[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 81 (Tuesday, June 12, 2001)]
[House]
[Page H3006]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ON NORTH KOREA
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of
January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) is
recognized during morning hour debates for 5 minutes.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, there was a range of interesting reactions
to the Bush administration's statements last week that they were
willing to resume talks with the government of North Korea, the DPRK,
some suggesting this was a reversal of policy, perhaps a return to the
North Korean foreign policy of the Clinton administration. Rather, the
last 4- to 5-month period should be recognized as an appropriate pause
in our intensive contacts with North Korea to reexamine the goals,
tactics, achievements, and failures of American policy toward North
Korea.
During the last few years, there have been substantial and growing
congressional concerns, especially among Republicans, over the Clinton
administration's North Korea policy. North Korea is arguably the most
dangerous and erratic nation in Asia, perhaps the world, with a ruling
clique that is intent on surviving even at any cost to its people.
Indeed, their policies have killed huge numbers of their people through
starvation. I believe it remains the place where there is the greatest
chance of U.S. troops becoming militarily engaged in a terrible
conflict. The DPRK continues to forward-deploy a 1.2 million-man army.
While finally agreeing to an indefinitely defined moratorium on
missile flight tests, North Korea continues to develop and produce
ballistic missiles, some of which are now capable of reaching the
United States. In addition, there are certain indications that the DPRK
may be maintaining a covert nuclear program.
Economically and socially, the ``Hermit Kingdom'' has come to the
crossroads and must decide whether it continues on its path towards
oblivion or whether it wants to dramatically reform its conduct and
join the community of responsible nations. Logically, the United States
should be in a position to significantly influence the DPRK's behavior.
Instead, however, we find ourselves in a position where over the last
few years North Korea has consistently been rewarded for outrageous
behavior or for threatening such conduct.
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North Korean behavior resembles that of the 18th century Barbary
pirates, demanding ever-increasing levels of tribute from America, and
some of its neighbors, in return for marginally tolerable behavior.
Overall, the preceding administration seemed too willing to tolerate
North Korean misbehavior and demands for tribute. The United States has
provided heavy fuel oil and humanitarian food aid in increasing
quantities. Quietly, escaping the notice of the American people, North
Korea became the largest recipient of foreign aid in Asia, although
humanitarian aid was given through indirect means. Despite that level
of assistance, we are prevented now from adequately monitoring the
distribution of that assistance, even though there is a very high
probability of aid diversions to the North Korean military.
Mr. Speaker, as the Bush administration stands poised and ready to
reengage North Korea in discussions, if there is any sign such talks
would be productive, it needs to be mindful of the need to let the
North Koreans know in no uncertain terms that the cycle of extortion
for their good behavior is over. Pay tribute or extortion is an
outrageous violation of the American heritage, and we will not continue
it. We will not pay, directly or indirectly, for what the North Koreans
should do to improve their own plight: live on the Korean Peninsula
peacefully with their neighbors to the south; end its tactics of
terrorism, weapons proliferation, and blackmail; sign a peace treaty to
finally end the Korean War; and give evidence that it wants to build a
positive relationship with the United States and the international
community.
Finally, Bush administration contacts with North Korea should be much
more careful than the Clinton administration to closely involve the
South Koreans, the Republic of Korea, in those talks directly or as
closely as possible. We must not succumb to the old North Korean
strategy to drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea or
to denigrate the legitimacy of the government of South Korea.
Mr. Speaker, that is my advice, gratuitous though it is, to the Bush
administration. We need to change our policy.
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