[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 90 (Tuesday, June 26, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6885-S6886]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
COLORADO REPUBLICAN CASE
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, on April 2 of this year, the Senate
voted overwhelmingly to pass the McCain-Feingold bill and ban soft
money. Even before the roll was called on final passage and 59 Senators
voted ``aye,'' the Senate's foremost opponent of reform declared that
he relished the opportunity to bring a constitutional challenge to the
bill. ``You're looking at the plaintiff,'' the Senator from Kentucky
announced.
Opponents of reform have consistently expressed confidence that the
courts will strike down our efforts to clean up the campaign finance
system. They regularly opine that the McCain-Feingold bill is
unconstitutional, and, despite clear signs to the contrary in the
Court's opinion last term in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
express great certainty that the Supreme Court will never allow our
bill to take effect.
Well, in its decision yesterday morning in FEC v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee, the Court again dumped cold water on that
certainty. The court held that the coordinated party spending limits
now in the law--the so-called ``441a(d) limits''--are constitutional.
It ruled that the coordinated spending limits are justified as a way to
prevent circumvention of the $1,000 per election limits on
contributions to candidates that the Court upheld in the landmark
Buckley v. Valeo decision in 1976. In my view, the decision makes it
even more clear that the soft money ban in the McCain-Feingold bill
will withstand a constitutional challenge.
The first thing to note about the Court's ruling is that it reaffirms
the distinction the Court has drawn between contributions and
expenditures and the greater latitude that the Court has given Congress
in the case of restraints on contributions. The Court noted that the
law treats expenditures that are coordinated with candidates as
contributions, and the Court has upheld contribution limits in previous
cases with that understanding. It agreed with the FEC that spending by
a party coordinated with a candidate is functionally equivalent to a
contribution to the candidate, and that the right to make unlimited
coordinated expenditures would open the door for donors to use
contributions to the party to avoid the limits that apply to
contributions to candidates.
The Court rejected the Colorado Republican Party's argument that
party spending is due special constitutional protection. Instead, the
Court found that the parties are in the same position as other
political actors who are subject to contribution limits. Those actors
cannot coordinate their spending with candidates. The Court noted that
under current law and the Court's previous decision in the first
Colorado case, the parties are better off than other political actors
in that they can make independent expenditures and also make
significant, but limited, coordinated expenditures. The limits on
coordinated expenditures have not prevented the parties from organizing
to elect candidates and generating large sums of money to efficiently
get out their message, the Court noted.
After determining that limits on party coordinated spending should be
analyzed under the same standard as contribution limits on other
political actors, the Court had little trouble in deciding that there
was ample justification for those limits based on the need to avoid
circumvention of the contribution limits in the federal election laws.
It pointed to substantial evidence of circumvention already in the
current system, and the near certainty that removing the 441a(d) limits
would lead to additional circumvention. The Court held:
[T]here is good reason to expect that a party's right of
unlimited coordinated spending would attract increased
contributions to parties to finance exactly that kind of
spending. Coordinated expenditures of money donated to a
party are tailor-made to undermine contribution limits.
Therefore, the choice here is not, as in Buckley and Colorado
I, between a limit on pure contributions and pure
expenditures. The choice is between limiting contributions
and limiting expenditures whose special value as expenditures
is also the source of their power to corrupt. Congress is
entitled to its choice.
So, Mr. President, I am pleased that the Court upheld Congress's
right to limit the coordinated spending of the parties. But even more
than that, I am pleased at the way that the Court looked at the
constitutional issues in the case and the arguments of the parties. The
Court's analysis demonstrates an understanding of the real world of
money and politics that gives me great confidence that it will uphold
the soft money ban in the McCain-Feingold bill against an inevitable
constitutional challenge.
As my partner and colleague, Senator McCain, pointed out to me prior
to my taking the floor, of course this decision was about hard money;
but if you really read it, it isn't so much about hard money or soft
money, it is just about money and the corrupting influence it has on
our political process.
For example, the Court noted that ``the money the parties spend comes
from contributors with their own interests.'' And the Court recognized
that those contributors give money to parties in an attempt to
influence the actions of candidates. The Court said:
Parties are thus necessarily the instruments of some
contributors whose object is not to support the party's
message to elect party candidates across the board, but
rather to support a specific candidate for the sake of a
position on one, narrow issue, or even to support any
candidate who will be obliged to the contributors.
This is precisely the point that we who have fought so hard to ban
soft money have been making for years. These contributions are designed
to influence the federal officeholders who raise them for the parties,
and ultimately, to influence legislation or executive policy. The Court
shows that it understands this use of contributions to political
parties when it states:
Parties thus perform functions more complex than simply
electing candidates; whether they like it or not, they act as
agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to produce
obligated officeholders.
The Court also recognized that the party fundraising, even of limited
hard money, provides opportunities for large donors to get special
access to lawmakers. The Court states:
[[Page S6886]]
Even under present law substantial donations turn the
parties into matchmakers whose special meetings and
receptions give the donors the chance to get their points
across to the candidates.
In a footnote, the Court notes evidence in the record of the
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee establishing exclusive clubs
for the most generous donors.
These special clubs and receptions are even more prevalent in the
world of soft money fundraising. Both parties sell access to their
elected officials for high dollar soft money contributions. This week a
Republican fundraiser featuring the President and the Vice President is
expected to raise over $20 million.
The corrupting influence of soft money, or at least the appearance of
corruption created by the extraordinary sums raised by party leaders
and federal officeholders and candidates, is an argument for the
constitutionality of a ban on soft money that those who support the
McCain-Feingold bill would have made even if the Colorado II case had
come out the other way. But the Court's decision itself is solid
support for another independent reason that the soft money ban is
constitutional.
Corporations and unions are prohibited from contributing money in
connection with federal elections. And individuals are subject to
strict limits on their contributions to candidates and parties. The
soft money loophole allows those limits to be evaded. This is not just
a theoretical possibility, as in the Colorado case. There is a massive
avoidance of the federal election laws going on today, as there has
been for over a decade. The evidence of this is overwhelming. Soft
money is being raised by candidates for the parties, and it is being
spent in a whole variety of ways to influence federal elections. In
recent years, the parties have used soft money to run ads that are
virtually indistinguishable from campaign ads run by the candidates.
That is what is going on in the real world.
A soft money ban will end the circumvention of these crucial limits
in the law, limits that date back to 1907 in the case of corporations,
1947 in the case of unions, and 1974 in the case of individuals. The
Supreme Court's decision yesterday tells us that Congress can
constitutionally act to end that evasion.
The remaining question, of course, is whether we will do it. Our vote
in this body on April 2 was the first step. When the House returns from
the July 4th recess it will take up campaign finance reform, and I am
hopeful that it will act decisively to pass a bill that is largely
similar to the McCain-Feingold bill. Then it will be up to the Senate
to act quickly and send the bill to President Bush for his signature.
We are getting close, Mr. President, to finally cleaning up the corrupt
soft money decision. The Supreme Court's decision yesterday, unexpected
as it was to many in the Senate and in the legal community, is a major
boost for our efforts. The Court has spoken. Now Congress must act.
I yield the remainder of the time under my control to the Senator
from New York.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
Mrs. CLINTON. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I add my thanks and
gratitude to my good friend from Wisconsin. He has been a leader on
this whole issue of campaign finance reform for so many years. He
started as a young boy, and it has taken most of his life. I think
progress is being made from a most unlikely source. I applaud the
continued perseverance and commitment of the Senator.
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