.
  At this point, I think there are several factors that have to be 
addressed in addition to the request of the Department of Defense and 
the recommendation from the Armed Services Committee before many 
Members would be comfortable voting for a new round. I am not sure the 
new round, if it is only a Defense Department review, will adequately 
look at some of these other broader issues that may have implications 
for both physical infrastructure and force deployment.

  Some have said the QDR, which is expected by the end of this month, 
is out of date now. I don't believe that is the case, at least from 
what I am told and read in the paper; that the quadrennial review that 
the Department has been undertaking will have some very significant 
recommendations that should be digested and taken into account with 
respect to moving forward on another round of base realignments and 
closings.
  It is important we integrate our domestic and military capacities in 
a way we have never had to think about before. Many were deeply 
concerned when we read reports of the short time, but nevertheless, 
unfortunately delayed time, that it took to scramble fighters into the 
air to try to deal with the impending threat and the potential threat 
that might have still been out there from additional hijackers.

[[Page S9710]]

  I don't know that the BRAC round has the same substantive 
understanding or impact that we have had in years past, given the new 
threats we have so tragically suffered. I would be very confident and 
supportive of our chairman and ranking member and members of the Armed 
Services Committee, working with the administration, coming up with a 
proposal that does make some sense.
  I listened very carefully to the comments of the Senator from 
Arizona--maybe certain bases should be taken off the table. Maybe they 
should. That is something we have never talked about before, but in the 
context of the new threats we face, I think we have to think 
differently. It may be we may have a BRAC round where some bases would 
be off the table, some of the assets that we have would be put to one 
side and we say they are essential to homeland security and they are 
essential to our projection of force abroad. Therefore, any BRAC round 
would not look at those. That might be an idea worth considering 
because I think everything changed on September 11. A threat that was 
not understood as being so deadly and imminent has caused such terrible 
destruction and tragedy.
  I, for one, will support the Bunning amendment at this time because I 
think we have to reevaluate what we mean when we think about closing 
bases and realigning our forces. No one should argue about the 
efficiency measures that need to be taken, so that we do, No. 1, get 
the most effective use of our dollars; and, No. 2, provide the kind of 
infrastructure and resources that our all-volunteer military deserves 
to have.
  I am concerned at this point we may not be ready for the ``son of'' 
BRAC. There may be the need to rethink how we get to the level of bases 
that are required. I think perhaps for the first time we have to 
seriously take into account the new mission that the President has 
given for homeland security, to make sure there is, if necessary, the 
kind of integration that will make us safe at home as well as abroad in 
terms of America's values, interests, and security.
  I rise with some regret because I have the greatest of respect for 
our chairman, our ranking member, and those who support this request 
for another round. I probably will very much end up supporting it, but 
only after we give the kind of thought I think is required today, to 
take into account the new threats and perhaps do it differently than we 
have done it before after we carefully evaluate what kind of presence 
we need, taking into account homeland security. I would support that 
kind of approach. That is not what is being proposed at this time. I 
urge my colleagues to support the Bunning amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I think it is important we go back and 
outline how the base-closing commission works. In listening to this 
debate, we get the idea that by continuing a process of having a base-
closing commission, that the commission simply takes on its own head 
and imposes the closing of bases without regard to the thinking of the 
President, without regard to the wishes of the Secretary of Defense.
  Let me remind my colleagues how the process works. How the process 
works is, you set up a structure and nothing happens until the 
President and the Secretary of Defense come forward and say, we believe 
for these reasons that these bases should be realigned, closed, 
restructured, merged, et cetera.
  Nothing happens until the President makes the proposal.
  Look, I understand base closings. We have closed bases in my State. I 
have a lot of bases. I am proud of every one of them. I love every one 
of them. And nothing is harder than watching communities that 
sacrificed and supported the military and helped win the cold war, and 
then through base closing and realignment we end up closing the base 
and imposing a very heavy burden on the community. I understand that. I 
identify with it. I have seen it in flesh and blood in my State.
  But the bottom line is we have 20 to 25 percent excessive capacity in 
military bases in America today. I was for the Base Closing Commission 
process before the 11th, but I am stronger for it now. The arguments 
for it today are stronger than they were then because we need these 
resources moved into areas where they can support the defense of the 
American people and into nontraditional areas.
  The first proposal the new Secretary of Defense made as part of his 
military realignment and restructuring was the renewal of the Base 
Closing Commission process that we had under a Democrat and a 
Republican President. If we come in now and simply say we forbid them 
from undertaking this process--we forbid the President and the 
Secretary of Defense from looking at our new situation and saying that 
based on where we were before the 11th, based on what happened on the 
11th, based on the challenge we face today, we need to close or realign 
these bases and we want an orderly process to have it evaluated and to 
have Congress vote up or down, yes or no in response to that 
evaluation--if we come in and take the first proposal the Secretary of 
Defense has made and say no, we are not going to do it, it seems to me 
we are basically saying we do not want to restructure the military and 
we are going to look at our interests in our States and we are going to 
say those interests supersede the national security interests of the 
United States.
  There are two sides of every argument. I know there are good 
arguments on the other side, and they are going to be made 
persuasively. But let me just sum up.
  We have 20 to 25 percent excessive capacity in military bases, and I 
cannot foresee or imagine a circumstance under which that will not grow 
as a result of the conflict that started on the 11th. No base could be 
considered for base closing by the Commission unless it was recommended 
by the President and the Secretary of Defense.
  What we are doing here is taking away flexibility from them, to 
restructure resources to meet the current needs--not the needs of World 
War II, not the needs of the Korean conflict, but the needs of the 
military today. In the end, if we do not agree with the process, if 
after we go through their recommendation and the outside evaluation of 
people who are appointed to the Commission, confirmed by the Senate, 
evaluated independently--if we disagree with it, we can reject it.
  But I think it is very important that we not reject the only reform 
proposal that has come before the Congress since the new administration 
took office. I just think to accept this amendment today is basically 
to say to them: Forget about this reform because the first one you 
proposed, we say no to.
  I hope this amendment will be rejected. I am not sure that it will 
be, but I hope it will be.
  I would also like to say, while I have Senator Levin here in the 
Chamber, I thank him for his leadership on this issue. I would like to 
make a plea to him.
  He and I, out of the best of intentions, have for the last half dozen 
years engaged in a battle about the Prison Industries. I am not going 
to give a long speech on it today. I will have plenty of opportunities 
if we do not work something out to do that. But for the last half dozen 
years we have had a running debate. I believe people in prison ought to 
work. I think the evidence of decline in recidivism of people who are 
in Prison Industries is overwhelming. No less an authority than de 
Tocqueville, when he came to America in the 1830s to study American 
prisons and then decided to stay and study democracy, commented on the 
importance of prison labor and prison industry.
  Senator Levin and I have had a running debate about this issue. I 
want to preserve the prison industry system. He wants to--I would say 
``kill it,'' but I will say ``dramatically change it,'' in this new 
spirit of bipartisanship. It is an important issue. It is one that 
deserves to be debated. There are two sides of the issue. Strong 
arguments can be made on both sides.
  But my plea to Senator Levin is, this is not the year or the time or 
the bill, it seems to me, on which to have this debate. I hope we can 
set aside this divisive issue on which the Senate has been roughly 
evenly divided. I think in the 6 years or so we have debated this 
issue, Prison Industries has survived by a handful of votes in each and 
every one of those years.

[[Page S9711]]

  I hope we can wait and debate this next year or the year after. We do 
not have to debate it this year. I think this is an impediment to 
seeing this important bill pass.
  I would just call on the better angels of his nature to let us set 
this issue aside with a guarantee that next year or the year after we 
will have a hot debate on it and we will each present our side of the 
argument and we can decide then on prison labor and prison industry in 
the Defense Department. But I think, with all we have going on, with 
all the major issues, this is not a good use of our time.
  So being here to support the chairman on this issue of base closing, 
I simply wanted to make my appeal that we put off this divisive issue 
of prison labor for another day. Next year we will do another Defense 
authorization bill. We can debate this divisive issue then. Hopefully 
this war will be well underway and we will be in the process of winning 
it overwhelmingly. If he would do that, this Member would greatly 
appreciate it. All the prisoners who are working would appreciate it. 
But I would appreciate it if we would eliminate this divisive issue and 
speed up the process of moving ahead with this bill.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. First, let me respond to my good friend from Texas. I very 
much welcome his constancy on the issue of base closings. We have had 
base closings in our States, just about all of us. We know how 
complicated that can be. He has taken a very courageous position on 
that, even though there have been bases closed in his State as well as 
others in this Chamber as well. I thank him for the commitment he has 
made to doing something which is not easy to do because back home it 
can, at least on occasion, cause some disruption.
  Senator Thomas is also in the Chamber. He is a cosponsor of our 
legislation, which is in the bill. My good friend from Texas mentioned 
perhaps a year or two from now we could debate it. It is kind of 
tempting to have that debate 2 years from now because such an effective 
advocate for his position would no longer be here, to wit, the good 
Senator from Texas.
  But when my good friend from Texas says people in prison ought to 
work, I have to say I could not agree with him more. I could not agree 
with him more.
  But I also think people who are not in prison ought to have the right 
to at least bid when their Government is buying items. Right now there 
are too many occasions when people in the private sector are prohibited 
from bidding for items being purchased by their Government. That may be 
hard for colleagues to believe. But it is the truth. Despite all of the 
advantages in terms of ``costs'' of Prison Industries, to wit: labor at 
incredibly low cost, including the fact that they do not pay a whole 
lot of other benefits, to put it mildly, there are businesses in this 
country that are not allowed to bid on items that their Government is 
purchasing. I find that to be simply incredible and wrong 
fundamentally.

  It is that issue which this language addresses in our bill. We want 
the Defense Department, when they bid for purchasers, to let out bids 
and to be able to receive bids not just from Prison Industries but from 
the private sector as well, and then go with the lowest bidder, or the 
best quality. The Defense Department wants that power. Prison 
Industries wants to maintain the monopoly and deny the private sector 
the opportunity simply to bid. It may be unbelievable that the private 
sector could bid less than Prison Industries charged the Defense 
Department for items. But there is one way to find out. Let them bid. 
It is the only way to find out. In this system of ours, it is 
unthinkable to me that we not allow the private sector to compete when 
it comes to the Government purchases.
  I thank Senator Thomas who has been so active on this issue, as well 
as others. I wish we could figure out a way to accommodate my friend 
from Texas. But I can't do that without giving up what I consider to be 
an important principle.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I know there are a lot of other people who 
want to talk. One of the compromises that I would be satisfied with is 
to have competition in the Defense Department on procuring--competition 
with Prison Industries but let prison labor within the constraints of 
not selling locally, which could disrupt the local economy, and not 
glut the markets, let them produce and sell things in the private 
sector.
  If we could generate that, the problem is the practical impact of the 
policy that we have 1.2 million people in jail--almost all of them 
males in their prime, productive period--and the net result of the 
amendment is that the relatively few who are working won't be working. 
So they can't sell in the private sector. If you take away from them 
the right to sell to the largest Government customer, then there is no 
prison labor.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will correct my friend. This is not a 
question of a right to sell to the customer. They have ever right to 
sell to the customer.
  Mr. GRAMM. The right to sell in the private sector.
  Mr. LEVIN. That is what we tell China--that we don't want China to 
use prison labor to make products to sell to us and that compete with 
us. We tell China that we don't want prison labor to make products that 
come into this country and compete with us. But my friend from Texas 
wants us to use domestic prison labor.
  Mr. GRAMM. Absolutely I do. Why shouldn't prisoners be paid to work?
  Mr. LEVIN. They are being paid about 35 cents an hour. No one in the 
private sector can compete for a job if he has to compete with prison 
labor on that basis.
  Let me say that I fundamentally disagree with the Senator from Texas 
on that issue. That is not the issue in the language in this bill. The 
issue in the language in this bill has to do with simply allowing the 
private sector to compete. This is one of those cases where the AFL-CIO 
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the NFIB are in total agreement. 
We can debate this later. It is not often that you get those 
organizations together. But in this case they are because the issue is 
so fundamental. Will our private sector be allowed to bid on Government 
purchases or can the Federal Prison Industries have a monopoly on some 
items even though they are charging the Government more despite their 
50-cents-an-hour payment on labor--whatever they pay--despite the fact 
they make no benefit payments to the prisoners. Despite all of that, in 
many cases they still are charging the Government more than the private 
sector can charge the Government. Let the private sector, for heaven's 
sake, bid on items which their own Government is buying. It is 
unthinkable that we do not allow the private sector to bid on items 
which their own Government is buying. It is unthinkable to me.

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I am little unsure where we are. I am not 
sure about my position on this issue. However, I and many of us here 
worked very hard to pass a fair bill last year to allow for the private 
sector to bid and compete for Government business rather than doing it 
by outsourcing. I think that applies here. Certainly there are many 
other things that prisoners can do to continue to work. This is matter 
of competition.
  I ask the Senator from Michigan: Did the Senator from Texas agree to 
pull his amendment? What is the agreement?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am happy that is not quite the way I 
heard him at this time. Perhaps we will be able to figure out some 
approach where this matter can be resolved.
  I emphasize that the right to compete with the private sector is in 
the bill. The amendment which will be offered would have to be written 
with language that allows competition in the bill.
  Mr. THOMAS. We are prepared to talk about that.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask the distinguished chairman: But it 
does change current law to provide for additional competitive 
strictures on the Federal prison system. Is that correct?
  Mr. LEVIN. No. It allows competition where there is none now. The 
Federal prison system now can declare a monopoly for something, and 
declare that no private sector can bid on an item that it wants to 
supply to the Federal Government. That prevents the private sector from 
bidding. We would say that is not right. Let the private sector bid, 
and if the Prison Industries folks can produce it cheaper or

[[Page S9712]]

better, fine. But if they can't, and the private sector is doing it 
cheaper or better, then the private sector ought to be allowed to 
compete.
  Mr. SESSIONS. But it would alter current law. Under current law, the 
plan has been for Prison Industries to produce products for sale to the 
Federal Government thereby improving prison conditions and receiving 
some financial benefit to the prison.
  Mr. LEVIN. That part doesn't change. They can still produce what they 
want but they wouldn't be allowed to declare a monopoly so nobody else 
could compete for that product.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I remember not too many years ago that I met an 
individual who I had prosecuted as a Federal prosecutor. He served a 
number of years in jail and was a former elected public official. We 
got to talking about this very subject. He said to me: If you need a 
witness, call me because I have been in prison where prisoners work, 
and I have been in prisons where they don't work. And it is a lot 
better where they are working. It is when you go to the chow line at 6 
o'clock in the afternoon, there are no fights, and no shoving or 
pushing. People are tired and want to get their food and go to the cell 
and go to bed.
  It is a tough call for me because I believe in competition. And I am 
wrestling with this vote. I understand the Senator's concern about it. 
But I believe deeply that we have to ensure that prisoners work. There 
are forces out there that want to shut it off at every angle. But at 
some point we need these prisoners working, for their benefit and for 
America's benefit. I don't know how they can't be competitive with the 
advantages they have. That is why I am thinking I could support the 
Senator's amendment on the theory that they would probably tighten 
things up and get competitive if it passed. But they certainly need to 
work.
  I thank the Senator from Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to support S. 1438, the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. This bill 
provides our armed forces the tools necessary to protect, serve, and 
defend the United States of America and our allies. Recent events 
underscore the critical importance of this bill: as the country mourns 
those lost in last week's terrorist attacks, our armed forces must 
stand at the ready.
  This bill has many laudable initiatives, including several efforts 
from all three of the subcommittees on which I serve: Seapower, 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, and Personnel.
  In the area of Seapower, our subcommittee was faced with the 
difficult task of balancing the competing priorities of: new 
construction of ships for our naval fleet; sustaining our current 
platforms and weapons systems; and investing in the weapons systems and 
platforms of the future. I am pleased that this bill takes important 
steps to ensure that our naval forces can continue to command the seas 
and project power ashore while sustaining a viable industrial base to 
support our future national security needs.
  The bill approves more than $9 billion in funding for such major 
programs as three DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers, one SSN-774 
Virginia class attack submarine, and one T-AKE auxiliary cargo and 
ammunition ship. It is critical that the U.S. Navy's destroyer program 
sustain a viable production rate to ensure a smooth transition from the 
current DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer program to the future land 
attack destroyer program, DD-21, which will form the backbone of our 
future fleet.
  The bill further authorizes advance procurement funding for four LPD-
17 amphibious transport dock ships and the LHD-8 amphibious assault 
ship. Full funding of $643.5 million for the continued research and 
development for the DD-21 Zumwalt land attack destroyer program is also 
included in this bill. This is particularly important in light of the 
House's unfortunate decision to cut the DD-21 authorization for the 
coming fiscal year.
  DD-21 will be vital to assure and sustain access to areas of U.S. 
interests overseas. It will do so very efficiently, with a target crew 
size of less than 100 and other design innovations that result in 
significant life-cycle cost reductions over the current destroyer 
program. The U.S. security strategy to defeat adversaries that seek to 
deny us access to littoral regions of the world will be critically 
dependent on U.S. ships that are harder to target and attack, and on 
weapons systems that can deliver combat power ashore.
  The Seapower Subcommittee also allocated substantial resources to 
strengthen aviation assets in the areas of airlift, as well as for 
patrol, reconnaissance and surveillance platforms. The bill authorizes 
nearly $90 million in additional funding to sustain readiness for C-17 
maintenance trainers and improved shipboard navigation radars, among 
other items. Additionally, the bill provides more than $170 million to 
improve the ability to meet non-traditional threats, including $96 
million for P-3 modifications to increase the capability of the P-3 
aircraft to support operations in littoral environments. These 
modifications to the P-3 aircraft will ensure that the aging P-3 
aircraft can continue to respond relevant to the changing threat and 
operational environment.
  The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities has spent a 
great deal of time this year analyzing the military's ability to meet 
non-traditional threats. This bill continues to improve the ability of 
U.S. forces to deter and defend against a very real, asymmetrical and 
growing terrorist threat. Tragically, we have learned just how real the 
threat has become. The threat is not ``emerging''; unfortunately, it's 
real and present.
  In light of the recent terrorist attacks and testimony of the 
military regional Commanders-in-Chief, I believe that we must do more 
in the areas of force protection, antiterrorism, counter-terrorism 
training, and research and development in order to protect U.S. forces 
against weapons of mass destruction, and to help them support domestic 
efforts to manage the deadly consequences of terrorist attacks on our 
homeland.
  The awful events of September 11th should highlight the urgency of 
ensuring preparedness in this arena. In this new ``war'' against 
terrorism, such programs are our front lines.
  The Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee sought to improve 
capabilities to meet non-traditional threats by encouraging the 
development of technology for the detection, identification, and 
measurement of weapons of mass destruction agents, investing in 
research initiatives that will detect biological and chemical weapons, 
and funding the terrorism readiness initiatives of the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  This bill demonstrates our commitment to reexamine and bolster our 
efforts to combat terrorism and to extend the Defense Department's 
emphasis upon force protection overseas to include better protection at 
home as well. One of the first hearings held by the Senate Armed 
Services Committee this year, for example, focused on ``lessons 
learned'' from the attack upon the destroyer USS Cole, which had killed 
17 sailors. Tragically, we will now have many more lessons to learn.
  The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats also has been examining the role 
of civil support teams in dealing with terrorist attacks and upon 
broader issues of how we should prepare for ``homeland defense.'' This 
work has been eye-opening, and the tragic events of the past few days 
underscore, as perhaps nothing else could, how important it is to 
support the Defense Department's efforts in these areas.
  I am pleased with the work of our Personnel Subcommittee as well. The 
bill we are considering fully funds the Tricare for Life, TFL, 
initiative authorized in the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization 
Act, while also improving the compensation and quality of life of U.S. 
forces and families. The committee added $700 million to the budget 
request to improve compensation and quality of life, including 
additional funds to reduce service members' out-of-pocket housing 
costs, to increase higher education opportunities, and to provide 
personal gear to improve the safety and comfort of U.S. forces in the 
field.
  Effective January 1, 2002, every service member will receive a pay 
raise of at least 5 percent, and personnel in certain pay grades will 
receive targeted pay raises ranging between 6 and 10

[[Page S9713]]

percent. These will be the largest increases in military pay since 
1982. Further, the bill supports the budget request of $17.9 billion 
for the Defense Health Program, which represents a significant increase 
in order to meet rising costs of medical care and increased benefits 
for military retirees.
  While it is our responsibility to exercise our best judgment 
regarding the security of our Nation, we must do so while considering 
the administration's current priorities, as well as the emergent needs 
of our sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines. In this time of 
constrained resources and limited budgets, every initiative needs to be 
carefully considered in the wake of traditional and non-traditional 
threats.
  With that said, it is my belief that we in Congress, and this 
administration have some very tough choices to make, not only in the 
areas of missile defense and the new war on terrorism, but also in 
developing a integrated national security strategy, force structure, 
and future investments critical to our armed forces. Such fundamental 
decisions should be made first, and we should move forward to the 
evaluation of where and how our force structure should be supported.
  While the debate continues on how to transform our armed forces, and 
the committee takes action to support our armed forces and the 
administration's priorities, I would like to take this opportunity to 
acknowledge and thank Chairman Levin and Senator Warner for their 
tireless efforts to tackle these very tough issues and produce an 
authorization bill that funds a number of critical priorities and 
provides support for the men and women of our armed forces.
  I wish to make a few points in response to the speech given by my 
distinguished colleague from Arizona earlier today on the issue of base 
closures.
  Many of us have made the argument that it makes far more sense to 
determine our force structure, particularly in light of the new 
emphasis that must be placed on homeland defense before we proceed with 
closing installations that may well prove to be needed later on.
  But it isn't just those of us serving in the Senate who support 
Senator Bunning's amendment who feel that way. Let me quote from an 
answer that our Secretary of the Army, Thomas White, gave to a question 
regarding base closures put to him by Senator Dorgan at a hearing 
before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in June. Senator Dorgan 
gave an excellent speech on this issue earlier. Secretary White said:

       I think that the cart's a little before the horse. The 
     first thing we have to nail down is what the national 
     military strategy is . . . in accordance with the QDR 
     process. That's step one.
       Step two is sizing the force against the strategy, and that 
     will flow out of the exercises currently ongoing.
       And the third step will be what's the most efficient basing 
     for that force, and only at that stage of the game, when we 
     try to figure out the most efficient way to base the force 
     and to support it from a business perspective, will we get 
     into which infrastructure is excess or not. This has got to 
     be a strategy driven exercise.

