[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 120 (Friday, September 14, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S9461-S9464]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   NOMINATION OF JOHN NEGROPONTE TO REPRESENT THE U.S. AT THE UNITED 
                                NATIONS

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I rise this afternoon at this late hour on 
Friday at the close of a terrible week--a week which has seared itself 
into our very being for the rest of our lives--to object to the 
approval of John Negroponte to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations.
  I understand an agreement was reached that this nomination be passed 
on a voice vote today. It has been made, and certainly I will honor and 
respect the agreement. However, I believe this nomination deserves a 
full debate on the Senate floor and a full look into the record of this 
individual who is about to represent all of us in the United Nations.
  I understand and I agree that America needs a U.N. ambassador. We do 
need someone there, especially given the terrorist attacks on our 
Nation this week, in terms of an international dialog and international 
response to this terrorist attack. But I believe it is also important 
that all Senators be given an opportunity to vote on this controversial 
nomination and to debate it.
  Why is Mr. Negroponte's nomination so controversial? Why did the 
Baltimore Sun, in April of this year, devote a five-part series just on 
this one nominee? Well, I think there are two considerations that stand 
out in my mind, and I will explain why I oppose his nomination.
  First of all, Mr. Negroponte showed a callous disregard for human 
rights abuses throughout his tenure as U.S. Ambassador to Honduras 
between 1981 and 1985, during which time I traveled to Honduras and, in 
fact, went out to one of the contra camps with the Ambassador at that 
time. Quite frankly, in my conversations at that time in Honduras, and 
with the later revelations of what was going on with Battalion 316, 
which was supervised and basically trained by our CIA and our military 
personnel--when a lot of these issues came to light, it became clear to 
me that during my trip there I was misled and, quite frankly, not given 
the correct information that I sought.
  Secondly, I believe Mr. Negroponte knowingly misinformed the U.S. 
State Department about gross human rights violations in Honduras and 
throughout Central America during the height of the so-called contra 
war in Central America in the 1980s.
  That action, in turn, resulted in the Congress being misled as to the 
scope and nature of gross human rights violations that were being 
committed by the contras and by the Honduran military and, in 
particular, Battalion 316 in the Honduran military.
  In a letter to The Economist in 1982, then-Ambassador Negroponte 
wrote:

       It is simply untrue that death squads have made appearances 
     in Honduras.

  Yet from 1981 to 1984 over 150 people disappeared, including one 
American priest, Father James Carney, whose body has never been 
recovered.

  All indications are it was Battalion 316 that took custody of and had 
control over Father Carney. There had been reports that they 
interrogated him, that he was severely tortured and killed--he was an 
American citizen, an American priest--during the time of Mr. 
Negroponte's ambassadorship.
  I am not saying in any way he was responsible. I do not want anyone 
to get that wrong. All I am saying is as Ambassador at that time, there 
is a lot of evidence to show he just turned a

[[Page S9462]]

blind eye and a deaf ear to the human rights abuses at that time in 
Honduras.
  The 1997 CIA Inspector General's report and other official records, 
as well as extensive research published in numerous books and articles, 
have implicated Mr. Negroponte personally in condoning and covering up 
egregious human rights violations during his service in Honduras in the 
1980s. Read the five-part series that was in the Baltimore Sun in 1995 
and later amplified this year. That lays out the case quite clearly.
  Is he really the best nominee President Bush could find to represent 
our Nation at the United Nations? I think not. I guess what bothers me 
more than anything else is, as we move ahead seeking to get other 
nations to support us in our efforts to uphold human rights around the 
world, he does not bring clean hands to this critically important and 
senior diplomatic post.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following articles be 
printed in the Record at the end of my remarks: An April 16, 2001, Los 
Angeles Times editorial headlined ``Hard Questions for U.N. Nominee''; 
a Sunday, April 8, 2001, editorial written by Frank Del Olmo, associate 
editor of the Los Angeles Times; a Thursday, April 19, 2001, editorial 
written by Father Joseph Mulligan, a Jesuit priest from Detroit who has 
been working in Central America since 1986; an April 2, 2001, editorial 
from In These Times of the Institute for Public Affairs, and a list of 
150 people who disappeared in Honduras from October 29, 1981, to May 
30, 1985.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I understand agreements were made. I wish 
we had a fuller debate on this nominee. I want the record to show if, 
in fact, there was a record vote on this nominee, this Senator from 
Iowa would have voted no.
  I thank the President, and I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

