[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 98 (Monday, July 16, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7713-S7718]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS

  Mr. KYL. Madam President, I wanted to speak briefly about the 
decision made last Friday to hold the next Olympics in Beijing, the 
2008 games. Our Government was not involved in that. It is not a 
government-to-government kind of decision. But I am hopeful the fact 
that the United States did not, as a nation, weigh in on that 
decision--I am hopeful that did not send a signal to the leaders in 
Beijing that the U.S. Government either supports what that Chinese 
Government leadership does or does not object to many of the things 
which are done by that Government that violate human rights and in 
other ways suggest the country of China is not yet willing to join the 
family of nations.
  I wanted to note a few of the activities of this recent Chinese 
Government that suggest to me the United States needs to take a very 
firm position with respect to China. That is why I say I am hopeful 
this decision that the Olympics go to China not be mistaken for U.S. 
support for what China has done.
  As illustrated in recent press reports, China's bid for that honor 
has been the subject of much international attention. For example, the 
European Union Parliament recently passed a resolution declaring that 
China's bid is ``inappropriate'' and that it is ``unsuitable'' for the 
Games due to its ``disastrous record on human rights.''
  The American government, however, chose to remain neutral on China's 
bid--a decision that I hope will not convey to China's leaders a signal 
that the United States is willing to blindly tolerate that country's 
continuing failure to abide by internationally-recognized norms of 
behavior. Consider just a few events of recent months:
  The collision of our reconnaissance plane with a Chinese fighter 
jet--the result of a Chinese pilot's aggressive flying.
  China's detention and interrogation of our plane's crew for nearly 
two weeks, and submission of a $1 million bill to the United States.
  China's detention and arrest of American citizens and permanent 
residents without clear evidence of wrongdoing or illegal activity--
including Gao Zhan, Wu Jianmin, Li Shaomin, and Tan Guangguang. Li 
Shaomin was convicted of espionage on July 14 and reportedly will be 
expelled from China in the near future.
  China's systematic torture and murder of hundreds of members of the 
Falun Gong--including the recent deaths of approximately fourteen 
peaceful adherents in a Chinese labor camp.
  China's hardening of its crackdown on this group--including a new 
legal directive issued by Chinese judicial authorities on June 10 
authorizing courts to prosecute Falun Gong practitioners for 
intentional wounding or murder, or for organizing, encouraging or 
helping other followers commit suicide or injure themselves. 
Additionally, it states that followers can be prosecuted if they 
produce or distribute anti-government materials.
  China's execution of at least 1,781 persons during the past three 
months--more than the total number of executions worldwide over the 
past three years
  A former Chinese doctor's testimony on June 27 to the House 
International Relations Committee that his job required him ``to remove 
skin and corneas from the corpses of over one hundred executed 
prisoners, and, on a couple of occasions, victims of intentionally 
botched executions.''
  The Chinese military's ongoing large-scale military exercises in the 
South China Sea aimed at preparing that country for an invasion of 
Taiwan.
  China's shipments to Cuba of arms and explosives, the latest of which 
reportedly occurred in December.
  China's continuing assistance and provision of military technology to 
rogue regimes, including the case involving the Chinese firm that 
helped Iraq outfit its air defenses with fiber-optic equipment.
  China's continuing purchases from Russia of conventional weapons, 
including plans to purchase two additional Sovremenny destroyers armed 
with Sunburn anti-ship cruise missiles.

  There is no doubt that dealing with China will continue to be a 
challenge.
  Whatever we do, we have to make sure that we don't send signals to 
China that we approve of these kinds of actions. Not standing in the 
way of their getting the Olympic games I hope will not send that kind 
of a signal.
  And there is no alternative. It is the world's most populous nation 
(and biggest potential market); it has the world's largest armed 
forces; and it is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Its 
economic and military strength has grown a great deal in recent years, 
and is projected to continue to grow significantly in the coming 
decades.
  There are many areas of potential disagreement with other nations, 
such as trade policy and human rights violations. But the one source of 
potentially catastrophic consequences is China's insistence that, by 
negotiation or force, Taiwan must be reunited with the mainland, and 
that conflict with the United States is inevitable as long as we stand 
in the way of that objective. We cannot ignore this very real and 
potentially dangerous situation. How we deal with it will dictate the 
course of history.
  The United States must develop a more comprehensive and realistic 
policy toward China, one which promotes good relations while not 
ignoring unpleasant exigencies.
  In March, two days prior to the collision over the South China Sea, I 
spoke on the Senate floor about the challenge of dealing with China's 
growing military strength. I discussed in detail China's threatening 
rhetoric aimed at the United States and Taiwan, and warned of that 
country's rapid military modernization and buildup. And most 
importantly, I asked the question: what if China's leaders mean what 
they say? To assume they do not, particularly in light of the 
prevalence of highly threatening public statements and military 
writings could mean leaving ourselves deliberately vulnerable to 
potential Chinese aggression, (or impotent to deal with Chinese 
aggression against others).
  China, unfortunately, has not been a very cooperative member of the 
international community. Several years ago, at a New Atlantic 
Initiative conference in Prague, I discussed America's role in that 
community and our vision for a world in which the United States could 
work side-by-side with other democracies, stating,

