[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 85 (Tuesday, June 19, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Page S6445]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             THE GROWING ALLIANCE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA

 Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, Dr. Constantine Menges has a 
distinguished career in the field of national security. He has written 
a timely piece on the growing alliance between Russia and China. I hope 
my colleagues will read this article and heed his expert advice. I ask 
that the article be printed in the Record.
  The article follows:

               [From the Washington Times, June 14, 2001]

              China-Russia: Preventing a Military Alliance

                        (By Constantine Menges)

       An important item on the agenda of President Bush as he 
     meets President Putin of Russia should be the new 30-year 
     treaty of cooperation which the leaders of Russia and China 
     are scheduled to sign in July 2001.
       This treaty will formalize the ever-increasing Chinese-
     Russian strategic coordination of recent years, which is 
     intended to counter the United States around the globe.
       Why would the leadership of China and Russia believe they 
     need to join for this purpose? At their summit meeting in 
     July 2000, Mr. Putin endorsed China's view as expressed in 
     their joint statement that the U.S. ``is seeking unilateral 
     military and security advantages'' in the world. Mr. Putin 
     also criticized the ``economic and power domination of the 
     United States'' and agreed with China on the need to 
     establish a still undefined ``new political and economic 
     order.''
       The new China-Russia treaty will not only mean a 
     significantly increased political-strategic challenge to the 
     U.S., it will also pose additional military risks. These are 
     illustrated by Russia's sale of advanced weapons systems to 
     China which it is aiming at U.S. forces and by the February 
     2001 Russian military exercises that included mock nuclear 
     attacks against U.S. military units viewed as opposing a 
     Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
       The relationship between Russia and China went from 
     alliance in the 1950s to deep hostility from 1960 to 1985 
     followed by gradual normalization during the Gorbachev years. 
     After 1991, Boris Yeltsin continued negotiations to demarcate 
     the disputed border but kept a political distance because 
     China remained communist and had publicly welcomed the 1991 
     coup attempt by Soviet communist hard-liners and also opposed 
     Mr. Yeltsin's democratic aspirations.
       Mr. Yeltsin and the first President Bush had three summit 
     meetings in 1992 and 1993, and Russia declared its intention 
     to move toward a ``strategic partnership and in the future, 
     toward alliance'' with the U.S. The mutually positive and 
     hopeful initial relationship with the new, post-Soviet 
     Russia, also included a signed agreement on reductions in 
     offensive nuclear weapons and a joint decision on modifying 
     ``existing agreements'' (including the ABM treaty) to permit 
     global missile defense which both Presidents Yeltsin and Bush 
     acknowledged were needed. Unfortunately the Clinton 
     administration did not pursue the opportunity for Russian-
     U.S. agreement on missile defense.
       In April 1996, Mr. Yeltsin decided to agree with China on a 
     ``strategic partnership'' and increased Russian weapons 
     sales. Through a series of regular summit meetings, China 
     moved the ``partnership'' with Russia toward strategic 
     alignment marked by an ever-larger component of shared anti-
     U.S. political objectives (e.g. support for Iraq, opposition 
     to missile defense) along with increased Russian military 
     sales and military cooperation. This was ignored by the 
     previous administration.
       As a result, for the first time in 40 years the U.S. faces 
     coordinated international actions by China and Russia. This 
     could have six principal negative implications starting, 
     first, with the fact that Russia has accepted and repeats 
     most of communist China's views about the U.S., for example 
     that the U.S. seeks to dominate the world.
       Second, the Chinese view of the coming July 2001 treaty 
     emphasizes that, when one of the parties to the treaty 
     ``experiences military aggression,'' the other signatory 
     state should when requested ``provide political, economic, 
     and military support and launch joint attacks against the 
     invading forces.''
       As the American public has learned from the April 2001 
     reconnaissance aircraft event, China defines not only Taiwan 
     but also most of the international South China Sea and all 
     its islands as its sovereign territory. If the United States 
