[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 122 (Wednesday, September 19, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9481-S9485]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE SENATE AND THE CONSTITUTION
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, this is Constitution Week. Of course, I am
talking about the U.S. Constitution. A point that all Governors and
Senators might well remember: No State constitution in this country is
like the Federal Constitution. No State's constitution so clearly and
so strictly delineates the separation of powers as precisely as does
the U.S. Constitution. So it is here in the Senate that the
Constitution is defended--the U.S. Constitution--and it is here that we
support the separation of powers, the checks and balances; and the one
Constitution that we are bound by in this institution is the U.S.
Constitution, a copy of which I hold in my hand. I want to take a
little while today to talk about this Federal Constitution.
On Monday of this week we marked the 114th anniversary of the U.S.
Constitution. Of course, the Senate was not in on Monday, and
consequently I have been forced to wait until today to speak about the
Constitution. Again, this is Constitution Week. In tragic and sad
times, we instinctively reach for what matters most in our lives: Our
faith, our families, and our fundamental rights as Americans.
As we struggle with the horrific events of September 11, we should
take a measure of strength from the events of another September day, an
18th century September day.
On September 17, 1787, an extraordinary convention of American
statesmen, meeting at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, adopted the
Constitution of the United States of America. My memory may prove me
wrong, but I believe that, too, was a Monday--as was September 17, in
2001, this year of our Lord. So today I wish to commemorate that
singular event by discussing several of the constitutional provisions
that shape the structure and guide the operations of the U.S. Senate. I
think there will never be a better time, or a more propitious time, or
a time when we more need to think and to speak of the Constitution of
the United States, than this time, and amidst the circumstances that
have attracted the attention and galvanized the attention of Americans,
wherever they may live--in this country or elsewhere--as well as the
people of other countries. So it is timely to think about the
Constitution of the United States.
Imagine a U.S. Senate in which the State of West Virginia was
assigned three Members while California was entitled to 30.
Or, consider a Senate in which Members served for life--or for just a
single year.
How about a system in which the House of Representatives elected the
Senate?
Or a Senate in which Members voted as a State block rather than as
individuals?
To our modern ear, these options sound preposterous, perhaps, but to
the Framers of the Constitution, these proposals deserved serious
consideration.
There was nothing inevitable about the Constitution as we now know
it. Every word required delicate construction, balancing, and
refinement. In cases where the Framers could not fully agree on a
particular point, they chose ambiguity--or even silence.
Among that charter's 55 draftsmen--only 39 actually signed the
document--there existed a vast fund, a vast reservoir of knowledge
about the operation of legislative bodies. That knowledge served the
Framers well as they struggled to fashion the institutional structure
of the United States Senate.
Let us examine some of the Senate-related options that the
Convention's delegates confronted from the Convention's convening on
May 25 until its adjournment on September 17.
First the issue of representation. Delegates representing large
States at the Constitutional Convention advocated a strong national
government. In Edmund Randolph's Virginia Plan, the number of Senators
in each State would be determined by that State's population of free
citizens and slaves. Large States, then, stood to gain the most seats
in the Senate. As justification for this advantage, these delegates
noted that their States contributed more of the Nation's financial and
defense resources than did small States, and therefore, deserved a
greater say in Government.
Small-State delegates countered with a plan designed to protect
States' rights within a confederated system of government. Fearing the
effects of majority rule, they, the small States, demanded equal
representation in Congress. This was the system, they noted, that was
then in effect under the Articles of Confederation. When the Convention
agreed to divide the national legislature into two chambers, various
Framers argued that every State should enjoy equal representation in
both Chambers. In fact, some delegates threatened to withdraw from the
Convention if it adopted any population-based representation plan.
Other delegates sought a compromise between large State and small
State interests. As early as 1776, Connecticut's Roger Sherman--he is
one of the
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signers of the Constitution of the United States--Roger Sherman, as
early as 1776 had suggested that the Continental Congress, in which
each State had one vote, should be organized to represent people as
well as States, and during the 1787 Convention, Sherman proposed the
so-called ``Connecticut Compromise'' which provided population-based
representation in the House of Representatives and equal State
representation in the Senate.