              [From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 16, 2001]

                    Hard Questions for U.N. Nominee

       Under normal circumstances, President Bush's nomination of 
     a veteran U.S. diplomat like John D. Negroponte to be 
     ambassador to the United Nations would be a routine matter. 
     Negroponte is well regarded in the State Department and close 
     to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. Senate approval would 
     be all but certain.
       But while Negroponte's 37-year career in the foreign 
     service has admittedly been an impressive upward arc of 
     increasingly important ambassadorships, it was not routine. 
     It would be a mistake for the Senate, and particularly for 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, to treat Negroponte with 
     kid gloves.
       To be sure, Negroponte's diplomatic career has been marked 
     by noteworthy accomplishments. He handled sensitive embassy 
     posts quite effectively, most notably Mexico City in the 
     years leading up to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
     and Manila following the collapse of Philippine dictator 
     Ferdinand Marcos' regime. But Negroponte's career also 
     includes some troubling activities that took place in 
     Honduras during his tenure as ambassador there, between 1981 
     and 1985.
       Those were the years when President Ronald Reagan ordered 
     the CIA to launch covert activities against the Sandinista 
     government in neighboring Nicaragua. The key element of 
     Reagan's anti-Nicaragua strategy was a guerrilla war waged by 
     a puppet army based in Honduras and known as the Contras. It 
     was composed largely of former soldiers of Nicaraguan 
     dictator Anastasio Somoza, whom the Sandinistas had ousted. 
     With such unseemly allies, the Contra war was immediately 
     controversial, and Congress imposed limits on how the CIA 
     could wage it.
       Among other things, Congress insisted that before a small 
     nation like Honduras received massive increases in military 
     aid (from $4 million a year to $77 million during 
     Negroponte's tenure alone) that the U.S. Embassy there had to 
     verify that the notoriously corrupt Honduran army would use 
     the money properly. The Honduran security forces were not, 
     for instance, to use the money to pursue political dissidents 
     or otherwise violate the human rights of their fellow 
     citizens. Congress even required annual human rights reports 
     on Honduras to ensure that its mandate was being carried out.
       The human rights reports that Negroponte signed off on 
     during his tenure in Honduras need to be carefully reviewed 
     by the Senate. For while he routinely reported few violations 
     by the Honduran government, it has since become public 
     record, through declassified government documents and 
     reputable reports in the U.S. and Honduran press, that the 
     Honduran military was indeed engaged in some very brutal 
     activities in support of the Contras and U.S. policy.
       Honduran officials have documented the disappearance of as 
     many as 184 Honduran citizens, not just political dissidents 
     but innocent civilians who may have been mistaken for 
     dissidents, during that period. Most of these kidnappings and 
     murders were carried out by a secret, CIA-trained Honduran 
     army unit known as Battalion 316. The Senate should probe 
     deeply regarding how much of this activity Negroponte was 
     aware of and whether he hid what he knew from Congress.
       The Contra war was an ugly and inconclusive affair--but 
     brush-fire wars usually are. And no one is suggesting that 
     Negroponte bears all, or even most, of the blame for whatever 
     excesses may have taken place in Honduras. But he had a legal 
     obligation to truthfully inform Congress of what was 
     happening in Honduras in support of U.S. policy. If 
     Negroponte did not live up to that obligation, it calls into 
     question his suitability for an important post at the United 
     Nations.
       The Senate must not approve Negroponte's nomination without 
     asking him some very tough questions and putting his tenure 
     in Honduras under renewed and thorough scrutiny.
                                  ____


               [From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 8, 2001]

                Is Negroponte Clean Enough for the U.N?

                          (By Frank Del Olmo)

