[Congressional Record Volume 147, Number 62 (Tuesday, May 8, 2001)]
[House]
[Pages H2004-H2005]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON VTOL TECHNOLOGY WILL EXAMINE FAILED OSPREY
PROJECT AND NEW TECHNOLOGY
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the
gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to discuss an issue that
relates directly to the safety of the men and women whose task it is to
defend our country. It also goes to the heart of the American lead in
the aviation technology upon which we depend so much.
For over a decade, I backed a project that I believed would permit
America to take the lead in the next major step in aviation technology,
that is, Vertical Takeoff and Vertical Landing aircraft. Unfortunately,
it is clear now that the project, the Osprey project, has been a costly
and a dangerous failure.
Of the 11 aircraft built, four have crashed, and three of the crashes
resulted in 30 fatalities. That is 30 dead heroes whom we cannot bring
back. The flight crews that were lost were the most experienced on this
craft and some of the best and the brightest of the Marine Corps.
On page 32 of the most recent copy of the Marine Corps Gazette, there
is an article by a pilot who is also a weapons and tactics instructor
that underscores the skepticism about the viability of the Osprey
program. Then there is the alarming allegations of a cover-up, a cover-
up and records falsification by Marine officers directly involved in
the Osprey's operational testing. Recently, the Defense Department's
Blue Ribbon panel echoed the finding of the Marine Corps' Accident
Mishap Board in recommending extensive redesign of the craft. All of
this calls into question the Osprey's future use by the military and,
of equal significance, its commercial viability. No commercial aviation
company in this country is ever going to get insurance on a craft with
this kind of safety record.
The Blue Ribbon panel mandates that we go back to the drawing board.
That is not a condemnation of vertical landing, vertical takeoff; it is
a condemnation of the Osprey program. Vertical Takeoff and Vertical
Landing technologies are the way to alleviate our overcrowded airports,
to ease our overburdened air traffic control systems, and to ensure our
military's ability to respond when our runways have been destroyed by a
wartime adversary. To pull us into the 21st century, we need a simple
Vertical Takeoff, Vertical Landing aircraft with longer range, higher
speed, and greater payload capacity. Perhaps like a transport version
of the Harrier jet.
Tomorrow, the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, a subcommittee
that I chair, will be holding a hearing on one such aircraft that holds
promise for the future, and it will fly for the first time this summer.
Let me note that my father was a Marine pilot.
Mr. Speaker, these 30 casualties during the testing of the Osprey
program are unconscionable, 30 dead Marines. We do not need any more
dead Marines. The Osprey program is a failure, but the Vertical
Takeoff, Vertical Landing concept is not. We should not abandon that
technology, and we should try to keep America first in aviation
technology by ensuring that new concepts of Vertical Landing, Vertical
Takeoff will be available to the American military and also available
to commercial aviation so that the United States of America will be
able to fly its up-to-date, cutting-edge aircraft throughout the world
and remain the leader in aviation technology, creating jobs for our
people and creating a capability, both militarily and commercially,
that will keep America ahead of the competition and ahead of our
adversaries.
So I would ask my colleagues tomorrow to pay attention to our
hearing, and I would ask the public to pay attention to the hearing of
the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
[[Page H2005]]
that I chair, and we will be examining the Vertical Takeoff and
Vertical Landing concept, and perhaps some of the reasons why the old
program failed and why there is hope that better technology is
available in the future, technology that would protect our military
people and offer great commercial possibilities for our country.
Mr. Speaker, I would submit for the Record the article in the Marine
Corps Gazette entitled, ``MV-22 Osprey or Edsel?''
[Ideas & Issues, MV-22 Osprey]
MV-22 Osprey or Edsel?
(By LtCol Bruce A. Milton, USMCR)
is the osprey `too much' aircraft?
Mishaps have been an aviation bane ever since Orville and
Wilbur made those first epic flights amid the dunes of Kitty
Hawk. The early days of powered flight took an incredible
toll on those intrepid airmen who ventured forth to challenge
gravity. Despite tremendous losses, the potential benefits to
both the civil and military complexes enabled a fledgling
enterprise to evolve into the technologically advanced
industry that we have today. I doubt few events in modern
history can compare with the meteoric accomplishments of the
aviation field. To think that Neil Armstrong walked on the
moon less than 65 years after the Wrights' first powered
flight is simply phenomenal.