Benjamin Franklin agreed that each State should have an equal vote in
the Senate except in matters concerning money. The Convention's grant
committee reported Franklin's motion with some modifications to the
delegates early in July. Madison led the debates against that measure
believing it to be an injustice to the majority of Americans. Some
small State delegates were reluctant even to support proportional
representation in the House.
On July 16, delegates narrowly adopted the mixed representation plan,
the Great Compromise, giving States equal votes in the Senate. That is
why we are here. The Presiding Officer would not be sitting where he is
sitting today if there had not been a July 16 Great Compromise. The
Official Reporter would not be here listening to me and taking down
what I am saying. I would not be here. These young people who are our
pages and who help us in so many ways to do our work for our
constituencies would not be here. That was the Great Compromise, giving
States equal votes in the Senate.
The compromise resolved the Convention's most divisive issue and
created a Federal system of Government.
Senators already know what I am saying. Many people on the outside
who are watching through that electronic eye up there know it. These
things were taught long ago in the early years of a child's schooling,
but this is Constitution Week. We need to be reminded, and now in the
circumstances that confront this country and have confronted it
especially since Tuesday, September 11, we must be reminded that we are
to be guided by a constitution, the United States Constitution.
We must zealously guard the powers of the legislative branch in times
like these when there is a war, when there is a military conflict.
Powers have a way of gravitating toward the Chief Executive, and it is
in times like those, in times like these, that we must be very zealous
and jealous of the constitutional prerogatives and powers that are
vested in this body, the legislative branch.
We must be on our guard more than ever because the Constitution lives
and it will live when these circumstances are behind us, if and when
they indeed are ever put behind us, and I assume that they will be put
behind us at some point in time.
It might be a good thing to point out here, just to remind Senators
that the Continental Congress met behind closed doors. The Congress,
under the Articles of Confederation, met behind closed doors. The
Constitutional Convention, where the Framers gave us this Constitution,
met behind closed doors, with sentries at the doors and the windows
drawn. So, there we have food for another speech, another day.
Be conscious of the Constitution and this institution (the Senate)
and its prerogatives and its precedents, its rules. We need
particularly now to be reminded of these things.
A second major issue related to the number of Senators allotted to
each State. Once the convention's delegates established the principle
of equal State representation in the Senate, they needed to determine
how many Senators a State would be allotted. Few, if any, delegates
considered that one Senator per State would be sufficient
representation. Lone Senators might leave their State unrepresented in
times of illness or other absences, and they would have no colleague to
consult with on State-related issues. Additional Senators would make
the Senate a more knowledgeable body and, perhaps, better able to
counter the influence of the House of Representatives. But, some
believed a very large Senate would soon lose its distinctive character,
would lack the agility needed to effectively counterbalance the House,
and would make it easier for Senators to escape personal responsibility
for their actions.
Given these considerations, delegates had only a narrow choice
regarding the number of Senators. During the Convention, they briefly
discussed the advantages of two seats versus three. Gouverneur Morris
of Pennsylvania, the man with the peg leg, stated that three Senators
per State were necessary to form an acceptable quorum, while other
delegates thought a third Senator would be too costly. On July 23, one
week after the Great Compromise, only Pennsylvania voted in favor of
three Senators. When the question turned to two Senators, Maryland
alone voted against the measure, not because of the number, but because
Luther Martin disagreed with the concept of per capita voting, which
gave each Senator, rather than each State, one vote.
