[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 124 (Friday, September 21, 2001)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1691-E1692]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            POW/MIA DAY 2001

                                 ______
                                 

                        HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, September 21, 2001

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to bring to my colleague's attention 
that tomorrow has been designated as National POW/MIA Day for 2001. 
This is an annual commemoration, designated by the President, for 
Americans to remember the sacrifices of those armed service-members who 
were captured in wartime, and those whose ultimate fate remains 
unknown.
  Our nation fought four major conflicts in the 20th century. In those 
wars, over 142,000 Americans were taken prisoner-of-war. Those 
servicemen and women experienced numerous hardships and treatment which 
could often be described only as barbaric during the course of 
captivity. Those Americans imprisoned by the Japanese during World War 
II faced the worst possible conditions in captivity and were firsthand 
witnesses to the utter depravity of their fellow men. Americans 
imprisoned in North Korea and Southeast Asia suffered similar 
treatment.
  The vast majority of these individuals, ore than 134,000, were 
eventually returned to U.S. control. However, more than 17,000 did not 
come home, and joined the ranks of the missing-in-action. According to 
the Congressional research service, over 88,000 Americans remain 
unaccounted for from 20th century wars. The bulk of these, 78,794, are 
remains not recovered from World War II. Approximately 1,600 Americans 
remain missing from the first World War, and more than 8,100 
individuals remain missing from the Korean War. Korean War figures have 
been notoriously inaccurate, and of this aforementioned figure, 
``only'' 2,195 cases exist where death was not witnessed or otherwise 
well-documented. Regarding the Vietnam War, 1,956 Americans remain 
missing from that conflict, of which the defense department believes 
657 are definitely dead, including 459 who were lost at sea or over 
water.
  I have been a strong advocate of an accounting of our POW/MIA's since 
I first came to the Congress in 1973. I was introduced to the issue 
through the experience of two friends and constituents, George and 
Gladys Brooks, who had lost their son in Vietnam. They were early 
members of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and 
Missing in Southeast Asia, an advocacy group for the families that 
continues to play a key role in this issue to this day. At the time, 
the POW/MIA issue did not resonate with the American public, who wanted 
to forget the whole Vietnam experience as soon as possible. Along with 
like-minded colleagues in the House, I sought to work closely with the 
National League of Families to raise the profile of the POW/MIA issue 
with the American people and force the Department of Defense to adopt a 
sustained policy of seeking a full accounting for all those individuals 
who did not come home, especially with those who were last known to be 
alive in captivity.
  From 1975-77, I served as a member of the Montgomery Select Committee 
on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, a body which held numerous 
hearings on the issue of whether live Americans were left behind in our 
Exodus from Vietnam. Subsequent to this, I co-chaired the House Select 
task force on this issue with my former colleague from Virginia, Lester 
Wolf. During this time, I made numerous trips to Southeast Asia, 
beginning with a trip to Hanoi in 1975.
  In 1995, I introduced H.R. 945, The Missing Service Personnel Act of 
1995, which was eventually incorporated into the Defense Authorization 
Act for FY '96. Included in this legislation was language which 
required the Secretary of Defense to centralize the responsibility for 
search and rescue operations under one office; instruct the Secretary 
to establish procedures for dealing with the families of missing 
persons by protecting the interests of the families; and provide a 
means by which the families of MIA's can express their concerns and 
questions about the missing family member. It also called for greater 
consultation between DOD and family members, and incorporated 
provisions create accountability and punishment for those in DOD who 
refuse to follow the law in this area.
  Many of the good provisions in the bill were stripped out at the 
request of DOD in the House/Senate conference on the following year's 
authorization bill. The bulk of these, however, were overwhelmingly 
restored by the House in the FY 98 Defense Authorization bill.
  Two years ago, I introduced legislation to declassify all of the 
classified documents from these hearings that were in the possession of 
the national archives. This resolution, which the House adopted 
unanimously, made available hundreds of formerly secret documents, 
allowing family members and academic researchers the opportunity to 
review previously unavailable material, which might eventually help 
with securing a final resolution for some MIA cases.
  Permit me to focus special recognition on those POW/MIA's from Korea 
and Vietnam. Despite the prior administration's best assurances to the 
contrary, many of us in Congress remained unconvinced that the 
governments of North Korea and Vietnam have been fully cooperating with 
the united states on this issue. Regrettably, by normalizing relations 
with Vietnam, I believe that we have withdrawn our leverage over the 
Vietnamese government on this issue.
  It bears noting that we have made some progress. Since the end of the 
war, 586 sets of remains have been returned from Vietnam, with 285 
returned since 1991. However, despite an official position to the 
contrary, U.S. government efforts on the POW/MIA issue have 
traditionally focused on remains recovery, with little, if any, 
emphasis on the live Americans issue. In fact, in answers to questions 
I posed in hearings on recovery efforts back in 1996, Clinton 
administration officials admitted that the discussion of live American 
prisoners was not even on the agenda when U.S. officials met with their 
North Korean, Vietnamese, or Laotian counterparts. Rather, they 
preferred to focus solely on the issue of remains recovery as a 
measurement of cooperation on the MIA issue from those countries.
  The U.S. government, particularly the last administration, has often 
appeared to equate activity on recovery efforts, regardless of any 
subsequent results, with progress on the issue. This is not an 
insignificant point, the Defense Department has expended a substantial 
amount of money on remains recovery over the past decade, which begs 
the following question. Are North Korea, Vietnam and Laos truly 
interested in bilateral cooperation on this issue, or are they using it 
as a source of badly needed hard currency?
  This is especially pertinent concerning the case of North Korea. 
According to the Congressional research Service, 208 sets of remains 
were repatriated from North Korea between 1990-96, and 107 sets since 
1996 when joint exhumation efforts began. During the period of 1990-96, 
the United States paid North Korea $897,000 for their unilateral 
retrieval efforts. Once bilateral efforts began in 1996, the price tag 
sharply increased--we paid $6.3 million for the 77 sets of remains 
exhumed through November of last year.