     should threaten or take any type of counteraction (political, 
     economic or military) against China to uphold the rights of 
     US aircraft or ships in that international air and sea space 
     or to help allies or other countries defend themselves 
     against coercion by China, which has territorial disputes 
     with 11 neighboring countries including Japan and India, 
     China could define this as ``blackmail'' and a violation of 
     its ``sovereignty''. It would then hope to draw Russia in 
     militarily, if only as a potential counter-threat as 
     suggested by the February 2001 Russian military exercise.
       A third negative consequence is ever-increasing Russian 
     military sales and other support for the buildup of Chinese 
     advanced weapons systems specifically targeted at U.S. air, 
     sea and electronic military capabilities and vulnerabilities 
     in the Pacific. For example the Russian anti-ship missiles 
     that accompany the two Russian destroyers already delivered 
     (and the four more to come) skim the ocean at twice the speed 
     of sound, can carry nuclear warheads and were designed to 
     sink U.S. aircraft carriers. In the 1990s, Russia sold China 
     about $9 billion to $20 billion in advanced weapons systems 
     aimed at U.S. forces (jet fighters, submarines, destroyers, 
     anti-air/missile systems) with another $20 billion to $40 
     billion in weapons and high-technology sales planned through 
     2004. The income from these sales also helps Russia further 
     modernize its strategic nuclear forces that currently have 
     4,000 warheads on about 1,000 ICBMs.
       A fourth negative result is that Russia and China are 
     working together and in parallel to oppose any U.S. decision 
     to deploy national or Asian regional missile defenses; they 
     are seeking to persuade U.S. allies to oppose this and refuse 
     cooperation. At the same time Russia has sold China one of 
     its most advanced weapons (S-300), originally designed to 
     shoot down the Pershing medium range missile as well as 
     aircraft and cruise missiles, along with a similar medium-
     range system (Tor-M1) in such quantity that China is now in 
     effect already deploying its own missile/air defense system 
     on the coast.
       Fifth, Russia and China have been providing weapons of mass 
     destruction components, technology and expertise to a number 
     of dictatorships such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya 
     which are hostile to the United States and its allies. Russia 
     and China have also established military supply links with 
     Cuba and the pro-Castro Chavez regime in Venezuela. The risk 
     of conflict increases as all these dangerous regimes become 
     militarily stronger and also believe they are backed by both 
     China and Russia.
       The sixth negative result is that the ever-closer 
     relationship with China strengthens the authoritarian 
     tendencies with Russia, thereby increasing the risk it will 
     become more aggressive internationally. While the Chinese 
     government develops relations with the Putin government and 
     military, the Chinese Communist Party has revived direct 
     relations with the Communist Party in Russia.
       At their June 16, 2001, meeting in Slovenia, it is urgent 
     that President Bush seek to persuade President Putin that 
     Russia should assure the U.S. and the world that there is no 
     open or secret military component to the July 2001 China-
     Russia treaty. Mr. Bush should remind Mr. Putin that the U.S. 
     has no territorial or other claims of any kind on Russia. In 
     contrast, communist China has on numerous occasions during 
     the 1950s and through 1992 formally demanded that Russia 
     ``return'' virtually all of the Russian Far East that China 
     alleges was stolen by an ``illegal'' 1860 treaty. Russia is 
     arming a potentially very dangerous country, perhaps making 
     the same mistake Josef Stalin did in selling weapons to arm 
     Germany which then attacked the Soviet Union in 1941.
       Unless Russia excludes such a military component in the new 
     treaty, Mr. Bush should indicate that the U.S. will view this 
     as a China-Russia military alliance and a potentially grave 
     threat to be met by the significant reductions in U.S. 
     economic support for Russia directly, through debt 
     restructuring, international institutions and trade access. 
     Further the U.S. would see the need to immediately accelerate 
     movement toward missile defense.
       The U.S. and its allies need to give the China-Russia 
     strategic alignment effective attention. With skill and 
     foresight it is still possible to turn back the momentum by 
     hard-liners in both Russia and China toward more 
     confrontation while adopting realistic U.S. policies that 
     maintain deterrence and peaceful relations.




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