       If I had to sum up in one sentence the U.S. national 
     interest in the world, I would say that it is promoting the 
     security, well-being, and expansion of the community of 
     nations that respect the democratic rights of their peoples.

  China cannot become a member of this trusted family until there is a 
serious change in the attitude of its leadership. Indeed, China's 
leaders systematically violate the most fundamental rights of the 
Chinese people. Moreover, they increasingly lack respect for the 
democratic rights of individuals visiting China, including U.S. 
citizens. The Chinese government seeks to maintain absolute control 
over all domestic political matters. It remains resistant to what it 
considers interference in its internal affairs, threatening the use of 
force, if necessary, to achieve its objectives, including reunification 
with Taiwan. And China actively pursues foreign policies that risk 
destabilizing the South China Sea.
  In the long-term, our goal must be to live in peace and prosperity 
with the Chinese people; however, to do so requires that we reconcile 
the different aspirations of our governments. It is clear that many of 
the Chinese government's goals conflict with American values, and it is 
important that we do not to compromise these values in dealing with the 
communist regime.

[[Page S7714]]

 We should, instead, encourage China to adopt a less aggressive and 
less threatening attitude through firm and principled interactions with 
that country's leaders.
  Since the formal establishment of the People's Republic of China in 
1949, the United States has purposely remained ambiguous about the 
degree to which we recognize the governments in Beijing and Taipei. Our 
``One-China'' policy, dating back to the Shanghai Communique of 1972, 
has served U.S. strategic and economic interests, allowing the United 
States to peacefully retain ties with China and Taiwan.