Both the Congress under the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitutional Convention used a voting method that gave each State one
vote. This system of block voting was meant to reinforce State
solidarity, but it often frustrated those State delegations divided by
controversial issues. The alternative, of course, was for Members to
vote as individuals. Those Framers who had served in State legislatures
had ample experience with the per capita system. At the Convention,
they spent little time debating the two proposed voting methods. On
July 14, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts stated that per capita voting
in the Senate would ``prevent the delays and inconvenience that had
been experienced in [the Continental] Congress and would give a
national aspect and spirit to the management of business.'' One week
later, Gouverneur Morris and Rufus King of Massachusetts added a per
capita voting clause to their motion designating the number of Senators
for each State. As I have already noted, Maryland's Luther Martin
objected to the motion. A States' rights advocate, he regarded per
capita voting as a departure ``from the idea of the States being
represented in the second branch.'' Consequently, Martin convinced his
fellow Maryland delegates to vote against the two-Senator, per capita
measure. Supported by every State except Maryland, both the measure's
clauses passed on July 23, allowing each State's two Senators to vote
as individuals, though still subject to the influence of States,
constituents, and party policies.
Because they did not have parties in those days, but I am speaking
within the context of the current moment, the Constitution's Framers
understood that no matter which method they chose for electing
Senators, it would have a significant impact on the Senate's future
relationships with the House, the people, and the States.
From the beginning, most delegates dismissed any notion of
implementing the British House of Lords' peerage system based on
heredity and title. This system contradicted the egalitarian notions
outlined in the Declaration of Independence. The system set forth in
the Virginia Plan received little support, as well. Had this measure
passed, the House would have selected Members of the Senate from
nominations offered by the State legislators. The Senate could not be
expected to serve as an effective check on the very institution
responsible for its Members' election.
Senators will recall that the Virginia plan was introduced by Gov.
Edmund Randolph, a delegate from the State of Virginia, on May 29,
1787. It is easy for me to remember the date of May 29 because it was
on that date, 64 years ago, that I married my wife Erma; 64 years ago
on May 29.
The convention then considered a revised version of the Virginia
Plan, which contained the clause, ``the Members of the Second Branch of
the national Legislature ought to be chosen by the individual
Legislatures.'' Most delegates easily accepted this election method,
regarding it as the most ``congenial'' plan available. Only
Pennsylvania's James Wilson criticized the idea. He believed that the
State legislative method would ``introduce and cherish local interests
and local prejudices.'' The alternative method, elections through
popular vote, never gained the adherents it needed to become a viable
option.
In Federalist 63, Madison defended the plan of election by State
legislatures against those who feared indirect elections would
transform the Senate into a ``tyrannical aristocracy.'' For
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such an unlikely event to happen, the Senate, the State legislatures,
the House of Representatives, and the people would all have to fall
prey to corruption. Madison cited Maryland's successful experiment with
indirect election. Elected by a unique electoral college system, the
Senate in Maryland showed no symptoms of tyranny, and in fact, had
built a reputation unrivaled by any other state in the Union.
Despite Madison's assurances, the system of indirect elections
ultimately proved vulnerable to corruption. Following the Civil War,
newspaper reporters accused State legislatures of accepting bribes or
remaining willfully ``deadlocked,'' and therefore, unable to elect a
Senator into office. Reformers reacted to these allegations by
advocating a constitutional amendment that would provide for the
election of Senators by popular vote. This one substantive correction
to the Framers' handiwork for the Senate went into effect in 1913 as
the Constitution's 17th amendment.
And, next, to the issue of term length. The 6-year Senate term
represented a compromise between those Framers who wanted a strong,
independent Senate and those who feared the possible tyranny of a
Senate insulated from popular opinion. While few delegates to the 1787
Convention wanted to emulate the House of Lords' lifelong terms, or the
Congress under the Articles Confederation's single-year terms, the
Framers' reaction against these extremes helped shape their arguments
for and against long terms in the Senate.
Delegates examined the experience of the various State legislatures.
Although the majority of States set 1-year terms for both legislative
bodies, five State constitutions established longer terms for upper
house members. South Carolina's senators received 2-year terms. In
Delaware, the senate had 3-year terms with one-third of the senate's
nine members up for reelection each year. New York and Virginia
implemented a similar class system but with 4-year terms instead of 3.
