[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 125 (Monday, September 24, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9694-S9734]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
resume consideration of S. 1438, which the clerk will report by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 1438) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2002 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe
personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. REID. As I announced for the majority leader this morning, he has
every intent of finishing this bill by tomorrow. This is one of the
most important pieces of legislation we have dealt with all year.
People who have amendments should offer those amendments. I have spoken
to the two managers. We are in the process of getting ready to offer a
unanimous consent agreement that we would have a finite list of
amendments by 4 o'clock today. Everyone who wants to offer an amendment
must notify their respective manager or aide by 4 o'clock today. I hope
we can propound that unanimous consent agreement within the next few
minutes so we will know the status of all the amendments.
The managers have indicated if we have no amendments, they will move
to third reading.
Mr. LEVIN. Could we tell the Senators who have amendments they wish
to offer, if they could notify our respective Cloakrooms, it would
facilitate things. We are not ready yet to offer a unanimous consent
agreement, but we will propound that agreement in the next few minutes
to set a time for those who want to offer amendments. Is that
agreeable?
Mr. WARNER. We are endeavoring to do that on our side. A number of
Senators have just returned to Washington. They need just a bit of time
to assess this situation. I know there is a strong spirit of
cooperation on this side to move forward with the bill and complete it
by Wednesday afternoon early. In order to do that, we have to have this
type of working document from which to chart our course, night and day,
between now and Wednesday afternoon, and recognize that we have to set
aside time for the CR when it comes.
Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if it is agreeable with my friend from Virginia
we seek to complete action on this bill by tomorrow night, rather than
Wednesday. That is the goal. I take it the Senator would agree with
that goal?
Mr. WARNER. I agree.
Mr. DOMENICI. I say to the distinguished chairman, I understand there
is an amendment that the Senator from Kentucky will offer.
Mr. LEVIN. Senator Jack Reed has been waiting to make an opening
statement.
Mr. DOMENICI. Of course. And I ask it be in order that after the
first amendment offered by the Senator from Kentucky, I offer an
amendment on behalf of Senator Bingaman.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we have to clear that. I wonder if we could
withhold that for a moment.
Mr. DOMENICI. Sure.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it is hard to hear. I would like to know
what kind of agreement we are coming to concerning amendments.
Mr. WARNER. I do not think we have reached any agreement. We have
just come to the floor for the purpose of starting consideration of the
bill. I defer to my chairman. As I understand, we have colleagues
waiting to move ahead. I am prepared to try to do what we can, subject
to his concurrence.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if we could recognize Senator Reed, who is
waiting to make an opening statement, and while he is giving that
statement, we will try to line up the order of amendments. Is that
agreeable?
Mr. WARNER. Yes.
Mr. SESSIONS. I would like to have a chance for opening comments,
perhaps 10 minutes for that, whenever it is appropriate.
Mr. LEVIN. I ask that the Chair recognize Senator Reed, then Senator
Sessions, and at that point, after opening statements, we hope to have
at least one or two amendments lined up in terms of order of
recognition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the
Senator from Michigan regarding the order of speakers?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I thank the Senators from Michigan and
Virginia not only for their gracious offer of the opportunity to speak
this afternoon but also for their work as chairman and ranking member
of this committee. I thank Chairman Levin and Senator Warner for their
leadership.
I rise this afternoon in support of this authorization bill for the
Department of Defense for the year 2002. It comes at a critical time in
history where we have to prepare for a series of threats, both
anticipated before September 11 and now understood very well after
September 11.
I also speak specifically with respect to my responsibility as
chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee.
In that regard, I first thank and commend Senator Wayne Allard of
Colorado, the ranking member. Senator Allard did a tremendous amount of
work, and his perseverance, diligence, his good humor, and his
cooperation were essential to the legislation we are contemplating and
considering today. He has truly done a remarkable job. It was a
distinct pleasure and honor working with him. I thank him for his
activities.
The jurisdiction of the Strategic Subcommittee has a very wide swath,
including space and space systems, strategic programs, intelligence,
reconnaissance and surveillance programs, ballistic missile defense
programs, and Defense-funded programs at the Department of Energy.
The Strategic Subcommittee held hearings on all of the matters of
jurisdiction, including reports of the Space Commission and the
National Reconnaissance Organization Commission. We had extensive
hearings, particularly on the ballistic missile defense organization.
We had at one point a 5-hour hearing on their plans and programs for
this year. We also had a very useful and instructive hearing on the
status of our long-range bomber force. Even though we had a compressed
timeframe to consider these issues because of the late submission of
the budget, the Strategic Subcommittee conducted extensive hearings.
The result is the legislation we have before the Senate, a product of
these hearings, and of hard work, particularly by the staff. I commend
and compliment the staff for their intense effort and their thorough
analysis of the requests made to the committee.
Based upon these hearings and this extensive analysis, we were able
to increase, in many critical areas, authorization for programs. In
providing additional funds for these programs, we were guided by the
recommendations of the military services themselves. We were very
attentive to the unfunded requests outlined and identified by the
Departments of the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, their so-
called wish lists. That gave us a sense of where we had to apply
additional resources. We tried to do that.
Now, with respect to space and space systems, we understand the
United States has a continuing and increased reliance on access to
space. For space programs, we added $53.9 million to improve readiness
and operations of safety at the east and west coast space launch and
range facilities. This was the Air Force's No. 1 unfunded priority. We
were able to fund a significant portion of their request.
We also added funds to the Air Force to improve its space
surveillance capabilities and its communications capabilities. With the
additional funds we have provided in this legislation, the Air Force
will be able to exercise an option to buy additional wide band gap-
filler satellites to ensure global wide band communications capability.
Again, as we contemplate and prepare for extensive operations around
the world directed at those who attacked us, these types of global
communications become more and more critical to the successful
operations not only of the Air Force but of our ground elements and all
of the elements in the Department of Defense.
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In the area of strategic systems, we have included a provision
consistent with the requests by the Department of Defense and the
administration that would repeal section 1302 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998. Section 1302 required the
Secretary of Defense to stay at the START I nuclear force structure
level until such time as START II enters into force. This provision,
the provision we have included, will allow significant immediate
reduction in the number of strategic nuclear warheads, and will
continue the transition of our forces away from a cold war structure
without having to wait for START II to enter into force.
Also related to the repeal of section 1302 is the inclusion within
the bill of funds to allow the Air Force to begin to retire the
Peacekeeper ICBMs beginning next year. This is consistent with the
overall thrust of the administration to make reductions in our nuclear
force structure.
We are awaiting a nuclear posture review, due in the next few weeks.
But we are giving the administration what they desire and what we think
is appropriate: the authority to begin to make reductions in our
nuclear forces and the money to begin immediately to retire the
Peacekeeper ICBMs.
Also in the strategic area, we have included a provision that would
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to keep the full fleet of B-1B
bombers in place, including those B-1B bombers that are assigned to the
Air National Guard until both the Quadrennial Defense Review and the
Nuclear Posture Review are completed and the Secretary has thoroughly
reviewed the missions of the B-1B bomber fleet. We have included the
necessary $100 million in operations and maintenance funds to keep the
B-1B bombers flying in fiscal year 2002.
I also suggest and point out the B-1B bombers are among those assets
that have been identified and notified for possible forward deployment
in support of our antiterrorist operations.
As we today and in the future place increased reliance on our bomber
fleet, not only have we dealt with the B-1B bomber force, we have also
added an additional $125 million for much needed upgrades to the B-2
bomber and the B-52 bomber. We have all watched recently as those B-52s
left Barksdale Air Force Base in support, again, of our antiterrorist
operations, so it is essential to support these Air Force aircraft
also.
In the intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance area, we have
continued the emphasis started by Senator Warner on transforming our
military forces by promoting unmanned aerial vehicles. This bill
includes an additional $64.2 million for unmanned aerial vehicles. As
we improve the capability of these vehicles, we will rely on them for a
growing list of missions. Once again, in any type of counterterrorism
operation where we need relatively low-level, nonobservable, we hope,
observation from the sky and where we are unwilling to risk pilots,
these vehicles are terribly useful.
Last year we sponsored a demonstration for the Global Hawk system in
an air surveillance role. This bill includes funding for a signals
intelligence demonstration project using the Global Hawk UAV. We think
it is an important addition to our repertoire of overhead
reconnaissance.
Another responsibility of the Strategic Subcommittee is the defense-
funded programs at the Department of Energy with the exception of the
nonproliferation programs. These DOE programs include environmental
cleanup programs, the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and intelligence
and counterintelligence programs.
This bill would add approximately $855 million for these important
programs. The budget request for these programs was not sufficient to
cover all the needs for DOE to comply with its cleanup agreements or to
improve the conditions of the production complex or to complete
stockpile life extension programs. Additional resources are needed to
not only maintain weapons reliability and our ability to safeguard the
stockpile, but also our responsibility to clean up sites that have been
polluted by nuclear processes in the past.
We recognize that more money may be needed but this is a substantial
downpayment on cleanup and stockpile security programs. The additional
funding included $422 million for the DOE environmental programs and
$500 million for the National Nuclear Security Administration.
In addition to the extra funding for DOE programs, we have included
legislative provisions to streamline the DOE polygraph program and help
the National Nuclear Security Administration complete its
reorganization. As we all know, the initial response prompting these
programs, the polygraph program and the creation of NNSA, was the
situation of security breaches in our nuclear laboratories. We hope and
believe that is a thing of the past because of our emphasis on
streamlined security procedures and a more rational, robust, and
efficient NNSA.
One of the most controversial elements of our deliberations involve
ballistic missile defense. Let me say initially that there is a
consensus on the committee that we need robust research and development
of ballistic missile defense and immediate deployment of theater
missile defenses to counter the threat. But it turns out that when you
come to national missile defense there are two schools of thought.
There are those who might say it will never work and those who say we
don't care if it works, we need it. The reality is somewhere in
between. We have a strong obligation to test and develop national
missile defenses so we can bring, we hope, that technology to bear to
defend the country. But we have to be careful not to deploy something
that will not work. That is what we have attempted to do in this
legislation, to provide a counter to immediate threats but also ensure
that we spend money wisely, with the ultimate goal of producing a
technology that works, not fielding a technology that doesn't work.
Let me first discuss the threat that we see before us immediately. It
is most easily divided, I think, into the theater threats, short-range,
less than 1,000 kilometers, and medium range, 1,000 to 3,000
kilometers, and then those national threats, ICBMs that can travel more
than 5,500 kilometers.
You can see there is a large number of countries that have theater
missile capability, and it is growing each and every day. These are the
threats that immediately challenge our troops in the field, that
immediately involve American interests through our forces and our
allies throughout the world.
When you go to the area of national missile defense, we know the
Russians have thousands of missiles, the Chinese approximately 20, and
then it is uncertain, frankly. As we all know, there is a strong
suspicion that the North Koreans have this capability. There is
certainly an indication other countries want this capability. But it is
clear to us, and it should be clear to the American public, that the
great, immediate threat that should prompt our immediate response is in
the area of theater missile defense. This authorization responds to
that grave theater missile defense threat.
It responds also to the national missile defense threat by continuing
to support robust funding for research and development.
Let me give an overview of the funding levels that we have
recommended for the ballistic missile defense program. It is good, I
think, to begin with our baseline, which is last year's authorization:
$5.1 billion overall--national missile defense and theater missile
defense, as indicated on this bar graph. The ``other'' category simply
refers to other nonspecific BMDO-wide activities such as program
operation and other generally supporting programs. The request by the
administration was $8.3 billion, about a 60-percent increase, the
largest request for any particular category in this DOD authorization.
In this chart, you can see roughly the breakout between ``other,''
national missile defense, and theater missile defense.
After very careful consideration of each and every program, after
hours of hearings and discussions with the officers in charge of BMDO,
and other officials, we made adjustments unrelated to the debate about
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, related simply to several principles
that are important.
Avoid contingency deployments--avoid deploying equipment that has not
been thoroughly tested and we are not quite sure will work.
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Do not fund activities that cannot be executed this year. We have
scarce resources. We are about to mount a worldwide campaign against
terror and terrorists who struck us and to fund things this year that
cannot be performed when we have other glaring needs, to me is not the
way to spend our money wisely and to support our troops appropriately.
Also, to avoid excessive nonspecific funding, requests for large
amounts of money without any real plan to spend it--the sense I got
from listening to the Administration is that they will figure out what
they are doing on the run.
That is not the way to develop a system that is going to protect the
United States.
Finally, avoid an undue program growth rate--programs that have been
moving along with good progress and suddenly are going to be
accelerated without justification for the acceleration.
Those are the principles we used to decide program-by-program
adjustments we would be making.
The effect was to reduce the overall budget to $7 billion, almost $2
billion more than last year's authorization; specifically, to increase
theater missile defense by $600 million, the immediate threat, while
reducing the administration's request for national missile defense yet
still increasing that budget by $1.1 billion. This was a robust
authorization for ballistic missile defense.
The committee decisions have been impacted, of course, by what we did
last week. In the manager's amendment, we added back the $1.3 billion
we had cut. But we have given the President the opportunity to use this
money for either ballistic missile defense or for antiterrorism
activity.
I hope he will look at what we have done, and while looking at the
ability to deploy systems that aren't ready and activities that can't
really be executed this year, that he will wisely spend that $1.3
billion for antiterrorism in the conduct of this campaign that
threatens America today. If he does that, we will still be on the path
to a strong theater missile defense and a strong national missile
defense, but we will be able to affect the immediate crisis we face
with more resources. I hope he makes that choice. The legislation we
presented him after last week's amendment will give him that choice.
Let me try to go into some detail about the recommendations.
Again, I hope the President and DOD will take our work and use it to
form their views with respect to the additional $1.3 billion.
As I mentioned, we have increased theater missile defense by $626
million. We have tried to identify with surety well-defined programs
such as the PAC-3 Program, which is just ready for deployment, and the
THAAD Program, and to fund them robustly. We have also tried to
increase resources for the Navy Area Defense Program and the Airborne
Laser to resolve emerging technical problems to keep them on schedule.
In addition to these programs, we have added $76 million to the
administration's request for the Arrow Missile System. The Arrow is a
joint Israeli-United States project. These funds will help make the
Arrow interoperable with our forces. It is an essential part of the
development. Today that is one of the few theater missile defense
systems that is fielded and operational.
We have also gone ahead and looked at some of these ill-advised
contingency deployments.
We save $390 million by not funding untested THAAD missiles, Navy
Theater-Wide missiles, premature THAAD radar, and Airborne Laser
components. We save over $200 million by rationalizing the Navy
Theater-Wide test and radar development programs while funding tests
for Block 1 missiles and asking the Secretary of Defense for future
plans on Navy Theater-Wide.
When it comes to national missile defense, I also pointed out that we
have increased last year's authorization by a total of $1.1 billion. It
would fund a new midcourse test bed. It would provide 20 percent more
for NMD, but it would save over $500 million by moderating growth in
the NMD system and reducing funding for nonexecutable programs--those
programs which we think, after careful analysis, cannot be completed in
this year's authorization.
We also have saved over $200 million by reducing excessive funding
for activities not associated with specific programs--essentially large
categories of money with very little justification. All of this money
can now be used, pursuant to the amendment of last week, for
counterterrorism operations, all the things we know we have to do
today, and I hope we do today.
We have also funded the request by the administration for a test bed
in Alaska. Even though there is a great deal of controversy about the
efficacy of this test bed to test missiles, even though there is a
suggestion that it could be used for deployment which would raise
issues under the ABM Treaty, we have tried to give the administration
the benefit of the doubt by not only significantly increasing resources
but also assuming that they are working very diligently not to
arbitrarily move away from the treaty but to comply with it until they
are forced otherwise.
This approach of giving the administration not only permission but
authority to establish their test bed is again another commitment to do
everything we can to promote research and development of a national
missile defense system. As we go forward, we hope we can continue
working closely with the administration.
Let me also point out that our response to the proposal by the
administration for missile defense was prompted not by an ideological
approach to BMD but by a desire to see a program that works. We tried
to base our judgments on the experience of these programs before.
One of the most influential aspects of our review was considering the
report of General Welch, the former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air
Force, who conducted a thorough study of the THAAD system, the theater
high-altitude system. A few years ago, this system was going nowhere,
with test failure after test failure. General Welch was asked to come
in and look at the program, analyze its faults, and point out whether
it could be saved and how it could be saved. His conclusions were very
instructive to our deliberations.
First of all, the Welch panel, set up by the BMD office to look at
the failure in this theater high-altitude program, concluded that the
THAAD program's ``rush-to-failure'' was caused in part by the decision
to buy operational missiles early. That was the key factor in the
difficulties of this program. Until they got back to careful, thorough
development with requirements and objectives, this program was in
danger of failing. If it failed, it would be a significant loss to the
Nation.
The same logic was echoed by GEN Kadish, director of BMDO, when he
testified that ``emergency deployments are disruptive and can set back
normal development programs by years.'' That is precisely what the
administration was urging us to do in this authorization--to accelerate
deployment before we had done the testing, to buy missiles that were
untested, to rush to failure.
I argue very strenuously that if the program adopted by the
administration is to simply take this $1.3 billion back and plug it
right back into this program, it will be a rush to failure, and it will
defeat what we all want to see--the immediate deployment of effective
theater missile defenses and the deployment, subject to considerations
of international law and treaties at this point, of an effective
national missile defense.
Until we have the testing and the development completed, deployment
is something that is both premature and ultimately harmful to the
program development. The program should be careful and deliberate, and
we hope ultimately successful. As the Welch report concluded,
attempting to deploy minimal operational capability early ``is unlikely
to be productive for programs of this complexity. The drive for early
capability is proving to be counterproductive.''
I hope the administration takes these words to heart. Much of what we
suggested in terms of funding reductions was based upon this logic--the
logic of seasoned professionals who looked closely at this program and
who want these programs to succeed but understand that they have to be
done thoroughly and carefully, and not rushed to failure.
As we go forward, we will, I am sure, continue this debate about
national
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missile defense and ballistic missile defense, and a host of other
issues. I hope and I know the full Senate has the same type of very
constructive and very helpful debate that the members of my
subcommittee and the members of the full committee had because I think
it is important to have this type of significant debate as we go
forward about issues. We have tried to do this, and we have tried to do
it thoroughly. I believe we have produced, at the subcommittee level,
and the full committee, a thoughtful and very logical and very
defensible product.
Today we are in this Chamber presenting the administration with the
opportunity to use these resources to counter terrorism or to go back
and invest in programs of dubious immediate efficacy and efficiency and
worth for the national defense. Again, I hope that the administration
does this.
Let me just make brief comments about the situation with respect to
the ABM treaty which, I point out, was separated from the logic of this
discussion.
Regardless of the existence of an ABM treaty, our responsibility is
to look closely at every one of these programs and to conclude which
ones have real value for national defense and which ones are simply not
worth the effort in terms of the resources committed this year. We did
that--regardless of the existence of the ABM treaty. But the ABM treaty
is a factor that has to be considered when you talk about national
missile defense.
The point I make is that many things changed on September 11. One
thing that changed is the appreciation, I believe, by all of us and the
administration that we need the help and the cooperation of the world
community to beat our enemy, to beat the terrorists, to root out these
networks out and destroy them.
In that context, I suggest and advise that it would be very
counterproductive for immediate and unilateral departure from the ABM
treaty, because of the consequences it would produce. That advice, I
hope, is taken to heart by the President.
The President clearly has the authority today to withdraw from a
treaty. We attempted--and we continue to attempt in separate
legislation--to provide a forum for this Senate at least to consider a
proposed departure from the ABM treaty. But until that other
legislation is considered, and perhaps passed, it is clear that the
President has this right.
But today, as we assemble a world coalition to fight people who have
harmed us--grievously--I would think that he would be very careful not
to withdraw because we need the support of many nations. I think it is
particularly inappropriate and premature to do that since I believe we
do not have the technology today that will, in fact, be capable of
deployment within the next few months, perhaps the next few years.
While we are developing the technology, we should be very careful
about undermining the stability of international relations,
particularly at a time when we are reaching out to nations across the
globe, including our European allies, including Russia, including
China, asking them all to stand with us and to trust our judgment and
our leadership as we go forth to counter and destroy the common enemy,
the terrorists in the world.
So I believe among the many things that have changed on September 11
is the attitude that was demonstrable in the administration that we can
go it alone, that we don't need many other people; it is our way or the
highway. We are now on a common path, we hope, to overcome and defeat
the terrorists. This is not time to debate the language that was
embodied in the original version of the bill which passed the
committee. I do hope there is a more appropriate time soon.
We are in this Chamber today at a momentous time in our history. All
of us are committed to giving our Department of Defense every resource
it needs to defend this country and, most specifically, to destroy
those who attacked us and attempted to destroy us. It is in that spirit
we continue these deliberations. It is in that spirit we will pass this
legislation. And it is in that spirit we will triumph and prevail.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Carper). Under the previous order, the
Senator from Alabama is recognized.
Mr. WARNER. I ask my colleague to defer for a moment so that I can
recognize the valuable contribution of the Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. SESSIONS. I defer to the ranking member.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator. We recognize the Senator from
Alabama is next to be recognized for an opening statement.
I commend our colleague from Rhode Island first for his hard work
throughout the years on the committee on which he has served from the
first day he came to the Senate, and most particularly now in his
capacity as the chairman of the subcommittee, which is a very important
subcommittee dealing with many issues. I thank him for his work with
Senator Levin and myself as we worked our way through the resolution of
some issues that were very important to him. I thank the Senator very
much.
Mr. President, I will keep on my desk, as will the distinguished
chairman, a list of the amendments which are now coming in. I am
pleased to say we are down to where there is a single person who is
examining the possibility of the UC request shortly to be propounded on
the question of putting in the amendments for consideration by a
certain time today, so we can hopefully complete this bill tomorrow
night.
My understanding is that at the conclusion of the remarks of the
Senator from Alabama, we will turn to amendments; and in all
probability, our distinguished colleague from Kentucky will seek
recognition at that time.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from Alabama yield for just an additional
minute without losing his order for recognition?
Mr. SESSIONS. I am pleased to yield.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator from Rhode Island for not just his
opening statement, which is always extraordinary and thoughtful, but
also for his magnificent work as the chairman of the Strategic
Subcommittee. They are both invaluable. I thank him very much for that.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, may I say what a privilege it is working
with Chairman Levin and the ranking member, Senator Warner. The
Senators have led this Senate with great distinction.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
Alabama is recognized.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I am pleased to express my appreciation
to Senator Levin and Senator Warner and to all others who have worked
very hard to make sure we complete our work in this Chamber in a
bipartisan way. We were very close to doing that on almost every issue
that has come before us. But one issue did divide us; that was national
missile defense. And Senator Reed is one of the most knowledgeable and
articulate spokesmen concerning that issue.
In my subcommittee, of which I am ranking member, I think Senator
Kennedy and I were able to reach an agreement on issues pertinent to
seapower that both of us felt good about. It was not perfect; it was
not what we would like; but with the money that we were allocated to
spend on seapower, I think we did a good job. Our problems simply were
the lack of money and resources. And, indeed, I will mention a few
things that we were missing as a result of that.
President Bush campaigned that he would improve the situation for our
defense people and our defense budget and do some things that needed to
be done. If you look at his budget, it represents an historic
improvement and increase in defense. This appropriations bill we are
voting out today totals $328 billion. Last year, we were at $296
billion. That is a $30 billion increase, plus a $6 billion supplemental
we passed. It means a $38 billion increase in defense this year over
last year.
That is the biggest increase in probably 15 years in defense. It
represents a long overdue step. It was done before we had these
terrorist attacks. And it represented a consensus by the administration
and their representation to the Congress on the needs of our defense
budget. So we made a big step forward, and we are happy about that.
We spent a good deal of that money on a number of things, such as a
5-percent pay raise for our men and women
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in uniform, which is tacked on to last year's increase--well above the
inflation rate; 6- to 10-percent pay raises for people in critical
positions; a $232 million increase in the housing allowance for
families--increased funding for housing--an increase for national
missile defense, and a number of other increases.
So we are proud of those things. We are proud of the overall increase
in the defense budget. However, our defense budget still, as a
percentage of our GDP--our total gross domestic product--is far less
than it was in the 1980s. At a time when we are seeing increased
threats to our ability to function in the world as a result of
terrorists and rogue nations, we are going to have to increase the
budget in the years to come.
The biggest thing we were not able to do in this budget--and the
American people need to understand it--we did not make enough progress
in recapitalization, replacing old and worn-out equipment such as
tanks, aircraft, and ships; nor did we do enough in research and
development of new equipment for the future. We did not make enough
progress despite a very significant increase in defense spending this
year.
We are going to have--we approved the other day--an additional $20
billion for defense, most of which--virtually all of which will be
spent for the terrorist problem we are now facing. With some of that,
we will be able to strengthen our Defense Department for other issues,
but most of it, indeed, will go to a terrorist response. That is not
going to leave us in a significantly stronger position.
If you count that, we are looking at a $58 billion increase over last
year. From a financial point of view, we did pretty well. From a
procurement point of view, most of us are somewhat concerned.
For example, in the Seapower Subcommittee, of which I am ranking
member, we were wrestling with a Navy that now has about 315 ships
afloat out there. At one point in this country not too long ago, we
were talking about a 600-ship Navy. Along with everything else, we have
had a steady reduction in funding for ships. In this budget, we are
going to have six new ships approved, which is good--they are
expensive, every one of them--but that will not stop the decline. Our
estimates from our Navy people are it takes eight to ten ships a year
to maintain the current level of 315 ships. So we are still on a
downward slope for ships.
At some point, you just have to have a ship on the sea to be able to
project American power in areas around the globe. You have to have a
certain number. Many of them have to be in home port to be repaired.
The sailors need to be home at various times. They need to respond to
various crises in different places. It does not leave you that many
ships to actually send to a given place at a given time when they are
needed. Seapower is a good example of our inability to be as effective
in procuring capital assets for our defense as we would like to be. I
wish I had a more positive story to tell there, but I don't.
One defense official recently said that it was like a bow wave in
front of a ship, this procurement need. We are just pushing it in front
of us. Sooner or later, we will have to confront it. Another defense
official in the Clinton administration said we are in a death spiral.
What he meant by that was, we are trying to keep afloat and keep
operating equipment and airplanes and ships that need constant repair,
and they are getting older and older. We would do better to purchase
new, modern, more effective equipment that would not, perhaps, have as
many personnel needed to operate it and could actually save us money in
operation to a significant degree. Those are the issues with which we
need to wrestle.
Senator Reed is very knowledgeable and makes a number of points about
national missile defense. It would be appropriate for me to respond to
some degree on that. I will make a few points the items that concern
me. We are not in perfect agreement on it.
However, I do want to say how much I appreciate Senator Reed and
Chairman Levin and Senator Warner, the ranking member, and Senator
Allard, ranking member of the subcommittee, for their determination at
this time of national crisis to reach an agreement on this issue and
not to have us be in disagreement. They have accomplished that. They
have done so in a way I can support. I believe it moves us in a
direction that we needed to move. I am very proud we were able to have
that occur.
As it came out of committee, we split 13-12 on the budget for
national missile defense. Let me relate a few things about it.
President Clinton's budget for national missile defense this year, as
he projected it, was approximately $5 billion. As President Bush
campaigned, he told America he believed we needed to do more on
national missile defense. Two and a half years ago, this Congress voted
97-3, I believe, to deploy a national missile defense system. As soon
as technologically feasible, we would deploy a national missile defense
system.
Secretary Rumsfeld, when he was in the private sector, chaired a
bipartisan commission, the Rumsfeld commission. They did a study to
determine what kind of threat we faced from incoming missiles. The
report was unanimous, the bipartisan commission was unanimous, that by
2005, this Nation could be subject to missile attack for which we have
absolutely no defense at this time. The President recognized that.
Later he chose Mr. Rumsfeld to be Secretary of Defense. When he came
in, he proposed a $38 billion increase in the defense budget. He asked
for $3 billion more for national missile defense, to go from $5 to $8
billion. We think that is a reasonable increase. It is a significant
increase, but I believe--and I know Senator Warner and others believe--
this is the right thing for us to do.
People say: Well, they may not have this missile that can reach us
now. The commission said, by 2005, they could. If we are going to have
a defense against it when they do have the capability of reaching us
with missiles, we have to start today. This is not something about
which we can do at a snap of our fingers.
Of course, this administration will not, this Congress will not
tolerate the deployment of a system that is not feasible, that won't
work. We have to get started on building it. A $3 billion increase in
national missile defense spending is a reasonable increase when that is
the one gap we saw in our defense.
Indeed, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, in his
testimony, talked about the Gulf War. He said: If you look at the Gulf
War, you could see that in many ways we overestimated our enemy's
capability. And, in fact, we overestimated his capability in virtually
every area except one. The one we did not consider enough was his
ability to launch missiles, Scud missiles, if you remember, into our
military bases and troops out in the field and into Israel and perhaps
even destabilizing our relationship with Israel and causing
consternation in our defense effort. So we rushed in the Patriot
missile. It actually succeeded in knocking some of those Scuds down,
but it was not designed for that and had not been ready to be deployed
for that. It was rushed out as an emergency, and it worked to a degree.
Since then, we realize we do have the capability to knock down an
incoming missile. Some people almost think it is Star Wars and it can't
be done, but we have had hearing after hearing after hearing on that
subject. Both sides of the aisle agree it is technologically something
that can be done. We have the ability to do it. It is just the question
of when it ought to be deployed, I suppose; that is our disagreement.
The American people need to realize that if, by 2005, Iran or
Pakistan, any nation, Iraq, or North Korea continues their development
or their purchase of missiles, they could have the ability to reach us
with a missile, and we have no defense to that whatsoever.
You say we have theater missile defense, but it cannot be deployed
around this country in a way that would protect us as a national
missile defense. Why is that, under present circumstances? The reason
for that is, in 1972 we entered into an ABM treaty, Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, with the Soviets.
At that time, we both had the capability to destroy each other many
times over with our missiles. Both of us, in the 1970s, were thinking
about a national missile defense program. So somebody finally, I guess,
got our nations to start thinking that this is
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really not good for either one of us. Why should we invest billions of
dollars in a system that will not really protect us from the
overwhelming force of the other. So we signed the treaty. It, flat out,
said that we will not deploy a national missile defense. The treaty is
not but two or three pages.
The first article says: We will not build a national missile defense.
People have said we don't need to get out of this treaty. Well, if we
are going to build a national missile defense, we do have to get out of
it. What if the Russians don't agree? We are threatened now from a
multitude of nations. We want to have a friendly relationship with
Russia. I pray we don't have a threat from Russia. I hope that our
relationship will get even better with Russia. But we have a bunch of
nations out there--and if anybody had any doubts about it, they didn't
after September 11--who wish us ill. If they had the capability of
launching missiles and hitting Los Angeles, New York, Miami, or some
other American city and can kill millions of American people, then we
are not safe in this world.