  On one subject, however, there should be no ambiguity--U.S. policy in 
the event China should ever attack democratic Taiwan. That is why I am 
pleased that President Bush made very clear to China that the United 
States will actively resist any such aggression. Yet even those 
measures ostensibly intended to eliminate any doubt of our commitment 
to Taiwan have not been so concrete. While we presented Taiwan with an 
arms package that will help that island build its defensive forces, the 
United States cannot ensure that Taiwan will ever receive the diesel 
submarines that were included since we do not build them and it remains 
unclear as to whether another country would be willing to provide a 
design for them.
  Additionally, President Bush chose not to include Aegis destroyers in 
this arms package, though he reserves the right to sell them in the 
future should China continue or increase its belligerent behavior 
toward Taiwan. In light of China's military exercises in the South 
China Sea, perhaps now is the time to seriously consider this option.
  We must be very clear in our own minds about our strategic intentions 
and just as clear in signaling these intentions to China. The object is 
to avoid a situation in which China's leaders miscalculate and are 
tempted to use force against Taiwan in the mistaken belief that they 
won't meet resistence from the United States.
  History is replete with examples of ambiguity fostering aggression. 
Perceptions of American ambivalence contributed to North Korea's 
invasion of South Korea and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, for example.
  We have also observed instances where conflict never occurred because 
of the resoluteness of our stance. Our unambiguous commitment to 
contain Soviet expansion and defend our Western European allies during 
the Cold War enabled Western Europe to escape the grip of communism. 
And it led to one of the greatest accomplishments in history: the 
West's victory without war over the Soviet Empire.
  There is an old saying that, ``There is nothing wrong with making 
mistakes. Just don't respond with encores.'' Let us not repeat the 
mistake--failing to signal our commitment to defend our friends and our 
interests--that has many times led the United States to military 
conflict. China should be certain that we will help Taiwan resist any 
aggression against it.
  We should make every effort to work with China, trade with China and 
seek greater understanding of our mutual cultures--while, at the same 
time, appropriately dealing with all aspects of China's troubling 
behavior. This offers our greatest hope for maintaining a balanced 
relationship near-term and helping to bring about change in the 
communist regime in the longer term. While reconciling our two very 
different views about the relationship of a nation's people to its 
government requires patience, and even some short-term compromise, the 
United States cannot remain true to its fundamental belief in the 
natural rights of man without promoting respect for human rights, the 
rule of law, and the embrace of democracy by all governments, including 
the government of China.
  There are five specific aspects of China's behavior that require a 
straightforward, firm response from United States: China's 
proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction; 
its threats and corresponding military buildup opposite Taiwan; its 
threatening rhetoric and missile buildup aimed at the United States; 
its human rights abuses; and its history of refusing to play by 
economic rules.
  China is perhaps the world's worst proliferator of the technology 
used to develop and produce ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction. Beijing has sold ballistic missile technology to Iran, 
North Korea, Syria, Libya, and Pakistan. It has also sold nuclear 
technology to Iran and Pakistan. It has aided Iran's chemical weapons 
program and sold that nation advanced cruise missiles. And it has sold 
Iraq fiber-optic cables, and assisted with their installation between 
antiaircraft batteries, radar stations, and command centers.
  Chinese assistance has been vital to the missile and weapons of mass 
destruction programs in these countries. And because of this 
assistance, the American people and our forces and friends abroad now 
face a much greater threat.
  The United States needs to impose sanctions on Chinese organizations 
and government entities for their proliferation activities, as required 
by U.S. laws. Sanctions need not be the first or only tool used in the 
fight against proliferation. Nor, however, should this tool grow rusty 
from disuse. As the Washington Post noted in an editorial on July 14, 
2000, ``China's continuing assistance to Pakistan's weapons program in 
the face of so many U.S. efforts to talk Beijing out of it shows the 
limits of a nonconfrontational approach.'' We must back our frequent 
expressions of concern with actions if our words are to be perceived as 
credible.
  Unfortunately, the United States has all too often sent a signal to 
Beijing that its irresponsible behavior will be tolerated by failing to 
enforce U.S. laws requiring sanctions, or doing so in ways deliberately 
calculated to undermine the intent of the sanctions. For example, China 
transferred M-11 missiles and production technology to Pakistan in 
violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime, despite promising 
to adhere to that agreement. U.S. law requires sanctions to be imposed 
on nations that transfer technology regulated by the MTCR. In 1993, the 
Clinton Administration imposed sanctions on China's Ministry of Defense 
and eleven Chinese defense and aerospace entities for violations of 
Category 2 of the MTCR--despite the fact that the M-11 transfers were 
Category 1 violations--thereby imposing the mildest form of sanctions 
possible. Then, in return for a Chinese promise in October 1994 not to 
export ``ground-to-ground missiles'' covered by the MTCR, the Clinton 
Administration waived the sanctions.
  After the waiver, despite a steady stream of press reports, 
Congressional testimony, and unclassified reports by the intelligence 
community that described China's continued missile assistance to 
Pakistan, the Clinton Administration did not impose sanctions as 
required by law. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation 
Robert Einhorn said in Senate testimony in 1997 that sanctions had not 
been invoked on China for the sale of M-11s to Pakistan because the 
Administration's ``. . . level of confidence [was] not sufficient to 
take a decision that [had] very far-reaching consequences.'' The 
Clinton Administration appeared to have purposely set a standard of 
evidence so high that it was unattainable.
  Madam President, China has promised six times during the past two 
decades not to transfer missiles and missile technology--in 1988, 1989, 
1991, 1992, 1994, and 2000--and six times has broken its promises 
without any consequences. It is no wonder that China does not take 
seriously its obligations.
  I recently joined several of my colleagues in sending a letter to 
President Bush expressing concern about Beijing's continuing 
proliferation activities. The letter states:

       The PRC's most recent missile nonproliferation promise was 
     made on November 21, 2000. China promised not to assist, in 
     any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles 
     that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons, and to abide by 
     the MTCR. The PRC further pledged to issue export regulations 
     covering dual-use technologies. However, no regulations have 
     been promulgated, and we are concerned that China has 
     continued to transfer missile equipment and technology in 
     contravention of both the MTCR and its November pledge.
  In return for China's November 2000 pledge, the previous 
administration ``swept the decks clean,'' sanctioning numerous Chinese 
entities for their activities and subsequently waiving those sanctions. 
And again it appears as though China may be continuing to transfer 
missile equipment and technology. We do not need more empty