  Ironically, Secretary Rumsfeld, in arguing for base closures, also 
makes the point that:

       Our future needs as to base structure are uncertain and 
     strategy dependent.

  This is the wrong time. We face tremendous challenges. We should not 
be embarking on a whole new round of closing and downsizing base 
installations until we know what our needs are. And then, Mr. 
President, we should not be using the discredited BRAC process.
  My colleague from Maine, Senator Snowe, and I have extensive 
experience with the BRAC process. We have found it to be unfair. We 
have found it to be inconsistent in its application.

  If the Pentagon identifies bases that are truly excess, that are not 
needed--and I recognize there is excess capacity--then the Pentagon 
should identify those bases and put it in the budget. Why should we put 
every community across this country that hosts a base through the 
uncertainty, the worry, and the expense of hiring consultants to make 
the case for the retention of their base? That just does not make 
sense.
  We are experiencing this right now in Maine the Pentagon's closure of 
a base in Winter Harbor. We wish that this Navy installation, which has 
been there for more than 70 years, were going to remain open, but, 
unfortunately, its mission has become obsolete. What the Maine 
congressional delegation is doing is working with the local 
communities, with the Park Service, and with DOD, on a transition plan 
so it can be effectively reused. We do not need to endure the 
uncertainties of a politicized BRAC system.
  Finally, I want to respond to the comments made by the Senator from 
Arizona about the need for improved housing for our troops. I could not 
agree with him more. I have visited our troops stationed at the DMZ in 
Korea. I was shocked and appalled at how bad the housing was for our 
brave men and women who are serving there on the front lines. We do 
have to do better. But that is a completely separate issue from the 
issue of whether now is the time to embark on base closures.
  Now is not the time--now is the worst possible time--to divert the 
energies of the civilian and military leaders of the Pentagon into an 
exercise of closing bases that may well prove to be needed later. Now 
is certainly not the time to create concern and chaos and confusion in 
every community that has proudly hosted a military installation and is 
supporting our men and women in uniform. Now is certainly not the time 
to embark on another round of base closures when all of our energies 
must be focused on the overriding goal of crushing the international 
network of terrorist organizations that have so harmed our Nation and 
its citizens.
  I urge support for the amendment offered by the Senator from 
Kentucky.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first, I would like to make an inquiry and 
then I have a couple comments to make.
  When are we going to be taking up amendments that have been on the 
list for quite some time? Has that been decided yet? Or may I ask the 
manager of the bill, are we going to be disposing of the Bunning 
amendment before we go to other amendments? Is that going to be the 
order?
  Mr. LEVIN. We are going to be disposing of the Bunning amendment 
tomorrow morning at 9:15. What we are hoping for is that other people 
with amendments--if debate ends early enough tonight on the Bunning 
amendment--will come forward with their amendments so we can debate 
those amendments and then set votes on those amendments tomorrow.
  Mr. INHOFE. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Senator Reid is here so we will leave that conversation 
for him.
  Mr. REID. The manager of the bill is absolutely right. We are 
certainly willing tonight to take up any amendments that need to be 
offered. I say to my friend from Oklahoma, as I have said several times 
throughout the day, this is a very important amendment, the one now 
before the Senate. We are going to dispose of it in the morning, more 
than likely, at 9:45.
  But the problem we have, I say to my friend from Alabama, is we 
cannot get your side to agree on a list of amendments. We are not 
saying eliminate amendments. We are not saying you cannot offer 
amendments. We are saying offer anything you want, but let's have the 
managers have a finite list of amendments.
  And I don't know what the majority leader is going to do, but if this 
goes on tomorrow, I think the majority leader would have to think 
seriously about going to some other legislation because we cannot go on 
with each hour that goes by with more amendments coming in. We need a 
cutoff period of some kind.
  So I say to my friend from Alabama, if there is some way you can 
prevail on the people on your side of the aisle to allow us to have 
this unanimous consent request agreed to--what the consent agreement 
says is that--I offered it already, and I will just tell you what is in 
it again--in fact, I will propound it right now.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the list that I will send 
to the desk at this time be the only first-degree amendments remaining 
in order to S. 1438; that these amendments be subject to second-degree 
amendments that are relevant; that upon disposition of

[[Page S9714]]

all amendments, the bill be read a third time and the Senate vote on 
passage of the bill, with no intervening action or debate.
  I propound this unanimous consent request, but I say, Mr. President, 
before I ask you to rule--I say to my friend from Alabama, and anyone 
within the sound of my voice--this is something that isn't unique to 
this bill. We do it all the time. That is how we complete legislation. 
If we cannot get people to agree on a finite list of amendments, we 
cannot do anything on the legislation. We might as well just pull it.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the distinguished assistant majority leader.
  And I will say this: I started out with 16 amendments, and I have 3. 
I think if everyone did this, we would be able to complete this bill. 
It is very important we have the Defense authorization bill and we act 
on it. So I will do my part.
  Mr. REID. I say to my friend, if he had 16, that is your privilege. 
You can have as many as you want. We are saying, have as many as you 
want, but let's have a cutoff period so the managers, at some time, can 
work through these amendments. If there is no end to these amendments, 
there is nothing to work through; we never finish the legislation.

  So, Mr. President, I propound this unanimous consent request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I understand there are still those who wish to continue 
debate and who have not been prepared to agree to that on this side--
maybe somebody on this side. We have had this frustration ever since I 
have been in the Senate. We have been on the other side as the 
majority. But maybe we can get this thing moving. I certainly would 
like to see this bill move. I would not personally object. I am 
objecting for others who, I understand, have a right to object and have 
asked that I do so. I certainly will do what I can to see this bill 
move. I hope we can reach an agreement soon.
  Mr. REID. I say to my friend from Alabama, this unanimous consent 
request that I have propounded does not in any way limit debate. In 
fact, it will allow unlimited debate on each amendment. We are not 
saying don't talk more than an hour on an amendment. We are saying just 
tell us what you want to talk about so that the managers can determine 
if they can be accepted as part of a managers' package, or if they want 
to try to work out time agreements on these amendments, or if they want 
to basically accept some of them.
  The way it is now, under the Senate rules we will never, ever finish 
this legislation unless there is a finite list of amendments. And we 
can't do it.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I understand the Senator's concerns and frustrations. 
We have been on this less than 2 full days. This is a major bill. Maybe 
we can get the agreement soon. I will certainly help him in that 
regard, if I can.
  Mr. INHOFE. Let me reclaim my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma does have the floor.
  Mr. INHOFE. I appreciate this, I say to both the Senator from Alabama 
and the Senator from Nevada. It is very important. We must get to a 
point where we can vote on it. I do have three amendments I want to 
take up. I will just stick it through until such time as I can bring 
them up.
  Let me make a couple comments on some of the debate that has been 
going on. As far as prison labor is concerned, I assure the Senator 
from Alabama, who has been concerned about it, expressing his desire to 
have prisoners work, I can assure him that prisoners can work.
  I can also assure him that the language, in my opinion--I have been 
on this committee now since 1994, and I have heard this debate every 
year since 1994--in the bill is good language. We need to be able to 
have quality work done on the work we are talking about in conjunction 
with this prison labor debate.
  Let me assure the Senator from Alabama that we can go ahead and keep 
the language that is in our bill and still have a lot for the prisoners 
to do. I know a lot about this. I was mayor of Tulsa for three, four 
terms. During that time, we had a prostitution ring that hit Oklahoma 
and hit my city of Tulsa. It was a very serious problem. Of course, we 
would throw them in jail. They would get out about 10 minutes later, 
when their attorneys would come up. What I did was, instead of putting 
them in jail and incarcerating them, I put them in work details.
  We had them out there--it worked out really well--cleaning up our 
parks. Because they had spiked heels, they could kind of go out there 
and pick up the trash, and it worked out very well. That program 
actually stopped that ring. It was because it was hard work. They 
didn't want to do it.
  I can remember once I got a call from someone from Sidney, Australia, 
on a live radio show. I don't know what time it was there, but it was 
the middle of the night in Tulsa.
  He said: Mr. Mayor, how cruel can you be, making those poor women go 
out and work hard in the hot sun and do all that labor.
  I said: I'll tell what you I will do. We will just package them all 
up and send them to Sidney, and then it will be your problem.
  Then he said: By jove, I think you have a good program there.
  There is a lot of work that can be done by prisoners. Anyone who has 
worked in this area, which I have in Oklahoma with our State 
penitentiary, knows that can happen. That is not the issue. There is 
going to be work. They are going to get work anyway that is not as 
enjoyable as the work we are talking about. I support the language in 
the bill.
  Under the debate right now, we have been talking about the proposed 
fifth round of the BRAC, base realignment and closure round. I have to 
say this: I am opposed to it, but for a different reason than the 
Senator from Maine who spoke before me. It is not that I don't believe 
in the process.
  I was elected to the House of Representatives in 1986. Dick Armey put 
out this problem. He said: As it is, we are never going to be able to 
close installations and get rid of infrastructure that is no longer 
something we need if we leave it up to the political process. Each one 
is an economic base. There is not a Member of the House or the Senate 
who is not going to protect his own turf.

  That had been true. So I strongly supported Dick Armey, and in 1987 
we passed the BRAC process. We went through four rounds. Until the last 
round came up, it worked beautifully. It wasn't to everyone's 
satisfaction. A lot of people were mad about it. But a lot of bases, in 
New York and other places, were closed down and everyone cooperated.
  In the fourth round, politics entered into it. It was a partisan 
thing because it was Democrats and Republicans who did it. That has 
taken care of where it can't happen again.
  The system is good. I far prefer the system of having BRAC rounds 
over the system that we used before then.
  Here is why I am opposed to it. It is a totally different reason. I 
heard Senator Bunning ask: Can anyone show me the amount of money that 
has been saved? We all have opinions as to what is projected into the 
future. I will say this: One thing we know for sure, we have closed 97 
installations. I would suggest we wouldn't have closed one of them if 
it had not been for this process. We closed them. And in that time that 
we actually closed those, there wasn't one that didn't lose money for 
the first 3 or 4 years afterwards.
  I think there probably is infrastructure out there that we are going 
to have to address at some time. We have two things that are going on 
right now: No. 1, we are bleeding. Everything is hemorrhaging right 
now. We know we are having problems in our force structure, problems 
with retention, problems with modernization. We need to have a missile 
defense system. All these things have top priority in the bill, and I 
agree that they should be done. So if we postpone the consideration--I 
know it doesn't take place until 2003--if we postpone it until a later 
date, then we will not have to forgo that money that it is going to 
cost to close bases at a time that we need to go into rebuilding our 
defense structure. We are repeating something right now like it was in 
1981. We have a hollow force. So this is not the time. I might 
seriously consider it later on.

[[Page S9715]]

  The second reason is this: We know we are going to change the force 
structure. We know we are right now at one-half of the force structure 
we were in 1991 during the Persian Gulf War. That can be documented. 
That is one-half the Army divisions, one-half the tactical Air Force, 
one-half the ships, down from 600 to 300. We know we are going to have 
to start building that force structure back up.
  As we do it, we may be needing some of the infrastructure that right 
now, if it were looked at by a committee that were appointed now or 
next year, they might think is not necessary.
  Let's wait. To artificially lower the infrastructure down to here, 
when our force structure is too low and we are going to have to raise 
it up--we don't know what we are going to be needing at the time. The 
time is not right.
  I believe in the system. I will support it at the appropriate time. 
But we need every dollar we can get to rebuild our defenses today. That 
is what this bill is all about. That is why this is one of the few 
parts of this bill with which I disagree.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Stabenow). The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Madam President, I rise today to indicate my strong 
opposition to amendment No. 1622, which would strip a provision 
authorizing a round of base closures in fiscal year 2003 from the 
fiscal year 2002 Defense authorization bill, and differ from some of my 
colleagues who would like to do that.
  As one who voted for base closing last year, I understand how 
important this provision is to our national security. As many of my 
colleagues are aware, our military now finds itself with an 
infrastructure base that is no longer proportionate to its force 
structure. It is estimated we now support an infrastructure that is in 
excess nearly 25 percent. In other words, we have an infrastructure out 
there of bases; there is 25 percent more than what we really need. I 
believe rather than continuing to pay for unneeded facilities, our 
defense dollars can and should be better spent to meet the most 
pressing needs of our armed services.
  I stand behind Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and other members of 
the Armed Services Committee who supported the inclusion of this 
provision in the fiscal year 2002 Defense authorization bill.
  As the committee noted in its report accompanying the bill, our top 
civilian and uniformed military leaders have requested this authority. 
For the last 5 years, they have been asking for it. I believe we should 
trust their guidance and act to grant the Defense Department this much-
needed authority. Too often I have noticed in this body that we do not 
support the recommendations of the people we charged with the 
responsibility to get the job done. We know more about it than they do.
  In this case, we have charged these people with the responsibility to 
secure our freedom and provide our national defense. We should listen 
to them. I am so glad the Armed Services Committee did so in this case.
  The committee said:

       The committee believes that the arguments for allowing the 
     closure of additional facilities are clear and compelling. 
     The department has excess facilities. Closing bases saves 
     money, and the military services have higher priority uses 
     that could be funded with those savings.

  As our Nation prepares to engage in a new battle to combat terrorist 
threats against the United States and the Free World at large, it is 
critical that these excess resources be used to meet the most pressing 
defense needs.
  I respectfully disagree with the argument that we should not act on 
this initiative as our country prepares to take on those who commit 
acts of terrorism against our Nation. On the contrary, I believe that 
now, more than ever before, we need these resources for more important 
endeavors.
  As the Secretary of Defense noted in a letter to Chairman Levin, 
dated September 21, 2001--I want to make the point that I have heard 
several people say on the floor of the Senate that they can't do it, 
they are too busy with other things, and don't have the time or 
resources to properly do the overview that they need to determine which 
of these bases ought to be closed. It seems to me that they have a 
better idea of what their capacity is than we have.
  In this letter from the Secretary of Defense, dated September 21--
that is pretty near--he said:

       Indeed, in the wake of the terrible events of September 11, 
     the imperative to convert excess capacity into war-fighting 
     ability is enhanced, not diminished.

  Basically, they say we can handle the job. Give us the permission so 
we can move on with it. We made hard decisions regarding the size of 
force structure during the past decade and we can continue to do more 
to make corresponding choices regarding the size and configuration of 
our military installations. Some of the words I have heard were that we 
have had base closings and they have been wonderful in terms of cost 
savings. The cost savings associated with past base realignment and 
closures, including several from my State of Ohio, is considerable.
  That is the other thing. So often when these things come up, people 
are thinking of their own bases and they don't want to lose the bases. 
I didn't want to lose the bases in Ohio that went through the BRAC 
process. I thought it was fair and above board. They did close down 
bases. In other instances, we were able to convince them that the bases 
should remain open. But the fact is, as a result of these base 
closings, the Department of Defense has a cost savings of nearly $14 
billion because of these initiatives. Given the fact we still have a 
military infrastructure that is in excess of more than 20 percent, we 
can continue to generate even more savings with an additional round of 
base closures.
  The Secretary of Defense estimates that with an additional round of 
base closures, in fiscal year 2003, our taxpayers are going to save 
$3.5 billion annually. In this particular case, I don't think the 
savings are going to be there. We will take the savings and put them to 
use by taking care of this war dealing with terrorism. Given these 
savings, there should be little doubt that additional rounds of 
closures will do a much better job of directing expenditures where we 
need them.
  As I have long advocated during my time in public office, I believe 
we should work harder and smarter and do more with less. That is what 
we are asked to do. Keeping excess and unneeded military installations 
up and running takes scarce and critical resources from meeting 
important priorities in light of our new war. It just doesn't make 
sense.
  How can we ask the American people to increase our defense budget by 
$18.4 billion and, at the same time, know that by closing these bases 
we can save another $3.5 billion annually? Again, that is $3.5 billion 
annually. I believe the base closures are essential to allowing our men 
and women in uniform to best serve the strategic and national security 
interests of the United States.
  I strongly oppose any amendment that would remove the much needed 
provision from the fiscal year 2002 Defense Authorization Act.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you. Madam President, I will be brief. I rise in 
reluctant support of this amendment. There have been many who have 
talked about the macro reasons for doing this--that since September 11 
we are in a brave new world; that we may need reassessment, and we 
probably do; that we probably should not rush to judgment.
  Those are good arguments. But I want to talk about the particular 
issues that affect my State because we are all looking at our States 
here. I supported BRAC while I was in the House consistently. I knew 
that it might affect bases in my State. But my mouth has been so soured 
by the last BRAC that I cannot support it again. It is not simply that 
my State suffered dramatically of our large bases--three out of the 
four were closed--it is rather that the process, by just about all 
accounts, was highly politicized--at least in the instance of my State.
  While the BRAC Commission did recommend the closing of Griffiss Air 
Force Base, and they did recommend the closing of the Seneca Army 
Depot, they did not recommend the closing of Plattsburgh Air Force 
Base. It was a state-of-the-art base, one of the few bases east of the 
Mississippi that dealt with long-range bombers and tankers. Plattsburgh 
was a state-of-the-art facility with a huge landing runway, with huge 
investments in its infrastructure that was being built; and,