We have the ability to do this, and it is time for us to get busy
about it. No great nation ought to leave itself vulnerable. Indeed,
Henry Kissinger, an architect of the ABM Treaty, was quoted. He talked
about the new circumstances we are in. He said:
I have never heard of a nation whose policy it is to keep
itself vulnerable to attack.
That is what we are basically talking about. We are having a policy
by trying to adhere to a treaty with a dead empire, the Soviet Union--
it wasn't even with the Russia of today. Many legal scholars say we are
not even required to abide by it because it is not with a legal entity
that exists today. So we need to get out of that treaty.
The Russians want to extract compromises from us, and we all
understand that. So the President deals with them and works and
increases our relationship with Russia, and the mutual interests get
furthered. I thought we were on the road to making an agreement with
the Russians. They have said some things that indicate they would
agree. The Europeans, after initially being opposed, have warmed up to
the idea quite considerably. About the only place left that we are
having problems with is the U.S. Senate. The House is on board with
this, but we are still having some problems here. So there was language
in this bill--and the reason I and others voted against it when it came
out of committee--which said that if the Russians didn't agree to allow
us to build a national missile defense, the President could not go
forward, but had to come back to Congress and ask for a vote.
Whereas, under the ABM treaty, the President has personal unilateral
power to wipe out the treaty. But if they did agree, the President
could go forward. To me, that is an odd thing for the Congress to do--
to cede our power to build a national missile defense system to the
Russians, to have them have a veto over whether or not we have a
missile system deployed. I don't think that was good.
I am glad that this compromise language came out. I am very, very
happy that it came out. It is something I don't think we should have
done.
As a former Federal lawyer, I think about the legal situation here.
The treaty prohibits us from deploying a national missile defense
system, which would include deploying the radar systems, perhaps, out
there that support one. It prohibits us from developing or testing a
sea-based or mobile system of any kind, which is precisely what we need
to be doing now. As a lawyer, it seems to me that when the Senate votes
97-3 to deploy a national missile defense system, the President of the
United States at that time, President Clinton, signed that legislation,
and the President of the United States today, President Bush, campaigns
on developing and deploying one, and we are funding the money to carry
one out, we ought to be honest enough to say we are moving to
contradiction of the treaty, if we have not already.
We have the intent to deploy a national missile defense system, which
is contrary to the treaty. So the President either has to get out of
it, or the Russians need to agree to that. Hopefully, they will agree.
If not, we need to move on because we have to protect ourselves. We
can't let a 1972 treaty with an empire that no longer exists prohibit
us from protecting ourselves from other nations around this world who
have the ability to launch missiles that could hit us. It is just that
simple. I hope and believe I can support the language that is in the
bill. I salute those who worked hard to make it acceptable.
I will just mention a couple of things in general about this
legislation. Secretary Rumsfeld is committed to transforming our
military. Certainly, the events of September 11 should make us doubly
committed to that goal. The old system of defending against a Soviet
attack on the planes of Europe is not what our threat is today. We need
a transformation that has more mobility, the ability to move our
equipment, to disembark it around the globe. This is what the
transformation plan was about that he has pushed, which was in
discussion and agreement, really, by all of us before September 11. It
was that we be more mobile, have more agility, that the weapons systems
and equipment we use have more abilities to perform different
functions. It would be more lethal with the smart bombs and those kinds
of things. A single round, a single bomb, could be much more directed
and effective in its attack.
We needed better surveillance and reconnaissance and intelligence
information, and we need a modernized command and control system. Those
were the goals of transformation. I believe this legislation supports
that, although perhaps not as much as I would like. I would like to
believe that the quadrennial defense review coming out of the
Department of Defense within a few weeks, and Secretary Rumsfeld's own
internal review, will further push our services to go forward to a
transformation to a world that is quite different than the one we have
had--particularly against asymmetric threats.
I am concerned that we may not have enough money in this budget for
smart weapons of all kinds--the kinds we saw in Kosovo that could go in
the window of a building. We need an adequate supply of those weapons,
but the new funding--the $20 billion we approved--should be able to
fill those needs. But we have to watch to make sure we have a
sufficient supply of those. I don't think we have been operating at the
level we should. We are closer to minimum sustaining rates for
production of those kinds of weapons; whereas, we could get the weapons
cheaper if we increase the production level.
I thank Chairman Levin for his leadership and dedication, and I
particularly thank Senator Warner, the ranking member, whose advice and
wisdom I have called on frequently and value highly.
I believe we have a bill here that is good. But we remain challenged
as a nation. Our challenge remains that we have to consider how much
more we are going to need for defense, because this remains a dangerous
world.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to commend our distinguished
colleague from Alabama. He is a tireless worker on our committee and a
great watchdog of the taxpayers' dollars. I especially thank him for
his reference to the work done by the full committee, and indeed others
subsequent thereto, to resolve such issues as we had during the course
of the markup on the missile defense system. He has been a keen
observer and a strong contributor to America's ability to prepare
itself against a limited attack. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
Amendment No. 1622
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Bunning] for himself, Mr.
Lott, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Craig, Mr. Burns, Mr.
Hutchinson, Ms. Collins, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Smith of New
Hampshire, Ms. Snowe, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Conrad,
Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Stevens, and Mrs. Clinton, proposes an
amendment numbered 1622.
(Purpose: To strike title XXIX, relating to defense base closure and
realignment)
Strike title XXIX, relating to defense base closure and
realignment.
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I thank the chairman and ranking member
of the full committee for giving me
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an opportunity to offer this amendment on behalf of 20 cosponsors. This
amendment is a straightforward amendment.
The underlying bill authorizes a base closure realignment in the year
2003. This amendment simply strikes that language, that provision.
There are a number of good reasons why we should not move ahead with
another BRAC at this time. Most important, there has always been the
uncertainty as to whether or not previous rounds of BRAC have actually
saved the military and the taxpayers any money. This has always been my
main concern with proposals for future BRACs.
I will go further into this aspect in a moment, but right now I, and
many others, have a bigger concern with future BRAC rounds, and it
unfortunately stems from the awful terrorist attacks on September 11.
Now more than ever, we should hold off further downsizing of our
military infrastructure as we analyze how to fight the first war of the
21st century.
Last week, President Bush laid it all out for us. We are gearing up
for war. It will be a different kind of war and different from any
battles this Nation has ever fought. Its future is unknown. The course
of the conflict is uncharted. The strengths we will use and need are
unforeseen.
The President has warned us that victory is not going to come quickly
and it is not going to come without pain. There will be casualties, and
our will and resources will be tested, probably for many years to come.
The fight will require force. It may require more and a different
kind of training at our military posts and bases. This war may change
from the United States battling only terrorist organizations to the
United States battling armies of nations harboring terrorists.
Because of this uncertainty, it is unwise to begin hacking away at
our military infrastructure. I am not here to chant gloom and doom. I
know in the end we are going to triumph over evil, but at this point in
time, we have to ask a fundamental question: Is now the time to cut
bases and to reduce our military infrastructure? The answer is a clear
and resounding no.
President Bush said recently the course of this conflict is unknown.
If this course is unknown, then it must be unwise to move ahead with
another BRAC round until we have a clearer picture of where we are
going and how we are going to get there. Now is not the time to further
authorize the reduction of our military infrastructure.
More than ever, we must focus on security and how to maximize our
resources. We should not leap before we are even able to look. We are
venturing into the unknown and attempting to survey the landscape of
21st century warfare. We should not go blindly or with one hand tied
behind our back in the name of so-called efficiency and cost savings.
During markup of this bill, the Readiness Subcommittee heard from our
professional staff on the BRAC issue. They were unable to pinpoint any
definitive cost savings from the prior BRAC rounds. In fact, they could
not provide any firm details because DOD could not provide them
definitive numbers from previous BRAC rounds.
We have heard talk about so-called savings numbers from DOD here and
there, but when the rubber hits the road, DOD is unable to provide
these savings with cold, hard numbers.
I and many others have asked the Department of Defense many times to
provide detailed data showing savings from previous BRAC rounds. If it
is there, we should definitely take a look at it, but until we see real
numbers, supporting another BRAC is only a shot in the dark.
CRS, CBO, and GAO have all been asked to find real savings, and they
also have had a tough time finding consistent and detailed savings
numbers. They quote DOD projections and predictions as their source,
but they admit that DOD has been unable to document any detailed
underlying savings.
We all support efficiency in not only our military but throughout the
Federal Government. But after the attacks of September 11, the
landscape for me and others has changed from one of efficiency to one
of security. In these turbulent times, we need serious numbers before
we can even contemplate another BRAC, let alone approve it.
In conclusion, it seems to me at this point that it would be foolish
and dangerous to go ahead with another BRAC. When you boil it down, it
is pretty simple: We are entering a new type of conflict in which we
are not sure what resources are going to be needed. So how can we take
a chance on eliminating resources that may be vital to our struggle
against terrorism? In fact, last week, the House of Representatives
withdrew a BRAC amendment to their fiscal year DOD authorization bill.
It is clear that support in the House for another BRAC round evaporated
after the attacks of September 11.
If the Senate bill includes another BRAC round, this could make for a
contentious issue in conference, and now is not the time for prolonged
contentious debate.
I ask my colleagues' support for this amendment. In light of the
September 11 terrorist attacks, we need to act prudently and carefully.
Authorizing another BRAC round is neither. I urge my colleagues to
support this amendment.
I want to read from Secretary Rumsfeld's letter of September 21. I
want to read a portion of it because it says in the third paragraph:
``While our further future needs as to base closure are uncertain and
are strategically dependent,'' he says we must simply go ahead and do
it. I firmly and strongly disagree with Secretary Rumsfeld. If base
closures are uncertain and strategically dependent, then now is not the
time when we are planning for a full, all-out war against terrorism.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank our distinguished colleague from
Kentucky for his remarks. He is a very valuable member of our
committee, and he straightforwardly told us from the very first he
would be in opposition to the BRAC procedure. The opposition he
indicated preceded indeed the crisis we now face as a consequence of
the tragedies of September 11.
I nevertheless have decided to continue to support the action of the
committee, and I will recite my reasons for doing so in the course of
the next few minutes. I will address one point my colleague made so it
is fresh in the minds of those Senators and others following this
important debate. He read from a letter, and I shall put the letter in
the Record. It is addressed to me from the Secretary of Defense and I
will read it in its entirety momentarily. But he quoted:
While our future needs as to base structure are uncertain
and are strategy dependent, we must simply have the freedom
to maximize the efficient use of our resources.
Freedom, in a sense, goes directly to what the bill says. The bill
very carefully and simply puts in place, in the hands of the Secretary
of Defense, the authority to go forward with such legislation if he
deems it necessary at some future date. So the Senate will be asked to
make a decision of deleting this provision or sustaining the committee
report and bill and thereby just putting in place the authority for the
Secretary to do the following: If the President does not transmit to
Congress the nomination for appointment to the commission on or before
the date specified for 1993 in clause 2 of subparagraph B, for 1995 in
clause 3 of that paragraph, or for 2003 in section 4, the process by
which the military installations may be selected for closure
realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be
terminated.
So what we are doing, in a sense, putting aside all of that technical
language, is simply giving the Secretary of Defense the authority to
proceed. I supported it in the committee, and I support it now.
I say to my good friend, after discussion with him and others, I
thought as to whether or not we should proceed to put in place on a
standby basis the authority. I reflected on the many rounds of base
closures in which I have had personal experience. As a matter of fact,
I was the author of the legislation involving several previous BRAC
rounds. Going as far back as when I was privileged to serve in the
Department of Defense, in those days a service secretary could initiate
the BRAC procedures and did so and closed such
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major installations as the Boston naval shipyard. That was, I believe,
in the 1971-1972 timeframe. So I have had a long familiarity with the
BRAC procedures, the goals of BRAC, and I reflected on whether or not I
would support the BRAC when this bill came to the floor, and I do so.
My concern was much along the lines of our distinguished colleague
from Kentucky. America is experiencing a callup of the Reserve and
Guard units. America sees our Nation faced with a great many
uncertainties and challenges never before faced, the complexity of the
foreign policy considerations and the security considerations flowing
from the tragic events of September 11, without parallel in our
history. So why should we at this point in time critical to our
national defense and that to help our allies and friends be faced with
a BRAC round?
I long ago made the decision, before we took it up in committee, we
would not have 2 years; we would only have the one, and I told that to
the Secretary of Defense, and indeed when they came before the Congress
they had selected the single year because BRAC brings upon a community
a tremendous amount of unsettling factors, particularly in the towns
and cities where we have the military bases. It is home for so many of
the men and women of the Armed Forces and civilian workers. It is an
unsettling thing from their economic standpoint. They are planning for
the future and for business, and to have this hanging over their head
is a difficult situation.
Most communities will go out and expend a considerable sum of money
to hire experts who have been through the complicated procedures that
BRAC thrusts upon the communities to assist them in stating their
claim, as they have a right under the law for continuing to have those
military facilities open and not have them the subject of a possible
future closure by a base closure commission.
Having thought all through that, I personally talked to the Secretary
of Defense and I reiterated these arguments to him. I think it was not
more than a day or two after September 11, because I have had an
opportunity to visit with him on a number of occasions--and Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz--and I laid before them the fact we are calling up
people, we are augmenting our forces, there is uncertainty, and the
last thing we need is instability in those communities which provide a
home for the men and women of the military.
So I said I would like to have you send a letter to me, if it is your
desire that the Senate proceed to ask for a vote in favor of the bill
as now written, and he wrote me on September 21.
I will read it because it is very important.
Dear Senator Warner: I write to underscore the importance
we place on the Senate's approval of authority for a single
round of base closures and realignments. Indeed, in the wake
of the terrible events of September 11, the imperative to
convert excess capacity into warfighting ability is enhanced,
not diminished. Since that fateful day, the Congress has
provided additional billions of taxpayers' funds to the
department. We owe it to all Americans, particularly those
service members on whom much of our responsibility depends,
to seek every efficiency in the application of those funds on
behalf of our warfighters.
Our installations are the platform from which we will
deploy the forces needed for the sustained campaign the
President outlined last night. While our future needs as to
the base structures are uncertain and are strategy dependent,
we simply must have the freedom to maximize the efficient use
of our resources. The authority to realign and close bases
and facilities will be a critical element of ensuring the
right mix of bases and forces within our warfighting
strategy. No one relishes the prospect of closing a military
facility or even seeking the authority to do so, but as the
President said last evening, `We face new and sudden national
challenges,' and those challenges will force us to confront
many difficult choices. In that spirit, I am hopeful that
Congress will approve our request for authority to close and
realign our military base facilities. Thank you for the
opportunity to provide our views in this important matter.
Other Senators are anxious to address this matter, and I may reenter
the debate subsequently before we proceed to a vote, but I assure the
Senate this Senator deliberated long and carefully as to whether or not
I would continue my support. I have given the request by the Secretary
simply to put in place the necessary authorization to proceed. If it is
his judgment and that of the President to do so some months ahead, then
I think it is important we do proceed because we have an obligation to
the American taxpayers that those dollars that are authorized and
appropriated for the Department of Defense be spent very wisely.
Subsequently, I or others will address the question of savings, but
my calculation is, the 152 major closures and realignments resulting
from the BRAC procedures of 1988 through 1995 will save the Department
$14.5 billion by 2001--that fiscal year is about to end--and $5.7
billion every year thereafter. There is additional information on the
savings which will be placed into the Record.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, before I speak to the pending amendment,
I want to commend the two leaders of our committee. I joined this
committee in January, and they have worked very hard in the last week
to come up with a bill that would unify this body. So I want to commend
both Senator Levin and Senator Warner for their tremendous efforts in
producing a bill that will help bring us together and ensure we are
providing the resources and the authority for the important task before
us. I praise them and thank them for their efforts.
I commend the Senator from Kentucky for his amendment. I rise in
strong opposition to the provisions in our bill known as the base
realignment and closure, or BRAC, proposal. I opposed this proposal in
committee, and I continue to oppose it today. In fact, I think the
reasons for opposition are even more compelling than they were at the
time of our committee markup. After the September 11 attacks on
America, I question, with even more certainty, the decision to proceed
with additional cuts in our base infrastructure.
As the result of the first 4 BRAC rounds, 97 military bases in the
United States have been or are in the process of being closed,
degrading our defense readiness according to some military experts.
In light of the recent terrorist attacks on our homeland, and based
on the testimony provided by the Chief of Naval Operations before the
Senate Armed Services Committee when Admiral Clark recently cautioned
that the Navy's infrastructure is already at barebones, now is simply
not the time, it is simply not in our country's best interests, to
initiate yet another round of base closures.
At a time when our Commander in Chief has warned of a long and
sustained military operation, we should be preserving, not eroding, our
facilities and infrastructure, so that they are fully available for our
Armed Forces both at home and abroad. It is the responsibility of this
Congress to ensure that these installations are not placed at risk
without careful, prudent consideration of the additional military
requirements, particularly with regard to homeland defense, that are
evolving as a result of the recent horrific attacks on our Nation. It
is also clear that our ongoing peacekeeping and humanitarian missions
require a greater force structure than had been expected. Our war on
terrorism will most likely require a greater one still. In short, it is
difficult to conceive of a worse time for the Pentagon to divert its
energies to another round of base closures.
Before we legislate a defense-wide policy that will reduce the size
and number of training areas critical to our force readiness, the
Department of Defense needs time to complete its comprehensive plan
identifying the operational and maintenance infrastructure required to
support national security requirements, particularly in light of the
challenge to come. Before we know what to cut, we need to know what to
keep. It is that simple. I fear we are approaching the issue of excess
capacity exactly backwards. As Secretary Rumsfeld acknowledged in his
recent letter to the committee, our future needs as to base structure
are uncertain and our strategy dependent.
I make it clear I understand the Secretary still wants to proceed
with base closures, but his own letter says very clearly that our
future needs as to base structure are uncertain. Shouldn't we determine
what our infrastructure needs are before embarking on a whole
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new round of closing bases? Wouldn't that be the better, more logical
way to proceed?
Further, while those who support BRAC hope for substantial savings
from base closures, the one consequence you can count on when a base is
closed is the need for a significant upfront investment.
A recent GAO report released in July of this year underscores how
costly base closures can be and how ephemeral the savings estimates may
be. The loose estimates of supposed savings, for example, exclude over
$1.2 billion in costs of Federal assistance provided to affected
communities. These are costs paid by the Federal Government but not out
of the BRAC budget accounts. Some $10.4 billion in environmental
cleanup costs were the direct result of the first four BRAC rounds. We
ought to be doing a better job of environmental cleanup at our bases,
whether they are open or closed. However, we can't ignore these
significant costs. These are considerable costs which only continue to
grow, often not counted, as costs associated with closing bases.
There is another more fundamental reason I oppose the BRAC language
in this bill. Simply stated, BRAC is the wrong process for identifying
bases for closure. If the Pentagon believes certain bases are no longer
needed, those installations should be identified and included in DOD's
budget submission. There is no need to cast a cloud of uncertainty over
every base in virtually every community hosting a base all across this
great Nation.
Senator Snowe and I can testify personally that BRAC is not the
clinical, impartial process it is often made out to be. Rather, the
BRAC process in the past has been highly politicized and it remains
susceptible to political pressure in its current form in this bill.
While I recognize the need to reduce proven excess capacity, the BRAC
procedure has been unfair in the past. It has not produced the savings
anticipated by past rounds of closures, and it could at a critical time
result in degraded readiness for our Armed Forces.
I will continue, therefore, to voice my strong opposition to another
round of base closures. I will continue to work to ensure that critical
assets and training capacities provided by our existing force structure
and infrastructure are not lost.
Now is certainly not the time to create chaos, concern, in every
community that has proudly hosted a military installation. Now is
certainly not the time to embark on another round of base closures,
when all of the energies of our civilian and military leaders must be
focused on the overriding goal of crushing the global network of
terrorists intent on harming our great Nation and its citizens.
I urge support for the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Durbin). The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. I intend to speak at greater length later on on this
issue. It is very clear, the opinion of Members of this body, including
those just articulated by the Senator from Maine who, among other
things, said there has been no savings, when we have ample
documentation that they have achieved net savings of $15 billion by the
end of this fiscal year from the previous base closure rounds, with
another $6 billion in savings each and every year thereafter.
What we are really talking about is an opinion held in the Senate,
which I respect, for which I have admiration, and I have great respect
for the individuals who are opposing the base closing round. The fact
is, at a time when we rally around the President of the United States
and the Secretary of Defense and the men and women in the armed
services, we are going in direct contravention to the views of the
President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and our
military and civilian leadership. It is that clear.
That is really what this debate is all about.
As the Secretary of Defense wrote on September 21, to Senator Carl
Levin and Senator John Warner:
We owe it to all Americans--particularly those service
members on whom much of our response will depend--to seek
every efficiency in the application of those funds on behalf
of our warfighters.
Our installations are the platforms from which we will
deploy the forces needed for the sustained campaign the
President outlined last night. While our future needs as to
base structure are uncertain and are strategy dependent, we
simply must have the freedom to maximize the efficient use of
our resources.
Why is that? Earlier this year there was testimony before the Armed
Services Committee by the people who are responsible for our
installations. Do you know what they are saying?
``We are in a slow death spiral,'' said Air Force MG Earnest Robbins
II, the civil engineer for his service, who predicted the 2002 defense
budget will include enough money only to handle the most pressing
priorities.
The services have argued that the poor conditions of many facilities
and the shortage of money to fix them are proof they must close
unneeded bases.
What is going on here is, because we have so many bases, we don't
have the funds to maintain not only their capabilities but the quality
of life. The quality of life deteriorates when we do not maintain these
facilities. Therefore, there is a requirement to close the unnecessary
ones.
By the way, we will get into this argument about how you do it and
whether it is politicized. I will submit for the Record and discuss,
over time, clearly the fact that there is no other way to close bases.
We went for many years until we came up with the Base Closing
Commission.
But if you go out to any military facility, you will see that people
have aging, not only installations at which they work but aging
installations in which they live. It is because we simply have not
enough money to go around to maintain all of these facilities.
So what does that translate into? Difficulties in recruiting,
difficulties in retention. According to a study last year, the U.S.
Army has had the greatest exodus of captains they have had in their
history. What do they say? They say they do not put us in conditions in
which we can live. We have men and women in the military living in
barracks that were constructed in World War II and Korea.
An example of the problems, Robbins said, is at Travis Air Force
Base, where routine operations on one runway had to be suspended
because a 90-foot-long, 4- to 6-inch-wide crack has appeared.
The Navy has a $2.6 billion backlog in critically needed repairs,
about the same as a year ago, because the budget did not include enough
money to make up any ground, officials said. Navy people ``are so used
to operating and living in inadequate facilities that many accept this
as the norm.''
Should we be asking men and women in the military to be living in
inadequate facilities and accepting it as the norm?
The carrier berth at Norfolk Naval Air Station is a prime example.
Structural deterioration of the berth has forced access restrictions
that allow only emergency vehicles to park near the ships.
Marine COL Michael Lehnert, assistant deputy commandant
for installations and logistics, says his service does not even have
enough money to assess problems at its bases.
Assess problems at its bases?
We are doing the right thing; we just aren't doing it fast
enough.
At Camp Pendleton, the base sewer system, which spilled 3 million
gallons of sewage into the Santa Margarita River last year, needs to be
replaced. But that would cost $179 million--more than the entire $173
million construction budget proposed by the Marine Corps for 2002.
``The effects of underfunding only get worse as our facilities age,''
Army MG Robert Van Antwerp, Jr. said. He noted that the backlog has
grown to $18.4 billion, a $600 million increase in 1 year.
We are asking these men and women to live and work in facilities that
are, at best, substandard, in some cases absolutely abysmal, because we
have too many of them. We have too many of them.
I will challenge the proponents of this amendment to find one
military expert, active-duty or retired, who would not say we need to
close unnecessary bases. I would like for the Senator from Maine to
talk to GEN Schwarzkopf. He is a fairly well respected individual. I
would like for her to hear all the former Chairmen of the Joints Chiefs
of Staff. I would like for her to hear from all the experts on
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military readiness. All these people unanimously, without exception,
will say we have too many bases and we need to reduce those numbers of
bases so we can be more efficient, but also we can take the limited
assets that we have and put them into the bases that remain so the
people there would have a lifestyle, both operationally and
recreationally, and living-wise, that would give them the standard of
living of most Americans outside the military.
That is all we are asking. The President of the United States needs
the flexibility to be able to do that. I know the President feels
strongly about this. I know the Secretary of Defense feels strongly
about it. I know how the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff feels
about it. But do you know who feels most strongly about it? The
squadron commanders and base commanders at these installations where
they see their men and women subjected to a lifestyle that is not
satisfactory. It is not satisfactory. They know it, I know it, and
everybody else knows it.
I believe if we take this base closing amendment out of this bill, we
will send a signal, my friends, and the signal is: It is business as
usual in the U.S. Congress. It is business as usual. We are not
prepared to make the necessary sacrifices--even if it affects our
State; a base closing commission can clearly affect my State--that are
necessary to fight this war on terrorism.
The opening signal is business as usual, my friends. We will not even
approve giving the Secretary of Defense the authority, through a base
closing commission which, with one exception, has been an apolitical
process.
I admit there were some politics around the base closing. We have
fixed this. Senator Levin and I have fixed this with this amendment so
that is not possible again. If anybody believes there can be any other
process to eliminate these bases, then obviously the history of how we
tried to do this in the past shows it doesn't work.
So I say this is a very important vote. It is even more important
than whether we are going to have a base closing commission. This vote
is really all about whether we are going to do business as usual and
preserve our bases in our States, whether they are necessary or not, or
whether we are going to have another commission so we can have the most
efficient military machine to fight this long, protracted struggle, the
opening salvo of which was fired on Tuesday, September 11. This is a
very important vote.
I am glad to see the Secretary of Defense has made such a very strong
statement, a very strong statement in support of this base closing
commission. I hope the Members of this body will pay close attention to
the views of the uniformed and civilian leadership of the U.S.
military, including the President of the United States of America.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode island.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to support the language in this
legislation that would authorize another round of base closings. I do
so, as we all do, knowing full well there are perhaps facilities in my
home State that might be considered. I am confident and hopeful that,
because of their critical role, they will continue to be vital parts of
the Department of Defense. But every Senator is a bit nervous when we
authorize a round of base closings.
Simply stated, we have too many facilities. We have a cold-war base
structure. We have a post-cold-war Department of Defense. We have to
reconcile the two.
I associate myself with the comments of the Senator from Arizona. The
bottom line here, the effect that is most obvious from too many bases,
is the deteriorating quality of life of the troops who serve in our
Armed Forces.
I spent 12 years in the U.S. Army, from 1967 to 1979. There were
facilities back then, in the 1970s, which the Army desired to close.
Some are still open. There were facilities back then that were
inadequate or barely adequate. They remain on the books of the
Army. Troops are using them for their barracks. Family housing is being
used.
Base closure is just common sense. When you have the demands of
training, operational readiness, integrating new equipment, and then
family housing, troop housing, and community facilities on Army posts
and Navy bases or an Air Force base, something has to give. What
typically gives are those quality-of-life items: The community center,
the child care center, the library, family housing, and troop housing.
That is multiplied and amplified when you have just too many bases.
About 3 weeks ago, I traveled to Fort Bragg, NC, to watch the 82nd
Airborne Division conduct live fire exercise for their division
readiness brigade. Those soldiers are today on orders and on alert to
go out and be the tip of the spear. I talked to the brigade commander,
the division commander, the battalion commander, and the troops. The
one thing they said is they are proud to be in this division, and that
one of the reasons they are is because the commanding officer, the
division commander, and battalion commander--all the way down--put the
money and emphasis on training. They are ready to go. They are well
trained. But what they can't do is put sufficient resources to all the
needs they have on the post.
I must say that Bragg is one of the primary posts in the Army it does
quite well. They are getting ready to conduct massive reconstruction of
family housing. They are reconstructing barracks. But they cannot do as
much as they want.
When you go away from those major division posts, such as Fort Bragg,
Fort Campbell, and other posts around the country and go out to other
posts that do not have quite that high of a priority, the crisis is
even more severe. It is then manifested, as Senator McCain indicated,
in retention problems and in recruiting problems. It is manifested in
quality of life which is not commensurate with the sacrifices these
young men and women make for their country and will make even more
dramatically in the days ahead.
This base closing round is supported by the President, the Secretary
of Defense, by the Joint Chiefs, and by service chiefs because they
know they can't continue to operate efficiently and effectively if they
have facilities they do not need but have to keep barely open. It
drains resources from the quality-of-life of troops, and also from the
ability of this military force, which is the best in the world, to
maintain its razor edge of readiness, training, and operational
capability.
The DOD estimates that we are maintaining 23-percent excess capacity
of infrastructure. That is obvious because after the end of the cold
war we reduced our force structure 36 percent.
There are those arguing based upon the tragic and horrific events of
September 11 that we need to keep these bases open. Some of those bases
were built at the beginning of the First World War. But substantially
the infrastructure was built in the Second World War when we were
fighting huge national armies in two theaters. We were drafting
hundreds of thousands of men. We were training them. We were preparing
to conduct operations with armies and corps.
The operation we face going forward will involve our military forces
but most likely special operations troops--specially tailored brigades
of Army and Marines. We will not be engaged, mercifully, thankfully in
a tank-to-tank army battle with hundreds of thousands of troops on each
side. We don't have that force structure today. But we have
that infrastructure today.
If we want to be efficient and effective, we have to reconcile our
infrastructure with our force structure. We are not going to fight
World War II again--I hope. We are not going to fight the cold war
again--I hope. But we have serious threats before us. Those threats
require a faster, leaner military. Part of that efficient, leaner
military is allowing the services to make judicial judgments about what
real estate they need.
Yes, we have an imperfect structure in terms of base closing
conditions. Nothing is perfect. But there are closed bases that some
people thought would never be closed in our lifetime, or several
lifetimes. So it has worked.
There are other arguments that no savings have been realized. As the
Senator from Arizona pointed out, between $15 billion and $16 billion
will have been realized by the end of fiscal year
[[Page S9704]]
2001 on these base closures. It is projected going forward that we will
accrue an annual savings of approximately $6.2 billion. That is real
money that goes back into the bottom line of the Department of Defense
for improved barracks, improved family housing, improved readiness,
improved technology, a better fighting force.
There are some who argue that we can't do this because there is just
too many environmental flaws; that it turns out to be just a big
environmental remediation project. Those environmental costs are not
avoidable. It is mandated by law that the DOD, like everyone else, is
responsible for serious environmental degradation. They have to pay for
it. They are doing it right now on posts that are open and operating.
It is not something you can throw into the mix and say don't close the
base because of environmental costs. You have environmental costs for
open bases. They have to be faced, addressed, and paid for.
For many reasons, I believe we have to follow through on the base
closing language in this legislation. I think it is time to give the
Department of Defense the flexibility to tailor their resources, to
tailor their infrastructure, and to fit the mission that faces us
today.
We have the best military force in the world. We will see them in
action shortly. I think we owe them our vote to sustain their base
closing round as we go forward.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, I am compelled to rise today in opposition
to the amendment offered by the Senator from Kentucky and to join with
the Senator from Rhode Island and the Senator from Arizona and others
who have spoken eloquently and effectively on this point.