[[Page S7715]]

promises from China--we need action. It is important that the Bush 
Administration signal to China by imposing sanctions required by U.S. 
nonproliferation statutes and making them stick that the United States 
will no longer tolerate that country's irresponsible proliferation 
activities.
  In addition to enforcing nonproliferation laws, we should also resist 
efforts to weaken controls on the export of dual-use technologies, 
which China can use to further modernize its military, as well as 
transfer to other countries. In particular, I am concerned that the 
Export Administration Act of 2001 would reduce the ability of the U.S. 
government to maintain effective export controls on such items.
  An Asian Wall Street Journal op-ed published on March 19 by two 
researchers at the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control described 
how the Chinese firm that helped Iraq outfit its air defenses with 
fiber-optic equipment has purchased a significant amount of technology 
from U.S. firms and is seeking to import more. For example, the op-ed 
indicated that one such firm has applied for an export license to teach 
this Chinese company how to build high-speed switching and routing 
equipment that will allow communications to be shuttled quickly across 
multiple transmission lines. The U.S. government should have the 
ability to deny exports of dual-use technology to a company such as the 
Chinese firm in this case.
  The second of five areas of concern is China's belligerent behavior 
toward Taiwan. China is intent on gaining control over that island--by 
force if necessary--and is taking the necessary military preparations 
that would enable it to do so. According to an article published in the 
Washington Post on April 27, Wu Xinbo, a professor at Fudan 
University's Center for American Studies in Shanghai, stated:

       At this moment it's very difficult to argue that there's 
     still a high prospect for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan 
     issue . . . From a Chinese perspective there has to be a 
     solution to Taiwan either way, peacefully or with the use of 
     force. Given [the] change in U.S. policy . . . you have to 
     give more weight to the second option.''

  The ``change'' to which he was referring was the U.S. commitment to 
come to Taiwan's defense articulated by President Bush.
  China's threats have been backed by rapid efforts to modernize its 
military. The immediate focus of the modernization is to build a 
military force capable of subduing Taiwan swiftly enough to prevent 
American intervention. According to the Department of Defense's Annual 
Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 
released in June 2000, ``A cross-strait conflict between China and 
Taiwan involving the United States has emerged as the dominant scenario 
guiding [the Chinese Army's] force planning, military training, and war 
preparation.''
  To solidify its ability to launch an attack against Taiwan, China is 
increasing its force of short-range ballistic missiles opposite the 
island. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal on April 23, 
U.S. defense officials estimate that China currently has 300 such 
missiles aimed at the island, and is increasing this number at a rate 
of 50 per year.
  China is also in the process of modernizing its air force and navy. 
The Defense Department's June 2000 report predicted that after 2005, 
``. . . if projected trends continue, the balance of air power across 
the Taiwan Strait could begin to shift in China's favor.'' The same 
report warned, ``China's submarine fleet could constitute a substantial 
force capable of controlling sea lanes and mining approaches around 
Taiwan, as well as a growing threat to submarines in the East and South 
China Seas.''
  In response to the growing threat and Taiwan's increasing 
vulnerability to an attack, President Bush approved the sale to Taiwan 
of some much-needed defensive military equipment. As noted, however, 
the sales are limited in practical effect and, in any event, must be 
accompanied by proper training and coordination with the U.S. military 
in order to be useful in conflict.
  In addition to the Chinese military's investment in hardware, Beijing 
has increasingly focused on advanced training methods, demonstrating 
joint-service war-fighting skills in its military exercises that are 
steadily altering the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait. Over 
the past several years, these exercises have shifted from an 
intimidation tactic to a more serious effort intended to prepare China 
for an invasion of Taiwan.
  Beijing's amphibious exercises at Dongshan Island in the Taiwan 
Strait have illustrated this increasing level of sophistication in war-
fighting tactics and interoperability. A Chinese state-owned newspaper, 
Hong Kong Ming Pao, reported on June 1 that China's Central Military 
Commission proposed that these exercises be held near Taiwan ``in order 
to warn the United States and the Taiwan authorities not to play with 
fire over the Taiwan issue.'' Furthermore, according to the same 
article, ``the main aim of this exercise will be to attack and occupy 
Taiwan's offshore islands and to counterattack U.S. military 
intervention.'' Another article in the state-owned Hong Kong Wen Wei Po 
on June 4 stated that the purpose of the exercise ``not only includes 
capture of [the islands around Taiwan], but also how to tenaciously 
defend these islands and turn them into wedges for driving into the 
heart of the enemy.''
  According to an article in the New York Times on July 11, the 
official Chinese publication, International Outlook Magazine, described 
in detail these recent ``war games''. The games reportedly occurred in 
three stages. The first, information warfare, was intended to paralyze 
enemy communications and command systems electronically. The second 
involved a joint navy, infantry, and air force landing on Dongshan 
Island. And the third, according to the Chinese publication, simulated 
a ``counterattack against an enemy fleet attempting to intervene in the 
war.'' It was also reported that this final stage incorporated Russian-
bought SU-27 fighter aircraft. Thus far, military experts state that 
China has had difficulty incorporating these aircraft into its arsenal, 
and its ability to do so indicates a significant improvement in its 
ability to integrate military operations.
  Taiwan's war-fighting skills are not nearly as advanced. For over 
twenty years, the United States has cut Taiwan off from the 
intellectual capital that should accompany the hardware we sell, thus 
reducing the readiness of that island's forces. Our defense officials 
and military personnel need to be able work with their Taiwanese 
counterparts to ensure that they know how to use the equipment and they 
will be capable of operating alongside U.S. forces. Increased 
interaction would better prepare Taiwan's military to defend itself in 
the event of a Chinese attack, reduce the possibility that the United 
States would need to become involved in such a conflict, and inevitably 
save lives.
  This leads directly to the third area of concern--China's actions 
that directly threaten America. China's harsh rhetoric aimed at the 
United States is accompanied by Beijing's build-up of long-range 
missiles targeted at our cities, acquisition of anti-ship cruise 
missiles to counter U.S. carrier battle groups, and development of 
cyberwarfare and anti-satellite capabilities. China also understands 
the importance of aggressive intelligence operations against the United 
States.
  In February 2000, the People's Liberation Army Daily, a state-owned 
newspaper, warned the United States against intervening in a conflict 
in the Taiwan Strait, stating,