       We're eyeball to eyeball with the Chinese, talking tough to 
     the Russians and not talking to North Korea at all. It's back 
     to the Cold War.
       Call me parochial, but what has me shivering after a brief 
     but chilly visit to Washington is how the Bush administration 
     is reviving the old U.S.-Soviet standoff in a part of the 
     world where I spent my crazy youth as a correspondent: 
     Central America. And if you loved how the Bushies tossed 
     those alleged Russian spies out of the country, wait until 
     you see what's for dessert. Warmed over Contras!
       Or, to be more precise, a warmed-over Contra paymaster, 
     John D. Negroponte, who has been nominated to be ambassador 
     to the United Nations.
       You remember the Contras--the CIA-funded guerrillas who 
     waged a futile war to overthrow the revolutionary Sandinista 
     government in Nicaragua, until the Nicaraguan people simply 
     voted the Sandinistas out of power. Even those poor Central 
     Americans, it turned out, know how democracy works. But more 
     on the Contras later.
       It is no longer news that most of the men (doesn't National 
     Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice know any women she can 
     suggest for some of these jobs?) President Bush wants to put 
     in key positions on his foreign policy team are Cold Warriors 
     from the days of presidents Reagan and Bush the First. But 
     some of the guys being hauled out of cold storage have 
     worrisome histories that Congress needs to revisit before 
     punching their tickets. We can start with Negroponte.
       During his 37-year career with the State Department, 
     Negroponte has held several sensitive embassy jobs in Asia 
     (Vietnam, during the war, and the Philippines in the 1990s) 
     and Latin America (Mexico, in the years leading up to the 
     North American Free Trade Agreement, and Honduras, during the 
     start of the Contra war against neighboring Nicaragua). It is 
     Negroponte's tenure in Honduras, from 1981 to 1985, that the 
     Senate needs to consider.
       I traveled all over Central America in those days, knew 
     Negroponte and members of his staff and have no illusions 
     about anyone who was involved in those brush-fire wars. Some 
     ugly things were done on both sides in the same of national 
     security--from assassinations to wholesale massacres. It was 
     quite literally a bloody mess, and Negroponte was in it up to 
     his elbows.
       Just how deep we don't know because Negroponte's 
     involvement in convert U.S. activities in Honduras has never 
     been fully investigated by Congress, even when the Mexican 
     government protested Negroponte's 1989 appointment to run 
     the U.S. Embassy there. Former Mexican President Carlos 
     Salinas de Gortari wanted NAFTA so badly that he probably 
     would have accepted any U.S. ambassador. Knowing that, 
     Congress stamped Negroponte's passport after some token 
     questions about Honduras.
       Since then, however, much more has become public, largely 
     because of an excellent, but insufficiently recognized, 
     series of articles published by the Baltimore Sun in 1995. 
     Through interviews with former Honduran soldiers and some of 
     the people they kidnapped and tortured, the articles laid out 
     in gruesome detail the activities of a CIA-funded death squad 
     run by the Honduran military during the Contra war.
       Those articles also made a credible case that Negroponte 
     knew about the Honduran death squad, officially known as 
     Battalion 316, and other covert operations taking place under 
     his nose, and he ignored them. Worse, he may have lied to 
     Congress about what he knew.
       The Sun documents the fact that embassy staffers knew about 
     human rights violations and duly reported them to their 
     superiors in the embassy (including Negroponte) and 
     Washington. Yet their annual human-rights reports to Congress 
     did not reflect what they knew was going on all around them. 
     In just one of the less egregious cases (no one was killed), 
     the 1982 year-end report to Congress asserted there had been 
     ``no incident of official interference with the media'' that 
     year. Yet in June 1982, Negroponte had personally intervened 
     with the Hondurans to free a prominent journalist, Oscar 
     Reyes, who had been arrested and tortured by Battalion 316 
     for a week. The ambassador did so at the behest of his 
     embassy's press spokesman, who

[[Page S9463]]

     warned Negroponte: ``We cannot let this guy get hurt. . . . 
     It would be a disaster for our policy.''
       The Sun series should be reread by every member of the 
     Senate before Negroponte comes before them for confirmation 
     later this spring. Better yet, the Foreign Affairs Committee 
     should move beyond what one gutsy newspaper did and 
     thoroughly review any and all still-classified documents that 
     might shed light on just what Negroponte knew about Battalion 
     316 and the wider Contra war, and when he knew it.
       Negroponte is, after all, the guy Bush wants in New York to 
     lecture the Chinese and Cubans about human rights. We ought 
     to be sure they won't have reason to laugh in his face when 
     he does.
                                  ____


              [From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 19, 2001]

           What Did Negroponte Hide and When Did He Hide It?