For 23 years of my life, I was not a Senator but was a naval flight
officer, and I served as commission commander of Navy aircraft.
We saw a lot in the news earlier this year about this. I have been
stationed on bases that did not get much support. As the Senator from
Rhode Island suggested, it is not an enviable position to be in--either
professionally in terms of supporting your mission, your aircraft, or
whatever weapons systems with which you operate. And it is not an
especially satisfying position to be in for the families of those who
are assigned to those bases because you don't get the kind of support
for your child care development centers, and you don't get the kind of
support for your family-related activities on those bases.
Several people rose today to say there are cost savings that flow out
of base realignment and closures. Just take the figures that were
estimated by the previous two speakers: Savings of $15 billion to $16
billion by 2001, and annual savings going forward of about $6 billion
per year. Let's say those figures are not right. Let's say they
overstate by half the amount of money that has been saved and will be
saved. It was suggested that we have already saved anywhere between
$7.5 billion to $8 billion, and that going forward we might expect to
save another $3 billion each year.
What would we do with that money? There are plenty of things to spend
it on in this Defense authorization bill. I will just mention a few of
them: Fighter aircraft that we are anxious to build; military airlift
capability; cargo aircraft--either anxious to build or upgrade and
improve--helicopters that need to be replaced, and ships.
Earlier we heard from the Senator from Alabama that 315 Navy ships
continue to diminish. We need to build ships to replace those that are
being decommissioned. We need to build submarines as well.
The President and others support the idea of developing and deploying
a national missile defense system which will cost tens of billions of
dollars. But even if we set aside those weapons systems and simply
consider the aircraft and the ships that stay on the ground, with the
helicopters that stay on the ground that are used just for
cannibalization--we steal their spare parts to keep other ships and
other aircraft and other helicopters flying, the ships that aren't
going to sea simply because they lack the spare parts that enable them
to carry out their missions.
It has been suggested that in the wake of the tragedies in the last 2
weeks--the terrorist attacks in New York and Virginia--somehow keeping
military bases that are unutilized or underutilized open will enable us
to be more vigilant against our enemies. I just do not see it. I just
do not see it that way.
The language in the legislation before us today does not mandate the
establishment of a base realignment commission. It provides the
discretion to the President and to our Secretary of Defense, if they
see fit, to appoint the members to serve on a commission. As Senator
McCain has suggested, the language in this legislation is crafted in a
way to take the politics out of whatever might be done with respect to
base realignment.
If the President and if the Secretary of Defense elected to use the
discretion provided for them in this legislation, they would ultimately
establish the commission, and that commission would ultimately come
back to us in this body and in the House of Representatives in order to
have the final say, the final word, as to whether or not the bases
recommended for closure be closed. We have the final word.
I believe it is prudent for us, in a day and age when we do have
substantial needs for additional weapons systems--upgraded weapons
systems, and to make the ones we already have workable--to look for
some opportunities to save not just a few dollars but a substantial
number of dollars. The potential in this bill, with this approach, is
very real.
With that, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the
language the committee has reported out, and also to support our
President and our Secretary of Defense, as well as our military
leaders, who have sought just this kind of authorization.
I yield back my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. REID. Will the Senator from North Carolina allow me to propound a
unanimous consent request without you losing your right to the floor?
Mr. DORGAN. I have no idea what the Senator from North Carolina would
say, but the Senator from North Dakota would be happy to yield.
Mr. REID. I am so sorry.
Mr. DORGAN. They both start with ``North.''
Mr. REID. That is why they should change the name to ``Dakota.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, first of all, I am going to propound a
unanimous consent request. We have been talking now for a couple days
about having a final cutoff time for amendments, telling Senators that
they have to give both Cloakrooms amendments so we know how many. We
need a finite list of amendments. We have been going back and forth on
this. We want to move this along. This is the country's bill. The
President is very interested in getting this passed as quickly as
possible. Unless we work out something on these amendments, we will
never finish this bill. So this is the purpose of this unanimous
consent request.
I ask unanimous consent that the list I will send to the desk be the
only first-degree amendments remaining in order to S. 1438, the
Department of Defense authorization bill; that these amendments be
subject to relevant second-degree amendments; that upon disposition of
all amendments the bill be read a third time and the Senate vote on
passage of the bill, with no intervening action or debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. ALLARD. I object, Mr. President. I might explain.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Mr. ALLARD. I understand there are a couple Members yet on our side
who are still working on it. I am not sure whether we have those issues
resolved or not. As soon as Senator Warner returns to this Chamber, we
might be able to get a final agreement on that.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I would say we are losing ground. A little
while ago we only had one Member who was concerned; now we have two.
This has been going on literally all this day. I repeat, I certainly
understand the point by my friend from Colorado, but the fact is, we
need to move this legislation. This does not prevent anyone from
offering an amendment. They can offer amendments to their heart's
content. But we
[[Page S9705]]
need a list of finite amendments so the managers can work on these
amendments to move this legislation forward.
I think it is really too bad that we can't get a final list of these
amendments. Senator Warner and Senator Levin have worked very hard on
this legislation. It is important--I repeat--to this institution and to
the country to get this legislation passed.
So I am very disappointed we were not able to do this. I hope we can
do it at some subsequent time. And I hope that subsequent time is not
far in the future.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 9:30 a.m. tomorrow,
Tuesday, September 25, following the usual opening activities, the
Senate resume consideration of S. 1438, the Department of Defense
authorization bill; that there be 15 minutes remaining for debate prior
to a motion to table the Bunning amendment, with the time equally
divided and controlled in the usual form, provided no second-degree
amendments be in order prior to the vote.
I would say, before I put this to the Chair in final form, that the
managers of the bill are being very gracious in doing this. People
tonight can debate this amendment as long as they wish. Either manager,
or any anyone else, of course, could move to table at any time. So I
think this is certainly generous on behalf of the two managers. People
would have all night tonight to debate. We would come in tomorrow
morning and have a vote on a motion to table. So I propound this
request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. BUNNING. I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I again----
Mr. BUNNING. May I state my objection?
Mr. REID. Of course.
Mr. BUNNING. I really have not had a chance to talk to the minority
leader.
Mr. REID. OK.
Mr. BUNNING. As soon as I speak with him, I will get back to you.
Mr. REID. I express my appreciation to the Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. BUNNING. Thank you.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this amendment deals with an issue that is
not new to any of us. We have long debated the issue of base closures
and the establishment of a BRAC commission for the purpose of base
closures. In fact, we have had previous base closure rounds in 1988,
1991, 1993, and 1995. In those rounds, 451 installations, including 97
major installations, were ordered closed or realigned by the year 2001.
And the last two big installations, Kelly and McClellan Air Force
Bases, were closed this past summer.
Now even though most of those installations have been closed or
realigned, only 41 percent of the unneeded base property has, in fact,
been transferred. From all of those base closures, over all of that
period of time, only 41 percent of the unneeded base property has been
transferred.
It takes years to dispose of this property. And, principally, the
reason for that is the strict environmental cleanup standards which are
very costly and very expensive. In fact, I find it interesting,
according to pages 118 and 119 of the Department of Defense's 1998
Report on Base Realignment and Closure, the first several years after a
base closure incur additional costs to the government, not savings.
For the 1993 BRAC round, a net cost to the Federal Government--not a
net savings--a net cost was incurred for the first 3 years beginning in
the year 1994.
If you take a look at the 1995 BRAC round, you find exactly the same
thing. The BRAC-related costs exceeded savings by $1.5 billion for five
years from fiscal year 1996 to 2000.
One might make the case, if you skip over the next 3-5 years you will
find some savings from a new round of base closures. Maybe so, although
lying out there is the disposal of almost 40 percent of all the
property that has not yet been disposed of because of the environmental
cleanup costs. So one wonders exactly what these savings are. They are
certainly not in the next 3-5 years.
Those who make the point that there is an urgency to close these
bases, at a time when we desperately need investment in the Department
of Defense, are probably going to end up costing the Department of
Defense additional money through base closures if we, in fact, decide
to approve another round.
I support this amendment to strike the base closure provisions from
the underlying bill for two reasons. One is military, and the other is
economic. First, the military side of things.
We do not know what the force structure is going to be of the
Department of Defense. There is a quadrennial review that is going on,
but at this point no one in this Chamber knows what the force structure
is going to be. If you do not know what the force structure is going to
be, how do you know what the base structure should be? How do you know
what kind of facilities for military operations you need if you do not
know what kind of military force you are going to have?
Will this military force change as a result of the tragedies that
occurred on September 11? Probably. Will we--when we see now a renewed
attention to homeland security and homeland defense--will we be more
concerned about the issue of bases in this country? Where they are
located? Whether they are strategic in location? Whether they are
needed or not needed? Will all that change? I think it will.
But the main point is this: If you do not know what your force
structure is, how can you be talking about your base structure? Yet the
Department of Defense is already saying our base structure is way out
of line, even though they don't know their force structure.
I deeply respect the men and women in uniform. God bless them. I want
to give them everything they need to do their job in preserving liberty
and fighting for freedom. But we don't need a new BRAC round to find
savings in the Pentagon. We all know there are areas of inefficiency in
the Pentagon. I won't go through them. But let me give you one instance
I have dealt with in the last 6 months, just as an example. I say this
only to say that if there are worries about efficiency, let's go find
where money is being wasted hand over foot.
We have 5,700 trailers that were manufactured for the U.S. Army. They
had a problem with the brake actuator. The result is, they put 5,700
trailers in storage facilities, and they were there for years. It turns
out in fact, in addition to a brake actuator that didn't work on the
hitch, the bumpers on the Humvees that were supposed to pull the
trailers weren't strong enough. They hooked these things up to the
Humvee, and it broke the Humvee. You talk about waste. There is a lot
of waste, a lot of inefficiency. I think we ought to go at that. I
don't think it ought to be business as usual with respect to the waste
of the taxpayers' money.
With respect to the question of which bases are important in the
future of this country, which bases might be important with respect to
homeland security, I don't think we know the answer to that at this
point. We certainly don't know what the force structure is, so how on
Earth would we know what the base structure should be?
Economic circumstances have really changed with respect to this
country's economy. We had a very soft economy prior to the tragedy on
September 11. That economy has turned more than soft, I am afraid. All
of us are struggling to try to find ways to see if we can't give some
lift to the economy.
I will tell you how you put a lodestone on the economy, how you put
an anvil on the economies of literally dozens and dozens of
communities, all across America: Tell the communities tomorrow that we
are going to have a base closing commission and that every single base
is at risk, and, therefore, if you are thinking of making an investment
in a community that has a sizable base, don't do it because it might be
this base that will get caught in the next BRAC round and be closed.
That message in this particular piece of legislation will say to
potential investors in literally hundreds of communities across this
country that you ought not make investments in those communities now,
you ought to wait.
I can't think of a more destructive thing to do to the economy at
this point than to send that message to all of those communities and
all the folks who might invest in them.
When you have a wide open BRAC commission like the Administration
[[Page S9706]]
proposes, every single military installation is at risk. It is as if
you are painting a bull's eye on the front gate of every base that
says: This might be the one that is selected; this might be the one
that is closed. The result is, people will stunt the economic growth of
those communities because they feel they must, in order to make good
prudent investment decisions, they must wait until that BRAC round is
complete.
Investors will say: I can't build a 12-plex apartment in this
community because I don't know whether there will be 20- or 30-percent
unemployment 2 years from now if that base is ordered closed. From a
military standpoint and economic standpoint, I think this is a very
inappropriate and unwise judgment. That is what will happen if we
approve the base closure provision in this bill.
The amendment I support simply says, let's strip that provision out.
My point remains: How can you realign and create a base structure
before you know what your force structure is? And we don't know that.
No one in the Senate, no one in the Congress and, for that matter, no
one in the Pentagon yet understands what our force structure is going
to be.
It might very well be the case--I suspect it will--that following the
tragedy of September 11, we might have a very different view of the
base structure in this country relating to homeland security and
homeland defense. If that is the case, it will change the views of
Congress and the Pentagon about what our missions ought to be and where
they ought to be placed. At this point I believe strongly that we ought
to do the right thing, and the right thing is to take this out of the
bill. Pass this amendment.
My colleague, for whom I have great affection, said that, if we strip
this out of the bill, we will be sending a signal that it is business
as usual in the Congress. It is not that, with due respect. It just is
not that. Business as usual is gone, as far as I am concerned. Business
as usual is thinking the way we used to think. Everyone in this Chamber
and in the Congress ought to be prepared to think differently about
these issues. We have a quadrennial review commission that will
evaluate force structure. We don't have the foggiest idea what that is
going to be or how that will change as a result of what has happened in
the last couple weeks. Yet we are going to go right back to the same
old cry on the floor of the Senate that we need to unleash a base
closing commission that will evaluate whether any and every base in
this country shall be a candidate for closure. That makes no sense to
me.
Let me make a couple of additional points. The term they are now
using to create a BRAC is ``efficient facilities initiative,'' which as
an acronym is pronounced ``iffy.'' I really don't like acronyms very
much. This particular one I don't like a lot. ``Iffy'' probably
describes the difficulty, the serious difficulty, virtually every
community in this country that hosts a military installation will have
with respect to its future and the consequences of this Congress
unleashing another round of base closures.
One of my colleagues said: This doesn't really create a round, it
just authorizes a round. Of course it creates a round. There is no
difference between authorization and creating one. If we don't pass
this amendment and it strip out the base closure provision, we will
have a new round of base closures. And if we have a base closing round,
I am certain it will have significant consequences on this country's
economy, beginning immediately. The minute the Congress enacts
legislation and it is signed, every single community in this country
that hosts a military installation is going to see its investment
deteriorate. It is the worst possible result for this country's
economy.
Aside from that, as I said, the issue is not just economics, and
should not be. The issue is also military. Given the circumstances with
our new needs in homeland defense and given the fact that we don't know
what the military force structure is going to be, this Congress should
not at this point anticipate that the base structure ought to be cut by
creating a new BRAC commission. If the new force structure
justifies cutting base structure, we can consider that again next year,
since the base closure round the Administration wants is not applicable
until the year 2003. There would be nothing that would prevent it from
being included in the next year's authorization bill.
This proposal for a new round of base closures is a terrible idea. I
hope very much my colleagues will join me in supporting the amendment
offered by the Senator from Kentucky.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?
Mr. BINGAMAN. I yield to my colleague from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I renew now the unanimous consent request
the Senator from Nevada had made before. I understand it has now been
cleared.
I ask unanimous consent that at 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, September 25,
following the usual opening activities, the Senate resume consideration
of S. 1438, the Department of Defense authorization bill; that there be
15 minutes remaining for debate prior to a motion to table the Bunning
amendment, with the time equally divided and controlled in the usual
form, provided no second-degree amendments be in order prior to the
vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. ALLARD. Reserving the right to object, and I don't plan to
object, does that mean there will not be any more votes tonight so
Members can clear their schedules?
Mr. REID. May I respond to that on behalf of the manager of the bill?
Senator Daschle has not made a decision on whether or not there will be
more votes tonight. We hope there will be the opportunity to offer
other amendments tonight. If people want to debate this base closing
issue until the wee hours of the morning, the two managers have no
concern about that. But if people have completed their debate tonight
on this issue, we hope that others will offer amendments on other
matters. There could be votes. The leader has not made an announcement
on that.
I think the Senator from Colorado makes a good point, that the leader
needs to make a decision on that, and he will in the near future.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. ALLARD. I withdraw my reservation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. I join Senator Lott, Senator Bunning, my colleague who
just spoke, and others, in supporting the amendment to strike section
29 of the bill. That is the provision in the bill that comes to the
Senate floor to authorize the Base Realignment and Closure Commission
that would be convened 2 years from now.
Simply stated, I believe this is the wrong time for us to be
committing our country to this course. It adds greatly to the
uncertainty that already is substantial in the country. In the context
of this new threat that we have all come to recognize in stark terms in
recent weeks, it strikes me as inconsistent for us to agree to close
more military facilities, not knowing precisely what our military needs
are going to be as we move ahead. We may decide we need to resize the
military and we may need to reconfigure it in a great many ways.
Let me make one other point that I believe is accurate, which I have
always thought got too little attention in this discussion; that is,
the point that the administration has authority to realign and, in
fact, even to close bases--or essentially do that--if it determines
that is an appropriate course to follow. When they send us their budget
each year, they can send us proposals to move people from here to there
and, in fact, they don't need to wait for the next budget cycle or for
the next fiscal year to take those actions.
I think the reality is that this whole concept of setting up a
commission to make these determinations is a way for the administration
to not have to specify what bases it believes ought to be realigned or
what bases it believes ought to be closed.
We had a base closed in my State back in the 1960s. Lyndon Johnson
was the President at the time that happened. We didn't have a law on
the books that authorized that in this
[[Page S9707]]
same way. It was the decision of the President to support the
recommendations made to him by the people he chose to review this
matter.
So I don't really think anyone in this Senate should be under the
illusion that if we don't pass this provision, the administration is
totally hamstrung; they are not. If they feel strongly about this, they
should come to the Congress and make their recommendation or take their
action. If the Department of Defense decides to reduce the number of
vulnerable overseas bases and facilities--which they may well do in
light of this new terrorist threat of which we have all become aware--
then that would require that personnel and equipment and their families
be brought home, and we may well need the various facilities in this
country to accommodate them at that time. It is another aspect of the
uncertainty that we face in going forward. Clearly, there are other
aspects of that uncertainty that we also need to take into account.
Let me also raise the obvious issue about the impact that closing
bases and realigning bases has on morale and quality of life for the
people in uniform and their families. There is a lot of relocating that
goes on when you are in the military. I think we have all observed
that, and we see that in our own States. But that relocating is added
to very substantially when you go through this process of doing a major
realignment and closure of a whole raft of bases. So that needs to be
taken into account in determining whether this is the right time to be
pursuing this course of action.
Among those who support setting up a new commission on realignment
and closure, we hear a lot about savings. They say the reason we are
doing this is that this will give us extra money in the defense budget
to meet these urgent needs. Several Senators have already spoken about
how those savings are fairly illusory when you get down to looking at
them. The costs of closing bases and realigning bases can be very
substantial. When the Department of Defense was closing bases in the
1990s, there were expenditures--identifiable expenditures--of over $3
billion during 1994, 1995, and 1996. The Congressional Budget Office
cited the Department of Defense estimates that an average round of base
realignment and closure could average costing more than $2 billion each
year during the first 3 years after that process begins.
I think what people are not focusing on is that these extra costs--if
we approve this provision as it comes to the Senate floor, these extra
costs that can be incurred in going forward with this issue are not in
the budgets we have been given by the Department of Defense so far. If
the Congress approves another round of base realignment and closure,
those upfront costs have to come out of some other portion of funds
that are identified for the Department of Defense. It could be
procurement of weaponry, it could be readiness, and it could be
research and development for improvements in our force structure in the
future. Those choices, which are already hard to make, become even
harder if we lay these additional billions of dollars of expense on the
defense budget. So the upfront cost problem is a very real problem and
needs to be taken into account.
Supporters of BRAC, as I mentioned before, refer to the billion
dollars in savings; there will be savings and I recognize that. But
they will be a long time in the future. According to the Department of
Defense estimates, the Department did not begin to show overall net
savings for the first four rounds of base realignment and closure until
at least 10 years after the first round of the base realignment and
closure was approved in 1988. So there may be savings, but we need to
recognize that those are far in the future, and that for the next
several years there will be additional costs laid on top of the
military, which they will have to take out of some other activity in
which they are engaged. I believe the timing is wrong for this issue.
From a national security standpoint, it does not make sense to me to
commit ourselves to reducing our base infrastructure, with all of the
uncertainty we have about what that base infrastructure ought to be as
we move forward. It also doesn't make sense to undertake significant
new spending that is not currently in the Department of Defense budget
when future budgets promise to be tighter and our economy clearly is
more fragile than we thought it was several months ago. All of this we
are doing, or proposing to do, in the hope we will have some savings in
the far distant future.
In my view, that is not an adequate justification for going forward
with another base realignment and closure commission. I hope my
colleagues will support the amendment Senator Lott and Senator Bunning
have put forward on this issue. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment
and to support our chairman, Senator Levin, and our ranking member,
Senator Warner, and to support our Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld, who has written a very clear letter to all of us, which
Senator Warner has already read into the Record, setting forth his
reasons why we need to consider realignment and closure of some bases.
We have close to 400 bases in the United States. With a
reorganization of the force structure, it is very clearly stated by the
Secretary of Defense that we don't need all of those bases, and that
there would be substantial savings from closing some of them.
Now, is any Senator up here going to want any base closed in his or
her particular State? Of course not.
Are all of us, with such a recommendation for closure, going to fight
like the dickens to keep that base open in our particular States? Of
course we are. But we are judging a question not within the myopic lens
of just the interest of our own States but, rather, from the view as
Senators looking at protection and providing for the common defense of
the country.
I have heard a number of our colleagues talk about this very sad
tragedy of September 11 as a justification for not closing bases. It
seems to me it is a justification for exactly the opposite; that it is
a justification for recognizing that we need to be smart in how we are
going to allocate the funds that are clearly going to be needed for the
defense of this country, and that we best utilize and direct those
funds in combating this terrible plague that has now beset not only us
but the entire world, and that is this plague of terrorism.
I wanted to add my voice to perhaps what is an unpopular point of
view. Indeed, if one of our bases ends up on the closure list, I will
be making the pitch, but that is not the question. The question is what
is in the best interest of the country in the allocation of the dollars
that are appropriated for the Department of Defense. If we can save
some that can be allocated more to the prosecution of this war against
terrorism, then, in this Senator's judgment, that is in the best
interest of our country.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Florida. He is a
man who has served his country in a variety of capacities and
understands the military, the men and women in the military, and the
need for this provision.
None of us who have a significant number of bases--such as is the
case in the State of Florida, as is the case in the State of Arizona--
that are very important to the economy of our States enjoy this
exercise. I respect the views of those who are supporters of the
amendment, including the sponsor himself, who is an experienced
individual having served in the House and now in the Senate and has
been involved in these issues of national security.
We have an honest difference of opinion. I believe this is a good
debate to have. I respect--I repeat, I respect--the views articulated
by those who are supporters of the amendment. But I do think, as I said
before, this will be a defining vote. The President of the United
States has clearly asked for the authority to close unnecessary bases.
The Secretary of Defense has spoken in the strongest terms. Our
civilian and military leaders of the services have spoken in the
strongest terms. Every objective observer recognizes that we need to
have a base closing process.
There are several arguments that are being made in behalf of the
amendment of the Senator from Kentucky. One is we need more studies
before we act.
[[Page S9708]]
Here are some things we already know. We know we have excess
infrastructure. An April 1998 report from the Department of Defense on
base closure required by the Congress found that the Department still
maintains excess capacity that should be eliminated.
We know having more facilities to run costs more money, and having
fewer facilities to run costs less. Excess infrastructure is a drain on
resources and the military services are struggling. I quoted earlier
from testimony given to the House Armed Services Committee by the
people who are responsible for these installations.
Some of the conditions at these bases are deplorable. None of us
would want to live and work under the conditions which they presently
have, and this does have an effect on morale, which then does have an
effect on retention of good men and women in the military. God knows,
we need them now more than any time perhaps since December 7, 1941.
We know the Base Closure Commission used to reduce that excess in an
impartial way not only works well but is considered a model for others
to follow. Many times I hear we ought to have a commission on Social
Security along the lines of the Base Closure Commission so Congress can
vote up or down. It has been a model.
We know the military has unmet needs that have higher priority than
preserving our current base structure. The fact is DOD has excess
facilities; that closing bases saves money; that the military has other
pressing needs for those savings, and BRAC is the fairest way we know
to reduce the excess.
I point out, I do not think it is totally fair. As long as you have
human beings making these decisions, it will not be a totally fair
process. There will be some subjectivity, but for me, someone has to
come up with a more objective way. The only way I know is crank all the
information into a computer, and I do not think we are quite ready for
that process.
People keep saying: We don't know if closing bases really saves
money. The Defense Department says they will have achieved a net
savings of $15 billion by the end of this fiscal year from the previous
base closure rounds, with another $6 billion in savings each and every
year thereafter.
One of the things that costs money that was not anticipated was the
environmental cleanup costs. We found out that on these bases,
particularly those that were built during World War II and before, in
some cases there were enormous environmental problems. Those were
additional costs associated with closing those facilities.
My response to that is, no, we did not anticipate that, but should we
have left these environmental problems alone? Shouldn't we have cleaned
them up anyway? Were we asking our active duty military men and women
to work in places that were environmental hazards, perhaps even to
their health? These measures should have been taken while the bases
were still open.
We do know it saves money. We do know there are environmental costs,
but I would argue those environmental steps should be taken on every
base in America whether they are open or closed. Why should we expect a
military base to put up with an environmental situation which is not
acceptable off the military base? Some people say DOD has not proved
that is the right number. This is because the BRAC savings costs you
avoid does not mean the savings are not real. The more bases you have,
the more you have to spend. We know that.
We have to wait for Secretary Rumsfeld to finish all his strategy
reviews before we authorize any new base closures. The fact is, we are
now undertaking several strategy reviews that may revise DOD's force
structure plans and their estimates of what facilities are in excess.
Authorizing new base closure rounds now does not preempt these reviews.
Just the opposite: It will allow Congress to act on them.
We are in the process right now and already have spent more money on
defense. There will be additional costs for defense because, as the
President so eloquently stated to Congress and the American people, we
are in a long twilight struggle. But I know of no one who believes we
will have to expand the size of the military establishment to fit in
these excess costs. I think all of us envision a military that is not
necessarily expanded in size but restructured; something we should have
done beginning in 1991 at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
This military structure will not necessarily be a larger one. This
military structure will be one that is equipped to respond to
emergencies throughout the world, deploy in force, be on the
battlefield, effect the outcome, and leave. That is basically the kind
of military we need to meet the challenges and win the first war of the
21st century.
So, yes, there is restructure in the military; yes, we need more
high-tech equipment; yes, we need more of some kinds of equipment. We
need less of others. But no one believes we will go back to a military
of the size that would require the use of the number of bases we have
today.
I do not believe the Secretary of Defense would have written the
letter he did yesterday that says I want to underscore the importance
we place on the Senate's approval of authority for a single round of
base closures and alignments. Indeed, in the wake of the terrible
events of September 11, the imperative to convert excess capacity and
warfighting ability is enhanced, not diminished.
I repeat, the imperative to convert excess capacity into warfighting
ability is enhanced, not diminished.
I want to talk about another issue that is kind of important,
although perhaps from a national security standpoint it is not too
important, but that is the economic impact it has on the local
communities. There is the belief it devastates the local community. If
a base is closed, it can go well, and it can go badly. There are many
cases where the local communities put together a good reuse plan and
they are as well off or even better off after the closure of an
installation.
The Congress and the Defense Department have taken steps, since the
last base closure round, to speed up the disposal of property for any
future rounds.
In the majority of bases that were closed, there has been an increase
both of employment as well as revenues into the local communities. Why
is that? One reason is that in a lot of cases you have a nice runway,
and an air facility is readily available then for usage; in the case of
Williams Air Force Base, in the case of many others. Another reason is,
you have recreational facilities, such as a golf course. You have
buildings. You have an infrastructure there that businesses, education,
and others have chosen to move into.
There is another argument that it is not fair to put every community
with a base through all the anxiety of BRAC when we only need to close
some of them, so we ought to change the process and take some bases we
know we will not want to close off the list, certain bases that will
not be closed under any circumstances.
On the surface it sounds like a good idea. I think anybody could name
20 bases we would not want to see closed. But who decides which 20
bases cannot even be looked at, what criteria would be used, and how do
you put 20 bases on the list and say no to the 21st or the 40th or the
100th?
I have every confidence the Norfolk naval base will not be closed. I
do not see how the Navy could exist without it. Could Luke Air Force
Base be closed? It is the only place where F-16 pilots are trained
today. I am not so sure. Should Luke Air Force Base be in the top 20? I
hope so. But maybe not. Maybe this BRAC could figure they could
consolidate F-16 and F-15 training together in one base. So that is
not, I believe, a procedure that could lead us to any meaningful
result.
There is another issue that is important: Closing bases will deprive
military retirees of access to health care, and that happens. Not only
health care but commissary facilities and others. That is one of the
reasons we induce people to join the military--because they will
receive benefits and have access to military bases after they are
retired. They have reduced retiree health care options, but the TRICARE
For Life Program enacted in the fiscal year 2001 Defense authorization
bill addresses this issue by providing a quality benefit package that
allows military retirees to get care from civilian doctors. This was a
big step forward. It also allows the services in the Base
[[Page S9709]]
Closure Commission to focus fully on the military value of each base.
I know if Luke Air Force Base were closed, a lot of retirees who use
the commissary, use the other facilities, would be deprived. I feel
very bad about that, but at least we have taken care, to some degree,
of their most important needs, and that is health care they would
otherwise get at these installations.
So we have been through this debate for years. We have been through
this debate since I came to the Congress in 1983. We had a series of
base closures, and unneeded and unwanted and unnecessary bases were
closed. If we had not gone through that process and left a number of
bases open that had been closed through previous BRAC processes, I
cannot imagine the costs that would be entailed today.
I note with some interest the Secretary of Defense is asking for one
more round. Perhaps we are getting close to the point where we will not
need any more rounds of base closings, but every study, every objective
observer, every person I know of--and there may be some who do not, but
I do not know of any who are military experts who are admired and
respected by the people of this country who think we need another round
of BRAC.
Again, I want to point out--and this is a very important point--it is
very difficult for us to recruit and maintain a quality military force
if they are living and working in facilities that are inadequate and
sometimes unsatisfactory. I mentioned the issue of environmental
cleanup. It is obvious now, because of the base closure process, that
many of the men and women in the military were working and living in
areas that were environmentally unsafe, if not hazardous. So the
quality of life does have a significant impact on the efficiency of our
military.
We will be asking men and women in the military to go out and fight
and perhaps sacrifice their lives. It seems to me the least we can do
is make sure their quality of life, both at home and overseas, is at a
level we would want for all of us, our families and our friends and
particularly those brave young Americans whom we are going to ask to
serve and sacrifice in the future.
Is this a life-or-death issue? No, it is not a life-or-death issue.
We will muddle through if the Bunning amendment is passed. As I said
earlier, I think this sends a signal that could be very wrong, and that
is that on a major issue, according to the Secretary of Defense and our
uniformed and civilian leaders, we do need a base closing commission,
we are not prepared to do that. I think that would be a very serious
error on our part.
So I hope we will defeat the Bunning amendment.
I want to thank Senator Levin, the distinguished chairman of the
committee, for his unstinting and unrelenting support of this issue. He
and I have tried to get this done for a number of years now, and our
track record, like mine on several other issues, has not been
exemplary, but I think we now have an opportunity.
I thank Senator Levin again for his leadership and his willingness to
be involved in this issue. I am aware in the State of Michigan there
are bases that could be closed, as there are in any State.