       On the Taiwan issue, it is very likely that the United 
     States will walk to the point where it injures others while 
     ruining itself . . . China is neither Iraq or Yugoslavia . . 
     . it is a country that has certain abilities of launching a 
     strategic counterattack and the capacity of launching a long-
     distance strike. Probably it is not a wise move to be at war 
     with a country such as China, a point which U.S. policymakers 
     know fairly well also.''

  China is, in fact, continuing to increase its capacity to launch a 
long-distance strike against the United States. The Defense 
Department's report, Proliferation: Threat and Response, states:

       China currently has over 100 nuclear warheads. . . While 
     the ultimate extent of China's strategic modernization is 
     unknown, it is clear that the number, reliability, 
     survivability, and accuracy of Chinese strategic missiles 
     capable of hitting the United States will increase during the 
     next two decades.
       China currently has about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs with a range of 
     over 13,000 kilometers, which can reach the United States. 
     Some of its ongoing missile modernization programs likely

[[Page S7716]]

     will increase the number of Chinese warheads aimed at the 
     United States. For example, Beijing is developing two new 
     road-mobile solid-propellant ICBMs. China has conducted 
     successful flight tests of the DF-31 ICBM in 1999 and 2000; 
     this missile is estimated to have a range of about 8,000 
     kilometers. Another longer-range mobile ICBM also is under 
     development and likely will be tested within the next several 
     years. It will be targeted primarily against the United 
     States.''

  China's military has also taken steps to improve its capability to 
counter U.S. carrier battle groups, in response to its encounter with 
the U.S. Navy in 1996. It has acquired two Sovremenny destroyers from 
Russia armed with Sunburn anti-ship cruise missiles, and according to 
an article in the Washington Times on May 4, plans to purchase two 
more. These weapons were designed to attack U.S. carriers and Aegis 
ships during the Cold War and are a significant improvement to the 
Chinese Navy's capabilities in this area.
  In addition to its buildup of conventional and nuclear weapons, 
China's military is also placing an emphasis on information warfare, 
including computer network attacks and anti-satellite operations. In 
September 2000, the U.S. Navy identified China, among several others, 
as having an acknowledged policy of preparing for cyberwarfare and as 
rapidly developing its capabilities. In fact, an article in the 
People's Liberation Army Daily in 1999 stated that the Chinese military 
planned to elevate information warfare to a separate service on par 
with its army, navy and air force.
  Also of great concern is the Chinese military's development of a 
broad range of counterspace measures, including an anti-satellite 
(ASAT) capability. According to China's Strategic Modernization: 
Implications for the United States, written by Mark Stokes, ``Chinese 
strategists and engineers perceive U.S. reliance on communications, 
reconnaissance, and navigation satellites as a potential Achilles' 
heel.'' The Defense Department's June 2000 report warned that China may 
already possess the capability to damage optical sensors on satellites 
and furthermore, that it may have acquired high-energy laser equipment 
and technical assistance that could be used in the development of 
ground-based ASAT weapons.