[[Page S9716]]

with good reason, the Commission did not recommend Plattsburgh.
  Perhaps because the chairman of the Commission came from another 
State--a fact that may or may not have had an effect on this 
situation's ultimate outcome--at the last minute Plattsburgh was put on 
the closing list and McGuire Air Force Base in the middle of the New 
York/Philadelphia skyway was used to replace it. The devastation in 
Plattsburgh was enormous. The BRAC Commission does not take into 
account areas where, when bases are closed, people will never find jobs 
again because they are shrinking areas. We are having the same problem 
in Utica. It was done so unfairly that I cannot support this amendment 
unless steps are taken to avoid the kind of politicization that 
occurred. I was not in the Senate then. I would have filibustered or 
done whatever I could to stop it because it was so unfair.
  Now we have only really two large non-Guard facilities left in New 
York State. They are: Fort Drum, a state-of-the-art 10th Mountain 
Division, a highly trained and mobile unit, those soldiers have served 
nobly in the Bosnian arena. We have Rome Labs, which is an information 
center for the Air Force. These days, as the tragedy of September 11 
showed us, military intelligence, information, and communication is the 
key.
  If I had faith that the decision would be made on the merits, I 
believe that neither of these bases would be on the list. They are both 
outstanding and important to our security and unique. Fort Drum is, 
again, one of the few bases in the East--Northeast--that does this. It 
is one of the few that can train mountain fighting in the kind of 
terrains that we will be called upon to be involved with in the near 
future. Rome Labs, with the work of Congressman Boehlert and myself, 
has chipped in $12.5 million to help revitalize, and it is doing state-
of-the-art research. I have no doubt that if a decision were made 
totally on the merits, those bases would not be on a BRAC list. Had not 
the sour experience of the Plattsburgh Air Force Base existed in my 
mouth, I would roll the dice and gamble, hoping and believing that a 
decision would be made on the merits. But I believe that that did not 
happen. I don't think New York should take another hit, especially with 
two such outstanding bases like Fort Drum and Rome Labs.
  So, as I said, I will reluctantly vote for this amendment. I would 
like to see some safeguards put in, and that we take into account areas 
that are shrinking in terms of population and in terms of jobs.
  Most important, I would like to see the process insulated from the 
kind of last-minute political horse trading that occurred and unfairly 
closed Griffiss and put McGuire in its place.
  I appreciate the work of my colleagues on the committee. I know their 
intentions are the best and, as I said in the past, before I reached 
the Senate, I had supported this process. I hope we can straighten it 
out so that decisions are completely made on the merits and I can 
support it again. But until that time, given, again, the bitter and 
unfair experience of our State, I cannot.
  Thank you, Madam President. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Ms. SNOWE. Thank you, Madam President.
  I rise today in strong support of the amendment that has been offered 
by the Senator from Kentucky to strike the base closing provisions 
within the DOD authorization bill.
  We all recognize that this is not business as usual. We also 
recognize how we will have to reevaluate many of the considerations 
that are included in the Defense authorization bill, many of the ways 
in which we viewed our military and our force structure prior to 
September 11.
  Even before the horrific attacks of September 11, I, along with many 
of my colleagues, had serious questions about the integrity of the base 
closing process itself, as well as the actual benefits realized. Now, 
with acts of war committed against the United States, with the 
President addressing a joint session of Congress that justice will be 
done, with our Reservists being called up and our troops being deployed 
and the unpredictability of the mission ahead, of the asymmetric 
threats, I do not believe this is the time to be considering the 
closure of additional bases.
  Indeed, now more than at any other time in recent history, I believe 
it is absolutely critical that this Nation not sacrifice valuable 
defense infrastructure when we have just committed ourselves to a new 
war on terrorism.
  This challenge will require a new overarching military doctrine, one, 
indeed, that has yet to be developed. One of the central goals of this 
administration has been to overhaul the military doctrine which has 
been in place since the cold war, requiring that the United States must 
be able to be engaged in and to win two major theater wars at the same 
time.
  Until a new doctrine has been determined, we cannot decide what the 
military infrastructure should be. Now with the announcement by the 
President of a Cabinet-level position responsible for homeland defense, 
we certainly do not know essentially what our requirements at home will 
be to provide for our national security interests. Until there is an 
assessment and cataloging of those needs, we simply cannot afford to 
determine what additional bases should be closed.

  I look at the Northeast, and in all the four previous rounds the 
Northeast has lost 49 bases, roughly 50 percent of what we had prior to 
the BRAC process; 73 of those bases, or just under 35 percent of the 
installations on the east coast, were closed during the previous four 
rounds.
  Although the Office of Homeland Security will not take the place of 
the Department of Defense, it obviously will be coordinating many of 
the law enforcement responsibilities of the myriad agencies across the 
Federal Government, and all of our military installations will no doubt 
play a critical and prominent role in our homeland security.
  Moreover, the war on terrorism will be a long-term challenge, as the 
President has said repeatedly. This will require a sustained resolve 
and effort on the part of the United States. It will employ U.S. 
military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel and resources. 
These forces will require the support of our domestic and overseas 
installations. This is all in addition to our existing force 
deployments and peacekeeping operations that we have in Bosnia and 
Kosovo and, of course, our logistical support in Macedonia.
  Instead of chasing elusive savings, I believe the Department of 
Defense needs to provide to the Congress a comprehensive plan that 
identifies the operational and maintenance infrastructure required to 
support the services' national security requirements. We all know that 
once the property is relinquished and remediated, it is permanently 
lost as a military asset for all practical purposes.
  Proponents of additional base closure rounds are quick to point out 
that reducing infrastructure has not kept pace with post-cold-war 
military force reductions. They say bases must be downsized 
proportionate to the reduction in total force strength. However, the 
fact of the matter is, there is no straight-line corollary between the 
size of our forces and the infrastructure required to support them. 
Belief that there is disturbs me. I heard it repeatedly when I served 
on the Senate Armed Services Committee and chaired the Seapower 
Subcommittee. I was in the House when this whole process began. I think 
about it in terms of the 1997 QDR, the Quadrennial Defense Review 
process.
  Since the end of the cold war, we have reduced the military force 
structure by 36 percent and have reduced the Defense budget by 40 
percent, but now I ask you: How much are we employing that force? 
Although the size of our armed service has decreased, the number of 
contingency operations that our service members, our men and women who 
are in the military, have been called upon to respond to in recent 
years has dramatically increased.
  As I said, I chaired the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in the last Congress. Guess what. The Navy and 
Marine Corps team alone responded to 58 contingent missions between 
1980 and 1989--58 between 1980 and 1989--and between 1990 and 1999 they 
responded to 192, a remarkable threefold increase.
  Between 1980 and 1989, they responded to 58 contingencies. But from 
1990 to 1999, in that entire decade, it was 192, and that is just for 
the Navy and Marine Corps alone.

[[Page S9717]]

  During the cold war, the U.N. Security Council rarely approved the 
creation of peace operations. In fact, it was a relatively rare event. 
I served on the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of 
Representatives, and I was the ranking member on the Subcommittee on 
International Operations. We rarely had such contingency operations. In 
fact, the U.N. implemented only 13 peace operations between 1948 and 
1978 and none--none--from 1979 to 1987. However, from 1988 through last 
year, by contrast, there were 38 peace operations, nearly 3 times as 
many during the previous 40 years.
  Madam President, as a former member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, and chair of the Seapower Subcommittee, I can attest that 
the Armed Services Committee has listened to our leaders in uniform 
testify that our current military forces have been stretched too thin, 
and that estimates predicted in the fiscal year 1997 QDR underestimated 
how much the United States would be using its military. Clearly, the 
benefits of the peace dividend were never truly realized. So, we are 
seeing first hand that the 1997 QDR force levels underestimated how 
much our military force was intended to be used, that our military 
force is beign called upon now more than what military strategies 
estimated, and that are forces are being stretched to cover a wide 
range of operations.
  Keep in mind, Mr. President, that force levels may have to be 
revisited once again in light of the new anti-terror mission our 
military faces, and may well require an increase. So would we then go 
and buy back property that we have given up in future base closure 
rounds to build new bases--I think not.
  Madam President, the Department of Defense contends there is 20 to 25 
percent excess infrastructure today. Before we legislate defense-wide 
policy that will reduce the size and number of training areas critical 
to our force readiness, the Department of Defense ought to be able to 
tell us, through a comprehensive plan, the level of operational and 
maintenance infrastructure required to support our shifting national 
security requirements. Congress, instead, is being pressed to 
authorized base closures essentially in the dark, without the upcoming 
Quadrennial Defense Review or Future Years Defense Plan. We will have a 
preliminary QDR in the near future, but it will have to be revised in 
light of the new threat facing this nation. How can we make fundamental 
decisions about our infrastructure needs before we even have any 
guidance from the QDR?
  In the full committee hearings and the subcommittee hearings that the 
Armed Services Committee held during the 106th Congress--while I sat on 
the committee, and chaired the Seapower Subcommittee--the Chief of 
Naval Operations and fleet commanders testified that the QDR-
established force levels were not sufficient to support their 
operational requirements. A report by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff concluded that the submarine force levels needed to be raised 
from the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and I anticipate that the next 
QDR will support an increase in the Navy force as well.
  We simply must not take the risk of losing critical infrastructure at 
this time. Not only have arbitrary comparisons of personnel and 
infrastructure levels never been the basis for military force structure 
changes . . . Not only has a direct correlation between force and 
facility level yet to be established . . . but the Department of 
Defense has said that the primary criteria for base closure will be 
military value tied to the forthcomong QDR. But this begs the question 
as to the validity of the QDR numbers--the 1997 QDR has been heavily 
criticized for getting the numbers wrong, particularly with regard to 
Naval fleet size. It could be premature and costly to predicate base 
closure decsions even on the 2001 QDR, until we knwo for certain what 
our needs will be as we confront the new terrorist threat. Critical 
assets such as waterfront property, airspace, and bombing ranges would 
be far more difficult and expensive to replace then troops, ships, and 
tanks.
  Proponents argue that the administration's approach will be based 
upon military value and removes parochial and political factors from 
the process, but in reality, the administration's Efficient Facilities 
Initiative is more similar to past BRAC rounds than one might think. 
Much has been made of the de-politicization of the process by including 
``military value'' and the other criteria in the legislation. However, 
review of the last process reveals that these criteria are nearly 
identical to those used in the 1995 round. This is very disturbing, 
because in my view, the past BRAC rounds were not fair or equitable, 
and were not based solely on military value. I have been through BRAC 
before. And I have to say, I know how the criteria can be twisted to 
the advantage or disadvantage of a given facility. In fact we had not 
one but two Air Force generals defending the former Loring Air Force 
Base before a past BRAC commission; yet the Air Force claimed its 
facilities were ``well below average''--and this despite the fact that 
$300 million had been spent there over a ten year period to replace our 
upgrade nearly everything on the base and it ended up being closed on 
so-called ``quality of life'' issues even though that was never 
supposed to be part of the criteria.
  I strongly believe Congress must also consider the economic impact of 
base closures on communities in light of the uncertainty regarding the 
nation's economy in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
Prior to that date, it was clear that the economy was slowing, perhaps 
even entering a recession. Today, there is a great deal of uncertainty 
about the state of the economy in the quarters to come.
  In August 2001, GAO issued an overview of the status of economic 
recovery, land transfers, and environmental cleanup in communities that 
have lost bases during previous BRAC rounds. GAO found that the short 
term impact of a base closure was traumatic for the surrounding 
community and that economic recovery was dependent on several factors 
including the strength of the national economy, federal assistance 
programs totaling more than $1.2 billion, and an area's natural 
resources and economic diversity.

  Keep in mind, Mr. President, this assessment was done during a time 
of unprecedented economic growth and as GAO stated, the health of the 
national economy was critical to the ability of communities to adjust: 
``Local officials have cited the strong national or regional economy as 
one explanation of why their communities have avoided economic harm and 
found new areas for growth.'' GAO also noted: ``Local officials from 
BRAC communities have stressed the importance of having a strong 
national economy and local industries that could soften the impact of 
job losses from a base closure.''
  With the slow-down of the economy, and the uncertainty brought about 
by the recent tragedy, it is doubtful that communities will be able to 
rebound even to the extent they have in previous years. Indeed, it is 
vital to note that not every community affected by base closures has 
fared so well in the past--those in rural areas still experienced above 
average unemployment and below average per capita incomes.
  In this vein, I would like to discuss for a moment the issue of the 
up-front costs involved in the base closure process. This appears to be 
noticeably absent from the debate. The facts reveal that there are, in 
fact, billions of dollars in costs incurred to close a base.
  These costs include over $1.2 billion in federal financial assistance 
provided to each affected community--a cost paid by the federal 
government, not through base closure budget accounts, and therefore not 
counted in the estimates. And more significantly, there is at least a 
$7 billion environmental cleanup bill so far as a result of the first 
four BRAC rounds--a conservative figure that will continue to grow, 
according to a December 1998 GAO report.
  Indeed, the Department of Defense has admitted that savings would not 
be immediate; that approximately $10 billion would be needed for up-
front environmental and other costs. The Department of Defense also 
projects that savings from 2003 closures would not materialize until 
2007.
  Advocates of base closure allege that billions of dollars will be 
saved, despite the fact that there is no consensus on the numbers among 
different sources. These estimates vary because, as the Congressional 
Budget Office explains, BRAC savings are really ``avoided costs.'' 
Because these avoided costs are not actual expenditures and cannot be 
recorded and tracked by the Defense

[[Page S9718]]

Department accounting systems, they cannot be validated, which has led 
to inaccurate and overinflated estimates.
  The General Accounting Office found that land sales from the first 
base closure round in 1988 were estimated by Pentagon officials to 
produce $2.4 billion in revenue; however, as of 1995, the actual 
revenue generated was only $65.7 million. That's about 25 percent of 
the expected value. This type of overly optimistic accounting 
establishes a very poor foundation for initiating a policy that will 
have a permanent impact on both the military and the civilian 
communities surrounding these bases.
  And the GAO has found that, in reality, the majority of land 
designated as excess in previous BRAC rounds is still in DOD 
possession. Moreover, GAO reports that environmental cleanup costs have 
been underestimated. So far, as I mentioned, $7 billion or 32 percent 
of BRAC-associated costs have been attributed to environmental 
cleanups. This figure is estimated to increase over $3.4 billion after 
FY01, $1 billion more than the $2.4 billion originally projected in 
1999.
  Lastly, when and if cost savings materialize, the Department of 
Defense intends to allow the services to retain savings and use the 
funding at their discretion. This does not guarantee that any freed up 
funding will go toward comprehensive modernization or quality of life 
improvements--one of the arguments employed in favor of the BRAC 
process.
  I believe that the Department of Defense has other long term 
alternatives to base closures that provide savings for important 
military programs. The 1997 Defense Reform Initiative included actions 
such as streamlining, paperless contracting, and reduction in staff 
personnel. These reforms were estimated to lead to approximately $3 
billion in savings. The new administration has proposed similar 
initiatives and efficiency improvements that could generate substantial 
savings.
  Madam President, I want to protect the military's critical readiness 
and operational assets. I want to protect the home port berthing for 
our ships and submarines, the airspace that our aircraft fly in and the 
training areas and ranges that our armed forces require to support and 
defend our Nation and its interests. I want to protect the economic 
viability of communities in every state. And I want to make absolutely 
sure that this Nation maintains the military infrastructure it will 
need in the years to come to support the war on terrorism. We must not 
degrade the readiness of our armed forces by closing more bases, 
certainly not at this time. Certainly not without information on our 
future defense needs that we do not have.
  Madam President, we say that we are going to have a Quadrennial 
Defense Review, and at least the preliminary report is expected to be 
forthcoming this month. Supposedly we predicate our infrastructure and 
our national security requirements on that report, and I know, having 
been a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, we listened to 
our leaders in uniform testify that our current military forces have 
been stretched too thin and that the estimates in that 1997 QDR, in 
fact, underestimated how much the United States would be using its 
military, how much our men and women would be called upon to be 
involved in contingency operations abroad.
  They have multiplied. So now we are seeing firsthand, even before 
September 11, that the forces established in the 1997 QDR 
underestimated how much our military force was intended to be used, 
that our military force is being called upon now more than what the 
military strategies estimated, and that our forces are being stretched 
to cover a wide range of operations.
  We know our force levels obviously may have to be revisited once 
again in light of the new antiterrorism our military faces. The threat 
that is represented to the United States and our security interests may 
well require an increase. How do we know exactly what infrastructure we 
need and where we need it? In hearing after hearing, I implored the 
Pentagon and the previous administration: Give us your plan, tell us 
what you think our infrastructure requirements will be, and based on 
what threats, that we will need to have so many installations and so 
many locations around the country. That is something we have never 
received.
  Now they say they base it on the 1997 QDR report. Well, we know that 
underestimated the utilization of our military forces. So now why would 
we want to put in place another base commission closing process, set it 
on an automatic path, when we have yet to receive the new Quadrennial 
Defense Review and how that will have to be reevaluated in light of the 
threat we now face with terrorism? It really does not make any sense.
  I know the Department of Defense has indicated there is a 20- to 25-
percent excess of infrastructure, but I do not know how we have arrived 
at that excess of this 20 to 25 percent because we have never had a 
plan. I know this is a new administration, and it is beginning to 
evaluate it, and obviously an enormous burden has been placed upon it 
as a result of September 11. Those of us who have been through the four 
previous rounds, who have been through the experience of this last 
decade with contingency operation upon contingency operation that has 
stretched our forces to the maximum--that has had a tremendous impact 
on their abilities, and they have performed in such a professional and 
skilled way, even in spite of all of the pressures as a result of doing 
so much more with less.
  So I say we have to really draw back. We cannot afford to put this 
process in an automatic motion for some course in the year 2003 because 
we have to go back and reexamine exactly what we need and why we need 
it.
  What message does it send to those who are deployed or those who are 
about to deploy, that somehow we are going to be downsizing at home? We 
might need those bases. I know the Senator from New York mentioned 
Plattsburgh, that it was a state-of-the-art facility. So too was Loring 
Air Force Base. It was on the base closing list and was closed in 1991, 
and we spent a total of $300 million providing every upgrade in that 
facility. It happened to be a base that was the closest base to Europe, 
to the Middle East, to Africa, to Russia, but we were told we are in a 
new era where it is no longer required.
  How do we really know, when we see the threat that occurred and the 
tragedy and the enormity of the impact of that attack on September 11? 
No one could have fully anticipated what has affected the United States 
and the civilized world.
  So I think it would be prudent on our part to recede from this 
predicate that somehow we have excess infrastructure because we really 
do not know. It is an uncertainty. It is as uncertain as the asymmetric 
threats that are now prevalent in the world today.
  So I hope the Senate will support this amendment to strike these 
provisions because we really do have to reexamine many of the issues 
that are now prevailing in our world of today. We do not know the 
validity of what numbers, from which report, will now be applicable in 
today's world with this threat of terrorism. I know from my own 
experience, not only with the four previous rounds and the base closing 
process, but also in terms of underestimating the number of times our 
men and women would be deployed in other parts of the world, and I know 
firsthand from the testimony that was provided to my subcommittee when 
I chaired the Seapower Subcommittee, that our forces were stretched too 
thin, that we could no longer absorb the demands being placed on us 
because we were being asked to do so much in so many places around the 
world.

  So now, in view of September 11, it is all the more prudent that we 
begin to examine what we need in America today to provide for our 
security, an acknowledgment that we have now had an attack on domestic 
soil that we heretofore did not anticipate in the manner in which this 
happened.
  I think we really do have to look very carefully at what our 
requirements will be in the future, because once these bases are lost, 
once you lose the waterfront property, once you lose the land, once you 
lose the access, it is very difficult to retrieve. It is very difficult 
to be able to create an installation in the manner in which it was 
established before.
  Also, we hear about the savings, and there is no doubt we ought to do 
everything we can to find savings within the Defense Department, as is 
true with all other budgets, but I have yet to see the methodology that 
is the rationale for

[[Page S9719]]

the savings the Defense Department has indicated have been created as a 
result of the four previous base closing rounds.
  I know the Defense Department claims there are $15.5 billion in net 
savings through fiscal year 2001 due to prior base closing rounds, but 
even in the July 2001 GAO report it indicated there were flaws with 
that estimate. And I quote: The savings estimates have been 
infrequently updated, and, unlike for estimated costs, no method or 
system has been established to track savings on a routine basis. Over 
time, this contributes to imprecision as the execution of closures or 
realignments may vary from original plans.
  That is true. It has been my experience, in examining what potential 
savings would be derived from these base closings, that they have 
traditionally underestimated the costs of closing such a base. They 
overestimated the savings and the benefits that would be yielded as a 
result of land sales. In fact, they were far below what they had 
originally estimated.
  The environmental cleanup costs have been underestimated. So far, $7 
billion, or 32 percent, of the BRAC-associated costs have been 
attributed to environmental cleanups, and this figure is estimated to 
increase over $3.4 billion after fiscal year 2001. These figures are 
for base closures already in progress. If another 20 to 25 percent of 
installations are closed, environmental costs can be expected to 
skyrocket. Increased costs in environmental cleanup have led to delays 
in the cleanup process and deferment of land transfer for reuse. This 
further cripples local communities already hurt by the base closures.