Only Maryland's Senate featured 5-year terms, making that legislative
body the focus of the convention's Senate term debates.
The delegates either praised Maryland's long terms for checking the
excesses of lower-house democracy or feared them for the same reason.
Some members of the Convention believed that even 5-year terms were too
short to counteract the dangerous notions likely to emerge from the
House of Representatives. In June, Madison, Edmund Randolph, and other
convention delegates cited Maryland's experiences when they argued for
long Senate terms. According to Madison, the senate of Maryland had
never ``created just suspicions of danger.'' Far from being the more
powerful branch, the senate had actually yielded too much, at times, to
Maryland's House of Delegates. Unless the U.S. Senate obtained
sufficient stability, Madison expected a similar situation under the
new Constitution. He suggested terms of 7 years, or more, to counter
the influence of the popularly chosen House of Representatives. Edmond
Randolph believed that the primary object of an upper house was to
control the larger lower house. He noted that Maryland's senate had
followed this principle but had been ``scarcely able to stem the
popular torrent.'' Seven-year terms, then, had a greater chance of
checking the House than terms of 5 years or fewer.
On June 13, the convention took up a provision for 7-year Senate
terms. This encountered heated criticism from several Framers. For
Alexander Hamilton, only lifelong terms could check the ``amazing
violence and turbulence of the democratic spirit.'' Other delegates
preferred 4-year terms. Madison devised a 9-year-term proposal with
one-third of the seats subject to election every 3 years. He received
little support for this plan, but he argued in its favor until the
final votes on June 26. On that date, and following the failure of his
own measure, Madison joined the majority of his colleagues in voting
for a 6-year term. In the Federalist papers, Madison argued that
Maryland's experiment with 5-year terms proved that slightly longer
terms posed no danger to bicameral legislatures. In fact, he expected
the agreed-upon 6-year terms to have a stabilizing effect on the new
national government. Long terms would control turnover in the
legislature. Long terms would allow Senators to take responsibility for
measures over time. Long terms would make Senators largely independent
of public opinion.
The Articles of Confederation set no qualifications for delegates to
the Continental Congress. It left these decisions up to the individual
States. By contrast, convention delegates supported establishing
membership limitations for House and Senate Members. Influenced by
British and State precedents, they established age, citizenship, and
residence qualifications for Senators, but voted against proposed
religion and property requirements. There was a lot of sentiment
especially on property requirements as to age. I might pay particular
attention to that aspect.
The Framers debated the minimum age for Members of the House of
Representatives before they considered the same qualification for
Senators. Although James Wilson of Pennsylvania State stated that
``there was no more reason for incapacitating youth than age, where the
requisite qualifications were found,'' other delegates were in favor of
age restrictions. I'm glad they did not have their way. They were
familiar with England's law requiring members of Parliament to be 21 or
older. Some lived in States that barred individuals from serving in
their upper chambers who had not attained the age of 21 or 25.
On June 25, 3 days after designating 25 as the minimum age for
Representatives, delegates unanimously set a 30-year-minimum for
Senators. In Federalist 62, Madison justified the higher age
requirement for Senators. By its deliberative nature, the ``senatorial
trust,'' called for a ``greater extent of information and stability of
character,'' than would be needed in the more democratic House of
Representatives. The Framers, not all of them by any means, trusted
democracy.
As to citizenship, under English law, no person ``born out[side] of
the kingdoms of England, Scotland, or Ireland'' could be a member of
either house of Parliament. While some delegates may have admired the
``strictness'' of this policy, no Framers advocated a blanket ban on
foreign-born legislators. Instead, they debated the length of time
Members of Congress should be citizens before taking office. The
States' residency qualifications offered moderate guidelines in this
regard. New Hampshire's State senators needed to be residents for at
least 7 years prior to election. In other States, upper house members
fulfilled a 5-, 3-, or 1-year requirement.