  An article in Jane's Missiles and Rockets on May 1 confirmed the 
Defense Department's warning, stating that China's state-run press 
reports indicate that country is, in fact, developing an ASAT 
capability. It is currently in the ground-testing phase and will start 
flight testing in 2002.
  In light of China's threatening rhetoric and its efforts to acquire 
the capabilities that could allow it to carry out those threats, we 
must begin to implement a broad range of measures that will safeguard 
our national security.
  First, we need to develop and deploy a missile defense system to 
protect ourselves and our allies from an accidental or deliberate 
missile launch and to eliminate the possibility of blackmail by hostile 
powers. As President Bush recently stated in a speech to the National 
Defense University,

       We must seek security based on more than the grim premise 
     that we can destroy those who seek to destroy us. . . . We 
     need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses 
     to counter the different threats of today's world. To do so, 
     we must move beyond the constraints of the 30 year old ABM 
     Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present, or point 
     us in the future. It enshrines the past. No treaty that 
     prevents us from pursuing promising technology to defend 
     ourselves, our friends and our allies is in our interests or 
     in the interests of world peace.

  Second, the United States needs to develop better anti-ship cruise 
missile defenses. Systems to counter the cruise missile threat have 
lagged behind the level of that threat, despite the fact that, 
according to the U.S. Navy, over 75 nations possess more than 90 
different types of anti-ship cruise missiles.
  We must also prepare for China's potential use of information 
warfare. It is important that we find ways to protect our computer 
networks from hacking, to eliminate future lapses in security, as most 
recently occurred at Sandia National Laboratory in Mexico. According to 
an article in the Washington Times on March 16, this attack has been 
partially attributed to hackers with links to the Chinese government.
  The United States should also develop defenses against China's ASAT 
weapons. As the Commission to Assess United States National Security, 
Space Management and Organization recently concluded:

       The present extent of U.S. dependence on space, the rapid 
     pace at which this dependence is increasing and the 
     vulnerabilities it creates, all demand that U.S. national 
     security space interests be recognized as a top national 
     priority.

  With this goal in mind, Secretary Rumsfeld recently announced a 
reorganization of our Nation's space programs. Moreover, President 
Bush, recognizing U.S. reliance on our network of satellites for 
civilian and military uses, has stressed the need for ``great effort 
and new spending'' to protect our satellites from attack.
  Of course, our ability to defend against China's increasing military 
capabilities is largely dependent on our knowledge of their 
development. We must do a better job of ascertaining Chinese government 
plans and intentions (and proliferation activities) and improve our 
counterintelligence vis-a-vis China.
  The fourth area of concern is the Chinese government's deplorable 
human rights record that, according to the State Department's Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices, has continued to deteriorate over 
the past year. The report states:

       The [Chinese] Government continued to commit widespread and 
     well-documented human rights abuses in violation of 
     internationally accepted norms. These abuses stemmed from the 
     authorities' extremely limited tolerance of public dissent 
     aimed at the Government, fear of unrest, and the limited 
     scope or inadequate implementation of laws protecting basic 
     freedoms . . . Abuses included instances of extrajudicial 
     killings, the use of torture, forced confessions, arbitrary 
     arrest and detention, the mistreatment of prisoners, lengthy 
     incommunicado detention, and denial of due process.