  There are a number of other issues regarding those savings, and I 
draw my colleagues' attention to the GAO report ``Military Base 
Closures, DOD's Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains Substantial'' 
dated July, 2001.
  In conclusion, this is not the time to ask this of our communities 
that would be directly affected by potential closures, the men and 
women who work at these installations. They have to use their energy, 
attention, and focus to begin to prepare for the arduous, complex, and 
burdensome process that we ask of those who are trying to defend these 
installations. It costs millions of dollars for communities across this 
country, with the installations at stake. In Maine, for example, a 
community in Brunswick has already established a committee to begin to 
reevaluate. Now, in light of September 11, that is not what we should 
be asking of anyone.
  We have to absolutely make sure this Nation maintains the military 
infrastructure it will require in the years to come to support all of 
our challenges, and certainly this new one, which is the war on 
terrorism. I hope we will not embark on this process that ultimately 
could lead to a degradation in terms of the readiness of our Armed 
Forces, certainly not at this time, not without information on our 
future defense requirements that we certainly do not have at our 
disposal at this point.
  I hope my colleagues will support the Senator from Kentucky in his 
effort to strike the language that creates this additional process. I 
thank Senator Lott, our leader, for all of his efforts. I know he has 
been supportive in making sure this can happen.
  Mr. LOTT. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Maine for her 
remarks and for her leadership in this area. She paid attention to 
these issues when she was in the House and served on the Armed Services 
Committee in the Senate and is very knowledgeable and makes such a good 
point. To go forward with this, with no plan, no certainty about where 
we are going in the future, would be a big mistake. I thank her for her 
efforts.
  Madam President, I rise in support of an amendment that strikes 
section 29 of the National Authorization Act of 2002. Section 29 
provides authority to carry out a base closure round in 2003.
  As this body considers yet another round of base closure hearings, I 
think it is very important that we pause and reflect on where we have 
been, and examine where we are, and particularly today, where we are 
going with our future force structure considering we find ourselves in 
a new war against terrorism.
  I've said it many times before; we have been down this ``old BRAC 
Road'' before, actually four times. The pros and cons of the BRAC 
process should be well defined by now.
  I have always opposed the BRAC process because, first and foremost, 
it is an abdiction of responsibility by Congress. For years, Congress 
made base closure decisions based on recommendations from our military 
leaders. This supposedly independent BRAC commission was supposed to 
take politics out of the base closure process, but it has failed. There 
are always concerns about the fairness of how it is done. There are 
always implications or indications that some political considerations 
came into play, and always will be.
  Regrettably there have already been statements from Defense 
officials, which hint at bases that should be reduced or moved. In a 
USA Today article Ray DuBois, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 
Installations and Environment, said the Pentagon wants to consolidate 
its bases by relocating some operations from congested areas to 
sparsely populated regions. He offered hints about moving training 
bases in the fast-growing Southeast to the Northern Plains State, 
whittling down some of the 150 military operations in the Norfolk, 
Virginia area, and moving activities out of Andrews Air Force Base.
  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently said the Pentagon was 
considering a variety of options, including mothballing some bases, 
mothball part of a base and keep the rest open, or close only part of a 
base. Mothballing means that even the surrounding community will be 
prevented from using the abandoned facilities, devastating any hope of 
economic development in these local communities.
  We must realize that an attempt to close bases, through any means, is 
in some form political. The future of our bases, our base communities 
and our Nation's security should therefore be decided by the elected 
officials of this nation, not by an appointed commission.
  Secondly, we know for certain that the BRAC process severely disrupts 
the local economies of communities across the nation. Statements like 
those coming out of the DOD in the past few months only exacerbate the 
anxieties of local communities. These communities have hired 
consultants and will spend millions of dollars trying to prove the 
worth of their bases out of fear that they will be closed.
  For such communities, losing a base is more than just an economic 
loss; it is an emotional loss and a blow to the core of their identity. 
These are not just nameless, faceless people involved. In most military 
communities, personnel from the base are their church leaders, little 
league coaches and scout leaders, not just men and women with money to 
spend. Communities that closed a base have lost must more than economic 
well being, they have lost friends. neighbors, and community leaders. I 
think it is very important that we remember what this process does to 
these communities and to the people who are involved.
  The third thing we now know about BRAC is that its savings cannot be 
documented. The economic and fiscal ramifications of closing and 
realigning bases Congress has already authorized will stretch well into 
the 21st century. The proposed savings from previous BRAC rounds are 
nothing more than imprecise Department of Defense estimates that cannot 
be confirmed.
  In fact, both the CBO and the GAO have said the Department of Defense 
cannot back up its savings estimates with hard facts. Given BRAC's 
purpose in life is to save money, I find this especially disturbing. If 
DOD cannot tell us how much has been saved by previous base closures, 
it begs the question, how can they say we need more?
  Now are know that it is almost impossible to assess the real damages, 
savings, or benefits from these previous base closings. We have seen 
this time and time again. For instance, we have made decisions that 
certain bases would be closed and there would be certain savings. Yet, 
we have found that it is very difficult to move toward closing these 
bases and getting the savings for no other reason than there are 
extensive environmental problems in cleaning up those bases before they 
can be turned over to the private sector or the local communities. To 
this day, many

[[Page S9720]]

of the recommendations from previous BRAC's have not been completed. We 
are still operating bases, facilities, or depots that supposedly were 
going to be closed. Today, they are still not closed.
  Finally, the objective of BRAC is to match base infrastructure with 
force structure. Yet today, the Department of Defense is working on 
their plan to transform our Armed Forces. In light of current events, I 
think we all agree that a new threat has emerged and a new type of war 
will be fought. I have to ask, what will be the force structure of the 
future? And, where will we need bases for operating, training, and 
maintaining this force? These are just a few of the questions that must 
be answered before we make a large-scale commitment to change our 
defense infrastructure.
  Secretary Rumsfield is still working on his Strategic Reviews to 
define the environment for the future and to make recommendations on 
force structure changes. He has stated that the fiscal year 2003 
Defense budget submission will be his first opportunity to implement 
these transformational ideas.
  DOD is also currently executing the Congressionally mandated 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and was scheduled to report to the 
Congress later this month on the results. I have no doubt this report 
will be delayed due to the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. This body 
has been patient, and continues to wait anxiously for these reviews 
because we know their importance to the future of our military. Why, 
then, would we make such an important decision as closing certain bases 
before these long awaited reports are even available?
  Without these key assessments, how do we define the base requirements 
for our future force? We have yet to decide not only what that force 
should be, but where it should be based. Now is not the time to get the 
proverbial ``cart in front of the horse.'' Another round of base 
closures should not occur until all of the studies and reviews have 
been completed and the President is given the appropriate time to 
update the National Security Strategy.
  So without having had an opportunity or a means to assess the changes 
in our infrastructure, and without having the opportunity to get 
previously identified bases closed and savings realized, and without 
even identifying the future force structure of our military, we now 
have to confront the recommendation that we should have yet another 
round of base closures. As a result of all these factors, CBO observed 
that additional base closures ``should follow an interval during which 
DOD and independent analysis examine the actual impact of the measure 
that have been taken.''
  I agree. Before we go forward, we need to take a look at what we have 
already done, evaluate it, and make sure we understand the cost savings 
and the costs that have been expended--both in financial terms and in 
terms of our military capabilities. Only after this review can we make 
an informed decision about whether or not to have another round. To go 
forward and blindly close more bases when we are not even sure what the 
benefits, if any, would be, just does not seem like good policy.
  I have stated to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and all the 
Service Chief of Staffs that if they desire another round I could only 
support a round that focuses on those areas identified with large 
excess capacity. This focused round would provide savings but not 
reduce infrastructure below what might be required by the future force.
  One area is overseas bases and facilities. The 1990 BRAC legislation 
outlines the sense of Congress that closure of military installations 
outside the United States should be accomplished at the discretion of 
the Secretary of Defense at the earliest opportunity.
  Yet today, we have over 700 activities in Europe and Asia alone. 
Europe has 523 activities with 115,650 active duty personnel. We 
invested $572 million in military construction in Europe from 1997-
2001. That equates to an average annual investment of $114.5 million 
per year. In Asia we have 188 activities with 129,482 active duty 
personnel. There are more troops in Asia than Europe but 60 percent 
less activities. The United States invested $653.8 million in military 
construction in Asia from 1997-2001. That equates to an average annual 
investment of $121 million per year.
  In a recent meeting with Secretary of the Army Tom White, he 
mentioned the possibility of moving 10,000 troops from the European 
theater to the Pacific theater. During a separate meeting, Deputy 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz mentioned transferring 10,000 troops from 
Europe back to the United States. Just last week on Friday, September 
14, President Bush granted the authority to mobilize 50,000 reserve 
personnel for Homeland Defense. How will these large-scale troop 
realignments affect our infrastructure requirements of the future?
  Why are we continuing to close installations in the United States 
when there are so many facilities overseas that we continue to sink 
large amounts of funds into year after year? In light of the events of 
September 11, I believe we need to consolidate overseas installations, 
therefore providing a more secure environment as well as improving the 
quality of life for our service-members and their families.
  These are some of the questions we need answered before we authorize 
an additional round of BRAC. If after the Strategic Reviews and the 
QDR, the required force structure supports further base closures, then 
I think DOD should identify bases they no longer feel are necessary and 
submit their finding to Congress. I have full faith that this body is 
capable of looking objectively at our defense needs and determining 
whether a base has outlived its usefulness.
  Given what we already know about BRAC, the ongoing reviews, and more 
importantly, what has happened in recent days, I cannot support and 
vigorously oppose the Department of Defense's request for another round 
of base closure.
  For that and many other reasons, I offer these amendments, one to 
strike and one to modify section 29 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. I hope my colleagues will 
support me on this important issue.
  I support and am a principal cosponsor of the amendment to strike 
section 29 of the national authorization act of 2002. That section 
provides authority to carry out the base closure round of 2003.
  As this body considers yet another round of base closure hearings and 
proceedings, I think it is important we pause and reflect on where we 
have been and examine where we are, and particularly, today, where we 
plan to be in the future with our force structure, considering the 
events we have witnessed in the last 2 weeks.
  I have said many times before we have been down this old BRAC road--
actually, four times--and there are pros and cons about whether we 
should do it.
  This time I have listened to the arguments of the Pentagon, and the 
Secretary of Defense and I have weighed it very carefully. I still 
oppose the process. I still think this is an abdication of 
responsibility, to turn decisions of this nature over to this Base 
Closure Commission. I have always taken that position. Some people, 
say, well, how did you plan to do it? How did we do it before? We 
started this process in the 1980s. The Pentagon would make decisions 
about excess capacity, bases we did not need, missions that were not 
necessary or could not be consolidated, and they sent a recommendation 
to the Congress. And the Congress would take it under advisement, 
sometimes accept the recommendation, sometimes reject it. In many 
instances, bases were closed in the late 1940s and 1950s and 1960s. I 
know of at least four bases in my immediate region that were closed, 
including one I believe in the 1970s, Brookley Air Force Base in 
Mobile, AL, bases around my State.
  Congress faced up to it. If it could be justified, if it can be, and 
we can be assured it will leave us the capacity to do what we need to 
do, I think Congress will step up to it. Some will say this is a way to 
get politics out of it. Really? How many think politics did not come 
into play the last time we had a base closure round? It clearly did. 
That is why many Democrats and Republicans in the Senate have opposed 
another BRAC process over the last 2 years.
  Some would have said 3 weeks ago that it is time we give it another 
chance, and we do have duplication and excess capacity. In my meetings 
with

[[Page S9721]]

the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries and 
representatives of the Office of Management and Budget, I have 
indicated I would do one round, not two, but also if it would be 
targeted to those places where we know we have redundancy or excess 
capacity; or, to put it conversely, where we know we are not going to 
close bases, then say it will not apply in these areas.
  By the way, one of the key questions I want to ask in my remarks: 
What about bases in other places of the world? We have given the 
Pentagon the authority to consolidate missions and close bases in 
Europe and other parts of the world, but they have done very little of 
it. In fact, I think one of the most interesting statistics I have come 
across anywhere is this: We have over 700 activities in Europe and Asia 
alone. Europe has 523 activities with 115,650 active-duty personnel. We 
have invested $572 million in military construction in Europe from 1997 
to 2001. That equates to an average annual investment of $114.5 million 
per year. Shouldn't we look at excess capacity and consolidation in 
Europe before we start closing bases and facilities we may need at 
home?
  Now I support and understand the need for having some Air Force bases 
in Europe, such as at Rhein-Main, and we need naval bases so we can 
project force. But when you look at the number of missions, where the 
missions are, what we are doing in Europe, you cannot help but realize 
they are snickering at us. They view it as economic development and 
jobs activity.

  I would like to make sure in fact something is going to be done in 
Europe before we start down this track of another base closure round in 
the United States. We have already had some hints at how this might 
work. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 
Environment was quoted as saying maybe we would want to accommodate 
bases by relocating some operations from congested areas to sparsely 
populated regions, even talking of moving bases from one region to 
another. I understand there is some denial of that or apology for it. 
Maybe it shows some of the thinking.
  We have also had the suggestion from the Pentagon that they were 
maybe considering a variety of options, including mothballing some 
bases, or mothballing part of a base and keeping the rest open or 
closing only part of that base. What that means is, even the 
surrounding community will be prevented from using the abandoned bases. 
That might be the worst of all worlds. We will not say yes or no. We 
will say, well, we might want to keep part of it, not this part, maybe 
mothball it, we will not turn it over to the county, community, the 
State, for them to do something else with it.
  I don't think this has been thought out. I don't think there is a 
plan of how this would work.
  We know for certain that the BRAC process severely disrupts local 
economies of communities across this Nation. If we have another BRAC, 
every community, every State in America for the next 2 years will have 
to hire some high-priced, high-powered consultants and lobbyists to 
tell them what to do. You are not talking about cheap money, you are 
talking about $200,000 a year, a quarter of a million a year. Everybody 
will get on their war footing to try to satisfy the anxieties. And, by 
the way, in many instances where they are not even going to be 
considered--or where they might be considered, but clearly in the end 
it will not happen. But let me tell you, that is what will happen.
  Here is one thing that worries me. I had this feeling basically 
before 2 weeks ago, but think about it now. Think about it today. Our 
National Guard units are being activated. Tankers from Meridian, MS, 
are flying overhead to keep our jets flying. Our Air Guard unit that 
has the C-141 cargo aircraft, they are going to be involved. You can be 
sure of that. We have already had reservists called up, medical units, 
intelligence units and military police forces.
  At a time when we are activating Reserve units and calling up Guard 
units and we are telling the American people: We have been attacked, 
get ready, be ready and break out the flags. Let's support our men and 
women in uniform--oh, gee, and by the way, your base may be on the base 
closure list.
  Great timing? This is a great way to rally the troops. While we are 
expanding and planning for the future and not really sure what all we 
are going to need, making demands on communities, individuals, every 
community in every State in America is about to be affected by this, 
and then we are going to come with this particular proposal? I don't 
think so, colleagues.
  Some people say: Don't worry, it will be taken care of in conference. 
I have counted on that before and it did not quite work out that way.
  So I hope my colleagues in the Senate will think about the timing of 
this. What are we to expect in the future?
  The third thing we now know about BRAC is the savings cannot really 
be documented. Again, we will get arguments there can be savings. Yes, 
maybe there should be savings in the future, but as a matter of fact 
the proposed savings from previous BRAC rounds are nothing more than 
imprecise Department of Defense estimates that cannot be confirmed. In 
fact, both the CBO and GAO have said the Department of Defense cannot 
back up its savings estimates with hard facts.
  One thing, the cleanup we have to go through, you can argue about 
whether it is necessary or not, and sometimes I think we go to the 
extreme on that. But the cleanup has been a big problem in terms of 
cost and also in getting it into some other usage.
  In some areas, some communities, some States, they have been able to 
turn these bases into economic development opportunities, and they 
worked out in those local communities. But I think the savings are of a 
very dubious nature.
  Finally, the objective of BRAC, as I understand it, is to match base 
infrastructure with force structure. Yet today the Department of 
Defense is working on their plan to transform our Armed Forces. In 
light of current events, we all agree a new threat has emerged and a 
new type of war will have to be fought. So I have to ask what will be 
the force structure of the future? What it likely may have been 3 weeks 
ago may not be what it is now. Where will we need bases for operating, 
training, and maintaining this force?
  Just this past weekend I heard an Air Force general talking about how 
our jets and our mission had always been set up and planned from inside 
out, looking out to stop attack. Now we have to change that thinking. 
We have to think about how do we have protection inward. It is going to 
be fundamentally different. We have to now think about, if we have to 
scramble planes, where would they have to come from to get to New York? 
Where would they have to come from to get to Chicago? Where would they 
have to come from to get to Boston? I understand we did have some 
planes scrambled out of Massachusetts. But we have to look anew at how 
we have this force structure and where these aircraft will come from, 
what type of forces we will need, what type of training will we need 
for our men and women.

