[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 91 (Wednesday, June 27, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7000-S7002]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Ms. LANDRIEU:
  S. 1117. A bill to establish the policy of the United States for 
reducing the number of nuclear warheads in the United States and 
Russian arsenals, for reducing the number of nuclear weapons of those 
two nations that are on high alert, and for expanding and accelerating 
programs to prevent diversion and proliferation of Russian nuclear 
weapons, fissile materials, and nuclear expertise; to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.
  Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, when Winston Churchill addressed the 
student body at Westminister College in 1946, he declared to the United 
States that ``with primacy of power is also joined an awe-inspiring 
accountability to the future . . . you must not only feel the sense of 
duty done, but also the anxiety lest you fall below that level of 
achievement.'' Over the course of the cold war, we did not fail in our 
duty, nor should we in the new century.
  In the same speech he laid before the whole world the rhetoric that 
would define the cold war. In describing the Sphere of Soviet dominance 
in Eastern Europe, Mr. Churchill described an Iron Curtain which the 
ancient capitals of Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest were

[[Page S7002]]

held. With the fall of communism in the early part of the last decade, 
the United States has had to re-shape its review of Eastern Europe. No 
longer do we view the countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, or 
Hungary as isolated adversaries, but as partners in the very alliance 
that carried us through the cold war. In the same way that we have 
looked to reforming our relationship with the countries of the old 
Warsaw Pact we must find new ways to view Russia. It is difficult to 
fathom that in the 21st century we view Russia as a declared ally on 
the world stage while maintaining a nuclear posture at home which 
treats her as an enemy. It is time that we transform our nuclear 
doctrine from one that reflects the thinking of the cold war to one 
that fits in the context of the 21st century and addresses what is 
perhaps the greatest threat to our security.
  When President Bush met with Mr. Putin a few weeks ago, he expressed 
that the United States and Russia can find a ``common position'' on a 
``new strategic framework''. President Bush declared that the two 
countries are friends and that it is time for the U.S. and Russia to 
act that way. In context of this historic meeting, it is time that we 
``work together to address the world as it is, not as it used to be, it 
is important that we not only talk differently, we must also act 
differently.''
  I rise today to introduce legislation that would direct the President 
to seek in his own words: `` . . . a broad strategy of active non-
proliferation . . . to deny weapons of terror from those seeking to 
acquire them . . . and to work with allies and friends who wish to join 
us to defend against the harm they, WMD can inflict''
  The Nuclear threat Reduction Act of 2001, NTRA, would make it the 
policy of the United States to reduce the number of nuclear warheads 
and delivery systems held by the U.S. and Russia through bilateral 
agreements. These reductions should fall to the lowest possible number 
consistent with national security. It would enable the President to 
reduce our nuclear stockpile while negotiating such reductions with the 
Russians that are transparent, predictable and verifiable. To do such a 
thing would be a mark of principled leadership. It would acknowledge 
that it is no longer necessary to maintain large stockpiles of nuclear 
arms by the United States and Russia and that to continue to do so 
would be unacceptable.
  On May 23,2000 President Bush stated ``The premises of cold war 
targeting should no longer dictate the size of our arsenal.'' I could 
not agree with the President more. The current level of nuclear weapons 
maintained by the United States comes at a great cost to ourselves 
financially and poses a significant threat to our security. The level 
of nuclear protection that we maintain forces the Russians to keep a 
similarly robust force which they cannot afford. The crumbling 
infrastructure of the Russian Military continually raises the risk of 
accidental launch or greater proliferation. Indeed, the legislation 
being considered today would ensure that once parts of the Russian 
arsenal are dismantled, they will be kept safe, they will be accounted 
for, and they will eventually be destroyed.
  The savings from reducing our nuclear arsenal are substantial. A 
recent CBO report estimated that $1.67 billion could be saved by 
retiring 50 MX Peacekeeper missiles by 2003. We could use this money to 
address shortfalls in our conventional capabilities. Additionally, we 
can devote more funds to meeting the asymmetrical threats that will 
face us in the future. To invest in deterrents to cyberwarfare and to 
augment spending on homeland defense would be the best way to transform 
our thinking and spending from the Cold War to the twenty-first 
century.
  In addition to this, the Nuclear Threat Reduction Act would encourage 
the U.S. and Russia to take their systems off of high-alert status. In 
the context of the cold war, such a strategy was necessary to ensure 
our security, but it no longer applies to present conditions.
  The Nuclear Threat Reduction Act would also embolden existing 
Department of State, Energy, and Defense programs that seek to contain 
existing nuclear weapons material and expertise in Russia. The economic 
situation in Russia makes it more and more likely that a rouge state 
will acquire the means to manufacture nuclear weapons. This could come 
through the distribution of nuclear material or the exodus of Russian 
scientists. Our former colleague Sen Nunn put it best when he said ``We 
dare not risk a world where a Russian scientist can take care of his 
children by endangering ours.'' The cost to the United States is 
minuscule compared to the threat of nuclear proliferation. Work on this 
serious issue has already been addressed by the Nunn-Lugar bill, but it 
is time that we further our efforts.
  In January of this year, a task force headed by Howard Baker and 
Lloyd Cutler issued a report calling the proliferation of the Russian 
nuclear stockpile ``The most serious threat to national security we 
face today''. The Baker-Cutler Task Force strongly endorsed existing 
non-proliferation programs and suggested that their goals could be 
achieved in 8-10 years if they are fully funded. Increased support for 
these programs will certainly bring them more in line with the 
immediacy and scope of the dangers that they address.
  The NTRA requires the President to formulate and submit to Congress a 
strategic plan to secure and neutralize Russia's nuclear weapons and 
weapons-usable materials over the next eight years. The plan would have 
to include the administrative and organizational reforms necessary to 
provide effective coordination of these programs and to reflect the 
priority that the President attaches to them. The President himself has 
advocated such a strategy and I call on him to implement it.
  Finally, the NTRA requires the President to submit a report to 
Congress on the feasibility of establishing a ``debt for security'' 
program with Russia. Under this concept, a portion of Russia's debts to 
various major powers would be forgiven in exchange for a Russian 
commitment to devoting those funds to non-proliferation activities. If 
successful, such a program could significantly help Russia's secure, 
account for, and neutralize its weapons materials.
  In closing, The Nuclear Reduction Act of 2001 would help us fulfill 
the duty that comes with being the world's last remaining super power. 
By preventing the spread of nuclear materials and technology, reducing 
the nuclear stockpiles of the United States and Russia, and by taking 
our missiles off of high-alert status, we can fulfill that duty. I ask 
the other Members of the Senate to join me in support of this measure.

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