[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 122 (Wednesday, September 19, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9477-S9479]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AVIATION SECURITY
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I come to the floor today to discuss the
issue of aviation security. The Senate Commerce Committee, on which I
serve, had hearings this week on this issue. I want to take a few
minutes this morning to discuss the history of this issue, the history
of the debate in Congress about aviation security. I do that with one
overriding concern. I do not want to be back on the floor of the Senate
in 6 months or a year taking my turn once again in the procession of
somber floor speeches about how sorry and upset and how sad the Senate
is that another air tragedy has occurred. I think it is important for
the Senate to step back and take a look at this issue now so we are not
dealing with it again in another 6 months or a year.
Beginning my discussion this morning, I want to talk about the
pattern of the past with respect to aviation security. Let's make no
mistake about it. There is a very clear pattern. Again and again, there
has been an air tragedy. Again and again, there is outrage in the
Congress and in the country. Again and again, task forces are
established and commissions are assigned to make reports and
recommendations. Again and again, there has been incremental and
ultimately ineffective implementation of changes that simply don't get
the job done when it comes to aviation security.
It would be an enormous disservice to those lives that have been lost
and to the many who love them if the only response of this Congress is
again to issue more reports, let more commissions go forward, and once
again fail to act with respect to putting in place the actual
provisions that are going to protect our citizens with respect to
terrorism.
The American people deserve quick, decisive, and sweeping aviation
security reforms. It is time now to get the job done right.
For a variety of reasons, for more than 20 years, plans to improve
aviation security have not been put into practice. What I intend to do
this morning is to outline specifically some of those specific
proposals, to describe what happened to them, and why they didn't seem
to be acted on.
After the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie in 1988, and again
after the TWA Flight 800 crashed near Long Island in 1996, there was
enormous support for tightening aviation security. In each case, the
Presidential commission was established and reforms were initiated. In
each case, studies by the GAO or the Department of Transportation
inspector general made clear that there were vulnerabilities. And in
each case, by the time the reports came out, the momentum was lost.
Action was slow. It was incomplete and incremental at best.
I am not interested this morning in talking about whose fault that
was. Clearly, part of the problem stems from what Presidential
administrations of both political parties did in allowing the process
to bog down in redtape and regulations. Part of the responsibility lies
with airlines that, indeed, did fight tougher security measures by
claiming costs would cripple their operations. But we should be very
clear. Part of the responsibility lies right in this Chamber, right
where the Congress did not insist on action, and did not insist on
safety for our constituents.
For example, in 1998, the GAO warned that vigilant congressional
oversight was essential. They made clear that momentum for reform would
stall otherwise. But while there were spasms of interest on Capitol
Hill, Congress didn't do the job with respect to oversight.
I am going to make clear as a member of the Senate Subcommittee on
Aviation that this time is going to be different. This time the
argument between those in the various agencies and the airline
executives over cost, inconvenience, and control of the system aren't
going to be allowed to be used as an argument for delay. We are not
going to sit by again and reap the grim harvest of congressional
inaction.
This is just a bit of the history on this issue. In 1987, the GAO
recommended that the FAA establish a certification program setting
performance standards for screening companies that operate the airport
security x rays. After the 1996 TWA Flight 800 crash, a White House
commission said the same thing, and Congress passed legislation calling
on the Federal Aviation Administration to get it done. But the Federal
Aviation Administration's rulemaking process dragged on for years with
multiple rounds of public comment. In June of 2000, the GAO reported
that the Federal Aviation Administration was then 2 years behind
schedule. As of this morning, the certification process for screening
these companies still has not gone into effect.
In 1988, the GAO reviewed FAA's progress in implementing a variety of
key improvements, including passenger profiling, bag-matching action,
and a variety of other initiatives.
Their conclusion was:
Based on FAA's current schedule and milestones, this whole
process for enhancing the Nation's aviation security system
will take years to fully implement.
To ensure followthrough on it, the same White House commission
recommended an annual report from the Secretary of Transportation on
the implementation of new security measures. That report happened
exactly once: on the first anniversary of the TWA crash. Once again,
the response was nothing.
Under legislation passed in 1990 and 1996, anyone with access to a
secured area in an airport is subject to a background check. The White
House commission established after the 1996 TWA crash went further,
recommending a full criminal background check and the FBI fingerprint
check. However, the inspector general of the Department of
Transportation recorded in 2000 that existing background check
procedures were, in his view, ineffective.
First, Federal Aviation Administration regulations required a
criminal background check for some employees but not for others.
Second, and more incredibly, some serious crimes, such as assault with
a deadly weapon, were not on the list of offenses that would disqualify
an employee.
Many airports were not complying with the FAA's rules anyway. For 35
percent of the employee files reviewed by the inspector general, there
was no evidence that a complete background check was ever performed.
Let's reflect on that. In 35 percent of the instances, the inspector
general found no evidence that a complete background check was ever
performed.