  Secretary Rumsfeld is still working on his strategic review to define 
the environment for the future and to make recommendations of force 
structure changes. He stated that the fiscal year 2003 defense budget 
submission will be his first opportunity to implement these 
transformational ideas. If that is the case, shouldn't we at least wait 
until we know that before we move toward another base closure round?
  I have never supported a BRAC, but I have also never said I would not 
someday if I could be convinced there was a plan, that there was a 
force structure, that we knew what we were going to need and we could 
be shown there is duplication and redundancy and overlapping, things we 
did not need because of changes in plans for the future, and it would 
be aimed at those areas, not just a broad brush at every base.
  DOD is also currently executing the congressionally mandated 
Quadrennial Defense Review and was scheduled to report to Congress 
later this month on the results. I have no doubt this report will be 
delayed due to the terrorist attack.
  So I think I have made my point here. This could be done, but I think 
it would have to be done with more planning, with more indication of 
what our needs are going to be, what we want in the future, and with 
some targeting. But that is not what we have here.
  I say again, I think we need to take a look when we do it, not just 
at what

[[Page S9722]]

we have here in America but what we have around the world. We are going 
to have this new homeland defense position. Would we like to see how 
that is going to be formed and what their recommendations would be, 
before we start down this trail?
  I think that would be the responsible thing to do. This is an 
administration that I am very proud of. I have had a long relationship 
with Secretary Rumsfeld. I have listened to Secretary Cohen, my 
personal friend-- I sat next to him on the Armed Services Committee--
the Secretary of Defense with President Clinton; I have listened to the 
Pentagon officials this time around. I think they are the experts, but 
I think we have a responsibility to ask the tough questions.
  This time, the toughest question is, Are we ready? Do we know what we 
are doing, or is this just the knowledge that maybe we have some 
activities that we can do without? But is that the case today as it was 
2 weeks ago? I don't think we know.
  So I hope we will move on this amendment to strike. I appreciate the 
effort that has been made by the chairman and the ranking member to 
come with this bill. Concessions were made. Senator Daschle and I kept 
encouraging them to keep working and they did. They did a great job.
  I hate to stand up and speak on behalf of an amendment to strike 
anything out of this bill. I hoped basically we could just come 
together and get it done. I still think we can. There is no reason why 
we should not be able to get a list of amendments agreed to and 
complete this legislation tomorrow or Wednesday morning. I think that 
would be another important sign of how we are working together. We are 
doing the right thing for the defense of our country and our efforts to 
help the economy and help deal with the threats this country faces.
  The American people are saying they like seeing us do that. I think 
we should do it on this bill. But for now, I think we should do it 
without this section. I thank my colleagues for their patience and I 
yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent the list I shortly will send to the 
desk be the only first-degree amendments remaining in order to S. 1438, 
the Defense authorization bill, and that these amendments be subject to 
relevant second-degree amendments; upon disposition of all amendments, 
the bill be read a third time, and the Senate vote on passage of the 
bill with no intervening action or debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. GRAMM. Reserving the right to object, I was over here trying to 
do my reading homework. I am not sure I heard. Is the Senator asking 
that we limit amendments to the bill at this point?
  Mr. REID. Yes. The unanimous consent agreement I proposed just now, 
for the third or fourth time, is that we would have a finite list of 
amendments, not limiting the amendments but that the two managers would 
be able to sort through the amendments, find out which ones they agree 
with, those they want in the managers' amendment. Anyway, they would 
have a list of amendments.
  If we do not do that, I say to my friend from Texas, we will never 
finish the bill. This doesn't limit debate on any amendment. It doesn't 
limit the number of amendments that people would want to offer. But it 
would bring some finality to the list of amendments.
  Mr. GRAMM. Further reserving the right to object, I am hoping 
something can be worked out on a nondefense issue which has found its 
way into the bill. I am doing everything I can to expedite that, to get 
that issue out of the way. I think we can save time by working that 
out, if we can.
  On that basis I have to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. REID. I say to my friend, I know there are other items that need 
to be worked on tonight. I say to my friend from Texas, we are arriving 
at a point in this legislation where I simply do not think it works to 
have us on this bill. There are many other important issues we need to 
finish before Wednesday at 2 o'clock.
  One of the things we wanted to finish was this bill. The majority 
leader badly wanted to finish this bill.
  The President wants the bill. It is important for this institution 
and it is important for the country, but unless the managers get a list 
of amendments, we are not going to finish this bill.
  I suggest perhaps to the leader that tomorrow maybe we should go to 
some of the other legislation that has to be done before we get out of 
here on Wednesday. I know the Senator from Texas feels strongly about a 
matter that is in the bill. But I would suggest to him that he should 
offer an amendment, debate it, and let the cards fall where they may.
  But, as I said, the unanimous consent request that has been 
propounded does not limit debate or amendments in any way.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to the 
motion to strike BRAC from the Defense authorization bill and to speak 
on behalf of amendments that would put the money that we would save to 
better use in terms of our national security.
  We just elected a new President of the United States. He selected an 
outstanding management team: Colin Powell, Secretary of State; Donald 
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; people who are well seasoned in terms 
of our national security interests. It seems to me if that team we are 
entrusting the security of the United States of America to believes the 
BRAC process would be well taken in the best interests of the United 
States of America and would serve our national security needs that we 
ought to follow their leadership in that regard.
  If we have confidence in them moving forward with all the other 
aspects of securing our national defense, we ought to also give them 
some recognition and approval in terms of what they want to do in terms 
of our infrastructure and our bases in the United States and throughout 
the world.
  I hope the Members of the Senate will consider their recommendations.
  As recently as September 21 after the national tragedy on the 11th, 
Secretary Rumsfeld came back and said to the Armed Services Committee: 
We want it. We need it. Please give it to us.
  I urge my colleagues to pay attention to the folks to whom we have 
entrusted our security.
  Almost two weeks ago, the American people watched in horror as the 
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon unfolded 
before our very eyes.
  As the nation slowly recovers, the image that no one will forget is 
that of Fire, Police and emergency service personnel running towards 
the flames and destruction while terrified individuals ran the other 
way.
  These brave men and women knew they were racing into obvious danger, 
risking their own lives in order to save others, but each one knew--and 
accepted the fact--that it was their job to do so.
  Just three days after the attack on the Pentagon, I got an 
opportunity to see the devastation at that familiar landmark first-
hand.
  I was struck by the looks of quiet determination on the faces of the 
rescue personnel, each knowing the serious business they faced, and 
contemplating the serious business they have yet to do.
  Last Thursday, I was in New York City with 40 of my colleagues to 
tour the World Trade Center site. Standing at ``ground zero,'' seeing 
that devastation first hand, has sealed my resolve to do whatever I can 
to make sure that such terrorism is never again used upon the United 
States of America.
  It is important for the future of our nation--our children and 
grandchildren--that we support the President. The President was 
absolutely right in his speech to the nation last Thursday evening when 
he said ``Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy 
campaign unlike any other we have ever seen.''
  As I said on the floor of the Senate the day after this heinous 
attack, ``our actions must be ongoing and relentless, and be dedicated 
to excising the cancer of terrorism wherever it raises its ugly head.''
  And if we expect to win this war, we will need the resources 
necessary to do so, and the one resource we need above all others is 
human capital.
  The American people have demanded--and rightly so--that we make

[[Page S9723]]

our airports and commercial aircraft safer.
  They want this government to turn the full force of the FBI towards 
conducting investigations and pursuing terrorism suspects.
  They have urged us to beef-up our border patrols and strengthen our 
immigrations and customers enforcement.
  And most of all, they want this nation to use the full force of its 
intelligence, law enforcement and military apparatus to root out and 
squash every terrorist organization in the world.
  To ask their government to do these things is the right of every 
American, but these will not be easy tasks to accomplish, Mr. 
President.
  They will not be easy because at this moment, the federal government 
faces a human capital crisis; we are losing the very people we need to 
run our government--and their valuable experience--with each passing 
month.
  And as they retire, we are not doing enough to replace them with the 
``best and the brightest:'' the individuals who will carry-on the 
important work of our nation.
  The human capital crisis saps our strength as a nation, and at this 
critical time in our history, we cannot afford to be vulnerable.
  Since I was elected to the Senate, I have devoted a great deal of my 
time towards examining this crisis in the Federal workforce and how we 
can address it.
  I can tell you that we need a unified strategy to rebuild the federal 
civil service in light of the challenges it confronts--especially in 
the aftermath of the attack on our nation on September 11.
  The human capital crisis extends not just to our security and law 
enforcement agencies, but it includes virtually every department, 
agency, and office in the Federal Government.
  While the entire Federal Government is in need of a massive infusion 
of high quality human capital, I am most concerned about the workforce 
of the national security establishment, because national security is 
the most important responsibility of the Federal Government.
  On March 29, the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management 
held a hearing entitled, ``The National Security Implications of the 
Human Capital Crisis.''
  At the March 29 hearing that I chaired, former Defense Secretary 
James Schlesinger and Admiral Harry Train, United States Navy, retired, 
testified on behalf of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 
21st Century.
  The Commission, which was chartered by former Defense Secretary 
William Cohen in 1998 and chaired by former Senators Warren Rudman and 
Gary Hart, undertook a comprehensive evaluation of our national 
security strategy and structure.
  The final report of the Commission, ``Road Map for National Security: 
Imperative for Change,'' was released this past February. It includes 
50 recommendations on such areas as recapitalizing America's strengths 
in science and education, institutional redesign of critical national 
security agencies, the human requirements for national security, and 
securing the national homeland.
  On this latter point, I am pleased that the President has taken quick 
action to establish an Office of Homeland Security. The head of that 
office, Governor Tom Ridge is a friend of mine, and I know that he is 
more than able to face this challenge.
  Regarding human capital, the Commission's final report concludes:

       As it enters the 21st century, the United States finds 
     itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence 
     in government. The maintenance of American power in the world 
     depends on the quality of U.S. government personnel, civil 
     and military, at all levels. We must take immediate action in 
     the personnel area to ensure that the United States can meet 
     future challenges.

  The report went on the state that:

     . . . it is the Commission's view that fixing the personnel 
     problem is a precondition for fixing virtually everything 
     else that needs repair in the institutional edifice of U.S. 
     national security policy.

  The General Accounting Office's Comptroller General, David Walker, 
also pointed to the human capital crisis as a growing problem in our 
national security establishment, stating at a hearing I held in 
February that:

       At the Department of Defense, where a Defense Science Board 
     task force found that ``there is no overarching framework'' 
     for planning DOD's future workforce, civilian downsizing has 
     led to skills and experience imbalances that are jeopardizing 
     acquisition and logistics capacities. In addition, the State 
     Department is having difficulty recruiting and retaining 
     Foreign Service Officers . . .

  In fact, we have less people today applying to the Foreign Service. 
And of those people who we find meeting those very high standards, less 
of them are going in the Foreign Service than ever before.
  I believe Secretary Schlesinger and Comptroller General Walker hit it 
right on the head when it comes to human capital.
  Consider that we are currently making preparations to take on Osama 
bin Laden and his Taliban protectors and we don't have enough people 
who speak their language.
  Consider that the investigation that is underway by the FBI is 
hampered by a lack of language specialists.
  Indeed, the Washington Post reported on September 17 that:

     . . . although investigators are receiving large quantities 
     of data from documents and wiretaps, two well-placed former 
     law enforcement officials said the FBI suffers a lack of 
     Arabic linguists and analysts.

  In fact, the situation is such that, the United States is now 
advertising for anyone who speaks Farsi or Arabic to come forward and 
help out as translators in the aftermath of the September 11 tragedies.
  I do not know how many people in the national security establishment 
actually speak Farsi, but it is apparent that we do not have enough.
  And while I believe we need a full scale assault on human capital 
crisis in the Federal Government, again, the first and foremost 
obligation of the Nation is to ensure the defense of its citizens.
  For the last 2\1/2\ years, I have been working on a targeted piece of 
the human capital needs of the civilian defense workforce.
  I remind my colleagues that during the 1990s, over 280,000 Defense 
Department civilian positions were eliminated with little or no regard 
for workforce planning. On top of that, new hiring was severely 
restricted.
  Taken together, these two factors have inhibited the development of 
mid-level career, civilian professionals--the men and women who serve a 
vital role in the management and development of our Nation's military.
  To help remedy this, Senator DeWine and I amended last year's defense 
authorization bill and provided the Department with a special authority 
to reshape its workforce after a decade of significant downsizing.
  The authority provided to the Department last year allowed it to 
offer 1,000 voluntary separation incentive payments in fiscal year 
2001, and 8,000 total incentive payments and voluntary early 
retirements--4,000 in fiscal year 2002 and 4,000 in fiscal year 2003--
for the purpose of reshaping that workforce. Last year's defense 
authorization bill required these authorities to be reauthorized this 
year.
  Human capital is the Federal Government's most valuable resource, and 
this program is only a downpayment on the changes and authorities the 
U.S. will need to enact and implement to revitalize the civilian side 
of our defense establishment.
  The amendment Senator DeWine and I are offering to section 1113 of 
this bill is simple: it reauthorizes these important workforce 
reshaping proposals for both fiscal years 2002 and 2003.
  Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, OH, is an excellent 
example of the challenge facing military installations across the 
country. Wright-Patterson is the headquarters of the Air Force Materiel 
Command, employing 10,900 civilian Federal workers.
  By 2005, 40 percent of the workforce will be age 55 or older. Another 
19 percent will be between 50 and 54 years of age. Thirty-three percent 
will be in their forties. Only 6 percent will be age 35 to 39, and less 
than 2 percent will be under the age of 34.
  According to these numbers, by 2005--only 4 years from now--60 
percent of Wright-Patterson's civilian employees will be eligible for 
either early or regular retirement.
  There is a legitimate concern that when significant portions of the 
civilian workforce at Wright-Patterson and other military bases retire, 
including

[[Page S9724]]

hundreds of key leaders and employees with crucial expertise, the 
remaining workforce could be left without experienced leadership and 
most important institutional knowledge.
  Military base leaders--indeed, the entire Defense establishment--need 
to be given the flexibility to hire new employees so they can begin to 
develop another generation of civilian leaders and employees who will 
be able to provide critical support to our men and women in uniform.
  I thank Chairman Levin and Senator Warner for their support on this 
amendment.
  Incredibly, with a human capital crisis facing our Nation and the 
report on the vulnerability of U.S. security in the year 2000, it seems 
that the House of Representatives may not reauthorize the workforce 
reshaping program that Congress passed last year. We should be very, 
very concerned about this.
  If the provisions of our amendment are not included in the House 
bill, I would urge the House conferees to join in support of this 
amendment as the final version of the Defense Authorization Act is 
being developed.
  Let me state again that this amendment does not address all of the 
human capital needs of the Defense Department. It is just a small down 
payment.
  Additional action needs to be taken to help ensure that the 
Department of Defense recruits and retains a quality workforce so that 
our Armed Forces may remain the best in the world and be able to keep 
the world secure in the 21st century.
  I will continue to work towards that goal, and will be introducing a 
more comprehensive bill that not only responds to the human capital 
crisis in the U.S. security establishment, but in the entire Federal 
Government as well.
  In the wake of these attacks, our men and women in Government all 
across the Nation have a renewed sense of purpose--to keep America safe 
and preserve our freedoms. I have never seen more determination and 
patriotism in my entire life.
  Right now, law enforcement and military personnel are standing 
vigilant to watch over America.
  The Border Patrol, the Customs Service, and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service are closely monitoring who is coming into the 
United States and who is leaving.
  Active and reserve elements of the Air Force, Navy, and the Marine 
Corps have been and will continue to patrol the skies above Washington 
and other cities.
  The Navy and Coast Guard are guarding our ports and patrolling our 
waters. Tens of thousands of reservists have been called up to assist 
in these activities.
  At this moment, troops are being deployed in Southwest and Central 
Asia.
  In the days and weeks and months ahead, our brave soldiers, sailors, 
airmen and Marines will be called upon to risk their lives and, in some 
cases, give their lives in an effort to rid the world of the evil 
scourge of terrorism.
  Still, Mr. President, as much as we are asking our military personnel 
and our Government employees to do what we are asking them to do right 
now, more is going to be asked of them. More will be asked of them.
  We have a responsibility to the future generations of this Nation to 
give the Federal Government the tools it needs to help retain and 
attract the best and the brightest. I believe our amendment is a good 
first start towards getting that job done.
  I think all of us know, if we want to win the World Series or we want 
to win the Super Bowl, we need the best and the brightest. That is what 
we need. And the best and the brightest have not been coming to the 
Federal Government. In fact, I have talked to the dean of Harvard's 
John F. Kennedy School, Dean Nye. He is very concerned about the fact 
that 10 years ago, 70 percent of their brightest people would be going 
into Government; today it is around 40 percent. So we have a long way 
to go.
  I hope with this amendment we will be able to attract some of those 
people to our civilian defense establishment.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues, 
Senator Bunning in strong support of Amendment 1622. This important 
provision would prevent military base closures through 2003.
  In the light of the recent, tragic events, implementing another round 
of base closures could be a dangerous decision. We are entering a new 
phase of heightened national security in our great Nation. And 
President Bush has correctly warned of the continued threat to the 
security of the United States and its allies from terrorist groups and 
rogue states. I believe that base closures would not be in our 
country's best interest any time in the near future.
  While the defense budget can be increased in a matter of days for 
increased intelligence efforts or readiness assistance, the same is not 
true of the force structure or the base structure. Once property is 
converted to civilian use, as it would be under another round of Base 
Closures, it is, for all practical purposes, permanently lost as a 
military asset.
  I would like to draw attention to Malmstrom Air Force Base in my home 
State of Montana. After two weeks of rigorous evaluations, the 341st 
Space Wing's operations, security, maintenance, communications 
personnel, and equipment were recently given an ``excellent'' overall 
rating for Combat Capability Assessment. A very high mark! I'd like to 
congratulate them on a job well done.
  It would take months or even years to reach this state of 
effectiveness if we had to start from scratch to re-engage the base. To 
lose this asset in moments of heightened national security could 
permanently scar our force capability to respond.
  While protection of our national security and military readiness is 
enough of a reason to halt base closures, there are additional concerns 
to address, as well: first, while reducing spending is the main 
motivation behind base closures, studies have shown that the additional 
funds are never realized. The majority of savings comes from reduction 
of personnel, which is not directly tied to base closures. And 
reduction of personnel shouldn't be an option given the current 
circumstances. Second, there is no procedure for selecting which bases 
are closed. And that is very troubling. ``Military value'' is only the 
definition currently used and is open to interpretation. A concrete set 
of criteria must be developed before any further base closures are 
conducted.
  Since September 11, we have seen that our economic security is 
clearly tied to our national security. In order to bring strength to 
our economy, we must maintain strength in our military.
  We do not have months or years to wait while our bases are 
refurnished with military personnel, equipment and missions. If 
additional bases were closed, we would waste valuable resources as we 
scrambled to reinstate a base during a time of high security. Now is 
not the time to limit our military's ability to respond.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against further base closures and 
support amendment 1622.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise in support of this amendment to the 
Defense Authorization Bill.
  I must tell you that I have thought long and hard on the subject of 
base closings. The arguments for and against initiating another process 
which might lead to additional base closings have weighed heavily on my 
mind. I have the deepest respect for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and I 
know how hard he is working to find efficiencies and economies within 
the Department of Defense. I know he believes that a new base closing 
initiative is an important tool in his efforts to fix our defense 
infrastructure problems. However, I strongly believe that the events of 
September 11th changed this Nation's priorities. Now is not the time to 
engage in any type of activity that distracts from our national defense 
priorities.
  This is a pivotal time in our history. All our efforts and resources 
must be focused on fighting terrorism at home and abroad. At this time, 
I do not think that the time and money spent preparing for base 
closings will contribute to this effort. Military bases and the 
military establishment need to be focused on the war effort. Our 
military leaders and base commanders throughout the country do not need 
to be worrying about justifying their installations' existence. The 
communities around the bases do not need to be worrying about their 
future economic well-being. At a time when we,