I thank all of those who support this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I hope I did not cause the Senator from
Arizona to wrap up his argument prior to when he planned to. I did not
mean to do that.
Senator Daschle has asked me to announce there will be no more
rollcall votes tonight. We also hope, if there is a lull in the debate
regarding this base closing issue, that Senators offer amendments on
other matters, and we would arrange a time to vote on those tomorrow.
We are going to renew our request for a finite list of amendments. We
had great difficulty getting that. We are sorry the minority has
objected to that. This is a bill that is of the utmost importance, and
it appears now there are people who do not want this legislation to go
forward, which I think sends a terrible message to the American people.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from Nevada yield for a question?
Mr. REID. Yes.
Mr. LEVIN. If Senators come forward tonight with other amendments, if
the BRAC debate ends at a reasonable hour, would it be possible for
those amendments not agreed to, to have votes on those amendments,
stacked immediately after the BRAC motion to table tomorrow morning?
Mr. REID. It may be difficult because the Attorney General is coming
before the Judiciary Committee at 10 o'clock. It is a very important
meeting. With all he has on his plate, we should not keep him waiting.
We will work to arrange the votes as quickly as possible.
Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. REID. I am happy to yield.
Mr. McCAIN. I was prepared and I think Senator Levin was prepared to
offer a motion to table very shortly. Is that out of the question at
this time?
Mr. REID. I say to my friend from Arizona, we have a vote scheduled
at 9:45 in the morning. People said they wanted more time to debate
this. Although, as I announced prior to entering into that consent
agreement, anyone at any time can move to table, but in consideration
of the importance of this issue, we thought it would be best that
everyone have everything they have to say tonight.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rockefeller). The Senator from New York.
Mrs. CLINTON. Mr. President, I, too, thank the chairman and ranking
member and a number of our distinguished colleagues who have risen to
support and oppose the Bunning amendment. I believe many Members in
this Chamber either had no well-informed or formed opinion prior to
September 11, or, perhaps, were inclined to support a new round of base
realignment closings. It is with some regret that I rise in support of
the amendment from the Senator from Kentucky. I believe after September
11, it is imperative we have more information available than we
currently have.
There are many arguments that have already been made on the floor,
very good ones, from our colleagues from Arizona, Rhode Island,
Delaware, and Florida, as to what efficiency issues should take
precedence. I agree we need to constantly be evaluating our defense
budget and expenditures, to become as efficient as possible. Yet I also
believe there are serious security concerns we are only beginning to
address. I take very seriously the Secretary's letter which has been
referred to and which has been read into the Record.
I believe my colleague from New Mexico, Senator Bingaman, is correct
in saying the President and the Secretary have inherent power to
realign, depending upon the needs we face in any kind of strategic or
emergency situation.
We are about to engage in a broad-scale reevaluation of our homeland
defense and security. We are going to be asking ourselves some very
tough questions about our readiness, about the proper intersection
between our domestic policing agencies and functions and our military.
At this point, I think there are several factors that have to be
addressed in addition to the request of the Department of Defense and
the recommendation from the Armed Services Committee before many
Members would be comfortable voting for a new round. I am not sure the
new round, if it is only a Defense Department review, will adequately
look at some of these other broader issues that may have implications
for both physical infrastructure and force deployment.
Some have said the QDR, which is expected by the end of this month,
is out of date now. I don't believe that is the case, at least from
what I am told and read in the paper; that the quadrennial review that
the Department has been undertaking will have some very significant
recommendations that should be digested and taken into account with
respect to moving forward on another round of base realignments and
closings.
It is important we integrate our domestic and military capacities in
a way we have never had to think about before. Many were deeply
concerned when we read reports of the short time, but nevertheless,
unfortunately delayed time, that it took to scramble fighters into the
air to try to deal with the impending threat and the potential threat
that might have still been out there from additional hijackers.
[[Page S9710]]
I don't know that the BRAC round has the same substantive
understanding or impact that we have had in years past, given the new
threats we have so tragically suffered. I would be very confident and
supportive of our chairman and ranking member and members of the Armed
Services Committee, working with the administration, coming up with a
proposal that does make some sense.
I listened very carefully to the comments of the Senator from
Arizona--maybe certain bases should be taken off the table. Maybe they
should. That is something we have never talked about before, but in the
context of the new threats we face, I think we have to think
differently. It may be we may have a BRAC round where some bases would
be off the table, some of the assets that we have would be put to one
side and we say they are essential to homeland security and they are
essential to our projection of force abroad. Therefore, any BRAC round
would not look at those. That might be an idea worth considering
because I think everything changed on September 11. A threat that was
not understood as being so deadly and imminent has caused such terrible
destruction and tragedy.
I, for one, will support the Bunning amendment at this time because I
think we have to reevaluate what we mean when we think about closing
bases and realigning our forces. No one should argue about the
efficiency measures that need to be taken, so that we do, No. 1, get
the most effective use of our dollars; and, No. 2, provide the kind of
infrastructure and resources that our all-volunteer military deserves
to have.
I am concerned at this point we may not be ready for the ``son of''
BRAC. There may be the need to rethink how we get to the level of bases
that are required. I think perhaps for the first time we have to
seriously take into account the new mission that the President has
given for homeland security, to make sure there is, if necessary, the
kind of integration that will make us safe at home as well as abroad in
terms of America's values, interests, and security.
I rise with some regret because I have the greatest of respect for
our chairman, our ranking member, and those who support this request
for another round. I probably will very much end up supporting it, but
only after we give the kind of thought I think is required today, to
take into account the new threats and perhaps do it differently than we
have done it before after we carefully evaluate what kind of presence
we need, taking into account homeland security. I would support that
kind of approach. That is not what is being proposed at this time. I
urge my colleagues to support the Bunning amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I think it is important we go back and
outline how the base-closing commission works. In listening to this
debate, we get the idea that by continuing a process of having a base-
closing commission, that the commission simply takes on its own head
and imposes the closing of bases without regard to the thinking of the
President, without regard to the wishes of the Secretary of Defense.
Let me remind my colleagues how the process works. How the process
works is, you set up a structure and nothing happens until the
President and the Secretary of Defense come forward and say, we believe
for these reasons that these bases should be realigned, closed,
restructured, merged, et cetera.
Nothing happens until the President makes the proposal.
Look, I understand base closings. We have closed bases in my State. I
have a lot of bases. I am proud of every one of them. I love every one
of them. And nothing is harder than watching communities that
sacrificed and supported the military and helped win the cold war, and
then through base closing and realignment we end up closing the base
and imposing a very heavy burden on the community. I understand that. I
identify with it. I have seen it in flesh and blood in my State.
But the bottom line is we have 20 to 25 percent excessive capacity in
military bases in America today. I was for the Base Closing Commission
process before the 11th, but I am stronger for it now. The arguments
for it today are stronger than they were then because we need these
resources moved into areas where they can support the defense of the
American people and into nontraditional areas.
The first proposal the new Secretary of Defense made as part of his
military realignment and restructuring was the renewal of the Base
Closing Commission process that we had under a Democrat and a
Republican President. If we come in now and simply say we forbid them
from undertaking this process--we forbid the President and the
Secretary of Defense from looking at our new situation and saying that
based on where we were before the 11th, based on what happened on the
11th, based on the challenge we face today, we need to close or realign
these bases and we want an orderly process to have it evaluated and to
have Congress vote up or down, yes or no in response to that
evaluation--if we come in and take the first proposal the Secretary of
Defense has made and say no, we are not going to do it, it seems to me
we are basically saying we do not want to restructure the military and
we are going to look at our interests in our States and we are going to
say those interests supersede the national security interests of the
United States.
There are two sides of every argument. I know there are good
arguments on the other side, and they are going to be made
persuasively. But let me just sum up.
We have 20 to 25 percent excessive capacity in military bases, and I
cannot foresee or imagine a circumstance under which that will not grow
as a result of the conflict that started on the 11th. No base could be
considered for base closing by the Commission unless it was recommended
by the President and the Secretary of Defense.
What we are doing here is taking away flexibility from them, to
restructure resources to meet the current needs--not the needs of World
War II, not the needs of the Korean conflict, but the needs of the
military today. In the end, if we do not agree with the process, if
after we go through their recommendation and the outside evaluation of
people who are appointed to the Commission, confirmed by the Senate,
evaluated independently--if we disagree with it, we can reject it.
But I think it is very important that we not reject the only reform
proposal that has come before the Congress since the new administration
took office. I just think to accept this amendment today is basically
to say to them: Forget about this reform because the first one you
proposed, we say no to.
I hope this amendment will be rejected. I am not sure that it will
be, but I hope it will be.
I would also like to say, while I have Senator Levin here in the
Chamber, I thank him for his leadership on this issue. I would like to
make a plea to him.
He and I, out of the best of intentions, have for the last half dozen
years engaged in a battle about the Prison Industries. I am not going
to give a long speech on it today. I will have plenty of opportunities
if we do not work something out to do that. But for the last half dozen
years we have had a running debate. I believe people in prison ought to
work. I think the evidence of decline in recidivism of people who are
in Prison Industries is overwhelming. No less an authority than de
Tocqueville, when he came to America in the 1830s to study American
prisons and then decided to stay and study democracy, commented on the
importance of prison labor and prison industry.
Senator Levin and I have had a running debate about this issue. I
want to preserve the prison industry system. He wants to--I would say
``kill it,'' but I will say ``dramatically change it,'' in this new
spirit of bipartisanship. It is an important issue. It is one that
deserves to be debated. There are two sides of the issue. Strong
arguments can be made on both sides.
But my plea to Senator Levin is, this is not the year or the time or
the bill, it seems to me, on which to have this debate. I hope we can
set aside this divisive issue on which the Senate has been roughly
evenly divided. I think in the 6 years or so we have debated this
issue, Prison Industries has survived by a handful of votes in each and
every one of those years.
[[Page S9711]]
I hope we can wait and debate this next year or the year after. We do
not have to debate it this year. I think this is an impediment to
seeing this important bill pass.
I would just call on the better angels of his nature to let us set
this issue aside with a guarantee that next year or the year after we
will have a hot debate on it and we will each present our side of the
argument and we can decide then on prison labor and prison industry in
the Defense Department. But I think, with all we have going on, with
all the major issues, this is not a good use of our time.
So being here to support the chairman on this issue of base closing,
I simply wanted to make my appeal that we put off this divisive issue
of prison labor for another day. Next year we will do another Defense
authorization bill. We can debate this divisive issue then. Hopefully
this war will be well underway and we will be in the process of winning
it overwhelmingly. If he would do that, this Member would greatly
appreciate it. All the prisoners who are working would appreciate it.
But I would appreciate it if we would eliminate this divisive issue and
speed up the process of moving ahead with this bill.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. First, let me respond to my good friend from Texas. I very
much welcome his constancy on the issue of base closings. We have had
base closings in our States, just about all of us. We know how
complicated that can be. He has taken a very courageous position on
that, even though there have been bases closed in his State as well as
others in this Chamber as well. I thank him for the commitment he has
made to doing something which is not easy to do because back home it
can, at least on occasion, cause some disruption.
Senator Thomas is also in the Chamber. He is a cosponsor of our
legislation, which is in the bill. My good friend from Texas mentioned
perhaps a year or two from now we could debate it. It is kind of
tempting to have that debate 2 years from now because such an effective
advocate for his position would no longer be here, to wit, the good
Senator from Texas.
But when my good friend from Texas says people in prison ought to
work, I have to say I could not agree with him more. I could not agree
with him more.
But I also think people who are not in prison ought to have the right
to at least bid when their Government is buying items. Right now there
are too many occasions when people in the private sector are prohibited
from bidding for items being purchased by their Government. That may be
hard for colleagues to believe. But it is the truth. Despite all of the
advantages in terms of ``costs'' of Prison Industries, to wit: labor at
incredibly low cost, including the fact that they do not pay a whole
lot of other benefits, to put it mildly, there are businesses in this
country that are not allowed to bid on items that their Government is
purchasing. I find that to be simply incredible and wrong
fundamentally.
It is that issue which this language addresses in our bill. We want
the Defense Department, when they bid for purchasers, to let out bids
and to be able to receive bids not just from Prison Industries but from
the private sector as well, and then go with the lowest bidder, or the
best quality. The Defense Department wants that power. Prison
Industries wants to maintain the monopoly and deny the private sector
the opportunity simply to bid. It may be unbelievable that the private
sector could bid less than Prison Industries charged the Defense
Department for items. But there is one way to find out. Let them bid.
It is the only way to find out. In this system of ours, it is
unthinkable to me that we not allow the private sector to compete when
it comes to the Government purchases.
I thank Senator Thomas who has been so active on this issue, as well
as others. I wish we could figure out a way to accommodate my friend
from Texas. But I can't do that without giving up what I consider to be
an important principle.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I know there are a lot of other people who
want to talk. One of the compromises that I would be satisfied with is
to have competition in the Defense Department on procuring--competition
with Prison Industries but let prison labor within the constraints of
not selling locally, which could disrupt the local economy, and not
glut the markets, let them produce and sell things in the private
sector.
If we could generate that, the problem is the practical impact of the
policy that we have 1.2 million people in jail--almost all of them
males in their prime, productive period--and the net result of the
amendment is that the relatively few who are working won't be working.
So they can't sell in the private sector. If you take away from them
the right to sell to the largest Government customer, then there is no
prison labor.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will correct my friend. This is not a
question of a right to sell to the customer. They have ever right to
sell to the customer.
Mr. GRAMM. The right to sell in the private sector.
Mr. LEVIN. That is what we tell China--that we don't want China to
use prison labor to make products to sell to us and that compete with
us. We tell China that we don't want prison labor to make products that
come into this country and compete with us. But my friend from Texas
wants us to use domestic prison labor.
Mr. GRAMM. Absolutely I do. Why shouldn't prisoners be paid to work?
Mr. LEVIN. They are being paid about 35 cents an hour. No one in the
private sector can compete for a job if he has to compete with prison
labor on that basis.
Let me say that I fundamentally disagree with the Senator from Texas
on that issue. That is not the issue in the language in this bill. The
issue in the language in this bill has to do with simply allowing the
private sector to compete. This is one of those cases where the AFL-CIO
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the NFIB are in total agreement.
We can debate this later. It is not often that you get those
organizations together. But in this case they are because the issue is
so fundamental. Will our private sector be allowed to bid on Government
purchases or can the Federal Prison Industries have a monopoly on some
items even though they are charging the Government more despite their
50-cents-an-hour payment on labor--whatever they pay--despite the fact
they make no benefit payments to the prisoners. Despite all of that, in
many cases they still are charging the Government more than the private
sector can charge the Government. Let the private sector, for heaven's
sake, bid on items which their own Government is buying. It is
unthinkable that we do not allow the private sector to bid on items
which their own Government is buying. It is unthinkable to me.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I am little unsure where we are. I am not
sure about my position on this issue. However, I and many of us here
worked very hard to pass a fair bill last year to allow for the private
sector to bid and compete for Government business rather than doing it
by outsourcing. I think that applies here. Certainly there are many
other things that prisoners can do to continue to work. This is matter
of competition.
I ask the Senator from Michigan: Did the Senator from Texas agree to
pull his amendment? What is the agreement?
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am happy that is not quite the way I
heard him at this time. Perhaps we will be able to figure out some
approach where this matter can be resolved.
I emphasize that the right to compete with the private sector is in
the bill. The amendment which will be offered would have to be written
with language that allows competition in the bill.
Mr. THOMAS. We are prepared to talk about that.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask the distinguished chairman: But it
does change current law to provide for additional competitive
strictures on the Federal prison system. Is that correct?
Mr. LEVIN. No. It allows competition where there is none now. The
Federal prison system now can declare a monopoly for something, and
declare that no private sector can bid on an item that it wants to
supply to the Federal Government. That prevents the private sector from
bidding. We would say that is not right. Let the private sector bid,
and if the Prison Industries folks can produce it cheaper or
[[Page S9712]]
better, fine. But if they can't, and the private sector is doing it
cheaper or better, then the private sector ought to be allowed to
compete.
Mr. SESSIONS. But it would alter current law. Under current law, the
plan has been for Prison Industries to produce products for sale to the
Federal Government thereby improving prison conditions and receiving
some financial benefit to the prison.
Mr. LEVIN. That part doesn't change. They can still produce what they
want but they wouldn't be allowed to declare a monopoly so nobody else
could compete for that product.
Mr. SESSIONS. I remember not too many years ago that I met an
individual who I had prosecuted as a Federal prosecutor. He served a
number of years in jail and was a former elected public official. We
got to talking about this very subject. He said to me: If you need a
witness, call me because I have been in prison where prisoners work,
and I have been in prisons where they don't work. And it is a lot
better where they are working. It is when you go to the chow line at 6
o'clock in the afternoon, there are no fights, and no shoving or
pushing. People are tired and want to get their food and go to the cell
and go to bed.
It is a tough call for me because I believe in competition. And I am
wrestling with this vote. I understand the Senator's concern about it.
But I believe deeply that we have to ensure that prisoners work. There
are forces out there that want to shut it off at every angle. But at
some point we need these prisoners working, for their benefit and for
America's benefit. I don't know how they can't be competitive with the
advantages they have. That is why I am thinking I could support the
Senator's amendment on the theory that they would probably tighten
things up and get competitive if it passed. But they certainly need to
work.
I thank the Senator from Michigan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to support S. 1438, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. This bill
provides our armed forces the tools necessary to protect, serve, and
defend the United States of America and our allies. Recent events
underscore the critical importance of this bill: as the country mourns
those lost in last week's terrorist attacks, our armed forces must
stand at the ready.
This bill has many laudable initiatives, including several efforts
from all three of the subcommittees on which I serve: Seapower,
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, and Personnel.
In the area of Seapower, our subcommittee was faced with the
difficult task of balancing the competing priorities of: new
construction of ships for our naval fleet; sustaining our current
platforms and weapons systems; and investing in the weapons systems and
platforms of the future. I am pleased that this bill takes important
steps to ensure that our naval forces can continue to command the seas
and project power ashore while sustaining a viable industrial base to
support our future national security needs.
The bill approves more than $9 billion in funding for such major
programs as three DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers, one SSN-774
Virginia class attack submarine, and one T-AKE auxiliary cargo and
ammunition ship. It is critical that the U.S. Navy's destroyer program
sustain a viable production rate to ensure a smooth transition from the
current DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer program to the future land
attack destroyer program, DD-21, which will form the backbone of our
future fleet.
The bill further authorizes advance procurement funding for four LPD-
17 amphibious transport dock ships and the LHD-8 amphibious assault
ship. Full funding of $643.5 million for the continued research and
development for the DD-21 Zumwalt land attack destroyer program is also
included in this bill. This is particularly important in light of the
House's unfortunate decision to cut the DD-21 authorization for the
coming fiscal year.
DD-21 will be vital to assure and sustain access to areas of U.S.
interests overseas. It will do so very efficiently, with a target crew
size of less than 100 and other design innovations that result in
significant life-cycle cost reductions over the current destroyer
program. The U.S. security strategy to defeat adversaries that seek to
deny us access to littoral regions of the world will be critically
dependent on U.S. ships that are harder to target and attack, and on
weapons systems that can deliver combat power ashore.
The Seapower Subcommittee also allocated substantial resources to
strengthen aviation assets in the areas of airlift, as well as for
patrol, reconnaissance and surveillance platforms. The bill authorizes
nearly $90 million in additional funding to sustain readiness for C-17
maintenance trainers and improved shipboard navigation radars, among
other items. Additionally, the bill provides more than $170 million to
improve the ability to meet non-traditional threats, including $96
million for P-3 modifications to increase the capability of the P-3
aircraft to support operations in littoral environments. These
modifications to the P-3 aircraft will ensure that the aging P-3
aircraft can continue to respond relevant to the changing threat and
operational environment.
The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities has spent a
great deal of time this year analyzing the military's ability to meet
non-traditional threats. This bill continues to improve the ability of
U.S. forces to deter and defend against a very real, asymmetrical and
growing terrorist threat. Tragically, we have learned just how real the
threat has become. The threat is not ``emerging''; unfortunately, it's
real and present.
In light of the recent terrorist attacks and testimony of the
military regional Commanders-in-Chief, I believe that we must do more
in the areas of force protection, antiterrorism, counter-terrorism
training, and research and development in order to protect U.S. forces
against weapons of mass destruction, and to help them support domestic
efforts to manage the deadly consequences of terrorist attacks on our
homeland.
The awful events of September 11th should highlight the urgency of
ensuring preparedness in this arena. In this new ``war'' against
terrorism, such programs are our front lines.
The Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee sought to improve
capabilities to meet non-traditional threats by encouraging the
development of technology for the detection, identification, and
measurement of weapons of mass destruction agents, investing in
research initiatives that will detect biological and chemical weapons,
and funding the terrorism readiness initiatives of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This bill demonstrates our commitment to reexamine and bolster our
efforts to combat terrorism and to extend the Defense Department's
emphasis upon force protection overseas to include better protection at
home as well. One of the first hearings held by the Senate Armed
Services Committee this year, for example, focused on ``lessons
learned'' from the attack upon the destroyer USS Cole, which had killed
17 sailors. Tragically, we will now have many more lessons to learn.
The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats also has been examining the role
of civil support teams in dealing with terrorist attacks and upon
broader issues of how we should prepare for ``homeland defense.'' This
work has been eye-opening, and the tragic events of the past few days
underscore, as perhaps nothing else could, how important it is to
support the Defense Department's efforts in these areas.
I am pleased with the work of our Personnel Subcommittee as well. The
bill we are considering fully funds the Tricare for Life, TFL,
initiative authorized in the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization
Act, while also improving the compensation and quality of life of U.S.
forces and families. The committee added $700 million to the budget
request to improve compensation and quality of life, including
additional funds to reduce service members' out-of-pocket housing
costs, to increase higher education opportunities, and to provide
personal gear to improve the safety and comfort of U.S. forces in the
field.
Effective January 1, 2002, every service member will receive a pay
raise of at least 5 percent, and personnel in certain pay grades will
receive targeted pay raises ranging between 6 and 10
[[Page S9713]]
percent. These will be the largest increases in military pay since
1982. Further, the bill supports the budget request of $17.9 billion
for the Defense Health Program, which represents a significant increase
in order to meet rising costs of medical care and increased benefits
for military retirees.
While it is our responsibility to exercise our best judgment
regarding the security of our Nation, we must do so while considering
the administration's current priorities, as well as the emergent needs
of our sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines. In this time of
constrained resources and limited budgets, every initiative needs to be
carefully considered in the wake of traditional and non-traditional
threats.
With that said, it is my belief that we in Congress, and this
administration have some very tough choices to make, not only in the
areas of missile defense and the new war on terrorism, but also in
developing a integrated national security strategy, force structure,
and future investments critical to our armed forces. Such fundamental
decisions should be made first, and we should move forward to the
evaluation of where and how our force structure should be supported.
While the debate continues on how to transform our armed forces, and
the committee takes action to support our armed forces and the
administration's priorities, I would like to take this opportunity to
acknowledge and thank Chairman Levin and Senator Warner for their
tireless efforts to tackle these very tough issues and produce an
authorization bill that funds a number of critical priorities and
provides support for the men and women of our armed forces.
I wish to make a few points in response to the speech given by my
distinguished colleague from Arizona earlier today on the issue of base
closures.
Many of us have made the argument that it makes far more sense to
determine our force structure, particularly in light of the new
emphasis that must be placed on homeland defense before we proceed with
closing installations that may well prove to be needed later on.
But it isn't just those of us serving in the Senate who support
Senator Bunning's amendment who feel that way. Let me quote from an
answer that our Secretary of the Army, Thomas White, gave to a question
regarding base closures put to him by Senator Dorgan at a hearing
before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in June. Senator Dorgan
gave an excellent speech on this issue earlier. Secretary White said:
I think that the cart's a little before the horse. The
first thing we have to nail down is what the national
military strategy is . . . in accordance with the QDR
process. That's step one.
Step two is sizing the force against the strategy, and that
will flow out of the exercises currently ongoing.
And the third step will be what's the most efficient basing
for that force, and only at that stage of the game, when we
try to figure out the most efficient way to base the force
and to support it from a business perspective, will we get
into which infrastructure is excess or not. This has got to
be a strategy driven exercise.
Ironically, Secretary Rumsfeld, in arguing for base closures, also
makes the point that:
Our future needs as to base structure are uncertain and
strategy dependent.
This is the wrong time. We face tremendous challenges. We should not
be embarking on a whole new round of closing and downsizing base
installations until we know what our needs are. And then, Mr.
President, we should not be using the discredited BRAC process.
My colleague from Maine, Senator Snowe, and I have extensive
experience with the BRAC process. We have found it to be unfair. We
have found it to be inconsistent in its application.
If the Pentagon identifies bases that are truly excess, that are not
needed--and I recognize there is excess capacity--then the Pentagon
should identify those bases and put it in the budget. Why should we put
every community across this country that hosts a base through the
uncertainty, the worry, and the expense of hiring consultants to make
the case for the retention of their base? That just does not make
sense.
We are experiencing this right now in Maine the Pentagon's closure of
a base in Winter Harbor. We wish that this Navy installation, which has
been there for more than 70 years, were going to remain open, but,
unfortunately, its mission has become obsolete. What the Maine
congressional delegation is doing is working with the local
communities, with the Park Service, and with DOD, on a transition plan
so it can be effectively reused. We do not need to endure the
uncertainties of a politicized BRAC system.
Finally, I want to respond to the comments made by the Senator from
Arizona about the need for improved housing for our troops. I could not
agree with him more. I have visited our troops stationed at the DMZ in
Korea. I was shocked and appalled at how bad the housing was for our
brave men and women who are serving there on the front lines. We do
have to do better. But that is a completely separate issue from the
issue of whether now is the time to embark on base closures.
Now is not the time--now is the worst possible time--to divert the
energies of the civilian and military leaders of the Pentagon into an
exercise of closing bases that may well prove to be needed later. Now
is certainly not the time to create concern and chaos and confusion in
every community that has proudly hosted a military installation and is
supporting our men and women in uniform. Now is certainly not the time
to embark on another round of base closures when all of our energies
must be focused on the overriding goal of crushing the international
network of terrorist organizations that have so harmed our Nation and
its citizens.
I urge support for the amendment offered by the Senator from
Kentucky.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first, I would like to make an inquiry and
then I have a couple comments to make.
When are we going to be taking up amendments that have been on the
list for quite some time? Has that been decided yet? Or may I ask the
manager of the bill, are we going to be disposing of the Bunning
amendment before we go to other amendments? Is that going to be the
order?
Mr. LEVIN. We are going to be disposing of the Bunning amendment
tomorrow morning at 9:15. What we are hoping for is that other people
with amendments--if debate ends early enough tonight on the Bunning
amendment--will come forward with their amendments so we can debate
those amendments and then set votes on those amendments tomorrow.
Mr. INHOFE. Yes.
Mr. LEVIN. Senator Reid is here so we will leave that conversation
for him.
Mr. REID. The manager of the bill is absolutely right. We are
certainly willing tonight to take up any amendments that need to be
offered. I say to my friend from Oklahoma, as I have said several times
throughout the day, this is a very important amendment, the one now
before the Senate. We are going to dispose of it in the morning, more
than likely, at 9:45.
But the problem we have, I say to my friend from Alabama, is we
cannot get your side to agree on a list of amendments. We are not
saying eliminate amendments. We are not saying you cannot offer
amendments. We are saying offer anything you want, but let's have the
managers have a finite list of amendments.
And I don't know what the majority leader is going to do, but if this
goes on tomorrow, I think the majority leader would have to think
seriously about going to some other legislation because we cannot go on
with each hour that goes by with more amendments coming in. We need a
cutoff period of some kind.
So I say to my friend from Alabama, if there is some way you can
prevail on the people on your side of the aisle to allow us to have
this unanimous consent request agreed to--what the consent agreement
says is that--I offered it already, and I will just tell you what is in
it again--in fact, I will propound it right now.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the list that I will send
to the desk at this time be the only first-degree amendments remaining
in order to S. 1438; that these amendments be subject to second-degree
amendments that are relevant; that upon disposition of
[[Page S9714]]
all amendments, the bill be read a third time and the Senate vote on
passage of the bill, with no intervening action or debate.
I propound this unanimous consent request, but I say, Mr. President,
before I ask you to rule--I say to my friend from Alabama, and anyone
within the sound of my voice--this is something that isn't unique to
this bill. We do it all the time. That is how we complete legislation.
If we cannot get people to agree on a finite list of amendments, we
cannot do anything on the legislation. We might as well just pull it.
Mr. INHOFE. I thank the distinguished assistant majority leader.
And I will say this: I started out with 16 amendments, and I have 3.
I think if everyone did this, we would be able to complete this bill.
It is very important we have the Defense authorization bill and we act
on it. So I will do my part.
Mr. REID. I say to my friend, if he had 16, that is your privilege.
You can have as many as you want. We are saying, have as many as you
want, but let's have a cutoff period so the managers, at some time, can
work through these amendments. If there is no end to these amendments,
there is nothing to work through; we never finish the legislation.
So, Mr. President, I propound this unanimous consent request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Mr. SESSIONS. I understand there are still those who wish to continue
debate and who have not been prepared to agree to that on this side--
maybe somebody on this side. We have had this frustration ever since I
have been in the Senate. We have been on the other side as the
majority. But maybe we can get this thing moving. I certainly would
like to see this bill move. I would not personally object. I am
objecting for others who, I understand, have a right to object and have
asked that I do so. I certainly will do what I can to see this bill
move. I hope we can reach an agreement soon.
Mr. REID. I say to my friend from Alabama, this unanimous consent
request that I have propounded does not in any way limit debate. In
fact, it will allow unlimited debate on each amendment. We are not
saying don't talk more than an hour on an amendment. We are saying just
tell us what you want to talk about so that the managers can determine
if they can be accepted as part of a managers' package, or if they want
to try to work out time agreements on these amendments, or if they want
to basically accept some of them.
The way it is now, under the Senate rules we will never, ever finish
this legislation unless there is a finite list of amendments. And we
can't do it.
Mr. SESSIONS. I understand the Senator's concerns and frustrations.
We have been on this less than 2 full days. This is a major bill. Maybe
we can get the agreement soon. I will certainly help him in that
regard, if I can.
Mr. INHOFE. Let me reclaim my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma does have the floor.
Mr. INHOFE. I appreciate this, I say to both the Senator from Alabama
and the Senator from Nevada. It is very important. We must get to a
point where we can vote on it. I do have three amendments I want to
take up. I will just stick it through until such time as I can bring
them up.
Let me make a couple comments on some of the debate that has been
going on. As far as prison labor is concerned, I assure the Senator
from Alabama, who has been concerned about it, expressing his desire to
have prisoners work, I can assure him that prisoners can work.
I can also assure him that the language, in my opinion--I have been
on this committee now since 1994, and I have heard this debate every
year since 1994--in the bill is good language. We need to be able to
have quality work done on the work we are talking about in conjunction
with this prison labor debate.