                        (By Joseph E. Mulligan)

       Managua, Nicaragua.--As the Senate considers the nomination 
     of John D. Negroponte to be the U.S. ambassador to the United 
     Nations, it is important to look at charges that, as 
     ambassador to Honduras, Negroponte suppressed information 
     about the Honduran military's human rights violations. This 
     is a serious matter. What is the evidence?
       According to a 1997 CIA inspector general's report, U.S. 
     officials in Honduras were aware of serious violations of 
     human rights by the Honduran military during the 1980s but 
     did not adequately report this to Congress. A heavily 
     redacted version of the report notes particularly that the 
     U.S. Embassy suppressed sensitive data during Negroponte's 
     time there.
       I am especially concerned about the disappearance of two 
     U.S. citizens--Father James ``Guadalupe'' Carney and David 
     Arturo Baez Cruz--during Negroponte's tenure. Carney had come 
     to Honduras in 1983 as a chaplain to a revolutionary group, 
     which include Baez Cruz, a Nicaraguan American who had served 
     in the U.S. special forces. The group was captured by the 
     Honduran army, and Carney ``disappeared'' along with nearly 
     all of the 96 members of the group.
       U.S. officials eventually gave Carney's chalice and stole, 
     turned up by the Honduran army, to his relatives. But the 
     army never explained the circumstances of the priest's death, 
     suggesting only that he probably starved in the mountains. 
     Five years later, in 1988, the New York Times reported that a 
     former officer of the Honduran army sad he personally had 
     interrogated Carney. Carney's body has not been found, and 
     the people responsible for his death have not been 
     identified. Whether any U.S. agents or officials were 
     involved in his disappearance remains an open question.
       In a section with repeated references to the capture and 
     execution of Jose Maria Reyes Mata, the political leader of 
     the group, the CIA inspector general's report cited a source 
     whose name has been blacked out who ``believes that the 
     embassy country team in Honduras wanted reports on subjects 
     such as this to be benign to avoid Congress looking over its 
     shoulders.''
       Reporting murders, executions and corruption, says the 
     source, would ``reflect negatively on Honduras and not be 
     beneficial in carrying out U.S. policy.'' The embassy seemed 
     particularly sensitive to reports about the operation in 
     which the two U.S. citizens disappeared, the report said, 
     quoting another source as recalling ``a discussion . . . 
     circa 1983 wherein the latter indicated that unspecified 
     individuals at the embassy did not want information 
     concerning human rights abuses . . . to be disseminated 
     because it was viewed as an internal Honduran matter,'' This 
     is corroborated by an Aug. 19, 1985, handwritten memo 
     declassified by the State Department ``Fr. Carney case . . . 
     is dead. Front office does not want the case active. . . . We 
     aren't telling that to the family.''
       The CIA report cites another person whose name has been 
     deleted as explaining ``the basis for no further reporting on 
     the prisoner executions--the event had been reported 
     previously and there was concern on the part of Negroponte 
     that over-emphasis would create an unwarranted human rights 
     problem for Honduras.'' Among his conclusions, the CIA 
     inspector general states: ``The ambassador was particularly 
     sensitive regarding the issue and was concerned that earlier 
     CIA reporting on the same topic might create a human rights 
     problem for Honduras. Based on the ambassador's reported 
     concerns, [blacked out] actively discouraged [blacked out] 
     from following up the information reported by the [blacked 
     out] source.''
       It was up to members of Congress to determine whether 
     Honduras had a human rights problem. But Negroponte denied 
     the facts needed for their judgment.
                                  ____


  [From the Institute for Public Affairs in These Times, Apr. 2, 2001]

 In From the Cold War; Bush's Pick for U.N. Ambassador Has Some Spooky 
                          Stuff on His Resume

                          (By Terry J. Allen)