[[Page S9725]]

as a Nation, face an uncertain future, we need not take on a process 
that is rife with uncertainty and turmoil and which distracts from our 
national goals.
  Additionally, we do not yet know what force structure will be 
required to accomplish all the missions associated with this new 21st 
century warfare. I believe it will take some time to determine what our 
military should look like. Why would we start a base closure process 
when we have no idea what shape or size our forces will take? Equally 
important, we do not know which bases will be key to our efforts in 
building an effective homeland security network.
  There is great debate about how much base closings cost and how much 
base closings save. In a time of economic uncertainty, I do not believe 
it is wise to spend millions of dollars on a base closure process. I am 
not willing to sacrifice the readiness of our armed forces for 
theoretical savings.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from Nebraska yield for an inquiry?
  Mr. NELSON of Nebraska. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am wondering if my friend from Oklahoma 
would agree with me on the following procedure, that after Senator 
Nelson speaks--I understand that is going to be on the BRAC amendment, 
I want to speak on the BRAC amendment--that unless others notify our 
Cloakrooms that they wish to speak on the BRAC amendment, at that point 
we would be done with the BRAC debate. We would then move to the 
amendments offered by the Senator from Oklahoma. I don't want to put 
that in the form of a UC, but I will state that would be my intention. 
I am wondering whether or not the Senator will concur.
  Mr. INHOFE. I do concur in that. In fact, I will go along with a UC 
to that effect, whatever the Senator wishes.
  Mr. LEVIN. We are not sure yet if anyone else wants to speak on BRAC. 
I would ask if any of our colleagues want to speak on the Bunning 
amendment, that they let our Cloakrooms know so we would then be able 
to accommodate those Senators before we move to the Senator's two 
amendments. I thank my friend from Nebraska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. NELSON of Nebraska. Mr. President, I rise in support of the 
amendment of the Senator from Kentucky to strike the BRAC language from 
the fiscal year 2002 Defense authorization bill.
  Senator Dorgan referred to Secretary Rumsfeld's label for BRAC, the 
Efficient Facilities Initiative, as ``Iffy.'' I have to agree with him. 
I think it is iffy in terms of cost, iffy in terms of our present force 
structure, and would be iffy to the morale of our troop force.
  On Tuesday, September 11, the strategic environment in which the 
United States operates was completely changed; certainly, as it relates 
to the military as well. Many issues that crowded our plate 
disappeared, and we have all begun to focus on the current crisis. I 
believe that change in environment involves base closures.
  I said at the time we were debating this issue during the Defense 
authorization bill that we should wait on the QDR before we voted to 
give the administration the ability to close bases. That point of view 
was not shared by every member of the Armed Services Committee, and 
accordingly the BRAC language was included in the authorization bill.
  We are now told that the Department of Defense will submit an on-time 
QDR to the Congress and that DOD has indicated they will send an 
amended QDR to us just as soon as they can at a later date to address 
the current crisis.
  Authorizing another round of BRAC without first reviewing the QDR and 
without first admitting that our strategic environment has shifted 
dramatically is a classical case of putting the cart before the horse. 
I didn't think that BRAC was right before September 11, and I don't 
think our military knows if it is right now.
  We know, for example, as a result of the September 11 events, our 
fighter jets are flying cover over major U.S. cities. Those jets need 
bases from which to fly in and out. It strikes me as a rather odd time 
to be closing bases.
  Now that we are in the process of creating a homeland defense office, 
what role will our bases play in the protection of our major cities? 
Will we need increased ground defenses which are located at bases which 
could otherwise be closed? What role will bases play in our new 
security structure? Again, we haven't had the opportunity to think this 
through and, therefore, we must, in fact, set aside the BRAC 
authorization at this time.
  Some say that BRAC will provide us significant cost savings. 
Certainly, I am for cost savings. Over the long term it may be 
possible, but no one disagrees that in the short run, BRAC costs money. 
Right now we need every bit of our resources, financial and otherwise, 
to address our significant force protection concerns.
  Finally, this sends a mixed message to the men and women who are now 
preparing to engage a new and terrible enemy. How can we be united as a 
country if we are adversely affecting morale? Now is the time to focus 
on reducing the threat of terrorism, not on relocating and uprooting 
families from bases. It would be inopportune to include this language 
in the Defense authorization bill, certainly at this time.
  Until I am presented with more persuasive evidence regarding this 
matter, I simply cannot support an initiative that could hamstring our 
homeland defense. And in my opinion, it might. Certainly I believe 
others share that view based on comments on the floor.
  Clearly, it would be prudent to strike the language in the best 
interest of our country and our military personnel at this time. Let us 
consider BRAC under less threatening circumstances, when we will have 
more information at our disposal and when we will know what the QDR 
expects from our military. Let us not act prematurely. Instead, let's 
exercise prudence and do the right thing for the right reason.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of the 
Bunning amendment because I don't think we are ready to make the 
decisions about which bases we are going to need. We didn't know before 
September 11 exactly what our troop strength was going to be in the 
future because we didn't have the reviews in place yet from the new 
administration.
  Today we know even less about the troop strength, and we certainly 
need to know how many we are going to have in our component 
organizations--the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines--before we make 
the decision on which bases we will need for the future.
  Also we need to know how we are going to do our training. What is the 
best place to do the training? I have visited bases overseas where we 
have training facilities, but we have limited airspace in some of 
those. We have limited missile range in some of those places.
  Is it better to do the training there or is it better perhaps to do 
it at a U.S. base where we have better facilities and more control over 
the airspace and the ground space? I don't know the answer to those 
questions. I know we should have the answer before we make a decision 
on whether we start closing bases.
  I have seen us do two things in previous base closings. I have seen 
us close bases that we then needed in the future. The Air Force has 
said that we should have kept some of the training bases in the United 
States opened, but they were already closed. It was too late to do 
anything about it.
  Secondly, I have not seen us estimate anywhere close to the true cost 
of closing a base. If I could get real numbers that showed that closing 
a base really saves money, I would consider having another round of 
base closings. But until we know what the environmental cleanup is, 
what the hazards are in each of these bases and what it is going to 
cost for that cleanup to put it in order for the base to either be sold 
or given back to the community, depending on what the arrangement is, 
there is no way I would support a base-closing commission.
  I think we are spending more closing these bases than we have keeping 
them open. I am the ranking member of the Military Construction 
Subcommittee. We have $150 million in that bill that is going to come 
to the floor in the next

[[Page S9726]]

few weeks, $150 million for environmental cleanup that was not 
anticipated in base closings.
  That is not the way we ought to do business. I don't think we ought 
to say that environmental cleanup is going to be $15 million and then 
all of a sudden have a bill for $150 million and say that is an 
efficient use of our assets. We have not done our homework yet.
  I am not saying I am never going to be for a base closing. I will be 
for a base closing, if I see what our troop strength is projected to be 
for the next 25 years or even 10 years, if I see that training is going 
to be done either in America or overseas, but we have studied where 
that training ought to be. In fact, I would support a study that would 
prepare us for a base-closing round. But I will not support another 
round of base closings until we have done our homework, until we have a 
study, until we know how this new war that we have just determined we 
must wage for the freedom of our country is going to be waged and how 
long it is going to take and where the bases might be needed. We 
probably will have more overseas bases. But are they going to be in the 
same places that they are now? Maybe not. Maybe we will have to build 
new bases in other sites.
  So I don't think we ought to be talking about closing things until we 
know what we are going to need in the future. I am not against base 
closings; I am just against doing it too soon, because I think we are 
throwing good money after bad if we don't have our ducks in a row and 
know exactly what our needs will be from the military construction 
standpoint.
  On the Military Construction Subcommittee, I did not like having to 
spend money on environmental cleanup, when I would have liked to have 
spent that money building better housing for our people, building more 
facilities to do the job that we know we must do. Yet we are still 
cleaning up bases that were closed 10 years ago. I don't think that is 
the way we ought to operate. We ought to operate with good business 
sense. We ought to decide what our troop strength is going to be, where 
we can best do the training, what our needs are going to be with this 
new war that we now know we must fight--and we know it is going to be 
tough. We are going to support the President and give him the resources 
he needs to make sure we win because freedom is at stake.
  The idea that we would have a premature round of base closings is a 
bad idea whose time has not come. So I appreciate the work of everyone 
here. I know we have legitimate disagreements on this issue. But I am 
going to support the Bunning amendment. I hope we can set it aside for 
this year.
  I have an amendment, which I have already offered, which I hope we 
can consider. It does have a study that would ask just the questions I 
have asked tonight. If we can answer those questions, then we can have 
base closings based on what we are going to need in the future, based 
on facts, based on studies, and knowing exactly what we are going to do 
before we take these steps. Most of all, we will know what the costs 
are going to be and how much could be saved and how much must be spent 
for those savings.
  Mr. President, I appreciate the work of the distinguished chairman 
and ranking member, and I hope we can pass the Bunning amendment. I 
also hope we can pass the Hutchison amendment that will provide studies 
for the future, and that we can do this in the right way and in a 
thoughtful way, in a way that will make sure we do right by our men and 
women in the services and protect them wherever they may be in the 
world.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, a number of arguments have been raised this 
afternoon about the Bunning amendment which would strike the BRAC 
language from our bill. By the way, this is the first time the Armed 
Services Committee--at least within my memory--has adopted a bill for 
an additional round of base closings on a very strong bipartisan vote. 
It was adopted because the civilian and uniformed leadership of our 
Armed Forces pleaded with us to allow them to get rid of excess 
structure, which costs a lot of money and makes it impossible for us to 
do the things we want to do to modernize Air Forces, make them more 
ready and more lethal, to make them more mobile, to give them greater 
pay, because we are spending billions of dollars on infrastructure we 
do not need.
  For the last 4 years, Senator McCain and I have come to this floor 
and said our leadership is asking for the authority--just the 
authority--to have another round of base closings. It has been denied 
year after year. We have been told ``this is not the time,'' year after 
year. We have been told we should have a study year after year. As a 
matter of fact, in 1997 there was a study that was substituted for the 
round of base closings. The April 1998 report contained 1,800 pages of 
detailed backup material for why we should have another round of base 
closings.
  I think the most important question that has been raised is, Does 
September 11 change all this? That, to me, is the real vital issue. We 
wanted to get the thinking of our uniformed and civilian leadership on 
that issue because, surely, I think each one of us--and perhaps no one 
more than the person occupying the chair now--would want to know what 
is the effect of the events of September 11. I want to read a letter we 
have received because even though parts of it have been used before, it 
seems to me this letter addresses that most pungent of all questions. 
This is from Donald Rumsfeld, dated September 21. The same letter was 
written to both myself and to Senator Warner. It reads as follows:
       I write to underscore the importance we place on the 
     Senate's approval of authority for a single round of base 
     closures and realignments. Indeed, in the wake of the 
     terrible events of September 11, the imperative to convert 
     excess capacity into warfighting ability is enhanced, not 
     diminished.
       Since that fateful day, the Congress has provided 
     additional billions of taxpayer funds to the Department. We 
     owe it to all Americans--particularly those service members 
     on whom much of our response will depend--to seek every 
     efficiency in the application of those funds on behalf of our 
     warfighters.
       Our installations are the platforms from which we will 
     deploy the forces needed for the sustained campaign the 
     President outlined last night. While our future needs as to 
     base structure are uncertain and are strategy dependent, we 
     simply must have the freedom to maximize the efficient use of 
     our resources. The authority to realign and close bases and 
     facilities will be a critical element ensuring the right mix 
     of bases and forces within our warfighting strategy.
       No one relishes the prospect of closing a military facility 
     or even seeking the authority to do so, but as the President 
     said last evening, ``we face new and sudden national 
     challenges,'' and those challenges will force us to confront 
     many difficult choices.
       In that spirit, I am hopeful the Congress will approve our 
     request for authority to close and realign our military base 
     facilities.
  Mr. President, I hope we will have the will to do something that is 
not easy. This is not easy for any Member for his facilities and his 
State to do; we know that. That is why facilities were not closed until 
we had commissions that were in place. We make a recommendation to the 
President, and the President would then have a right under our approach 
to either say yes or no to the entire list. If he says yes, Congress 
has the right to say yes or no to the entire list.
  This does not abdicate responsibility to a base-closing commission. 
What it does is it permits us to shed excess infrastructure that is 
costing us billions, that is detracting from the ability of our 
warfighters to fight a war, because it means billions of dollars which 
should go into that effort are instead being spent to maintain 
structure that is no longer needed.
  We would not put excess baggage on a warfighter. We would not tell 
that warfighter you have to carry a larger load than is necessary. By 
keeping bases open, that is exactly what we are doing. We are denying 
the warfighter the resources that would otherwise go into what is 
needed in the Defense Department.
  That is the issue. The issue, if anything, it seems to me, is sharper 
since 9-11. More than ever, we must avoid waste. More than ever, we 
must have the will to make tough choices. We have done a lot of things 
that have been difficult, and we have done a lot of things differently 
since 9-11 in this Congress. We have come together on a lot of issues 
that we thought we could not come together on, and we have avoided the 
kind of dissension and debate in which our people do not want us to 
engage.

[[Page S9727]]

  Now we have our military leadership and the President of the United 
States pleading with us to allow them to get rid of excess 
infrastructure 2 years down the road. That is the plea from our 
President, that is the plea from our military leadership, civilian and 
uniformed: to allow them to begin the process 2 years from now of 
removing excess infrastructure.
  I hope we have the will to do that, to respond to the men and women 
of our military who have much greater needs than excess infrastructure.
  We have been told also that we should be closing more bases overseas 
instead of starting this process here. Since the end of the cold war, 
the Department of Defense has closed 59 percent of our overseas sites 
compared to about 21 percent of our domestic sites. They do not need 
authority legislatively to close overseas facilities. They have that 
without our action, and they have been able to close 59 percent of the 
overseas sites. That is quite a difference from what they have closed 
in this country. So I do not think that argument works either.
  Then we have been told as well that we should know what we want in 
our force structure before we move for some additional flexibility on 
our base structure. We ought to know what our force structure is going 
to be, and there is no doubt about that. Before the base structure is 
concluded, surely we must know, or should know, what the force 
structure is going to look like. That is why in this bill we require 
that ``the Secretary shall carry out a comprehensive review of the 
military installations of the Department of Defense inside the United 
States based on the force structure plan submitted under section A(2). 
. . .'' And that plan is very specific. That is part of the budget 
justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the budget 
for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2003: The Secretary shall 
include a force structure plan for the Armed Forces based on the 
assessment of the Secretary in the Quadrennial Defense Review under 
another section.
  The force structure plan is required by our law. We have heard many 
times this afternoon and this evening, and correctly, that we ought to 
base our base structure on our force structure and we do not know what 
that force structure is going to be.
  The answer is we know that the force structure must be determined 
prior to the base structure recommendations that go to the Base Closure 
Commission and then from them to us. It is a requirement of law.
  The Senators who have made this point are right; we should know our 
force structure before we know our base structure, but the inaccuracy 
is in their argument that we will not know that force structure prior 
to the decision on base structure, both by the Defense Department, in 
terms of their recommendation to the Base Closure Commission, and by 
the Base Closure Commission in their recommendations back to the 
President and to us.
  The one final point I will make this evening has to do with cost. The 
argument has been made that there either have not been savings or that 
the savings have not been demonstrated, or that there has been no proof 
of the savings, or that the savings have not been precise. We have GAO 
report after GAO report saying that--and I will reading from one:

       Our work has consistently affirmed that the next savings of 
     the four rounds of base closures and realignments are 
     substantial and are related to decreased funding requirements 
     in specific operational areas.
       In addition to our audits, review by the Congressional 
     Budget Office, the Department of Defense Inspector General, 
     the Army Audit Agency have affirmed the net savings are 
     substantial after initial investment costs are recouped.

  The Defense Department has even attempted to give us a very precise 
document as to what those savings are. They have made a real effort 
year by year, item by item, to tell us where there have been costs, 
where there have been savings, starting in 1990 for each round of base 
closures.
  They have come up with net savings to date of approximately $16 
billion. Total savings, and I am rounding this off, is $37 billion. 
That is gross savings. Those are total costs of about $21 billion--
again I am rounding that off--with the savings to date of $16 billion.
  Recurring savings from those rounds each year are now about $6 
billion per year. That is what we are saving because Congress had 
enough courage to walk down this road, and believe me, I know it takes 
courage. It is not an easy vote. I have been through a few. We have 
lost our strategic air command bases. We have some other bases, other 
facilities that are very nervous about the possibility that maybe in 
the next round they will be caught. So this is not an easy vote, but it 
is a cost-effective vote. It is a vote that the President, his 
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, every military 
leader we have ever had in front of our committee, civilian or 
uniformed, is pleading with us to make.
  The plea, it seems to me, is more eloquent than ever after September 
11 because it is so critically important that we not load down our 
defense with unneeded infrastructure anymore than we would load down a 
soldier with unneeded baggage. They are related.
  I hope that tomorrow we will cast this vote. The country will be 
looking at us, the Nation will be looking at us to see whether or not 
we are willing to do some tough things that our uniform and our 
civilian leadership in the Defense Department and our President are 
calling upon us to do. I cannot think of any way more eloquently to 
state this cause, other than to read from a letter of August 30 from 
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Shelton. I expect we will be hearing 
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on this same issue before we vote 
tomorrow.
  This letter, which I will make part of the Record, makes a very 
potent case for saving the money. I ask unanimous consent that the 
letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                  August 30, 2001.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     Hon. John W. Warner,
     Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner: We are writing to 
     underscore how critically important it is that Congress 
     authorize the Department to conduct another round of base 
     closures and realignments.
       The Department must reshape and restructure its 
     installations to serve the country's national security in the 
     21st century. Currently, our installations do not match and 
     therefore do not adequately serve our current and projected 
     force structure. Under-utilized facilities, estimated to be 
     23 percent DoD wide, are a waste of public resources and an 
     impediment to our efforts to protect our national security.
       Because current law makes it virtually impossible for the 
     Department to make prudent decisions in managing its 
     facilities, we can only rectify these problems through a 
     Congressionally authorized round of base closures and 
     realignments in 2003. Drawing on the process from past 
     rounds, the Efficient Facilities Initiative is an objective 
     way to rationalize an infrastructure on the basis of military 
     value, verified by an independent commission. In addition, 
     both the General Accounting Office and the Congressional 
     Budget Office confirm DoD's savings estimates from prior 
     rounds.
       The Department is committed to accomplishing the necessary 
     reshaping and restructuring in a single round of base 
     closures and realignments to minimize the difficulty these 
     efforts pose to communities surrounding our bases. While the 
     process may be hard, the record from our previous rounds 
     indicates that the majority of affected communities actually 
     emerge in a better economic condition than prior to the 
     closure or realignment. As before, the Department will work 
     closely with these communities in fostering economic reuse.
       We know you share our concerns that additional base 
     closures are a necessity to provide resources necessary to 
     meet essential national security requirements. We simply must 
     take action. Please do not hesitate to call on us in your 
     efforts to secure passage of this important legislation.
           Sincerely,
                                    General Henry H. Shelton, USA,
                            Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
                                               Donald H. Rumsfeld,
                                             Secretary of Defense.

  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend my colleague for his strong 
stance on base closure. He and Senator McCain have worked for a number 
of years on this issue.
  I do not know how many years ago it was I joined on that legislation, 
and then, of course, we had a problem with the previous administration. 
Anyway, I was with them up until that problem arrived. So it is indeed 
long overdue.
  Even though I am proud to say my State has a very significant share 
of

[[Page S9728]]

military installations, I stand with my colleagues and the vote of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee because I think that is what it should 
be, an efficiency that should be given to the Secretary of Defense. We 
need these savings. We need them desperately.
  Mr. President, I believe that concludes the remarks on base closure. 
I see the Senator from Oklahoma, one of our valued members of the 
committee. He wishes to, as I understand it, lay down two amendments 
for tonight, and then the chairman and I will proceed to do a number of 
cleared amendments. Am I correct?
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is correct. We now hopefully will turn to our 
friend from Oklahoma to offer two amendments. I think one of them we 
may be able to accept, although I am not sure if that is true, on both 
sides. If that is true, and I think the Senator knows which one that 
is, he can offer that one first.
  Mr. WARNER. That would be----
  Mr. INHOFE. The amendment on the waiver process.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.


                           Amendment No. 1594

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, in an effort to try to get this bill 
through, which America desperately needs now, I had about 16 amendments 
on which I worked out arrangements and understandings with other people 
so that I am down to only three amendments. Of these three amendments, 
as was suggested by the Senator from Michigan, one is without 
controversy, I thought, until about 5 minutes ago.
  My understanding is one Republican Senator is going to object to it. 
That being the case, we will have to have a rollcall on that amendment.
  I would like to explain that amendment and hopefully that one Senator 
would be available and tell us if she is not going to object to it.
  Mr. President, for quite a number of years we have had a debate, when 
we do our defense authorization bills, on an issue that is in place in 
order to keep an internal ability to handle depot maintenance in areas 
where it might be considered to be core maintenance; in other words, 
areas where it is necessary to have that ability in order to fight a 
war. The concern has been this: With the decreasing number of defense 
contractors and the decreasing number of people who are able to perform 
certain maintenance functions, if we are in a war, we would not want to 
be held hostage by a single contractor who would be able to keep us 
from being able to do it internally.
  For that reason, some time ago we passed a law that said under that 
60/40 bill, which is now 50/50 in our statute, simply this, that 50 
percent of the maintenance has to be performed in-house by a depot 
capable of doing it without outside help. For that reason--and I agree 
with those who disagree with the 50/50 concept, that this is merely an 
arbitrary figure, but there has to be some type of a figure and we have 
not been able to come up with anything since then that is any better 
than this. So the law now says that 50 percent of the maintenance has 
to be done internally by a public depot.

  There is a way they have been able to get around 50/50, and that is 
if any of the service secretaries say that within their service they 
could declare there is a national security reason that for 1 year or 
one period of time we are not going to be able to do 50 percent of the 
maintenance work in a public depot, if they do that, they do not have 
to give any reason for it, but they merely say this is for national 
security.
  This has happened a few times so we have gone back to the service 
secretaries and we have said to them: Tell us why it is as much as 50 
percent of the maintenance in a public depot. We have never gotten any 
good answers, and then we have also asked them afterwards: What are you 
going to do to ensure that we are going to be able to meet this 50 
percent in the next fiscal year? And we have not been able to do that.
  I am not saying this critically of any particular service secretary. 
We need to know why, if we are going to find a loophole around one of 
our existing laws, this being the 50/50, it is necessary, and what we 
are going to do in the future to prevent that from being invoked.
  So my amendment does simply two things: One, it takes that 
jurisdiction away from the service secretary and puts it with the 
President of the United States. He then can delegate it back to the 
Secretary of Defense. If he is going to say that there is a national 
security reason that we cannot do 50 percent of the work at a public 
depot, he has to say why that is and what they are planning to do to 
correct that in the next fiscal year. That is all it does.
  So if people are opposed to the 50/50 concept, fine. Let us pass a 
bill or try to pass a bill to do away with 50/50. That is not the 
issue. The issue is if we are going to use a national security waiver 
to waive 50/50 for a given year, we need to make sure we know why we 
are doing it and what can be done for the next year to keep from having 
to do that. So that is simply it.
  I was hoping we might have a note from the Senator. We do, and there 
will be apparently one vote against this.
  So that is an explanation, and I am going to ask that this be voted 
on tomorrow.
  I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment has not been sent up yet.
  Mr. INHOFE. Yes, the amendment is at the desk. It has been there 
since last week.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a minute?
  Mr. INHOFE. Yes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator call up his amendment so it will be 
pending immediately after the disposition of the Bunning amendment?
  Mr. INHOFE. I call up amendment No. 1594 and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is 
set aside. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1594.