Let me assure the Senator from Alabama that we can go ahead and keep
the language that is in our bill and still have a lot for the prisoners
to do. I know a lot about this. I was mayor of Tulsa for three, four
terms. During that time, we had a prostitution ring that hit Oklahoma
and hit my city of Tulsa. It was a very serious problem. Of course, we
would throw them in jail. They would get out about 10 minutes later,
when their attorneys would come up. What I did was, instead of putting
them in jail and incarcerating them, I put them in work details.
We had them out there--it worked out really well--cleaning up our
parks. Because they had spiked heels, they could kind of go out there
and pick up the trash, and it worked out very well. That program
actually stopped that ring. It was because it was hard work. They
didn't want to do it.
I can remember once I got a call from someone from Sidney, Australia,
on a live radio show. I don't know what time it was there, but it was
the middle of the night in Tulsa.
He said: Mr. Mayor, how cruel can you be, making those poor women go
out and work hard in the hot sun and do all that labor.
I said: I'll tell what you I will do. We will just package them all
up and send them to Sidney, and then it will be your problem.
Then he said: By jove, I think you have a good program there.
There is a lot of work that can be done by prisoners. Anyone who has
worked in this area, which I have in Oklahoma with our State
penitentiary, knows that can happen. That is not the issue. There is
going to be work. They are going to get work anyway that is not as
enjoyable as the work we are talking about. I support the language in
the bill.
Under the debate right now, we have been talking about the proposed
fifth round of the BRAC, base realignment and closure round. I have to
say this: I am opposed to it, but for a different reason than the
Senator from Maine who spoke before me. It is not that I don't believe
in the process.
I was elected to the House of Representatives in 1986. Dick Armey put
out this problem. He said: As it is, we are never going to be able to
close installations and get rid of infrastructure that is no longer
something we need if we leave it up to the political process. Each one
is an economic base. There is not a Member of the House or the Senate
who is not going to protect his own turf.
That had been true. So I strongly supported Dick Armey, and in 1987
we passed the BRAC process. We went through four rounds. Until the last
round came up, it worked beautifully. It wasn't to everyone's
satisfaction. A lot of people were mad about it. But a lot of bases, in
New York and other places, were closed down and everyone cooperated.
In the fourth round, politics entered into it. It was a partisan
thing because it was Democrats and Republicans who did it. That has
taken care of where it can't happen again.
The system is good. I far prefer the system of having BRAC rounds
over the system that we used before then.
Here is why I am opposed to it. It is a totally different reason. I
heard Senator Bunning ask: Can anyone show me the amount of money that
has been saved? We all have opinions as to what is projected into the
future. I will say this: One thing we know for sure, we have closed 97
installations. I would suggest we wouldn't have closed one of them if
it had not been for this process. We closed them. And in that time that
we actually closed those, there wasn't one that didn't lose money for
the first 3 or 4 years afterwards.
I think there probably is infrastructure out there that we are going
to have to address at some time. We have two things that are going on
right now: No. 1, we are bleeding. Everything is hemorrhaging right
now. We know we are having problems in our force structure, problems
with retention, problems with modernization. We need to have a missile
defense system. All these things have top priority in the bill, and I
agree that they should be done. So if we postpone the consideration--I
know it doesn't take place until 2003--if we postpone it until a later
date, then we will not have to forgo that money that it is going to
cost to close bases at a time that we need to go into rebuilding our
defense structure. We are repeating something right now like it was in
1981. We have a hollow force. So this is not the time. I might
seriously consider it later on.
[[Page S9715]]
The second reason is this: We know we are going to change the force
structure. We know we are right now at one-half of the force structure
we were in 1991 during the Persian Gulf War. That can be documented.
That is one-half the Army divisions, one-half the tactical Air Force,
one-half the ships, down from 600 to 300. We know we are going to have
to start building that force structure back up.
As we do it, we may be needing some of the infrastructure that right
now, if it were looked at by a committee that were appointed now or
next year, they might think is not necessary.
Let's wait. To artificially lower the infrastructure down to here,
when our force structure is too low and we are going to have to raise
it up--we don't know what we are going to be needing at the time. The
time is not right.
I believe in the system. I will support it at the appropriate time.
But we need every dollar we can get to rebuild our defenses today. That
is what this bill is all about. That is why this is one of the few
parts of this bill with which I disagree.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Stabenow). The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. VOINOVICH. Madam President, I rise today to indicate my strong
opposition to amendment No. 1622, which would strip a provision
authorizing a round of base closures in fiscal year 2003 from the
fiscal year 2002 Defense authorization bill, and differ from some of my
colleagues who would like to do that.
As one who voted for base closing last year, I understand how
important this provision is to our national security. As many of my
colleagues are aware, our military now finds itself with an
infrastructure base that is no longer proportionate to its force
structure. It is estimated we now support an infrastructure that is in
excess nearly 25 percent. In other words, we have an infrastructure out
there of bases; there is 25 percent more than what we really need. I
believe rather than continuing to pay for unneeded facilities, our
defense dollars can and should be better spent to meet the most
pressing needs of our armed services.
I stand behind Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and other members of
the Armed Services Committee who supported the inclusion of this
provision in the fiscal year 2002 Defense authorization bill.
As the committee noted in its report accompanying the bill, our top
civilian and uniformed military leaders have requested this authority.
For the last 5 years, they have been asking for it. I believe we should
trust their guidance and act to grant the Defense Department this much-
needed authority. Too often I have noticed in this body that we do not
support the recommendations of the people we charged with the
responsibility to get the job done. We know more about it than they do.
In this case, we have charged these people with the responsibility to
secure our freedom and provide our national defense. We should listen
to them. I am so glad the Armed Services Committee did so in this case.
The committee said:
The committee believes that the arguments for allowing the
closure of additional facilities are clear and compelling.
The department has excess facilities. Closing bases saves
money, and the military services have higher priority uses
that could be funded with those savings.
As our Nation prepares to engage in a new battle to combat terrorist
threats against the United States and the Free World at large, it is
critical that these excess resources be used to meet the most pressing
defense needs.
I respectfully disagree with the argument that we should not act on
this initiative as our country prepares to take on those who commit
acts of terrorism against our Nation. On the contrary, I believe that
now, more than ever before, we need these resources for more important
endeavors.
As the Secretary of Defense noted in a letter to Chairman Levin,
dated September 21, 2001--I want to make the point that I have heard
several people say on the floor of the Senate that they can't do it,
they are too busy with other things, and don't have the time or
resources to properly do the overview that they need to determine which
of these bases ought to be closed. It seems to me that they have a
better idea of what their capacity is than we have.
In this letter from the Secretary of Defense, dated September 21--
that is pretty near--he said:
Indeed, in the wake of the terrible events of September 11,
the imperative to convert excess capacity into war-fighting
ability is enhanced, not diminished.
Basically, they say we can handle the job. Give us the permission so
we can move on with it. We made hard decisions regarding the size of
force structure during the past decade and we can continue to do more
to make corresponding choices regarding the size and configuration of
our military installations. Some of the words I have heard were that we
have had base closings and they have been wonderful in terms of cost
savings. The cost savings associated with past base realignment and
closures, including several from my State of Ohio, is considerable.
That is the other thing. So often when these things come up, people
are thinking of their own bases and they don't want to lose the bases.
I didn't want to lose the bases in Ohio that went through the BRAC
process. I thought it was fair and above board. They did close down
bases. In other instances, we were able to convince them that the bases
should remain open. But the fact is, as a result of these base
closings, the Department of Defense has a cost savings of nearly $14
billion because of these initiatives. Given the fact we still have a
military infrastructure that is in excess of more than 20 percent, we
can continue to generate even more savings with an additional round of
base closures.
The Secretary of Defense estimates that with an additional round of
base closures, in fiscal year 2003, our taxpayers are going to save
$3.5 billion annually. In this particular case, I don't think the
savings are going to be there. We will take the savings and put them to
use by taking care of this war dealing with terrorism. Given these
savings, there should be little doubt that additional rounds of
closures will do a much better job of directing expenditures where we
need them.
As I have long advocated during my time in public office, I believe
we should work harder and smarter and do more with less. That is what
we are asked to do. Keeping excess and unneeded military installations
up and running takes scarce and critical resources from meeting
important priorities in light of our new war. It just doesn't make
sense.
How can we ask the American people to increase our defense budget by
$18.4 billion and, at the same time, know that by closing these bases
we can save another $3.5 billion annually? Again, that is $3.5 billion
annually. I believe the base closures are essential to allowing our men
and women in uniform to best serve the strategic and national security
interests of the United States.
I strongly oppose any amendment that would remove the much needed
provision from the fiscal year 2002 Defense Authorization Act.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.
Mr. SCHUMER. Thank you. Madam President, I will be brief. I rise in
reluctant support of this amendment. There have been many who have
talked about the macro reasons for doing this--that since September 11
we are in a brave new world; that we may need reassessment, and we
probably do; that we probably should not rush to judgment.
Those are good arguments. But I want to talk about the particular
issues that affect my State because we are all looking at our States
here. I supported BRAC while I was in the House consistently. I knew
that it might affect bases in my State. But my mouth has been so soured
by the last BRAC that I cannot support it again. It is not simply that
my State suffered dramatically of our large bases--three out of the
four were closed--it is rather that the process, by just about all
accounts, was highly politicized--at least in the instance of my State.
While the BRAC Commission did recommend the closing of Griffiss Air
Force Base, and they did recommend the closing of the Seneca Army
Depot, they did not recommend the closing of Plattsburgh Air Force
Base. It was a state-of-the-art base, one of the few bases east of the
Mississippi that dealt with long-range bombers and tankers. Plattsburgh
was a state-of-the-art facility with a huge landing runway, with huge
investments in its infrastructure that was being built; and,
[[Page S9716]]
with good reason, the Commission did not recommend Plattsburgh.
Perhaps because the chairman of the Commission came from another
State--a fact that may or may not have had an effect on this
situation's ultimate outcome--at the last minute Plattsburgh was put on
the closing list and McGuire Air Force Base in the middle of the New
York/Philadelphia skyway was used to replace it. The devastation in
Plattsburgh was enormous. The BRAC Commission does not take into
account areas where, when bases are closed, people will never find jobs
again because they are shrinking areas. We are having the same problem
in Utica. It was done so unfairly that I cannot support this amendment
unless steps are taken to avoid the kind of politicization that
occurred. I was not in the Senate then. I would have filibustered or
done whatever I could to stop it because it was so unfair.
Now we have only really two large non-Guard facilities left in New
York State. They are: Fort Drum, a state-of-the-art 10th Mountain
Division, a highly trained and mobile unit, those soldiers have served
nobly in the Bosnian arena. We have Rome Labs, which is an information
center for the Air Force. These days, as the tragedy of September 11
showed us, military intelligence, information, and communication is the
key.
If I had faith that the decision would be made on the merits, I
believe that neither of these bases would be on the list. They are both
outstanding and important to our security and unique. Fort Drum is,
again, one of the few bases in the East--Northeast--that does this. It
is one of the few that can train mountain fighting in the kind of
terrains that we will be called upon to be involved with in the near
future. Rome Labs, with the work of Congressman Boehlert and myself,
has chipped in $12.5 million to help revitalize, and it is doing state-
of-the-art research. I have no doubt that if a decision were made
totally on the merits, those bases would not be on a BRAC list. Had not
the sour experience of the Plattsburgh Air Force Base existed in my
mouth, I would roll the dice and gamble, hoping and believing that a
decision would be made on the merits. But I believe that that did not
happen. I don't think New York should take another hit, especially with
two such outstanding bases like Fort Drum and Rome Labs.
So, as I said, I will reluctantly vote for this amendment. I would
like to see some safeguards put in, and that we take into account areas
that are shrinking in terms of population and in terms of jobs.
Most important, I would like to see the process insulated from the
kind of last-minute political horse trading that occurred and unfairly
closed Griffiss and put McGuire in its place.
I appreciate the work of my colleagues on the committee. I know their
intentions are the best and, as I said in the past, before I reached
the Senate, I had supported this process. I hope we can straighten it
out so that decisions are completely made on the merits and I can
support it again. But until that time, given, again, the bitter and
unfair experience of our State, I cannot.
Thank you, Madam President. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. SNOWE. Thank you, Madam President.
I rise today in strong support of the amendment that has been offered
by the Senator from Kentucky to strike the base closing provisions
within the DOD authorization bill.
We all recognize that this is not business as usual. We also
recognize how we will have to reevaluate many of the considerations
that are included in the Defense authorization bill, many of the ways
in which we viewed our military and our force structure prior to
September 11.
Even before the horrific attacks of September 11, I, along with many
of my colleagues, had serious questions about the integrity of the base
closing process itself, as well as the actual benefits realized. Now,
with acts of war committed against the United States, with the
President addressing a joint session of Congress that justice will be
done, with our Reservists being called up and our troops being deployed
and the unpredictability of the mission ahead, of the asymmetric
threats, I do not believe this is the time to be considering the
closure of additional bases.
Indeed, now more than at any other time in recent history, I believe
it is absolutely critical that this Nation not sacrifice valuable
defense infrastructure when we have just committed ourselves to a new
war on terrorism.
This challenge will require a new overarching military doctrine, one,
indeed, that has yet to be developed. One of the central goals of this
administration has been to overhaul the military doctrine which has
been in place since the cold war, requiring that the United States must
be able to be engaged in and to win two major theater wars at the same
time.
Until a new doctrine has been determined, we cannot decide what the
military infrastructure should be. Now with the announcement by the
President of a Cabinet-level position responsible for homeland defense,
we certainly do not know essentially what our requirements at home will
be to provide for our national security interests. Until there is an
assessment and cataloging of those needs, we simply cannot afford to
determine what additional bases should be closed.
I look at the Northeast, and in all the four previous rounds the
Northeast has lost 49 bases, roughly 50 percent of what we had prior to
the BRAC process; 73 of those bases, or just under 35 percent of the
installations on the east coast, were closed during the previous four
rounds.
Although the Office of Homeland Security will not take the place of
the Department of Defense, it obviously will be coordinating many of
the law enforcement responsibilities of the myriad agencies across the
Federal Government, and all of our military installations will no doubt
play a critical and prominent role in our homeland security.
Moreover, the war on terrorism will be a long-term challenge, as the
President has said repeatedly. This will require a sustained resolve
and effort on the part of the United States. It will employ U.S.
military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel and resources.
These forces will require the support of our domestic and overseas
installations. This is all in addition to our existing force
deployments and peacekeeping operations that we have in Bosnia and
Kosovo and, of course, our logistical support in Macedonia.
Instead of chasing elusive savings, I believe the Department of
Defense needs to provide to the Congress a comprehensive plan that
identifies the operational and maintenance infrastructure required to
support the services' national security requirements. We all know that
once the property is relinquished and remediated, it is permanently
lost as a military asset for all practical purposes.
Proponents of additional base closure rounds are quick to point out
that reducing infrastructure has not kept pace with post-cold-war
military force reductions. They say bases must be downsized
proportionate to the reduction in total force strength. However, the
fact of the matter is, there is no straight-line corollary between the
size of our forces and the infrastructure required to support them.
Belief that there is disturbs me. I heard it repeatedly when I served
on the Senate Armed Services Committee and chaired the Seapower
Subcommittee. I was in the House when this whole process began. I think
about it in terms of the 1997 QDR, the Quadrennial Defense Review
process.
Since the end of the cold war, we have reduced the military force
structure by 36 percent and have reduced the Defense budget by 40
percent, but now I ask you: How much are we employing that force?
Although the size of our armed service has decreased, the number of
contingency operations that our service members, our men and women who
are in the military, have been called upon to respond to in recent
years has dramatically increased.
As I said, I chaired the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee in the last Congress. Guess what. The Navy and
Marine Corps team alone responded to 58 contingent missions between
1980 and 1989--58 between 1980 and 1989--and between 1990 and 1999 they
responded to 192, a remarkable threefold increase.
Between 1980 and 1989, they responded to 58 contingencies. But from
1990 to 1999, in that entire decade, it was 192, and that is just for
the Navy and Marine Corps alone.
[[Page S9717]]
During the cold war, the U.N. Security Council rarely approved the
creation of peace operations. In fact, it was a relatively rare event.
I served on the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of
Representatives, and I was the ranking member on the Subcommittee on
International Operations. We rarely had such contingency operations. In
fact, the U.N. implemented only 13 peace operations between 1948 and
1978 and none--none--from 1979 to 1987. However, from 1988 through last
year, by contrast, there were 38 peace operations, nearly 3 times as
many during the previous 40 years.
Madam President, as a former member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, and chair of the Seapower Subcommittee, I can attest that
the Armed Services Committee has listened to our leaders in uniform
testify that our current military forces have been stretched too thin,
and that estimates predicted in the fiscal year 1997 QDR underestimated
how much the United States would be using its military. Clearly, the
benefits of the peace dividend were never truly realized. So, we are
seeing first hand that the 1997 QDR force levels underestimated how
much our military force was intended to be used, that our military
force is beign called upon now more than what military strategies
estimated, and that are forces are being stretched to cover a wide
range of operations.
Keep in mind, Mr. President, that force levels may have to be
revisited once again in light of the new anti-terror mission our
military faces, and may well require an increase. So would we then go
and buy back property that we have given up in future base closure
rounds to build new bases--I think not.
Madam President, the Department of Defense contends there is 20 to 25
percent excess infrastructure today. Before we legislate defense-wide
policy that will reduce the size and number of training areas critical
to our force readiness, the Department of Defense ought to be able to
tell us, through a comprehensive plan, the level of operational and
maintenance infrastructure required to support our shifting national
security requirements. Congress, instead, is being pressed to
authorized base closures essentially in the dark, without the upcoming
Quadrennial Defense Review or Future Years Defense Plan. We will have a
preliminary QDR in the near future, but it will have to be revised in
light of the new threat facing this nation. How can we make fundamental
decisions about our infrastructure needs before we even have any
guidance from the QDR?
In the full committee hearings and the subcommittee hearings that the
Armed Services Committee held during the 106th Congress--while I sat on
the committee, and chaired the Seapower Subcommittee--the Chief of
Naval Operations and fleet commanders testified that the QDR-
established force levels were not sufficient to support their
operational requirements. A report by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff concluded that the submarine force levels needed to be raised
from the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and I anticipate that the next
QDR will support an increase in the Navy force as well.
We simply must not take the risk of losing critical infrastructure at
this time. Not only have arbitrary comparisons of personnel and
infrastructure levels never been the basis for military force structure
changes . . . Not only has a direct correlation between force and
facility level yet to be established . . . but the Department of
Defense has said that the primary criteria for base closure will be
military value tied to the forthcomong QDR. But this begs the question
as to the validity of the QDR numbers--the 1997 QDR has been heavily
criticized for getting the numbers wrong, particularly with regard to
Naval fleet size. It could be premature and costly to predicate base
closure decsions even on the 2001 QDR, until we knwo for certain what
our needs will be as we confront the new terrorist threat. Critical
assets such as waterfront property, airspace, and bombing ranges would
be far more difficult and expensive to replace then troops, ships, and
tanks.
Proponents argue that the administration's approach will be based
upon military value and removes parochial and political factors from
the process, but in reality, the administration's Efficient Facilities
Initiative is more similar to past BRAC rounds than one might think.
Much has been made of the de-politicization of the process by including
``military value'' and the other criteria in the legislation. However,
review of the last process reveals that these criteria are nearly
identical to those used in the 1995 round. This is very disturbing,
because in my view, the past BRAC rounds were not fair or equitable,
and were not based solely on military value. I have been through BRAC
before. And I have to say, I know how the criteria can be twisted to
the advantage or disadvantage of a given facility. In fact we had not
one but two Air Force generals defending the former Loring Air Force
Base before a past BRAC commission; yet the Air Force claimed its
facilities were ``well below average''--and this despite the fact that
$300 million had been spent there over a ten year period to replace our
upgrade nearly everything on the base and it ended up being closed on
so-called ``quality of life'' issues even though that was never
supposed to be part of the criteria.
I strongly believe Congress must also consider the economic impact of
base closures on communities in light of the uncertainty regarding the
nation's economy in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Prior to that date, it was clear that the economy was slowing, perhaps
even entering a recession. Today, there is a great deal of uncertainty
about the state of the economy in the quarters to come.
In August 2001, GAO issued an overview of the status of economic
recovery, land transfers, and environmental cleanup in communities that
have lost bases during previous BRAC rounds. GAO found that the short
term impact of a base closure was traumatic for the surrounding
community and that economic recovery was dependent on several factors
including the strength of the national economy, federal assistance
programs totaling more than $1.2 billion, and an area's natural
resources and economic diversity.
Keep in mind, Mr. President, this assessment was done during a time
of unprecedented economic growth and as GAO stated, the health of the
national economy was critical to the ability of communities to adjust:
``Local officials have cited the strong national or regional economy as
one explanation of why their communities have avoided economic harm and
found new areas for growth.'' GAO also noted: ``Local officials from
BRAC communities have stressed the importance of having a strong
national economy and local industries that could soften the impact of
job losses from a base closure.''
With the slow-down of the economy, and the uncertainty brought about
by the recent tragedy, it is doubtful that communities will be able to
rebound even to the extent they have in previous years. Indeed, it is
vital to note that not every community affected by base closures has
fared so well in the past--those in rural areas still experienced above
average unemployment and below average per capita incomes.
In this vein, I would like to discuss for a moment the issue of the
up-front costs involved in the base closure process. This appears to be
noticeably absent from the debate. The facts reveal that there are, in
fact, billions of dollars in costs incurred to close a base.
These costs include over $1.2 billion in federal financial assistance
provided to each affected community--a cost paid by the federal
government, not through base closure budget accounts, and therefore not
counted in the estimates. And more significantly, there is at least a
$7 billion environmental cleanup bill so far as a result of the first
four BRAC rounds--a conservative figure that will continue to grow,
according to a December 1998 GAO report.
Indeed, the Department of Defense has admitted that savings would not
be immediate; that approximately $10 billion would be needed for up-
front environmental and other costs. The Department of Defense also
projects that savings from 2003 closures would not materialize until
2007.
Advocates of base closure allege that billions of dollars will be
saved, despite the fact that there is no consensus on the numbers among
different sources. These estimates vary because, as the Congressional
Budget Office explains, BRAC savings are really ``avoided costs.''
Because these avoided costs are not actual expenditures and cannot be
recorded and tracked by the Defense
[[Page S9718]]
Department accounting systems, they cannot be validated, which has led
to inaccurate and overinflated estimates.
The General Accounting Office found that land sales from the first
base closure round in 1988 were estimated by Pentagon officials to
produce $2.4 billion in revenue; however, as of 1995, the actual
revenue generated was only $65.7 million. That's about 25 percent of
the expected value. This type of overly optimistic accounting
establishes a very poor foundation for initiating a policy that will
have a permanent impact on both the military and the civilian
communities surrounding these bases.
And the GAO has found that, in reality, the majority of land
designated as excess in previous BRAC rounds is still in DOD
possession. Moreover, GAO reports that environmental cleanup costs have
been underestimated. So far, as I mentioned, $7 billion or 32 percent
of BRAC-associated costs have been attributed to environmental
cleanups. This figure is estimated to increase over $3.4 billion after
FY01, $1 billion more than the $2.4 billion originally projected in
1999.
Lastly, when and if cost savings materialize, the Department of
Defense intends to allow the services to retain savings and use the
funding at their discretion. This does not guarantee that any freed up
funding will go toward comprehensive modernization or quality of life
improvements--one of the arguments employed in favor of the BRAC
process.
I believe that the Department of Defense has other long term
alternatives to base closures that provide savings for important
military programs. The 1997 Defense Reform Initiative included actions
such as streamlining, paperless contracting, and reduction in staff
personnel. These reforms were estimated to lead to approximately $3
billion in savings. The new administration has proposed similar
initiatives and efficiency improvements that could generate substantial
savings.
Madam President, I want to protect the military's critical readiness
and operational assets. I want to protect the home port berthing for
our ships and submarines, the airspace that our aircraft fly in and the
training areas and ranges that our armed forces require to support and
defend our Nation and its interests. I want to protect the economic
viability of communities in every state. And I want to make absolutely
sure that this Nation maintains the military infrastructure it will
need in the years to come to support the war on terrorism. We must not
degrade the readiness of our armed forces by closing more bases,
certainly not at this time. Certainly not without information on our
future defense needs that we do not have.
Madam President, we say that we are going to have a Quadrennial
Defense Review, and at least the preliminary report is expected to be
forthcoming this month. Supposedly we predicate our infrastructure and
our national security requirements on that report, and I know, having
been a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, we listened to
our leaders in uniform testify that our current military forces have
been stretched too thin and that the estimates in that 1997 QDR, in
fact, underestimated how much the United States would be using its
military, how much our men and women would be called upon to be
involved in contingency operations abroad.
They have multiplied. So now we are seeing firsthand, even before
September 11, that the forces established in the 1997 QDR
underestimated how much our military force was intended to be used,
that our military force is being called upon now more than what the
military strategies estimated, and that our forces are being stretched
to cover a wide range of operations.
We know our force levels obviously may have to be revisited once
again in light of the new antiterrorism our military faces. The threat
that is represented to the United States and our security interests may
well require an increase. How do we know exactly what infrastructure we
need and where we need it? In hearing after hearing, I implored the
Pentagon and the previous administration: Give us your plan, tell us
what you think our infrastructure requirements will be, and based on
what threats, that we will need to have so many installations and so
many locations around the country. That is something we have never
received.
Now they say they base it on the 1997 QDR report. Well, we know that
underestimated the utilization of our military forces. So now why would
we want to put in place another base commission closing process, set it
on an automatic path, when we have yet to receive the new Quadrennial
Defense Review and how that will have to be reevaluated in light of the
threat we now face with terrorism? It really does not make any sense.
I know the Department of Defense has indicated there is a 20- to 25-
percent excess of infrastructure, but I do not know how we have arrived
at that excess of this 20 to 25 percent because we have never had a
plan. I know this is a new administration, and it is beginning to
evaluate it, and obviously an enormous burden has been placed upon it
as a result of September 11. Those of us who have been through the four
previous rounds, who have been through the experience of this last
decade with contingency operation upon contingency operation that has
stretched our forces to the maximum--that has had a tremendous impact
on their abilities, and they have performed in such a professional and
skilled way, even in spite of all of the pressures as a result of doing
so much more with less.
So I say we have to really draw back. We cannot afford to put this
process in an automatic motion for some course in the year 2003 because
we have to go back and reexamine exactly what we need and why we need
it.
What message does it send to those who are deployed or those who are
about to deploy, that somehow we are going to be downsizing at home? We
might need those bases. I know the Senator from New York mentioned
Plattsburgh, that it was a state-of-the-art facility. So too was Loring
Air Force Base. It was on the base closing list and was closed in 1991,
and we spent a total of $300 million providing every upgrade in that
facility. It happened to be a base that was the closest base to Europe,
to the Middle East, to Africa, to Russia, but we were told we are in a
new era where it is no longer required.
How do we really know, when we see the threat that occurred and the
tragedy and the enormity of the impact of that attack on September 11?
No one could have fully anticipated what has affected the United States
and the civilized world.
So I think it would be prudent on our part to recede from this
predicate that somehow we have excess infrastructure because we really
do not know. It is an uncertainty. It is as uncertain as the asymmetric
threats that are now prevalent in the world today.
So I hope the Senate will support this amendment to strike these
provisions because we really do have to reexamine many of the issues
that are now prevailing in our world of today. We do not know the
validity of what numbers, from which report, will now be applicable in
today's world with this threat of terrorism. I know from my own
experience, not only with the four previous rounds and the base closing
process, but also in terms of underestimating the number of times our
men and women would be deployed in other parts of the world, and I know
firsthand from the testimony that was provided to my subcommittee when
I chaired the Seapower Subcommittee, that our forces were stretched too
thin, that we could no longer absorb the demands being placed on us
because we were being asked to do so much in so many places around the
world.
So now, in view of September 11, it is all the more prudent that we
begin to examine what we need in America today to provide for our
security, an acknowledgment that we have now had an attack on domestic
soil that we heretofore did not anticipate in the manner in which this
happened.
I think we really do have to look very carefully at what our
requirements will be in the future, because once these bases are lost,
once you lose the waterfront property, once you lose the land, once you
lose the access, it is very difficult to retrieve. It is very difficult
to be able to create an installation in the manner in which it was
established before.
Also, we hear about the savings, and there is no doubt we ought to do
everything we can to find savings within the Defense Department, as is
true with all other budgets, but I have yet to see the methodology that
is the rationale for
[[Page S9719]]
the savings the Defense Department has indicated have been created as a
result of the four previous base closing rounds.
I know the Defense Department claims there are $15.5 billion in net
savings through fiscal year 2001 due to prior base closing rounds, but
even in the July 2001 GAO report it indicated there were flaws with
that estimate. And I quote: The savings estimates have been
infrequently updated, and, unlike for estimated costs, no method or
system has been established to track savings on a routine basis. Over
time, this contributes to imprecision as the execution of closures or
realignments may vary from original plans.
That is true. It has been my experience, in examining what potential
savings would be derived from these base closings, that they have
traditionally underestimated the costs of closing such a base. They
overestimated the savings and the benefits that would be yielded as a
result of land sales. In fact, they were far below what they had
originally estimated.
The environmental cleanup costs have been underestimated. So far, $7
billion, or 32 percent, of the BRAC-associated costs have been
attributed to environmental cleanups, and this figure is estimated to
increase over $3.4 billion after fiscal year 2001. These figures are
for base closures already in progress. If another 20 to 25 percent of
installations are closed, environmental costs can be expected to
skyrocket. Increased costs in environmental cleanup have led to delays
in the cleanup process and deferment of land transfer for reuse. This
further cripples local communities already hurt by the base closures.
There are a number of other issues regarding those savings, and I
draw my colleagues' attention to the GAO report ``Military Base
Closures, DOD's Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains Substantial''
dated July, 2001.
In conclusion, this is not the time to ask this of our communities
that would be directly affected by potential closures, the men and
women who work at these installations. They have to use their energy,
attention, and focus to begin to prepare for the arduous, complex, and
burdensome process that we ask of those who are trying to defend these
installations. It costs millions of dollars for communities across this
country, with the installations at stake. In Maine, for example, a
community in Brunswick has already established a committee to begin to
reevaluate. Now, in light of September 11, that is not what we should
be asking of anyone.
We have to absolutely make sure this Nation maintains the military
infrastructure it will require in the years to come to support all of
our challenges, and certainly this new one, which is the war on
terrorism. I hope we will not embark on this process that ultimately
could lead to a degradation in terms of the readiness of our Armed
Forces, certainly not at this time, not without information on our
future defense requirements that we certainly do not have at our
disposal at this point.
I hope my colleagues will support the Senator from Kentucky in his
effort to strike the language that creates this additional process. I
thank Senator Lott, our leader, for all of his efforts. I know he has
been supportive in making sure this can happen.