  According to an Amnesty International report on June 7, China has 
executed at least 1,781 persons during the past 3 months--more than the 
total number of executions worldwide over the past 3 years. Moreover, 
the report indicates that 2,960 people have been sentenced to death in 
China during this brief time period.
  What is the significance to the United States of such abuses? First, 
they are not only directed at Chinese citizens; they are also directed 
at Americans. Second, if China is to become a reliable member of the 
international community, it must begin to adhere to accepted norms of 
behavior. In this regard, China's leaders seem to be oblivious to the 
understanding that all people deserve certain basic freedoms and that 
violation of such fundamental rights is an appropriate concern of the 
United States and the world at large. For example, when questioned by 
the Washington Post about China's detention of several Americans, 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated, ``. . . the United States is the 
most developed country in the world in terms of its economy and it 
high-tech; its military is also very strong. You have a lot of things 
to occupy yourself with . . . why do you frequently take special 
interest in cases such as this?''
  Jiang Zemin's perplexity speaks volumes. Until the Chinese leadership 
understands why Americans and most of the rest of the world make such 
``a big deal'' over denial of the rule of law, it will be hard to reach 
a reconciliation of our mutual aspirations. For example, the Chinese 
government's continued detention of two American citizens and two U.S. 
permanent residents--Gao Zhan, Wu Jianmin, Li Shaomin, and Tan 
Guangguang--is unacceptable, and should be much more the focus of 
official U.S. government attention. One of these individuals, Li 
Shaomin was convicted of espionage on July 14 and is expected to be 
deported from China. With regard to the others, China has failed to 
present evidence of wrongdoing or illegal activity, or indicate when 
their cases might begin to move forward.
  President Bush addressed China's detention of Americans in a phone 
conversation with Chinese President Jiang Zemin on July 6, making clear 
that they should be ``treated fairly and returned promptly.'' These 
words need to be reinforced with actions. While the State Department 
issued a travel advisory in March to American citizens and permanent 
residents of Chinese descent

[[Page S7717]]

traveling to China who have connections to Taiwan or have openly 
criticized the Chinese government, we can also deny visas to Chinese 
officials, seek international sanctions, and continue to link an 
improvement in human rights to other policies, as we did with the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
  As I mentioned earlier, I am concerned that our government's 
neutrality on Beijing's ultimately successful bid to host the 2008 
Olympic Games may send a signal of U.S. tolerance of China's 
inappropriate behavior. With the Secretary of State visiting China to 
help prepare for the President's trip this fall, there is an 
opportunity to reinforce our opposition to the repressive behavior of 
China's leaders. While some hope otherwise, it seems unlikely that the 
International Olympic Committee's choice of Beijing will bring about 
positive change in the communist regime. In fact, I fear that the 
decision could serve to strengthen the standing of China's communist 
leaders in the world, as the 1936 Games glorified and emboldened Nazi 
Germany.
  The only hope for a positive result of China hosting the games is a 
concerted effort by our government, Europeans (and others) and human 
rights groups using the occasion to push China's leaders. The multitude 
of media covering the games can also help.
  During the 1980's President Reagan was a champion for human rights, 
standing up for freedom, democracy, and civil society. He passionately 
spoke of American values and universally-recognized rights, and more 
importantly, backed his words with action. In his 1982 ``Evil Empire'' 
speech before the British House of Commons, President Reagan stated:

       While we must be cautious about forcing the pace of change, 
     we must not hesitate to declare our ultimate objectives and 
     to take concrete actions to move toward them. We must be 
     staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole 
     prerogative of a lucky few but the inalienable and universal 
     right of all human beings.

  This is the course we must chart in the coming years. China must 
understand that a friendly, productive relationship with the United 
States can only be based upon mutually shared values. Beijing's human 
rights abuses are anathema to the American people, and relations cannot 
reach their full potential as long as the communist government 
continues to violate the most fundamental rights of worship, peaceful 
assembly, and open discourse. A failure to reconcile this most basic 
attitude will result in continued strained relations.
  The final area of concern is that, in addition to its violation of 
other international norms, China has a history of failing to play by 
accepted economic rules, placing an extensive set of requirements on 
companies that wish to do business in China and imposing an array of 
trade barriers on imports that compete directly with products made by 
domestic Chinese firms. Such barriers make it difficult for U.S. 
companies to penetrate China's market. The result is a surging U.S. 
trade deficit between us, reaching $85 billion in 2000.
  On June 1, President Bush submitted to Congress a determination 
extending normal trade relations status to China for another year, 
allowing that country's WTO (World Trade Organization) negotiations to 
continue. Not until these negotiations are completed and China has 
acceded to the WTO will the permanent normal trade status approved by 
the 106th Congress take effect.
  In June, China took a significant step toward WTO accession by 
completing its bilateral WTO agreement with the United States. That 
country must now complete bilateral negotiations with Mexico and 
resolve several outstanding issues related to its multilateral 
agreement before its accession package proceeds to the WTO's Working 
Party, and then to the WTO's General Council, for approval.
  As a member of the WTO, China will be required to play by the same 
rules as all other members. China's membership in this organization has 
the potential to improve our trading relationship, benefitting many 
American businesses and consumers, as long as China holds to its 
agreements.
  Finally, we expect that China's accession to the WTO will be 
immediately followed by Taiwan's accession to this organization. Last 
September, I received a letter from President Clinton that responded to 
a letter I sent him in July 2000 (along with 30 other Senators), that 
sought assurances that his Administration remained committed to 
Taiwan's entry to the WTO under terms acceptable to Taiwan. In the 
letter the former President stated that, ``My administration remains 
firmly committed to the goal of WTO General Council approval of the 
accession packages for China and Taiwan at the same session.'' The 
letter went on to say that ``China has made clear on many occasions, 
and at high levels, that it will not oppose Taiwan's accession to the 
WTO.'' However, the President acknowledged that, ``China did submit 
proposed language to their working party stating that Taiwan is a 
separate customs territory of China,'' but went on to say that it had 
``advised the Chinese that such language is inappropriate and 
irrelevant to the work of the working party and that we will not accept 
it.''