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

     (Purpose: To authorize the President to waive a limitation on 
   performance of depot-level maintenance by non-Federal Government 
                               personnel)

       At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:

     SEC. 335. REVISION OF AUTHORITY TO WAIVE LIMITATION ON 
                   PERFORMANCE OF DEPOT-LEVEL MAINTENANCE.

       Section 2466(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
     to read as follows:
       ``(c) Waiver of Limitation.--(1) The President may waive 
     the limitation in subsection (a) for a fiscal year if--
       ``(A) the President determines that--
       ``(i) the waiver is necessary for reasons of national 
     security; and
       ``(ii) compliance with the limitation cannot be achieved 
     through effective management of depot operations consistent 
     with those reasons; and
       ``(B) the President submits to Congress a notification of 
     the waiver together with--
       ``(i) a discussion of the reasons for the waiver; and
       ``(ii) the plan for terminating the waiver and complying 
     with the limitation within two years after the date of the 
     first exercise of the waiver authority under this subsection.
       ``(2) The President may delegate only to the Secretary of 
     Defense authority to exercise the waiver authority of the 
     President under paragraph (1).''.

  Mr. WARNER. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INHOFE. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There appears to 
be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, then there would be additional debate 
available on this amendment because there has been no time agreement 
relative to this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. As I understand--perhaps the Chair can confirm--after 
disposition of the Bunning amendment at approximately 9:45 a.m. or 10 
a.m. tomorrow, the debate on the first amendment of the Senator from 
Oklahoma would recur; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That would then be the pending question, the 
Senator is correct.

[[Page S9729]]

  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent, so that we can sequence 
amendments, if the Senator from Oklahoma is willing, that we now set 
aside the pending amendment and the underlying amendment to allow the 
Senator from Oklahoma to offer an additional amendment, and then part 
of that unanimous consent agreement will be we will then immediately, 
after he lays down his second amendment, come back to the Bunning 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
pending amendment will be set aside.


                           Amendment No. 1595

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I send Senate amendment No. 1595 to the 
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1595.

  Mr. INHOFE. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To revise requirements relating to closure of Vieques Naval 
                            Training Range)

       On page 380, after line 15, insert the following:

     SEC. 1066. CLOSURE OF VIEQUES NAVAL TRAINING RANGE.

       (a) Conditional Authority.--Title XV of the Floyd D. Spence 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as 
     enacted by Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654A-348) is 
     amended by striking sections 1503 and 1504 and inserting the 
     following new section:

     ``SEC. 1503. CONDITIONS ON CLOSURE OF VIEQUES NAVAL TRAINING 
                   RANGE.

       The Secretary of the Navy may close the Vieques Naval 
     Training Range on the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico, and 
     discontinue live-fire training at that range only if the 
     Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine 
     Corps jointly certify that the training range is no longer 
     needed for the training of units of the Navy and the Marine 
     Corps stationed or deployed in the eastern United States.''.
       (b) Actions Related to Closure.--(1) Section 1505 of such 
     Act (114 Stat. 1654A-353) is amended--
       (A) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:
       ``(a) Time for Taking Actions.--The actions required or 
     authorized under this section may only be taken upon the 
     closure of the Vieques Naval Training Range by the Secretary 
     of the Navy.'';
       (B) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``Not later than May 
     1, 2003, the`` and inserting ``The'';
       (C) in subsection (d)(1), by striking ``pending the 
     enactment of a law that addresses the disposition of such 
     properties'';
       (D) in subsection (e)(2), ``the referendum under section 
     1503'' and all that follows and inserting ``the Secretary of 
     the Navy closes the Vieques Naval Training Range.''; and
       (E) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) Military Use of Transferred Property During War or 
     National Emergency.--
       ``(1) Temporary transfer by secretary of the interior.--
     Upon a declaration of war by Congress or a declaration of a 
     national emergency by the President or Congress, the 
     Secretary of the Interior shall transfer the administrative 
     jurisdiction of the Live Impact Area to the Secretary of the 
     Navy notwithstanding the requirement to retain the property 
     under subsection (d)(1).
       ``(2) Training authorized.--Training of the Armed Forces 
     may be conducted in the Live Impact Area while the property 
     is under the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary of 
     the Navy pursuant to a transfer made under that paragraph 
     (1). The training may include live-fire training. Subsection 
     (b) shall not apply to training authorized under this 
     paragraph.
       ``(3) Return of property to secretary of the interior.--
     Upon the termination of the war or national emergency 
     necessitating the transfer of administrative jurisdiction 
     under paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Navy shall transfer 
     the administrative jurisdiction of the Live Impact Area to 
     the Secretary of the Interior, who shall assume 
     responsibility for the property and administer the property 
     in accordance with subsection (d).''.
       (2) The heading of such section is amended to read as 
     follows:

     ``SEC. 1505. ACTIONS UPON CLOSURE OF THE VIEQUES NAVAL 
                   TRAINING RANGE.''.

       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 1507(c) of such Act is 
     amended by striking ``the issuance of a proclamation 
     described in section 1504(a) or''.

  Mr. INHOFE. This amendment is one further that there may be some 
opposition to and it is going to require the yeas and nays, but I will 
briefly say what we are doing with this. The issue of the Vieques 
training range has been a contentious one now for a number of years. We 
did resolve this in such a way that there would be a referendum that 
would take place on November 6, where the eligible voters among the 
population of 9,300 people on the Island of Vieques would vote as to 
whether or not the Navy should continue naval training operations on 
the range.
  A lot of things have happened since then. I agreed with that. That 
was my language in the Defense authorization bill last year. However, 
since that time we have found we are deploying east coast deployments 
to the Persian Gulf. A lot of these battle groups have not been able to 
have adequate training. Since that time we had the war declared upon us 
by the terrorists on the 11th of September. That has changed 
everything.
  Since that time we have had Puerto Rico come and say they want to 
support the training of our troops. We currently have, being debated 
now, a resolution in the legislature in Puerto Rico that is going to 
say: ``We Puerto Ricans, as proud American citizens with the same 
responsibilities as our brethren in the continental United States, have 
the obligation of contributing to this fight, allowing and supporting 
military training and exercises on the island municipality of 
Vieques.''
  Vieques is a municipality of Puerto Rico.
  What we believe is a solution to this now and should be put on this 
bill as an amendment is language that would do away with the referendum 
of November 6. There are several reasons why. One reason is the policy 
is not a good policy. I never believed it was. Prior to the events of 
September 11, we thought this was something that would resolve that 
issue.
  This amendment would do two things. It would do away with the 
referendum of the 6th of November; two, it would say we would continue 
to do as the law provides today, until such time as both the CNO of the 
Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps sign a certificate saying 
that training is no longer needed. I cannot think of a worse time to 
force our military to stop training than right now. Right now we should 
be enhancing training.
  That is a very simple amendment, one to which there may be some 
opposition. However, it merely says that, at least in the time being, 
do not have a referendum, but continue to train our troops as they are 
deployed in these battle group deployments, from the east coast and 
elsewhere, until such time as the CNO and the Commandant agree that 
training is no longer necessary.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator has received, in accordance 
with your request, a communication from the Department of Defense.
  Does the Senator wish to include it in the Record?
  Mr. INHOFE. First, I will read the last paragraph:
       Senator Inhofe's amendment, SA 1595, supports the Defense 
     Department's request to repeal the local referendum and 
     provides for transfer of the eastern property to the 
     Department of Interior, following cessation of training. 
     Unlike the Department's proposed legislation on Vieques, 
     however, the amendment does not provide for a date certain 
     departure. Nonetheless, the Department believes that the 
     amendment does not constrain the Department's ability to 
     define and meet its training needs and the target departure 
     date may still be achieved. To the extent that the amendment 
     offered by Senator Inhofe, SA 1595, is not inconsistent with 
     the Department's legislative proposal and underlying intent, 
     we interpose no objection.

  I ask unanimous consent this entire letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                       Department of the Navy,

                                Washington, DC, 24 September 2001.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Levin: As you are aware, the Department of 
     Defense previously submitted proposed legislation that would 
     eliminate the requirement in Section 1503 of the Floyd D. 
     Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2001, requiring a referendum among the Vieques electorate on 
     whether the people of Vieques approve or disapprove of the 
     continuation of training beyond May 1, 2003. Consistent with 
     the commitments made by both the President and the Department 
     of the Navy, the Navy is actively planning to discontinue 
     training operations on the island of Vieques in May of 2003 
     and is committed to identifying alternatives to Vieques from 
     both a geographical and technological standpoint to provide 
     effective military training. Consequently, a referendum 
     regarding continuation of training past this point in time is 
     no

[[Page S9730]]

     longer necessary. I still believe that conducting a local 
     referendum on issues critical to the Department of Defense 
     sets a bad precedent and strikes at the heart of military 
     readiness. Enacting legislation that does away with this 
     requirement will avoid such a precedent and potential domino 
     effect on our other military training ranges.
       Senator Inhofe's amendment, SA 1595, supports the Defense 
     Department's request to repeal the local referendum and 
     provides for transfer of the eastern property to the 
     Department of Interior, following cessation of training. 
     Unlike the Department's proposed legislation on Vieques, 
     however, the amendment does not provide for a date certain 
     departure. Nonetheless, the Department believes that the 
     amendment does not constrain the Department's ability to 
     define and meet its training needs and the target departure 
     date may still be achieved. To the extent that the amendment 
     offered by Senator Inhofe, SA 1595, is not inconsistent with 
     the Department's legislative proposal and underlying intent, 
     we interpose no objection.
           Sincerely,
                                                Gordon R. England,
                                            Secretary of the Navy.

  Mr. INHOFE. I am happy to respond to any questions, and if there are 
no questions, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. INHOFE. The amendment I will not bring up is the amendment having 
to do with incorporating the language of our energy policy in this 
bill.
  The question could be asked, Is this an issue that should be put into 
the Defense authorization bill? I served as chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee for 5 years. I can assure Members 
there is no time in our history that should be more clear that we will 
have to do something about our dependency on the Middle East for our 
ability to fight a war. Right now, we are 56.6-percent dependent upon 
foreign sources for our ability to fight a war. That is not acceptable.
  I remember back in the early 1980s during the Reagan administration I 
criticized the Republicans and Democrats alike. We have been trying to 
get an energy policy since the Reagan administration. We tried at that 
time. We introduced one. We were unable to get it done.
  We tried during the Bush administration, certainly thinking that a 
President coming out of the oil patch would understand why we cannot be 
dependent upon foreign sources for our ability to fight a war. We were 
unsuccessful. We were unsuccessful during the Clinton administration. 
We started during the Carter administration.
  I have an amendment that will put a policy into effect. I have two 
amendments. One adopts the House language and the other is to adopt the 
language of the energy bill that is proposed in the Senate. I will not 
bring it up and debate it tonight because I want to do it when 
everybody is here. This is very significant.
  Right now, on a daily basis, we are becoming more and more dependent 
upon foreign sources for our energy supply. By the end of this decade 
it is projected to be in excess of 60 percent. We will become 60-
percent dependent upon foreign sources for our ability to fight a war.
  I remember a few years ago Don Hodel, Secretary of the Interior, and 
I used to go to consumption states and make speeches as to how the 
outcome of every war--back to and including the First World War--has 
been who controlled the energy supplies. We have gone through the 1990 
war, the Persian Gulf war. In 1991, we remember the words of Saddam 
Hussein who said, ``if we had waited for 10 years to go into Kuwait, 
the Americans would not have intervened because we would have a missile 
we could shoot over at them.'' And now we are dependent upon the Iraqis 
for our imported oil.
  It is very much an issue. There has been a lot of things floating 
around, including letters saying they are saying this has to do with 
ANWR. It doesn't. I only say this is an issue that should be addressed 
on this bill, and sometime tomorrow or the next day I will debate this 
and call for a vote on this.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. We are ready to handle a series of amendments and 
complete our work on this bill before the Senate tonight.


                           Amendment No. 1660

  Mr. WARNER. I offer an amendment on behalf of myself and my 
distinguished colleague, the chairman, Mr. Levin. This amendment would 
eliminate the cap costs that the Congress very wisely and appropriately 
placed on the costs of the overall renovation of the Department of 
Defense. Given the tragic attack on September 11--and, coincidentally, 
that attack was directed at a portion of the building which was the 
subject of the very contract on which this cap rests--we think it is 
wise, now, the chairman and I, that the cost of repairing this area of 
the Department of Defense just would not enable us to work within this 
cap as now established in current law.
  This amendment has been cleared by the chairman on his side. I 
believe we are ready to proceed on it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself and Mr. 
     Levin, proposes an amendment numbered 1660.

  Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

                           AMENDMENT NO. 1660

  (Purpose: To repeal the limitation on the cost of renovation of the 
                         Pentagon Reservation)

       Strike section 2842, relating to a limitation on 
     availability of funds for renovation of the Pentagon 
     Reservation, and insert the following:

     SEC. 2842. REPEAL OF LIMITATION ON COST OF RENOVATION OF 
                   PENTAGON RESERVATION.

       Section 2864 of the Military Construction Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1997 (division B of Public Law 104-201; 110 
     Stat. 2806) is repealed.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we support Senator Warner's amendment. It 
is obvious the circumstances have changed in a massive way. Senator 
Warner knows, probably more than anybody I know of, firsthand, what the 
necessity is out there. We certainly support his amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, once again, I thank my distinguished 
colleague. He and I went out there to the Department of Defense just a 
matter of a few hours following that attack to join the Secretary of 
Defense. I think it is important we adopt this amendment, so I urge the 
adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 1660) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


               Amendments Nos. 1661 through 1670, En Bloc

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I send to the desk now 10 amendments and 
ask they be considered and agreed to en bloc and any statements 
relating to the amendments be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself and Mr. 
     Warner, proposes amendments numbered 1661 through 1670, en 
     bloc.

  Mr. WARNER. The chairman has correctly represented to the Senate the 
status of this bloc of amendments. We concur, of course.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendments.
  The amendments Nos. 1661 through 1670 were agreed to, en bloc, as 
follows:


                           amendment no. 1661

 (Purpose: To authorize emergency supplemental appropriations made for 
                           fiscal year 2001)

       At the end of subtitle A of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1009. AUTHORIZATION OF 2001 EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL 
                   APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR RECOVERY FROM AND 
                   RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       (a) Authorization.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated 
     to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2001 in the 
     Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398) are 
     hereby adjusted by the amounts of appropriations made 
     available to the Department of Defense pursuant to the 2001 
     Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from 
     and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States.

[[Page S9731]]

       (b) Quarterly Report.--(1) Promptly after the end of each 
     quarter of a fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 
     the House of Representatives a report on the use of funds 
     made available to the Department of Defense pursuant to the 
     2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery 
     from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States.
       (2) The first report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted 
     not later than January 2, 2002.
       (c) Proposed Allocation and Plan.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the 
     Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 15 
     days after the date on which the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget submits to Committees on Appropriations 
     of the Senate and House of Representatives the proposed 
     allocation and plan required by the 2001 Emergency 
     Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and 
     Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, a 
     proposed allocation and plan for the use of the funds made 
     available to the Department of Defense pursuant to that Act.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 1662

  (Purpose: To authorize the use of contractors to provide logistical 
           support to the Multinational Force and Observers)

       At the end of subtitle B of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1217. ACQUISITION OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR SECURITY 
                   FORCES.

       Section 5 of the Multinational Force and Observers 
     Participation Resolution (22 U.S.C. 3424) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d)(1) The United States may use contractors to provide 
     logistical support to the Multinational Force and Observers 
     under this section in lieu of providing such support through 
     a logistical support unit composed of members of the United 
     States Armed Forces.
       ``(2) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) and section 
     7(b), support by a contractor under this subsection may be 
     provided without reimbursement whenever the President 
     determines that such action enhances or supports the national 
     security interests of the United States.''.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 1663

(Purpose: To clarify the use of State Department authority to contract 
  for personal services in support of activities of the Department of 
    Defense and other departments and agencies of the United States)

       At the end of subtitle B of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1217. PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTS TO BE PERFORMED BY 
                   INDIVIDUALS OR ORGANIZATIONS ABROAD.

       Section 2 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 
     1956 (22 U.S.C. 2669) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(n) exercise the authority provided in subsection (c), 
     upon the request of the Secretary of Defense or the head of 
     any other department or agency of the United States, to enter 
     into personal service contracts with individuals to perform 
     services in support of the Department of Defense or such 
     other department or agency, as the case may be.''.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 1664

   (Purpose: To provide SBP eligibility for survivors of retirement-
 ineligible members of the uniformed services who die while on active 
                                 duty)

       At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:

     SEC. 652. SBP ELIGIBILITY OF SURVIVORS OF RETIREMENT-
                   INELIGIBLE MEMBERS OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES 
                   WHO DIE WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY.

       (a) Surviving Spouse Annuity.--Section 1448(d) of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking paragraph (1) and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(1) Surviving spouse annuity.--The Secretary concerned 
     shall pay an annuity under this subchapter to the surviving 
     spouse of--
       ``(A) a member who dies while on active duty after--
       ``(i) becoming eligible to receive retired pay;
       ``(ii) qualifying for retired pay except that the member 
     has not applied for or been granted that pay; or
       ``(iii) completing 20 years of active service but before 
     the member is eligible to retire as a commissioned officer 
     because the member has not completed 10 years of active 
     commissioned service; or
       ``(B) a member not described in subparagraph (A) who dies 
     in line of duty while on active duty.''.
       (b) Computation of Survivor Annuity.--Section 1451(c)(1) of 
     title 10, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) by striking ``based upon his years of active service 
     when he died.'' and inserting ``based upon the following:''; 
     and
       (B) by adding at the end the following new clauses:
       ``(i) In the case of an annuity payable under section 
     1448(d) of this title by reason of the death of a member in 
     line of duty, the retired pay base computed for the member 
     under section 1406(b) or 1407 of this title as if the member 
     had been retired under section 1201 of this title on the date 
     of the member's death with a disability rated as total.
       ``(ii) In the case of an annuity payable under section 
     1448(d)(1)(A) of this title by reason of the death of a 
     member not in line of duty, the member's years of active 
     service when he died.
       ``(iii) In the case of an annuity under section 1448(f) of 
     this title, the member's years of active service when he 
     died.''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``if the member or 
     former member'' and all that follows and inserting ``as 
     described in subparagraph (A).''.
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The heading for subsection 
     (d) of section 1448 of such title is amended by striking 
     ``Retirement-Eligible''.
       (2) Subsection (d)(3) of such section is amended by 
     striking ``1448(d)(1)(B) or 1448(d)(1)(C)'' and inserting 
     ``clause (ii) or (iii) of section 1448(d)(1)(A)''.
       (d) Extension and Increase of Objectives for Receipts From 
     Disposals of Certain Stockpile Materials Authorized for 
     Several Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 1999.--
     Section 3303(a) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261; 
     112 Stat. 2262; 50 U.S.C. 98d note) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (3);
       (2) in paragraph (4)--
       (A) by striking ``$720,000,000'' and inserting 
     ``$760,000,000''; and
       (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``; 
     and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(5) $770,000,000 by the end of fiscal year 2011.''.
       (e) Effective Date and Applicability.--This section and the 
     amendments made by this section shall take effect as of 
     September 10, 2001, and shall apply with respect to deaths of 
     members of the Armed Forces occurring on or after that date.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 1665

 (Purpose: To provide for the construction of a parking garage at Fort 
                            DeRussy, Hawaii)

       At the end of subtitle D of title XXVIII, add the 
     following:

     SEC. 2844. CONSTRUCTION OF PARKING GARAGE AT FORT DERUSSY, 
                   HAWAII.