Mr. LOTT. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Maine for her
remarks and for her leadership in this area. She paid attention to
these issues when she was in the House and served on the Armed Services
Committee in the Senate and is very knowledgeable and makes such a good
point. To go forward with this, with no plan, no certainty about where
we are going in the future, would be a big mistake. I thank her for her
efforts.
Madam President, I rise in support of an amendment that strikes
section 29 of the National Authorization Act of 2002. Section 29
provides authority to carry out a base closure round in 2003.
As this body considers yet another round of base closure hearings, I
think it is very important that we pause and reflect on where we have
been, and examine where we are, and particularly today, where we are
going with our future force structure considering we find ourselves in
a new war against terrorism.
I've said it many times before; we have been down this ``old BRAC
Road'' before, actually four times. The pros and cons of the BRAC
process should be well defined by now.
I have always opposed the BRAC process because, first and foremost,
it is an abdiction of responsibility by Congress. For years, Congress
made base closure decisions based on recommendations from our military
leaders. This supposedly independent BRAC commission was supposed to
take politics out of the base closure process, but it has failed. There
are always concerns about the fairness of how it is done. There are
always implications or indications that some political considerations
came into play, and always will be.
Regrettably there have already been statements from Defense
officials, which hint at bases that should be reduced or moved. In a
USA Today article Ray DuBois, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment, said the Pentagon wants to consolidate
its bases by relocating some operations from congested areas to
sparsely populated regions. He offered hints about moving training
bases in the fast-growing Southeast to the Northern Plains State,
whittling down some of the 150 military operations in the Norfolk,
Virginia area, and moving activities out of Andrews Air Force Base.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recently said the Pentagon was
considering a variety of options, including mothballing some bases,
mothball part of a base and keep the rest open, or close only part of a
base. Mothballing means that even the surrounding community will be
prevented from using the abandoned facilities, devastating any hope of
economic development in these local communities.
We must realize that an attempt to close bases, through any means, is
in some form political. The future of our bases, our base communities
and our Nation's security should therefore be decided by the elected
officials of this nation, not by an appointed commission.
Secondly, we know for certain that the BRAC process severely disrupts
the local economies of communities across the nation. Statements like
those coming out of the DOD in the past few months only exacerbate the
anxieties of local communities. These communities have hired
consultants and will spend millions of dollars trying to prove the
worth of their bases out of fear that they will be closed.
For such communities, losing a base is more than just an economic
loss; it is an emotional loss and a blow to the core of their identity.
These are not just nameless, faceless people involved. In most military
communities, personnel from the base are their church leaders, little
league coaches and scout leaders, not just men and women with money to
spend. Communities that closed a base have lost must more than economic
well being, they have lost friends. neighbors, and community leaders. I
think it is very important that we remember what this process does to
these communities and to the people who are involved.
The third thing we now know about BRAC is that its savings cannot be
documented. The economic and fiscal ramifications of closing and
realigning bases Congress has already authorized will stretch well into
the 21st century. The proposed savings from previous BRAC rounds are
nothing more than imprecise Department of Defense estimates that cannot
be confirmed.
In fact, both the CBO and the GAO have said the Department of Defense
cannot back up its savings estimates with hard facts. Given BRAC's
purpose in life is to save money, I find this especially disturbing. If
DOD cannot tell us how much has been saved by previous base closures,
it begs the question, how can they say we need more?
Now are know that it is almost impossible to assess the real damages,
savings, or benefits from these previous base closings. We have seen
this time and time again. For instance, we have made decisions that
certain bases would be closed and there would be certain savings. Yet,
we have found that it is very difficult to move toward closing these
bases and getting the savings for no other reason than there are
extensive environmental problems in cleaning up those bases before they
can be turned over to the private sector or the local communities. To
this day, many
[[Page S9720]]
of the recommendations from previous BRAC's have not been completed. We
are still operating bases, facilities, or depots that supposedly were
going to be closed. Today, they are still not closed.
Finally, the objective of BRAC is to match base infrastructure with
force structure. Yet today, the Department of Defense is working on
their plan to transform our Armed Forces. In light of current events, I
think we all agree that a new threat has emerged and a new type of war
will be fought. I have to ask, what will be the force structure of the
future? And, where will we need bases for operating, training, and
maintaining this force? These are just a few of the questions that must
be answered before we make a large-scale commitment to change our
defense infrastructure.
Secretary Rumsfield is still working on his Strategic Reviews to
define the environment for the future and to make recommendations on
force structure changes. He has stated that the fiscal year 2003
Defense budget submission will be his first opportunity to implement
these transformational ideas.
DOD is also currently executing the Congressionally mandated
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and was scheduled to report to the
Congress later this month on the results. I have no doubt this report
will be delayed due to the terrorist attack on the Pentagon. This body
has been patient, and continues to wait anxiously for these reviews
because we know their importance to the future of our military. Why,
then, would we make such an important decision as closing certain bases
before these long awaited reports are even available?
Without these key assessments, how do we define the base requirements
for our future force? We have yet to decide not only what that force
should be, but where it should be based. Now is not the time to get the
proverbial ``cart in front of the horse.'' Another round of base
closures should not occur until all of the studies and reviews have
been completed and the President is given the appropriate time to
update the National Security Strategy.
So without having had an opportunity or a means to assess the changes
in our infrastructure, and without having the opportunity to get
previously identified bases closed and savings realized, and without
even identifying the future force structure of our military, we now
have to confront the recommendation that we should have yet another
round of base closures. As a result of all these factors, CBO observed
that additional base closures ``should follow an interval during which
DOD and independent analysis examine the actual impact of the measure
that have been taken.''
I agree. Before we go forward, we need to take a look at what we have
already done, evaluate it, and make sure we understand the cost savings
and the costs that have been expended--both in financial terms and in
terms of our military capabilities. Only after this review can we make
an informed decision about whether or not to have another round. To go
forward and blindly close more bases when we are not even sure what the
benefits, if any, would be, just does not seem like good policy.
I have stated to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and all the
Service Chief of Staffs that if they desire another round I could only
support a round that focuses on those areas identified with large
excess capacity. This focused round would provide savings but not
reduce infrastructure below what might be required by the future force.
One area is overseas bases and facilities. The 1990 BRAC legislation
outlines the sense of Congress that closure of military installations
outside the United States should be accomplished at the discretion of
the Secretary of Defense at the earliest opportunity.
Yet today, we have over 700 activities in Europe and Asia alone.
Europe has 523 activities with 115,650 active duty personnel. We
invested $572 million in military construction in Europe from 1997-
2001. That equates to an average annual investment of $114.5 million
per year. In Asia we have 188 activities with 129,482 active duty
personnel. There are more troops in Asia than Europe but 60 percent
less activities. The United States invested $653.8 million in military
construction in Asia from 1997-2001. That equates to an average annual
investment of $121 million per year.
In a recent meeting with Secretary of the Army Tom White, he
mentioned the possibility of moving 10,000 troops from the European
theater to the Pacific theater. During a separate meeting, Deputy
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz mentioned transferring 10,000 troops from
Europe back to the United States. Just last week on Friday, September
14, President Bush granted the authority to mobilize 50,000 reserve
personnel for Homeland Defense. How will these large-scale troop
realignments affect our infrastructure requirements of the future?
Why are we continuing to close installations in the United States
when there are so many facilities overseas that we continue to sink
large amounts of funds into year after year? In light of the events of
September 11, I believe we need to consolidate overseas installations,
therefore providing a more secure environment as well as improving the
quality of life for our service-members and their families.
These are some of the questions we need answered before we authorize
an additional round of BRAC. If after the Strategic Reviews and the
QDR, the required force structure supports further base closures, then
I think DOD should identify bases they no longer feel are necessary and
submit their finding to Congress. I have full faith that this body is
capable of looking objectively at our defense needs and determining
whether a base has outlived its usefulness.
Given what we already know about BRAC, the ongoing reviews, and more
importantly, what has happened in recent days, I cannot support and
vigorously oppose the Department of Defense's request for another round
of base closure.
For that and many other reasons, I offer these amendments, one to
strike and one to modify section 29 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. I hope my colleagues will
support me on this important issue.
I support and am a principal cosponsor of the amendment to strike
section 29 of the national authorization act of 2002. That section
provides authority to carry out the base closure round of 2003.
As this body considers yet another round of base closure hearings and
proceedings, I think it is important we pause and reflect on where we
have been and examine where we are, and particularly, today, where we
plan to be in the future with our force structure, considering the
events we have witnessed in the last 2 weeks.
I have said many times before we have been down this old BRAC road--
actually, four times--and there are pros and cons about whether we
should do it.
This time I have listened to the arguments of the Pentagon, and the
Secretary of Defense and I have weighed it very carefully. I still
oppose the process. I still think this is an abdication of
responsibility, to turn decisions of this nature over to this Base
Closure Commission. I have always taken that position. Some people,
say, well, how did you plan to do it? How did we do it before? We
started this process in the 1980s. The Pentagon would make decisions
about excess capacity, bases we did not need, missions that were not
necessary or could not be consolidated, and they sent a recommendation
to the Congress. And the Congress would take it under advisement,
sometimes accept the recommendation, sometimes reject it. In many
instances, bases were closed in the late 1940s and 1950s and 1960s. I
know of at least four bases in my immediate region that were closed,
including one I believe in the 1970s, Brookley Air Force Base in
Mobile, AL, bases around my State.
Congress faced up to it. If it could be justified, if it can be, and
we can be assured it will leave us the capacity to do what we need to
do, I think Congress will step up to it. Some will say this is a way to
get politics out of it. Really? How many think politics did not come
into play the last time we had a base closure round? It clearly did.
That is why many Democrats and Republicans in the Senate have opposed
another BRAC process over the last 2 years.
Some would have said 3 weeks ago that it is time we give it another
chance, and we do have duplication and excess capacity. In my meetings
with
[[Page S9721]]
the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries and
representatives of the Office of Management and Budget, I have
indicated I would do one round, not two, but also if it would be
targeted to those places where we know we have redundancy or excess
capacity; or, to put it conversely, where we know we are not going to
close bases, then say it will not apply in these areas.
By the way, one of the key questions I want to ask in my remarks:
What about bases in other places of the world? We have given the
Pentagon the authority to consolidate missions and close bases in
Europe and other parts of the world, but they have done very little of
it. In fact, I think one of the most interesting statistics I have come
across anywhere is this: We have over 700 activities in Europe and Asia
alone. Europe has 523 activities with 115,650 active-duty personnel. We
have invested $572 million in military construction in Europe from 1997
to 2001. That equates to an average annual investment of $114.5 million
per year. Shouldn't we look at excess capacity and consolidation in
Europe before we start closing bases and facilities we may need at
home?
Now I support and understand the need for having some Air Force bases
in Europe, such as at Rhein-Main, and we need naval bases so we can
project force. But when you look at the number of missions, where the
missions are, what we are doing in Europe, you cannot help but realize
they are snickering at us. They view it as economic development and
jobs activity.
I would like to make sure in fact something is going to be done in
Europe before we start down this track of another base closure round in
the United States. We have already had some hints at how this might
work. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and
Environment was quoted as saying maybe we would want to accommodate
bases by relocating some operations from congested areas to sparsely
populated regions, even talking of moving bases from one region to
another. I understand there is some denial of that or apology for it.
Maybe it shows some of the thinking.
We have also had the suggestion from the Pentagon that they were
maybe considering a variety of options, including mothballing some
bases, or mothballing part of a base and keeping the rest open or
closing only part of that base. What that means is, even the
surrounding community will be prevented from using the abandoned bases.
That might be the worst of all worlds. We will not say yes or no. We
will say, well, we might want to keep part of it, not this part, maybe
mothball it, we will not turn it over to the county, community, the
State, for them to do something else with it.
I don't think this has been thought out. I don't think there is a
plan of how this would work.
We know for certain that the BRAC process severely disrupts local
economies of communities across this Nation. If we have another BRAC,
every community, every State in America for the next 2 years will have
to hire some high-priced, high-powered consultants and lobbyists to
tell them what to do. You are not talking about cheap money, you are
talking about $200,000 a year, a quarter of a million a year. Everybody
will get on their war footing to try to satisfy the anxieties. And, by
the way, in many instances where they are not even going to be
considered--or where they might be considered, but clearly in the end
it will not happen. But let me tell you, that is what will happen.
Here is one thing that worries me. I had this feeling basically
before 2 weeks ago, but think about it now. Think about it today. Our
National Guard units are being activated. Tankers from Meridian, MS,
are flying overhead to keep our jets flying. Our Air Guard unit that
has the C-141 cargo aircraft, they are going to be involved. You can be
sure of that. We have already had reservists called up, medical units,
intelligence units and military police forces.
At a time when we are activating Reserve units and calling up Guard
units and we are telling the American people: We have been attacked,
get ready, be ready and break out the flags. Let's support our men and
women in uniform--oh, gee, and by the way, your base may be on the base
closure list.
Great timing? This is a great way to rally the troops. While we are
expanding and planning for the future and not really sure what all we
are going to need, making demands on communities, individuals, every
community in every State in America is about to be affected by this,
and then we are going to come with this particular proposal? I don't
think so, colleagues.
Some people say: Don't worry, it will be taken care of in conference.
I have counted on that before and it did not quite work out that way.
So I hope my colleagues in the Senate will think about the timing of
this. What are we to expect in the future?
The third thing we now know about BRAC is the savings cannot really
be documented. Again, we will get arguments there can be savings. Yes,
maybe there should be savings in the future, but as a matter of fact
the proposed savings from previous BRAC rounds are nothing more than
imprecise Department of Defense estimates that cannot be confirmed. In
fact, both the CBO and GAO have said the Department of Defense cannot
back up its savings estimates with hard facts.
One thing, the cleanup we have to go through, you can argue about
whether it is necessary or not, and sometimes I think we go to the
extreme on that. But the cleanup has been a big problem in terms of
cost and also in getting it into some other usage.
In some areas, some communities, some States, they have been able to
turn these bases into economic development opportunities, and they
worked out in those local communities. But I think the savings are of a
very dubious nature.
Finally, the objective of BRAC, as I understand it, is to match base
infrastructure with force structure. Yet today the Department of
Defense is working on their plan to transform our Armed Forces. In
light of current events, we all agree a new threat has emerged and a
new type of war will have to be fought. So I have to ask what will be
the force structure of the future? What it likely may have been 3 weeks
ago may not be what it is now. Where will we need bases for operating,
training, and maintaining this force?
Just this past weekend I heard an Air Force general talking about how
our jets and our mission had always been set up and planned from inside
out, looking out to stop attack. Now we have to change that thinking.
We have to think about how do we have protection inward. It is going to
be fundamentally different. We have to now think about, if we have to
scramble planes, where would they have to come from to get to New York?
Where would they have to come from to get to Chicago? Where would they
have to come from to get to Boston? I understand we did have some
planes scrambled out of Massachusetts. But we have to look anew at how
we have this force structure and where these aircraft will come from,
what type of forces we will need, what type of training will we need
for our men and women.
Secretary Rumsfeld is still working on his strategic review to define
the environment for the future and to make recommendations of force
structure changes. He stated that the fiscal year 2003 defense budget
submission will be his first opportunity to implement these
transformational ideas. If that is the case, shouldn't we at least wait
until we know that before we move toward another base closure round?
I have never supported a BRAC, but I have also never said I would not
someday if I could be convinced there was a plan, that there was a
force structure, that we knew what we were going to need and we could
be shown there is duplication and redundancy and overlapping, things we
did not need because of changes in plans for the future, and it would
be aimed at those areas, not just a broad brush at every base.
DOD is also currently executing the congressionally mandated
Quadrennial Defense Review and was scheduled to report to Congress
later this month on the results. I have no doubt this report will be
delayed due to the terrorist attack.
So I think I have made my point here. This could be done, but I think
it would have to be done with more planning, with more indication of
what our needs are going to be, what we want in the future, and with
some targeting. But that is not what we have here.
I say again, I think we need to take a look when we do it, not just
at what
[[Page S9722]]
we have here in America but what we have around the world. We are going
to have this new homeland defense position. Would we like to see how
that is going to be formed and what their recommendations would be,
before we start down this trail?
I think that would be the responsible thing to do. This is an
administration that I am very proud of. I have had a long relationship
with Secretary Rumsfeld. I have listened to Secretary Cohen, my
personal friend-- I sat next to him on the Armed Services Committee--
the Secretary of Defense with President Clinton; I have listened to the
Pentagon officials this time around. I think they are the experts, but
I think we have a responsibility to ask the tough questions.
This time, the toughest question is, Are we ready? Do we know what we
are doing, or is this just the knowledge that maybe we have some
activities that we can do without? But is that the case today as it was
2 weeks ago? I don't think we know.
So I hope we will move on this amendment to strike. I appreciate the
effort that has been made by the chairman and the ranking member to
come with this bill. Concessions were made. Senator Daschle and I kept
encouraging them to keep working and they did. They did a great job.
I hate to stand up and speak on behalf of an amendment to strike
anything out of this bill. I hoped basically we could just come
together and get it done. I still think we can. There is no reason why
we should not be able to get a list of amendments agreed to and
complete this legislation tomorrow or Wednesday morning. I think that
would be another important sign of how we are working together. We are
doing the right thing for the defense of our country and our efforts to
help the economy and help deal with the threats this country faces.
The American people are saying they like seeing us do that. I think
we should do it on this bill. But for now, I think we should do it
without this section. I thank my colleagues for their patience and I
yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent the list I shortly will send to the
desk be the only first-degree amendments remaining in order to S. 1438,
the Defense authorization bill, and that these amendments be subject to
relevant second-degree amendments; upon disposition of all amendments,
the bill be read a third time, and the Senate vote on passage of the
bill with no intervening action or debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Senator from Texas.
Mr. GRAMM. Reserving the right to object, I was over here trying to
do my reading homework. I am not sure I heard. Is the Senator asking
that we limit amendments to the bill at this point?
Mr. REID. Yes. The unanimous consent agreement I proposed just now,
for the third or fourth time, is that we would have a finite list of
amendments, not limiting the amendments but that the two managers would
be able to sort through the amendments, find out which ones they agree
with, those they want in the managers' amendment. Anyway, they would
have a list of amendments.
If we do not do that, I say to my friend from Texas, we will never
finish the bill. This doesn't limit debate on any amendment. It doesn't
limit the number of amendments that people would want to offer. But it
would bring some finality to the list of amendments.
Mr. GRAMM. Further reserving the right to object, I am hoping
something can be worked out on a nondefense issue which has found its
way into the bill. I am doing everything I can to expedite that, to get
that issue out of the way. I think we can save time by working that
out, if we can.
On that basis I have to object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Mr. REID. I say to my friend, I know there are other items that need
to be worked on tonight. I say to my friend from Texas, we are arriving
at a point in this legislation where I simply do not think it works to
have us on this bill. There are many other important issues we need to
finish before Wednesday at 2 o'clock.
One of the things we wanted to finish was this bill. The majority
leader badly wanted to finish this bill.
The President wants the bill. It is important for this institution
and it is important for the country, but unless the managers get a list
of amendments, we are not going to finish this bill.
I suggest perhaps to the leader that tomorrow maybe we should go to
some of the other legislation that has to be done before we get out of
here on Wednesday. I know the Senator from Texas feels strongly about a
matter that is in the bill. But I would suggest to him that he should
offer an amendment, debate it, and let the cards fall where they may.
But, as I said, the unanimous consent request that has been
propounded does not limit debate or amendments in any way.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to the
motion to strike BRAC from the Defense authorization bill and to speak
on behalf of amendments that would put the money that we would save to
better use in terms of our national security.
We just elected a new President of the United States. He selected an
outstanding management team: Colin Powell, Secretary of State; Donald
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; people who are well seasoned in terms
of our national security interests. It seems to me if that team we are
entrusting the security of the United States of America to believes the
BRAC process would be well taken in the best interests of the United
States of America and would serve our national security needs that we
ought to follow their leadership in that regard.
If we have confidence in them moving forward with all the other
aspects of securing our national defense, we ought to also give them
some recognition and approval in terms of what they want to do in terms
of our infrastructure and our bases in the United States and throughout
the world.
I hope the Members of the Senate will consider their recommendations.
As recently as September 21 after the national tragedy on the 11th,
Secretary Rumsfeld came back and said to the Armed Services Committee:
We want it. We need it. Please give it to us.
I urge my colleagues to pay attention to the folks to whom we have
entrusted our security.
Almost two weeks ago, the American people watched in horror as the
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon unfolded
before our very eyes.
As the nation slowly recovers, the image that no one will forget is
that of Fire, Police and emergency service personnel running towards
the flames and destruction while terrified individuals ran the other
way.
These brave men and women knew they were racing into obvious danger,
risking their own lives in order to save others, but each one knew--and
accepted the fact--that it was their job to do so.
Just three days after the attack on the Pentagon, I got an
opportunity to see the devastation at that familiar landmark first-
hand.
I was struck by the looks of quiet determination on the faces of the
rescue personnel, each knowing the serious business they faced, and
contemplating the serious business they have yet to do.
Last Thursday, I was in New York City with 40 of my colleagues to
tour the World Trade Center site. Standing at ``ground zero,'' seeing
that devastation first hand, has sealed my resolve to do whatever I can
to make sure that such terrorism is never again used upon the United
States of America.
It is important for the future of our nation--our children and
grandchildren--that we support the President. The President was
absolutely right in his speech to the nation last Thursday evening when
he said ``Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy
campaign unlike any other we have ever seen.''
As I said on the floor of the Senate the day after this heinous
attack, ``our actions must be ongoing and relentless, and be dedicated
to excising the cancer of terrorism wherever it raises its ugly head.''
And if we expect to win this war, we will need the resources
necessary to do so, and the one resource we need above all others is
human capital.
The American people have demanded--and rightly so--that we make
[[Page S9723]]
our airports and commercial aircraft safer.
They want this government to turn the full force of the FBI towards
conducting investigations and pursuing terrorism suspects.
They have urged us to beef-up our border patrols and strengthen our
immigrations and customers enforcement.
And most of all, they want this nation to use the full force of its
intelligence, law enforcement and military apparatus to root out and
squash every terrorist organization in the world.
To ask their government to do these things is the right of every
American, but these will not be easy tasks to accomplish, Mr.
President.
They will not be easy because at this moment, the federal government
faces a human capital crisis; we are losing the very people we need to
run our government--and their valuable experience--with each passing
month.
And as they retire, we are not doing enough to replace them with the
``best and the brightest:'' the individuals who will carry-on the
important work of our nation.
The human capital crisis saps our strength as a nation, and at this
critical time in our history, we cannot afford to be vulnerable.
Since I was elected to the Senate, I have devoted a great deal of my
time towards examining this crisis in the Federal workforce and how we
can address it.
I can tell you that we need a unified strategy to rebuild the federal
civil service in light of the challenges it confronts--especially in
the aftermath of the attack on our nation on September 11.
The human capital crisis extends not just to our security and law
enforcement agencies, but it includes virtually every department,
agency, and office in the Federal Government.
While the entire Federal Government is in need of a massive infusion
of high quality human capital, I am most concerned about the workforce
of the national security establishment, because national security is
the most important responsibility of the Federal Government.
On March 29, the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management
held a hearing entitled, ``The National Security Implications of the
Human Capital Crisis.''
At the March 29 hearing that I chaired, former Defense Secretary
James Schlesinger and Admiral Harry Train, United States Navy, retired,
testified on behalf of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the
21st Century.
The Commission, which was chartered by former Defense Secretary
William Cohen in 1998 and chaired by former Senators Warren Rudman and
Gary Hart, undertook a comprehensive evaluation of our national
security strategy and structure.
The final report of the Commission, ``Road Map for National Security:
Imperative for Change,'' was released this past February. It includes
50 recommendations on such areas as recapitalizing America's strengths
in science and education, institutional redesign of critical national
security agencies, the human requirements for national security, and
securing the national homeland.
On this latter point, I am pleased that the President has taken quick
action to establish an Office of Homeland Security. The head of that
office, Governor Tom Ridge is a friend of mine, and I know that he is
more than able to face this challenge.
Regarding human capital, the Commission's final report concludes:
As it enters the 21st century, the United States finds
itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence
in government. The maintenance of American power in the world
depends on the quality of U.S. government personnel, civil
and military, at all levels. We must take immediate action in
the personnel area to ensure that the United States can meet
future challenges.
The report went on the state that:
. . . it is the Commission's view that fixing the personnel
problem is a precondition for fixing virtually everything
else that needs repair in the institutional edifice of U.S.
national security policy.
The General Accounting Office's Comptroller General, David Walker,
also pointed to the human capital crisis as a growing problem in our
national security establishment, stating at a hearing I held in
February that:
At the Department of Defense, where a Defense Science Board
task force found that ``there is no overarching framework''
for planning DOD's future workforce, civilian downsizing has
led to skills and experience imbalances that are jeopardizing
acquisition and logistics capacities. In addition, the State
Department is having difficulty recruiting and retaining
Foreign Service Officers . . .
In fact, we have less people today applying to the Foreign Service.
And of those people who we find meeting those very high standards, less
of them are going in the Foreign Service than ever before.
I believe Secretary Schlesinger and Comptroller General Walker hit it
right on the head when it comes to human capital.
Consider that we are currently making preparations to take on Osama
bin Laden and his Taliban protectors and we don't have enough people
who speak their language.
Consider that the investigation that is underway by the FBI is
hampered by a lack of language specialists.
Indeed, the Washington Post reported on September 17 that:
. . . although investigators are receiving large quantities
of data from documents and wiretaps, two well-placed former
law enforcement officials said the FBI suffers a lack of
Arabic linguists and analysts.
In fact, the situation is such that, the United States is now
advertising for anyone who speaks Farsi or Arabic to come forward and
help out as translators in the aftermath of the September 11 tragedies.
I do not know how many people in the national security establishment
actually speak Farsi, but it is apparent that we do not have enough.
And while I believe we need a full scale assault on human capital
crisis in the Federal Government, again, the first and foremost
obligation of the Nation is to ensure the defense of its citizens.
For the last 2\1/2\ years, I have been working on a targeted piece of
the human capital needs of the civilian defense workforce.
I remind my colleagues that during the 1990s, over 280,000 Defense
Department civilian positions were eliminated with little or no regard
for workforce planning. On top of that, new hiring was severely
restricted.
Taken together, these two factors have inhibited the development of
mid-level career, civilian professionals--the men and women who serve a
vital role in the management and development of our Nation's military.
To help remedy this, Senator DeWine and I amended last year's defense
authorization bill and provided the Department with a special authority
to reshape its workforce after a decade of significant downsizing.
The authority provided to the Department last year allowed it to
offer 1,000 voluntary separation incentive payments in fiscal year
2001, and 8,000 total incentive payments and voluntary early
retirements--4,000 in fiscal year 2002 and 4,000 in fiscal year 2003--
for the purpose of reshaping that workforce. Last year's defense
authorization bill required these authorities to be reauthorized this
year.
Human capital is the Federal Government's most valuable resource, and
this program is only a downpayment on the changes and authorities the
U.S. will need to enact and implement to revitalize the civilian side
of our defense establishment.
The amendment Senator DeWine and I are offering to section 1113 of
this bill is simple: it reauthorizes these important workforce
reshaping proposals for both fiscal years 2002 and 2003.
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, OH, is an excellent
example of the challenge facing military installations across the
country. Wright-Patterson is the headquarters of the Air Force Materiel
Command, employing 10,900 civilian Federal workers.
By 2005, 40 percent of the workforce will be age 55 or older. Another
19 percent will be between 50 and 54 years of age. Thirty-three percent
will be in their forties. Only 6 percent will be age 35 to 39, and less
than 2 percent will be under the age of 34.
According to these numbers, by 2005--only 4 years from now--60
percent of Wright-Patterson's civilian employees will be eligible for
either early or regular retirement.
There is a legitimate concern that when significant portions of the
civilian workforce at Wright-Patterson and other military bases retire,
including
[[Page S9724]]
hundreds of key leaders and employees with crucial expertise, the
remaining workforce could be left without experienced leadership and
most important institutional knowledge.
Military base leaders--indeed, the entire Defense establishment--need
to be given the flexibility to hire new employees so they can begin to
develop another generation of civilian leaders and employees who will
be able to provide critical support to our men and women in uniform.
I thank Chairman Levin and Senator Warner for their support on this
amendment.
Incredibly, with a human capital crisis facing our Nation and the
report on the vulnerability of U.S. security in the year 2000, it seems
that the House of Representatives may not reauthorize the workforce
reshaping program that Congress passed last year. We should be very,
very concerned about this.
If the provisions of our amendment are not included in the House
bill, I would urge the House conferees to join in support of this
amendment as the final version of the Defense Authorization Act is
being developed.
Let me state again that this amendment does not address all of the
human capital needs of the Defense Department. It is just a small down
payment.
Additional action needs to be taken to help ensure that the
Department of Defense recruits and retains a quality workforce so that
our Armed Forces may remain the best in the world and be able to keep
the world secure in the 21st century.
I will continue to work towards that goal, and will be introducing a
more comprehensive bill that not only responds to the human capital
crisis in the U.S. security establishment, but in the entire Federal
Government as well.
In the wake of these attacks, our men and women in Government all
across the Nation have a renewed sense of purpose--to keep America safe
and preserve our freedoms. I have never seen more determination and
patriotism in my entire life.
Right now, law enforcement and military personnel are standing
vigilant to watch over America.
The Border Patrol, the Customs Service, and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service are closely monitoring who is coming into the
United States and who is leaving.
Active and reserve elements of the Air Force, Navy, and the Marine
Corps have been and will continue to patrol the skies above Washington
and other cities.
The Navy and Coast Guard are guarding our ports and patrolling our
waters. Tens of thousands of reservists have been called up to assist
in these activities.
At this moment, troops are being deployed in Southwest and Central
Asia.
In the days and weeks and months ahead, our brave soldiers, sailors,
airmen and Marines will be called upon to risk their lives and, in some
cases, give their lives in an effort to rid the world of the evil
scourge of terrorism.
Still, Mr. President, as much as we are asking our military personnel
and our Government employees to do what we are asking them to do right
now, more is going to be asked of them. More will be asked of them.
We have a responsibility to the future generations of this Nation to
give the Federal Government the tools it needs to help retain and
attract the best and the brightest. I believe our amendment is a good
first start towards getting that job done.
I think all of us know, if we want to win the World Series or we want
to win the Super Bowl, we need the best and the brightest. That is what
we need. And the best and the brightest have not been coming to the
Federal Government. In fact, I have talked to the dean of Harvard's
John F. Kennedy School, Dean Nye. He is very concerned about the fact
that 10 years ago, 70 percent of their brightest people would be going
into Government; today it is around 40 percent. So we have a long way
to go.
I hope with this amendment we will be able to attract some of those
people to our civilian defense establishment.
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues,
Senator Bunning in strong support of Amendment 1622. This important
provision would prevent military base closures through 2003.
In the light of the recent, tragic events, implementing another round
of base closures could be a dangerous decision. We are entering a new
phase of heightened national security in our great Nation. And
President Bush has correctly warned of the continued threat to the
security of the United States and its allies from terrorist groups and
rogue states. I believe that base closures would not be in our
country's best interest any time in the near future.
