[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 101 (Thursday, July 19, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7985-S7986]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            SUDAN PEACE ACT

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 89, S. 180.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 180) to facilitate famine relief efforts and 
     comprehensive solutions to the war in Sudan.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill 
which had been referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations with an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute.
  [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
in italic.]

                                 S. 180

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecution 
     of the war against areas outside of its control, which has 
     already cost more than 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more 
     than 4,000,000.
       (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored 
     peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best 
     chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of 
     human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
       (3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian 
     relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the 
     effort to bring an end to the war.
       (4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
       (5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas 
     of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, 
     the absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a 
     major impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese 
     people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace 
     process.
       (6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among 
     peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government 
     of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques 
     to subjugate their population, and internationally sponsored 
     reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in 
     reducing the tactic's effectiveness and human suffering.
       (7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and organizing 
     militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units 
     for raiding and slaving parties in areas outside of the 
     control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to severely 
     disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain 
     themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of 
     bans on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war 
     through selective starvation and to minimize the Government 
     of Sudan's accountability internationally.
       (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it 
     intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to 
     increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas 
     outside its control.
       (9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport 
     flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation 
     Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able 
     to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people 
     from the United States and other donor countries as a 
     devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the 
     Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the 
     Government's control.
       (10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in 
     delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS 
     have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in 
     OLS and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food 
     donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
       (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan 
     facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the 
     population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the 
     Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption 
     of their ability to sustain themselves.
       (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, 
     Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded 
     completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently 
     placing their populations at increased risk of famine.
       (13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000 per 
     day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the 
     immediate food needs of the recipients, the current 
     international relief operations are neither sustainable nor 
     desirable in the long term.
       (14) The ability of populations to defend themselves 
     against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan's 
     control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of 
     the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within 
     officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the 
     battlefield can be achieved.
       (15) The United States should use all means of pressure 
     available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war 
     in Sudan, including--
       (A) the multilateralization of economic and diplomatic 
     tools to compel the Government of Sudan to enter into a good 
     faith peace process;
       (B) the support or creation of viable democratic civil 
     authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside 
     government control;
       (C) continued active support of people-to-people 
     reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside of 
     government control;
       (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide 
     humanitarian relief to those areas; and
       (E) cooperation among the trading partners of the United 
     States and within multilateral institutions toward those 
     ends.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan'' 
     means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, 
     Sudan.
       (2) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief 
     operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and 
     participating relief organizations known as ``Operation 
     Lifeline Sudan''.

     SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, 
                   AND TACTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

       Congress hereby--
       (1) condemns--
       (A) violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict 
     in Sudan;
       (B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights record, 
     with regard to both the prosecution of the war and the denial 
     of basic human and political rights to all Sudanese;
       (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role of the 
     Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating the practice; 
     and
       (D) the Government of Sudan's use and organization of 
     ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'', Popular Defense Forces 
     (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army units into organized and 
     coordinated raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, 
     the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and
       (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air 
     transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use 
     of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food 
     shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the 
     societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and 
     Nuba peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

     SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED PEACE 
                   PROCESS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress hereby recognizes that--
       (1) a single viable, internationally and regionally 
     sanctioned peace process holds the greatest opportunity to 
     promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in 
     Sudan; and
       (2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best made 
     through a peace process based on the Declaration of 
     Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994.
       (b) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of 
     State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the 
     Department of State for the support of--
       (1) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of 
     Sudan and opposition forces;
       (2) any necessary peace settlement planning or 
     implementation; and
       (3) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a 
     peace process in Sudan.

     SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United Nations should be used as a tool to 
     facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and
       (2) the President, acting through the United States 
     Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should seek 
     to--
       (A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline Sudan to end the 
     veto power of the Government of Sudan over the plans by 
     Operation Lifeline Sudan for air transport of relief flights 
     and, by doing so, to end the manipulation of the delivery of 
     those relief supplies to the advantage of the Government of 
     Sudan on the battlefield;
       (B) investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan and 
     provide mechanisms for its elimination; and
       (C) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of Sudan each 
     time it subjects civilians to aerial bombardment.

     SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

       Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections (d) 
     and (f), the report required by subsection (d) shall 
     include--
       ``(1) a description of the sources and current status of 
     Sudan's financing and construction of oil exploitation 
     infrastructure and pipelines, the effects on the inhabitants 
     of the oil fields regions of such financing and construction, 
     and the Government of Sudan's ability to finance the war in 
     Sudan;
       ``(2) a description of the extent to which that financing 
     was secured in the United States or with involvement of 
     United States citizens;
       ``(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial 
     bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in areas 
     outside its control, including targets, frequency, and best 
     estimates of damage; and
       ``(4) a description of the extent to which humanitarian 
     relief has been obstructed or manipulated by the Government 
     of Sudan or other forces for the purposes of the war in 
     Sudan.''.

     SEC. 8. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF 
                   EFFORTS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS 
     agencies in the distribution of relief supplies in southern 
     Sudan.

[[Page S7986]]

       (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a detailed 
     report to Congress describing the progress made toward 
     carrying out subsection (a).

     SEC. 9. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF 
                   FLIGHTS.

       (a) Plan.--The President shall develop a contingency plan 
     to provide, outside United Nations auspices if necessary, the 
     greatest possible amount of United States Government and 
     privately donated relief to all affected areas in Sudan, 
     including the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in 
     the event the Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial, 
     or incremental ban on OLS air transport relief flights.
       (b) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, in carrying out the plan developed under 
     subsection (a), the President may reprogram up to 100 percent 
     of the funds available for support of OLS operations (but for 
     this subsection) for the purposes of the plan.

     SEC. 10. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR EXCLUSIONARY ``NO GO'' 
                   AREAS OF SUDAN.

       (a) Pilot Project Activities.--The President, acting 
     through the United States Agency for International 
     Development, is authorized and requested to undertake, 
     immediately, pilot project activities to provide food and 
     other humanitarian assistance, as appropriate, to vulnerable 
     populations in Sudan that are residing in exclusionary ``no 
     go'' areas of Sudan.
       (b) Study.--The President, acting through the United States 
     Agency for International Development, shall conduct a study 
     examining the adverse impact upon indigenous Sudan 
     communities by OLS policies that curtail direct humanitarian 
     assistance to exclusionary ``no go'' areas of Sudan.
       (c) Exclusionary ``No Go'' Areas of Sudan Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``exclusionary `no go' areas of Sudan'' 
     means areas of Sudan designated by OLS for curtailment of 
     direct humanitarian assistance, including, but not limited 
     to, the Nuba Mountains, the Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile.

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee 
substitute be agreed to, the bill be read a third time, and passed, the 
motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements 
relating to the bill be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
  The bill (S. 180), as amended, was read the third time and passed.

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