  Further, in a September 2000 letter to Senators Lott and Daschle, 
President Clinton stated:

       . . . I am confident we have a common understanding that 
     both China and Taiwan will be invited to accede to the WTO 
     under the language agreed to in 1992, namely as the Separate 
     Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu 
     (referred to as ``Chinese Taipei"). The United States will 
     not accept any other outcome.

  We must continue to make clear to China that it would be unacceptable 
to the United States for China to fail to live up to its commitments 
not to block Taiwan's entry to the WTO as a separate customs territory, 
Chinese Taipei, not a customs territory of China.
  Mr. President, let me briefly recap the concerns I have raised today 
regarding China's proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of 
mass destruction, its threats and military buildup opposite Taiwan and 
the United States, it human rights abuses, and its history of failing 
to play by accepted economic rules.
  I believe our policy toward China should be one of strength and 
firmness, with friendly intentions, but never compromising U.S. 
principles. In the long-term, our goal must be to live in peace and 
prosperity with the Chinese people; however, to do so requires that 
China's leaders begin to alter their behavior. As Robert Kagan and 
William Kristol wrote on April 16 in the Weekly Standard, with regard 
to China's handling of the collision of our reconnaissance plane and 
China's fighter jet, ``China hands both inside and outside the 
government will argue that this crisis needs to be put behind us so 
that the U.S.-China relationship can return to normal. It is past time 
for everyone to wake up to the fact that the Chinese behavior we have 
seen is normal.'' To conduct business as usual with a communist regime 
that mistreats its people and threatens the security of Americans and 
our allies would be a dereliction of our duty as a world leader. We 
have no higher obligation than the protection of Americans, and the 
support of our friends and allies, including Taiwan, which stands to 
lose the freedoms it has worked so hard to sustain in face of 
resistance from China's communist regime.
  During his ``Sinews of Peace'' address in 1946, Winston Churchill 
stated,

       Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing 
     our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to 
     see what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of 
     appeasement.

  As it has so often been said, those who ignore history are condemned 
to repeat it. In the face of obvious belligerency and determination to 
impose a different set of rules by China's leadership, the United 
States must not repeat the mistakes of the past. We cannot stand idle 
or look away in the face of the Chinese behavior and rhetoric I have 
discussed.
  There is no doubt that China will play a larger role on the world 
stage in the coming years. Our goal must be to ensure that China's 
leaders do not assume that this heightened stature grants them the 
right to attack Taiwan or be a force for belligerency and instability 
in the world.
  Dealing with China will be a challenge, but America does not fear 
challenge. Our greatest hope for change remains, as it has always been, 
to stand firmly as a force for peace and progress, and to champion no 
less for

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the people of other countries what we guarantee for our own citizens. I 
am confident that, if we make clear our friendly intentions to China 
and follow through with actions that reinforce our words, Beijing will, 
in time, respond positively, Taiwan will continue to flourish, and 
China can be welcomed as a peaceful and productive member to the 
community of nations.
  I express the hope that by holding those games in Beijing, the media, 
human rights organizations, and others will work to hold the Chinese 
leadership accountable for what goes on in that nation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. WYDEN. Madam President, before he leaves the floor, I want to 
express my thanks to the Senator from Arizona. Because of his 
thoughtfulness, I am able to speak now. I want him to know I very much 
appreciate that.

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