While the defense budget can be increased in a matter of days for
increased intelligence efforts or readiness assistance, the same is not
true of the force structure or the base structure. Once property is
converted to civilian use, as it would be under another round of Base
Closures, it is, for all practical purposes, permanently lost as a
military asset.
I would like to draw attention to Malmstrom Air Force Base in my home
State of Montana. After two weeks of rigorous evaluations, the 341st
Space Wing's operations, security, maintenance, communications
personnel, and equipment were recently given an ``excellent'' overall
rating for Combat Capability Assessment. A very high mark! I'd like to
congratulate them on a job well done.
It would take months or even years to reach this state of
effectiveness if we had to start from scratch to re-engage the base. To
lose this asset in moments of heightened national security could
permanently scar our force capability to respond.
While protection of our national security and military readiness is
enough of a reason to halt base closures, there are additional concerns
to address, as well: first, while reducing spending is the main
motivation behind base closures, studies have shown that the additional
funds are never realized. The majority of savings comes from reduction
of personnel, which is not directly tied to base closures. And
reduction of personnel shouldn't be an option given the current
circumstances. Second, there is no procedure for selecting which bases
are closed. And that is very troubling. ``Military value'' is only the
definition currently used and is open to interpretation. A concrete set
of criteria must be developed before any further base closures are
conducted.
Since September 11, we have seen that our economic security is
clearly tied to our national security. In order to bring strength to
our economy, we must maintain strength in our military.
We do not have months or years to wait while our bases are
refurnished with military personnel, equipment and missions. If
additional bases were closed, we would waste valuable resources as we
scrambled to reinstate a base during a time of high security. Now is
not the time to limit our military's ability to respond.
I urge my colleagues to vote against further base closures and
support amendment 1622.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise in support of this amendment to the
Defense Authorization Bill.
I must tell you that I have thought long and hard on the subject of
base closings. The arguments for and against initiating another process
which might lead to additional base closings have weighed heavily on my
mind. I have the deepest respect for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and I
know how hard he is working to find efficiencies and economies within
the Department of Defense. I know he believes that a new base closing
initiative is an important tool in his efforts to fix our defense
infrastructure problems. However, I strongly believe that the events of
September 11th changed this Nation's priorities. Now is not the time to
engage in any type of activity that distracts from our national defense
priorities.
This is a pivotal time in our history. All our efforts and resources
must be focused on fighting terrorism at home and abroad. At this time,
I do not think that the time and money spent preparing for base
closings will contribute to this effort. Military bases and the
military establishment need to be focused on the war effort. Our
military leaders and base commanders throughout the country do not need
to be worrying about justifying their installations' existence. The
communities around the bases do not need to be worrying about their
future economic well-being. At a time when we,
[[Page S9725]]
as a Nation, face an uncertain future, we need not take on a process
that is rife with uncertainty and turmoil and which distracts from our
national goals.
Additionally, we do not yet know what force structure will be
required to accomplish all the missions associated with this new 21st
century warfare. I believe it will take some time to determine what our
military should look like. Why would we start a base closure process
when we have no idea what shape or size our forces will take? Equally
important, we do not know which bases will be key to our efforts in
building an effective homeland security network.
There is great debate about how much base closings cost and how much
base closings save. In a time of economic uncertainty, I do not believe
it is wise to spend millions of dollars on a base closure process. I am
not willing to sacrifice the readiness of our armed forces for
theoretical savings.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from Nebraska yield for an inquiry?
Mr. NELSON of Nebraska. I am happy to yield.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am wondering if my friend from Oklahoma
would agree with me on the following procedure, that after Senator
Nelson speaks--I understand that is going to be on the BRAC amendment,
I want to speak on the BRAC amendment--that unless others notify our
Cloakrooms that they wish to speak on the BRAC amendment, at that point
we would be done with the BRAC debate. We would then move to the
amendments offered by the Senator from Oklahoma. I don't want to put
that in the form of a UC, but I will state that would be my intention.
I am wondering whether or not the Senator will concur.
Mr. INHOFE. I do concur in that. In fact, I will go along with a UC
to that effect, whatever the Senator wishes.
Mr. LEVIN. We are not sure yet if anyone else wants to speak on BRAC.
I would ask if any of our colleagues want to speak on the Bunning
amendment, that they let our Cloakrooms know so we would then be able
to accommodate those Senators before we move to the Senator's two
amendments. I thank my friend from Nebraska.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. NELSON of Nebraska. Mr. President, I rise in support of the
amendment of the Senator from Kentucky to strike the BRAC language from
the fiscal year 2002 Defense authorization bill.
Senator Dorgan referred to Secretary Rumsfeld's label for BRAC, the
Efficient Facilities Initiative, as ``Iffy.'' I have to agree with him.
I think it is iffy in terms of cost, iffy in terms of our present force
structure, and would be iffy to the morale of our troop force.
On Tuesday, September 11, the strategic environment in which the
United States operates was completely changed; certainly, as it relates
to the military as well. Many issues that crowded our plate
disappeared, and we have all begun to focus on the current crisis. I
believe that change in environment involves base closures.
I said at the time we were debating this issue during the Defense
authorization bill that we should wait on the QDR before we voted to
give the administration the ability to close bases. That point of view
was not shared by every member of the Armed Services Committee, and
accordingly the BRAC language was included in the authorization bill.
We are now told that the Department of Defense will submit an on-time
QDR to the Congress and that DOD has indicated they will send an
amended QDR to us just as soon as they can at a later date to address
the current crisis.
Authorizing another round of BRAC without first reviewing the QDR and
without first admitting that our strategic environment has shifted
dramatically is a classical case of putting the cart before the horse.
I didn't think that BRAC was right before September 11, and I don't
think our military knows if it is right now.
We know, for example, as a result of the September 11 events, our
fighter jets are flying cover over major U.S. cities. Those jets need
bases from which to fly in and out. It strikes me as a rather odd time
to be closing bases.
Now that we are in the process of creating a homeland defense office,
what role will our bases play in the protection of our major cities?
Will we need increased ground defenses which are located at bases which
could otherwise be closed? What role will bases play in our new
security structure? Again, we haven't had the opportunity to think this
through and, therefore, we must, in fact, set aside the BRAC
authorization at this time.
Some say that BRAC will provide us significant cost savings.
Certainly, I am for cost savings. Over the long term it may be
possible, but no one disagrees that in the short run, BRAC costs money.
Right now we need every bit of our resources, financial and otherwise,
to address our significant force protection concerns.
Finally, this sends a mixed message to the men and women who are now
preparing to engage a new and terrible enemy. How can we be united as a
country if we are adversely affecting morale? Now is the time to focus
on reducing the threat of terrorism, not on relocating and uprooting
families from bases. It would be inopportune to include this language
in the Defense authorization bill, certainly at this time.
Until I am presented with more persuasive evidence regarding this
matter, I simply cannot support an initiative that could hamstring our
homeland defense. And in my opinion, it might. Certainly I believe
others share that view based on comments on the floor.
Clearly, it would be prudent to strike the language in the best
interest of our country and our military personnel at this time. Let us
consider BRAC under less threatening circumstances, when we will have
more information at our disposal and when we will know what the QDR
expects from our military. Let us not act prematurely. Instead, let's
exercise prudence and do the right thing for the right reason.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of the
Bunning amendment because I don't think we are ready to make the
decisions about which bases we are going to need. We didn't know before
September 11 exactly what our troop strength was going to be in the
future because we didn't have the reviews in place yet from the new
administration.
Today we know even less about the troop strength, and we certainly
need to know how many we are going to have in our component
organizations--the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines--before we make
the decision on which bases we will need for the future.
Also we need to know how we are going to do our training. What is the
best place to do the training? I have visited bases overseas where we
have training facilities, but we have limited airspace in some of
those. We have limited missile range in some of those places.
Is it better to do the training there or is it better perhaps to do
it at a U.S. base where we have better facilities and more control over
the airspace and the ground space? I don't know the answer to those
questions. I know we should have the answer before we make a decision
on whether we start closing bases.
I have seen us do two things in previous base closings. I have seen
us close bases that we then needed in the future. The Air Force has
said that we should have kept some of the training bases in the United
States opened, but they were already closed. It was too late to do
anything about it.
Secondly, I have not seen us estimate anywhere close to the true cost
of closing a base. If I could get real numbers that showed that closing
a base really saves money, I would consider having another round of
base closings. But until we know what the environmental cleanup is,
what the hazards are in each of these bases and what it is going to
cost for that cleanup to put it in order for the base to either be sold
or given back to the community, depending on what the arrangement is,
there is no way I would support a base-closing commission.
I think we are spending more closing these bases than we have keeping
them open. I am the ranking member of the Military Construction
Subcommittee. We have $150 million in that bill that is going to come
to the floor in the next
[[Page S9726]]
few weeks, $150 million for environmental cleanup that was not
anticipated in base closings.
That is not the way we ought to do business. I don't think we ought
to say that environmental cleanup is going to be $15 million and then
all of a sudden have a bill for $150 million and say that is an
efficient use of our assets. We have not done our homework yet.
I am not saying I am never going to be for a base closing. I will be
for a base closing, if I see what our troop strength is projected to be
for the next 25 years or even 10 years, if I see that training is going
to be done either in America or overseas, but we have studied where
that training ought to be. In fact, I would support a study that would
prepare us for a base-closing round. But I will not support another
round of base closings until we have done our homework, until we have a
study, until we know how this new war that we have just determined we
must wage for the freedom of our country is going to be waged and how
long it is going to take and where the bases might be needed. We
probably will have more overseas bases. But are they going to be in the
same places that they are now? Maybe not. Maybe we will have to build
new bases in other sites.
So I don't think we ought to be talking about closing things until we
know what we are going to need in the future. I am not against base
closings; I am just against doing it too soon, because I think we are
throwing good money after bad if we don't have our ducks in a row and
know exactly what our needs will be from the military construction
standpoint.
On the Military Construction Subcommittee, I did not like having to
spend money on environmental cleanup, when I would have liked to have
spent that money building better housing for our people, building more
facilities to do the job that we know we must do. Yet we are still
cleaning up bases that were closed 10 years ago. I don't think that is
the way we ought to operate. We ought to operate with good business
sense. We ought to decide what our troop strength is going to be, where
we can best do the training, what our needs are going to be with this
new war that we now know we must fight--and we know it is going to be
tough. We are going to support the President and give him the resources
he needs to make sure we win because freedom is at stake.
The idea that we would have a premature round of base closings is a
bad idea whose time has not come. So I appreciate the work of everyone
here. I know we have legitimate disagreements on this issue. But I am
going to support the Bunning amendment. I hope we can set it aside for
this year.
I have an amendment, which I have already offered, which I hope we
can consider. It does have a study that would ask just the questions I
have asked tonight. If we can answer those questions, then we can have
base closings based on what we are going to need in the future, based
on facts, based on studies, and knowing exactly what we are going to do
before we take these steps. Most of all, we will know what the costs
are going to be and how much could be saved and how much must be spent
for those savings.
Mr. President, I appreciate the work of the distinguished chairman
and ranking member, and I hope we can pass the Bunning amendment. I
also hope we can pass the Hutchison amendment that will provide studies
for the future, and that we can do this in the right way and in a
thoughtful way, in a way that will make sure we do right by our men and
women in the services and protect them wherever they may be in the
world.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, a number of arguments have been raised this
afternoon about the Bunning amendment which would strike the BRAC
language from our bill. By the way, this is the first time the Armed
Services Committee--at least within my memory--has adopted a bill for
an additional round of base closings on a very strong bipartisan vote.
It was adopted because the civilian and uniformed leadership of our
Armed Forces pleaded with us to allow them to get rid of excess
structure, which costs a lot of money and makes it impossible for us to
do the things we want to do to modernize Air Forces, make them more
ready and more lethal, to make them more mobile, to give them greater
pay, because we are spending billions of dollars on infrastructure we
do not need.
For the last 4 years, Senator McCain and I have come to this floor
and said our leadership is asking for the authority--just the
authority--to have another round of base closings. It has been denied
year after year. We have been told ``this is not the time,'' year after
year. We have been told we should have a study year after year. As a
matter of fact, in 1997 there was a study that was substituted for the
round of base closings. The April 1998 report contained 1,800 pages of
detailed backup material for why we should have another round of base
closings.
I think the most important question that has been raised is, Does
September 11 change all this? That, to me, is the real vital issue. We
wanted to get the thinking of our uniformed and civilian leadership on
that issue because, surely, I think each one of us--and perhaps no one
more than the person occupying the chair now--would want to know what
is the effect of the events of September 11. I want to read a letter we
have received because even though parts of it have been used before, it
seems to me this letter addresses that most pungent of all questions.
This is from Donald Rumsfeld, dated September 21. The same letter was
written to both myself and to Senator Warner. It reads as follows:
I write to underscore the importance we place on the
Senate's approval of authority for a single round of base
closures and realignments. Indeed, in the wake of the
terrible events of September 11, the imperative to convert
excess capacity into warfighting ability is enhanced, not
diminished.
Since that fateful day, the Congress has provided
additional billions of taxpayer funds to the Department. We
owe it to all Americans--particularly those service members
on whom much of our response will depend--to seek every
efficiency in the application of those funds on behalf of our
warfighters.
Our installations are the platforms from which we will
deploy the forces needed for the sustained campaign the
President outlined last night. While our future needs as to
base structure are uncertain and are strategy dependent, we
simply must have the freedom to maximize the efficient use of
our resources. The authority to realign and close bases and
facilities will be a critical element ensuring the right mix
of bases and forces within our warfighting strategy.
No one relishes the prospect of closing a military facility
or even seeking the authority to do so, but as the President
said last evening, ``we face new and sudden national
challenges,'' and those challenges will force us to confront
many difficult choices.
In that spirit, I am hopeful the Congress will approve our
request for authority to close and realign our military base
facilities.
Mr. President, I hope we will have the will to do something that is
not easy. This is not easy for any Member for his facilities and his
State to do; we know that. That is why facilities were not closed until
we had commissions that were in place. We make a recommendation to the
President, and the President would then have a right under our approach
to either say yes or no to the entire list. If he says yes, Congress
has the right to say yes or no to the entire list.
This does not abdicate responsibility to a base-closing commission.
What it does is it permits us to shed excess infrastructure that is
costing us billions, that is detracting from the ability of our
warfighters to fight a war, because it means billions of dollars which
should go into that effort are instead being spent to maintain
structure that is no longer needed.
We would not put excess baggage on a warfighter. We would not tell
that warfighter you have to carry a larger load than is necessary. By
keeping bases open, that is exactly what we are doing. We are denying
the warfighter the resources that would otherwise go into what is
needed in the Defense Department.
That is the issue. The issue, if anything, it seems to me, is sharper
since 9-11. More than ever, we must avoid waste. More than ever, we
must have the will to make tough choices. We have done a lot of things
that have been difficult, and we have done a lot of things differently
since 9-11 in this Congress. We have come together on a lot of issues
that we thought we could not come together on, and we have avoided the
kind of dissension and debate in which our people do not want us to
engage.
[[Page S9727]]
Now we have our military leadership and the President of the United
States pleading with us to allow them to get rid of excess
infrastructure 2 years down the road. That is the plea from our
President, that is the plea from our military leadership, civilian and
uniformed: to allow them to begin the process 2 years from now of
removing excess infrastructure.
I hope we have the will to do that, to respond to the men and women
of our military who have much greater needs than excess infrastructure.
We have been told also that we should be closing more bases overseas
instead of starting this process here. Since the end of the cold war,
the Department of Defense has closed 59 percent of our overseas sites
compared to about 21 percent of our domestic sites. They do not need
authority legislatively to close overseas facilities. They have that
without our action, and they have been able to close 59 percent of the
overseas sites. That is quite a difference from what they have closed
in this country. So I do not think that argument works either.
Then we have been told as well that we should know what we want in
our force structure before we move for some additional flexibility on
our base structure. We ought to know what our force structure is going
to be, and there is no doubt about that. Before the base structure is
concluded, surely we must know, or should know, what the force
structure is going to look like. That is why in this bill we require
that ``the Secretary shall carry out a comprehensive review of the
military installations of the Department of Defense inside the United
States based on the force structure plan submitted under section A(2).
. . .'' And that plan is very specific. That is part of the budget
justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the budget
for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2003: The Secretary shall
include a force structure plan for the Armed Forces based on the
assessment of the Secretary in the Quadrennial Defense Review under
another section.
The force structure plan is required by our law. We have heard many
times this afternoon and this evening, and correctly, that we ought to
base our base structure on our force structure and we do not know what
that force structure is going to be.
The answer is we know that the force structure must be determined
prior to the base structure recommendations that go to the Base Closure
Commission and then from them to us. It is a requirement of law.
The Senators who have made this point are right; we should know our
force structure before we know our base structure, but the inaccuracy
is in their argument that we will not know that force structure prior
to the decision on base structure, both by the Defense Department, in
terms of their recommendation to the Base Closure Commission, and by
the Base Closure Commission in their recommendations back to the
President and to us.
The one final point I will make this evening has to do with cost. The
argument has been made that there either have not been savings or that
the savings have not been demonstrated, or that there has been no proof
of the savings, or that the savings have not been precise. We have GAO
report after GAO report saying that--and I will reading from one:
Our work has consistently affirmed that the next savings of
the four rounds of base closures and realignments are
substantial and are related to decreased funding requirements
in specific operational areas.
In addition to our audits, review by the Congressional
Budget Office, the Department of Defense Inspector General,
the Army Audit Agency have affirmed the net savings are
substantial after initial investment costs are recouped.
The Defense Department has even attempted to give us a very precise
document as to what those savings are. They have made a real effort
year by year, item by item, to tell us where there have been costs,
where there have been savings, starting in 1990 for each round of base
closures.
They have come up with net savings to date of approximately $16
billion. Total savings, and I am rounding this off, is $37 billion.
That is gross savings. Those are total costs of about $21 billion--
again I am rounding that off--with the savings to date of $16 billion.
Recurring savings from those rounds each year are now about $6
billion per year. That is what we are saving because Congress had
enough courage to walk down this road, and believe me, I know it takes
courage. It is not an easy vote. I have been through a few. We have
lost our strategic air command bases. We have some other bases, other
facilities that are very nervous about the possibility that maybe in
the next round they will be caught. So this is not an easy vote, but it
is a cost-effective vote. It is a vote that the President, his
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, every military
leader we have ever had in front of our committee, civilian or
uniformed, is pleading with us to make.
The plea, it seems to me, is more eloquent than ever after September
11 because it is so critically important that we not load down our
defense with unneeded infrastructure anymore than we would load down a
soldier with unneeded baggage. They are related.
I hope that tomorrow we will cast this vote. The country will be
looking at us, the Nation will be looking at us to see whether or not
we are willing to do some tough things that our uniform and our
civilian leadership in the Defense Department and our President are
calling upon us to do. I cannot think of any way more eloquently to
state this cause, other than to read from a letter of August 30 from
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Shelton. I expect we will be hearing
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on this same issue before we vote
tomorrow.
This letter, which I will make part of the Record, makes a very
potent case for saving the money. I ask unanimous consent that the
letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
August 30, 2001.
Hon. Carl Levin,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
Hon. John W. Warner,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner: We are writing to
underscore how critically important it is that Congress
authorize the Department to conduct another round of base
closures and realignments.
The Department must reshape and restructure its
installations to serve the country's national security in the
21st century. Currently, our installations do not match and
therefore do not adequately serve our current and projected
force structure. Under-utilized facilities, estimated to be
23 percent DoD wide, are a waste of public resources and an
impediment to our efforts to protect our national security.
Because current law makes it virtually impossible for the
Department to make prudent decisions in managing its
facilities, we can only rectify these problems through a
Congressionally authorized round of base closures and
realignments in 2003. Drawing on the process from past
rounds, the Efficient Facilities Initiative is an objective
way to rationalize an infrastructure on the basis of military
value, verified by an independent commission. In addition,
both the General Accounting Office and the Congressional
Budget Office confirm DoD's savings estimates from prior
rounds.
The Department is committed to accomplishing the necessary
reshaping and restructuring in a single round of base
closures and realignments to minimize the difficulty these
efforts pose to communities surrounding our bases. While the
process may be hard, the record from our previous rounds
indicates that the majority of affected communities actually
emerge in a better economic condition than prior to the
closure or realignment. As before, the Department will work
closely with these communities in fostering economic reuse.
We know you share our concerns that additional base
closures are a necessity to provide resources necessary to
meet essential national security requirements. We simply must
take action. Please do not hesitate to call on us in your
efforts to secure passage of this important legislation.
Sincerely,
General Henry H. Shelton, USA,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend my colleague for his strong
stance on base closure. He and Senator McCain have worked for a number
of years on this issue.
I do not know how many years ago it was I joined on that legislation,
and then, of course, we had a problem with the previous administration.
Anyway, I was with them up until that problem arrived. So it is indeed
long overdue.
Even though I am proud to say my State has a very significant share
of
[[Page S9728]]
military installations, I stand with my colleagues and the vote of the
Senate Armed Services Committee because I think that is what it should
be, an efficiency that should be given to the Secretary of Defense. We
need these savings. We need them desperately.
Mr. President, I believe that concludes the remarks on base closure.
I see the Senator from Oklahoma, one of our valued members of the
committee. He wishes to, as I understand it, lay down two amendments
for tonight, and then the chairman and I will proceed to do a number of
cleared amendments. Am I correct?
Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is correct. We now hopefully will turn to our
friend from Oklahoma to offer two amendments. I think one of them we
may be able to accept, although I am not sure if that is true, on both
sides. If that is true, and I think the Senator knows which one that
is, he can offer that one first.
Mr. WARNER. That would be----
Mr. INHOFE. The amendment on the waiver process.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Amendment No. 1594
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, in an effort to try to get this bill
through, which America desperately needs now, I had about 16 amendments
on which I worked out arrangements and understandings with other people
so that I am down to only three amendments. Of these three amendments,
as was suggested by the Senator from Michigan, one is without
controversy, I thought, until about 5 minutes ago.
My understanding is one Republican Senator is going to object to it.
That being the case, we will have to have a rollcall on that amendment.
I would like to explain that amendment and hopefully that one Senator
would be available and tell us if she is not going to object to it.
Mr. President, for quite a number of years we have had a debate, when
we do our defense authorization bills, on an issue that is in place in
order to keep an internal ability to handle depot maintenance in areas
where it might be considered to be core maintenance; in other words,
areas where it is necessary to have that ability in order to fight a
war. The concern has been this: With the decreasing number of defense
contractors and the decreasing number of people who are able to perform
certain maintenance functions, if we are in a war, we would not want to
be held hostage by a single contractor who would be able to keep us
from being able to do it internally.
For that reason, some time ago we passed a law that said under that
60/40 bill, which is now 50/50 in our statute, simply this, that 50
percent of the maintenance has to be performed in-house by a depot
capable of doing it without outside help. For that reason--and I agree
with those who disagree with the 50/50 concept, that this is merely an
arbitrary figure, but there has to be some type of a figure and we have
not been able to come up with anything since then that is any better
than this. So the law now says that 50 percent of the maintenance has
to be done internally by a public depot.
There is a way they have been able to get around 50/50, and that is
if any of the service secretaries say that within their service they
could declare there is a national security reason that for 1 year or
one period of time we are not going to be able to do 50 percent of the
maintenance work in a public depot, if they do that, they do not have
to give any reason for it, but they merely say this is for national
security.
This has happened a few times so we have gone back to the service
secretaries and we have said to them: Tell us why it is as much as 50
percent of the maintenance in a public depot. We have never gotten any
good answers, and then we have also asked them afterwards: What are you
going to do to ensure that we are going to be able to meet this 50
percent in the next fiscal year? And we have not been able to do that.
I am not saying this critically of any particular service secretary.
We need to know why, if we are going to find a loophole around one of
our existing laws, this being the 50/50, it is necessary, and what we
are going to do in the future to prevent that from being invoked.
So my amendment does simply two things: One, it takes that
jurisdiction away from the service secretary and puts it with the
President of the United States. He then can delegate it back to the
Secretary of Defense. If he is going to say that there is a national
security reason that we cannot do 50 percent of the work at a public
depot, he has to say why that is and what they are planning to do to
correct that in the next fiscal year. That is all it does.
So if people are opposed to the 50/50 concept, fine. Let us pass a
bill or try to pass a bill to do away with 50/50. That is not the
issue. The issue is if we are going to use a national security waiver
to waive 50/50 for a given year, we need to make sure we know why we
are doing it and what can be done for the next year to keep from having
to do that. So that is simply it.
I was hoping we might have a note from the Senator. We do, and there
will be apparently one vote against this.
So that is an explanation, and I am going to ask that this be voted
on tomorrow.
I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment has not been sent up yet.
Mr. INHOFE. Yes, the amendment is at the desk. It has been there
since last week.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a minute?
Mr. INHOFE. Yes.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator call up his amendment so it will be
pending immediately after the disposition of the Bunning amendment?
Mr. INHOFE. I call up amendment No. 1594 and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is
set aside. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] proposes an amendment
numbered 1594.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To authorize the President to waive a limitation on
performance of depot-level maintenance by non-Federal Government
personnel)
At the end of subtitle D of title III, add the following:
SEC. 335. REVISION OF AUTHORITY TO WAIVE LIMITATION ON
PERFORMANCE OF DEPOT-LEVEL MAINTENANCE.
Section 2466(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
``(c) Waiver of Limitation.--(1) The President may waive
the limitation in subsection (a) for a fiscal year if--
``(A) the President determines that--
``(i) the waiver is necessary for reasons of national
security; and
``(ii) compliance with the limitation cannot be achieved
through effective management of depot operations consistent
with those reasons; and
``(B) the President submits to Congress a notification of
the waiver together with--
``(i) a discussion of the reasons for the waiver; and
``(ii) the plan for terminating the waiver and complying
with the limitation within two years after the date of the
first exercise of the waiver authority under this subsection.
``(2) The President may delegate only to the Secretary of
Defense authority to exercise the waiver authority of the
President under paragraph (1).''.
Mr. WARNER. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. INHOFE. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There appears to
be a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, then there would be additional debate
available on this amendment because there has been no time agreement
relative to this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. LEVIN. As I understand--perhaps the Chair can confirm--after
disposition of the Bunning amendment at approximately 9:45 a.m. or 10
a.m. tomorrow, the debate on the first amendment of the Senator from
Oklahoma would recur; is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That would then be the pending question, the
Senator is correct.
[[Page S9729]]
Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent, so that we can sequence
amendments, if the Senator from Oklahoma is willing, that we now set
aside the pending amendment and the underlying amendment to allow the
Senator from Oklahoma to offer an additional amendment, and then part
of that unanimous consent agreement will be we will then immediately,
after he lays down his second amendment, come back to the Bunning
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
pending amendment will be set aside.
Amendment No. 1595
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I send Senate amendment No. 1595 to the
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Inhofe] proposes an
amendment numbered 1595.
Mr. INHOFE. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To revise requirements relating to closure of Vieques Naval
Training Range)
On page 380, after line 15, insert the following:
SEC. 1066. CLOSURE OF VIEQUES NAVAL TRAINING RANGE.
(a) Conditional Authority.--Title XV of the Floyd D. Spence
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as
enacted by Public Law 106-398; 114 Stat. 1654A-348) is
amended by striking sections 1503 and 1504 and inserting the
following new section:
``SEC. 1503. CONDITIONS ON CLOSURE OF VIEQUES NAVAL TRAINING
RANGE.
The Secretary of the Navy may close the Vieques Naval
Training Range on the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico, and
discontinue live-fire training at that range only if the
Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps jointly certify that the training range is no longer
needed for the training of units of the Navy and the Marine
Corps stationed or deployed in the eastern United States.''.
(b) Actions Related to Closure.--(1) Section 1505 of such
Act (114 Stat. 1654A-353) is amended--
(A) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:
``(a) Time for Taking Actions.--The actions required or
authorized under this section may only be taken upon the
closure of the Vieques Naval Training Range by the Secretary
of the Navy.'';
(B) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``Not later than May
1, 2003, the`` and inserting ``The'';
(C) in subsection (d)(1), by striking ``pending the
enactment of a law that addresses the disposition of such
properties'';
(D) in subsection (e)(2), ``the referendum under section
1503'' and all that follows and inserting ``the Secretary of
the Navy closes the Vieques Naval Training Range.''; and
(E) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(f) Military Use of Transferred Property During War or
National Emergency.--
``(1) Temporary transfer by secretary of the interior.--
Upon a declaration of war by Congress or a declaration of a
national emergency by the President or Congress, the
Secretary of the Interior shall transfer the administrative
jurisdiction of the Live Impact Area to the Secretary of the
Navy notwithstanding the requirement to retain the property
under subsection (d)(1).
``(2) Training authorized.--Training of the Armed Forces
may be conducted in the Live Impact Area while the property
is under the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary of
the Navy pursuant to a transfer made under that paragraph
(1). The training may include live-fire training. Subsection
(b) shall not apply to training authorized under this
paragraph.
``(3) Return of property to secretary of the interior.--
Upon the termination of the war or national emergency
necessitating the transfer of administrative jurisdiction
under paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Navy shall transfer
the administrative jurisdiction of the Live Impact Area to
the Secretary of the Interior, who shall assume
responsibility for the property and administer the property
in accordance with subsection (d).''.
(2) The heading of such section is amended to read as
follows:
``SEC. 1505. ACTIONS UPON CLOSURE OF THE VIEQUES NAVAL
TRAINING RANGE.''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 1507(c) of such Act is
amended by striking ``the issuance of a proclamation
described in section 1504(a) or''.
Mr. INHOFE. This amendment is one further that there may be some
opposition to and it is going to require the yeas and nays, but I will
briefly say what we are doing with this. The issue of the Vieques
training range has been a contentious one now for a number of years. We
did resolve this in such a way that there would be a referendum that
would take place on November 6, where the eligible voters among the
population of 9,300 people on the Island of Vieques would vote as to
whether or not the Navy should continue naval training operations on
the range.
A lot of things have happened since then. I agreed with that. That
was my language in the Defense authorization bill last year. However,
since that time we have found we are deploying east coast deployments
to the Persian Gulf. A lot of these battle groups have not been able to
have adequate training. Since that time we had the war declared upon us
by the terrorists on the 11th of September. That has changed
everything.
Since that time we have had Puerto Rico come and say they want to
support the training of our troops. We currently have, being debated
now, a resolution in the legislature in Puerto Rico that is going to
say: ``We Puerto Ricans, as proud American citizens with the same
responsibilities as our brethren in the continental United States, have
the obligation of contributing to this fight, allowing and supporting
military training and exercises on the island municipality of
Vieques.''
Vieques is a municipality of Puerto Rico.
What we believe is a solution to this now and should be put on this
bill as an amendment is language that would do away with the referendum
of November 6. There are several reasons why. One reason is the policy
is not a good policy. I never believed it was. Prior to the events of
September 11, we thought this was something that would resolve that
issue.