       Like spooks from an abandoned B-Movie graveyard, officials 
     of the Reagan-Bush era are merging from the dirt and showing 
     up inside the George W. Bush administration. The latest 
     resurrection is John Negroponte, whom Bush recently nominated 
     as ambassador to the United Nations.
       As U.S. ambassador to Honduras from 1981 to 1985, 
     Negroponte abetted and covered up human rights crimes. He was 
     a zealous anti-Communist crusader in America's covert wars 
     against the leftist Sandinista government in Nicaragua and 
     the FMLN rebels in El Salvador. The high-level planning, 
     money and arms for those wars flowed from Washington, but 
     much of the on-the-ground logistics for the deployment of 
     intelligence, arms and soldiers was run out of Honduras. U.S. 
     military aid to Honduras jumped from $3.9 million in 1989 to 
     $77.4 million by 1984. So crammed was the tiny country with 
     U.S. bases and weapons that it was dubbed the USS Honduras, 
     as if it were simply an off-shore staging ground.
       The captain of this ship, Negroponte was in charge of the 
     U.S. Embassy when, according to a 1995 four-part series in 
     the Baltimore Sun, hundreds of Hondurans were kidnapped, 
     tortured and killed by Battalion 316, a secret army 
     intelligence unit trained and supported by the Central 
     Intelligence Agency. As Gary Cohn and Ginger Thompson wrote 
     in the series, Battalion 316 used ``shock and suffocation 
     devices in interrogations. Prisoners often were kept naked 
     and, when no longer useful, killed and buried in unmarked 
     graves.'' Members of Battalion 316 were trained in 
     surveillance and interrogation at a secret location in the 
     United States and by the CIA at bases in Honduras. Gen. 
     Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, the chief of the Honduran armed 
     forces who personally directed Battalion 316, also trained in 
     the United States at the School of the Americas.
       Negroponte tried to distance himself from the pattern of 
     abuses, even after a flood of declassified documents exposed 
     the extent of U.S. involvement with Battalion 316. In a 
     segment of the 1998 CNN mini-series Cold War, Negroponte said 
     that ``some of the retrospective effort to try and suggest 
     that we were supportive of, or condoned the actions of, human 
     rights violators is really revisionistic.''
       By the time Negroponte was appointed ambassador by 
     President Reagan in 1981, human rights activists in Honduras 
     were vocally denouncing abuses. Former Honduran congressman 
     Efrain Diaz Arrivillage pleaded with Negroponte and other 
     U.S. officials to stop the abuses committed by the U.S.-
     controlled military. ``Their attitude was one of tolerance 
     and silence,'' Diaz told the Sun. ``They needed Honduras to 
     loan its territory more than they were concerned about 
     innocent people being killed.''
       Negroponte ignored such protests, and annually filed State 
     Department reports from Honduras that gave the impression 
     that the Honduran military respected human rights. But in an 
     interview with In These Times, Negroponte's predecessor as 
     ambassador, Carter appointee Jack Binns, tells a different 
     story: ``Negroponte would have had to be deliberately blind 
     not to know about human rights violations. . . . One of the 
     things a departing ambassador does is prepare a briefing 
     book, and one of those issues we included [in our briefing 
     book] was how to deal with the escalation of human rights 
     issues.''
       Binns considered the U.S. support for Alvarez and Battalion 
     316 ``counterproductive'' to the declared objective of 
     ``establishing a rule of law.'' This lack of enthusiasm, 
     Binns says, led to ``my being cut out of the loop'' by the 
     Reagan administration, which he served for several months 
     before Negroponte took over. In the summer of 1981, Binns 
     recalls, ``I was called unexpectedly to Washington by Tom 
     Enders, the assistant secretary of state. He asked me to 
     stop reporting human rights violations through official 
     State Department channels and to use back channels because 
     they were afraid of leaks.''
       As Binns explains, back-channel messages ``don't officially 
     exist. The message is translated over CIA channels, decrypted 
     and hand-carried from Langley, one copy only. No record.''
       Binns did not agree to use back channels and when he 
     returned to Honduras, he received no further reports of human 
     rights violations from the CIA. ``I was deliberately lied 
     to,'' says Binns, who later found out that Reagan 
     administration had been working behind his back.
       Honduras was only one of many hot spots where Negroponte 
     served. He spent four years as a political officer in the 
     U.S. Embassy in Saigon during the height of the Vietnam War. 
     As an aide to then National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger 
     at the Paris Peace Talks, he fell out of favor with his boss, 
     wrote Mark Matthews in a 1997 article in the Sun, ``by 
     arguing that the chief U.S. negotiator was making too many 
     concessions to the North Vietnamese.'' Negroponte also served 
     in the Philippines, Panama and Mexico, where he was a strong 
     booster for NAFTA.
       Rumored to have been Colin Powell's pick for the job of 
     U.N. ambassador, Negroponte has a reputation as a loyal 
     bureaucrat and efficient fixer. He also has a Cold War 
     mentality characteristic of many of the old Reagan-Bush 
     people surrounding the new president.
       The lessons Negroponte has learned from the past may shed 
     light on what kind of U.N. ambassador he will be if his 
     nomination is approved by the Senate. When he appeared in 
     1981 before a Senate committee for confirmation as envoy to 
     Honduras, he said, ``I believe we must do our best not to 
     allow the tragic outcome of Indochina to be repeated in 
     Central America.''
       The tragedy to which he referred, of course, was the defeat 
     of the United States, not the devastation and death caused by 
     U.S. intervention.