Last year, one screening company pled guilty and paid a $1.2 million
fine
[[Page S9478]]
for doing inadequate background checks and for hiring at least 14
airport workers who had criminal convictions.
Congress passed legislation in 2000 directing the FAA to implement
criminal fingerprint checks and expanding the list of disqualifying
offenses. New requirements, however, apply only to large airports. And
there still is no requirement to repeat fingerprint checks
periodically.
In 1993, the Department of Transportation inspector general reported
weaknesses in airport measures to keep unauthorized persons out of
restricted areas. A followup review in 1996 found no significant
improvement.
In 1999, the inspector general reported that in a test of eight major
airports, undercover agents were able to penetrate secure areas in 117
of 173 attempts--a 68-percent success rate. In many of those cases, the
test intruder, an individual who was testing the system, was able to
actually board an aircraft. Now, the list goes on.
I want to mention just several more in terms of laying out this
chronology.
Following the 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, there was a major
effort to develop baggage-screening equipment in order to detect
explosives. Technology was developed, but it was still not widely
deployed at the time of the 1996 TWA crash.
The White House commission created in response to that tragedy
recommended the widespread deployment of such equipment. Congress
provided funding, and machines were deployed in a variety of locations.
But last year--just last year--the Department of Transportation
inspector general found that these machines were significantly
underutilized. The inspector general found that more than 50 percent of
the machines were being used to screen fewer than 225 bags per day,
even though their capacity is 225 bags per hour.
According to a 1999 report by the National Research Council, at some
locations ``the throughput rate has been so low that operators could
even lose their skills for operating the equipment.''
The reason I am going through this 15-year chronology is that on
September 11, 2001, known vulnerabilities in America's aviation system
remained unaddressed.
Last week's hijackers knew there were holes. The General Accounting
Office, that serves the U.S. Congress, had documented these significant
gaps in our system. The terrorists took advantage of those gaps, and
the price paid by our country has been far too great.
Now it is time to correct these vulnerabilities. The legislation
should include action on at least four fronts:
First, swift implementation of the specific to-do list that I have
outlined this morning should be a top priority. This is a to-do list
not made up from some sort of cavalier review by an interest group.
This is a to-do list taken from recommendations from the inspector
general of the United States and from the General Accounting Office.
These recommendations have accumulated for years. It is time to focus
on getting those tasks done rather than just perpetually creating more
reports and more lists.
Second, Tuesday's unprecedented attack points to the need for a
number of additional safeguards. As we all know, a number of our
colleagues have advocated armed sky marshals onboard many flights.
Certainly this is a sensible recommendation, a credible deterrent; and
I support that.
I also think there needs to be significantly improved intelligence
sharing of information. Background checks for students applying for
flight training obviously need to be more thorough and more meticulous.
If a passenger is on a terrorist watch list, the country is saying: How
in the world can aviation security officials not be aware of that?
The technology exists to coordinate efforts between law enforcement
and the airline industry, so no more turf fights, no more lack of
communication. Focusing on information sharing of the best and most
current intelligence is absolutely key so that the names and faces of
those who are apparently unknown to the airline industry but aware to
some in the intelligence gathering can be out and available so as to
serve as an important tier of protection for the public.
Third, and perhaps most important, Congress must fundamentally
rethink who should be responsible for carrying out day-to-day
functions, such as the screening of baggage and access to restricted
areas. A number of forward-thinking Members of the Senate have been
after this issue for years, particularly the chairman of the Senate
Commerce Committee, Senator Hollings. He has been suggesting this since
1996 and before.
Obviously, between airlines and airports there have been conflicts in
the past, with some wanting security, some wanting to maximize the
number of flights and passengers and convenience. Certainly, security
and speed and convenience do not always fit perfectly together. But
aviation security functions need to be placed in the hands of those
without any conflict of law, those whose sole and paramount focus will
be the security of the American people.
Finally, it is obvious there will be costs associated with this. If,
in fact, the question of airline security becomes a function of the
Government--which is something I support, and I believe has bipartisan
support in this body--there are opportunities to use existing funds,
such as the airport trust fund. I, for one, would be willing to look at
additional ways to secure that revenue. And there has been a debate of
an aviation security trust fund. We are all aware that our constituents
are saying, in great numbers, that they would be willing to pay a bit
more for aviation security.
Let's look at using existing funds more efficiently, but if that does
not do the job, clearly, responding to our constituents, and getting
the job done, even if it requires some additional charges, will be
necessary.
Finally, I think we ought to be especially concerned about smaller,
more rural airports. It is clear they are not going to be able to
afford some security measures. Let's be clear to the public that we are
not going to allow rural airports to be security-sacrifice zones, in
effect, written off by the Congress.