Throughout these ever-evolving phases of aviation,
countless steps have been taken to reduce the inherent risks
associated with flying. There isn't adequate space in this
article to pay homage to all the positive changes
incorporated by manufacturers, operators, government
entities, and others to enhance flight safety. Suffice it to
say that the mishap rate--a tangible statistic that measures
how safe we really are--has improved markedly over the years
as a result of these positive changes.
However, just as the automotive industry has had models
that were not successful, the annals of aviation history also
include numerous aircraft that were ``scrapped'' or pulled
from production. Unlike the doomed Edsel, a car that the
driving public simply did not find aesthetically pleasing,
many prematurely canceled aircraft, certainly many military
aircraft, had their operational lives shortened because they
were deemed too dangerous.
With a new aircraft, as with any complicated machine, there
is a learning curve. This wringing out period includes the
time that skilled test pilots put the aircraft through its
paces. They ``push the envelope'' to establish limitations,
procedures, and guidelines for subsequent squadron pilot
usage. During this wringing out, the aircraft also undergoes
operational test and evaluation (OTE). During OTE, more
guidelines and procedures are established as how to best
employ the aircraft in a tactical environment. Once the new
aircraft has successfully completed this rigorous testing,
it is ready for introduction to the fleet.
When speaking of the MV-22, it is with this latter portion
of the learning curve that I am most concerned. I am not now,
nor have I ever been, a test pilot. I have, however, spent
the majority of my aviation career in some type of
instructional capacity. From my days on active duty as a
weapons and tactics instructor to my current duties as a
training captain for a large commercial emergency medical
services operator, I have amassed literally thousands of
hours of flight instruction in both fixed- and rotary-wing
aircraft. This experience has provided me with some insights
into pilot performance and behavior.
Collectively, pilots are merely a cross section of society.
As such, among pilots there exists a widely varying degree of
aeronautical prowess and ability. I have flown with pilots
whose seemingly effortless skill I admired. I have flown with
those who struggled very hard to make the required grade. I
have also flown with pilots whose performance made me wonder
how they had progressed as far as they had. Interestingly
enough, I suppose most of the pilots I have flown with over
the last 19 years can be defined as being average.
In most communities and subcultures of naval aviation,
there is certainly nothing wrong with average. Average can be
equated to someone who is safe, reliable, and aware of his or
her capabilities and limitations. However, in the case of the
Osprey, I am concerned that average may not be good enough.
As recent tragic events illustrate, ``above average'' or even
``outstanding'' may not be sufficient skill levels to
successfully master the MV-22. We have lost the two most
experienced Osprey aircrews, senior test pilots even, in the
first stages of fleet incorporation. What happens when we man
this aircraft with less than stellar experienced aircrews?
I'm not sure the jury is ``in'' on this subject.
In my capacity as an instructor, I have more than a
layman's appreciation for helicopter aerodynamics. I
understand such phenomena as ``settling with power'' and
``vortex ring state.'' I have deliberately induced this
condition at altitude to show pilots how dangerous it can be
if encountered in close proximity to the ground. I opine that
in most helicopters, under most conditions--even
tactically--it is rare to enter the vortex ring state.
Reports I have read about the Marana incident attribute
the mishap to the pilot having entered a vortex ring
state. The speed and rates of descent reported certainly
did not seem to me to be excessive. I have seen conditions
far worse with no hint of loss of control. Is the margin
of error or more correctly, margin of safety, of the
Osprey so narrow as to put the aircrews at a disadvantage?
If the Osprey is as demanding to fly as it might seem, what
happens when we man it with the inevitable average crew,
cloak them in the fog of war, and send them forth in harm's
way? Send them into a hot landing zone on a dark night
wearing night vision goggles? Send relatively inexperienced
crews into tactical situations where it is prudent to
expedite time spent in the vulnerable landing phase? I cannot
help but ponder such questions.
I do not particularly care about the politics involved in
the overwhelming process of aircraft acquisition and
employment. Instead, I worry about the troops tasked to fly
in those aircraft. It is time to take a long, unbiased,
nonpartisan look at the MV-22's future in the Corps. If it
can be proven that cockpit workload and aircrew skill
requirements are reasonable, then let us welcome its
capabilities into our arsenal. If the aircraft needs further
redesign or modification to make it safer, then we should
pursue those changes. If it turns out that there is no
rational or cost-effective solution to the current woes, then
perhaps we should consider tabling MV-22 acquisitions until
such time that it is safe.
We owe this analysis to our Marines. After all, the Edsel
may have been unsightly, but it wouldn't kill you.
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