The Virginia Plan introduced by Edmund Randolph, on May 29, made no
mention of citizenship when it was introduced to the Convention. Two
months later, the Committee of Detail reported a draft of the
Constitution that included a 4-year citizenship requirement for all
Senators. On August 9, Gouverneur Morris moved to substitute a 14-year
minimum. Later that day, delegates voted against Senate citizenship
requirements of 14, 13, and 10 years before settling on 9 years as a
residency requirement. The issue of foreign birth was particularly
important in the Senate, whose responsibilities would extend to the
review of international treaties. While the Framers were concerned that
the Senate, especially, might be subject to foreign influence, they did
not wish to offend foreign allies or close the institution to
meritorious naturalized citizens. The 9-year provision made the Senate
requirement 2 years longer than that for the House of Representatives.
On August 13, the Convention confirmed the 9-year requirement by a vote
of 8 States to 3.
Inhabitancy: Although the Parliament of Great Britain repealed its
residency law in 1774, no Convention delegates spoke against a
residency requirement for Members of Congress. The qualification first
came under consideration on August 6 when the Committee of Detail
reported its draft of the Constitution. Article V, section 3 stated,
``Every member of the Senate shall be * * * at the time of his
election, a resident of the state from which he shall be chosen.''
Two days later, Roger Sherman moved to strike the word ``resident''
from the portion of the clause that related to the House, and insert in
its
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place ``inhabitant,'' a term he considered to be ``less liable to
misconstruction.'' Madison seconded the motion, noting that
``resident'' might exclude people occasionally absent on public or
private business. Delegates agreed to the term, ``inhabitant,'' and
voted against adding a time period to the requirement. The following
day, they amended the Senate qualification to include the word,
``inhabitant'' and passed the clause by unanimous agreement.
We now turn to the issue of who gets to make executive and judicial
nominations. Argued over the course of several weeks, the
Constitution's nomination clause split the delegates into two factions.
The first faction wanted the executive to have the sole power of
appointment. The second wanted the Senate to have that responsibility.
The second faction followed precedents that the Articles of
Confederation and most of the State constitutions had established
favoring legislative appointment. The Massachusetts constitution
offered yet another approach. This third way particularly interested
the convention delegates. For over 100 years, Massachusetts had divided
the appointment responsibilities between its Governor, who made the
nominations, and its legislative council, which confirmed the
appointments.
Rather than adopt the Massachusetts model immediately, the delegates
initially agreed to language that split the responsibility in a
different way. The President would appoint executive branch officers,
who would serve during his term, and the Senate would appoint members
of the judiciary because they would hold their positions for life--a
period most likely to exceed the tenure and authority of one President.
However, the Framers in favor of a strong executive argued that Senate
appointments would lead to government by a ``cabal'' swayed by the
interests of constituents. Other delegates, fearful of monarchies,
wanted to remove the President entirely from the appointment process.
On September 4, the Committee of Eleven reported an amended appointment
clause. Unanimously adopted on September 7, the clause, based on the
Massachusetts model, provided that the President ``shall nominate, and
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint'' the
officers of the United States--certain officers.
As they debated the controversial treaty-making clause, the
Constitutional Convention's delegates considered, but did not follow in
whole, those precedents with which they were most familiar. In Great
Britain, treaties were made by the king and, in certain cases, had to
be approved by a majority vote in Parliament. The Continental Congress,
which had no executive branch, dispatched agents to negotiate treaties.
The treaties only went into effect after two-thirds, 9 out of 13, of
the States approved the documents. This inefficient process was further
complicated by the States' ability to enter into their own treaties.
While the delegates agreed that the States could not continue to make
treaties with foreign powers, they disagreed over the manner in which
the United States should negotiate, draft, and ratify international
agreements.
On August 6, the Committee of Detail reported a preliminary
Constitution to the full Convention. Article IX, section 1 stated,
``The Senate of the United States shall have power to make treaties,
and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court.''
Throughout August and into the month of September, the delegates
debated treaty-making as a separate issue from the rest of the clause.