[[Page S9464]]

     
                                  ____
Disappearances in Honduras During Amb. Negroponte's Tenure, October 29, 
                           1981-May 30, 1985


                                  1981

       Eduardo Anibal Blanco Araya, November 14, 1981; Yolanda del 
     Carmen Solis Corrales, December 11, 1981; Francisco Fairen 
     Garbi, December 11, 1981; Alfredo Duarte, December 20, 1981; 
     Jose Frech Guiterrez, December 20, 1981; Jose Francisco 
     Rivera Miranda, December 22, 1981; Victor Hugo Alas Herrera, 
     December 24, 1981.


                                  1982

       Maria Ediltrudis Montres Giron, January 24, 1982; Julio 
     Cesar Zavala Mendez, January 24, 1982; Samuel Perez, January 
     24, 1982; Enrique Lopez Hernandez, January 24, 1982; Nelson 
     Mackay Chavarria, February 21, 1982; Guadalupe Carillo 
     Coleman, June 11, 1982; Eduardo Coleman Martinez, June 11, 
     1982; Reynaldo Coleman Martinez, June 11, 1982; Amado 
     Espinoza Paz, June 12, 1982.
       Adan Villanueva, June 12, 1982; Hans Albert Madisson Lopez, 
     July 8, 1982; Jose Saul Godinez Cruz, July 22, 1982; Jose 
     Eduardo Becerra Lanza, August 1, 1982; German Perez Aleman, 
     August 18, 1982; Teresa de Jesus Sierra Alvarenga, August 31, 
     1982; Rafael Antonio Pacheco, September 1, 1982; Hector 
     Hernandez, December 24, 1982; Jose Celestino Medina, December 
     24, 1982.


                                  1983

       Casimiro Castellanos, Exact day unknown, 1983; Pedro Jose 
     Amador Meza, January 22, 1983; Maria Martha Ventura Garcia, 
     February 17, 1983; Dolores Geraldina Garcia Zelaya, February 
     25, 1983; Melba Caceres Mondragon, March 15, 1983; Jose 
     Martinez Vasquez, March 17, 1983; Filiberto Flores Zuniga, 
     April 13, 1983; Victor Manual Torres Lopez, April 13, 1983; 
     Luis Alonso Romero Ortiz, April 24, 1983; Daniel Velasquez 
     Nunez, May 4, 1983.
       Jose Eloy Torres Barahona, June 1, 1983; Victor Manuel 
     Ramos, June 10, 1983; Jose Amilcar Mardiaga, July 1, 1983; 
     Marco Antonio Marin Aguilar, August, 1983; Ramon Adonay 
     Bustillo Jimenez, September 9 1983; Pablo Roberto Munguia, 
     September 28, 1983; Mario Mejia Mateo, October 1, 1983; Jose 
     Melanio Valle Alvarado, October 1, 1983; James Francisco 
     Carney (Father Guadalupe), December, 1983; Juan Batista 
     Canales H., December 15, 1983.


                                  1984

       Marcelino Moncada Bustamante, February 18, 1984; Gustavo 
     Adolfo Morales Funes, March 18, 1984; Rolando Vindel 
     Gonzalez, March 18, 1984; Francisco Garcia, July 9, 1984; 
     Francisco Osorto, July 9, 1984; Alberto Garcia, July 9, 1984; 
     Elsa Marina Perdomo, August 12, 1984; Juan Alberto Villeda, 
     September 25, 1984; Luis Ramon Blandon Zeas, September 28, 
     1984.
       Elman Luis Cortes Seiza, September 28, 1984; Marcia 
     Mercedes Chamorro Morales, October 5, 1984; Estanislao 
     Vasquez M., October 22, 1984; Joaquin, October 22, 1984; 
     Reynaldo Caceres Lopez, October 28, 1984; Estanislao Martinez 
     Lopez, October 31, 1984; Maritza Cubillo Molina, November 4, 
     1984; Jose Isabel Salgado, November 20, 1984; Jose Eduardo 
     Lopez, December 24, 1984.


                                  1985

       Rose Nelly Matamoros, January, 1985; Jesus Reyes Escobar, 
     March 24, 1985.

                          ____________________