[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 63 (Wednesday, May 9, 2001)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4586-S4587]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




         THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AT NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to offer a few observations 
regarding the President's speech at the National Defense University 
regarding missile defense and the future security of our nation. The 
President was quite correct in describing today's world as one that is 
far different from the days of the Cold War some thirty years ago. 
However, his prescription for how best to ensure our national security 
and achieve a more peaceful world is seriously flawed. The President 
has assigned the nation's highest military priority to building a 
robust missile defense that will cost tens of billions of dollars 
during the coming decade with no assurance that the system of 
interceptors will work. The primary objective of such a system, in his 
view, is to counteract intercontinental missiles carrying weapons of 
mass destruction from targeting our nation. I would urge the President 
to take a step back; a more effective and higher priority approach 
would be to cut off weapons of mass destruction at their source, before 
they are in the hands of our potential enemies. The greatest potential 
source of those weapons, materials, and technological expertise resides 
in Russia, and therein lies the fundamental key to our national and 
global security.
  The President's view of Russia misunderstands this important point. 
While it is true that, in the President's words, Russia is no longer a 
communist country and that its president is an elected official, it 
does not follow that we needn't worry about the security threat which 
it can pose to the United States and our allies. Indeed, there are very 
disturbing stories in the press about the internal dynamics of the 
Russian government and its fragile democratic ways. Its economy remains 
in dire straits, unemployment is high, and the future, particularly for 
those who live outside of Moscow, continues to look grim. I'm certain 
that many of us were alarmed at the recent mutual recriminations and 
dismissals of dozens of Americans and Russians in an exchange that 
hearkened back to Cold War days.
  In Russia's weakened state, I believe it poses an even greater threat 
to the United States than the ``nations of concern'' that we hear about 
so often. Why is that? Aside from the United States, Russia is the most 
advanced nation in the world to possess advanced missile technologies 
and weapons of mass destruction. Its scientific expertise is second 
only to our own. Weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons, number in the tens of thousands, and 
materials that go into making those weapons are widely distributed, and 
poorly guarded, around Russia. If countries of concern pose a serious 
threat to the United States, it is likely that the tools underlying 
those threats have been or could most easily be gained from the most 
likely source, a cash-strapped, antagonistic Russia.
  Senior advisors to the Secretary of Energy, including former Senators 
Howard Baker and Sam Nunn, recently released a report that stated, 
``The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States 
today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable 
material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile 
nation states . . . .'' Having reviewed the scope of the WMD threat in 
Russia, the Secretary of Energy's Advisory Board recommended that the 
United States spend $30 billion over the next decade to secure those 
weapons and materials, and to prevent Russia's technological expertise 
from finding paychecks in the wrong places. Despite that 
recommendation, the President has submitted a budget request to the 
Congress that cuts funding for those programs by $100 million below 
what was appropriated a year ago. In fact, this year's funding request 
is over $500 million below what was planned for FY 2002 just twelve 
months ago. I question why the President would choose to cut funding 
for programs that constitute the nation's ``most urgent unmet threat.'' 
In light of the imposing costs of a robust missile defense system, it 
appears that the Administration has determined that such 
nonproliferation programs are of secondary importance.

  Listening to the President's speech, I'm concerned that his vision of 
missile defense has all the characteristics of the boy sticking his 
finger in the dike. What's really needed is a new and stronger dike. I 
believe we must redouble our efforts to support critical 
nonproliferation programs with Russia as the first line of our own 
defense and national security interest. Investing tens of billions of 
dollars in a missile defense program as an alternative approach 
virtually insures the acceleration of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction if the nation reduces funding for nonproliferation programs 
as a result. The President and his advisors are missing the forest for 
the trees.
  Let me add one additional thought. Countries of concern that may be 
genuinely interested in using weapons of mass destruction against us or 
our allies are likely to choose methods that are affordable, effective, 
and unanticipated. An intercontinental ballistic missile could be one 
way to achieve their goal, but there are other, less expensive and more 
probable ways. Potential enemies seeking to disrupt and destroy the 
U.S. and our friends, for example, could achieve their aims through 
weapons delivered in suitcases, small boats, or delivery vans. If the 
United States devotes its attention, resources, and expertise to solve 
the potential intercontinental missile threat without addressing the 
possibility of low tech applications of weapons of mass destruction, we 
will have made a very grave error. I urge my colleagues, Mr. President, 
not to be lulled into a false sense of security regarding plans for a 
robust missile defense of our nation. As with the case of the dike, 
deployment of a missile defense system

[[Page S4587]]

may simply redirect the flow of the threat.
  That assumes, that we actually have a missile defense system that 
works. We are a long, long way from that capability, a fact that I hope 
that we in the Senate and the American people fully understand. I am 
pleased that the President did not announce the unilateral abrogation 
of the ABM Treaty in that regard. It would be foolhardy, in my opinion, 
to step back from our legal obligations under that Treaty without 
having the means to defend ourselves--a missile defense system that 
works. Make no mistake, my colleagues, the unilateral abrogation of the 
ABM Treaty will have major negative security consequences for the 
United States and our allies and friends. I urge my colleagues, 
regardless of how they feel about the ABM Treaty, to join me and other 
senators to insist that any missile defense system be successfully 
tested in realistic operational conditions before making any decision 
to deploy it. The American taxpayer being asked to provide tens of 
billions of dollars to support that effort, not to mention the men and 
women in uniform who would operate it, deserve nothing less than a 
system that works.
  I applaud the President's desire for building cooperative 
relationships that should be ``reassuring, rather than threatening . . 
. . premised on openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities for 
cooperation, including the area of missile defense.'' There are many 
important ways to achieve those goals that are currently at risk in the 
worsening climate of U.S.-Russian relations, particularly if the 
President chooses to abrogate the ABM Treaty either in word or in deed. 
Cooperation and reassurance are important byproducts of our 
nonproliferation programs in Russia that have yielded major dividends 
in preventing the loss of weapons and materials of mass destruction to 
those who would be our enemies. Greater emphasis, not less, is needed 
for such programs. In addition, we have made important confidence-
building progress in cooperative approaches regarding early warning of 
missile attacks through the establishment of a data center and research 
being conducted on the Russian American Observation Satellite program. 
I am deeply concerned that such confidence-building programs will be at 
risk should confrontational relations with Russia continue to increase. 
If that occurs, the ultimate loser could be ourselves in a less secure 
world of our own making.

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