Several delegates opposed granting the Senate the sole control over
treaty-making. It is a good thing that they did. While some wanted the
executive to have that responsibility, others advocated involving both
houses of Congress in the process. Small-State delegates, however, were
inclined to keep the Committee of Detail's treaty clause because it
gave each State an equal say in the adoption or rejection of treaties.
On September 4, the Committee of Eleven reported a treaty clause that
appeased many of the delegates. This is what it said: ``The President
by and with the advice and Consent of the Senate, shall have power to
make Treaties.'' After further debate, the delegates unanimously
approved the clause on September 7. However, the clause was taken up
again, this time to add to it the words, ``But no treaty shall be made
without the consent of two-thirds of the members present.'' Shortly
thereafter, the Convention passed James Madison's addition, ``except in
treaties of peace,'' which would be ratified by a simple majority vote.
The next day, the delegates struck out the peace treaty exception and
considered dropping the Senate supermajority requirement as well.
However, after two delegates cited the Continental Congress' ``two-
thirds of the States'' example, they voted to keep the two-thirds of
the Senate provision.
Although adopted by the Convention, the treaty clause continued to
stir debate in the period before the Constitution's ratification. As
one of the clause's strongest proponents, Alexander Hamilton defended
the provision in The Federalist 75. Remarkably, given the delegates'
extreme dissension over treaty-making, he wrote, the clause ``is one of
the best digested and unexceptionable parts of the plan.''
Let me pause here to say that we can witness the Convention as it
worked. And we know that time after time after time the Convention
would vote one way one day, and a few days later vote on the same
matter again and vote a different way, and then perhaps vote again
before the close of the Convention and arrive at an entirely different
conclusion.
If the Convention had been open to the public, the Framers would have
been severely restricted and constrained, and would have paused and
thought once, twice, and three times, and more, before they would have
changed their votes. They might, on a later date, have come to believe
that in the earlier vote they had voted the wrong way.
By having the closed Convention, by meeting secretly, they were able
to have full discussions of a matter, have a tentative vote, vote one
way, perhaps a few days later vote a different way, and in the final
analysis, in order to do the right thing, after considerable reflection
and after hearing the arguments of others, vote again finally and,
perhaps, differently.
That would have been very difficult to do had there been galleries,
had there been the media, newspapers, had there been television--which,
of course, there could not have been. It would have been difficult.
I say that to say that in some situations voting in executive
session, in secret session, may, in the last analysis, be in the best
interests of the country.
Early in the Convention, most delegates agreed that the inclusion of
an impeachment provision would help to hold national officers
accountable for their actions. Throughout the summer of 1787, committee
members reported impeachment plans to the full Convention. The Virginia
Plan proposed a supreme tribunal to hear and determine cases including,
among other concerns, the ``impeachments of any National officers.'' On
June 13, the Committee of the Whole amended the plan to provide that
the President could be ``removable on impeachment of malpractices or
neglect of duty.'' The revised measure did not specify the procedures
for trying the President. In June and July, the Framers debated whether
Congress should have a role in the impeachment process. Roger Sherman--
there that Connecticut delegate is again--Roger Sherman asserted that
the ``National Legislature should have the power to remove the
Executive at pleasure.'' Virginia's George Mason objected to Sherman's
plan, claiming that the President would become merely a ``creature of
the Legislature.'' John Dickinson of Delaware countered with an
unsuccessful motion to make the executive ``removable by National
Legislature at request of majority of State Legislatures.''
You see, they were all over the place.
On August 6, the Committee of Detail reported that the House of
Representatives ``shall have the sole power of impeachment'' and the
executive ``shall be removed from his office by ``conviction in the
Supreme Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption.'' Two weeks later,
the committee added that ``the judges of the supreme court be triable
by the senate, on impeachment by the house of representatives.''
Can you imagine what it would be like in this day and time to have a
Constitutional Convention with all the doors open, the windows open,
the galleries open, the media there? After
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every vote, Members would rush out the door to get before a camera and
explain their votes. Members would not later be able to easily change
their minds and their votes upon more careful thought, upon more
considered reflection.