  Given that only eight sets of remains have been identified as U.S. 
soldiers, although ten more appear to be so, we have in effect been 
paying the North Koreans $400,000 per body, an outrageous sum and 
certainly not evidence of North Korean ``cooperation.''
  While the Vietnamese were not quite so brazen in their profiteering 
on the MIA issue, there is considerable evidence that they maintained a 
mortuary storehouse of sorts of U.S. remains, and doled these out over 
time. Most analysts, including those at the Library of Congress, agree 
that if this did occur, the supply of stored bodies was depleted in the 
early 1990s.

[[Page E1692]]

  Regrettably, in its rush to normalize relations with Vietnam, the 
Clinton administration decided to overlook any evidence that Hanoi was 
holding back on cooperation or attempting to profit from it. This 
pattern was later repeated when the administration sought the 
establishment of trade relations. The opportunity to use trade and 
recognition as leverage to achieve faster results on the MIA issue was 
lost.
  I am optimistic about our new President and his commitment to the 
POW/MIA issue. In a refreshing break from the past eight years, I 
expect that the Bush administration will adopt a more traditional 
stance towards Vietnam and North Korea on the POW/MIA issue. At the 
very least, I expect to see a higher standard applied towards 
determining whether or not those countries are cooperating and acting 
in good faith on this matter.
  The new president has demonstrated a proven commitment to this 
important issue, and his relevant appointments to the State and Defense 
departments, including the new head of DPMO, Jerry Jennings, have the 
policy background to provide greater integration of the POW/MIA issue 
into our relations with Southeast Asia and North Korea.
  On this point, I believe that Vietnam is the lynchpin that will 
determine the success or failures of any future endeavors. The 
Vietnamese are the key to gaining more information from both Laos and 
Cambodia on missing personnel. Moreover, the Vietnamese, despite recent 
certifications to the contrary, realize that there is much more they 
can do on this issue. On the issue of documentation alone, there is far 
more they can provide than what they have offered up to this point.
  The Bush administration is in a much stronger position with regards 
to North Korea. This country has a far greater need for hard currency 
than Vietnam, and our new President is unlikely to continue the policy 
of outright appeasement on both nuclear power/weapons development and 
MIA remains recovery. It will be interesting to see how the white house 
approaches North Korea on these issues.
  I believe we in Congress also have a role to play regarding North 
Korea. We need to have the new administration press the North Koreans 
harder on the issue of prisoner transfers to the USSR during and after 
the Korean war, as well as the matter of the possibility of live 
Americans still being held by P'yongyang. While this possibility, if it 
still exists, becomes more remote with each passing year, the escapes 
of several South Korean veterans of the 1950-53 war in recent years 
means this cannot be totally discounted. If any Americans are still 
being held in captivity in North Korea, and we know that four 
defectors/deserters still reside there, they should have the 
opportunity to return home before they die.
  It is my hope that our bilateral relations can improve and will lead 
to a further clarification regarding the safe return of any living 
POW's who may still be in captivity in Korea or elsewhere.
  Americans should always remember the love of country that America's 
veterans have shown as well as their personal sacrifices, courage, 
convictions and dedication to freedom that these individuals have 
exhibited.
  To quote a portion of President Abraham Lincoln's letter to a mother 
who lost five sons on the battlefield: ``I cannot refrain from 
tendering to you the thanks of the republic they died to save. I pray 
that our heavenly father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, 
and leave you only the cherished memory of the loved and lost, and the 
solemn pride that must be yours to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon 
the alter of freedom.''
  May it be of some solace to the families and loved ones of our 
missing and POW's that there are many of us in the Congress committed 
to a full and final accounting of our missing.
  In light of recent events in New York City, we hope that we will not 
be faced with a future POW/MIA issue from any resulting military action 
that we may undertake in Southern Asia.

                          ____________________