This amendment would do two things. It would do away with the
referendum of the 6th of November; two, it would say we would continue
to do as the law provides today, until such time as both the CNO of the
Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps sign a certificate saying
that training is no longer needed. I cannot think of a worse time to
force our military to stop training than right now. Right now we should
be enhancing training.
That is a very simple amendment, one to which there may be some
opposition. However, it merely says that, at least in the time being,
do not have a referendum, but continue to train our troops as they are
deployed in these battle group deployments, from the east coast and
elsewhere, until such time as the CNO and the Commandant agree that
training is no longer necessary.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator has received, in accordance
with your request, a communication from the Department of Defense.
Does the Senator wish to include it in the Record?
Mr. INHOFE. First, I will read the last paragraph:
Senator Inhofe's amendment, SA 1595, supports the Defense
Department's request to repeal the local referendum and
provides for transfer of the eastern property to the
Department of Interior, following cessation of training.
Unlike the Department's proposed legislation on Vieques,
however, the amendment does not provide for a date certain
departure. Nonetheless, the Department believes that the
amendment does not constrain the Department's ability to
define and meet its training needs and the target departure
date may still be achieved. To the extent that the amendment
offered by Senator Inhofe, SA 1595, is not inconsistent with
the Department's legislative proposal and underlying intent,
we interpose no objection.
I ask unanimous consent this entire letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Department of the Navy,
Washington, DC, 24 September 2001.
Hon. Carl Levin,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Levin: As you are aware, the Department of
Defense previously submitted proposed legislation that would
eliminate the requirement in Section 1503 of the Floyd D.
Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001, requiring a referendum among the Vieques electorate on
whether the people of Vieques approve or disapprove of the
continuation of training beyond May 1, 2003. Consistent with
the commitments made by both the President and the Department
of the Navy, the Navy is actively planning to discontinue
training operations on the island of Vieques in May of 2003
and is committed to identifying alternatives to Vieques from
both a geographical and technological standpoint to provide
effective military training. Consequently, a referendum
regarding continuation of training past this point in time is
no
[[Page S9730]]
longer necessary. I still believe that conducting a local
referendum on issues critical to the Department of Defense
sets a bad precedent and strikes at the heart of military
readiness. Enacting legislation that does away with this
requirement will avoid such a precedent and potential domino
effect on our other military training ranges.
Senator Inhofe's amendment, SA 1595, supports the Defense
Department's request to repeal the local referendum and
provides for transfer of the eastern property to the
Department of Interior, following cessation of training.
Unlike the Department's proposed legislation on Vieques,
however, the amendment does not provide for a date certain
departure. Nonetheless, the Department believes that the
amendment does not constrain the Department's ability to
define and meet its training needs and the target departure
date may still be achieved. To the extent that the amendment
offered by Senator Inhofe, SA 1595, is not inconsistent with
the Department's legislative proposal and underlying intent,
we interpose no objection.
Sincerely,
Gordon R. England,
Secretary of the Navy.
Mr. INHOFE. I am happy to respond to any questions, and if there are
no questions, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. INHOFE. The amendment I will not bring up is the amendment having
to do with incorporating the language of our energy policy in this
bill.
The question could be asked, Is this an issue that should be put into
the Defense authorization bill? I served as chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee for 5 years. I can assure Members
there is no time in our history that should be more clear that we will
have to do something about our dependency on the Middle East for our
ability to fight a war. Right now, we are 56.6-percent dependent upon
foreign sources for our ability to fight a war. That is not acceptable.
I remember back in the early 1980s during the Reagan administration I
criticized the Republicans and Democrats alike. We have been trying to
get an energy policy since the Reagan administration. We tried at that
time. We introduced one. We were unable to get it done.
We tried during the Bush administration, certainly thinking that a
President coming out of the oil patch would understand why we cannot be
dependent upon foreign sources for our ability to fight a war. We were
unsuccessful. We were unsuccessful during the Clinton administration.
We started during the Carter administration.
I have an amendment that will put a policy into effect. I have two
amendments. One adopts the House language and the other is to adopt the
language of the energy bill that is proposed in the Senate. I will not
bring it up and debate it tonight because I want to do it when
everybody is here. This is very significant.
Right now, on a daily basis, we are becoming more and more dependent
upon foreign sources for our energy supply. By the end of this decade
it is projected to be in excess of 60 percent. We will become 60-
percent dependent upon foreign sources for our ability to fight a war.
I remember a few years ago Don Hodel, Secretary of the Interior, and
I used to go to consumption states and make speeches as to how the
outcome of every war--back to and including the First World War--has
been who controlled the energy supplies. We have gone through the 1990
war, the Persian Gulf war. In 1991, we remember the words of Saddam
Hussein who said, ``if we had waited for 10 years to go into Kuwait,
the Americans would not have intervened because we would have a missile
we could shoot over at them.'' And now we are dependent upon the Iraqis
for our imported oil.
It is very much an issue. There has been a lot of things floating
around, including letters saying they are saying this has to do with
ANWR. It doesn't. I only say this is an issue that should be addressed
on this bill, and sometime tomorrow or the next day I will debate this
and call for a vote on this.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. We are ready to handle a series of amendments and
complete our work on this bill before the Senate tonight.
Amendment No. 1660
Mr. WARNER. I offer an amendment on behalf of myself and my
distinguished colleague, the chairman, Mr. Levin. This amendment would
eliminate the cap costs that the Congress very wisely and appropriately
placed on the costs of the overall renovation of the Department of
Defense. Given the tragic attack on September 11--and, coincidentally,
that attack was directed at a portion of the building which was the
subject of the very contract on which this cap rests--we think it is
wise, now, the chairman and I, that the cost of repairing this area of
the Department of Defense just would not enable us to work within this
cap as now established in current law.
This amendment has been cleared by the chairman on his side. I
believe we are ready to proceed on it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself and Mr.
Levin, proposes an amendment numbered 1660.
Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
AMENDMENT NO. 1660
(Purpose: To repeal the limitation on the cost of renovation of the
Pentagon Reservation)
Strike section 2842, relating to a limitation on
availability of funds for renovation of the Pentagon
Reservation, and insert the following:
SEC. 2842. REPEAL OF LIMITATION ON COST OF RENOVATION OF
PENTAGON RESERVATION.
Section 2864 of the Military Construction Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1997 (division B of Public Law 104-201; 110
Stat. 2806) is repealed.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we support Senator Warner's amendment. It
is obvious the circumstances have changed in a massive way. Senator
Warner knows, probably more than anybody I know of, firsthand, what the
necessity is out there. We certainly support his amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, once again, I thank my distinguished
colleague. He and I went out there to the Department of Defense just a
matter of a few hours following that attack to join the Secretary of
Defense. I think it is important we adopt this amendment, so I urge the
adoption of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is
on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 1660) was agreed to.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Amendments Nos. 1661 through 1670, En Bloc
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I send to the desk now 10 amendments and
ask they be considered and agreed to en bloc and any statements
relating to the amendments be printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself and Mr.
Warner, proposes amendments numbered 1661 through 1670, en
bloc.
Mr. WARNER. The chairman has correctly represented to the Senate the
status of this bloc of amendments. We concur, of course.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendments.
The amendments Nos. 1661 through 1670 were agreed to, en bloc, as
follows:
amendment no. 1661
(Purpose: To authorize emergency supplemental appropriations made for
fiscal year 2001)
At the end of subtitle A of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1009. AUTHORIZATION OF 2001 EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR RECOVERY FROM AND
RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED
STATES.
(a) Authorization.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated
to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2001 in the
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001 (as enacted into law by Public Law 106-398) are
hereby adjusted by the amounts of appropriations made
available to the Department of Defense pursuant to the 2001
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from
and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States.
[[Page S9731]]
(b) Quarterly Report.--(1) Promptly after the end of each
quarter of a fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
the House of Representatives a report on the use of funds
made available to the Department of Defense pursuant to the
2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery
from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States.
(2) The first report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted
not later than January 2, 2002.
(c) Proposed Allocation and Plan.--The Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than 15
days after the date on which the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget submits to Committees on Appropriations
of the Senate and House of Representatives the proposed
allocation and plan required by the 2001 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, a
proposed allocation and plan for the use of the funds made
available to the Department of Defense pursuant to that Act.
____
amendment no. 1662
(Purpose: To authorize the use of contractors to provide logistical
support to the Multinational Force and Observers)
At the end of subtitle B of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1217. ACQUISITION OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR SECURITY
FORCES.
Section 5 of the Multinational Force and Observers
Participation Resolution (22 U.S.C. 3424) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d)(1) The United States may use contractors to provide
logistical support to the Multinational Force and Observers
under this section in lieu of providing such support through
a logistical support unit composed of members of the United
States Armed Forces.
``(2) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) and section
7(b), support by a contractor under this subsection may be
provided without reimbursement whenever the President
determines that such action enhances or supports the national
security interests of the United States.''.
____
AMENDMENT NO. 1663
(Purpose: To clarify the use of State Department authority to contract
for personal services in support of activities of the Department of
Defense and other departments and agencies of the United States)
At the end of subtitle B of title XII, add the following:
SEC. 1217. PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTS TO BE PERFORMED BY
INDIVIDUALS OR ORGANIZATIONS ABROAD.
Section 2 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956 (22 U.S.C. 2669) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(n) exercise the authority provided in subsection (c),
upon the request of the Secretary of Defense or the head of
any other department or agency of the United States, to enter
into personal service contracts with individuals to perform
services in support of the Department of Defense or such
other department or agency, as the case may be.''.
____
AMENDMENT NO. 1664
(Purpose: To provide SBP eligibility for survivors of retirement-
ineligible members of the uniformed services who die while on active
duty)
At the end of subtitle D of title VI, add the following:
SEC. 652. SBP ELIGIBILITY OF SURVIVORS OF RETIREMENT-
INELIGIBLE MEMBERS OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES
WHO DIE WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY.
(a) Surviving Spouse Annuity.--Section 1448(d) of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by striking paragraph (1) and
inserting the following:
``(1) Surviving spouse annuity.--The Secretary concerned
shall pay an annuity under this subchapter to the surviving
spouse of--
``(A) a member who dies while on active duty after--
``(i) becoming eligible to receive retired pay;
``(ii) qualifying for retired pay except that the member
has not applied for or been granted that pay; or
``(iii) completing 20 years of active service but before
the member is eligible to retire as a commissioned officer
because the member has not completed 10 years of active
commissioned service; or
``(B) a member not described in subparagraph (A) who dies
in line of duty while on active duty.''.
(b) Computation of Survivor Annuity.--Section 1451(c)(1) of
title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) by striking ``based upon his years of active service
when he died.'' and inserting ``based upon the following:'';
and
(B) by adding at the end the following new clauses:
``(i) In the case of an annuity payable under section
1448(d) of this title by reason of the death of a member in
line of duty, the retired pay base computed for the member
under section 1406(b) or 1407 of this title as if the member
had been retired under section 1201 of this title on the date
of the member's death with a disability rated as total.
``(ii) In the case of an annuity payable under section
1448(d)(1)(A) of this title by reason of the death of a
member not in line of duty, the member's years of active
service when he died.
``(iii) In the case of an annuity under section 1448(f) of
this title, the member's years of active service when he
died.''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``if the member or
former member'' and all that follows and inserting ``as
described in subparagraph (A).''.
(c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) The heading for subsection
(d) of section 1448 of such title is amended by striking
``Retirement-Eligible''.
(2) Subsection (d)(3) of such section is amended by
striking ``1448(d)(1)(B) or 1448(d)(1)(C)'' and inserting
``clause (ii) or (iii) of section 1448(d)(1)(A)''.
(d) Extension and Increase of Objectives for Receipts From
Disposals of Certain Stockpile Materials Authorized for
Several Fiscal Years Beginning With Fiscal Year 1999.--
Section 3303(a) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261;
112 Stat. 2262; 50 U.S.C. 98d note) is amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (3);
(2) in paragraph (4)--
(A) by striking ``$720,000,000'' and inserting
``$760,000,000''; and
(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``;
and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(5) $770,000,000 by the end of fiscal year 2011.''.
(e) Effective Date and Applicability.--This section and the
amendments made by this section shall take effect as of
September 10, 2001, and shall apply with respect to deaths of
members of the Armed Forces occurring on or after that date.
____
AMENDMENT NO. 1665
(Purpose: To provide for the construction of a parking garage at Fort
DeRussy, Hawaii)
At the end of subtitle D of title XXVIII, add the
following:
SEC. 2844. CONSTRUCTION OF PARKING GARAGE AT FORT DERUSSY,
HAWAII.
(a) Authority To Enter Into Agreement for Construction.--
The Secretary of the Army may authorize the Army Morale,
Welfare, and Recreation Fund, a non-appropriated fund
instrumentality of the Department of Defense (in this section
referred to as the ``Fund''), to enter into an agreement with
a governmental, quasi-governmental, or commercial entity for
the construction of a parking garage at Fort DeRussy, Hawaii.
(b) Form of Agreement.--The agreement under subsection (a)
may take the form of a non-appropriated fund contract,
conditional gift, or other agreement determined by the Fund
to be appropriate for purposes of construction of the parking
garage.
(c) Use of Parking Garage by Public.--The agreement under
subsection (a) may permit the use by the general public of
the parking garage constructed under the agreement if the
Fund determines that use of the parking garage by the general
public will be advantageous to the Fund.
(d) Treatment of Revenues of Fund Parking Garages at Fort
DeRussy.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, amounts
received by the Fund by reason of operation of parking
garages at Fort DeRussy, including the parking garage
constructed under the agreement under subsection (a), shall
be treated as non-appropriated funds, and shall accrue to the
benefit of the Fund or its component funds, including the
Armed Forces Recreation Center-Hawaii (Hale Koa Hotel).
____
AMENDMENT NO. 1666
(Purpose: To modify the authority for the development of the United
States Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania)
Strike section 2841, relating to the development of the
United States Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania, and insert the following:
SEC. 2841. DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMY HERITAGE AND
EDUCATION CENTER AT CARLISLE BARRACKS,
PENNSYLVANIA.
(a) Authority To Enter Into Agreement.--(1) The Secretary
of the Army may enter into an agreement with the Military
Heritage Foundation, a not-for-profit organization, for the
design, construction, and operation of a facility for the
United States Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania.
(2) The facility referred to in paragraph (1) is to be used
for curation and storage of artifacts, research facilities,
classrooms, and offices, and for education and other
activities, agreed to by the Secretary, relating to the
heritage of the Army. The facility may also be used to
support such education and training as the Secretary
considers appropriate.
(b) Design and Construction.--The Secretary may, at the
election of the Secretary--
(1) accept funds from the Military Heritage Foundation for
the design and construction of the facility referred to in
subsection (a); or
(2) permit the Military Heritage Foundation to contract for
the design and construction of the facility.
(c) Acceptance of Facility.--(1) Upon satisfactory
completion, as determined by the Secretary, of the facility
referred to in subsection (a), and upon the satisfaction of
any and all financial obligations incident thereto
[[Page S9732]]
by the Military Heritage Foundation, the Secretary shall
accept the facility from the Military Heritage Foundation,
and all right, title, and interest in and to the facility
shall vest in the United States.
(2) Upon becoming property of the United States, the
facility shall be under the jurisdiction of the Secretary.
(d) Use of Certain Gifts.--(1) Under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary, the Commandant of the Army War College may,
without regard to section 2601 of title 10, United States
Code, accept, hold, administer, invest, and spend any gift,
devise, or bequest of personnel property of a value of
$250,000 or less made to the United States if such gift,
devise, or bequest is for the benefit of the United States
Army Heritage and Education Center.
(2) The Secretary may pay or authorize the payment of any
reasonable and necessary expense in connection with the
conveyance or transfer of a gift, devise, or bequest under
this subsection.
(e) Additional Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may
require such additional terms and conditions in connection
with the agreement authorized to be entered into by
subsection (a) as the Secretary considers appropriate to
protect the interest of the United States.
____
AMENDMENT NO. 1667
(Purpose: To waive a restriction on the use of funds that adversely
affects compliance with a requirement in law for Federal agencies to
utilize consensus technical standards)
At the end of subtitle C of title XI, add the following:
SEC. 1124. PARTICIPATION OF PERSONNEL IN TECHNICAL STANDARDS
DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES.
Subsection (d) of section 12 of the National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (109 Stat. 783; 15
U.S.C. 272 note) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new
paragraph (4):
``(4) Expenses of government personnel.--Section 5946 of
title 5, United States Code, shall not apply with respect to
any activity of an employee of a Federal agency or department
that is determined by the head of that agency or department
as being an activity undertaken in carrying out this
subsection.''.
____
AMENDMENT NO. 1668
(Purpose: To authorize use of Armed Forces Retirement Home Trust Fund
funds for a blended use, multicare facility at the Naval Home)
Strike section 303 and insert the following:
SEC. 303. ARMED FORCES RETIREMENT HOME.
(a) Amount for Fiscal Year 2002.--There is hereby
authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2002 from the
Armed Forces Retirement Home Trust Fund the sum of
$71,440,000 for the operation of the Armed Forces Retirement
Home, including the United States Soldiers' and Airmen's Home
and the Naval Home.
(b) Amounts Previously Authorized.--Of amounts appropriated
from the Armed Forces Retirement Home Trust Fund for fiscal
years before fiscal year 2002 by Acts enacted before the date
of the enactment of this Act, an amount of $22,400,000 shall
be available for those fiscal years, to the same extent as is
provided in appropriation Acts, for the development and
construction of a blended use, multicare facility at the
Naval Home and for the acquisition of a parcel of real
property adjacent to the Naval Home, consisting of
approximately 15 acres, more or less.
____
AMENDMENT NO. 1669
(Purpose: To require a study and report on the interconnectivity of
National Guard Distributive Training Technology Project networks and
related public and private networks)
At the end of subtitle C of title X, add the following:
SEC. 1027. COMPTROLLER GENERAL STUDY AND REPORT ON
INTERCONNECTIVITY OF NATIONAL GUARD
DISTRIBUTIVE TRAINING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT
NETWORKS AND RELATED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
NETWORKS.
(a) Study Required.--The Comptroller General of the United
States shall conduct a study of the interconnectivity between
the voice, data, and video networks of the National Guard
Distributive Training Technology Project (DTTP) and other
Department of Defense, Federal, State, and private voice,
data, and video networks, including the networks of the
distance learning project of the Army known as Classroom XXI,
networks of public and private institutions of higher
education, and networks of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency and other Federal, State, and local emergency
preparedness and response agencies.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of the study under subsection
(a) are as follows:
(1) To identify existing capabilities, and future
requirements, for transmission of voice, data, and video for
purposes of operational support of disaster response,
homeland defense, command and control of premobilization
forces, training of military personnel, training of first
responders, and shared use of the networks of the
Distributive Training Technology Project by government and
members of the networks.
(2) To identify appropriate connections between the
networks of the Distributive Training Technology Project and
networks of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, State
emergency management agencies, and other Federal and State
agencies having disaster response functions.
(3) To identify requirements for connectivity between the
networks of the Distributive Training Technology Project and
other Department of Defense, Federal, State, and private
networks referred to in subsection (a) in the event of a
significant disruption of providers of public services.
(4) To identify means of protecting the networks of the
Distributive Training Technology Project from outside
intrusion, including an assessment of the manner in which so
protecting the networks facilitates the mission of the
National Guard and homeland defense.
(5) To identify impediments to interconnectivity between
the networks of the Distributive Training Technology Project
and such other networks.
(6) To identify means of improving interconnectivity
between the networks of the Distributive Training Technology
Project and such other networks.
(c) Particular Matters.--In conducting the study, the
Comptroller General shall consider, in particular, the
following:
(1) Whether, and to what extent, national security concerns
impede interconnectivity between the networks of the
Distributive Training Technology Project and other Department
of Defense, Federal, State, and private networks referred to
in subsection (a).
(2) Whether, and to what extent, limitations on the
technological capabilities of the Department of Defense
impede interconnectivity between the networks of the
Distributive Training Technology Project and such other
networks.
(3) Whether, and to what extent, other concerns or
limitations impede interconnectivity between the networks of
the Distributive Training Technology Project and such other
networks.
(4) Whether, and to what extent, any national security,
technological, or other concerns justify limitations on
interconnectivity between the networks of the Distributive
Training Technology Project and such other networks.
(5) Potential improvements in National Guard or other
Department technologies in order to improve interconnectivity
between the networks of the Distributive Training Technology
Project and such other networks.
(d) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the
House of Representatives a report on the study conducted
under subsection (a). The report shall describe the results
of the study, and include any recommendations that the
Comptroller General considers appropriate in light of the
study.
____
amendment no. 1670
(Purpose: To provide eligibility for senior officers of the Armed
Forces to serve as Deputy Directors of facilities of the Armed Forces
Retirement Home)
On page 346, line 20, insert after ``professional'' the
following: ``or a member of the Armed Forces serving on
active duty in a grade above major or lieutenant commander''.
amendment no. 1667
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to discuss an amendment to the
Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act which will serve to
assist our military in their continuing transformation into a more
efficient fighting force, ready to meet the threats of the 21st
century. It amends the National Technology Transfer Act of 1995 in
order that the Federal Government can use appropriated funds for
personnel to participate in meetings to set technical standards for
products, manufacturing processes, and management practices of interest
to the military. Specifically, it eliminates an obscure technical
restriction established by an 89-year-old statute so that the Federal
Government will be able to cover the expenses of those employees
participating in standards activities critical to the Department.
The amendment is consistent with previous act of Congress, Department
of Defense policy and Governmentwide policy to support efforts to
replace Government-unique standards wherever possible with standards
developed jointly with the private sector and other interested parties.
There are major Federal savings and national security improvements that
can result from this participation. I am proud to be joined by Senator
Santorum in this effort. I thank my colleagues' for their support for
this technical amendment.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay the motion to reconsider on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the aftermath of the despicable terrorist
[[Page S9733]]
attacks continue to weigh heavily on our hearts, and I again express my
deepest sympathy to those lost and injured in the attacks, as well as
their families. We will do everything in our power to bring all of
those responsible to justice and I am confident that our military, both
active and reserve, stand ready to act in response to act. Congress
will see that they are given all they need to accomplish the missions
they are given.
This bill increases defense spending. It focuses on improving
readiness, and also improving service member quality of life. It
contains the largest defense spending increase in many years. At $329
billion, a $33 billion increase over last year, this bill represents a
significant new investment in service members and the nation's
security.
As chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee, I have strongly advocated
strengthening Navy, Marine Corps and Strategic Lift forces. The
worldwide presence of our armed forces requires at least a 300-ship
navy. The Navy is facing a serious shortfall in the numbers of ships
available to meet the Nation's future security needs. This bill fully
funded the President's request for most major programs, including the
Virginia Class attack submarine, the DDG-51 AEGIS Destroyer, research
and development for the DD-21 land attack destroyer, and 13 additional
C-17 airlift aircraft.
The bill also supports a series of transformation initiatives,
especially the Trident submarine conversion. The Navy's budget called
for converting only two of these submarines. The bill includes an
increase of $307 million to reserve the option of converting all four
submarines. I believe that these converted submarines can make a
significant contribution to the Navy in the future.
The committee also considered the V-22 Osprey program and the future
role of this aircraft. We agree that the production line needs to
remain open and we have authorized the minimum sustaining production of
nine aircraft. It is the committee's belief that the minimum sustaining
rate is nine rather than twelve aircraft. This reduced number of
aircraft will also limit future retrofit costs that the existing V-22
aircraft will require. The committee also recommended the program for
the Air Force V-22 version, the CV-22, be restructured by removing the
funding for acquisition, but supporting research and development.
Our Armed Forces continue to operate and train at a more robust level
than at any other time during this Nation's history. At this moment,
service members are being mobilized for possible action in the current
crisis. They are already risking their lives daily by actively
enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq and patrolling the Arabian Gulf
for oil smugglers. Our men and women in uniform are overseas providing
stability in Kosovo, and they are now involved in bringing peace to
Macedonia. They are also monitoring the demilitarized zone in Korea,
and they are assisting in the battle against drugs in Central and South
America. These activities are in addition to the daily exercises they
conduct at home and with our allies overseas to maintain the readiness
of our forces.
All of America's men and women in uniform put our Nation's interests
above their own. When called upon, they risk their lives for our
freedom. As a nation, we often take this sacrifice for granted, until
we are reminded of it again by tragic events such as the vicious attack
on the Pentagon.
They face constant risks in training for the many missions that they
are called upon to carry out. This past year, seven Army personnel lost
their lives when their helicopters crashed in a night training exercise
in Hawaii. Two Marine AV-8B pilots died in a training flight in North
Carolina. We lost 21 National Guardsmen when their transport plane went
down in Florida. The cost of training in the name of peace and security
is high, and we are very proud of the brave men and women who accept
these risks to defend our Nation and our ideals.
In this bill, we continue the efforts to support service members and
their families. The bill grants a minimum of a 5 percent pay raise,
with personnel in certain pay grades receiving raises between 6 and 10
percent. This raise is the largest since 1982, and the third straight
year that the committee has authorized a significant pay raise above
the rate of inflation.
The committee also recognizes the importance of providing service
members with decent housing and work conditions. The bill provides $451
million above the budget request for military family housing and
facilities.
The bill also expedites the timeline for the gradual reduction to
zero of the out-of-pocket housing costs for service members living off
base, from 2005 to 2003. We also provide additional funding to cover
the costs of military health care for service members and their
families. These are important quality of life improvements that our
dedicated, well-trained men and women deserve, and they are important
steps in retaining them in the armed forces.
The bill allows the transferability of GI bill benefits. Senator
Cleland's dedication to this issue has resulted in the authorization of
$30 million to allow the transfer of up to 18 months of unused G.I.
Bill education benefits to a family member, in return for a commitment
of four more years of service.
The bill also includes significant parts of the Tricare Modernization
Act, which I introduced earlier this year, to ensure that disabled
family members of active duty service men and women have access to the
health care they deserve. Early last year, a young man in the Air Force
drove 12 hours with his wife and disabled four-year old daughter to
testify to Congress about the need to make Medicaid more accessible,
because the military health care system did not adequately meet his
daughter's needs. In order to continue her eligibility for Medicaid, he
could not accept a promotion to a higher rank.
No member of the Armed Forces should ever be put in the position of
having to choose between health care for their disabled child and
serving our country. These families should not have to rely on Medicaid
to obtain health care that works.
The Tricare Modernization Act has been endorsed by The Military
Coalition, a consortium of armed forces and veterans' organizations
representing 5.5 million current and former members of the military and
their families. We need to correct the injustices that these families
have suffered by integrating services for disabled dependents into the
basic military health benefit program, so that no medically necessary
services are denied.
Last year, the Armed Services Committee heeded the needs of our
military retirees, and addressed their number-one priority--the cost of
prescription drugs. This benefit, which began in April, lets all men
and women in uniform know that we care about their service.
The bill also provides an additional $217 million for protection of
our forces against terrorism, for counter-terrorism training, research
and development to protect our forces against attacks by weapons of
mass destruction, and to help the services in their efforts to support
civilian agencies in the battle against terrorism.
The bill also recognizes the very real threat we face from biological
weapons. It addresses these threats with significant investments in
science and technology for chemical and biological defense and medical
counter-measures. These additional investments will support needed
research on chemical and biological detection technology and
decontamination. It will also support lifesaving research on medical
treatments, vaccines, anti-toxins, and advanced diagnostic technology.
In addition, the cyber threat to national security is very real, and
our armed forces must be better prepared to deal with this threat and
to protect their information systems. The bill adds $5 million to the
$7.9 million requested to address this serious and growing threat.
The bill also takes an important stand to begin the process of
cleaning up unexploded ordnance. At many active and closed military
bases, UXO is a major challenge. The bill addresses these hazards by
including a major provision requiring the Department of Defense to
establish specific accounts to fund the cleanup of UXO at military
bases across the country, which clearly poses a hazard to civilians,
military personnel, the environment, and the safe use of live-fire
ranges necessary for a high state of military readiness.
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These new accounts are essential to demonstrate the Department's
commitment to safety, the environment, and responsible use of its
facilities.
Finally, on the issue of ballistic missile defense, the committee
responsibly cut back the President's $8.3 billion request for research,
development and testing of a ballistic missile defense system by $1.3
billion. The administration's request was clearly in excess of what the
Ballistic Missile Defense Office could have reasonably allocated in the
coming year, and the committee was right to give priority to other
military programs. The committee also took a strong stand against
testing that would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
It makes no sense to rush forward prematurely with tests that will
violate the treaty, or with deployment of a missile defense system,
when there are serious doubts about whether it will work. Our European
allies and Russia continue to be skeptical about abandoning the ABM
Treaty and deploying a missile defense system. We should work with our
allies and continue consultations with Russia, not act unilaterally or
establish arbitrary deadlines.
It is disappointing that these important ballistic missile defense
provisions were removed from the bill we are currently considering.
These issues are, and will continue to be, very important.
I commend my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee for their
leadership in dealing with the many challenges facing our nation on
national and homeland defense. This bill keeps the faith with the 2.2
million men and women who make up our active duty, guard, and reserve
forces. This legislation is vital to the Nation's security, and I urge
the Senate to approve it.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 1438, the
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002. As the ranking
Republican on the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, I
would like to thank subcommittee Chairman Landrieu and her staff for
their cooperation in the preparation of this bill. While I may have
some concerns with several issues contained within the legislation, I
do support the bill and urge its adoption by the full Senate.
At this time I would like to take a moment to highlight a few
important issues which are under the jurisdiction of the Emerging
Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee.
In particular, the legislation continues to build upon the
committee's past efforts to strengthen and streamline the Department of
Defense's combating terrorism program. As we were tragically reminded
by the events on September 11 and last year's bombing of the U.S.S.
Cole, it is vital that we continue to focus on this growing threat.
As we all know, the threat of attacks on our national and defense
information systems seem to grow daily. Last year, Senator Warner
proposed an innovative scholarship program to encourage young people to
pursue careers with the Federal Government in the information assurance
area. I am gratified that our collective efforts this year have
increased support for this innovative program, as well as other
Departmental efforts to enhance the security of our critical
information systems. However, I am concerned that the funding level
included in the bill for the scholarship program may not be sufficient.
Since the creation of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee in 1999, I have worked hard to ensure that our
nonproliferation and threat reduction programs in Russia are fulfilling
their national security objectives. This year I have worked hard to
incorporate the kind of oversight I believe is essential if these
nonproliferation programs are going to produce the desired results.
This committee has a long history of supporting a strong and stable
science and technology program and I was pleased to see the
administration's budget request of $8.8 billion in this important area.
This $1.2 billion increase over last year's request is the first step
towards achieving the Secretary's goal of having science and technology
programs make up 3 percent of the overall defense budget. It remains
critical that we continue our support of a vibrant science and
technology base.
I strongly urge the rapid adoption of this important legislation. Our
Nation is faced with a daunting task ahead and now is the time to show
our strong support for the men and women in the armed services who so
proudly and bravely serve our Nation.
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