So there are those today who would hem and haw and holler: Oh, we
must not do this. We cannot do this. The people are entitled to hear
everything we say.
Well, those Framers were very wise men. It was they who wrote this
Constitution which I hold in my hand. Of course, there have been some
amendments added later, but those men were wise men. And, remember,
they were placing their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor
on the barrelhead.
Of course, we had fought a war, but many of them were among those who
voted on the Declaration of Independence in 1776.
The constitutional plan then went for review to a committee
consisting of one member from every State represented at the
Convention. The committee removed the full Supreme Court from the
process. The report, influenced by the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, stated, ``The Senate of the U.S. shall have power to try all
impeachments [by the House of Representatives]''--naturally--``but no
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the
members present.'' Ah, there you have it now. Alexander Hamilton later
explained this decision noting that no other institution would be
sufficiently dignified--no other institution would be sufficiently
dignified--or independent to handle the proceedings. The Framers
debated the clause on September 8 and despite Madison's objection that
the executive would become dependent on the legislature, the
Convention, thank God, passed the final measure by a vote of eight
States to two.
Mr. President, there are, of course, other provisions in the
Constitution that guide the operations of the Senate. But, those that I
have just discussed serve to stoke our appreciation for this
extraordinary charter of government that we are talking about. In
closing, let us consider the words of James Wilson, one of
Pennsylvania's eight delegates to the Convention. Here is what James
Wilson told a meeting of Philadelphia citizens several weeks after
September 17, 1787:
Perhaps there never was a charge made with less reason,
than that which predicts the institution of a baneful
aristocracy in the federal Senate. This body branches into
two characters, the one legislative, and the other
executive. In its legislative character, it can effect no
purpose without the co-operation of the house of
representatives: and in its executive character, it can
accomplish no object, without the concurrence of the
president. Thus fettered, I do not know any act which the
Senate can of itself perform: and such dependence
necessarily precludes every idea of influence and
superiority. But I will confess, that in the organization
of this body, a comprise between contending interests is
discernible: and when we reflect how various are the laws,
commerce, habits, population, and extent of the
confederated States, this evidence of mutual concession
and accommodation ought rather to command a generous
applause, than to excite jealousy and reproach. For my
part, my admiration can only be equaled by my
astonishment, in beholding so perfect a system formed from
such heterogeneous materials.
What a Constitution!
I have often thought that the Creator of heaven and earth also had
his hand in the creation of the Constitution of the United States.
Whenever, wherever did such another illustrious gathering of men ever
occur? And why at this particular time? Had it been 5 years earlier,
the Framers may have lacked the experience that they ultimately had
gained under the Articles of Confederation which enabled them to add
provisions that would avoid some of the problems with which they had
been confronted under the Articles.
The country, such as it was at that time, the citizenry might not
have yet had enough time--I say this particularly with reference to the
leaders of the Convention and the other members--to so convincingly
move them to the idea that mere amendments to the Articles of
Confederation would not really be enough. There had to be a new start,
a new beginning. They went outside the parameters of their authority to
initiate that new beginning.
Had it been 5 years later, it might have been impossible, because by
then we were seeing the excesses of the French Revolution, with men and
women being hauled to the guillotine. And so perhaps that is where God
had His hand. It happened at the right time. It brought together the
right men, learned men, wise men, experienced men.
I thank Providence for this Constitution and for the men who had the
foresight and the vision, the courage, the ability to listen to others
and to change their minds. We can be thankful. But we should also be
fully aware of our responsibilities to preserve that great document and
to amend it only with great care and after great deliberation.
At this perplexing time in this year of our Lord 2001, we must be
ever more on guard that we, as the elected Representatives of a great
people, as we go forth, hold in our hands, as it were, the Constitution
of the United States; that we resist any temptation because of the
demands of the moment, the exigencies of the day, we resist the
temptation to put that Constitution aside in order to avoid debate and
expedite the business before the Senate. Let's not hesitate to ask
questions. Let's look before we leap.
I yield the floor.
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