       (a) Authority To Enter Into Agreement for Construction.--
     The Secretary of the Army may authorize the Army Morale, 
     Welfare, and Recreation Fund, a non-appropriated fund 
     instrumentality of the Department of Defense (in this section 
     referred to as the ``Fund''), to enter into an agreement with 
     a governmental, quasi-governmental, or commercial entity for 
     the construction of a parking garage at Fort DeRussy, Hawaii.
       (b) Form of Agreement.--The agreement under subsection (a) 
     may take the form of a non-appropriated fund contract, 
     conditional gift, or other agreement determined by the Fund 
     to be appropriate for purposes of construction of the parking 
     garage.
       (c) Use of Parking Garage by Public.--The agreement under 
     subsection (a) may permit the use by the general public of 
     the parking garage constructed under the agreement if the 
     Fund determines that use of the parking garage by the general 
     public will be advantageous to the Fund.
       (d) Treatment of Revenues of Fund Parking Garages at Fort 
     DeRussy.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, amounts 
     received by the Fund by reason of operation of parking 
     garages at Fort DeRussy, including the parking garage 
     constructed under the agreement under subsection (a), shall 
     be treated as non-appropriated funds, and shall accrue to the 
     benefit of the Fund or its component funds, including the 
     Armed Forces Recreation Center-Hawaii (Hale Koa Hotel).
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 1666

  (Purpose: To modify the authority for the development of the United 
    States Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, 
                             Pennsylvania)

       Strike section 2841, relating to the development of the 
     United States Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle 
     Barracks, Pennsylvania, and insert the following:

     SEC. 2841. DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMY HERITAGE AND 
                   EDUCATION CENTER AT CARLISLE BARRACKS, 
                   PENNSYLVANIA.

       (a) Authority To Enter Into Agreement.--(1) The Secretary 
     of the Army may enter into an agreement with the Military 
     Heritage Foundation, a not-for-profit organization, for the 
     design, construction, and operation of a facility for the 
     United States Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle 
     Barracks, Pennsylvania.
       (2) The facility referred to in paragraph (1) is to be used 
     for curation and storage of artifacts, research facilities, 
     classrooms, and offices, and for education and other 
     activities, agreed to by the Secretary, relating to the 
     heritage of the Army. The facility may also be used to 
     support such education and training as the Secretary 
     considers appropriate.
       (b) Design and Construction.--The Secretary may, at the 
     election of the Secretary--
       (1) accept funds from the Military Heritage Foundation for 
     the design and construction of the facility referred to in 
     subsection (a); or
       (2) permit the Military Heritage Foundation to contract for 
     the design and construction of the facility.
       (c) Acceptance of Facility.--(1) Upon satisfactory 
     completion, as determined by the Secretary, of the facility 
     referred to in subsection (a), and upon the satisfaction of 
     any and all financial obligations incident thereto

[[Page S9732]]

     by the Military Heritage Foundation, the Secretary shall 
     accept the facility from the Military Heritage Foundation, 
     and all right, title, and interest in and to the facility 
     shall vest in the United States.
       (2) Upon becoming property of the United States, the 
     facility shall be under the jurisdiction of the Secretary.
       (d) Use of Certain Gifts.--(1) Under regulations prescribed 
     by the Secretary, the Commandant of the Army War College may, 
     without regard to section 2601 of title 10, United States 
     Code, accept, hold, administer, invest, and spend any gift, 
     devise, or bequest of personnel property of a value of 
     $250,000 or less made to the United States if such gift, 
     devise, or bequest is for the benefit of the United States 
     Army Heritage and Education Center.
       (2) The Secretary may pay or authorize the payment of any 
     reasonable and necessary expense in connection with the 
     conveyance or transfer of a gift, devise, or bequest under 
     this subsection.
       (e) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may 
     require such additional terms and conditions in connection 
     with the agreement authorized to be entered into by 
     subsection (a) as the Secretary considers appropriate to 
     protect the interest of the United States.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 1667

  (Purpose: To waive a restriction on the use of funds that adversely 
 affects compliance with a requirement in law for Federal agencies to 
                 utilize consensus technical standards)

       At the end of subtitle C of title XI, add the following:

     SEC. 1124. PARTICIPATION OF PERSONNEL IN TECHNICAL STANDARDS 
                   DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES.

       Subsection (d) of section 12 of the National Technology 
     Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (109 Stat. 783; 15 
     U.S.C. 272 note) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new 
     paragraph (4):
       ``(4) Expenses of government personnel.--Section 5946 of 
     title 5, United States Code, shall not apply with respect to 
     any activity of an employee of a Federal agency or department 
     that is determined by the head of that agency or department 
     as being an activity undertaken in carrying out this 
     subsection.''.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 1668

 (Purpose: To authorize use of Armed Forces Retirement Home Trust Fund 
     funds for a blended use, multicare facility at the Naval Home)

       Strike section 303 and insert the following:

     SEC. 303. ARMED FORCES RETIREMENT HOME.

       (a) Amount for Fiscal Year 2002.--There is hereby 
     authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2002 from the 
     Armed Forces Retirement Home Trust Fund the sum of 
     $71,440,000 for the operation of the Armed Forces Retirement 
     Home, including the United States Soldiers' and Airmen's Home 
     and the Naval Home.
       (b) Amounts Previously Authorized.--Of amounts appropriated 
     from the Armed Forces Retirement Home Trust Fund for fiscal 
     years before fiscal year 2002 by Acts enacted before the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, an amount of $22,400,000 shall 
     be available for those fiscal years, to the same extent as is 
     provided in appropriation Acts, for the development and 
     construction of a blended use, multicare facility at the 
     Naval Home and for the acquisition of a parcel of real 
     property adjacent to the Naval Home, consisting of 
     approximately 15 acres, more or less.
                                  ____



                           AMENDMENT NO. 1669

  (Purpose: To require a study and report on the interconnectivity of 
 National Guard Distributive Training Technology Project networks and 
                  related public and private networks)

       At the end of subtitle C of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1027. COMPTROLLER GENERAL STUDY AND REPORT ON 
                   INTERCONNECTIVITY OF NATIONAL GUARD 
                   DISTRIBUTIVE TRAINING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT 
                   NETWORKS AND RELATED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
                   NETWORKS.

       (a) Study Required.--The Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall conduct a study of the interconnectivity between 
     the voice, data, and video networks of the National Guard 
     Distributive Training Technology Project (DTTP) and other 
     Department of Defense, Federal, State, and private voice, 
     data, and video networks, including the networks of the 
     distance learning project of the Army known as Classroom XXI, 
     networks of public and private institutions of higher 
     education, and networks of the Federal Emergency Management 
     Agency and other Federal, State, and local emergency 
     preparedness and response agencies.
       (b) Purposes.--The purposes of the study under subsection 
     (a) are as follows:
       (1) To identify existing capabilities, and future 
     requirements, for transmission of voice, data, and video for 
     purposes of operational support of disaster response, 
     homeland defense, command and control of premobilization 
     forces, training of military personnel, training of first 
     responders, and shared use of the networks of the 
     Distributive Training Technology Project by government and 
     members of the networks.
       (2) To identify appropriate connections between the 
     networks of the Distributive Training Technology Project and 
     networks of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, State 
     emergency management agencies, and other Federal and State 
     agencies having disaster response functions.
       (3) To identify requirements for connectivity between the 
     networks of the Distributive Training Technology Project and 
     other Department of Defense, Federal, State, and private 
     networks referred to in subsection (a) in the event of a 
     significant disruption of providers of public services.
       (4) To identify means of protecting the networks of the 
     Distributive Training Technology Project from outside 
     intrusion, including an assessment of the manner in which so 
     protecting the networks facilitates the mission of the 
     National Guard and homeland defense.
       (5) To identify impediments to interconnectivity between 
     the networks of the Distributive Training Technology Project 
     and such other networks.
       (6) To identify means of improving interconnectivity 
     between the networks of the Distributive Training Technology 
     Project and such other networks.
       (c) Particular Matters.--In conducting the study, the 
     Comptroller General shall consider, in particular, the 
     following:
       (1) Whether, and to what extent, national security concerns 
     impede interconnectivity between the networks of the 
     Distributive Training Technology Project and other Department 
     of Defense, Federal, State, and private networks referred to 
     in subsection (a).
       (2) Whether, and to what extent, limitations on the 
     technological capabilities of the Department of Defense 
     impede interconnectivity between the networks of the 
     Distributive Training Technology Project and such other 
     networks.
       (3) Whether, and to what extent, other concerns or 
     limitations impede interconnectivity between the networks of 
     the Distributive Training Technology Project and such other 
     networks.
       (4) Whether, and to what extent, any national security, 
     technological, or other concerns justify limitations on 
     interconnectivity between the networks of the Distributive 
     Training Technology Project and such other networks.
       (5) Potential improvements in National Guard or other 
     Department technologies in order to improve interconnectivity 
     between the networks of the Distributive Training Technology 
     Project and such other networks.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit 
     to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     House of Representatives a report on the study conducted 
     under subsection (a). The report shall describe the results 
     of the study, and include any recommendations that the 
     Comptroller General considers appropriate in light of the 
     study.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 1670

   (Purpose: To provide eligibility for senior officers of the Armed 
 Forces to serve as Deputy Directors of facilities of the Armed Forces 
                            Retirement Home)

       On page 346, line 20, insert after ``professional'' the 
     following: ``or a member of the Armed Forces serving on 
     active duty in a grade above major or lieutenant commander''.


                           amendment no. 1667

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to discuss an amendment to the 
Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act which will serve to 
assist our military in their continuing transformation into a more 
efficient fighting force, ready to meet the threats of the 21st 
century. It amends the National Technology Transfer Act of 1995 in 
order that the Federal Government can use appropriated funds for 
personnel to participate in meetings to set technical standards for 
products, manufacturing processes, and management practices of interest 
to the military. Specifically, it eliminates an obscure technical 
restriction established by an 89-year-old statute so that the Federal 
Government will be able to cover the expenses of those employees 
participating in standards activities critical to the Department.
  The amendment is consistent with previous act of Congress, Department 
of Defense policy and Governmentwide policy to support efforts to 
replace Government-unique standards wherever possible with standards 
developed jointly with the private sector and other interested parties. 
There are major Federal savings and national security improvements that 
can result from this participation. I am proud to be joined by Senator 
Santorum in this effort. I thank my colleagues' for their support for 
this technical amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay the motion to reconsider on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the aftermath of the despicable terrorist

[[Page S9733]]

attacks continue to weigh heavily on our hearts, and I again express my 
deepest sympathy to those lost and injured in the attacks, as well as 
their families. We will do everything in our power to bring all of 
those responsible to justice and I am confident that our military, both 
active and reserve, stand ready to act in response to act. Congress 
will see that they are given all they need to accomplish the missions 
they are given.
  This bill increases defense spending. It focuses on improving 
readiness, and also improving service member quality of life. It 
contains the largest defense spending increase in many years. At $329 
billion, a $33 billion increase over last year, this bill represents a 
significant new investment in service members and the nation's 
security.
  As chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee, I have strongly advocated 
strengthening Navy, Marine Corps and Strategic Lift forces. The 
worldwide presence of our armed forces requires at least a 300-ship 
navy. The Navy is facing a serious shortfall in the numbers of ships 
available to meet the Nation's future security needs. This bill fully 
funded the President's request for most major programs, including the 
Virginia Class attack submarine, the DDG-51 AEGIS Destroyer, research 
and development for the DD-21 land attack destroyer, and 13 additional 
C-17 airlift aircraft.
  The bill also supports a series of transformation initiatives, 
especially the Trident submarine conversion. The Navy's budget called 
for converting only two of these submarines. The bill includes an 
increase of $307 million to reserve the option of converting all four 
submarines. I believe that these converted submarines can make a 
significant contribution to the Navy in the future.
  The committee also considered the V-22 Osprey program and the future 
role of this aircraft. We agree that the production line needs to 
remain open and we have authorized the minimum sustaining production of 
nine aircraft. It is the committee's belief that the minimum sustaining 
rate is nine rather than twelve aircraft. This reduced number of 
aircraft will also limit future retrofit costs that the existing V-22 
aircraft will require. The committee also recommended the program for 
the Air Force V-22 version, the CV-22, be restructured by removing the 
funding for acquisition, but supporting research and development.
  Our Armed Forces continue to operate and train at a more robust level 
than at any other time during this Nation's history. At this moment, 
service members are being mobilized for possible action in the current 
crisis. They are already risking their lives daily by actively 
enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq and patrolling the Arabian Gulf 
for oil smugglers. Our men and women in uniform are overseas providing 
stability in Kosovo, and they are now involved in bringing peace to 
Macedonia. They are also monitoring the demilitarized zone in Korea, 
and they are assisting in the battle against drugs in Central and South 
America. These activities are in addition to the daily exercises they 
conduct at home and with our allies overseas to maintain the readiness 
of our forces.
  All of America's men and women in uniform put our Nation's interests 
above their own. When called upon, they risk their lives for our 
freedom. As a nation, we often take this sacrifice for granted, until 
we are reminded of it again by tragic events such as the vicious attack 
on the Pentagon.
  They face constant risks in training for the many missions that they 
are called upon to carry out. This past year, seven Army personnel lost 
their lives when their helicopters crashed in a night training exercise 
in Hawaii. Two Marine AV-8B pilots died in a training flight in North 
Carolina. We lost 21 National Guardsmen when their transport plane went 
down in Florida. The cost of training in the name of peace and security 
is high, and we are very proud of the brave men and women who accept 
these risks to defend our Nation and our ideals.
  In this bill, we continue the efforts to support service members and 
their families. The bill grants a minimum of a 5 percent pay raise, 
with personnel in certain pay grades receiving raises between 6 and 10 
percent. This raise is the largest since 1982, and the third straight 
year that the committee has authorized a significant pay raise above 
the rate of inflation.
  The committee also recognizes the importance of providing service 
members with decent housing and work conditions. The bill provides $451 
million above the budget request for military family housing and 
facilities.
  The bill also expedites the timeline for the gradual reduction to 
zero of the out-of-pocket housing costs for service members living off 
base, from 2005 to 2003. We also provide additional funding to cover 
the costs of military health care for service members and their 
families. These are important quality of life improvements that our 
dedicated, well-trained men and women deserve, and they are important 
steps in retaining them in the armed forces.
  The bill allows the transferability of GI bill benefits. Senator 
Cleland's dedication to this issue has resulted in the authorization of 
$30 million to allow the transfer of up to 18 months of unused G.I. 
Bill education benefits to a family member, in return for a commitment 
of four more years of service.
  The bill also includes significant parts of the Tricare Modernization 
Act, which I introduced earlier this year, to ensure that disabled 
family members of active duty service men and women have access to the 
health care they deserve. Early last year, a young man in the Air Force 
drove 12 hours with his wife and disabled four-year old daughter to 
testify to Congress about the need to make Medicaid more accessible, 
because the military health care system did not adequately meet his 
daughter's needs. In order to continue her eligibility for Medicaid, he 
could not accept a promotion to a higher rank.
  No member of the Armed Forces should ever be put in the position of 
having to choose between health care for their disabled child and 
serving our country. These families should not have to rely on Medicaid 
to obtain health care that works.
  The Tricare Modernization Act has been endorsed by The Military 
Coalition, a consortium of armed forces and veterans' organizations 
representing 5.5 million current and former members of the military and 
their families. We need to correct the injustices that these families 
have suffered by integrating services for disabled dependents into the 
basic military health benefit program, so that no medically necessary 
services are denied.
  Last year, the Armed Services Committee heeded the needs of our 
military retirees, and addressed their number-one priority--the cost of 
prescription drugs. This benefit, which began in April, lets all men 
and women in uniform know that we care about their service.
  The bill also provides an additional $217 million for protection of 
our forces against terrorism, for counter-terrorism training, research 
and development to protect our forces against attacks by weapons of 
mass destruction, and to help the services in their efforts to support 
civilian agencies in the battle against terrorism.
  The bill also recognizes the very real threat we face from biological 
weapons. It addresses these threats with significant investments in 
science and technology for chemical and biological defense and medical 
counter-measures. These additional investments will support needed 
research on chemical and biological detection technology and 
decontamination. It will also support lifesaving research on medical 
treatments, vaccines, anti-toxins, and advanced diagnostic technology.
  In addition, the cyber threat to national security is very real, and 
our armed forces must be better prepared to deal with this threat and 
to protect their information systems. The bill adds $5 million to the 
$7.9 million requested to address this serious and growing threat.
  The bill also takes an important stand to begin the process of 
cleaning up unexploded ordnance. At many active and closed military 
bases, UXO is a major challenge. The bill addresses these hazards by 
including a major provision requiring the Department of Defense to 
establish specific accounts to fund the cleanup of UXO at military 
bases across the country, which clearly poses a hazard to civilians, 
military personnel, the environment, and the safe use of live-fire 
ranges necessary for a high state of military readiness.

[[Page S9734]]

These new accounts are essential to demonstrate the Department's 
commitment to safety, the environment, and responsible use of its 
facilities.
  Finally, on the issue of ballistic missile defense, the committee 
responsibly cut back the President's $8.3 billion request for research, 
development and testing of a ballistic missile defense system by $1.3 
billion. The administration's request was clearly in excess of what the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Office could have reasonably allocated in the 
coming year, and the committee was right to give priority to other 
military programs. The committee also took a strong stand against 
testing that would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
  It makes no sense to rush forward prematurely with tests that will 
violate the treaty, or with deployment of a missile defense system, 
when there are serious doubts about whether it will work. Our European 
allies and Russia continue to be skeptical about abandoning the ABM 
Treaty and deploying a missile defense system. We should work with our 
allies and continue consultations with Russia, not act unilaterally or 
establish arbitrary deadlines.
  It is disappointing that these important ballistic missile defense 
provisions were removed from the bill we are currently considering. 
These issues are, and will continue to be, very important.
  I commend my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee for their 
leadership in dealing with the many challenges facing our nation on 
national and homeland defense. This bill keeps the faith with the 2.2 
million men and women who make up our active duty, guard, and reserve 
forces. This legislation is vital to the Nation's security, and I urge 
the Senate to approve it.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 1438, the 
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002. As the ranking 
Republican on the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, I 
would like to thank subcommittee Chairman Landrieu and her staff for 
their cooperation in the preparation of this bill. While I may have 
some concerns with several issues contained within the legislation, I 
do support the bill and urge its adoption by the full Senate.
  At this time I would like to take a moment to highlight a few 
important issues which are under the jurisdiction of the Emerging 
Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee.
  In particular, the legislation continues to build upon the 
committee's past efforts to strengthen and streamline the Department of 
Defense's combating terrorism program. As we were tragically reminded 
by the events on September 11 and last year's bombing of the U.S.S. 
Cole, it is vital that we continue to focus on this growing threat.
  As we all know, the threat of attacks on our national and defense 
information systems seem to grow daily. Last year, Senator Warner 
proposed an innovative scholarship program to encourage young people to 
pursue careers with the Federal Government in the information assurance 
area. I am gratified that our collective efforts this year have 
increased support for this innovative program, as well as other 
Departmental efforts to enhance the security of our critical 
information systems. However, I am concerned that the funding level 
included in the bill for the scholarship program may not be sufficient.
  Since the creation of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities 
Subcommittee in 1999, I have worked hard to ensure that our 
nonproliferation and threat reduction programs in Russia are fulfilling 
their national security objectives. This year I have worked hard to 
incorporate the kind of oversight I believe is essential if these 
nonproliferation programs are going to produce the desired results.
  This committee has a long history of supporting a strong and stable 
science and technology program and I was pleased to see the 
administration's budget request of $8.8 billion in this important area. 
This $1.2 billion increase over last year's request is the first step 
towards achieving the Secretary's goal of having science and technology 
programs make up 3 percent of the overall defense budget. It remains 
critical that we continue our support of a vibrant science and 
technology base.
  I strongly urge the rapid adoption of this important legislation. Our 
Nation is faced with a daunting task ahead and now is the time to show 
our strong support for the men and women in the armed services who so 
proudly and bravely serve our Nation.

                          ____________________