In considering the cost of the massive airline security overhaul, we
are all going to remember the numbers of last week. It is going to
require additional funds to rebuild the Pentagon, to rebuild New York
City. To me, to say the cost of improving airline security is too great
is not an argument that is acceptable. The country expects us to do
what it takes and to work together to get the job done.
Let me conclude this morning with one last point. I came to the
Chamber this morning to go through the 15-year chronology of inaction
with respect to aviation security so as to set out on the record how
again and again the inspector general and the General Accounting Office
have laid bare the vulnerabilities of our aviation system.
I want to make clear, again, I am not interested in assessing blame.
When we look at the various executive branch leaders, when we look at
the Congress, when we look at those in the various interest groups,
including the airline industry, all of them would now say that if they
could do it again, it would be very different. We would not have this
pattern, from 1987 until September 11, at the very least, that
constantly resulted in this cycle of tragedy, outrage, recommendations,
and then essentially slow motion implementation.
I do not want to be back here in 6 months or a year. I don't want to
be back in just a few months waiting with the distinguished Senator
from North Dakota and the President of the Senate, waiting in a line to
give speeches about yet another tragedy. The American people know their
elected officials share their grief right now. What they want to see is
that we can get the job done, that this time it is going to be
different. This time the Congress is going to take the to-do list that
has been spelled out by the General Accounting Office and the inspector
general for years now and, without any more delay, that to-do list is
going to be put in place and the American people will have every
possible measure of security as they fly in our skies.
I yield the floor.
Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Lincoln). The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DAYTON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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Mr. DAYTON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be
permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Dayton are printed in today's Record under
``Morning Business.'')
Mr. DAYTON. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dayton). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Dorgan and Mr. Allen are printed in today's
Record under ``Morning Business.'')
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in
morning business for up to 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The remarks of Mr. Allen pertaining to the introduction of S. 1433
are printed in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills
and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. ALLEN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. CARNAHAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. CARNAHAN. I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning
business for up to 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. CARNAHAN. Mr. President, last Tuesday's terrorist attack is
having an immeasurable effect on our country. We are a nation of heavy
and broken hearts devastated by the tremendous loss of life, property,
and sense of security. My heart goes out to the victims and their
families. We continue to take solace in the heroic deeds of the rescue
workers and the patriotic response of Americans across the country.
September 11 was a dark day in our history. But we have had dark days
before.
In the midst of World War II, Thornton Wilder wrote:
Every good and worthwhile thing stands moment by moment on
the razor edge of danger and must be fought for whether it is
a home, or a field, or a country.
We will lead the fight for freedom today. And, as in times past, we
will be victorious.
Last week Congress acted with unity and speed to respond to the
attack on our people. We are authorized the use of force. We provided
$40 billion for the relief effort.
We must deal promptly and decisively on another front. The ongoing
stability of the aviation industry must be an immediate priority.
First of all, we need to act quickly to heighten security in our
airports and on commercial aircraft. We must make Americans feel safe
so that they will continue to fly.
Unfortunately, improving security will not be enough. Our Nation's
airlines are clearly suffering as a result of the Federal Aviation
Administration's decision to ground commercial aircraft last week.
While most airlines began operating again last Thursday, it is unclear
when carriers will be able to resume their full schedules. Moreover, it
appears that ticket sales are declining, which will further weaken this
already distressed industry.
We must respond to this crisis to ensure that last week's attackers
do not succeed in bringing down our Nation's airlines. This Congress
must provide a meaningful economic recovery package to help stabilize
the airline industry.
A number of proposals are currently being considered. They include
extending credit or guaranteed loans to the airlines and providing
direct compensation for losses sustained as a result of last week's
events. I am extremely supportive of these measures.
I also believe that any relief package for the airlines must include
an additional component to provide assistance to displaced workers.
This Congress must demonstrate that while we stand ready to bolster the
airline industry, we are also committed to supporting the men and women
who represent its heart and soul.
I fear that even if a stabilization package for the airlines is
expeditiously approved, a certain number of layoffs are inevitable.
Midway Airlines has already been forced to suspend all of its flight
operations and will lay off its remaining 1,700 employees. Continental
Airlines announced that it was furloughing 12,000 of its employees.
Airline executives estimate that as many as 100,000 workers could lose
their jobs in the next few weeks.
The problems afflicting the airline industry will have a devastating
impact on thousands of hard-working men and women. I believe we must
enact a meaningful relief package designed to both reinforce the
airline industry and provide support for displaced workers.
I am currently crafting a proposal to provide support for displaced
workers. We do not know how long these employees will be out of work or
indeed if they will ever be able to be employed by the airline industry
again. They are going to need financial assistance. They are going to
need retraining. And they are going to need health coverage. As with
other aspects of the disaster relief effort, the Federal Government
needs to take the lead.
Our airline industry needs help. So do its many employees. I am
committed to ensuring that assistance for displaced workers is part of
the larger airline relief package that we will take up in the days
ahead.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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