[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 106 (Thursday, July 26, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8277-S8278]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     CONTROLLING THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, last week I came to the floor to 
express my concern about U.S. policy at the U.N. Conference on the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.
  This was the first effort by the international community to address 
the issue of the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons 
at the United Nations. I believed it was imperative that the United 
States take a leadership role in the conference rather than being an 
impediment to progress.
  It seemed to me, that the position staked out by Undersecretary 
Bolton in his opening statement at the conference--a position which I 
found to be unwarranted and unwise--had created the very real 
possibility the conference, because of the U.S. position, would be 
doomed to failure.
  The conference did not fail--a consensus on a program of action was 
achieved. But the conference was far from a total success.
  The conference had presented the international community with an 
unparalleled opportunity to take meaningful and concrete steps to 
develop and implement a clear international plan of action.
  Instead the program of action, approved by the conference, is all too 
often silent on important issues, and all too often weak and equivocal 
in places where a course of action is needed.
  The program of action does contain provisions addressing such 
critical issues as: establishing national regulations on arms brokers; 
the need for greater security of weapons stockpiles held by states; a 
commitment to carry out more effective post-conflict disarmament and 
demobilization programs, including the destruction of surplus stocks; 
and, criminalizing the illegal production, possession, stockpiling, and 
trade of small arms and light weapons.
  If individual nations and the international community are able to 
effectively follow through in these areas it will mark a significant 
step forward on this issue.
  And, just as importantly, the program of action calls for a follow-up 
conference, no later than 2006, the time and place to be determined by 
the 58th United Nations General Assembly.
  Unfortunately, consensus on the program of action was only achieved 
after lengthy and sometimes acrimonious negotiations.
  Many of the participants--especially those from sub-Saharan Africa, 
which has been hit so hard by the scourge of small arms and light 
weapons--have come away with a deep sense of disappointment that more 
was not accomplished.
  And they are laying the blame for much of the conference's 
shortcomings squarely at the feet of the United States.
  A number of critical issues were left out of the final program of 
action, including: failure to reach a commitment to negotiate 
international treaties on arms brokering or the marking and tracing of 
weapons; absence of any reference to regulate civilian ownership of 
weapons; no reference to protecting human rights; and, a lack of 
commitment to greater transparency on the trade in small arms and light 
weapons.
  In addition, in all too many cases the forward looking action that 
was agreed on is to take place ``within existing resources'' rather 
than with the additional resources that are required to address this 
issue--or to only be carried out ``as appropriate'' allowing wide 
latitude for interpretation.
  Considering the strong commitments for such issues as international 
agreements on brokering and the marking and tracing of weapons in the 
earlier drafts of the Program of action, it is very disappointing that 
these items were blocked from inclusion in the final document.
  While some of the blame must also be allotted to others, the United 
States must face up to the role it played in impeding action on some of 
these issues--including in areas where the United States itself already 
has strong laws on the books.
  For example, there were legitimate questions about what the 
appropriate language for the program of action should have been 
regarding private ownership of small arms and light weapons. But it is 
important to recognize that U.S. law and numerous Supreme Court rulings 
recognize that government regulations on private ownership of weapons 
is legitimate, notwithstanding somewhat spurious arguments about the 
nature of the Second Amendment raised by some who influenced the U.S. 
position at the conference.
  The National Firearms Act and the assault weapons ban are just two of 
the laws that the United States has on the books which control private 
ownership of small arms and light weapons and pass constitutional 
muster.
  For the United States to stand in the way of a non-binding document 
suggesting international efforts to seek ways, consistent with 
individual national constitutional and political structures, to control 
private ownership of small arms and light weapons is, to me at least, 
mind boggling.
  This is especially important given the clear nexus between legal 
trade and private ownership and the growth of the international black 
market in small arms and light weapons.
  According to the independent Small Arms Survey 2001 by the Graduate 
Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, the black 
market often operates on a individual basis, where a small numbers of 
legally purchased guns are sold to illegal buyers across international 
borders.
  Such individual black market transfers have a dramatic cumulative 
effect. The United States, with its huge stores of privately-held 
firearms, is both a source, a supplier, and a recipient of these 
transfers.
  Although it is very difficult to quantify illicit arms trafficking in 
the United States, there are clear indicators that a number of criminal 
gangs operating on U.S. territory are active in the trafficking of 
small arms and light weapons into Canada and Mexico.
  The United States is the largest source of illegal weapons for 
Mexico, for example, with this arms trade directly linked to the drug 
trade.

  I believe that Ambassador McConnell and Assistant Secretary 
Bloomfield and others on the U.S. delegation acted to the best of their 
abilities to represent the United States. But I am also concerned that 
the unrelenting unilateralist position taken by the United States has 
served to undermine and damage our reputation as a leader in the 
international community.
  The majority of delegations at the conference expressed displeasure 
with the U.S. attitude and approach to the meetings, sometimes in terms 
that verged on the undiplomatic.
  For example, Camilio Reyes of Colombia, the president of the 
conference--who deserves recognition for

[[Page S8278]]

his hard work on this issue--said at the conference's close that: ``I 
must express my disappointment over the conference's inability to agree 
due to the concerns of one State on language recognizing the needs to 
establish and maintain controls over private ownership of these deadly 
weapons and the need for preventing sales of such arms to nonstate 
groups.'' Both of these issues were blocked by the United States.
  As I stated on the floor last week, I believe that the global flood 
of small arms is a real and pressing threat to peace, development, 
democracy, human rights, and U.S. national security interests around 
the world.
  These weapons are cheap: An AK-47 can be bought for as little as $15 
in sub-Saharan Africa.
  They are durable and easy to transport and to smuggle across 
international boundaries.
  And, with little or no training, anyone--including children--can use 
these weapons to deadly effect.
  According to the independent Small Arms Survey 2001, small arms are 
implicated in well over 1,000 deaths around the world every single day.
  The goals of the United Nations conference was not to infringe on 
national sovereignty or to take guns away from their legal owners. And 
it would not have, in my opinion, even with the inclusion of some of 
the language to which the United States objected.
  The freedoms and rights of American citizens would not have been 
diminished by a stronger, more forward looking program of action.
  As Secretary General Annan stated, the goals of the conference were 
to address the problems created by ``unscrupulous arms dealers, corrupt 
officials, drug trafficking syndicates, terrorists and others who bring 
death and mayhem into streets, schools and towns throughout the 
world.''
  The conference's program of action represents an important first step 
by the international community toward developing an international 
framework for cooperation and collaboration to promote better national 
and international laws and more effective regulations to eliminate the 
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.
  In fact, the United States has not formally consented to the program 
for action, so this is a step I urge the Administration to take as soon 
as possible.
  And much more will be needed in the future. Many important issues 
that should have been addressed by the conference were not and other 
issues that were did not receive sufficient emphasis.
  I am hopeful that, looking ahead, the United States will be able to 
play a more constructive leadership role as we work towards developing 
real and binding international norms and agreements on these issues.

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